HC Deb 11 April 1871 vol 205 cc1180-99
CAPTAIN BEAUMONT

rose to move the following Resolution:— That, in the opinion of this House, no scheme of Army reorganization is satisfactory which does not form the reserves for the defence of this country by men passed through the ranks of the Regular Army. It was because he thought it desirable that legislation on the subject should be final that he proposed the Resolution. It might be said that the Government had already accepted the principle involved in the Motion, and he thought that they had, as far as words went; but, upon that matter, the effect given to those words by the provisions of the Government Bill, upon being look into, did not induce him to believe that they were ardent supporters of the principle they advocated—he believed, indeed, he should be able to show that the Government measure, to a certain extent, contradicted itself. He had read the debates that had taken place on the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Berkshire (Colonel Loyd Lindsay), in which two propositions were prominently brought forward. The first proposition established seemed to be that, with the exception of the question of purchase, the House was of opinion that the provisions of the Army Regulation Bill, so far as they went, were good; whilst the second proposition seemed to be that due effect had not been given in that Bill to the great principle of reorganization. The simple course pursued by the Government seemed to be to ask for more money in proportion as more men were required; but there was a strong opinion abroad that an increase in the forces necessary for the defence of this country ought to be got—at all events, so far as the men were concerned—without calling upon the people to pay more money. He himself agreed in this opinion. He voted in favour of a Motion to that effect brought forward by the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella), because he was of opinion that a proper system of re-organization would render it unnecessary to require an increased grant of money. It was, no doubt, the province of that House to deal with principles rather than with matters of detail, because they had not that knowledge of detail which was possessed by occupants of the Treasury Bench. Now, he wished to show that the principle he laid down in his Resolution was a great, and, he maintained, a correct one, and its full adoption would preclude the necessity for asking for more money. As to the principle itself, he would refer to the Prussian Army, for which the men were recruited by conscription and Ballot. Some 30 per cent passed into the Army and the remainder passed into the ersätz Reserve. The men who passed into the Army had three years with the Regular Army; then they were for four years in the Reserve, liable to join the standards in time of war; and then for five years they were in the Landwehr. This liability occupied their time between the ages of 20 and 32, and implied 12 years continuous service with the Army. The argument for this system was, that there was a close connection maintained between the various portions of the Army, and that the men passing regularly from one branch of the service to the other, had the benefit of the schooling to be obtained in the Regular Army. Each man was first taught in the Regular Army, and then passed through the other grades of the service. It would be in the knowledge of the House that the Russians were largely increasing their forces, and the Russian Secretary for War reported in favour of the Reserves being composed of men who had served in the Army, and added that the number of annual recruits must be increased and the period of service altered. The principle which pervaded the Prussian service had therefore been accepted by Russia, and he had no doubt that France would shortly recognize it, though he should not like to pretend that this was the reason why so disastrous a result had attended the French Army in the late campaign, yet when she should obtain a powerful Government he was of opinion that the first thing that they would attend to would be Army reform upon the principle of passing the Reserves through the ranks of the Regular Army. With these remarks he thought he might consider the first part of his text proved. He now came to the second—that the full adoption of this principle would have rendered any increase of the Estimates unnecessary. The present connection between the Militia and the Regular Army certainly deteriorated the Militia by taking away its best men. We had now the Regular Army enlisted for various periods; the Army was sometimes supplying the Militia, and sometimes the Militia was supplying the Army with men. Then we had the Militia generally recruited in the same way as the Army, though under exceptional circumstances there was the Ballot. The only connection between the Regular Army and the Militia was one that would deteriorate the latter by taking away its best men; and the Militia was not under existing circumstances properly drilled. He knew that under existing circumstances it was almost impossible to drill the Militia so as to put them upon a footing with the Landwehr, because they had so short a time for drill. That was not the fault of the Militia, but of the circumstances under which they were organized. As to the Volunteers, he must say that he did not like to look a gift horse in the mouth, especially when the highest praise was due to the men for their patriotism in giving up their time without pay to the service of the State; but he denied that a service which was voluntary and, from the nature of the case, prevented a sufficient strain being put on the machine to insure its efficiency ought not to be relied on by the Government as one of its main defences. He might, in illustration of this, quote a paragraph from a letter which had appeared in the papers from Colonel Shakespear, who commanded the artillery at the late Review at Brighton. He was anxious to obtain a further supply of artillery, and he sent to a captain who was in command of an artillery corps, who refused to come because he was tired; upon which Colonel Shakespear remarked that perhaps the best excuse that could be made was that the officers thought they were on a picnic. Putting the force under the Mutiny Act might, he hoped, have the effect that the Secretary for War anticipated from it, though at the same time he must say that he doubted it. As to artillery, he would simply state that they had sufficient artillery for the Regular Army, but not for the Reserves, and the reason was that the Reserves were organized in a higgledy-piggledy sort of way. The three branches of our military service had not that connection with each other they ought to have. A radical change in their organization was necessary. For the Government to state that, in their opinion, the system of passing recruits through the Army was right and proper, and yet to ask the House to vote £500,000 to increase the Militia and perpetuate a state of things which was in itself bad could not be regarded as a satisfactory scheme for Army re-organization. In the first instance, he held, they should ascertain the amount of force required for the defence of the country, for on that basis the whole question of organi- zation must turn. His view was, if we had 80,000 men of the Regular Army, supplemented by 300,000 of Reserves in proper proportions, combined with a proper amount of artillery and Army stores, the defence of the country would be in a more satisfactory condition than at present. How would he carry that out? By accepting boldly the principle of his Motion, and passing 55,000 at once from the ranks of the Regular Army into the Reserves. He denied that this would in any material degree weaken the defence of the country, because the men thus passed from the ranks of the Regular Army into the Reserves would still be old soldiers, with all their admirable training, at the service of the country. Instead of increasing the Militia he would increase the Regular Army. The Secretary for War might say that they proposed to increase the defence of the country by adding to the Militia; but to this he would say that the men they proposed to add to the Militia should rather be added to the Regular Army. It had been supposed that they could not get 55,000 men to pass into the Reserves; but he believed that this objection had no solid basis; and, indeed, his own opinion was that they would have rather a plethora than a deficiency of men willing to join the Reserves. He now came to the question of obtaining recruits, of whom at present we required 10,000 annually; but, if the Regular Army were reduced to 80,000 men of three years service, we should require 30,000 recruits annually. Under the circumstances he had contemplated, with the recruiting for the Militia stopped, with the inducements to enter the Reserve increased, and with the term of service in the Army shortened to three years, he thought there would be no difficulty in getting 30,000 recruits annually for the Army; but if there was any difficulty it would easily be got over by increasing the attractions of the Reserve rather than those of the Regular Army. The 20,000 men voted by the House at the close of the last Session were recruited in about six months—it must be admitted that the quality of them was not very good—and the reports from officers in command of the Militia were to the effect that there would be no difficulty in obtaining Militia recruits. There were one or two points he would touch upon briefly, lest it should be said they had been forgotten; and one had reference to the ages of recruits. He was well aware that from 17 to 20 was not the right age; a man ought to be 20 at the very least before he was fit to take his place as a soldier in the Regular Army; and confirmation of his view was furnished by the fact mentioned in the pamphlet of Major General Simmons, that, in the case of the Prussian Army, nearly the whole, or 98 per cent of the men returned by the ballot at the age of 20 were absolutely put back by the medical officers as physically unfit to go through the hardships of a campaign. With reference to the Indian Army, his impression was that it ought to be separate from the Home Army, for it was wrong to make Imperial interests subservient to colonial ones; but the principle he advocated had nothing at all to do with the question whether we did or did not separate the Indian from the Home Army, and it would accommodate itself to whatever might be thought in that respect desirable. Assuming that the scheme he proposed to the House was possible and could be carried out, he proceeded to discuss the results that would flow from it. It was necessary to get at some figure which should represent the real values of the Reserve man and of the Regular soldier—because he did not place entire and implicit belief in the figures which had been brought forward by the Treasury Bench, in so far as those figures represented the cost of the men. It was his impression that the £34 which had been said to be the cost of the soldier was too low a figure; and an analysis of the Estimates showed, him that the sum of £50 more nearly represented the cost of the Regular soldier. When the Secretary of State for War asked for 20,000 men, he also asked for £1,000,000, which was at the rate of £50 per man. For the purposes of his argument, the Army Estimates, amounting to £16,000,000, might be divided into three parts. The first consisted of the direct charges for pay, provisions, fuel, and clothing; the second of indirect charges for administration, medical service, divine service, &c.; and the third of indirect charges for the non-effective services. The direct charges for 134,961 men in the infantry amounted to £3,500,000, or £43 per man; and the direct charges for the other arms of the service—cavalry, artillery, and engineers—amounted to £2,750,000, which represented £52 per man. In the Army Reserve, including the Staff, the number was 39,000, and the direct charge, £125,000, represented £3 10s. per man; the Militia, consisting of 139,000 men, cost £1,250,000, which gave the cost per man £58 for the members of the Staff and £5 for the other individual members of the force; the Yeomanry numbered 15,773, and cost £81,700, which was £54 per member of the Staff and £4 per man; and the Volunteers, numbering 170,000, cost, with the Staff, £2 10s. per man. These direct charges amounted to a total of £8,250,000; the first class of indirect charges amounted to £5,500,000, and the cost of the non-effective services was £2,250,000. These figures showed that the Army proper was costing £8,250,000, while the indirect charges and the cost of the non-effectives amounted to £7,750,000. The result at which he arrived was that the infantry soldier cost £43, and the Reserve soldier at present £3 10s.; but, with such a Reserve as he proposed to organize, the cost of the Reserve soldier would no doubt be very much higher. If we took £50 as the cost of the Regular soldier, and if we took 55,000 men and passed them at once into the Reserve, we should, without impairing the efficiency of the service, save £2,750,000, against which must be set off the cost of £10 per man paid to those who on leaving the Army joined the Reserve, which would amount to £500,000, so that the net saving would be £2,250,000. The excess of the present Estimates over the former Estimates was £2,750,000, which was made up by £1,000,000 for men, £750,000 for auxiliary forces, and £1,000,000 for stores; but the last item was one of exceptional occurrence; the excess owing to the demand for men was £1,750,000, and more than that could be saved by the plan which he submitted to the House. The policy of the Government was, to a certain extent, self-contradictory; they wished for an Army Reserve, and yet they would not pay sufficient to obtain it; they would not make the terms sufficiently attractive, while they proposed to spend £1,750,000 in bolstering up services which they admitted to be unsatisfactory. Their conduct was almost like that of a girl on the steps of a bathing machine, splashing the water with her foot, and yet afraid to take the exhilarating plunge. He might quote in favour of his Motion speeches which had been made from the Treasury Bench this Session. On the 17th of March the Prime Minister said the Government thought that our Reserves ought mainly to consist of men who had gone through the training of soldiers, so that when they entered the ranks they might be what the German Landwehr was to the German Army. The Secretary of State for War had also said—"As you increase your Reserve, you will, without impairing your power, be able to diminish your present numbers;" and, again—"In time of peace the Army will give you a Reserve; in time of war the Reserve will give you an Army." He could only express his regret that the Government had not given effect to this language in a manner more satisfactory than was done by the Army Re-organization Bill, and he therefore moved his Resolution as an Amendment.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, no scheme of Army reorganisation is satisfactory which does not form the reserves for the defence of this Country by men passed through the ranks of the regular Army,"—(Captain Beaumont,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

COLONEL NORTH

said, the policy of the hon. and gallant Member opposite (Captain Beaumont) might lead to the formation of an efficient Reserve; but he thought it would involve the destruction of the Regular Army. The Order that had been issued during the holidays, calling for recruits who were to serve with the colours for three years, was about the longest nail that had yet been driven into the coffin of the British Army. It was all very well to pay no regard whatever to old soldiers; but he was sure that his right hon. Friend would recollect that a former Secretary of State for War had said, on an important occasion, on this very subject— The efficiency of the Army is at stake, and, in any change which we desire to make, we ought to be careful to have with us the assent of the great body of the profession."—[3 Hansard, p. 1841.] Now, as he took a very deep interest in the welfare of the Army, he had made it his business to speak on this subject with officers of every rank, and he had scarcely found one who approved the present management of the Army. It might be recollected that in last year's Estimates it was proposed to discharge 12,374 making no fewer than 23,000 men in less than 15 months. That proposal was much criticized, and his right hon. Friend (Mr. Cardwell), in a speech delivered at Oxford, said that the diminution had been effected by parting with those men whom it was desirable to part with, and that the Army would be quite as efficient as it ever had been. No battalions or regiments of cavalry had been returned. There was no doubt that the plan was a very proper one; but, at the same time, he must demur to the opinion of the right hon. Gentleman, who, by taking the steps he had done while there existed no Reserve of any kind, rendered every regiment in the British service utterly inefficient. Curiously enough, the blackguards were the last class of men who were got rid of. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that the reductions included men who had completed their service, men of 18 years' service unfit to go abroad, men of bad character, men whom it was not desirable to re-engage, and invalids. Nothing could be more fair than to discharge the men who had completed their 21 or 24 years' service, and who were to have permanent pensions. There could be no doubt it was also proper to reduce, by striking off the men of the second class, who were entitled to modified pensions under the Royal Warrant of 1869, and who were medically unfit for foreign service; but there were several regiments which had just returned from foreign service, and which, therefore, in all probability, would not have been sent abroad for some time, and the men of these regiments ought to have been allowed to serve their 21 years. Everybody knew that an English soldier would jump at any offer, and it was not surprising, therefore, that a great many accepted the retirement. The third class consisted of men who were within one year of the completion of the first period of their service. The hardship to these men was, that while they had one year more to look about them, some of them had just returned home and had no opportunity of ascertaining their prospects, yet they were required to declare at once whether they would or would not re-enlist. The tenth year was not allowed, and the result was, that many of them took their discharge, and did so in a most sulky mood. The next class consisted of men of notoriously bad and worthless character. Nobody could at all blame Her Majesty's Government in getting rid of such men. He could not help referring to a remark which was made by a noble Lord (Lord Northbrook) as to the decreased crime in the Army, which was noticed in the Inspector General's Report. The noble Lord had forgotten that a great deal of the statistics of crime was owing to the rule regarding confirmed drunkards, who were now most properly fined, a punishment which ought to have been adopted years ago. It was not to be thought that crime had increased, for such cases instead of being tried by court-martial were now punishable by fine. Last year the right hon. Gentleman took great credit for having reduced the artillery by 101 officers, 203 non-commissioned officers, and 1,606 gunners; but the noble Lord the Under Secretary for War (Lord Northbrook) stated in the other House that the reduction was only 325 officers and men in all. He trusted the right hon. Gentleman would explain to the House this apparent discrepancy. He had next to refer to a matter which he had taken notice of on a former occasion—the flying column at Wimbledon. He would remind the House that on the 7th of July last the Prime Minister came down to the House and stated that we had entered into treaties with France and Germany to join either of those Powers in a war, in case the neutrality of Belgium was violated by the other. Well, on the 26th of July the flying column came to Wimbledon, and the artillery troops were obliged to borrow, in order to march, 30 horses from the batteries at Aldershot. Now, he asked, was that a fit state for our artillery to be in at such a time when much anxiety was awakened in the country by the war breaking out between France and Prussia? His hon. and gallant Friend opposite had alluded to the success which had attended the recruiting. In August, 1870, the time when this country began to move and to think that something ought to be done, there were 5,523 men enlisted. In October, November, December, January, and February the recruits numbered 26,777; but if we had had to take the field, of what use would these recruits have been? The fact was that the 23,000 old and tried soldiers who had been sent to the right-about a short time previous had been replaced by 26,000 and odd raw recruits, many of whom were wretched boys. The experience gained by the nation at the outbreak of the Crimean War ought to have borne its fruits. What was the position of our Army at the outbreak of that Crimean War? The number of the Army was then raised to 185,000 men. Our regiments then consisted of 40 officers, 63 noncommissioned officers, and 850 men, making in all 953 men. On the 30th of April, 1854, they were raised to 1,000 men, making with officers 1,114 in all. Subsequently, on the excitement caused by the Indian Mutiny, they were still further increased. Our regiments now did not consist of more than 500 men. He believed that when the hon. Member for Chelsea (Sir Charles Dilke), the hon. Member for Sheffield (Mr. Mundella), and other hon. Members proposed to reduce the strength of our Army, they could not have taken the trouble to consider the position in which our Army would be placed if we had to go to war. He contended that if there ever was a Government less justified than any other in making proposals of this nature it was the present Government, because the Royal Commission appointed to consider this subject some three years ago, of which a predecessor of his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for War was president, in their Report, foretold distinctly that wars would be sudden in their commencement and short in their duration, and that disaster would attend the country which had to engage in one without sufficient preparation. On that Committee was Lord Dalhousie, Viscount Eversley, Lord W. Paulet, Colonel Wilson Patten, and Mr. O'Reilly. He was aware that the country would not submit to the Ballot, although, by such means, a large supply of trained men might be obtained; but if they would not do so, they ought to be willing to pay for the luxury. At all events, he thought there ought to be 200,000 Militia, apart from the regiments of the Line, thoroughly well drilled and trained. With regard to the permission which was to be granted to the three years' men to leave, he would ask whether it was intended that the officers should teach the men their drill in order that the latter might leave directly they knew it in order to join the Reserve. Among the effects of this permission was this, that nearly all the officers' servants had given notice to leave. He had stated last year that never had there been more wide-spread discontent among the Army than there was now. The oldest officers, even, did not know where they were to turn. Esprit de corps was the keystone of the regimental system. Surely, the officers of the British Army deserved well of their country; but he could not help thinking that they were treated in a manner which was hardly fair, and if the country did not mind, it might happen that they would have no officers at all. On the question of the abolition of purchase, the Government ought to have taken some means to ascertain the feelings of those most interested; but instead of doing so the officers of the Army, to whom this question was of the utmost importance, had been treated in the most cavalier manner. He should be glad to see the Reserve mentioned by his hon. and gallant Friend; but if they had a Reserve of that description, it would, he feared, be at the expense of the finest Army the world had ever seen.

MR. CARDWELL

My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Oxfordshire (Colonel North) has to a great extent discussed what was discussed last year; he will not, I trust, therefore deem it disrespectful in me if I refer to that portion of his argument not germane to this Motion rather briefly. I thought I had already answered—indeed, I thought I had answered times without number—the charge that we had disbanded 23,000 of the best soldiers of the British Army. I stated last year exactly what the reduction was. No doubt there was a reduction upon the whole of the British Army equal to that which my hon. Friend has mentioned, but that reduction included regiments like the Canadian Rifles, the Cape Mounted Rifles, two West African regiments—in fact, regiments formerly maintained by the taxpayers of this country, but which contributed nothing to our defence. My hon. and gallant Friend objected, as I understood, to the third class of men whom we had discharged from the Army—those to whom we had offered and who had accepted a modified pension. But I would ask, Sir, what hardship has been inflicted upon men who have, of their own free will, accepted the pension offered them? Then my hon. Friend says that we are 5,000 men short of what we ought to be in the numbers of the Regular Army. My hon. and gallant Friend quoted the numbers up to March 1, but I have here the Returns to the 1st of April, and the total number returned as being short is 1,690, which, as my hon. and gallant Friend knows very well, is no very large number, considering the nature of our establishment. My hon. and gallant Friend, in making that calculation, must, I think, have included the Returns from the Indian portion of the Army, which will bring the general total to 3,281. [Colonel NORTH: I stated that the Returns from which I took my figures were to the 1st of March.] And I take the 1st of April. I am not finding fault with my hon. and gallant Friend's statement, but I understood him to desire information on this point. Now, my hon. and gallant Friend says that by these reductions we have effected, we have greatly weakened the strength of the Army. But we have not weakened the strength of the Army for the purpose of home defence, although we have materially diminished the burdens of the taxpayer. While we have nearly the same number of men on service at home, the Reserve has largely increased. I have been charged with taking undue credit for the Militia Reserve; but, inasmuch as the number of the Reserve amounts to 19,916, I think my anticipations, in connection with the calculation for 1870, with regard to our obtaining 20,000 men for this branch of the service, may be said to have been realized. On the matter of the reductions, I do not know that I have anything more to say, except that while we have made these reductions, and by so doing have diminished the burden upon the taxpayer, we have increased the number of cadres and the Reserve, and in so doing have increased, as I believe, and not diminished, the strength of the Army. With reference to the flying column from Aldershot, if hon. Members will compare the provision made in time of peace for the artillery of Prussia, or of any foreign country, with the provision made by ourselves, I think they will find that we have no reason to complain. It can hardly be maintained that we are bound to support the force in time of peace which would be required in case of war. I will now proceed to matter more germane to the Motion before the House. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Durham (Captain Beaumont) contended that no new scheme would be satisfactory, which did not form the Army Reserve of men who had passed through the Regular Army. Last year, when I was contending for the advantage resulting from short service, I did not find it very easy to obtain the attention of the House, and the measure which I introduced excited a good deal of military opposition. I do not remember that my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for South Durham rendered me on that occasion any conspicuous assistance, and I must say I would rather have had his support then than his criticism now, when he accuses us of not carrying the principle far enough. [Captain BEAUMONT: I did speak last year in favour of the right hon. Gentleman's proposal.] I am glad to find that the hon. and gallant Gentleman did assist me, for we are fellow-soldiers striving in the same direction, though I feel bound to say that we have carried out the principle as far as possible; and I hope he will support me in the extent to which I wish to carry out the suggestion which he had offered to the House. My hon. and gallant Friend opposite (Captain Beaumont) says we have done harm by the circular which we have sent out, offering discharges to men with three years' service. Now, that invitation has not been issued without a limit. I was always told by the military authorities that we should find it difficult to obtain this First Army Reserve. As soon, however, as the state of our recruiting justified it, I desired that a circular should be issued from the Horse Guards to ascertain what well-conducted men of three years' service, according to the Act of last year, would be willing to join the Reserve. I do not know the details of the answers received, but I am informed that the whole number of those who have expressed their desire to accept the offer made them is between 3,000 and 4,000 I may add, too, that I have heard that the number of men willing to leave the service is not so great in the regiments going to India as it is in those remaining in this country—a result which I think must be regarded as very satisfactory, as showing that the Government had held out a sufficient inducement. Now, I differ entirely from my hon. and gallant Friend opposite in relation to this matter. I think that these results are most satisfactory, for I think they show that there are sufficient inducements to get men of good character to join the Reserve. We ought, therefore, to be pleased and satisfied with this first result of a now experiment. It will, however, be necessary to see that the efficiency of the regiments is not impaired, and, of course, measures will be taken for that purpose. My hon. and gallant Friend (Captain Beaumont) proposes to send 55,000 men at once into the Reserve; but I can only tell him that, in the first place, I do not think that number would be willing to go; and, secondly, if I had proposed to send that number into the Reserve I should have exposed myself to a renewal, in an aggravated degree, of the charge which has already been made against me. I really look upon this Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend only as other words for saying—"Let us at once abolish the Militia, the Yeomanry, and the Volunteers; let us have none but men who have been trained in the Army, and have passed through it, to form our Reserves." [Captain BEAUMONT: Hear!] My hon. and gallant Friend cheers me; but I can only tell him that anything more at variance with what I believe to be the wishes of the House and the country I can scarcely imagine. He should give me credit for being a hearty supporter of the system of short service, which I last year brought before the House, for I earnestly desire to train in the Regular Army as many men as possible, and to make them efficient Reserves for the future defence of the country, as the circumstances will, from time to time, enable us to accomplish. It is, however, of no use to point us to Prussia and other Continental countries, where recourse can be had to conscription; because if you will, as I hope, continue the voluntary system of this country, you must have to contend with difficulties from which a conscription would relieve you. My hon. and gallant Friend says that 17 is too early an age at which to take recruits, and that they should be, at least, 20 years old. Nobody agrees with him more cordially than I; but how am I to obtain men of 20 years of age? Do we not know that if you are to obtain men by voluntary enlistment you must take them at a time when they will come? That time is when they have already devoted themselves to other pursuits, or when they are seeking something to occupy their time and their thoughts. If you were to limit yourselves to take only recruits of 20 years old, the result would be that you would get but a few, and of those few many would be men who had tried other pursuits and failed. Part of the plan which we recommend to your consideration is, that you should endeavour to combine the recruiting of the Regulars and the Reserve forces so that you may be able to import into the Army those whom from age and other considerations you wish to enlist for the Regular service, and then, by combining them, dealing with each according to its nature and its capacity for usefulness, you will be able to form a competent force which will always insure the safety and the honour of the country. I am quite sure that you cannot do that by adopting such an abstract Resolution as that which is proposed by my hon. and gallant Friend; but you must do it by a judicious and careful combination of all the means which the present voluntary system places in your power.

MAJOR DICKSON

said, he had listened attentively to the speech of his hon. and gallant Friend, but he had failed to discover in it any proposal which would lead them to hope they would obtain a better class of men to join the Regular ranks of the Army. Neither did he think there was anything in the scheme of the Government which would have that effect. He had always held that it would be a dangerous experiment to introduce the system of short service in the Army to any extent, unless it was accompanied by a scheme for enlisting a better class of men than those who at present filled the ranks of the Army, and he had not heard the hon. and gallant Member for South Durham (Captain Beaumont) offer any suggestion on that point. They must, therefore, be prepared to see continued in our Army the class of men who now composed its ranks, and he thought that their experience showed that the best soldiers could be made out of them. But from personal inspection of the recruits enlisted during the last few months it appeared to him that they were entirely composed of lads between 17 and 18 years of age—narrow-chested, half-grown, and altogether most unsatisfactory specimens. A great many of them had no home, many had enlisted under feigned names, and others had enlisted with the hope of escaping justice, having broken the law or incurred the anger of their parents. He did not think they could hope to obtain a good Army of Reserve out of such materials, and by endeavouring to do so it appeared to him they would be striking a fatal blow at the efficiency of our standing Army itself. He freely admitted that a short enlistment system was an admirable one, if accompanied by a system of compulsion as in Prussia; but it was idle to compare our Army with that of Prussia, which had conscription with a limited service. If too many men for short service were sent into the Reserve we should have an Army composed, not of soldiers, but entirely of recruits. If his hon. and gallant Friend went to a Division he (Major Dickson) should vote against him, and he would ask the House not to be lead into adopting a system which in other countries worked well under different conditions.

CAPTAIN BEAUMONT

said, he would withdraw his Resolution.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

LORD GARLIES

rose to move— That, in the opinion of this House, it would be inexpedient to vote any sum of money towards the defrayment of the proposed increase of expense of the Military System of this Kingdom until a scheme having for its object the efficient reorganisation of our Regular and Auxiliary Forces has been introduced by Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord said that the prophecy which he had made a few years ago in respect to the military expenditure of the Government had been verified far sooner than he had anticipated. He remembered noticing at the time that, as regarded munitions of war, there were reductions in the year 1869 of £334,000. Her Majesty's Government continued the same course last year, and therefore it was not a matter of surprise that in the third year of their administration they were compelled to ask for £1,000,000 for munitions of war. It might create some surprise that he should take exception to increased military expenditure; but he had hitherto found that the economy of the Government was confined to reducing the number of soldiers, and lessening the quantity of munitions of war. But let bygones be bygones. He would first call attention to the real amount of the increase which the Government asked the House to vote. Next he would point out the different improvements in the organization of the Army which the Government proposed to give them for that increased expenditure; and, lastly, he would point out what, in his opinion, they had a right to expect for such increase. They were asked to vote in the Army Estimates an increase of £2,800,000. In addition to that, they would have to provide a sum to meet the contemplated abolition of purchase, and also the retirement scheme. Taking the figures of the Financial Secretary, the cost of the retirement scheme, founded upon the authority of Mr. O'Dowd, would amount to £1,000,000 a-year, or 1d. additional income tax. Therefore, he might fairly argue that, in addition to the £2,800,000 increase of the Vote, there would be, at least, £1,200,000 annually for the retirement scheme, making a total of £4,000,000 of additional expenditure. There must be also considered another item for new barracks throughout the country, which would also be necessary in order to amalgamate the Line with the Militia, and the expense of these would fall upon the sparsely populated counties, for the richer counties were already furnished with barracks. It seemed to him necessary, if the Government scheme were to be carried out, to have a further charge placed on the Consolidated Fund. Now, what did the Government propose to give in consideration of the expenditure of all this money? They were, first, to receive an addition of 20,000 men; secondly, an addition of 45,000 Militia; and, thirdly, there would be a great increase in the store department. Further, they were told that they were to have an establishment of camps throughout the country. It seemed to him that what they wanted was a sufficient force; but, above all, an efficient force. He believed it was a very decided opinion throughout the country that the policy of self-isolation had quite sunk to the ground. He thought that we should have a force not only sufficient to protect our shores from foreign invasion, and to defend our Colonies and dependencies, but also a force which would enable us at any moment to aid a foreign ally whilst protecting the honour and interests of this country. We should be ready at any time to send 100,000 men to aid an ally abroad, and to retain 300,000 properly trained troops in this country. With regard to our auxiliary forces, we had the first Army Reserve corps of 3,000 men up to last year; but it was proposed to increase this to 9,000 men in the current year. There were also 20,000 Militia Reserve available to be called on in time of war, and the second Reserve corps composed of Pensioners. Here, then, was a force of 300,000 men coming under the denomination of auxiliary troops which, if made more efficient, would be sufficient for the different points to which he had already adverted. It had been the fashion of late years to run down the Yeomanry cavalry; but he believed it would become a most valuable part of the service if more attended to by giving them a longer period for drill. Their object should be to obtain a harmonious whole. He did not think that any force of Militia or Volunteer field artillery would be of any real service in the field, until they got men who had served some half-dozen years in the artillery service to join them. If he understood the proposed scheme of the Government with regard to the infantry, it was their intention to amalgamate the Line and the Militia, which would have the effect of making the Line the first battalion, and the Militia the second battalion; but to make the amalgamation complete, it should include the Volunteers. The basis of the amalgamation, as he stated the other night, should be a change in the present system of enlistment, and that they should not have a Reserve force between the Regular Army and the Militia. The right hon. Gentleman had shown that the effect of the three years' service was to obtain recruits between 17 and 18 years of age instead of 21 or 22, the effect of which would be that when these men were wanted for foreign service in the Regular Army—that is, at the very age when, as trained men their physique would be such as to be best adapted for such service, they would be handed down to the Re- serve forces. What they ought to do was not to enlist men under 20 years of age, and it would be far better to make the Militia the nursery for the Line, and then pass them into the Reserve. He would enlist them for one or two years for the Militia, then to serve four years in the Line, and then to form the Reserve for three years. After that time they should be liable to be called out for foreign service, and after that they should remain in the position of the German Landwehr. He would also make the Militia the nursery for the Line for officers, whereby they would get trained officers. It would be impossible, he repeated, to make the Militia and Volunteer regiments really efficient unless they had extra training, and he suggested that the Militia should have an additional fortnight's continued drill with the Regular forces. It was very desirable that the Volunteers should be subjected to the Mutiny Act when called out, and that they should be compelled—at least 70 or 80 per cent of the force—to attend at least one week's continuous training in the camps of instruction it was proposed to form, or be brigaded with the Regular troops for some short period every year. Unless something of that kind was done, the House would not be justified in agreeing to the increased expenditure proposed by the Government. The noble Lord concluded by moving his Resolution.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, it would be inexpedient to vote any sum of money towards the defrayment of the proposed increase of expense of the Military System of this Kingdom until a scheme having for its object the efficient reorganisation of our Regular and Auxiliary Forces has been introduced by Her Majesty's Government,"—(Lord Garlies,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.