MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT PAYMENT. LEAVE.

HC Deb 05 April 1870 vol 200 cc1334-68

MR. P. A. TAYLOR*

Sir, I rise to ask for leave to bring in a Bill to restore the ancient constitutional custom of payment of Members of this House. When I first gave notice of this Motion it created some amusement, partly, no doubt, from its novelty, but also, as I believe, from what was deemed to be the extravagance of the proposition. I shall be disappointed, however, whether my proposal is accepted or not, if I do not succeed in convincing the House that it is, at any rate, a grave question, and well worthy of serious consideration. For myself, I may say that, when I first took up the question on general grounds of expediency and policy, I had no idea of the strength of the case that I should have in my hands. I find a practice supported by the precedent of hundreds of years in our own history—by all but universal adoption in every country but our own which has any pretence to representative institutions—and so entirely in unison with the principles of common sense and justice, that, to my mind, our recurrence to the system of payment of Members is a question of time only. I feel as confident of its ultimate adoption as, 10 years ago, I and other hon. Members near me felt assured of the adoption of an extended suffrage. The question has been so entirely neglected and forgotten for the last 30 or 40 years, that I should fail in respect to the House, and should not do justice to the question, if I did not make my statement now in this preliminary stage, rather than on the second reading; but I may console the House by the assurance that—should it accord to me, as I hope it will, leave to introduce the Bill—I shall not need to trouble them with a repetition of the argument. I have referred to my proposition as the "ancient constitutional custom." It may be thought that I am about the least likely person in the House to suggest the adoption of a practice because it was ancient or constitutional; and I will avow that, if I did not think it right and expedient now, I should not be greatly concerned to consider what our ancestors thought right 500 years ago. At the same time, it will be admitted to be worth noting that payment of Members did prevail in this country for centuries, and can hardly, therefore, be deemed incompatible with our constitution or national characteristics. Besides, I will acknowledge that I hope to command the support of hon. Gentlemen opposite upon this ground. Hon. Gentlemen opposite are always professing, and I am sure quite sincerely, their respect and veneration for the British Constitution. That Constitution has, in the course of time, undergone manifold changes and modifications; and it is not easy, perhaps, to define precisely what is the ideal they revere. But should I ask those hon. Gentlemen to name the time at which the British Constitution reached its most glorious proportions, they would probably fix it at that period when the Three Estates of the Realm exercised a very different proportion of authority to that which prevails now, when this Commons House of Parliament may be practically deemed supreme. Well, Sir, through all those halcyon days—in fact, from the very beginning of Parliamentary government down to some two centuries ago—the system of payment of Members was universal and unquestioned. But, of course, I shall be here met with the observation, that the conditions which rendered payment of Members appropriate in those days have entirely passed away, and given place to others, under which payment of Members would be as absurd now as it was appropriate then; that in those old days to be sent to Parliament was no object of ambition, but a troublesome duty, involving an expenditure of time and trouble, for which payment of wages was an essential condition; whereas now there is no need to pay persons for undertaking an office which is the object of general ambition. Upon this point I join issue absolutely. The principle of buying in the cheapest market and selling in the dearest, sound enough as applied to the affairs of trade, if applied to morals or to politics, is but another phrase for corruption and bribery. Let the House observe to what conclusions this reasoning would take us, if logically pursued—as when the man does not desire to be sent to Parliament he must be paid for it, so when it is an object of moderate desire he must pay his own expenses; and, as soon as it becomes the object of universal ambition, why should he not purchase that which others have to sell, and which he has the means to buy? If I am not mistaken, there are few of us who have not heard such argument adduced, with more or less covering of decent phraseology. In my view, when that change which has been adverted to took place, our system of government incurred a risk—rather an actuality—of mischief, which required to be dealt with in a very different manner. The system of corruption then inaugurated, and which in later times has swelled to such terrible proportions, should have been met by stern repressive legislation, and certainly not endorsed and accepted by cessation of payment to Members. Payment of Members is the symbol of a system of honest work fairly remunerated, while non-payment symbolizes a system which can hardly be more laconically illustrated than by a well-known politician of two generations back, who, in a moment, as I presume, of postprandial candour, thus apostrophized his constituents—"I bought you, and, by G—I'll sell you!" Small wonder, perhaps, that, in such a condition of things, this House, which should have been the best law-making machine in the world, is now more commonly known as the pleasantest club in the world. I should add, here, that I think the change of which I have spoken should, for obvious reasons, have been met by a transference of the charge from local to Imperial funds, and perhaps I need hardly say that such is the nature of the proposition I am about to make to the House. I lately met with a curious little illustration of how the question was regarded by a shrewd observer two centuries ago. Mr. Secretary Pepys relates that he "dined in the City on the 30th of March, 1668, with many men of mark;" that he there got into conversation with the rest of the company on State affairs; and that All concluded that the bane of Parliament had been the leaving off the old custom of the places allowing wages to those that served them in Parliament, by which they chose men that understood their business and would attend to it, and they could expect an account from them, which now they cannot. I now propose, with the leave of the House, to state, as shortly as I can, the history of the practice in this country, then to refer to the practice in foreign countries, and then to say a few words upon the general principles involved in the question of recurring to it. I have found considerable difficulty in tracing exactly when and how the custom of payment of Members arose. On this, doubtless, many hon. Members learned in the law would be able to give us more distinct information. I propose to read a short statement to the House, which probably gives as succinct and accurate a relation as I could find. It is from Dr. Henry's Great Britain, vol. x. p. 63— All the Members of the House of Peers always attended Parliaments at their own expense, that being one of the services they were obliged to perform for the baronies they held of the Crown. But as soon as the smaller tenants of the King in capite, or freeholders, were permitted to appear by representatives, they were subjected to pay the expenses or wages of these representatives. This custom of representatives receiving, and their constituents paying, wages, commenced with the commencement of representation, from a principle of common equity, without any positive law.…. The wages of knights of shires were always higher than those of citizens and burgesses, because they were really persons of a higher rank, and lived in a more expensive manner. For more than a century the wages of the Members of the House of Commons were sometimes higher and sometimes lower; but at length, in the reign of Edward III., they became fixed at 4s. a day for a knight of a shire, and 2s. a day for a citizen or burgess, and continued at that rate as long as they continued to be paid. Nor was this at first an incompetent sum, as 4s. then was equal to 40s. at present. The proudest and most opulent knights thought it no dishonour to receive their wages, and even to sue for them; and no man in those times imagined that this custom ever could or would be changed, as it was so reasonable, and productive of so many good effects; particularly it engaged the attendance of all the Members to the very last day of every Session, because those who did not attend from the first to the last day received no wages, and their negligence could not be concealed from their constituents. Accordingly we often find all the Members present, and receiving writs for their expenses, at the dissolution of a Parliament. On the other hand, another writer—Mr. Home, W.S., Edinburgh—says that in Scotland it was by statute, dated 1427, which has been preserved. He thinks it was copied—like many of their other laws—from an English statute, which has been lost; he gives the opinion that the system could never have been introduced, but by statute. However this may be, it seems clear that Dr. Henry was not precisely correct in stating that the amount of wages was the same everywhere after the reign of Edward III.—namely, 2s. a day for a citizen or burgess, and 4s. for a knight of a shire, as an interesting extract from the Newcastle Records proves— Johannes de Denton and Hugo de Hecham, in 1334, were each paid 2s. a day; Willielmus de Middleton and Robertus Swineburne, in 1413, were each paid 2s. a day; the Town Council voted, in 1054, 5s. a day; Robert Ellison, in 1660, was, paid 10s. a day; Sir Francis Anderson, in 1661, was paid 13s. 4d.a day. '1661, May.—Paid Sir Francis Anderson's sallarie for being Parliament man for the towne off Newcastle, 128 dayes, the last Parliament, at 13s. 4d. per day, £85 6s. 8d.' The Members, in 1685, were paid 13s. 4d. a day. Apparently the practice ceased to be universal at least 250 years ago. Hallam observes that "Andrew Marvell is commonly said to have been the last who received this honourable salary," while (he adds) it is asserted in a modern work—Lysons' Cornwall—that wages were paid in some Cornish boroughs as late as the 18th century. It has been by some incorrectly stated that payment was a voluntary offering on the part of the constituency; there is no doubt, on the contrary, that it was enforceable at law. Lord Campbell, in his Lives of the Chancellors, gives an instance in which this was done— After the dissolution of Parliament, in 1681, Thomas King, Esq., late Member for Harwich presented a petition, stating 'that he had served as burgesse in Parliament for the said borrough severall yeares, and did give his constant attendance therein; but that the said borrough had not paid him his wages, though often requested so to do.' Notice being given to the corporation of Harwich, and the facts being verified, the Lord Chancellor ordered the writ to issue de expensis burgensium levandis." From a passage in the same work it would appear at least an open question whether the law or custom might not be put in force at the present day. Lord Campbell says— Lord Nottingham's most important decision while he held the Great Seal probably was, that the obligation on constituencies to pay wages to their representatives in the House of Commons still continues.… I know no reason, in point of law, why any Member may not insist on payment of his wages.…. For this point of the People's Charter—payment of wages—no new law is required. As I stated just now, this question has quite fallen out of consideration for the last 30 years; but from the commencement of the agitation for Parliamentary Reform towards the close of last century, down to about the year 1840, it is worthy of note that almost every great scheme of Reform, whether springing from Whig magnates or from the Radical party, embodied the principle of payment of Members. In 1780 the electors of Westminster appointed a committee upon elections; C. J. Fox, chairman. In their report to the electors they recommended payment of Members. Immediately after, the Society for Constitutional Information was established in London. At the head of this society was the Duke of Richmond, president; supported by the Earl of Derby, the Earl of Effingham, the Earl of Surrey, the Earl of Selkirk, Viscount Mount-Morres, and Lord Kinnaird, and by 11 distinguished Members of the House of Commons. This society adopted the "Report of the Committee of Westminster," reprinted it in great numbers, and distributed it far and wide. In the year 1830 Lord Blandford introduced into the House of Commons a Reform Bill, which was supported by all the leading Liberals in the House. In his speech he observed— As the object of this Bill is to restore the representation to its ancient purity, I propose among other excellent old laws now either repealed or become obsolete, to restore the principle and practice of paying Members the wages of attendance, according to the value of money at the present day, which I consider should be £2 a day for citizens and burgesses, and £4 for knights or Members for counties."—[See 2 Hansard, xxii, 170, 176,325,326,391,527,678,805; xxiii. 805, 1389.] The House will remember that in 1837 arose a great agitation for the People's Charter. That document was drawn up by a Committee consisting of six working men and six Members of Parliament—amongst the latter were such men as O'Connell and Mr. Roebuck—and contained this provision— Be it enacted, that every Member of the House of Commons be entitled at the close of the Session to a writ of expenses on the Treasury for his legislative duties in the public service, and shall be paid £500 per annum. Again, in 1842 there was established an association, of which I had the honour to be a member, called the Metropolitan Parliamentary Reform Association. I do not refer to this for any great work it did, for its life was of very short dura- tion; but one of the objects in its programme was, "that each representative of the people should be paid for his services;" and amongst the promoters of this society I find such names as Henry Warburton, J. A. Roebuck, Wynn Ellis, Milner Gibson, Joseph Hume, the Earl of Radnor, J. Scholefield, and many others of note. I should here observe, that I do not propose to make payment dependent upon attendance, nor, indeed, to set up any Parliamentary surveillance over Members. I think this might be safely left, as now, to the decision and observation of the constituencies. It is for them to select representatives who hold their opinions and will do their work. There can be no doubt, however, that in olden time attendance was rigidly enforced. By an Act of Parliament, A.D. 1541, it was declared that, if any Member left the House without the leave of the Speaker before the end of the Session, he should have no claim for wages from his constituents. In 1580 the House of Commons resolved to fine all knights of the shire £20, and citizens, burgesses, or barons, £10 each, if they absented themselves without leave during the whole of the Session. It was provided that, in the case of those Members who had been absent without leave for only part of the Session, they should forfeit and lose the benefit of receiving their wages, and the Clerk of the Crown was prohibited from delivering out any writ for levying the wages or allowances for any such knight, citizen, burgess, or baron, without leave of the House. And in 1626 fine and imprisonment were decreed by the House of Commons for non-attendance. I come now to the second part of the question —namely, to the practice as it exists in other countries; and I think the House will be surprised to learn that, while there is great diversity in respect to the amount and mode of payment, still that the practice may be said to exist in every country but one—Spain—I except, of course, England and some of its dependencies— where there there is any pretence to Parliamentary government; and I may add that there seems a distinct relation between freedom of institutions and the amount of remuneration, the United States standing at the head, and I think Italy at the bottom, of the list. I have been greatly assisted in this part of the question by the fact that in 1868 a Royal Commission was appointed by the Government of Victoria— to inquire and report generally on the practice of paying or compensating Members of the Legislature in all countries where the practice prevails, and with a special view of ascertaining in each case the rate of payment or compensation, the conditions or limitations, if any, under which it is made, and the form of legislative enactment by which it has been authorized. I hold in my hand the Report of that Commission, by which I am enabled to lay a great deal of information before the House, supplemented, however, by inquiries of my own, which show that in some particulars the Report of the Commission is not quite accurate. I should state here that, as a result of this Report, a Bill has been introduced into the Legislative Assembly of Victoria, proposing to give a sum of £300 a year to Members of the Legislative Council, and of the Legislative Assembly. After debates, which I may say would do credit to any Imperial Parliament; the Bill was carried through all its stages in the Legislative Assembly. In the Legislative Council, after debate, the further consideration of the question was postponed. I have heard, but am not sure whether it is officially known, that it has been since rejected; I can, however, say, with the utmost confidence, that it is impossible to read the debate in the Assembly without feeling convinced that the measure will be passed at an early day, as certain as it is to be passed here—somewhat later. I shall only refer to? that debate to quote a single observation of the Hon. Mr. Duffy, Chairman of the Royal Commission. In reply to an observation that the Commission did not report in favour of the measure, he said— The reason was, that the terms of their appointment did not include a power to do so. They were directed to report as to the practice in other countries, and that report made the case so overwhelmingly in favour of compensation to Members as, without recommendation, to carry conclusion on the face of it. The Report states— At the present time the representatives of the people are compensated for their attendance in the Legislature in every country where Parliamentary government is in operation, with the exception of England, the Republic of Switzerland, and the kingdom of Italy. This is not absolutely correct in respect to Italy, and is singularly incorrect as to Switzerland. [The hon. Member read passages at great length from the Report of the Commission (Victoria), of which the following are the material statements.] In Italy, which, before 1848, had no representative institutions, by Article 50, by the Constitution granted by Charles Albert (Sardinia)—"The functions of senator and of deputy do not bring in any remuneration or indemnity"—and this remains the same. In regard to Switzerland, the Members of the National-Rath—that is, of the House of Representatives of the Swiss Confederacy—receive from the Federal Exchequer daily payment, 12 francs, and travelling expenses (per Wegstunde), 1 franc 50 centimes. Spain, as I have already mentioned, is the sole exception, so far as I know, to payment of Members. In the United States, the existing practice is regulated by an Act passed in the year 1866. Every Senator, Member of the House of Representatives, or delegate of a territory not yet admitted as a State, is paid a salary of $5,000 (or £1,041 13s. 4d.) per annum, and mileage to and from Congress at the rate of 20 cents per mile of estimated distance between his usual place of abode and the seat of Congress; but this mileage is granted only for two Sessions in each Congress. The recently-federated British Colonies on the same Continent, constituting the Dominion of Canada, have followed the example of the United States. The practice of compensating Members existed before federation, and has been continued by an Act of the Parliament of Canada, assented to in December, 1867. An allowance of $6, or £1 5s. for each day's attendance, is granted to Members of both Houses, provided the Session does not extend beyond 30 days. If the Session exceeds 30 days, each Member receives a sessional allowance of $600 (Or £125), and no more under any circumstances. The condition of personal attendance in Parliament is insisted upon. In New Zealand, the Members of both branches of the Legislature have been paid from their first Session in 1854. The practice was not established by any special legislative enactment, beyond granting the necessary sum in the Appropriation Act. The rate of payment is £1 per diem for each day the Member gives his personal attendance at the place of meeting of the Legislature. In Newfoundland, the Members of the Legislative Council and of the House of Assembly receive a cer- tain fixed sum per Session, which is provided for annually in a local act. The President of the Legislative Council receives $240; each Member, $120. The Speaker of the House of Assembly receives $923; each Member, resident in outports, $291; each Member, resident in capital, $194. In Holland, the revised Constitution of 1848 provides no compensation for Members of the Upper Chamber of the States General; but Members of the Second Chamber are paid an annual allowance of 2,000 guilders (or £160), besides mileage to cover travelling expenses. The Constitution of Belgium (1831), provides that Members of the Senate shall receive no indemnity for the expenses incurred in performing their duties; but a Member of the House of Representatives enjoys a monthly "indemnity" of 200 florins during the continuance of the Session—200 florins being equal to 423f. 28c, or £16 15s. 1d.in English money. Deputies, however, whose ordinary place of residence is in Brussels, where the Legislature sits, do not participate in this allowance. I now come to Sweden and Norway, which afford an illustration of the observation I have already made, that, as a rule, the more democratic the Government, the more liberal is the pay. Thus it will be seen that in Sweden, the more aristocratic and wealthy nation, the payment is lower than in Norway, one of the most practically democratic countries in Europe. The latest law regulating the functions and privileges of the Diet of Sweden was adopted in 1865. Members of the Upper Chamber receive no compensation. In the Riksdag, or Lower Chamber, Members are paid a salary of 1,200 rix-dollars (or £66 13s. 4d.) for each ordinary Session, and an allowance for travelling expenses. But if the Chambers be dissolved, or if the Member abandons his functions before four months have elapsed, and also in case of an extraordinary Session, the deputy receives, in lieu of the Sessional payment, an allowance of 10 rix-dollars (or a fraction under 10s. 11d.) a day. The entire sum received during a Session, however, must not exceed 1,200 rix-dollars. In Norway, the Members of both Chambers of the Storthing receive an allowance of three specie dollars (or 13s. 3¼d.) a day during the Session, and all their expenses travelling to and from the Legislature. In Portugal, the members of the Camara dos Pares are allowed no compensation; but the members of the Second Chamber, the Camara dos Deputados, receive remuneration at the rate of 10s. a day during the Session. In Greece, the Representative body are paid 250 drachmas (francs) per month during the Session; the Senate 500 drachmas per month, not limited to the Session. In France, the payment of Members there, as here, is an ancient constitutional custom. In les anciens Etats Généraux, Members were paid by the districts which sent them, not with uniformity in amount, but rather according to their rank. When, at the Revolution, the Etats Généraux were transformed into the National Assembly, the payment was made uniform—18 francs per day during the Session. Under the Restoration there was no payment—another illustration that despotism is not favourable to the practice; nor was it renewed under the Monarchy of July. Under the Republic, 1848–51, the payment was 25 francs a day from the State Exchequer, during the Session. Under the Empire, 1852, the Senators were paid a salary of £1,200 a year, and Members of the Legislative Assembly £100 per month during the Session; since which a slight change has taken place, the Deputies being paid 10,000 francs (about £400) for the Session; but for Sessions of unusual length, so much per month in addition. The last reference with which I shall have to trouble the House is in relation to Germany. In all Germany, in Prussia as well as in Austria, in Saxony, Bavaria, Wurtemburg, Baden, Hesse—in fact, in every State that forms part of a country comprising nearly 50,000,000 inhabitants—there is payment of Members of the various Houses of Deputies. The payment ranges between 9s. (in Prussia) and £1 a day (in Austria). Besides, travelling expenses are awarded. So much, Sir, for the state of the question in other countries than our own. Before entering upon the discussion of the policy of our adoption of the system, I wish to say a word upon two or three points which, though not directly connected with the question, may be considered in some degree collateral with it, and which, without stopping to discuss, it seems right just to allude to in passing. I refer to—1. The duration of Parliaments; 2. The number of Members; 3. The question of more equal electoral districts. While the measure which I have the honour to propose may stand upon its own merits, yet I think it right to acknowledge that, if passed, it would have an indirect action upon the questions to which I have referred. Though the repeal of the Septennial Act is, as I think, a measure quite inevitable under any circumstances, still, I think that payment of Members would clearly hasten that repeal. I think, too, that under the system I propose the excessive numbers, as many think, of this Assembly would naturally come under revision. In regard, again, to electoral districts, it is evident that existing anomalies would be made still more glaring by the fact of an equal stipend being paid to the representatives alike of a few hundreds or of many thousands. And now, Sir, what is the main object sought to be attained by the measure which I propose? I shall not need to detain the House to answer the question, seeing that the objects lie upon the surface, are clear and undeniable, and must be admitted by all to be in themselves desirable, provided I can show that no greater evils of some other kind would be produced. Those objects are—first, to give to constituencies the widest possible area for selection; and, second, that the men they choose shall be, so far as possible, rendered independent of corrupt influences. In regard to the former of these points, let me quote the words of Mr. J. Stuart Mill, in his able work on the Subjection of Women— In all things of any difficulty and importance, those who can do them well are fewer than the need, even with the most unrestricted latitude of choice: and any limitation of the field of selection deprives society of some chances of being served by the competent, without ever saving it from the incompetent. It must not be supposed that I wish to be understood that Mr. Mill is favourable to this measure. On the contrary, he is its firm opponent, and I shall have immediately to quote his own strong words against me, in the hope of being able to show that in this instance his arguments are not unanswerable. But there is another point in regard to which payment of Members will, I think, be admitted by all to be in itself desirable. I allude to the admission of working men into this House. Now, this is said to be desired as much by hon. Gentlemen opposite as by those on this side; and I maintain that no other means can possibly avail to insure that end short of a recurrence to the system of payment of Members. Sir, there is no quarter of this House, I think, from which the desire has not been expressed to see on these Benches some representatives of the working men. I fear those declarations will be received with but little faith if the House refuses to entertain this measure, and if, whenever a working man appears on the hustings, candidates from the Carlton Club or the Reform Club come forward to crush him beneath the weight of their long purses. If it be said that a poor man in the House must be subject to personal temptations, I reply, that that argument must be carried to the extent of excluding all poor men, and therefore working men; and that, if such are to sit in this House—as we all profess to desire—payment for their services is the only protection that can be afforded to them. Now, upon this point I beg to appeal to the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the Government for his support. I shall quote some admirable words of his, which I think, at any rate, will place him in the alternative of being obliged to support my measure, or of showing very strong grounds for believing that disastrous effects would follow its adoption. In a speech—delivered in July, 1868—on the Corrupt Practices at Elections Bill, the right hon. Gentleman, in supporting the proposition of my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett), used these remarkable words— It was time Parliament expressed a judgment, especially with the widely-extended constituency, as to the true nature of Parliamentary duties, and decided whether sitting and voting in the House was a privilege to be enjoyed by the individual, or a duty to be performed towards the community. In his judgment, it was a duty performed towards the community, and preaching upon the subject would be greatly strengthened by enactments showing that it was regarded as a duty.… It would be worse than ridiculous to admit all classes to the franchise, and yet to continue arrangements which practically limited the choice of candidates. He thought that to hold it was necessary for the safety of our institutions to prevent poor men from coming into that House was a most pernicious doctrine.… The coming into Parliament of such men would be must beneficial to all classes. It would do more than anything else could do to strengthen the confidence of the people in the Imperial Parliament. He did not think this clause would effect much in the way of admitting those men, but at least it would remove a very odious barrier to their admission."—[3 Hansard, cxciii. 1448.] Now, Sir, upon this I think I may venture to claim the support of the First Minister, or at least that he should prove very patent evils in the measure which I propose. He declares that to exclude poor men from the House is "a most pernicious doctrine;" nay, he believes that the presence of such men would be "most beneficial to all classes." He acknowledges, with perfect truth, that the proposition of the hon. Member for Brighton, to throw election expenses upon the constituencies, would effect but little in the way of admitting such men. I venture, therefore, to ask him, upon what grounds he is prepared to oppose a measure which alone can resist what he terms "a pernicious doctrine," and can produce results which he asserts would be "most beneficial to all classes?" The fact is, Sir, that the reforms in this House, which have taken place as the result of a long course of public agitation, have had for their aim to get this country out of the slough of class legislation. Now, I venture to remind the House that the evils of class legislation may exist—nay, be as rampant—under a system by which you limit the choice of constituencies, as under one by which you deny them votes. Suppose, for instance, you gave the people universal suffrage, but limited their choice to great landed proprietors: should any of us expect that the question of the Game Laws was likely to be discussed with entire impartiality? Or if, under universal suffrage, the choice of the constituencies were limited to railway directors, is it likely that our means of locomotion would be particularly safe or satisfactory? And so, if you maintain a system under which only the wealthy can gain admission to this House, what wonder is it if the interests of wealth and of privilege are more considered than the rights of the people or the interests of labour? Does anyone doubt that such is the fact? I ask any hon. Member to recall the groan of despair that echoes from Bench to Bench at a proposition to add 1d. to the income tax, as compared with the dignified equanimity with which we discuss the taxes on tea, coffee, or sugar. If hon. Members receive such doctrine from my lips with incredulity, let me quote words to them which they may perchance recall, as it is not so long since they echoed within these walls— But when this House is told of rights, and of rich and poor, let us remember that this House is an assembly in which the poor are not represented, in which poor men are not contained. These words, Sir, were spoken by the Prime Minister but three days back; and, while I honour him for their utterance, I appeal to him for their application. Well, now, Sir, what is the great objection to a proposition which appears upon the surface, at any rate, so obviously desirable and essential to the existence of free Parliamentary institutions? The objection raised is of course that, under this system, the character and tone of the House would be degraded, and that it would be made the arena for petty personal ambition, instead of being, as it is assumed to be now, full of disinterested desire for the public weal. I feel bound frankly to put this objection in its strongest form, and I will, therefore, quote the words of Mr. Mill. In his Representative Government he says, speaking of payment of Members— It amounts to offering 658 prizes for the most successful flatterer, the most adroit misleader, of a body of his fellow-countrymen. He also quotes, with evident approval, the observation of a writer in Fraser (Mr. Lorimer) that— By creating a pecuniary inducement to persons of the lowest class to devote themselves to public affairs, the calling of the demagogue would be formally inaugurated.…. If there were 658 places of certain, however moderate, emolument to be gained by persuading the multitude that ignorance is as good as knowledge, and better, it is terrible odds that they would believe and act upon the lesson. Now, Sir, what is the value, what is the weight, which is to be attached to this continual cry of alarm about demagogues? What is the object of representative government but that the people should send men to Parliament to represent their principles, express their opinions, and make laws in harmony with them? Clearly it is desirable, in the interests of morality and earnestness, that the people who make the laws here should ex animo hold with the principles and the opinions of the people who send them. But surely this is at most a matter of secondary importance. I admit, indeed, that it is desirable in a secondary degree, in the interests of abstract morality, that the measures promoted by representatives should be absolutely in harmony with their own fixed and matured convictions; but I cannot admit that the absence of this most desirable condition would be destructive to the principles of representative government, or would create what is somewhat vaguely called the reign of demagogy. But beyond this I must ask the House, do they think that this evil condition of things is unknown or rare under existing circumstances? Do Members always now hold in their inmost hearts with the principles they are sent here to advocate? and, furthermore, are there not, special evils under existing relations which might be expected to cease, or at least to be diminished, with an unlimited power of choice by the constituencies? To flatter the people is mean and injurious enough; but I am not sure it is more mean, and I think it is not so injurious, as bowing before the temptations of a Government. I return for a moment to the last portion of the passage I have quoted—namely— That if emolument were to be gained by persuading the multitude that ignorance is as good as knowledge, and better, it is terrible odds that they would believe and act upon the lesson— for the purpose of declaring that, in my opinion, it involves a gross libel upon the people, and shows how much such arguments are based upon a want of faith in the people. What ground has Mr. Lorimer for imagining that the people could be taught "that ignorance is as good as knowledge, and better?" Was it amongst the people that up to the last quarter of a century the saying was so rife—" Don't educate the people, or you will make them discontented with the situation in which it has pleased Providence to place them?" And now, from whence comes the demand, most loud and clear, for a national education, free, compulsory, and unsectarian, but from the masses of the people, who have most deeply felt the want? I ask again, Sir, what real ground is there for this theory, that in relation to political action all the ordinary principles of common life are to be reversed, that in regard to them alone it is held that the labourer is not worthy of his hire, or at least that the mere touch of Mammon—that is, the payment for services rendered—degrades and lowers the recipient? Is it supposed that there is something so pure and sacred in the profession of politics, that in regard to them alone all ordinary principles of action must be repudiated? Why, Sir, do we not pay all classes of employment and professions, some of which at least are ordinarily supposed to be of a higher and more elevated type? We pay our ministers of religion, although the same cynical observation as to the result of remuneration might be deemed applicable with greater force. Might it not be said that we were bribing one of the most important classes of the community to profess opinions which they did not hold, and, like Shakespeare's scurvy politician, seem to see the thing they do not? Do we not pay our doctors, and is not that open to the obvious remark that we give a pecuniary temptation to men, in whose hands we are all but powerless, to make us ill, and keep us so? We pay our Army and Navy, and is not this equally open to the remark that we create a class of men whose interests lie in war, and not in peace? Payment for services, I repeat, rendered to the community—payment sufficient to tempt men to devote themselves to the studies by which they may render themselves fit to exercise the various offices which humanity requires—is the rule of our society and of the world. We do not, it is true, pay M.P.s and J.P.s, and cynics have not been wanting to declare that it was doubtful whether the legislative functions of the one, or the judicial functions of the other, were performed with less efficiency or satisfaction. But, Sir, we even pay politicians, so soon as they become official politicians. Of course I am at once told—"Oh, that is quite a different thing; they have to devote their time and abilities to the public service." The inference is unmistakable: this devotion is not expected in unpaid Members of Parliament. Sir, that is my argument: where there is payment, duties are recognized; where there is not payment, the contrary is the natural inference. But I shall be told we can always find out of the leisure class men willing to undertake the duties of a Member of Parliament. Well, Sir, is not the same the case in regard to at least all the higher orders of officialism? Take the case of the right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister—if he will permit me to allude to him in his presence—whose Leadership we on these Benches are so proud to follow, always excepting the occasions on which he turns sharp round upon us, and presents a revolver at our heads. Does anyone believe that the right hon. Gentleman, inscribing, as he clearly is, his name and principles on a page of his country's history—does anyone believe that the pittance he receives forms an appreciable incentive in his career? Sir, there attaches to officialism power, influence, patronage, unknown to the humble Member. I am really not sure that I might not use the à fortiori argument, and say that, if either Members or officials must work for nothing, it had better be the latter than the former. Yes, Sir, we pay politicians when they become official; but, more than this, we pay them with enthusiasm. An official who is unpaid is a dark stain upon the brightness of the Constitution. I well remember last Session with what indignation an hon. Member who sits on the front Bench opposite (Mr. Sclater-Booth) denounced the principle of official non-payment. He said— Many gentlemen entering public life would, he felt, have some reason to be jealous at seeing a person appointed an officer of the Treasury without the salary which properly belonged to such an appointment, because he happened to be a nobleman possessing a large fortune.—[3 Hansard, cxciv. 847.] Sir, I well remember how the hon. Gentleman spoke as though in his mind's eye he saw the bulwarks of the Constitution crumbling at his feet before so unprecedented an event. Sir, it would seem that our Constitution is of a peculiar and fragile composition: it is endangered if a young nobleman, with more money than he knows what to do with, consents to serve his country without pay; but it is still more rudely shaken if a poor man, chosen by a constituency to represent them, is enabled, by remuneration for his services, to fulfil them. Now, Sir, will the House permit me to ask what is, or what is thought to be, the character of this House, in respect especially to the existence of those personal and sordid interests which it is thought would so greatly prevail if Members were paid for their services? And I would remind the House that, with regard to the character of such an Assembly as ours, what is thought to be is only secondary in importance to what is, in reference to such character. Now, Sir, it would be a most invidious task for any Member of this House to criticize this august Assembly; for so humble a Member as myself it would be simply intolerable, and nothing should induce me to undertake the task. Still, I must be permitted to remind the House that the answer to this question is most important for my argument; for I might be told—"True, you have discovered a blot in our system in theory, but that is all; a better House, a truer representation of the people than we achieve, it is almost impossible to imagine. From, amongst our numerous leisure class we find so many of the highest intelligence, the most thorough culture, the highest benevolence, and the most untiring devotedness, that under no system, however theoretically perfect, could improvement be hoped for. Do not fish in the troubled waters of innovation, in the vain hope of securing a greater prize." Now, I shall ask the House to permit me to read a short criticism upon the composition of this House, traced by no adverse hand; certainly, at any rate, not from a quarter likely to undervalue the existing from pure love of change. I quote from The Quarterly Review— The House of Commons is growing less attractive and less easy of access than of yore to the best men, while it retains all its charms and opens wide its doors to the worst men. Those whom we most need there are not those who can most easily get there, or who most eagerly seek to be there. Those whom the country can well dispense with flock to it in scores, and step easily over the threshold. Those who have personal, professional, or class interests to serve, have every motive for entering Parliament.… It will be sought, too, by Members who deem it a fit appanage or a natural corollary of their social position, as well as by those who hope through it to attain or assert a social position which is not theirs by general consent or hereditary right.… Partly for the same reasons, and partly for special ones applicable to themselves alone, the sons of noble families will still appear freely as candidates. The old sentiment—whether logically sound or not—that their wealth and social standing entitle them to a large share in the county representation, still lingers both in their own minds and in the minds of a considerable portion of the electoral body.…. The squirearchy and the aristocracy, therefore, will never be lacking among the aspirants to Parliamentary honours. The same may be said of lawyers.…. There is yet another class of men who, so long as legislative processes remain unchanged, will always abound, and superabound, in St. Stephen's Chapel—viz., railway directors, and the managers and chiefs of other great companies, who, as we all know, are far more influential than is desirable for the public wellbeing. They have every motive for entering the House of Commons, and every facility for winning entrance.…. Another class of men, at least as undesirable, will always crowd the avenues to the House of Commons, and force, buy, or beg their way into it by swarms—viz., the nouveaux riches—those who have suddenly grown wealthy by lucky speculation or exceptional sagacity, and who wish to obtain by membership the one thing which mere money cannot purchase. If that, Sir, be in any degree a true description of this House, I think all who hear me will allow that there is not much to be feared from such a change as I propose. Now, will the House permit me to compare the results at which, according to The Quarterly,this House has arrived, with the theory of what causes produce such results, according to the philosophy of Edmund Burke, and then see whether it does not appear that such and no other are the inevitable results flowing from the system which we maintain. Speaking on the question of remuneration for public service, he says— Ordinary service must be secured by the motives to ordinary integrity. I do not hesitate to say that that State which lays its foundations in rare and heroic virtues will be sure to have its superstructure in the basest profligacy and corruption. An honourable and fair profit is the best security against avarice and rapacity.… For as wealth is power, so all power will infallibly draw wealth to itself by some means or other; and when men are left no way of ascertaining their profits but by their means of obtaining them, those means will be increased to infinity. This is true in all the parts of administration as well as the whole. But, Sir, I can appeal to another and more modern authority on the condition of this House, and that is to the speech of an hon. Gentleman whom I do not now see in his place—I mean the Member for South-west Lancashire (Mr. A. Cross). That hon. Gentleman, in the Committee on Parliamentary and Municipal Elections which reported only the other day, opposed the introduction of the Ballot into this country; and one of the reasons he gave was its uselessness here, as compared with Australia, on account of "the absence of rich persons there willing to pay any sum of money for social position." Now, I ask that hon. Gentleman, and those who agree with him, what remedy do they propose for such a state of things? It is a frightful charge against the Legislature of the country, and not the less frightful because there is a great deal of truth in it. It amounts to nothing less than the declaration of a condition of hopeless corruption at present prevailing in. this country, and likely to increase rather than diminish. Surely the hon. Gentleman—jealous, as I am convinced he is, of the honour of this country— could not intend to place his statement on the records of the House, and not propose some remedy; and yet, what remedy has been proposed? My hon. Friends around me believe in the Ballot as a remedy; but the hon. Gentleman opposite repudiates it as ineffective under the conditions which here prevail. I confess, too, that I have never been so enthusiastic about the Ballot as many of its more ardent supporters. My remedy is in the Bill which I am now pressing upon the House; and I ask again, what remedy does the hon. Gentleman propose? He says that in this country we have a wealthy class who seek entrance to this House for the social distinction which it confers; he describes the evil; he repudiates the Ballot, the remedy proposed. Then, I say, there are but two courses open to him, if he would cleanse the country from this stain; he must either confiscate the wealth of this corrupting class—which he, no more than I, would advocate—or join with me to cut off the temptation, to lower this House in the sense of social position, to degrade it from its existing character of the pleasantest club in the world, while elevating it to the higher dignity of a pure Legislative Assembly. When poor men, and men of the working classes, sit side by side with us, the social prestige of the House will be greatly changed, and the magic letters M.P. will no longer serve as the ticket of admission to the ball of a duchess or the dinner of a lord. Now, Sir, I must say a word in answer to a plea that I have seen urged against this measure—the plea of economy. It is said that the country would not stand the expense. Sir, I hardly know how to meet the objection. What! England—the richest country on the face of the earth—the only one that cannot afford to pay for honest legislation! Sir, if I am told that the country is already overburdened with taxation, and cannot stand this charge, I can only answer it by saying that, on that very ground, the country cannot afford not to pay its legislators, and that upon the simplest of all grounds, just as not one of us would accept the services of bailiff, steward, or butler, if he should offer to serve us without pay, because we all know that gratuitous work is generally not good work, and that it is cheaper and better to pay for work that is to be paid for directly and openly, rather than by some indirect and probably sinister mode. Sir, I venture to prophesy that in the first Parliament of paid Members a saving will be effected equal to half a century's salaries. If hon. Gentlemen think this a rather wild assertion, I will venture upon an illustration. I last year invited the House to refrain from throwing away the last £1,500,000 upon fortifications, whose usefulness no man is now found to maintain. I believe that a house of paid Members would have backed me in that demand. I believe, too, that such a House would make very great savings in our defensive system. Without impugning the efficiency of our Army, I may probably assert without opposition that, in proportion to effective strength, no country pays so much as we do. Upon this question of economy I shall ask the House to permit me to read one more extract, and it shall be the last, to see how differently the wise reformers of last century thought on this matter. In an address—dated 1781—from the York Committee of the Constitutional Association, to which I have already referred, I find this passage— But though the corruptibility of Parliament may be justly dated from that innovation of royal authority [creation of small boroughs], the actual corruption of it was reserved for a more unfortunate period. The seeds of political depravity were for ages latent in the defective frame of the House of Commons; and it was possible they might still have remained there, in a state of harmless inactivity, if chance and the ill-judged parsimony of our forefathers had not presented to the Crown the opportunity of Parliamentary seduction. From the depreciation of money, the ancient salary paid by the counties, &c., to their respective Members had become too insignificant to be worth their acceptance; and from a most absurd frugality, the necessary augmentation had been improvidently omitted. And this was signed, amongst a number of county magnates, by such men as the Rev. Mr. Wyvill, Chairman; the Earl of Effingham, the Dean of York, Sir George Strickland, Sir R. D. Hildyard, Sir James Norcliffe, &c., &c. That, Sir, is my case for payment of Members. But before I sit down I shall be expected to answer a question which has been addressed to me a great many times, privately, by hon. Members—"How much are you going to give us?" It would, Sir, be highly presumptuous in me to desire to dictate at this time to the House the exact amount to be filled up in the Bill —that can be more fitly inserted in Committee; but I should like, Sir, to be allowed to indicate very shortly my opinion upon this point. There are three clear gradations in respect of amount which might be adopted, depending upon the principle on which such payments should be based. The first would be to give such a sum as should be sufficient to tempt into the political arena men fitted by intelligence and education to do good service here, but who are entirely without independent fortune; and, Sir, I do not hesitate to avow myself an advocate for this principle. I conceive that the country loses a vast amount of available power by making wealth a condition of its being put to use. If it has ever happened to any hon. Member to advertise for a secretary, he has probably been astonished, and perhaps shocked, by the overwhelming number of replies from men of intellect, of education, and of character, all rushing in the hope of some poor pittance of perhaps £200 a year. Again, when we hear of men who have taken University honours working at the diggings of Ballarat or California, or eager to obtain a place as station-master on a railway, or even as engine-driver, I can hardly doubt but it will be admitted that the country fails most grievously to utilize all its valuable elements. I should say, Sir, that the amount to be given under this theory should be placed as a minimum at £500 a year. The second gradation to which I would allude will be applicable to the theory of giving just so much as would enable a person with the humblest desires to exist while serving in this House—such a sum as probably to any of us would be but a small proportion of the inevitable expenses attendant upon membership. When I say this, I have in my mind some such sum as £150 a year. The third gradation I mention is one which seems to have arisen in the minds of a portion of the working classes. Keeping steadily in view as the one object the possible admission of working men into this House—which, as the House will have observed, is only one of the objects in my mind—they have said—"Why should, not those Members be paid, and those only, who, being without means, should make a declaration to such effect at that Table, and should thereupon be entitled to some such bare subsistence as I have already indicated?" Although, to some extent, such a plan would not be without precedent in the case of official pensions, it must be admitted that there are grave objections to it. It would tend to divide this House into castes, and would place the recipients in a false position, both outside this House and within it. Still, should the House be disposed to go thus far, and no farther—regarding it as but a stepping-stone to the full acknowledgment of the principle—I would gladly and thankfully accept it. It now only remains for me to thank the House very sincerely for the kind and patient hearing they have accorded me, and, in conclusion, to express my sincere conviction that the measure I have brought under their consideration is one eminently calculated to extend the usefulness and increase the efficiency of this branch of the Legislature, and therefore to raise it in credit with the country and in honour with the world.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That leave be given to bring in a Bill to restore the ancient constitutional practice of Payment of Members."—(Mr. Taylor.)

MR. GLADSTONE

My hon. Friend who has made this Motion has predicted with much confidence that it will be carried within some reasonable period, and that the Septennial Act will be repealed and electoral districts established. Now, I do not at all think that the prospect of changes of that kind is so alarming that it need drive hon. Members out of their senses, or induce us to indulge in any vulgar outcry on those subjects. They ought each of them to be regarded upon their own merits. With respect to some I think their character is often misapprehended, and, as an example, I will take the subject of electoral districts. The plan for establishing electoral districts originally made its appearance in this country, I believe, as a part of the scheme of the Chartists, and from that circumstance it has been supposed to be a revolutionary, or at least a democratic and Radical measure. I know, however, that some Gentlemen think it open to argument whether it would be a Radical proposition at all. There may, no doubt, be much said against it, but much may, in my opinion, be likewise urged in its favour, apart from the question of its being more or less Radical or democratic. With respect to the particular question under the notice of the House, I must say my hon. Friend has made a fair contribution tonight towards realizing his own prophecies, for the subject he has brought forward could not have been better presented to the House and the country than it has been by my hon. Friend in his entertaining and also interesting and instructive speech. I hope my hon. Friend will not think I am aiming a revolver at his head if I say that, after having listened to such an interesting speech on the subject, I hope I shall not have the pleasure of listening to him again. I own that, looking at the whole circumstances of the time and the merits of the question conjointly, I do not think it is desirable that the House should entertain the question he raised. Let me say, however, in the first instance, that I do not recede in any degree from any part of the quotation which my hon. Friend made from the speech I delivered on the subject of introducing poor men into this House. To see this House composed and constituted of men who have received a limited education and are in dependent circumstances would be a most calamitous thing. But so far from that being a calamity which we have to apprehend we see the total exclusion of poor men from the House, and, with reference to that exclusion, I have spoken strongly in favour of the principle of the important measure proposed by my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton (Mr. Fawcett) with regard to the charges imposed upon candidates coming into this House, and, moreover, I have supported the measure, being sensible, at the same time, of the extreme difficulty which would attend any attempt to give it a perfectly satisfactory application in the present state of circumstances. Nothing could be more difficult than to make a satisfactory arrangement in respect to those charges; but I perfectly agree with my hon. Friend that, if possible, we ought to have a satisfactory representation of the less opulent portions of the community on the Benches of this House. How is that to be done? My hon. Friend reasons as if he thought that, by appointing payment for Members, you would neutralize the distinction at present existing between rich and poor in this country. I own, however, that I think it is a matter of great doubt whether it would have that effect. By giving to the rich man a certain salary you do not destroy his superiority over the poor man in his circumstances and external advantages. And we must not omit from our consideration that the tendency and disposition of the people of this country is to choose from among the more opulent classes those who are to represent them. It is not by the mere force of wealth, lavishly spent, that constituents are induced to return wealthy men. They themselves prefer to do so. No person, since the passing of the Household Suffrage Act, can have watched the comparatively slight efforts which have been made to open the doors of this House to the working men without seeing the immense difficulties that must be overcome. Supposing it to be open to the working man to come to the Table when he has got into the House, and to declare himself unable to serve his country unless he receives a salary—and I am far from seeing anything which is of necessity dishonourable or degrading in his so doing—does the hon. Member think he can make sure that we could get a single working man to make that declaration? I myself do not feel otherwise than extremely sceptical on the subject. It is not, after all, for the sake of introducing a mere handful of working men, even if we could be certain of effecting the object, that we ought to entertain the question of so large a change as that proposed by my hon. Friend. If it be desirable to open the House to those who are unable to support themselves during the time they are engaged in the discharge of their public duties here, it appears to me that we should have indications of that desire by the voluntary action of the constituencies themselves. We should have had such indications long before this. My hon. Friend has much faith in the voluntary principle. Now, what is there to prevent the members of a constituency from subscribing among themselves to enable a poor man to come into this House? I have heard—but I do not know whether it is true or not—of one instance of a person, who need not be named, but who, while he was here, commanded and preserved as much personal respect as any man among us, and the means of whose coming to London, and of paying his expenses here, were provided by the voluntary system. There is nothing to prevent a repetition of the experiment; but having been now in public life for thirty-eight years, I may say that is the only instance I can recollect. And yet, surely, if the measure of my hon. Friend would operate extensively in bringing poor men into the House, we should have had more indications of the kind among the constituencies, who, if they liked, might easily make the efforts necessary to secure the payment of such persons. It appears to me that if this subject were to be entertained at all, my hon. Friend, who has been so constitutional tonight, would do better if he kept still more in the road of the ancient Constitution, because the ancient Constitution knows nothing whatever about the little change which my hon. Friend slily slipped into his proposal of imposing the burden not on local rates, but on the Consolidated Fund. He skilfully skipped over, almost in a whisper, that part of the subject; but that is a most important and essential change. When the charge is locally levied it is an indication of a very strong sense in the local community of the necessity of the measure, and of the value of the services of the man; but if these payments are to be made out of the Consolidated Fund, then I must ask whether it is generally desirable that, irrespective of highly exceptional cases, which may be counted on one's fingers, we should alter entirely the practice which has so long governed our conduct with regard to the payment of Members. My hon. Friend does not question that this was originally a local charge, and that each community paid its own Members; but he says they were too niggardly, and therefore would not continue to do it; and, because they would not continue to do it, he proposes that we should cajole, wheedle, or induce them to do it by paying the charge out of the Consolidated Fund, in which case each community would be entirely insensible of its own share of the burden. The communities were, however, the proper judges of the value of the services rendered, and of the necessity for continuing the remuneration, and yet each and all of these communities, several hundreds in number, came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient reason for the payment of Members. They, therefore, all abandoned the practice, and all parties were satisfied with the result. My hon. Friend, I think, cannot conceal from himself that in one part of his speech his statements were less than accurate. He said that we had in this country no cases of gratuitous service except M.P.'s and J.P.'s. If that was strictly true, I should still doubt the policy of it; but surely it is very far from the truth. This country is full of gratuitous services; and whenever there is a public service to be done you do not pay for it unless you find it necessary to do so. I contend that that is a system well adapted to the circumstances of the country. If, indeed, you tell me that the service is ill done, that is another matter. My hon. Friend, says you mistrust the butler who comes to you and offers to perform the functions of his office for nothing, and I quite agree with him. I remember hearing an anecdote of an individual who offered himself for a footman's place in London, and when the person to whom he applied put the question, "What wages do you expect?" his answer was—"Well, as to wages I am indifferent; the two things I look to are recreation and perquisites." Can my hon. Friend show that this House is fairly open to the charge of having its heart set upon recreation and perquisites, while it is obviously indifferent to wages? Let us see whether my hon. Friend has stated the facts of the case with perfect accuracy. We have gratuitous service in this House and in the other House of Parliament, although my hon. Friend has not stated what course he proposed to take with regard to the Lords, either Spiritual or Temporal. The Lords Spiritual are not yet relieved from their attendance in Parliament, and they are subject to divers expenses whenever they come to London. The Lords Temporal are, happily on the whole, very largely blessed with the external and material gifts of Providence, yet to some of them an addition might not be unacceptable. How does my hon. Friend propose to proceed with regard to them? But besides the Houses of Parliament, we have the great instance of the magistracy, and we have likewise municipal services. Excepting the cases in which mayors are paid, and I believe they are very few—[An hon. MEMBER: Half-a-dozen.]—the whole of the municipal service of the country is performed gratuitously. Then what are we to say about parochial services? All the persons connected with parochial offices, including the churchwardens of this country, who dis- charge, not only ecclesiastical duties, but also very important civil ones, are unpaid. Again, if we look at the defensive forces of this country, let us consider how large a portion of their energy, ability, and skill is arrayed, either for no remuneration at all, or for a payment so slight that it cannot be considered to represent the value of the service. Take, again the administration of the Poor Law. Why do we not pay Poor Law Guardians for their difficult and very responsible duties? Look, also, at all those miscellaneous public services which are performed in this country from time to time through the medium of Commissions. I see my hon. Friend the Governor of the Bank of England (Mr. Crawford) here; he has served the Crown not only in this House, but also upon Commissions of great importance, with much expenditure of both time and thought. Such services as those are almost invariably gratuitous, except where they involve to a great degree the exercise of professional skill. Sir, I think I have said enough to show that we are discussing a much wider principle than my hon. Friend appears to suppose, and that gratuitous service where it can be obtained, and is not worse than you would get by payment, is the rule and principal practice of the country. [Several VOICES: Remember jurors, grand jurors, and sheriffs.] I am reminded of the case of jurors, both grand jurors and those who sit in criminal courts, who also render gratuitous services, and there is no doubt that the list might be very greatly lengthened. Now, are the examples of other countries entirely applicable to this case? Is it true that the service that is rendered gratuitously in this country is efficiently rendered? Is there anywhere among all the Legislative Assemblies of all the countries of the world, which, as my hon. Friend has reminded us, are in almost all instances in his favour, though I think we might have found some more in our own Colonies against him; but admitting that the rule is with him, is it true that those Legislative Chambers are more distinguished either by laborious service or by conscientious service than this British House of Commons, which is admitted in all countries to stand at the head of the Representative Assemblies of the world? What Assembly is there that attempts and transacts such an amount of business? What Assembly is there in which not only the official Members—who, as my hon. Friend says, are paid, and I will go one step further, and say, are amply and liberally paid—but also all the other Members, without distinction of class, undergo so much personal effort and personal inconvenience, so much sacrifice of comfort and risk to health, really and truly arising out of the discharge of duty, as is done by the Members of this House? It is not, then, on the inefficiency of unpaid duty that my hon. Friend bases his arguments, neither is it with regard to those other classes of duty to which I have referred. But the truth is this—and let us not disguise it from ourselves—the condition of this country is peculiar. We have in this country a vast leisure class to which there is nothing parallel on the face of the earth. There is no country in which such an amount of wealth is concentrated within so small a space, and where, with respect to occupations, wealth being abundant in the market—if I may use a metaphor of political economy—commands but a small price. We have wealthy men in this country to whom wealth is nothing, because it is so common, but power, honour, distinction, the confidence of their countrymen, the favour of the Crown—all these things have value in their eyes; they are not money, but they are money's worth, and the public has no difficulty whatever in finding competent and qualified persons—the most competent generally, and the best qualified persons—to discharge all these offices without pay. There is one case, indeed, the case of the sheriffs, where you find an unpaid office regarded as a burden, and often and often have I been engaged in fastening that burden on the shoulders of men sufficiently unwilling. That is as regards the country at large, but is not this most curious? Go into those centres of society where wealth is most rapidly created; go into Lancashire, and there you find that the office of sheriff, so far from being shunned, is coveted with all its burdens, because public charge and responsibility, and the being chosen to be a servant of the Crown and guardian of the public peace is itself an object desirable in the eyes of the wealthy. The people of this country have many disadvantages with regard to public charges. They have a very heavy debt to bear, and they have to pay a very high rate according to the value of labour. I am afraid my hon. Friend himself threatens a considerably greater augmentation of the public charge than he allows. My fear is that if my hon. Friend goes into the market and bids for labour which he can get for nothing, a price on the part of the public, he will not only have to pay that price in that particular case, but he will also entail a similar charge in all other cases in which gratuitous service is now rendered, and he may also raise to an artificial height the scale for all paid labour now in the market. Be that as it may, I contend that the public enjoys the fortunate advantage of having plenty of persons who are ready to serve it for nothing, and that the public is entitled to the benefit. When there are numbers of well-qualified men ready to give their labour without being paid, why should we go out of our way and insist upon adding to the taxation of the country for the purpose of giving them a payment? I think we are only doing the public fair justice in taking advantage of circumstances which happen to be in our favour, and I shall hold to that argument until my hon. Friend shows me—for he certainly has not done so tonight—that by the large and general change which he proposes with regard to the basis of Parliamentary service, we should obtain more efficient and more valuable service for the public than we receive at present. That being so I think it would not be wise to entertain my hon. Friend's proposal. I know that there is a practice of allowing Bills to be introduced into this House and of taking issue upon the second reading, and so far it would have been recommended by convenience that if the Bill had been introduced in silence we should have had—the enemies of the Bill would have had —to grapple with my hon. Friend upon the second reading; and how in the world or when in the world he would have found a day for that second reading I cannot tell. Upon the whole, then, with regard to this proposal, which is almost entirely new to our Parliamentary annals—without attempting to invest it with an access of horror or of tragic circumstances, and without pretending that the Constitution is dependent on the rejection of the Motion—I must own to thinking that my hon. Friend has not shown sufficient cause to induce us to depart from those usages which are so widely extended, and so deeply rooted, and have so long continued in this country. Thinking that, and believing that, I am only expressing the feeling of the vast majority of this House when I say that we do not wish to entertain this subject with reference to any practical issue. I think the fairer and more manly course towards my hon. Friend is to toll him that, while we frankly acknowledge the benefit that all must have derived from, his luminous discussion of the subject, it is better for us not to raise false hopes or to tantalize him by acceding to the introduction of the Bill, and then joining issue with him on the second reading. I would rather seek to avoid joining issue with him by appealing to the good sense which he possesses in such abundance, and asking him not to press this Motion upon the House, because I am convinced that many will be compelled to vote against a Motion of such a sweeping character as it undoubtedly is. Truly sympathizing with my hon. Friend in his heartfelt desire that we could see the representatives of all classes in this House, that they might join with us in promoting the public good—all voting upon a perfect equality, I am sure he will see that he would be placing us in a painful position, and rendering our sentiments liable to misconstruction if he were to press his Motion.

MR. HIBBERT

observed, that the hon. Member for Leicester had begun at the wrong end. Before such a measure as this should be introduced the way ought to have been cleared for enabling Members to get into this House by doing away with the large expenditure that now existed at Parliamentary elections. The legal expenses alone at the last General Election amounted to £1,250,000, and they might be considerably reduced, and indeed, as had been proposed, they might be thrown on the county and borough rates, and then the more humble class would be enabled to obtain seats in this House. In addition to the usual expenses of election, it was well known that Members of Parliament were called on from time to time for a considerable expenditure for charitable and other objects in connection with their counties and boroughs, and those additions to the real expenses of Members of Parliament ought to be got rid of before such a Bill as this was entertained. Again, if Members of Parliament were paid for their services, the same course ought to be followed in the case of the holders of municipal offices and the members of Boards of Guardians. On all these grounds he trusted that the Motion would not be pressed to a division—if it were, he should be compelled to vote against it.

MR. ASSHETON CROSS

said, the hon. Member for Leicester had referred to a Resolution which he (Mr. Cross) had placed at the end of the Resolutions passed by the Committee which sat last year on Municipal and Parliamentary Elections, and in consequence of that Resolution had claimed his vote in support of the Bill. But he could not allow such an inference to be drawn. The question before that Committee last year was, whether the example of Australia ought to induce us to accept the Ballot, and among the reasons which he recorded in the proceedings of the Committee for the view he entertained on the subject was that, while in England there were many rich men who were quite willing to pay any money for the social position given by a seat in this House, that was not the case in Australia. That was the reason why he recorded his Resolution on the books of the Committee. He wished also to remind the hon. Gentleman that, according to the ancient constitutional practice of England, all the magistrates throughout the country were paid as well as the Members of Parliament. In the name of the ratepayers of Lancashire, whom he represented, he protested against a revival of that practice. There were 800 magistrates in Lancashire, or as many magistrates as policemen, and he could not support a return to the old practice of paying them about 4s. a day each, and saddling the ratepayers with that additional expense.

VISCOUNT BURY

said, he had lived familiarly in some of the countries referred to by the hon. Member for Leicester in proof of the benefits attendant on the adoption of such a proposal as this, and his experience of them was that in those countries politics were degraded into a trade, and there was nothing like that public spirit which induced men in England to give their services to the State without reward or hope of reward. In France such a thing as gratuitous labour for the benefit of the State would not even be understood; Frenchmen could not conceive why people should give gratuitous services when they might demand adequate remuneration for them. He maintained that if the proposal under consideration were carried out the social distinction of that House would be destroyed, and a class of representatives would be introduced who would not be drawn from the highest, best-educated, and best-cultivated class of the community, but from the ranks below that class. ["Oh, oh!"] Gentlemen might protest; but he would reiterate that the new representatives, under the circumstances he had described, would not be so cultivated, and politics in England would be reduced to the level of what they were in some other countries. They might, in fact, descend to something like the "lobbying" system practised in the United States, where men of position and intellect were ashamed to avow themselves politicians. No doubt the American Congress contained Members of the very highest distinction, education, and honour; but the rank and file of that Assembly did not belong to that order. As an illustration of the depths to which politics had sunk in the States, he might mention that one representative had his travelling expenses challenged on the ground that he had charged five times the necessary amount. On being taxed with having done this, he replied—"Oh, but I came round Cape Horn." "Even then you have charged one-half too much," persisted the auditor. "Oh," was the response;" I came in a sailing ship, and there being a heavy head-wind on we had to tack about." The point of the story lay not in the jest that it contained; but the manner in which it had been received in Washington, where it was regarded as far from reflecting disgrace or dishonour upon the Member of Congress of whom it was related. Such a circumstance tended to show that a lower tone of political morality prevailed in America than in this country. If the principle of the payment of Members was adopted in this country, persons would endeavour to obtain seats in that House for what they could get. He recollected that when the question of increasing the remuneration of Members was before the Canadian Parliament, an hon. Member rose in his place and said—"If I am not worth five dollars a day to my consti- tuents, I am worth at least that sum outside in the lobby, and there I shall go." It was because he believed that the high tone of political morality which now prevailed in this country would be degraded and lowered were payment to be made to Members that he should record his vote against the Motion of the hon. Member.

MR. COLLINS

observed, that at the present time we should narrowly look at every principle before we adopted it. We were now adopting the system of compensation for disturbance, and if hon. Members were to be paid for their services in Parliament they would be entitled, in the event of a Dissolution, to compel the Treasury to compensate them for being disturbed in the possession of their seats. The cost to the Revenue would not be limited to the payment of such compensation, but would be increased by every long speech that an hon. Member chose to make. He was afraid he should not be able to give his vote in favour of the Motion.

Question put.

The House divided:—Ayes 24; Noes 211: Majority 187.