HC Deb 03 March 1870 vol 199 cc1150-8
SIR JOHN HAY

rose, pursuant to notice, to call attention to the proposed expenditure in a further competitive trial of the Woolwich and Whitworth Guns. He regretted exceedingly that, owing to the very peculiar circumstances under which his Motion was put upon the Paper, he could not defer it in answer to the appeal of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister; and he was certain that he should have the House with him when he stated that the subject was not only germane to the Army, but had been referred to that very occasion by the First Lord of the Admiralty. It would be recollected that on a late occasion, when the Navy Estimates were about to be laid before the House, he had asked the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he was prepared to recommend a very considerable expenditure being made in order to carry out certain trials with respect to Whit-worth guns, when the right hon. Gentleman had informed him that the documents relating to the matter were no longer in his power, they having become the property of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and that, therefore, he must put his question to the latter. Under these circumstances, he felt it to be his duty to call attention to the subject under consideration on the Motion for going into Committee of Supply on the Army Estimates. The sum of £18,000 was to be taken in the Army Estimates for certain Ordnance experiments, and a considerable portion of that sum was to be devoted to trials between a 35-ton Whit-worth gun and a Woolwich gun, that were to be made for the purpose of competing. In the first place, he wished to point out that the proposed trial was not calculated to give satisfaction to the country. If it were desired to ascertain whether the metal now used by Sir Joseph Whitworth was superior to that which he had hitherto used, and which had invariably failed in comparison with that produced at Woolwich, it would be necessary, in order to ox chide all elements of confusion, to create two guns identical in all respects except the metal of which they were composed. If it were proposed to test the different systems of rifling, the guns should be identical in all respects except their rifling; and if it were proposed to test the relative merits of the projectiles, the guns should be identical; but he undertook to say that in the proposed experiment the Admiralty had submitted to the War Office that three elements of confusion existed—namely, rifling, projectiles, and size. The approaching trial would be a very expensive one, because Sir Joseph Whitworth had valued his gun at £6,000, and the Woolwich gun, that was to compete with it, would cost at least £3,000 or £4,000, while the manufacture of the projectiles to be used by them would also involve a very considerable expenditure; and the question, so far from being set at rest, would be set rolling, and would entail a cost of many thousands of pounds. Having pointed out the insufficiency of the experiment proposed, and the very considerable expenditure to which it would give rise, he called attention to the state of our knowledge on the subject and the reasons which had led to the re-opening of the question. As they all knew, the ordnance for the Navy was made under the authority of the Secretary of State for War, and the charge was made in the Army Estimates. It was, in fact, a matter of adjustment between the two Departments. The Secretary of State for War limited the expenditure, but he did not override the decisions of the Admiralty. Both Departments had professional officers to advise them, and, as he understood, they were—certainly the advisers of the Secretary of State for War—entirely opposed to the re-opening of the question. They thought, as he did, that the Woolwich gun was the best gun in the world. The experience and information possessed by the professional advisor and the concurrent information obtained from the Governments of Europe pointed to the disadvantages of adopting the Whitworth gun; and, in addition to that, the First Lord of the Admiralty had in his possession a Report—from which he was about to lay on the table certain extracts—of certain Brazilian officers, who, in the late war in that country, had had considerable practical experience of the Whitworth guns. The Brazilian Government applied to the Elswick Ordnance Company for guns; but in consequence of the number of orders they had in hand they could not supply them, and the Brazilian Government applied to Sir Joseph Whit-worth, as the second best manufacturer in England, who issued them under circumstances which the Report would show. In active service they jammed in the bore and fouled after about ten rounds. The First Lord of the Admiralty said that happened in consequence of bad handling and bad powder. That, again, confirmed what he said—that it was useless to adopt a gun that in the rough-and-tumble of active service would be rendered unserviceable by bad Powder. He understood the recommendation for these new guns was not put forward by the professional advisers of either Department, and he was confident it was not by persons conversant with the use of guns, or who were likely to use them. He had been informed that the First Lord of the Admiralty and Mr. Reed, who was a very able shipbuilder, proceeded to Manchester. They were entertained by Sir Joseph Whitworth, and shown over his works, and they were so overwhelmed with what they saw that the Chief Constructor of the Navy, who had nothing to do with guns, thought it his duty to suggest that this trial should take place. The recommendation was sent to the Secretary of State for War, whose advisers condemned the proposal, which was communicated to the Admiralty, but the latter insisted that the trial should be made. The Secretary for War was in the hands of the Admiralty, and all he could do was to limit the amount to be expended. Certain trials of the Whit-worth gun were made yesterday at Shoeburyness, which confirmed previous decisions that it was a good gun, but that the metal of which it was made was extremely treacherous and dangerous, for while the Whit worth shot cost five times as much as the ordinary service shot, it did the very thing its competitor was charged with doing; the ordinary service shot proved tough and firm, the Whit-worth burst in the gun with the third round. And they were now asked to go to further expense in experiments to prove that it was a valuable metal, when it had been proved that one out of the three fired burst in the gun. It was for that reason he had interposed with an Amendment he should submit to the House, not with the view of pressing it to a division, but in order to give hon. Members an opportunity of expressing an opinion upon the subject. When in Committee he should propose the reduction of the Vote of £18,000 by £10,000, or any other sum thought desirable, and on it he should take the opinion of the Committee. He moved that it was inexpedient that the trial between the two guns should be proceeded with.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "further trials of Whitworth Guns are inexpedient,"—(Sir John Hay,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. CARDWELL

said, it would be more convenient to discuss the question in Committee on the Vote, not only because the money for the proposed experiments would then be asked for, but also because of the position in which the question really stood. He did not think the hon. and gallant Gentleman quite understood that position. As he (Mr. Cardwell) understood, the real truth was this—the Board of Admiralty were building a new class of vessel, and they were going to put on board them a new class of guns, of a different side to those now in the service. Sir Joseph Whitworth had invented a new metal for guns—which might or might not be superior to the metal of which the Navy guns now in use were made—and the Admiralty, before deciding what guns they would have for the new ships, were desirous of testing the quality of the new metal. The Council at the War Office appointed to deal with such matters, having upon it professional men competent to give an opinion, had received the tenders relating to the new gun, but had not discussed them. Having, therefore, no report from the Council, he could not state decisively what would be done; but inasmuch as it was possible the Council would recommend a trial, some provision was necessary; if, however, no trial were recommended, the money included in the Vote would not be taken. At the proper time a full explanation would be given.

MR. HANBURY - TRACY

Sir, having been appealed to by my hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay), and having had some experience as a gunnery officer, I am anxious to say a few words on the merits of this question. Sir, when the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Admiralty moved the Estimates the other evening. I am certain that no one could have listened with greater pleasure than I did to his clear, able, and comprehensive statement, and I confess it was with no little surprise that I heard in that progressive speech those words which I fear announced a retrograde step in our naval armaments. It will be in the recollection of the House that, after referring to the general satisfactory character of our naval ordnance, although he said that more trials were considered necessary with the 18-ton gun before expressing entire satisfaction, he acknowledged that all the smaller guns, as well as the trials of the large 12-inch 25-ton gun were entirely satisfactory, and that he had accepted this 25-ton gun for the Monarch, Captain, and Glatton. Now, Sir, I presume that the slight doubt raised as to the 18-ton guns had reference to the supposed failure of some guns on board the Hercules, about which all sorts of exaggerated stories have got about, but of which the simple fact is that the only damage done was that the small platinum tips of the vents gave way. This did not prejudicially affect the guns in the slightest degree, and if the guns had been in action it would probably have never been discovered, and at any rate, would not have stopped the firing for one moment. Now, Sir, I am quite certain that this doubt will soon be removed, especially as the 18-ton gun has already been tested by about 400 rounds. The position we thus stand in is this—that practically all sizes of the Armstrong gun, or what is really properly called the service gun, are perfectly satisfactory, as the 25-ton gun, which is our present largest piece, is acknowledged by the right hon. Gentleman "to be entirely satisfactory." Now, Sir, this gun (the 25-inch gun) is amply large enough for all purposes as a land gun; it could pierce any armour-clad vessel afloat at 1,000 yards, but, as a ship gun, it is quite true that it could not pierce the armour which might be placed on a land battery—for instance an armour-plate such as is known as Jervis' Shield. And here arises the point of contention, for, allowing that a 35-ton gun is required, instead of pursuing the policy we have adopted since the famous Whitworth and Armstrong controversy of adhering to the naval service guns, and enlarging the construction of the guns, as the change of circumstances demanded, we are suddenly told that because it is thought possible Sir Joseph Whitworth may have discovered a new metal in the shape of compressed steel, which may or may not be peculiarly adapted for very heavy guns, that therefore the old controversy of Armstrong versus Whitworth is to be re-opened at enormous expense to the country. Sir, I am totally at a loss to understand what possible good can be derived from this trial. I would ask what possible guarantee have you in respect to this metal. Is it in the open market, has it any market value, and what possible advantage do you expect to derive from this Whitworth gun, if even constructed, which you cannot get from your service guns? The enduring power of your 25-ton gun no artillerist has ever doubted, and, certainly, I am not aware that any of our Ordnance officials have ever had cause to fear that a 35-ton gun of the same construction could not be manufactured of equal endurance. Perhaps, Sir, I may be allowed to explain that what is commonly called the Armstrong Gun, is really nothing of the sort, it is simply the "Naval Service Gun," which is constructed on the advantages gained from several systems. It is indebted to Whitworth, for its calibre and other proportions; to Palliser, for most valuable details; to Frazer, for a bold simplification of the coil; and to France, for a great refinement in the mode of rifling; and the ammunition is indebted to Palliser, Boxer, Noble, and Armstrong. I cannot hardly believe that it is really contemplated to open up the old controversy, as the theory on which it was based has long since exploded, and it is acknowledged by all the European powers, as well as by our greatest artillerists, that the polyginal system of rifling is a failure, and that the opposite principle of a yielding medium, either of a stud-rib or coating between the shot and the bore, is the best. But, Sir, I am quite confident that if once you open the question as to the larger size guns, it will be utterly impossible to prevent the trial being extended to the smaller guns. In I 1867, our greatest naval artillerist, Admiral Cowper Key, in a letter to the War Office, gave it as his decided opinion that the old controversy should not be re-opened, in these words— This system satisfies every requirement for the service; it would, therefore, be most impolitic to incur the enormous expense of introducing any other until some defect is discovered in that now adopted for which a permanent remedy cannot be found. The regularity or certainty of construction of heavy guns on Mr. Whitworth's system has not yet been proved; that of the Armstrong coil or service system has been ascertained by the manufacture of many hundreds, by which its efficiency has been placed beyond donbt. The cost of Mr. Whitworth's gun is double that of a gun on the service system. Admiral Key Proceeded to say— On a review of the comparative qualities of the two guns, it is evident that, for naval purposes, the Woolwich or service system produces the most effective weapon. The excellence of workmanship and many good qualities of the Whitworth gun are unquestioned; but when it is considered that, in addition to the large store of guns and ammunition on the service system now forming the armament of our ships, and finding I their way to all parts of the world, these guns are now more efficient for naval purposes than those I which are proposed to replace them, I cannot recommend that such a substitution should be sanctioned. Such was the opinion of one of the first I naval artillerists in this country. If it could be shown that there could be anything gained by this trial, I should be the last to oppose it, but I foresee nothing but confusion and waste of public money. In a financial point of view, what will be the result? I do not believe it would be possible to carry out these experiments without involving ourselves in an expenditure of at least £100,000. The controversy a few years ago led us into an expenditure of £32,000, and it should be remembered that then the guns were small as compared with these. It is estimated that Whitworth's 35-ton gun would cost £5,800, and the naval service gun, £2,500. Then every shot fired would cost at least £10 or £12; and, in order to test the endurance, it was necessary that 400 shots should be fired. What possible reason, therefore, could there be for going into this controversy? After spending an enormous sum of money, and ascertaining that the 35-ton gun on the Whitworth construction had, perhaps, slightly the advantage as regards endurance over the 35-ton gun constructed on the service pattern, we should merely gain a gun which would cost twice as much as the other. Sir, the only question is really of endurance, and, after spending so much money, it seems rather hard that this country should be called upon to bear the burden of proof as to whether its service construction is the most enduring. I do trust the House will not allow the old controversy of Armstrong v. Whitworth to be re-opened, as it can only have the effect of throwing our naval arma- ments into confusion, and of imposing an enormous cost on the country.

MR. CHILDERS

remarked that it was not his intention to say a word as to the relative merits of the two systems, as he had stated last night that the Admiralty were perfectly satisfied with the naval service gun, and did not intend to supersede it. It was therefore unnecessary for him to comment on the opinions expressed by Admiral Key in 1867, with reference to that gun. He would merely state that his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) had made the same mistake that his right hon. Friend opposite fell into the other night, in regard to the visit to Messrs. Whitworth's establishment. In point of fact, when he came to the determination to recommend that there should be a competitive trial, Mr. Heed, the Chief Constructor of the Navy, was not present, but his professional adviser, the Director of Naval Ordnance, was. His right hon. Friend and Colleague the Secretary of State for War was also there, and was also attended by his professional adviser, the Director of Military Ordnance. Both of these professional gentlemen recommended that the trial should be made. It was neither his own nor Mr. Heed's recommendation, but the recommendation of those gentlemen which was afterwards adopted by the Board of Admiralty.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair," put, and agreed to.