[BILL 28.] SECOND READING.

HC Deb 15 June 1870 vol 202 cc129-83

Order for Second Reading read.

MR. HARDCASTLE

, in rising to move that the Bill be now read a second time, said, his object was simply to repeal certain clauses in the Acts of 1867 and 1868, which had the effect of partially disfranchising voters in certain urban and rural constituencies of this country and Scotland. The constituencies to which he referred were those known as the "unicorn" constituencies. There were six urban and seven rural constituencies which came within that category, and the clauses which he sought to have repealed had been introduced into the Reform Bills by the House of Lords. On two occasions during the discussions on the Representation of the People Bill in the House of Commons attempts were made to have clauses of this or a somewhat similar nature inserted in that Bill. Mr. John Stuart Mill made the first of those attempts, but after some discussion his proposition was withdrawn. The second was made by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer; and he must say that he preferred the right hon. Gentleman's plan to that of Mr. Mill, but the House rejected it by a majority of 317 to 137. When the Bill went up to the other House, Lord Cairns proposed, and succeeded in getting inserted in it, the clauses which he (Mr. Hardcastle) now wanted to have repealed. Lord Cairns disavowed any party object in reference to those clauses, and he (Mr. Hardcastle) might now do the same. To show that he was not actuated by party motives, he might mention that the working of those clauses had been more beneficial to the Liberals than to the Conservatives; in the cities and boroughs which came within the operation of these clauses the gains of the two parties had been about equal, but there were three or four county constituencies in which the new principle had secured the return of Liberal Members. When the Bill came back to the Commons the Session was far advanced, and to have entered into fresh discussions of any length would have been to endanger the passing of the Bill. He believed that, but for that circumstance those clauses would have been rejected. In moving the clauses Lord Cairns argued that to leave only two votes to the voter in a constituency which returned three Members could do the voter no harm, because he would be no worse off than the voter in a constituency which only returned two Members. He certainly should have been more astonished than he was at the argument only he remembered that the noble Lord came from the other side of St. George's Channel. Such an argument was about as sound as would be the assertion that to take away one Member from a constituency which returned three Members would do no harm to that constituency. The noble Lord had also advocated the clauses on the ground that some provision should be made for the representation of persons whose claim consisted of independence, intelligence, and freedom from popular excitement. He also observed that it would be very advantageous that in some counties gentlemen quite unconnected with land in those counties should be returned, and that in some boroughs gentlemen altogether unconnected with the trade and commerce of those boroughs should be selected. The General Election, however, had shown them what the real working of the clauses was. In not one single instance had any representative been returned for a unicorn county who was unconnected with land, and in no instance had a representative for a city or borough been returned who was not connected with trade or commerce. In Manchester there were five or six candidates. A Gentleman who now sat on the Opposition Bench (Mr. Birley), and against whose qualifications no one could say a word, was returned by a minority. He was connected with the trade of the locality, while a gentleman well known in connection with philanthrophic movements in London, but unconnected with Manchester (Mr. Joseph Hoare), was rejected. In Liverpool, his hon. Friend (Mr. Rathbone), who was connected with the commerce of that town, was returned as the minority Member, while a Gentleman who had for years been a Member of that House, who had filled the office of Chairman of Committees, and subsequently that of Financial Secretary for India (Mr. Massey), was rejected. In Cambridgeshire his right hon. Friend (Mr. Brand), a landowner, was returned as the representative of the minority, while a gentleman unconnected with land (Mr. Richard Young) was rejected. In the county of Berks there were two Liberal candidates—one (Mr. Walter) a Gentleman who had for a long time represented Berkshire, who was a great landowner, and who had other claims to respect—perhaps he might say to fear—claims to which he need not further allude. Well, that hon. Gentleman had as a colleague in the candidature a Gentleman of whom this character—he did not say it was a just one—had appeared in the columns of the leading journal. In The Times of the 24th of February there was this reference to the Gentleman who, at that date, had just been elected Member for Nottingham— Possibly he may dream that the future, whatever it may be, would be more his own than the present. But, at all events, he represents, with perfect genuineness, that interesting band of scholars who framed a new constitution for the universe, and for this part of it in particular, within the first few months of leisure which followed their admission to degrees, and who exhort us to sweep away every existing institution to make room for their academic Utopia. He did not say that that was any great recommendation of the views and opinions of his hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham (Mr. Auberon Herbert); but he did say that anyone to whom such a description applied much more nearly realized Lord Cairns's idea of a minority candidate for Berkshire, than did the hon. Gentleman who was the Liberal Member for that constituency. All anticipations in regard to the operation of these clauses having totally failed, he asked why the principle should be retained. He should, no doubt, be told that it should be retained because it was there; that the minority clauses applied to but comparatively few constituencies; and that it was not worth while, for the sake of repealing the clauses, to disturb the settlement of a great question; but he might observe that, as far as the House of Commons was concerned, those clauses were not a part of the settlement. That House had nothing to do with the introduction of those clauses, and he thought it was now free to exercise its judgment as to whether they ought to be retained. The Government had on the Table a Bill relating to Elections; and he hoped that, if his own measure were not adopted, the Government would sooner or later embody its principle in their Bill. The system which those clauses brought into operation was an expedient—an indirect way—he might almost say a dodge—to give to a large minority in certain constituencies the power which ought to belong to the majority. It might be argued that truth was sometimes with the minority. He did not deny that; but he did deny that it was a good reason for assuming that truth was always with the minority. In the last letter he ever wrote Mr. Cobden expressed himself against the scheme. In answer to the argument that the minority had an opinion, and it ought to be represented, Mr. Cobden said— After all it is opinion that ought to be represented. If the minority have faith that their opinions, and not those of the majority, are the true ones, then let them agitate and discuss them until those opinions are in the ascendant. There were several practical objections to those clauses. One was forcibly illustrated by what had occurred in the City of London. Three Liberals and one Conservative having been elected, the Conservative died soon after, and there was a new election for one Member. Was a Conservative then elected? No; a Liberal was returned without a contest. Another objection to the scheme was, that it was only applicable to constituencies of a certain size. It was not applicable in counties which were large enough to be divided into two divisions, nor to boroughs which were not large enough to return three Members; but if there was anything in the principle it surely ought to be applied generally. After all that had been said and written on the subject, the principle of personal representation had not been adopted, except in one or two insignificant instances, by any legislative Assembly in the world. From a letter in The Times it appeared that the Convention of Illinois had decided in favour of it by a large majority. It had not yet been admitted into the constitution of Illinois; but, even if it had been, he did not think the fact would be a strong argument in favour of its adoption by the British House of Commons, which had always been regarded as the representative of representative bodies. As to Mr. Hare's plan of a proportionate representation—a principle which these clauses carried out to a certain limited extent—he must say that, if ever a scheme united ingenuity with impossibility, Mr. Hare's was that scheme. If it were applied to all the constituencies of the kingdom it would be a revolution compared with which every other revolution sank into complete insignificance. Judging by the number of candidates who presented themselves at the last General Election—between 1,000 and 1,100 in England and Scotland alone—there would probably be not fewer than 2,000 candidates at a General Election if Mr. Hare's scheme were adopted. In that case how would it be possible to bring under the notice of the 2,500,000 of electors of the United Kingdom the names and peculiar qualifications of this army of persons who came forward to represent the country? If printed lists of the names of the candidates were sent throughout the country, in the first place, many of the electors would be unable to read them; and, secondly, the vast majority would vote in favour of the local candidate, with whose opinions and character they were personally acquainted, and thus, by a roundabout process, exactly the same result would be arrived at as was attained under the present system. There were, however, other electors who had no local sympathies, but whose political sympathies were very strong—as was usually the case in metropolitan constituencies—and those persons would hardly take the trouble to inquire into the political opinions of the local candidates, but would record their votes in favour of the eminent Gentlemen who sat on the Front Benches before him, or who sat on the Front Opposition Benches. There were also large classes of electors who had neither strong political opinions nor strong local sympathies; but who were connected with great organizations, such as the Teetotallers, who were already represented by the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson). In the case of Mr. Hare's scheme being adopted, one representative of that association would not be deemed sufficient, and in all probability there would be seven instead of one Sir Wilfrid in the field. Again, there was the great organization of the Odd Fellows, which included among its members thousands of electors who would send their own representatives to that House; not because they had any strong political opinions, but because they thought that such Members would advocate the peculiar objects of the association. This example would, of course, be followed by other similar organizations; and, in fact, instead of having to encounter in the Lobby—as had to be done under the old rule, before the present solitude reigned there—the representatives of every crotchet and remarkable craze, hon. Member would have to encounter them in that House. The constitutional principle had always been that Members should be sent to the House to represent, first of all, political opinions; but the result of Mr. Hare's scheme would be entirely to alter that state of things, because many persons would be returned under it who possessed no political opinions whatever. Such a result would be most detrimental to the character of that great representative Assembly. These were some of the reasons that had induced him to introduce this Bill, the second reading of which he now begged to move, and which he confidently anticipated would be carried by a large majority.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Hardcastle.)

MR. COLLINS

said, he should have felt himself under some difficulty in being the mover of the Previous Question had this been the first time that this subject had been under the consideration of the House. The hon. Member (Mr. Hardcastle) appeared to have entirely forgotten that his Bill had a double effect—that it not only proposed to deprive minorities of the power of returning Members, but that it also proposed to revive the exploded system of triple representation—of allowing electors in certain constituencies to vote for more than two candidates. That system was a complete novelty in English representation, which practically was introduced in 1832, but which had ever since been virtually condemned, and he trusted that he should be able to convince the House that, after having been abolished three years ago, that system ought not to be revived. The clauses in the Bill of 1867 which gave minorities power to elect Members of that House had been objected to on the score of their novelty; but the charge of novelty might have been brought with equal force against the Reform Act of 1832 and all subsequent Reform Acts. The Bill of 1832 enacted a novelty, inasmuch as it bisected certain county constituencies. That was a successful novelty; and the Bill of 1867 extended this novelty, inasmuch as it trisected constituencies. The Chandos Clause, making occupation a main ingredient of the county suffrage, was also a successful novelty enacted in the Reform Bill in 1832, and extended to Ireland in 1852, and to England and Scotland in 1866 and 1867. He did not think our Constitution was so perfect that we could afford to reject improvements simply because they were new. But he was about to show that the novelty of triple representation in counties was introduced by Lord Althorp with a very different purpose from that assumed by the hon. Member, who was attempting to carry out the letter but not the spirit of the system introduced by that noble Lord. How did that scheme come to be introduced into the Reform Act of 1832 at all? Those familiar with the history of that Act would recollect that it was preceded by two other Reform Bills, the first of which proposed to largely reduce the number of Members in that House, and the second of which proposed to reduce that number by a smaller extent. When the Reform Bill of 1832 was brought forward, however, it was not thought worth while to reduce the number, and, therefore, it was determined to add certain seats to new boroughs proposed to be enfranchised; and it was in order to preserve the balance between the boroughs and the agricultural districts that Lord Althorp determined to give an additional Member to certain agricultural counties; but that addition to the county constituencies was not made with the view of giving cumulative votes to individual electors. Ever since the year 1832 the House of Commons had systematically set its face against the principle of giving three votes to an elector. Between the years 1832 and 1852 the question of Reform slept, but in the latter year a series of Reform Bills was commenced. The Bill introduced by Lord John Russell in the latter year in no way proposed to deal with the re-distribution of seats; but in 1854 a very remarkable Reform Bill was brought in, which was based upon higher philosophical principles, and which proposed a wide disfranchisement. That Bill was introduced by a Government that would vie in talent and in intellect with any modern Government, containing, as it did, among its members the chief members of the Governments of Sir Robert Peel and Earl Grey, including Sir James Graham, Lord John Russell, Lord Palmerston, and the present Prime Minister. That measure proposed to disfranchise something like 64 constituencies, and to create 44 new constituencies, returning three Members each. It did not, however, propose that the electors of any of those constituencies should have three votes, but two votes. Owing to the Crimean War that Bill fell through, and no more was heard about it. In 1854, however, the principle of giving minorities the power of returning Members was adopted in giving a constitution to the Cape of Good Hope, where it had been found to answer very well; and the same principle had also been adopted in giving a constitution to the Hebdomadal Council of the University of Oxford. Being highly-educated men, the members of that University were naturally prone to Tory opinions, and therefore it was necessary to provide for the representation of the Liberal minority. In 1860 a Bill was brought forward by Lord John Russell, disfranchising 25 places and creating several three-cornered constituencies, but not founded upon the principle of giving minorities the power of returning Members. Lord John Russell stated, on the occasion of that Bill being introduced, that he had seen nothing to change his opinion in favour of the representation of minorities, but that for some reason which he did not state he had thought it inexpedient to base his Bill upon that principle. At that time there was no honest wish for Reform on the part of Members on either side of the House, and the measure was talked to death, with the consent of Lord Palmerston, the House always counting out whenever the great question of Reform was brought forward. Then he came to a smaller Reform Bill, the discussion on which undoubtedly showed that the Parliament of 1859 was averse from the system of increasing the number of constituencies returning three Members each. When the Bill of 1861, for allotting the seats vacant by the disfranchisement of Sudbury and St. Albans, was before it, the House refused to give a triple vote to the constituencies whose representation it was proposed to increase, but they determined that the claims to increased representation should be acknowledged by bisecting the West Riding of Yorkshire instead of giving a third Member to Middlesex, and a third to West Yorkshire. In 1866 the right hon. Gentleman who was now at the head of the Government brought in a Bill which proposed to create a considerable number of these three-cornered constituencies. That Bill, as the House was aware, was lost upon a bye and a false issue—namely, whether it ought to be based upon rating or upon rent, or some other quibble of the kind; but its rejection was really the result of the belief of most moderate men on both sides of the House that a less democratic scheme would satisfy the country. But, although no decision was arrived at upon that Bill with respect to the triple vote, yet the House pronounced judgment upon the scheme very emphatically in the following year, when the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli) was before it. That Bill, although more democratic in a certain sense than its predecessor, was to be accompanied by certain so-called safeguards, which were to render it less offensive in the eyes of those who dreaded the advance of democratic principles. He was not about to enter into any discussion upon the subject of the value of those safeguards; but what he desired to point out was that when that Bill left the House, it was quite as much the Bill of the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government as it was of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire. But although the Bill was considerably mutilated by the right hon. Gentleman opposite, and all the so-called safeguards swept away, there was one point in it which was left untouched, and that was that certain counties should be trisected, and return two Members each division, and not be bisected and return three Members for each division. Parliament thus pronounced decisively against the wretched system of giving cumulative votes to electors which would enable them to vote for three candidates. He, therefore, maintained that since the year 1832 the whole course of legislation had been opposed to the proposition of the hon. Member for Bury (Mr. Hardcastle). That proposition involved very serious results. If this were a question affecting merely six borough and seven county seats it would be hardly worth hon. Members' while to oppose this Bill; but they must not forget that the last Reform Bill, so far as it related to the extension of the franchise, was Brobdignagian, and so far as regarded the distribution of seats was Lilliputian, and, therefore, it was impossible for hon. Members to close their eyes to the fact that some day or another—how soon it was impossible to say—another Reform Bill, involving a redistribution of seats would be passed. If the principle of the hon. Member were adopted it would largely affect the future measure, and it was important, therefore, that this question should not be hastily or rashly prejudged, and that it should not be determined until after ample consideration had been given to it. It was a fortunate circumstance that this question could be discussed entirely apart from any party feeling because, though this principle had been introduced by Lord Cairns, the representation of minorities had been advocated by Lord John Russell, by Lord Palmerston, and by Mr. J. Stuart Mill, and because its determination either way would but slightly affect the relative position of Liberals and Conservatives throughout the country. If in the counties the Conservatives lost five they gained two in the boroughs, so that by the experiment of 13 seats they lost three. It was, therefore, not a question for consideration in a party point of view; so far as the Conservatives were concerned, his object was far superior to that of mere party politics. He wished to show the House that he, and not his hon. Friend opposite (Mr. Hardcastle), was carrying out the principle of the Reform Bill of 1832. In that year, when the subject of a minority clause was brought under the consideration of the House by Mr. Praed, who wished to introduce the principle of giving three votes, Lord Althorp opposed it on the ground that it was unnecessary, because it would be impossible to get a constituency to return three men of the same colour, for the fact was, that then the greatest difficulty existed in getting a man to give two votes for two men of the same colour. If that were true in 1832 there could be no doubt it was false in 1870. In Acland's Election Book he gave the polls of every contested election since 1832. Taking him to be correct—and he (Mr. Collins) having watched contested elections since he was in his swaddling clothes, he was able to say that in many cases he personally knew the statements to be correct—in 1832 Lord Althorp's statement was completely borne out; because out of seven counties that returned three men each not one of them returned three men of the same colour; and that, probably, was owing to the fact that electors did not then, as now, vote by the ticket, according to the dictation of the clubs or working men's associations. In most cases the counties returned Liberals, but they afterwards, he was happy to say, came to their senses. He would take the Elections of 1841, 1847, and 1852, in which latter year Lord Derby went to the country with Free Trade for the boroughs and Protection for the counties. In 1841 there were 19 Conservatives and two Liberals returned by those counties. In 1852 they returned 20 Conservatives and but one Liberal, and the solitary piebald representation was the county of Bucks, which was probably owing to the moderating influence of the right hon. Gentleman the late Prime Minister, who did not think it fair that three should be elected of the same colour. In 1852 this great change took place, which completely upset the doctrine of Lord Althorp, that a minority, however small, must succeed in securing a representation. But, in truth, the minorities were, in many instances, not only not small, but very large in point of number. In Hertfordshire, for instance, three Liberal candidates were run against three Conservatives. The three latter succeded, a Conservative candidate heading the poll with 2,225 votes, and the highest of the losing candidates polling 2,043, so that there was only a difference of 182 between them. In Herefordshire they tried the plan of running one candidate against three, but failed here too, in spite of the advantage which they possessed of being able to obtain split votes; but while the three Conservative candidates were returned, the highest with 3,167 votes, the Liberals could only secure 2,836 votes for their candidate, Sir George Cornewall Lewis, whose exclusion from Parliament was a loss to the nation. Although Sir George Cornewall Lewis's merits were not ignored by the Conservative voters, they were bound to do all they could against him—had he been a voter he should, no doubt, have refused him his support—but it was not right that they should be under this necessity. He would now refer to the system as it worked under the Law which the hon. Gentleman proposed to repeal. In Berkshire the Conservative Members obtained 3,200 votes, the Liberal Members 2,500; the result was that, while each of the Conservative Members represented 1,600 voters, the hon. Gentleman sitting opposite (Mr. Walter) had the good fortune to represent 2,500: so that the hon. Gentleman, who occupied what some termed the ignominious position of representing the minority, really represented 2,500; whereas his two opponents represented only 3,200 between them. In other divisions the same thing occurred. In Cambridgeshire the Conservatives polled 3,700, and the Liberal 3,200. In Herefordshire the Conservatives polled 3,300, and the Liberal 2,000. In Hertfordshire the Liberals polled 3,600 and the Conservative 3,300; so that the so-called representative of the minority in reality represented a greater number of electors than the candidate returned for the majority. In Liverpool, again, there were 16,000 Conservatives and 15,000 Liberals, and he could not see how it would be fair that the 16,000 should monopolize the representation and the 15,000 have no share. It was only an approximation to fairness that the 16,000 should return two Members, and the 15,000 only one; but it was as fair as it could be made under our electioneering system. Out of the 2,300,000 persons said to live in these constituencies, he had shown that about two-fifths really belonged to the party of the minority; so that under the system to which the hon. Gentleman objected, to place the estimate at a very low figure, they had a rough way of giving representation to 800,000 people, no insignificant portion of the inhabitants of the kingdom. Therefore, when the hon. Member for Bury, with a large amount of assertion and assurance, took upon himself to talk about people being disfranchised, he had yet to learn the meaning of the term. Now, it was urged that under the old system the minority had indirect if not direct representation, but the correctness of this view he denied. Supposing that there were three Liberal Members for Manchester and three Conservative Members for Oxfordshire, would a Conservative merchant returned for Manchester be the same sort of person as the Conservative fox-hunting squire who represented Oxfordshire; was the Liberal Member who sat for Berkshire the same kind of man as the Radical Members returned for Leeds and Birmingham? It was a laudable object of ambition in a large squire to represent his county, and to a merchant to represent his town; but, if the large squire happened to be so unfortunate as to have been born a Whig, he would, if there were no minority clause, stand no chance of being elected by his county, nor would a Conservative merchant stand a much better chance of being elected by his town; but with that clause he did stand a chance, and those who were of his opinion had the power given to them of giving their opinions effect, and the consequence was that they got what was so desirable—a true reflex of public opinion. It was absurd to tell the 15,000 Liberal electors of Liverpool that they were not to have a candidate because Liberal Members were returned for Glasgow and Manchester. To do that would be to go back to the obsolete argument of virtual instead of direct representation, when it was said that the Members for Gatton and Old Sarum represented everybody and everything but the places for which they sat. Then he might be told that he was arguing in favour of theories which might be admirable for study at the winter fireside and as philosophical disquisitions, but were not calculated to afford any basis for legislation. But he would remind the House that he was not in favour of the representation of persons, but of localities and communities; but he had yet to learn that minorities did exist in space as undoubtedly they did in time. To tell him that the legitimate result of his argument was, that electors returning two Members should only have one vote was to reduce his proposition to an absurdity, because to do that would be to deprive the majority of their right to rule—a proposal he was not at all prepared to support. But in a political system like ours he had always thought it desirable, on public grounds, to interest, as far as possible, the different classes in the community in political questions. A majority had always a tendency to become larger; a minority to become smaller. People got tired of always fighting with a certainty of losing, and after several unsuccessful efforts gave up the contest. The result was that the minority at length took little or no interest in public life, and, therefore, it was of great service to the country that there should be a system which would give life and vigour to our political institutions without being attended by any corresponding disadvantages. It was this feeling that caused the disinclination to increase the representation of the metropolis. It was felt that, considering its wealth and population, London was inadequately represented; but it was also felt by many that, as all the Members returned were of the same political opinions, an increase of the number of representatives would not be attended with any advantage, and that it was the minority and not the majority in the Metropolis whom it was desirable to enfranchise. Against this Bill it had also been urged that its result would be frequently to deprive the Crown of valuable assistance, because no man who represented a minority would venture to accept Office with a certainty of being rejected by his constituency. But such a consideration was of little weight, for most of those who aspired to hold Office under the Crown would take care to be elected by majorities; while those who represented minorities were probably in no worse position than they would otherwise have been, for the absence of such a system might possibly have been attended by their exclusion from Parliament. Believing, therefore, as he did, that it would be unwise to repeal this Bill, he begged to move the Previous Question.

Previous Question put, "That that Question be now put."—(Mr. Collins.)

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, I entirely concur with the hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Collins) in the opinion that this question is not one with which it is necessary to deal with reference to any considerations of party, the more so as it is undeniable that the Liberal party, from the working of this clause, has derived considerable advantage. It is not objected to on that ground by Members on this side of the House; but because, in our view, the advantage derived from it does not outweigh or even in any degree compensate the balance of argument which is against the principle of the minority clause. The hon. Gentleman who has just sat down, feeling that he has to argue for a novel proposition, says that new things may be good. That is a very good doctrine, and comes in the most graceful manner from the opposite side of the House. But there is another doctrine, its counterpart, which may also be propounded occasionally from this side of the House, and that is that, though new things may be good, old things may be good also. The ancient principle of representation is that which the large majority of Members on this side of the House have always held to be a good principle. The hon. Gentleman says he objects to the innovations caused by the Reform Act of 1832, before which time, he seemed to think, it was a principle of the Constitution that no elector should record more than two votes. But there are instances under the Parliamentary system, as it existed before 1832, in which more than two votes were given. I would remind the hon. Gentleman that the City of London has for centuries enjoyed the privilege of returning four Members to this House, and that a similar privilege was formerly enjoyed, through some mistake of the Legislature, by the small and insignificant borough of Melcom be Regis. That principle, however, if it ever existed, was emphatically repudiated when, by an Act in the present century, four votes were given to the electors of Yorkshire. But the fact is, the hon. Gentleman has been arguing the question of the tripartite division of seats, and not the question of the representation of minorities; and feeling, I think, that he was addressing an assembly opposed to the representation of minorities, he has, like a skilful advocate would do, thrown that part of the subject carefully into the background, and has argued upon the expediency of the tripartite division of seats. If it were necessary to follow the hon. Gentleman I should feel bound to dissent from much that he has said; but it is not advisable to encumber the comparatively limited proposition of my hon. Friend by introducing an entirely distinct and important question into the discussion—namely, in what proportions it is desirable to distribute the local representation of counties. There is the opinion in favour of the old practice of returning two Members; the opinion in favour of one Member; and also the opinion in favour of three, or even more Members. These doubtless are very interesting and important questions; but they are hardly legitimately to be imported into the discussion that has been raised by my hon. Friend behind me. Again, the hon. Gentleman, with considerable astuteness, has sought to obtain an advantage in the debate by dwelling upon the principle that minorities ought to be represented. There is no doubt that they ought to be represented; but that is not the question. I cannot conceive the existence of a more detestable Government than one which should ignore the rights and override the opinions of all but the majority by whom they were elected; but it is the opinion of this side of the House that minorities were represented before the clause which we are now considering was embodied in the Reform Act of 1867. They were represented, in the limited way to which Lord Althorp referred in 1832, by the third county Member. Even in the double representation minorities are often represented. Take, for instance, a borough where the two parties are not very different in strength. It cannot be said that the party which is the stronger can permanently hold the two seats. Now, I think I understood the hon. Gentleman to speak in favour of dividing the country into constituencies represented by only one Member; but in each constituency the minority would remain unaltered. But the fact is the majority of one constituency is the minority of another, and, even under such a system as that, the representation of minorities would be obtained, as it should be obtained, in the variety of the constituencies of the kingdom. Now, this is a question upon which I do not think it is necessary that these principles which combine Governments should be applied. It is a matter upon which everyone must necessarily be free to exercise his own individual opinion, introduced, as it has been, by my hon. Friend behind me, and not upon the responsibility of the Executive Government. But let me refer to the history of this question, and to the arguments which induced Parlia- ment to incorporate the minority clause in the Act for the Representation of the People. The history of that matter must he well recollected by most hon. Members, and there can be nothing invidious in referring to it. The subject was discussed largely in the House when the Reform. Bill of 1867 was in progress. The proposal was done ample justice to by the men of ability by whom it was supported, amongst whom I may justly mention my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for the Home Department. My right hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), unfortunately not among us at this moment, was one of the most prominent in the opposition to it. It was opposed, too, by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli), who, speaking with all the responsibility which attached to his position, in a most able and, as I think, a conclusive speech, dealt with the whole subject, and on its merits condemned the minority clause. On a Division, a large majority of the House declined to adopt the clause, and the Bill then went to the House of Lords. In the House of Lords, the clause was inserted in the Bill by a large majority—a majority by no means of one political conviction. At the same time they introduced other important Amendments. The other Amendments introduced by the House of Lords were Amendments which the Liberal party were united in opposing; and as the Liberal party, when united as a party, commanded the majority in that Parliament, it was not in the power of the right hon. Gentleman, although at the head of the Executive, to induce the House to agree to the various Amendments made by the House of Lords, even although they might have been Amendments in which the right hon. Gentleman and his Government concurred. But the right hon. Gentleman was naturally anxious not to override in every particular the legislative power of the House of Lords, and so, without concealing his preference for the old and more constitutional system, the right hon. Gentleman recommended the House to adopt the minority clause. The right hon. Gentleman was followed, from mixed considerations, by a very large portion of his party; and the minority clause was, therefore, carried, in deference to the wishes of the House of Lords, by a majority made up chiefly from what is now the opposite side of the House, and by a minority of the Liberal party; but this is unquestionable, that during the debate on the minority clause the majority of hon. Members did not conceal their disapproval of the proposition. That is, I believe, an impartial statement, and I intend by it to convey nothing disrespectful to anyone, but simply to remind the House what the real circumstances were. It is manifest that, under these circumstances, the authority of the clause cannot be held to be very great, and we may approach this question of the minority clause without any apprehension that we are profaning the sanctuary of the Constitution, even although we think ourselves obliged to examine it a little more closely than we have hitherto done. What was the leading consideration which induced many most eminent supporters of the minority clause to support it at that particular time?—there was immense force in the objections against a partial adoption of the principle of a minority clause. Unless, indeed, I am much mistaken, many of its supporters went as far as to say—"We agree with you that the minority clause ought not to exist in our legislation in a partial form; but we are so convinced of its merits and beneficial working that we feel that if we can once obtain even the most limited recognition of the principle, it will give such satisfaction that our whole system of representation will be remodelled upon it, for the general adoption of the principle is the real object we have in view." This process is commonly called "getting in the thin end of the wedge," and it is a very useful process for those who happen to be right in thinking that when once the thin end is introduced the thicker end will follow, and the object they have in view be attained. But I ask those Gentlemen who hold the "thin end of the wedge" argument, not whether they have been converted with regard to their speculative opinions, but, whether, looking to the state of public opinion on this subject, and the unsatisfactory and vexatious manner in which this clause has worked in particular constituencies, they really think that, the "thin end of the wedge" having been inserted, it can be further propelled with success? It appears to me that the current of public opinion has been, in the main, decidedly unsatisfactory as regards the operation of the; clause; and it may not be unreasonable for those who supported it in 1867, and who with sanguine hopes anticipated that experience would be so satisfactory as to lead to its general adoption, to admit that their expectations have not been realized. I think that, after all we have seen, there must be very few persons indeed who are of opinion that Parliament is likely to extend the operation of the minority clause. Probably there are among the supporters of the clause in 1867 some who, perceiving the extreme improbability of its extension, admit it is untenable in our present position, and therefore had better be parted with. So much for the history of the opinions advanced in 1867. The hon. Member opposite says that there is a precedent for this clause in the Oxford University Reform Act of 1854. Now there is, perhaps, no one sitting in Parliament who is so responsible for that Act as myself. Consequently, I am responsible for the introduction of the minority clause into that measure; but, so far from admitting that that is a precedent for applying the same principle to our Parliamentary representation, I say that the considerations which induced us to introduce that provision into the University Reform Act are the very considerations which condemn its applicability to Parliamentary representation. The principle of Parliamentary representation is, that we should recognize each constituency as being in itself an integer—as being in itself a community—and what we want in this House is to have the prevailing sense of the community. We do not want to have represented in miniature particular shades of opinion that may at the moment prevail in it, but the sense of the majority, which represents the whole community; because the community is, in the spirit and sense of the Constitution, recognized as being in itself an integral quantity. As the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) well said in 1867—"If the minority are discontented with the existing state of things, let them set to work and exert themselves until they become the majority." In the case of Oxford, however, we wanted to attain precisely an opposite object. That object was to set up the University apart from the Colleges, because it had been previously too much absorbed in the Colleges. We wanted to have general representation, and being extremely desirous not to have the Colleges represented as integral quantities, we introduced the minority vote, with a view to obtain the most general representation that could he had. There is, no doubt, an important argument which appears primâ facie to tell against the Motion of my hon. Friend, and there is another argument which I think especially tells in favour of it. The latter is an argument the consideration of which you may say the House ought to postpone. I admit that it may be brought forward in reference to the Bill of the Postmaster General. It is, nevertheless, quite plain that, if the House should think fit to adopt the principle of secret voting, it will give a greatly increased power and operation to the minority clause. It is possible now for a large majority, watching the course of the poll, to assert themselves as they have done at Birmingham, Glasgow, and elsewhere; but if secret voting be adopted, such voting will become totally impossible, and the majority will be deprived of the natural and legitimate defence they now possess. But the main argument which tells against my hon. Friend is, that it is better not to disturb what Parliament has so recently enacted. After the experience which we have had, I think that argument loses much of its weight. On the part of the Government, of course, I need not say that there did not appear to us to be any such urgency in the question as to make it our duty to include the minority clause among the subjects which we felt bound to consider with a view to legislation. But my hon. Friend, acting upon his own discretion, challenges our judgment on this question. In consequence of no prompting or encouragement by us, but using his own undoubted free agency, he introduces a Bill into this House, and demands of us that we should state what we intend to do with regard to it. I am prepared to answer my hon. Friend. I really cannot refuse to accompany him into the Lobby. I have referred to the undoubted sense of this House in 1867, and the manifestly exceptional nature of the motives which induced the House to acquiesce in the minority clause, although a large minority opposed it to the last; but, finally, is there any great value in the argument respecting disturbance? If the disturbance related to any important points in regard to which the Act of 1867 is not entirety satisfactory—if, for instance, my hon. Friend had asked us to reconsider the question of the redistribution of seats, I should have admitted the force of the argument about not disturbing what had been so recently enacted; because to reopen any of the questions connected with the framework of the Act would be highly inexpedient in a Parliament which is so closely occupied with other matters. But the Bill of my hon. Friend will not, in the slightest degree, disturb the framework of the Act of 1867. It appears to me that that Act will stand rather firmer on its foundations after this extraneous and peculiar introduction into it has been dismissed than it does at the present moment. I do not think, therefore, that the Bill of my hon. Friend is likely to have the slightest tendency to produce a general disturbance of the subject of Parliamentary representation and a reopening of a question which we do not desire to re-open at the present moment. I am not aware of any other strong argument which can be urged against the Bill, except by those who are, upon principle, advocates of the minority clause. These were, in 1867, a decided minority of the House; and I have not the slightest reason to suppose that time has altered their position in this respect. After these remarks I can only say that, though we have not treated this as a party question, or one in regard to which Government is specially responsible, I shall give my cordial support to the Bill of my hon. Friend.

MR. MORRISON

said, he had risen for the purpose of seconding the Motion of his hon. Friend the Member for Boston (Mr. Collins); but he had been prevented from doing so in consequence of the First Minister of the Crown interposing. He was unable, however, to agree with much of the extraneous matter in his hon. Friend's speech, particularly that part of it relating to the conduct of the two great political parties on the question of Reform. He was prepared to support any proposition for applying the principle of three-cornered constituencies over the whole of England, although that would involve the apportionment of representation in strict accordance with population. He agreed with his hon. Friend that the introduction of the present Bill was inopportune. The time of the House had been sufficiently taken up of late in considering the question of the representation of the people, and hon. Members might fairly ask for leisure to deliberate on subjects which had been postponed in consequence of the omnibus of Reform stopping the way. He distinctly disclaimed the idea of the First Minister of the Crown that his hon. Friend the Member for Bury St. Edmunds (Mr. Hardcastle) was raising a very small question. The Act of 1867 might be left alone; but he warned the right hon. Gentleman that, if the question of the redistribution of seats were reopened at all, it might perhaps bring on an agitation for a much larger object than he had at present any conception of. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds seemed to be under the delusion that this was an Enfranchisement Bill; but the immediate effect of the minority clause was to enable 14,000 or 15,000 Liberal electors of Liverpool to obtain a spokesman in the House of Commons. It would be rather dangerous to compare Liverpool with the borough which the hon. Member represented, and which contained a population of about 13,000, including men, women, and children. Now, if the existing right of the 14,000 Liberal electors of Liverpool were disputed, the people of England, or, at all events, the Radical party, would ask why the borough of Bury St. Edmunds and a hundred other small constituencies should return one or two Members while the counties, the great boroughs, and the metropolis itself were not admitted to their rights. The hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds did not fall into the same fallacy as the First Minister did when he spoke of minorities being "virtually" represented. He thought the House had heard the last of that argument in 1867, when they were told that, though the working men had no votes themselves, they were virtually represented by the middle-class electors. It was obvious that everyone would rather look after his own interest than leave it to the guardianship of some person whose name he had never heard. The First Minister said that, by the operation of chance in our "happy-go-lucky" system, a particular opinion which cannot obtain representation in one constituency obtains it in another; but why should not the result be obtained by direct instead of indirect means? He denied, however, that we did obtain representation of all opinions in the House of Commons; and still less were they represented in proportion to the amount of strength they commanded outside the House. People were apt to forget the changes which had passed over modern society. The First Minister had spoken of the old method of giving a voter as many votes as there were candidates as being a return to the old lines of the Constitution; but we ought to recollect that our Parliamentary system was commenced in times when society was very different from what it was at present. Then the distinctions between parties were horizontal rather than vertical. First of all there was the King; secondly, the clergy; thirdly, the nobles; and, lastly, the middle class—the freeholders in the counties and the burgesses in the towns, who returned the Members to the early Parliaments. At the present day, however, parties were divided vertically. Besides that, the whole current of the changes we had passed through tended in the direction of making men more and more cosmopolitan. In the time of our early English Parliaments a man who was born in a particular borough in all probability lived there during the whole of his life, and the interests of each community was as nearly as possible homogeneous; whereas the case was now entirely different, in consequence of the greater facilities for locomotion and the spread of education. The right hon. Gentleman had stated that we attained a virtual representation of minorities by means of the variety of our constituencies. That variety was every year becoming less and less marked, and a great change had occurred in this respect even since the passing of the Reform Act of 1867. He agreed with the right hon. Gentleman and with the hon. Member for Bury St. Edmunds, that those who advocated the introduction of the principle of the minority clause into the Bill of 1867 did so on the ground that it was the thin end of the wedge, and would lead to the extension of the principle over the whole of England. He himself was one of those who voted for the clause with that end distinctly in view; and although he was willing to admit that on the surface the system of proportional representation did not appear to gain additional favour in England or inside that House, yet he felt certain that, among the younger class of politicians outside, and among thinkers on the Continent of Europe, and in America, this principle was surely gaining ground. Therefore, in voting against the Bill, he wished to hold on to the first step ever taken in England towards a fair system of apportioning Members according to the population. The Member for Bury St. Edmunds appeared to be sorely perplexed by the operation of the minority clause in certain constituencies; and he instanced Manchester, where the Conservative candidate was returned at the head of the poll, the two Liberal candidates each having slightly fewer votes than he. But this result accurately represented the strength of parties in Manchester, because there was almost as great a divergence between the Whig and Radical sections of our town constituencies as there was between the Whigs and the Conservatives. He was, therefore, not astonished to find that the Conservatives, who had a smaller programme, held together better at Manchester than the Liberals. Again, the hon. Member was sorely perplexed because Liverpool returned a local politician instead of his right hon. Friend Mr. Massey; but this was only another proof that, by introducing proportional representation, more liberty of choice and greater power were given to individual electors; for no doubt one reason of the success of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Rathbone) was, that he was favourably known by his exertions on behalf of that town, whereas Mr. Massey was a comparative stranger. For similar reasons, perhaps, the Liberal Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter) was preferred to his hon. Friend the present Member for Nottingham (Mr. Auberon Herbert); but was not Berkshire better represented now than it was before—and would it be desirable to see that county represented by three Conservatives? The hon. Member for Nottingham, like himself, happened to belong to the little body of politicians called "philosophers," who paid much deference to the opinions of Mr. John Stuart Mill; but, judging from the fate of various candidates, that body did not seem to find favour with English constitu- encies. They advocated the representation of opinions instead of the representation of the aggregation of houses or of so many acres and square miles. Desiring to get at the opinions of the people who lived in those houses or upon those acres, they paid but little attention to mere geographical position. The Member for Boston was affected by an old constitutional superstition when he supposed there could be a representation of communities independent of the people who formed those communities, and who did not all entertain the same opinions. Again, it had been said that this principle of proportional representation had only been accepted by insignificant Assemblies. He presumed that the allusion was to the discussions some years ago in the Parliament of Australia, and those at the Cape of Good Hope. He did not think, however, that his hon. Friend (Mr. Hardcastle) could have paid much attention to the present position of this question on the Continent of Europe and in America. Perhaps his hon. Friend had heard nothing about the acceptance of the principle of personal representation many years ago in Denmark? It was in 1855 that the Finance Minister of that country caused the introduction of a system, curiously like that subsequently proposed by Mr. Hare, into the Constitution of Denmark. In 1863, after it had been on a trial for eight years, it was fully discussed in the Danish Chambers, and in 1866, after it had been in operation 11 years, it was embodied in the new Danish Constitution, which was rendered necessary by the loss of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. He would now refer to the example of Switzerland. At Geneva, in consequence of the street riots, which led to much loss of life in 1864, the best men of different parties agreed to form the Association Réformiste, which, since that period, had been preaching the doctrine of proportional representation in Switzerland, A few years ago the question was discussed in the Swiss Chambers, and subsequently the principle supported by Mr. Hare was referred to a Committee. A considerable minority of the Members of the Committee were in favour of the scheme, but the majority objected to its adoption, because they advocated a further examination of the question, with regard to what was known as the cumulative vote. At Neufchatel a Committee recommended the adoption of the principle into the State Constitution; and at Zurich, not only was a strong party in favour of the adoption of the principle, but they carried it to its most extreme limit by relegating the decision of every question, however small, to the whole body of electors. His hon. Friend might, perhaps, say that these facts ought not to weigh much with us, because foreign countries were differently circumstanced from Great Britain; but, inasmuch as the party most strongly opposed to proportional representation in England might be identified generally with the Manchester School, and as they were in the habit of always holding up to us the example of America, no doubt his hon. Friend would pay some deference to what had been done in the United States. Last year a Committee of the Senate, which surely was no obscure representative Assembly, was appointed to inquire into the subject of the cumulative, or, as it was called in America, the "free" vote. That Committee, composed of Senators of various parties, agreed on their Report on the 2nd of March, 1869, and resolved unanimously that it was desirable to do away with districts altogether, to give each voter as many votes as there were Members to be returned, and to allow him to split those votes among all the candidates or cumulate them upon one. Outside of Congress the principle of the representation of minorities was winning its way, and it had been applied to the election of Judges in the States of Pennsylvania and New York, and it was on the point of being introduced into that of the Governing Body of Harvard University. Hon. Members, who looked upon the United States as an example to be followed, should be informed that a Report had been made by Committees of the State of Illinois appointed to consider whether the Constitution should be revised, recommending that the State should be divided into three-cornered constituencies with the cumulative vote on the 10th of March, 1870; the Convention confirmed the Report by a majority of 5 to 1. It had been said—"What Illinois says today, America will say tomorrow." All the Chicago papers favoured the new principle; and therefore the question, so far as it had gone in America, could not be said to be favoured only by "obscure bodies." He (Mr. Morrison) believed that the adoption of that principle here would ultimately lead to the adoption of Mr. Hare's plan. The hon. Member for Bury (Mr. Hardcastle) had urged, among other objections to Mr. Hare's scheme, that it would bring so many candidates into the field; but this was one of the principal arguments in its favour. The hon. Member also objected that it would bring into the House so many advocates of crotchets; and in speaking upon this point he was very hard upon the hon. Member for Carlisle (Sir Wilfrid Lawson), for he seemed to regret the presence of a single representative of the United Kingdom Alliance. Indeed, the hon. Member pointed out that if proportional representation were carried out to its full limits, the House would contain six or seven representatives as mad as his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle; and he went so far as to say that persons with crotchets never entertained intelligent views upon great Imperial questions because they over-estimated the importance of the one idea. As he generally found himself in the same Lobby as his hon. Friend the Member for Carlisle, he protested against the dogma that a man strongly in favour of an unpopular proposition was of necessity incompetent to form an opinion upon any other. And he asserted that it would be most desirable if representatives of every considerable body holding opinions peculiar to themselves were represented in the House of Commons, because those opinions would then be discussed under circumstances in which the speakers would be amenable to strict rules of debate and be confronted by able opponents, instead of urging their arguments in assemblies all of the same way of thinking. Among the ancients each party collected their constituents in the market-place; but one of the weaknesses of the system was the excessive power of the majority. The principle upon which representation should be based was, that a hearing should be obtained in the Legislature for advocates of every diversity of opinion mustering a very considerable number of adherents—that, in fact, the minority should be represented, but that the majority should rule. Even without the three-cornered principle, there were many cases in which the minority had succeeded in obtaining representatives. Southwark, the other day, presented an example of that kind. There were three parties who were about equal in numbers, and though the Liberals and Radicals together had a majority of nearly two-thirds among the constituents, a Conservative was returned. It would be invidious to mention cases in which Governments the representatives of minorities ruled the country; but he could not help referring to the fact that the proposal of household suffrage came from the Leaders of the present Opposition, when, perhaps, not one-tenth of the House was in favour of the step as it was eventually adopted. Household suffrage was proposed with safeguards; but the Radical party swept away the safeguards and household suffrage was carried by a ludicrously small majority. But had it not been so we should at present be in the midst of a violent agitation for Reform. The representation of Lancashire was an instance of the absurd character of our electoral system. The eight Members returned by its four divisions were all Conservatives. At the last Election 26,000 persons voted on the Conservative, side, and 24,000 voted on the Liberal side so that it was only necessary to convert a little over 1,000 Lancashire men to Liberal views to turn the whole of the representatives into Liberals. A change of 4 per cent in the electors would make a change of 100 per cent in the returns. In either case the effect would be bad, because the very large minority would go entirely unrepresented. It often happened, too, that about half-past three a very small minority of the electors had the result of a contest in their own hands. In reply to an hon. Member who called his attention to Westminster, he might observe that the case of Westminster was singular, but had no reference to his argument; he would, however, express a hope that at the next General Election the constituency would again return the most excellent of all representatives to Parliament. Another reason why he advocated a change was, that he thought before long they would find it necessary to make room in the House for the representatives of the working men. He was convinced that the working men would, before long, demand to be more effectually represented. The war be- tween capital and labour must be settled. However trifling the minority scheme might appear, it involved a great principle, and he had accepted it as an instalment of future Reform; but when they were talking about Reform they could not do better than first to admit within their walls the representatives of different opinions. It would be a great advantage, too, to give a greater latitude of choice to the electors; an illustration of which was afforded recently at Bristol. He protested against the doctrine asserted by the Prime Minister, that this clause could be allowed to stand alone; on the contrary it involved the whole question of the redistribution of seats, and he claimed his hon. Friend the Member for Bury as an ally in that direction. The Prime Minister had observed that the opinion of the House of Commons was decidedly against the minority principle in years gone by, and this was quite right; but it was possible that if the scheme were put before the country in a more complete and thorough manner a few years would discover a majority in its favour. It was only last year that an hon. Member sitting behind the Government (Mr. Stapleton) proposed a restricted vote for the election of Representative Peers of Scotland, and what said the First Lord of the Treasury? He said it was impossible to resist that principle in the case of Scotch Representative Peers. But if the adoption of the principle was advisable in the case of Scotch Representative Peers in order to swell the Ministerial majority, surely it could not be objected to in other cases.

MR. J. HARDY

said, he thought it would be unwise to disturb an arrangement which had been come to so recently as 1867, and which had been recommended to the House on the authority of the then Government. It was not a party question, but it was generally accepted as a compromise. He had originally supported—and should still support—the minority clause, because he believed that it was just and necessary; and on that ground it had been supported by men of weight on both sides of the House. No argument could be adduced in favour of allowing great cities to monopolize the representation, or of giving residents in large communities half-a-dozen votes while electors in small constituencies had but one. At the time when the mi- nority clause was proposed some of the large boroughs were asking for six Members; and it would have been monstrous that Roman Catholic electors in them should have had the right to give six votes at every General Election. If there was no such clause as this, the result would be that the large boroughs would become as inaccessible as the small boroughs formerly used to be. It was a question in which the interests of the whole country were concerned. There was no reason for reopening the subject now, and, above all, he thought they should postpone the consideration of it until the measure of the Government relative to the Ballot was before them. He should heartily support the hon. Member for Boston (Mr. Collins).

SIR GEORGE GREY

said, he wished to explain in a few words the reasons which induced him to oppose the Bill. The chief of them was the inexpediency of reopening a question which was settled in 1867 by agreement between the two Houses, without any pressing necessity for such a step. The provision which the Bill would repeal had been inserted in the Reform Bill as the result of a compromise, the other House consenting to give up certain Amendments to which they attached great importance, and the House of Commons agreeing in consequence to accept this minority clause. Allusion had been made to the legislation of last year with reference to the compound householder; but in that case there was a pressing necessity for an amendment of the law, arising out of the inconvenience experienced by local authorities in the collection of the rate—a state of things unforeseen by the promoters of the Reform Bill. In this case, however, there had been no strong appeal for an amendment of the law; in fact, the thin attendance of Members during the greater part of the debate, and its languid character, showed what little interest was taken in the subject, and what little occasion there was for this Bill. To pass the Bill under such circumstances would be to invite its summary rejection by the House of Lords, who would not be encouraged by this step to come to an arrangement with the House of Commons in any future differences that might arise between the two branches of the Legislature. He had seen no reason to alter the opinion he expressed when the question was dis- cussed in 1867—that it was desirable in the case of large constituencies to provide for the representation of minorities—not their virtual representation only, but their direct representation, especially in the case of constituencies where the parties were about equally divided. The First Lord of the Treasury, as an argument in support of the Bill, had urged that it was desirable to secure the real expression of opinion of each constituency in the country; but he (Sir George Grey) thought the prevailing opinion of Liverpool was much more accurately expressed by the two Conservatives and one Liberal it had sent to the House than if all the Members were of one political party. In Birmingham, Glasgow, and where there was a very great preponderance of opinion on one side of politics, the minority clause had produced no effect; but in Manchester and Leeds, where the minority pressed close on the majority, the clause had resulted in a more perfect representation of the general opinion of the constituency. He admitted that there might be better ways of producing the result than that at present in force; he had supported a Motion for the division of the city of Glasgow, on the ground that the inhabitants desired it, and that it was expected the minority would in that way best obtain a share in the representation. This Bill simply proposed to expunge the minority clause from the Statute, but this summary manner of dealing with the question was most unwise. If the House was dissatisfied with the present system some other more effectual means should be proposed with a view to effect an object which was advocated by some of the profoundest thinkers and ablest political writers of the day. As he was not disposed to treat all their arguments as worthless, he should oppose the Bill.

MR. WALTER

said, he felt he would be hardly justified in giving a silent vote upon a question in which the constituency he represented was so directly interested. So far, however, as his own position was concerned he was not at all certain that, in the long run, the chances of his enjoying the honour of a seat for that county had been improved by the passing of the minority clause. He had sat for Berkshire before that clause was adopted, and the difference it made generally speaking to the third Member—the Member of the minority—was that it deprived him of the votes of the more moderate electors of the opposite party, and at the same time placed him more absolutely in the hands of those whom he more especially represented. He was not sure that such a position, however honourable in itself and satisfactory to a constituency, was that which an independent Member would especially covet. But notwithstanding these considerations, he protested against the question being re-opened in the present Session, because it formed part of a very much larger question, the principle of which the First Lord of the Treasury seemed to disparage in a manner which he thought unworthy of his great intelligence. Personally, he (Mr. Walter) held a very strong opinion that the last Reform Bill was an utter failure as far as the re-distribution of seats was concerned; its provisions in this respect amounted to nothing less than trifling with the country. He had the honour to sit on the Boundary Commission—an honour for which he would always feel grateful to the right hon. Member for Buckinghamshire (Mr. Disraeli). The conclusion at which he arrived as the result of that inquiry was that, as far as the boroughs were concerned, no system could be more utterly anomalous and indefensible. The House could hardly be aware of the character of some of those boroughs. Aylesbury comprised a sixth of the whole county of Buckinghamshire; Shoreham comprised an eighth of the whole county of Sussex; Cricklade was 20 miles by 14 in extent; yet these places were called boroughs, and by the operation of the Reform Act, labourers residing within them were able to vote, while their neighbours on the other side of the hedge, in exactly the same circumstances socially speaking, were regarded as county residents, and left without direct representation. He asked the House to consider this anomalous state of things, as set forth in the Report of the Boundary Commission, and to judge whether so ridiculous a system was likely long to remain a part of the Constitution. This, however, was not the time to re-open the question under discussion, which must necessarily form a subordinate part of the general electoral system of the country. He was no supporter of Mr. Hare's or any particular scheme; his object in supporting the present state of the law was not so much to give direct representation to minorities as to prevent majorities from obtaining a larger share of representation than they were justly entitled to. The object of a General Election was to ascertain the aggregate opinion of the country at large; and when Mr. Burke said in a memorable speech that, although he sat for the city of Bristol, he was not the Member of Bristol, but of Parliament, he gave emphatic expression to the opinion that Members sat here not merely for the representation of particular constituencies, but for the consideration of measures which would be just and expedient in the interests of the whole country. If, then, the object of an election were to ascertain the aggregate opinion of the nation, the particular machinery which was necessary to attain that end was surely nothing but a matter of convenience and justice. It would be absurd that the opinion of the country should be indicated in one aggregate vote, in the proportion of one Member for every 500 people; but if you did not allow the representation of minorities in some form or other, that, however monstrous, was the conclusion you must come to. The only question was the most convenient mode of carrying out the minority principle, whether by geographical divisions, or by drawing, in the counties and boroughs, what he might term a numerical line between the electors who composed these constituencies. Take the case of Liverpool. It contained 500,000 people, and by any test of rating or population would be entitled to return from 10 to 12 Members. But would anybody contend that the electors of Liverpool should have the power of returning 10 Members of one way of thinking, when probably the majority who returned those Members was a very small one? So with Manchester and Birmingham; and the result was, that you must either divide these large communities, which were at present electoral units, or, as had been said, electoral integers, giving to each district one or two Members; or, if you continued them as single constituencies, you must have a minority clause limiting the number of votes. The more logical process might be to divide these large towns into districts; that might be the course ultimately adopted; but even then you would not get rid of the difficulty. You would have to fix the boundaries, a work of special delicacy and difficulty, which had given rise in America to a practice called "jerry-mandering," a periodical re-adjustment of boundaries with a view to upset the existing balance of power. This, therefore, was not an entirely satisfactory solution. What he contended was, that so long as you chose to exceed the number of two Members for a single community, the minority could be represented without any injustice to the majority. As to the case of the county which he represented, and of which he might be supposed to know something, he was not particularly enamoured of the present three-cornered system; and his opinion was, that if such a re-distribution of seats, as he thought ought to be made, were carried out by a Government resolved to deal honestly with the question—a thing not, perhaps, likely to come about in our day—Berkshire should be divided into two parts, each having two Members, and two little boroughs should be disfranchised, which, having regard to their population and importance, had no more right to return Members to Parliament than many of the old boroughs which had suffered disfranchisement already. In that way you would get an infinitely more complete representation of Berkshire than it enjoyed at present. What was the case in that county? A population of 125,000 returned three Members to Parliament. The four Parliamentary boroughs, with a population of 50,000, returned five Members. On what ground of justice or common sense could that state of things be defended? The arrangement he had suggested would be an honest and just mode of settling the question in Berkshire, and, no doubt, plenty of hon. Members could point to pretty much the same anomaly in their own counties, and would say that similar reforms were needed. He would not trouble the House further, but felt that in the position he held he could not give a silent vote on this subject; and, as long as the present distribution of seats existed, together with a three-cornered system—a system which he did not defend, but which he accepted as a fact—so long he should think it his duty to support what he believed to be a just and honest solution of the difficulty.

MR. GRAHAM

said, objections had been taken by hon. Members against bringing forward this question, on the ground that it was so immediately after what was alleged to have been a settlement of the matter with the House of Lords. He entirely admitted that, had the matter so settled been a question of principle, there might have been great force in this. But what was settled, he ventured to think, was not a question of principle at all. Almost at the close of the Session, the minority clause was introduced into the Representation Bill by the other House of Parliament. The House of Commons was then exhausted with the long discussions it had had upon the subject, and held that it was better not to imperil the whole Bill, on a question which applied only to a small number of the constituencies, and therefore the House consented to allow the minority clause to pass, contrary to the protest of those most deeply interested. In so protesting, hon. Members maintained their right to reopen this question whenever an opportunity presented itself. On that ground he held that they were not violating any compact, and that they had a perfect right to reopen this question. He ventured to point out that the arguments they had heard that day raised entirely false issues. The House was not discussing the principle of minority representation at all, but the question of the misrepresentation of a very small number of the constituencies of this country. If the question of the redistribution of seats and the corrupt state of representation alluded to by the hon. Member (Mr. Walter) were before the country, he might, perhaps, be a convert to the views of the philosophical party below the Gangway. But the point was this—Out of the constituencies of the country 13 were selected, to whom the House of Commons, after due consideration of their numbers, wealth, intelligence, and importance, awarded additional representation; and the Bill embodying that representation was sent to the House of Lords. There a clause was inserted which virtually took one-half of the representation away from those constituencies. He believed it might be just and desirable to divide these large constituencies, and, to some extent, a representation of minorities might be obtained by such a division; but so long as these constituencies remained electoral units, as they were at present, the representation which they enjoyed was by no means disproportionate to their just claims; and it was a great hardship upon them that upon every question of importance discussed in this House their voice should be deprived of its just weight, and their representation practically reduced from three to one. This result would have happened in Glasgow, but the excellent discipline and the wonderful intelligence of the electors there—an intelligence equalled in few other constituencies in the kingdom, and excelled in none—enabled them to baffle the tactics of their opponents. If, however, the Ballot became law, their difficulties under that system would undoubtedly be increased, though he had no fear but that the intelligence and pervading Liberal spirit of his constituency would enable them to cope with these difficulties, and that the representation of Glasgow would remain very much what it was at present. Meanwhile, the three-cornered constituencies were unjustly treated, and by maintaining the existing system you were not serving the principle of representation by minorities, but were really prejudicing that principle in the public mind, and were doing it great damage. In his opinion, also, if the Bill passed a much better feeling would arise in these constituencies between the opposite political parties, for his experience was, that in Glasgow the clause provoked an amount of bitterness and ill-feeling which had not previously existed.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he sincerely regretted the absence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, because he could not help thinking that the First Lord of the Treasury had taken advantage of the absence of his right hon. Colleague in his argument. The right hon. Gentleman had endeavoured to induce the House to overlook the ground on which the Chancellor of the Exchequer proposed these clauses, which was the extent of the change effected in constituencies and the representation by the Reform Bill of 1867. The First Lord, apparently forgetful of the extent of the change in the constitution of Parliament he had largely contributed to effect, condemned these clauses as a new invention, and said that he preferred the ancient forms of representation. But he (Mr. Newdegate) would call attention to the great difference that there was in the representation of the country in former times as compared with the present. In 1793 a Petition was presented to this House by Earl Grey, then Mr. Grey. He would read an extract from the Petition of the "Friends of the People," which was presented by Mr. Grey. They wished to show how wonderfully restricted the franchise was made under the circumstances of that time. The document was as follows:— They affirm that in addition to the 70 hon. Members so chosen (those for absolutely nomination boroughs), 90 more of your hon. Members are elected by 46 places, in none of which the number of voters exceeds 50. They affirm that, in addition to the 160 so elected, 37 more of your hon. Members are elected by 19 places, in none of which the number of voters exceeds 100. They affirm that in addition to the 197 hon. Members so chosen, 52 more are returned to serve in Parliament by 26 places, in none of which the number of voters exceeds 200. They affirm that in addition to the 249 so elected, 20 more are returned to serve in Parliament for counties in Scotland by less than 100 electors each; and 10 for counties in Scotland by less than 250 each; and this your Petitioners are ready to prove, even admitting the validity of fictitious votes. They affirm that, in addition to the 279 so elected, 13 districts of burghs in Scotland not containing 100 voters each, and 2 districts of burghs not containing 125 each, return 15 more hon. Members; and in this manner, according to the present state of the representation, 294 of your hon. Members are chosen, and being a majority of the entire House of Commons, are enabled to decide on all questions in the name of the whole people of England and Scotland. Thus it appeared that about 16,000 electors returned a majority of the House. Now, who would compare that system of representation with the present or with the requirements of the present? It was clear that the requirements of the present system of representation were totally different from those which existed under the system here described. That old form of representation had its advantages. By means of the rotten boroughs minorities in this country and great part of the Colonies were represented. Small as the number of electors in those boroughs were, those electors were representatives of their fellows, and the Parliaments thus returned were not inferior in talent to the present Parliament. Now there was household suffrage not only in the towns, but in those districts described by the hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter); and he thought that the First Lord of the Treasury, and those who opposed the existing means for the representation of minorities allowed their minds to cling too closely to the past, and did not realize the changes which they had themselves brought about in the representation. The right hon. Gentleman said, in 1867—"This is a great principle. The clauses are but the commencement. The principle will grow." Yes, it was growing, for the two Republics of Switzerland and America—as had been so ably shown by the Member for Plymouth—now felt that some such means as those of which it was now sought to deprive us, were necessary in order to secure a fair representation of the people. In Birmingham some persons had complained that the uniformity in the representation of that borough was threatened by the minority principle. What better result could be desired? The right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade (Mr. Bright), whose absence the House lamented, claimed the whole representation of Birmingham as his own; in debate, even, he spoke of it as a monopoly. He (Mr. Newdegate) disputed this claim, and denied that a majority—perhaps a small majority—of a large number of people had the right to enjoy a monopoly of Parliamentary representation. Great as the oratorical powers of the right hon. Member for Birmingham undoubtedly were, his views were peculiar and extreme. He (Mr. Newdegate), as representing the minority of Birmingham—for the freeholders of that town, as of others, voted for the county Members—had, of course, watched the declarations of the right hon. Member for Birmingham, and remembered that during the agitation, which he carried on with respect to Reform in Parliament, in the years 1858 and 1859, that right hon. Gentleman denied the special claims of the educated classes to enfranchisement. In speaking of the professional classes, he said that, in his opinion, neither the doctors nor the lawyers had any peculiar claims to enfranchisement on account of their superior education; and of the humbler and working classes he said, that if they had intelligence enough to know for which party they ought to vote, that would be sufficient. In 1867 that right hon. Gentleman was one of the most strenuous opponents of the clauses now under discussion. He (Mr. Newdegate) feared that the chief objectors to the minority clause were those who thought more of party than of a fair representation of the people. The principle might not be perfectly applied by the clauses in the Act of 1867; but it was the only mode of securing a representation of minorities that was now offered to the House; and he claimed the experience and authority of the United States and Switzerland to show that we were bound to secure by some means—better means, if they can be devised, than those already provided; but by some means to secure the representation of minorities. On the Continent it was universally admitted that the system of plébiscites had become the instrument of despotism. The unchecked voice of a majority constituted a despotism. The system of caucus was the curse of the United States; and, therefore, in the interest of freedom, he hoped that the House would not depart from the arrangement at which it had arrived by agreement with the House of Lords. The representation of minorities was a Conservative principle, not in a party sense, but in this sense—that it was conservative of the great peculiarity of the English Constitution, whereby minorities had at all times been represented. This was a glorious characteristic of our Constitution; it was one of the advantages of which foreigners were becoming aware, and which the House should on no account consent to surrender.

MR. DODSON

said, he wished to say a few words in explanation of the vote which he should give. He thought that constituencies possessing more than two Members were attended with considerable inconvenience. Such constituencies presented a choice of difficulties. Under the majority system there was a monotony of opinion, accompanied by great voting power emanating from a few centres. On the other hand, if Members were returned on the minority system, you got in this House antagonism of opinion of the most undesirable kind, because coloured by local disputes, and you also got a paralysis of voting power. Besides, if because constituencies were very populous or very wealthy they were to be represented by a preponderating number of Members, there was no reason for stopping at three or four. As the tendency of modern civilization was to concentrate population and wealth, there was no reason why, if we acted logically on the principle of multiplicity of Members, constituencies might not justly claim to return six, seven, eight, or even a greater number of Members. It seemed to him that there was rough justice and common sense in the system under which important constituencies returned two Members and less important constituencies returned one. When he spoke of the relative importance of constituencies, he did not understand an importance measured arithmetically by the number of the population, the value of rateable property, or the amount contributed to the income tax. By the importance of a constituency he understood not only its population and wealth, but also geographical position, the interests it represented, and that character and repute which gave a peculiar personality to certain towns or counties in England. If two Members did not suffice to discharge the duties of representation in any of these cases, it had always appeared to him that the proper course was not to multiply the number of Members, but to subdivide the town or county. You need not adopt the principle of dividing the whole country into constituencies each returning one Member; but you might act on the old and simple theory that some constituencies should return two Members and others one. If a constituency required three Members, he would divide it so that one part of the constituency should return two Members and the other part one. When that principle was adopted, he would vote cheerfully for the repeal of the minority clause; but until that time arrived, he was unprepared to give such a vote—not because he loved the representation of minorities much, but because he liked the system of representation by a multiplicity of Members voted for upon one "ticket" much less.

MR. BUXTON

said, he was surprised that the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Treasury had used an argument that used to be put forward against the introduction of the minority clause, but which had now vanished away. Time—the devourer of all things—had devoured the argument on which great stress used to be laid—that the representation of minorities would be a novelty in the British Constitution. That argument could be used no longer. This arrangement had now been part of the British Constitution for three years, and had worked most satisfactorily, and he admired the courage more than the discretion of those who now came forward to attack it, considering how distinctly experience had been in its favour. If anyone had a right to complain of it it would be the Conservatives, because, on the whole it had worked favourably to the Liberal side, giving them, in more than one case, representatives who would otherwise have scarcely had a chance of succeeding. No doubt in two or three cases it had worked the other way, as for example, in Manchester, and the City of London; but he could not understand how any fair mind could regret that the immense body of Conservatives—men, too, of such vast importance in the country as those living in these great centres of industry, should have been able to obtain in Manchester one in three and in the City one in four Members to speak on their behalf in the House of Commons. Now, the main objection urged against this plan was, that under it some of the largest constituencies in the country found their political influence partly cancelled, because the vote of one of their Members was neutralized by that of the third or fourth Member. He cordially accepted the premises of those who made that objection, although he entirely differed from their conclusion. He warmly agreed with them that those great constituencies ought, even beyond all others, to have the most entire and perfect representation. It was important not only to them, but to the country, that their views should receive the fullest expression in the national Council. Well, that was exactly what this arrangement provided. Wherever one of these great constituencies belonged to one or the other political party, under this scheme that fact received its perfect expression. Birmingham, for example, had three Members all voting on the same side, because that was the side adopted by the great mass of that constituency. On the other hand, in the case where a considerable proportion of the constituency held an opposite opinion to that of the majority, there, again, that difference of opinion was under this arrangement adequately expressed in Parliament. In fact, under it the mind of the country was exactly mirrored forth. The constituency had that influence on public affairs which it ought to have. Where a full third of them differed from the rest, that third was put in possession of its due share or political influence. It obtained, at any rate, a spokesman to represent its political views, although in actual Divisions it had to yield to the conclusion arrived at by the majority. The whole question, in fact, turned on what was understood by Parliamentary representation. Those who objected to the scheme must really do so upon the assumption that Parliament was a sort of machine for registering conclusions already arrived at by the nation; but they omitted from their view of it that which was assuredly an essential part of its character, that it was a deliberative Council, in which every important opinion ought to have its spokesman to plead on its behalf—in fact, that Parliament was, so to speak, the brain of the nation, in which questions ought to be thoroughly pondered and discussed before action was taken upon them. That, surely, must be the true view of the matter, and that view logically led to the conclusion, that the representation of minorities was an essential part of a perfect Parliamentary system; for if they were not represented it might frequently happen that debate and discussion on great questions might practically be extinguished altogether. It might easily happen that in almost every constituency in the kingdom a majority of mere numbers might be on the same side at a General Election, and although the minority might include a full third of the nation, and that portion the most educated and with the greatest stake in its prosperity, it might practically be altogether silenced. Now could they forget that many of the greatest causes had had to fight their way slowly upwards in Parliament against the almost universal opinion of the country? Catholic Emancipation, Municipal Reform, Parliamentary Reform, the Abolition of the Slave Trade and of Slavery, Free Trade, the Disestablishment of the Irish Church—these, and a multitude of other good and great causes were at first advocated by a small and even persecuted band, who pushed gradually their views forward by persistent debate in Parliament; and it would, he thought, be most disastrous if minorities had not the power to make their voices heard, and thus gradually win the mind of the nation over to their side. The danger that this might be so was very real; the experience of other democratic countries had shown that the danger really existed. Now, it was not only for the benefit of the minorities themselves that their voice should not be silenced, but it was very far better for the majority also that they should find themselves opposed—that there should be hostile criticism on proposals, and full debate and discussion upon them. If Parliament were really to be the Council of the nation, there ought to be a collision of mind with mind, and judgment with judgment; it ought not to be a mere machine for registering decisions already come at. It ought to be in very deed a deliberative Assembly. Moreover, the arrangement to which his hon. Friend (Mr. Hardcastle) so warmly objected could never take effect unless the minority amounted to at least one-third of the whole constituency, and that one-third must also act heartily together. It must be every man in earnest, or it would not have a chance of carrying its candidate. Another objection that had been made to this arrangement was, that it tended to put an end to political vitality in the constituency subjected to it. Experience had shown, however, that instead of quenching political vitality it it had a potent effect in kindling it. The truth was, that the real danger now-a-days lay in the direction of minorities becoming so absolutely powerless that they might sink into a state of dead stagnation. But this arrangement gave them hope—gave them life; they felt it worth while to organize themselves, and to make strenuous efforts to obtain representation. It stimulated the minority, but it stimulated the majority as well. It delivered the minority from apathy and despair, and the majority from the stagnation of secure triumph. The experiment had only been tried in a few constituencies; but, in those, experience as well as theory had been much in its favour. He trusted that those who supported it before would not now turn traitors to it. Other countries had been encouraged by our example to adopt this method of avoiding the great evils attendant upon partial representation; they would, of course, be greatly discouraged if they found we flung the plan aside after our first trial of it. He thought it would be highly discreditable to the House of Commons to be guilty of such a political vacillation; nothing would shake the confidence of the people in the House more than to find it shifting its opinion, from mere changeableness, without any sufficient cause, within three years from the time when it had deliberately determined to adopt this principle.

MR. FAWCETT

said, that the Preamble of the Bill, in somewhat stately phraseology, raised a question of vast and vital importance, for it asked them to declare that it was Expedient to restore to the electors in the several counties and boroughs of the United Kingdom those rights which by the ancient law and custom of the realm belonged to such electors of voting at elections for so many persons as there are members to be returned to represent such several counties and boroughs. He always thought that of all particular forms of carrying out the principle of minority representation, the House unfortunately selected the worst; and experience had strengthened his conviction of this, and that the plan of cumulative voting adopted in some parts of America was infinitely better than ours. The vital question raised was this—In each constituency are the wishes of the majority alone to be considered, or are the wishes of the whole community to be regarded as far as it is possible to give effect to them? He joined issue with the First Minister of the Crown when the right hon. Gentleman said that the majority of a constituency and the constituency itself were synonymous expressions. It was no valid argument to say that, in supporting the minority clauses, they were simply supporting that which was partial and limited in its operation, for they would be as logical and consistent as the House would permit them to be, and they would carry the system as far as they were allowed. The true notion of representation, as defined by the greatest writers on the subject, including De Tocqueville and Mill, was that the inhabitants of a country delegated to its representatives the duty and responsibility of expressing their wishes and their opinions in the Parliament of the nation. If the opinion of the majority only was expressed, what security was there that the opinion of the minority would be taken any notice of? He knew that our present representation of minorities was incomplete; but the Bill asked them to retrace their steps, and to declare that it was right and just that the majority alone in each constituency should be represented, and to such a declaration he could not be an assenting party. If it were asked, and if the demands of advanced Reformers were acceded to, and Liverpool and Manchester were allowed to have 10 Members each, they would be chosen as if there were none but Conservatives in Liverpool and none but Liberals in Manchester. This would not be representation, but a sham, considering that in Liverpool there were 15,000 Liberals to 17,000 Conservatives, while in Manchester there were 15,000 Conservatives to 17,000 Liberals. The First Minister of the Crown said that the minorities in these places were represented indirectly by the Members for other places; but one injustice did not neutralize another, and you could not do justice by means of two things which were unjust in themselves. Even if it were proved that the state of parties would not be affected in the slightest degree by a complete system of minority representation, that would not diminish his enthusiasm for carrying out some scheme of minority representation. What was to be desired was, not that the people of Manchester and. Liverpool should feel themselves so hopelessly disfranchised, that they should close their interest in political life; not that they should be represented by a Member for a place 100 miles distant, but that they should feel they were directly represented by a man of ability and honesty. It was said that those who were in favour of minority representation were anxious by some dodge to give the minority supremacy; but Mr. Hare's scheme—the most perfect scheme of minority representation ever devised, and the only objection to which was that it was so perfect it was impracticable—would with absolute certainty secure supremacy to the majority. At present it was only an accident that the majority of the country were represented by a majority in the House of Commons; and it was quite possible that the majority in the House might represent the minority outside. There were 10 men who polled altogether 1,870 votes, and there were 10 rejected candidates who polled a total of 85,000; and these facts showed that by our present system we did not attain the representation of the majority. It was said that the minority in a constituency ought to work themselves up into a majority; but what chance had they of doing so unless they were to have a voice in this House? He could mention facts which would show that minorities were altogether excluded from the House. You could not go into any Irish constituency without finding that there was a considerable minority in favour of undenominational education; and yet they were altogether unrepresented in that House. This produced demoralization among public men, for while an hon. Member sat for a Radical English constituency, he was an enthusiastic friend of undenominational education; but when he sat for an Irish constituency, he became the friend of denominational education. This could not be good either for the man himself, for the House, or for the best interests of the country. Again, it was a notorious fact that in the towns of England there were numbers of working men who, rightly or wrongly, believed they could not be adequately represented in this House, particularly upon education and trades unions, except by men of their own cless; and yet they could not command a majority in any constituency that would enable them to return such a Member. The Ballot and the extension of the franchise were not the cures for all political evils. In America they had universal suffrage and the Ballot, and yet it was there that there was the strongest cry for some form of minority representation. Protection prevailed there; and the consequence was that, although there were a considerable number of free-traders in every district, they were absolutely unable to obtain representation and to provoke discussion. If it were penal disfranchisement to allow a majority to return two or three Members and a minority one Member, he could not adequately describe the punishment inflicted by giving a majority three or four Members, and leaving the minority unrepresented. It was said that Manchester and Liverpool were reduced to the position of places with one Member; but that was speaking as if only the bricks and the mortar were represented; and they were certainly represented with more accuracy than they would be if Manchester returned three Liberals and Liverpool three Conservatives. The proper remedy for such a state of things was not to repeal the minority clauses, but to re-distribute seats in proportion to population and wealth. Minority representation was the proposal of a distinguished statesman, whose absence from the debate would create surprise in the House and in the country—namely, the present Chancellor of the Exchequer. Why had he not come down to pour out some of the ridicule which he used three years ago upon the arguments adduced by the then First Minister of the Crown? He hoped the transference of the right hon. Gentleman to the Treasury Bench had not changed all his opinions, and that he was not prepared to throw them all to the winds, as he had done with regard to the principles of political economy. Three years ago the right hon. Gentleman, speaking of this very proposal, said— It is impossible for me to conceive any proposal in favour of which stronger arguments can be advanced. Woe be to this country if we do not give this subject of minority representation our most thoughtful attention. Well, great thinkers had given thoughtful attention to it, and they had arrived at the conclusion that if we went on the principle of simply representing majorities important opinions would be altogether unrepresented, and that the aim of all reforms of our representative system should be to give every elector the opportunity of being represented as far as possible by the man who would reflect his opinion with most accuracy, ability, and honesty. Then, and not till then, would Parliament become what it ought to be—the mirror of the nation.

MR. RATHBONE

said, he was opposed to the repeal of the minority clause. One argument formerly used had been wisely dropped. It was said that minority representation would lead to compromises which would interfere with healthy action in the political atmosphere; but in the constituencies affected there had been more contests under than there were before the representation of minorities; and the reason was, that before the minorities knew that if they were not content with one Member they would probably lose representation. The working of the minority clauses had, to a certain extent, disappointed those who, like himself, hoped that under them men of eminence rather than men of local influence would be returned for large constituencies. Men like Mr. Massey, who contested Liverpool, would not expect to be minority representatives; they would rather look forward to being the senior Members for large constituencies, and if returned as senior Members the minority clause made them independent of any such temporary unpopularity as lost the Secretary of State for the Home Department his seat, and a few years ago drove Mr. Bright away from Manchester. It was as enabling such men to retain rather than to obtain seats that he regarded the principle as valuable. The thing had not yet received a fair trial; and, unless we were prepared to adopt a better mode of obtaining the representation of minorities, we had better try our present clauses for a few years longer.

MR. DISRAELI

Sir, it will, perhaps, not be thought unreasonable that I should make a few observations. I am of opinion that, on the whole, it will be the most prudent and profitable course for us to support the Previous Question. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has adverted to expressions of opinion of mine on previous occasions, and the different courses which, to some degree under my influence, the House took. I have not any quarrel with the reference made to my conduct and expressions by the Prime Minister. It was my duty, as I thought, in the state of Parliament, on the two occasions when this question was under discussion, to counsel different courses to be taken by the House. No doubt I was influenced in some degree, as I think it was my duty to be, by the desire to secure the passing of the Reform Bill by both Houses of Parliament in a manner which I thought, on the whole, would be most satisfactory to their feelings and to those of the country. But, although I think that was a consideration which ought to have influenced me, and which did influence me, that was not the only or the main reason which induced me to pursue a course which at the first glance appears to be inconsistent. The Prime Minister omitted to state, or perhaps forgot, that the question was placed before me on the two occasions under circumstances very different, and involveing very different responsibilities. When the House was first asked to sanction the principle of the representation of minorities—the House had not then settled the question of the distribution of seats, and the scheme of Her Majesty's Ministers had not then been, sanctioned by the House. Now, I had reason to believe that had the principle been adopted, when it was first submitted to the House by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, before the scheme which the then Government had prepared for the redistribution of seats had been sanctioned by the House, the success of the Motion of the right hon. Gentleman would certainly have been fatal to the Reform Bill. It was with that conviction, irrespective of my own individual opinions, that I felt it necessary to resist that Motion with all the influence of the Government. In saying this, I do not wish to conceal that my own feelings are not in favour of refined and fantastic arrangements for the representation of the people. I like what in our agricultural language is called the "custom of the country" in these matters; and the "custom of the country" is to bow to the feeling of the majority, and to that I have always been prepared to yield. But when the question was brought for the second time before the House it was of great importance, I will not say to conciliate the other House, but to show the other House that there was that degree of sympathy and mutual respect which I trust will always exist between the two Houses; and we had to consider a vast number of questions, some of them of great importance, suggested by the other House. One of them was the question of this minority clause, which had been carried by a large majority in the House of Lords, and was no doubt supported by a considerable number and by men of great eminence in this House, and it was a question which I thought a prudent statesman had a right to consider, because it was not brought before us under the same circumstances as on the former occasion, when, if the proposal had been carried, it must have influenced our whole scheme for the redistribution of seats. That was settled; the redistribution of seats was arranged and sanctioned by Parliament; and the new principle of the representation of minorities, as it was then passed by the Lords and submitted for the sanction of the Commons, could only be tried on a limited area and in a limited degree. Therefore, when we, on the whole, thought it our duty to recommend Par- liament to accede to the Amendment of the Lords, we were, indeed, acceding to that which we had before refused, but what we had before refused would, had it been carried into effect, have influenced our whole scheme for the redistribution of seats; whereas, in the circumstances under which we yielded, this new principle was extremely limited in its application, and a trial could be made of it under circumstances and conditions advantageous and prudential. The House, by a large majority, sanctioned that course. It was not done, as the hon. Member for Glasgow (Mr. Graham) supposes, by co-operation between the Leaders of the two parties; on the contrary, the right hon. Gentleman the present Prime Minister did not support the course which the Government upheld on that occasion; but it was a course which I think was, on the whole, satisfactory to the country. The question now arises whether, after so brief an experience of this new system, with the experiment still going on, under limitations which can alarm none, and which, indeed, in their immediate consequences, cannot produce results which can sensibly influence the Constitution, it would be wise, with some degree of caprice, and I cannot think with any prudence, suddenly to change our course? I have not attempted to conceal my own personal feelings from the House on this occasion, and, taking a general view of all the circumstances, I think the most prudent course is to support the Motion of the hon. Member for Boston (Mr. Collins) which commits the House to no principle—which only declares that more time is needed for experience; and, under any circumstances, more time cannot be injurious, if we avail ourselves of the opportunity of testing the wisdom and the prudence of what is, without doubt, some innovation in our constitutional practice.

MR. HENLEY

said, he would not trouble the House about the principle of the representation of minorities, for his vote depended on the question, whether the machinery for carrying that principle out was unobjectionable. In his opinion, the machinery was so bad as to be utterly destructive of the freedom of election, and consequently he could not refuse to vote with the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Hardcastle). In any borough or county represented by three Members, if on a Dissolution there were two Liberal candidates, and the Liberal party were dissatisfied with one of the Liberal candidates, in what a position would the constituency be placed? Of course, the Liberal party would not be unanimous in their dissatisfaction, and they would not dare to put up a third Liberal candidate, for if they did they would let in a second Conservative candidate. In like manner, if, upon his (Mr. Henley's) going back to his constituents for re-election, a third Conservative candidate was put up, the probability would be that a Liberal would be let in instead. And what was the only remedy for preventing that result? It was a test ballot, or, what was worse, a "caucus." It was by means of a "caucus" that the operation of the minority clause was defeated at Birmingham. Let those who were in favour of the minority principle suggest some unobjectionable machinery. He regretted to re-open a matter which had been so recently decided; but let not hon. Members have this matter hanging about their necks

MR. HIBBERT

could not give his vote in favour of the Bill without saying that he did not approve the state of law existing before the Reform Act of 1867. In the case of overgrown constituencies, the minority clause did not meet the difficulties of the case, especially as respects the expense which candidates were compelled to incur. The proper way of meeting the evil was to divide places with overgrown constituencies into a certain number of electoral districts; and with a view of arriving at that result, he supported the present Bill.

MR. HARDCASTLE

said a few words in reply.

COLONEL LORD LINDSAY

said, this was a very important question, and he, as representing a minority county (Berkshire), wished to explain why he intended, to vote for the Previous Question. He thought the question was one which should not be decided by the House at present. In all matters, when a principle was once laid down, it should be adhered to. Whether this were a good or a bad Bill, he held it to be of vast importance that when an enactment was once passed by Parliament, it should be allowed the dignity of a law, and should not be tampered with and tinkered and altered within three years of its adoption. The Prime Minister was, no doubt, a great statesman; but he would be thought a still greater one if he would engage in a less number of things and do more. The right hon. Gentleman encouraged Members who sat behind him to meddle with and alter the Reform Act, which had been agreed to after full deliberation by Parliament, and he did that after stating last year that it was not wise to disturb the question. Not only had he done that, but he proposed this Session to bring in a new Reform Bill, embracing the Ballot and many other questions—a measure which, in the opinion of many, would alter the representation of this country, even more than the Reform Act itself had done. Having given representation to so many thousands by the Reform Act, it was no small matter, upon the simple Motion of a private Member, to take away from those people the representation which they now had. For these reasons, he should vote for the Previous Question.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 181; Noes 181.

And the numbers being equal, Mr. Speaker stated that the House having given leave to introduce this Bill, and being now divided in opinion as to the expediency of putting the Question for the Second Reading, it was impossible for him by his single vote to withhold from the House another opportunity of expressing its judgment. But by giving his voice with the Ayes, he should afford an immediate occasion for the House to reconsider its Vote, upon the Main Question. He therefore declared himself with the Ayes.

Main Question put:—The House divided: —Ayes 175; Noes 183: Majority 8.

AYES.
Adair, H. E.	Baines, E.
Adam, W.P.	Bass, A.
Allen, W.S.	Bass, M. T.
Amcotts, Colonel W.C.	Baxter, W. E.
Anderson, G.	Bazley, Sir T.
Anstruther, Sir R.	Beaumont, Captain F.
Armitstead, G.	Beaumont, S. A.
Ayrton, rt. hon. A. S.	Bowring, E. A.
Bailey, Sir J. R.	Brand, right hon. H.

Brand, H. R.	Kirk, W.
Brewer, Dr.	Lambert, N. G.
Bright, J. (Manchester)	Lancaster, J.
Bristowe, S. B.	Lawrence, Sir J. C.
Brogden, A.	Lawrence, W.
Brown, A, H.	Lawson, Sir W.
Browne, G. E.	Leatham, E. A.
Bruce, Lord C.	Lefevre, G. J. S.
Bruce, right hon. H. A.	Lewis, J. D.
Cameron, D,	Lewis, J. H.
Campbell, H.	Lloyd, Sir T. D.
Candlish, J.	Locke, J.
Carnegie, hon. C.	Lush, Dr.
Carter, Mr. Alderman	Lyttelton, hon. C. G.
Castlerosse, Viscount	M'Arthur, W.
Chadwick, D.	M'Clean, J. R.
Chambers, M.	M'Clure, T.
Cholmeley, Sir M.	Macfie, R. A.
Cowen, J.	Mackintosh, E. W.
Craufurd, E. H. J.	M'Lagan, P.
Crawford, R. W.	M'Laren, D.
Croft, Sir H. G. D.	Magniac, C.
Dalglish, R.	Martin, P. W.
Davie, Sir H. R. F.	Melly, G.
Davison, J. R.	Miller, J.
Delahunty, J.	Monk, C. J.
Dent, J. D.	Morgan, G. O.
Dillwyn, L. L.	Morley, S.
Dixon, G.	Mundella, A. J.
Dowse, R.	Muntz, P. H.
Dundas, F.	Ogilvy, Sir J.
Dyott, Colonel R.	O'Loghlen, rt. hon. Sir C. M.
Egerton, Capt. hon. F.
Enfield, Viscount	Onslow, G.
Erskine, Admiral J. E.	Otway, A. J.
Ewing, H. E. C.	Palmer, J. H.
Fletcher, C.	Pease, J. W.
Forster, C.	Peel, A. W.
Forster, rt. hon. W. E.	Philips, R.N.
Gilpin, C.	Platt, J.
Gladstone, W. H.	Potter, E.
Glyn, hon. G. G.	Potter, T. B.
Goldsmid, Sir F. H.	Price, W. E.
Gore, J. R. O.	Rebow, J. G.
Goschen, rt. hon. G. J.	Reed, C.
Gourley, E. T.	Richard, H.
Gower, hon. E. F. L.	Richards, E. M.
Graham, W.	Robertson, D.
Grieve, J. J.	Rylands, P.
Grove, T. F.	St. Aubyn, J.
Guest, M. J.	Salomons, Sir D.
Hadfield, G.	Samuda, J. D'A.
Harris, J. D.	Sartoris, E. J.
Haviland-Burke, E.	Seely, C. (Lincoln)
Hay, Lord J.	Seely, C. (Nottingham)
Headlam, rt. hon. T.E.	Shaw, R.
Henderson, J.	Sheridan, H. B.
Henley, rt. hon. J. W.	Sherriff, A. C.
Henley, Lord	Simon, Mr. Serjeant
Heron, D. C.	Smith, E.
Hervey, Lord A. H. C.	Smith, J. B.
Hibbert, J. T.	Stacpoole, W.
Hoare, Sir H. A.	Stanley, hon. W. O.
Hodgkinson, G.	Stansfeld, rt. hon. J.
Holms, J.	Stepney, Colonel
Hoskyns, C. Wren-	Stevenson, J. C.
Hutt, right hon. Sir W.	Strutt, hon. H.
Johnston, A.	Sykes, Colonel W. H.
Kay-Shuttleworth, U. J.	Talbot, C. R. M.
King, hon. P. J. L.	Taylor, P. A.
Kingscote, Colonel	Tite, Sir W.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F.	Trelawny, Sir J. S.

Trevelyan, G. O.	Williamson, Sir H.
Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.	Willyams, E. W. B.
Vivian, A. P.	Wingfield, Sir C.
Vivian, H. H.	Woods, H.
Waters, G.	Young, A. W.
West, H. W.
White, J.	TELLERS.
Whitewell, J.	Hardcastle, J. A.
Williams, W.	Harcourt, W. G. G. V. V.

NOES
Allen, Major	Figgins, J.
Amphlett, R. P.	Fitzmaurice, Lord E.
Arkwright, A. P.	Floyer, J.
Aytoun, R. S.	Foljambe, F. J. S.
Baker, R. B. W.	Fortescue, hon. D. F.
Baring, T.	Foster, W. H.
Barnett, H.	Fowler, R. N.
Barrow, W. H.	French, rt. hon. Col.
Barttelot, Colonel	Gallwey, Sir W. P.
Bathurst, A. A.	Goldney, G.
Beach, Sir M. Hicks-	Graves, S. R.
Beach, W. W. B.	Gray, Lieut.-Colonel
Bentinck, G. C.	Greaves, E.
Biddulph, M.	Gregory, G. B.
Birley, H.	Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Bonham-Carter, J.	Grosvenor, Capt. R. W.
Bourke, hon. R.	Guest, A. E.
Bouverie, rt. hon. E. P.	Gurney, right hon. R.
Brassey, H. A.	Hamilton, J. G. C.
Brassey, T.	Hamilton, Lord C. J.
Bright, R.	Hamilton, Lord G.
Brise, Colonel R.	Hamilton, Marquess of
Broadley, W. H. H.	Hardy, J. S.
Brodrick, hon. W.	Hay, Sir J. C. D.
Brooks, W. C.	Herbert, rt. hon. Gen. Sir P.
Bruen, H.
Bury, Viscount	Hesketh, Sir T. G.
Buxton, C.	Heygate, Sir F. W.
Cartwright, F.	Hick, J.
Cave, right hon. S.	Hildyard, T. B. T.
Cavendish, Lord G.	Hill, A. S.
Cawley, C. E.	Hodgson, W. N.
Charley, W. T.	Holford, R. S.
Clive, Col. hon. G. W.	Holmesdale, Viscount
Clowes, S. W.	Holt, J. M.
Cochrane, A. D. W. R. B.	Hope, A. J. B. B.
Colebrooke, Sir T. E.	Hornby, E. K.
Corrance, F. S.	Hunt, right hon. G. W.
Cowper, hon. H. F.	Ingram, H. F. M.
Crichton, Viscount	James, H.
Cross, R. A.	Jenkinson, Sir G. S.
Cubitt, G.	Johnston, W.
Dalrymple, C.	Jones, J.
Davenport, W. B.	Kavanagh, A. MacM.
Dawson, R. P.	Kekewich, S. T.
Dickinson, S. S.	Kennaway, J. H.
Dilke, Sir C. W.	Knight, F. W.
Dimsdale, R.	Knightley, Sir R.
Disraeli, right hon. B.	Lacon, Sir E. H. K.
Dodson, J. G.	Langton, W. G.
Dowdeswell, W. E.	Lennox, Lord G. G.
Dyke, W. H.	Liddell, hon. H. G.
Eastwick, E. B.	Lindsay, hon. Colonel C.
Egerton, hon. A. F.	Lindsay, Colonel R. L.
Egerton, hon. W.	Lopes, Sir M.
Ellice, E.	Lowther, W.
Elliot, G.	Maitland, Sir A. C. R. G.
Ewing, A. O	Manners, rt. hn. Lord J.
Fawcett, H.	Marling, S. S.
Fielden, J.	Matthews, H.

Mellor, T. W.	Scourfield, J. H.
Meyrick, T.	Simonds, W. B.
Mills, C. H.	Sinclair, Sir J. G. T.
Mitford, W. T.	Smith, A.
Montagu, rt. hn. Lord R.	Smith, F. C.
Morgan, C. O.	Smith, W. H.
Mowbray, rt. hon. J. R.	Stapleton, J.
Newdegate, C. N.	Starkie, J. P. C.
Newport, Viscount	Stronge, Sir J. M.
Noel, hon. G. J.	Talbot, J. G.
Northcote, rt. hon. Sir S. H.	Talbot, hon. R. A. J.
	Tipping, W.
Pakington, rt. hn. Sir J.	Trevor, Lord A. E. Hill-
Parker, C. S.	Turner, C.
Parker, Lt.-Col. W.	Turnor, E.
Patten, rt. hon. Col. W.	Verner, E. W.
Pell, A.	Verner, W.
Phipps, C. P.	Walker, Major G. G.
Pim, J.	Walpole, hon. F.
Plunket, hon. D. R.	Walter, J.
Pollard-Urquhart, W.	Waterhouse, S.
Portman, hon. W. H. B.	Wedderburn, Sir D.
Price, W. P.	Welby, W. E.
Raikes, H. C.	Wheelhouse, W. S. J.
Rathbone, W.	Whitbread, S.
Ridley, M. W.	Wilmot, H.
Round, J.	Winterbotham, H. S. P.
Russell, A.	Wise, H. C.
Russell, H.	Winn, R.
Sackville, S. G. S.	Wynn, C. W. W.
Salt, T.
Samuelson, B.	TELLERS.
Samuelson, H. B.	Collins, T.
Sandon, Viscount	Morrison, W.
Scott, Lord H. J. M. D.

And it being Six of the clock, Mr. Speaker adjourned the House till Tomorrow, without putting the Question.