HC Deb 17 March 1869 vol 194 cc1599-617

Order for Second Reading, read.

MR. BAINES

, in moving that the Bill be now read the second time, said, he had no cause to apprehend that the Motion would lead to a division, for the measure, when under the charge of the present Judge Advocate (Sir Colman O'Loghlen), had been agreed to by the House in the two previous Sessions, after having been carefully considered by a Select Committee comprising many of the most distinguished Members of the House. Its object was to obtain from Parliament a fair and reasonable protection for the public Press in the exercise of one of its most important duties—the publication of reports of the proceedings of public meetings. It was not intended to give the slightest impunity to defamation—in fact, it would give a greater protection against defamation than was afforded by the present law, and a cheaper remedy against defamatory aspersions. The great number of Petitions which had been presented in favour of the Bill showed that the persons connected with the periodical Press felt that they were now exposed to gross injustice. The present Law of Libel was very singular in regard to public meetings, for the individual who uttered a libel at a meeting, knowing that the public were present through the medium of the reporters, was not answerable for what he said; but the unfortunate proprietor of a newspaper—who was utterly incapable of knowing whether what was said was right or wrong, but whose reporter, in the discharge of a duty acknowledged to be most important, gave a report of the proceedings—was made responsible. That was a remnant of the barbarous Law of Libel which so long existed in this country, and which, after several protracted struggles, had in process of time become ameliorated. It was true that publishers were no longer liable to be placed in the pillory, nor exposed to the decision of a Judge unrestrained by the opinion of a jury on the character of the alleged libel, nor were they subjected to the injustice of not being allowed to plead the truth of the statement, and that the publication of it was for the public interest. But they were liable to an action for damages for defamation uttered by a person of whom they might know nothing. It was only recently that the right of newspapers to publish an account of the proceedings in courts of justice had been distinctly acknowledged, and it was not longer ago than four months that the law in regard to reporting the proceed- ings in Parliament was decided, he hoped finally, by the Court of Queen's Bench. In the case of an action brought by Mr. Rigby Wason against The Times for publishing the report of a debate in the other House of Parliament, founded on a petition containing the severest imputations on the Chief Baron of the Exchequer, the Lord Chief Justice, in his admirable judgment, on the 19th of November, 1868, made use of the following language:— It is now well established that faithful and fair reports of the proceedings of courts of justice, though the character of individuals may incidentally suffer, are privileged, and that for the publication of such reports, the publishers are neither criminally nor civilly responsible. The immunity thus afforded in respect of the proceedings of courts of justice, rests upon a two-fold ground. In the English Law of Libel, malice is said to be the gist of an action for defamation. 'The rule,' says Lord Campbell, in the case of "Taylor v. Hawkins," 'is, that if the occasion be such as repels the presumption of malice the communication is privileged, and the plaintiff must then, if he can, give the evidence of actual malice.' It is thus" continues Chief Justice Cockburn, "that in the case of reports of proceedings in the courts of justice, though individuals may occasionally suffer from them, yet as they are published without any reference to the individual concerned, but solely to afford information to the public and for the benefit of society, the presumption of malice is rebutted, and such publications are held to be privileged. The other and broader principle on which this exception to the general Law of Libel is founded is that the advantage to the community from publicity being given to the proceedings of courts of justice is so great that the occasional inconvenience to individuals arising from it must yield to the general good. Referring to the publication of Parliamentary proceedings, the Chief Justice observes— It may no doubt be said that while it may be necessary, as a matter of national interest, that the proceedings in Parliament should in general be made public, yet that debates in which the character of individuals is brought into question ought to be suppressed. But to this, in addition to the difficulty in which parties publishing Parliamentary reports would be placed, if this distinction were to be enforced, and every debate had to be critically scanned to see whether it contained defamatory matter, it may be further answered that there is, perhaps, no subject in which the public have a deeper interest than in all that relates to the conduct of the public servants of the State—no subject of Parliamentary discussion which more requires to be made known than an inquiry relating to it. The House will observe—first, the condition laid down by the Chief Justice for exemption from prosecution—namely, that the publication should be without malice; secondly, the reason for privileging reports of proceedings in courts of justice and Parliament—namely, "the general good;" and, thirdly, his reply to the demand that the reports should be expurgated of all defamatory matter—namely, the difficulty of "critically scanning" the reports for that purpose. As for requiring the exclusion of everything of a defamatory nature from the reports of proceedings of public meetings, such an obligation would necessitate a critical scanning of their contents, which would be absolutely impossible on the part of a newspaper proprietor, who receives reports from various quarters just before his newspaper is about to be printed off in order to be despatched by the railway trains. Having had the honour of being connected with the public Press for many years, he knew that that could not be done; and, therefore, the Bill proposed that no newspaper proprietor should be liable to an action or prosecution for a true and fair report of the proceedings at a public meeting, unless he should refuse to publish a fair reply to the libel complained of. It also provided a statutory sanction for the decision of the Judges that no civil or criminal proceeding should be maintainable for the publication of a fair and true report of a debate in either House of Parliament. It might be said that a slander uttered at a meeting where, perhaps, only 100 persons were present, became known to thousands when published in a newspaper. He admitted that; but considering the advantage which resulted from publicity being given to the proceedings of public meetings in reference to political, municipal, and social questions, to the management of railway and joint-stock companies, to charitable and many other objects, he considered that any inconvenience which might occasionally affect individuals should be deemed as outweighed by the benefit received by the public. It must be borne in mind that to public meetings the country was greatly indebted for the extension of its liberties and for the promotion of beneficial objects of all kinds. If anything should be done unwittingly by a newspaper to damage an individual, the Bill gave him greater facilities than the existing law for obtaining immediate reparation. At present, if a person was defamed by a newspaper report, he brought an action against the newspaper proprietor at an expense to both parties perhaps of hundreds of pounds, and after the lapse of some months, during which his character remained under the imputation of which he complained, he might or might not get a verdict in his favour. The Bill proposed that the newspaper proprietor should be liable to be called on to insert without charge an explanation furnished by the person injured, and in as conspicuous a portion of the newspaper as the original defamatory matter. That was one way in which the party aggrieved might obtain a remedy. There was another mode in which he might obtain redress. He proposed that the author of any defamatory matter spoken at a public meeting at which, to his knowledge, the reporter of any newspaper was present, which newspaper might thereon publish a fair and true report of the proceedings of that meeting, might be called upon by the person defamed to publish in that newspaper, or in some other public journal, a suitable apology; and on his refusal might be proceeded against by action for libel. By that provision the author, and not the mere publisher, would be punished for his abuse. That was a common-sense way of doing justice to the party aggrieved. It was intended to exonerate the publisher on condition that he published a fair and faithful report without malice, and was ready to publish a retractation; and the speaker of defamatory matter was to be liable, unless he was willing to make the amende honorable when fairly called on to do so. Not a few newspaper proprietors had been subjected to the payment of £300, £400, and £500 for that of which they were morally as innocent as any Member now hearing him; and he hoped the House would feel it a duty to put an end to that state of the Law of Libel under which such injustice could be inflicted. He hoped there would be no objection to the second reading of the Bill. If objections were entertained to any particular clause, he should be happy to meet them in Committee. He only desired justice to all parties, and injury to none.

Motion made and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read a second time."—(Mr. Baines.)

MR. NEWDEGATE

observed that the thin and flagging appearance of the House shewed the strength of the organization by which the Bill was supported. Undoubtedly, as was proved by the Petitions which formerly and in the present Session had been presented, the Bill was supported by a very large number of members of the provincial Press. He thought he could show that this Bill would so extend the privileges of the Press beyond the protection afforded by the present law that it must lead to one of two results, perhaps to both—to a total exemption of newspaper proprietors from legal penalties upon the propagation of any amount of scandal, else, whilst granting what Lord Campbell thought an undue privilege to the Press, it must tend to the limitation of the freedom of speech. The hon. Member for Leeds (Mr. Baines) had cited the opinion of the Lord Justice in the case of "Wason v. The Times" yet there was a provision distinctly reserving the privileges of Parliament, in which the Press, after the decision in the case of Mr. Wason, clearly shared; and by a former decision it appeared, that the House granted this privilege, that the publication of their reports and their debates came within the privileges of Parliament. He wished hon. Members to dismiss from their minds any impression which might have been caused by the citation of the opinion which had been given on that point, for there was a clause in the Bill distinctly reserving the privileges of Parliament. The present Law of Libel was drawn by Lord Campbell, who, in the commencement of his career, was a reporter in the Gallery of the House of Commons, and was therefore able to form a correct opinion upon the whole subject. That noble Lord swept away many of those means of oppression which existed prior to the passing of his Act; yet he proved that the public should expect every newspaper proprietor to exercise a discretion, not over the notes of the reporters that came in in different hands, and in a hurry, but over the proofs when printed from these notes, which was the only form in which reports were submitted to the editor or sub-editor. Thus all difficulties of reading the reports were removed by the practice of the newspaper offices. The present law proceeded upon the principle that a person who deliberately, and after seeing the proofs of a speech, should circulate libellous matter, ought to be held answerable for the publication of libellous matter he thus issued to the public. He hoped his hon. Friend opposite would think that he had put the point right; because at the present moment words spoken in the heat of debate by persons who, for want of practice, had no command over their expressions, were treated by law far more leniently, as mere scandal, than were words which were deliberately written, printed, corrected, and published. Yet this Bill would abolish this distinction and would subject the mere utterance of hasty words to the penalties of deliberate libel. He put it to the common sense of the House whether it was right to put the two cases upon exactly the same footing, and to award the same punishment? That, however, was not all. The Bill proposed that another principle should be adopted. It sought to enact, that unless a speaker could prove that he did not know that a reporter was present, then he should be liable for what the reporter might attribute to him. He would ask, was it intended that there should be a close and direct relationship between speakers and reporters? Were this to be the case, gentlemen would require to hire reporters whenever they wished to go to a public meeting, for otherwise he could not rebut, by equivalent testimony, the imputation which might be made by some reporter, who was unknown to him, that he had uttered libellous matter. If this were not done the effect of the Bill, if passed, would be, that although the reporter was not an agent of the speaker, and had really no connection with him, yet the latter would be liable for what the former attributed to him. The speaker, in fact, would be liable to be prosecuted for the act of a person who was not his agent, who was not acting on his behalf. Every unguarded speaker, at a public meeting, would, in short, be required to prove a negative. Words, for instance, might be attributed to him in a form and in a connection, in which he had not certainly used them; and he might be held responsible for words the meaning of which had been changed. How was he to prove a negative? Unless he had a reporter by his side who took down all that he said, he would, in fact, have no equivalent evidence to set up against that of the reporter who may have attributed to him certain expressions. The hon. Member for Leeds laid great stress upon the fact that the speaker would have the privilege of writing to a newspaper proprietor and saying—"You have attributed to me a meaning which I did not intend to convey, and made that a libel which was not one when I uttered it." But then it was to be remembered that the very first principle of the Bill exempted a newspaper proprietor from any necessity of exercising discretion with respect to the matter that he might publish. He was to publish the defamatory matter, if he chose to do so, and to be held free from prosecution on the strength of his attributing the libel to another person. This principle, however, was found to be too strong even by the promoters of the Bill. They strove to qualify it by declaring that newspaper proprietors should be obliged to publish apologies and retractations for unjust accusations which they might have inserted by way of report. This was good enough as far as it went, but let the House mark the qualifications which followed the means of escape for the speaker, "unless the explanation or retractation contained libellous matter." If it did, in the opinion of the editor, then he need not publish it. Thus the discretion of the editor was to be invoked at the second stage of the transaction, after the harm had been done, instead of requiring the exercise of the discretion of the editor in the first instance to prevent the publication of the scandal, supposing it to have been uttered in words by the speaker at some public meeting. This proviso, moreover, would be of little avail in protecting speakers from contortions and misrepresentations of their meaning, and the consequence would be that the freedom of public discussion would be very much curtailed and restricted. It should be remembered that the proprietors of newspapers have already a distinct privilege: they can plead that they publish reports of speeches not maliciously, but in the course of their business. The Bill, in fact, proposed to extend the privilege of a small section of the community at the expense of freedom of speech at present enjoyed by the public. The first thing which the Speaker of the House of Commons did upon the assembling of the new Parliament was to crave from the Throne freedom of speech; and, that being so, the House ought very jealously to guard a privilege of such value, and not to impair or renounce it merely for the sake of increasing the privileges of the Press. The conduct of debate, the free expression of opinion in public, was one of the chief means upon which they depended for preserving honesty among all classes of society; and if a blow were aimed at this freedom of speech the public morality would suffer. Public opinion would be to a great extent emasculated. He considered that this Bill was dangerous in its tendencies. They were told that the second reading should be agreed to because it was only sanctioning the principle pro formâ, and that there would be plenty of time to discuss the provisions of the measure at a subsequent stage. This was an argument which he hoped would carefully be guarded against, as it was calculated to mislead. According to the practice and constitution of that House it was the custom to decide the principle of every measure upon the second reading: it was very desirable that this practice should be preserved, for there was a feeling growing up among the public that the House was somewhat departing from its old custom in this matter, and that the principle of measures was not sufficiently tested. This point was referred to in a pamphlet which he had recently seen, and which was entitled, The Democracy of Reason, or the Organization of the Press, just published by Simpkin and Marshall. The writer, after touching upon this point, proposed that the Press should be so organized that every subject could be canvassed by a central committee of the Press before being submitted to Parliament, that the whole initiation of legislation should be made over to a central committee of the Press as organized. [A laugh.] Hon. Gentlemen might laugh; but let them read the pamphlet. The proposal was not carelessly made, but with, an ability which was most striking; and, seeing that there was a feeling displayed among the members of the Press, that great questions were often not sufficiently considered, he asked the House to pause before—as it would by passing this Bill through its second reading—thus carelessly encouraging contemptuous re- flections with respect to the capacity of Parliament, as now constituted, to conduct the great business of the nation. Neither the hon. Member for Leeds nor the right hon. Gentleman the Judge Advocate (Sir Colman O'Loghlen) were men of equal authority upon this question of libel as the late Lord Campbell—the author of the legal principle, which by this their Bill they sought to reverse; that principle being, that the responsibility of publishing any libellous report should rest with the person who published it. Upon this point he would quote the opinion of the present Attorney General (Sir Robert Collier), who, in a debate which arose in the autumnal Session, when the Judge Advocate had attempted to slip this Bill through the second reading on the same day that it was delivered to Members, said— If the Bill had been confined to the clauses which gave extended liberty to the Press, he should have endeavoured to expedite it ……But the Bill appeared to contain other provisions, which he deemed to be in the last degree objectionable. There was the provision tending to restrict freedom of discussion at public meetings. The third clause provided, for the first time, that a man should be liable for what he spoke at public meetings to the same extent as if the words were written. He (Sir Robert Collier) held not only that there was a difference made by the law of this country, but that there was a fundamental distinction between words spoken and words written. Words written were taken by the law to express the deliberate conviction of the writer; words spoken had a different force attributed to them. Allowance was made for expressions used in the heat of debate. Besides, some men had not sufficient command of language to express their opinions with perfect clearness; and it was well known that a constant conflict of testimony was going on as to what words had really been spoken on a particular question. For these, among other reasons, he thought the law had wisely protected the privilege of speech, so far as a man did not impute to his neighbour an indictable offence, or something calculated to be injurious to him or his business. As for speeches calculated to bring men into contempt or ridicule, he had heard such, not only out of the House, but in the House; and a high authority among them had said that invective and sarcasm were the ornaments of debate; yet the object of invective and sarcasm was to hold their adversaries up to ridicule and contempt. Without, however, entering on this matter, he might say that, because an essential part of the Bill tended to curtail the privilege of discussion in a manner injurious to the public interest, he thought it highly desirable that the principle of the Bill should be discussed in that House, and he advised the hon. and learned Baronet (Sir Colman O'Loghlen) to concur in the Amendment of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire so far as not to press his Motion for the second reading."—[3 Hansard, cxc. 312. 313.] The Solicitor General, who was present, had, in the following Session, that of 1868, also expressed himself strongly against some of the principles embodied in the Bill. He said it was very desirable that all that was true should be published, but not that which was untrue. They had heard some remarks about fair reports; but what was a fair report? Was it to be conceived that local newspapers could give a full report of every speech made at every meeting which took place? That was out of the question, and yet no report, which was not a full report, could be a fair report. A condensed summarized report was the work of the intellect of the reporter and of the editor, and not the production of the speaker. Isolated passages, when taken without their context, and put together, unless very carefully selected and arranged, might not convey the meaning of the speaker. The proprietors of newspapers were already invested with great privileges, and were possessed of great powers, but he thought it would be dangerous to exempt them from the responsibility to which they were at present liable, and to exempt them at the expense of the public-speaker. For these reasons he should move that the Bill be read a second time upon that day six months.

MR. LIDDELL

seconded the motion.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day six months."—(Mr. Newdegate.)

Question proposed, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

MR. T. CHAMBERS

said, this was not simply a question of relieving a certain number of persons in the community from a supposed grievance, but one which in many vital points touched first principles in the most important department of constitutional law. It touched principles vital to the liberty of the subject and vital to the administration of the law. It bore, for instance, on the vital question of liberty of speech. That freedom was one of the most important privileges secured to the people by the Constitution of this country—one which lay at the very foundation of all our liberties; and it, therefore, became important to consider whether, if this Bill were passed, that privilege would not be seriously impaired. Under the law as it at present stood a person who spoke under the in- fluence of excitement at a public meeting, and made use of epithets in the heat of the moment which he could not afterwards justify, could not be prosecuted for libel; but if the measure now proposed were agreed to he could be so prosecuted. Moreover, the Bill laid it down that a man could be held guilty and punished for an offence which the Bill itself said he had not committed, while the man who had committed the offence was to be held harmless and allowed to escape. That was a principle which ought not to be sanctioned. It touched too first principles connected with the administration of the law. No question had been discussed more fully than the Law of Libel; on none had the opinions of the judicial tribunals been more frequently delivered; but this Bill would upset them from the foundation. It was said a grievance existed which required such a remedy. But the grievance must be proved; it must be a serious one—one of which there was a loud and universal complaint—not a trifling affair, or one on a mere matter of procedure—before they could be called on to over-ride the principles of the Constitution and the law in order to apply such a remedy as was now proposed. The whole question was a novel one—it was proposed to give not liberty, but license. What was the grievance? The hon. Member for Leeds (Mr. Baines) had said that numerous Petitions had been presented in its favour. Well, he (Mr. Chambers) had referred to the Report of the Committee on Public Petitions, and he found twelve Petitions had been presented, with fifteen signatures. He did not call that a large matter or a loudly expressed grievance. It was, on the contrary, a ludicrously small one. The Preamble of this Bill was in these words—"Whereas it is expedient to amend the Law of Libel." But, looking to all that has been said in favour of the Bill, he must say that it was inexpedient so to amend the Law of Libel. He would contrast with this the Preamble of the Act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 96. The title of that Act was—"An Act for the better protection of Private Character, and for more effectually securing the liberty of the Press, and for better preventing abuse in exercising the said liberty, be it enacted," &c. Now, he (Mr. Chambers) would vote for any Bill to which such a Preamble could be honestly prefixed, and he would vote for the Bill of the hon. Member for Leeds if it would accomplish these objects more effectually than Lord Campbell's Act; but it was perfectly obvious that the hon. Member could not put such a Preamble to his Bill. In what position were newspaper proprietors and editors at present? In an action for libel it was competent for the defendant to plead that the libel was inserted in the newspaper without actual malice and without gross negligence. The plaintiff in such action must therefore prove, in order to recover, actual malice or gross negligence. Was not that protection enough, or was the newspaper proprietor to be protected though he might have published libellous matter with actual malice and gross negligence? What was the history of this matter as regarded the publication of newspapers and books? Prom the reign of Henry VIII. to that of William III. there was a censorship of the Press. William III. very properly removed the censorship; but were no securities provided against an abuse of the liberty of printing? On the contrary, the printer and proprietor of a newspaper had to register their names at Somerset House, and give securities in order to afford facility of redress to parties aggrieved by libellous matter. That was a guarantee to a certain extent that the newspaper would be properly conducted, and it operated as some protection to private persons. The hon. Member talked of the barbarous Law of Libel. He might as well speak of the barbarous Law of Murder. The Law of Libel was not of itself a barbarous law, for to assault a man's character was to do him as much wrong as to attack his person. It was quite true that up to a recent period there was a grievance in regard to the Law of Seditious Libel; but now the jury decided upon the facts, and with very great fairness between the Crown and the party charged. The Act of the 6 & 7 Vict. which put the law upon its present footing, was framed by a man who understood these matters as well as any one. The hon. Member (Mr. Baines) said that the Law of Libel was in a most unsettled and dangerous state, that nothing could be more scandalous, and that it was only three or four months ago that an action was brought against the publisher of a newspaper for publishing a debate in the House of Lords upon an important subject, and that the action failed, being held not maintainable under the circumstances. But did not his hon. Friend see that by citing this case he had cut the very ground from under his feet? It could not be said after that decision that there was any confusion on this point as to the Law of Libel, and the argument founded on this case was now of no force whatever. He thought the House ought long to consider before it passed a measure like the present. On reading the abstract of the 1st clause of this Bill, it must be seen that it would be utterly impossible for the House to pass it, because it enacted that— No proprietor of a newspaper shall be liable to an action or prosecution for a faithful report of the proceedings at a public meeting, and proof that it was such shall amount to a defence. His hon. Friend said that nothing could be so important as the publication of these reports. But nothing could be so easy as to exaggerate their importance. Would the hon. Gentleman say that it was important the public should know how A. and B. abused each other at a meeting of a gas company in a small country town, and that their abuse should be carried into every corner of the country? It was important when a certain class of meetings was held, attended by a certain class of speakers, that the proceedings should be disseminated far and wide; but with regard to the great majority of public meetings such as he had alluded to it was a great, waste of ink and paper ever to publish them at all. His hon. Friend by exaggerating the importance of these reports desired to prepare the mind of the House to form an undue estimate of the value of these provincial newspapers. He confessed he could not follow his hon. Friend at all in this matter. The hon. Member stipulated that it should be a full and faithful report; but the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) truly said there never was or could be a full and faithful report. But then his hon. Friend went further, and said with regard to any defamatory matter that all this virulence and abuse was the very part of a speech that ought not to be left out. He said that the public were interested in these investigations, in "sifting," as he called it, a man's character. No doubt, many provincial newspapers circulated a very much larger number of copies than they would otherwise do by inserting the scurrility spoken at public meetings. It made the report more racy and stimulating, especially if you happened to know the person whose character had been "sifted." If the publication of this matter were of so much importance as his hon. Friend alleged, he should go a step further and make the proprietor of the newspaper liable if he left out any of the virulence and abuse. The fact was the newspapers generally did leave it out. He was more familiar with the London than the provincial Press, but of the London Press it might be said they were not interested in the Bill, because they did leave out such matter. What his hon. Friend wished to obtain immunity for publishing was that part of a man's speech which the speaker generally regretted as soon as he had said it. That was the part which was now left out. When the editor came to it he described but did not report it, saying—"Here the speaker attacked So-and-so with much vehemence." All those who listened to the speech knew the speaker and the circumstances, and the slander, as slander, was harmless on that account; but if it went to every corner of the country where people knew neither the people nor the circumstances, the effect would be very different. The grievance lay in this—that a newspaper proprietor said he must get his newspaper out in time to print and circulate it, and that in order to enable him to do so he must do this injustice to the character of individuals. Getting the newspapers out in time was the first thing to be considered; but the publication of a newspaper was a business matter, and it could not be put as if it were the function of the Government or the action of a court of justice, or a debate in the Houses of Parliament. He agreed in the decision in the case of "Wason v. Walter;" but what analogy there was between that case and the cases put by the hon. Gentleman he could not see, because in the case of "Wason v. Walter" it was right that the publication of an important debate should not be suppressed when it turned, not incidentally upon the character of an individual, but when that character formed the whole subject of the debate. For these reasons he must give the Bill his strenuous opposition.

MR. SERJEANT DOWSE

said, that when the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down (Mr. T. Chambers) quoted the Act of Parliament he began to think he had left all his law behind him in Ireland. He discovered, however, that the hon. and learned Gentleman left out the particular passages he ought to have read. He omitted half the plea, leaving out the part of Hamlet altogether. If the arguments of the hon. and learned Gentleman were no better than his law, his hon. Friend (Mr. Baines) would have little difficulty in carrying his Bill. The hon. and learned Gentleman wished the House to believe that the defence to an action for libel was merely that the defendant had published the libel without malice and without gross negligence. Now, if that were the case, the pleas he would have drawn would nearly always have saved his clients because he could have shown that the subject-matter of the libel was inserted by inadvertence. The hon. and learned Gentleman had, however, left out the material part of the plea. The clause of Lord Campbell's Act said that in an action for libel contained in any public newspaper it should be competent for the defendant to plead "that the libel was inserted in such newspaper or other periodical without malice and without gross negligence, and that before the commencement of the action, or at the earliest opportunity afterwards, he inserted in such newspaper or other periodical selected by the plaintiff a full apology for the said libel;" and that on filing such plea such defendant should be at liberty to pay a sum of money into Court by way of amends. Why did the Common Serjeant of the City of London—who appeared to him to be a very uncommon Serjeant—make such an omission, and give him the trouble of getting up there to explain the matter? He had not the smallest intention of speaking in the debate, but he confessed he could not let such an opportunity slip. To the general principle of the Bill he gave his hearty concurrence. The distinction between libel and slander, which was well known to the law of England, had existed for centuries, but was based on no rational foundation whatever. It was not slander unless you imputed to a man misconduct in his trade or profession, the commission of an indictable offence, or that he was labouring under a contagious disease; but it was a libel to write or print of a man anything which was calculated to excite feelings of hatred, contempt, or ridicule against him. It appeared to him rather absurd that if a man said of another words which did not make him liable to an action for slander, a publisher should be liable to an action for libel for the same words if he put them in a newspaper. The hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate) said there was no such thing as a full and fair report. Well, but if the reports were never full and fair, the newspapers would get no protection whatever, because if it were necessary to prove that the report was full and fair and it was not, the plea was got rid of. It was necessary to fix the responsibility somewhere. He, for one, was as obnoxious as anyone to the charge of speaking hastily at public meetings, and if the effect of this Bill would be to make persons more cautious in what they said against the character of others, it would be a very wise and beneficial measure. In England the law was such that if an action were brought against a man the plaintiff got no costs unless the damages amounted to 40s.; but in Ireland, till lately, if a plaintiff only got one halfpenny damages the defendant had to pay all the costs. He heard of a case in which the jury assessed the damages at a halfpenny, and the defendant taking a penny-piece from his pocket said to the plaintiff, "Give me change out of that—the value of your character." In this case the halfpenny damages carried £450 costs. He should support the second reading of the Bill.

MR. WATKIN WILLIAMS

said, that the Law of Libel had its origin in a time when the art of printing was in its infancy, and public meetings were very rarely held. He supported the present Bill, not so much in the interests of the Press as that of the public. The Press had in fact become a medium for extending the area of public meetings. The great difficulty in the way of this Bill arose from the peculiar line drawn by our law between written and spoken slander. By the law of Scotland and France this distinction between written and oral slander was not recognized, and the House would do well to put the law of England on the same scientific footing as that of Scotland and France. Several Committees had inquired into the subject, and recommended this change. In 1834 a Committee of that House examined an eminent French jurist, M. Dupin, who forcibly pointed out the absurdity of our distinction between written and spoken slander. In 1843 the House of Lords appointed a Committee, including Lords Campbell, Brougham, and other Law Lords, who recommended this alteration in the law affecting defamation of character. The public demanded early and full reports of the proceedings of all meetings of public interest, and it was impracticable for the Press, under the conditions of newspaper publication, to examine into the truth of the statements made at public meetings before they were published. Under existing circumstances, therefore, justice and convenience alike demanded that honest and correct reports of such proceedings should not subject the publishers to an action for defamation. He supported the second reading of the Bill.

MR. AYRTON

said, he was sorry to interpose at this stage of the Bill, but hon. Members would see that it was quite impossible to take the sense of the House upon the Bill as it now stood for their consideration. It was one which involved a principle of very great importance, and he was sorry that the Bill had been brought on before Her Majesty's Government had had an opportunity of introducing a measure which they had in preparation, which would relieve the Press from the restrictions imposed in years gone by, and which were supposed in those times to be necessary. That measure, when it was laid upon the table, would be found to relieve the Press from every fetter, and to enable those who embarked in the publication of newspapers to carry on their occupation with the same freedom as in any other business. At the same time, while they gave the Press the most perfect freedom and permitted every one to establish a newspaper, it was necessary to consider most carefully whether, and in what way, they would, alter the laws that now protected the public, so that any abuse which might arise from that perfect freedom might be corrected. It was desirable before the House pronounced an opinion on the present measure that the Government measure to which he had referred should be considered. Journalists had been treated almost from the commencement as if they were criminals, and were com- pelled to give security for large sums to meet any actions for libel. When the proprietors and conductors of newspapers were relieved from these oppressive conditions of former years, it would be necessary to consider what should be the law for the protection of individuals. The House would not be doing right to express an opinion upon a measure of such gravity and importance in the absence of the Attorney General, who ought to state his views on the subject. The hon. and learned Gentleman (Mr. Dowse) said, that under the Bill public meetings would be harmless, because everyone would control himself and would not indulge in so much freedom of speech. It was very easy for the hon. Member who had given such ample proof of his established reputation for eloquence to say that; but, so far as his experience went, the majority of the Members of that House did not possess the power of control which the hon. and learned Gentleman enjoyed, and were not capable of manifesting it as he had done—

And it being now a quarter before six,

Debate adjourned till To-morrow.