SIR JOHN HAYSir, I take this opportunity of calling the attention of the House to the rumoured despatch of a squadron on particular service, which I learn from the public papers is about to take place. I do so the more readily on this occasion, because I believe the policy which dictates it is one which not only leads to a wasteful appropriation of the sums granted for the service of the Navy, but also is likely to lead to an increase in the Array Estimates both in New Zealand and Japan, and is therefore germane to the present discussion. I understand, Sir, that a squadron, consisting of seven ships, and with crews of 2,500 men, is about to assemble under the command of an excellent officer— Admiral Hornby—for the purpose of exercise and instruction. Now I have no objection to the assembling of an experimental squadron. Such squadrons have frequently been assembled, either for the purpose of trying the qualities of the ships of which it has been composed, or for the exercise and instruction of those who command and man it. But such squadrons have always been kept in the Atlantic or Mediterranean; so that, in the event of any unforeseen disturbance, the vessels composing it have been at the disposal of the Admiralty at short notice. Now, I understand that the present squadron is not to be so available. I hold in my hand a paper, which purports to give its arrival and departure at and from various ports. The first-named is Bahia, from Bahia to Rio de Janeiro and the Cape of Good Hope. From that port it proceeds to the Australian colonies, and the Admiralty loses for more than a year the services of seven ships and 2,500 men. Of the ships I do not think so much. Four of them would make good cruizers against an enemy's commerce in time of war. The others may do well enough for training ships, but are not the class of ships in which we could wish the crews to be in case of hostilities. From the Cape this squadron proceeds to Melbourne and Sydney, omitting Adelaide and Hobart Town. The reason for this may be more obvious in the Cabinet than it is to me. From Australia the squadron, it appears to me, will proceed 310 in a course which may lead to grave complications. We all know the present disturbed state of New Zealand. The country has rightly or wrongly refused to give any aid to our suffering fellow-countrymen there; nothing, it seems to me, can be more tantalizing and heartless than to send 2,500 trained men to the harbours of New Zealand, and then to refuse to assist them in subduing the savages now in rebellion. It may lead, perhaps, to a deceitful calm by momentarily overawing the rebels; but this paper, which I hold in my hand, gives them ample warning that the visit of the squadron is evanescent, and that the mother country has no intention that it shall remain for purposes of war. But what of the colonists. They, if they are wise, will court a reverse before the arrival of the squadron, and will seek to embroil it in their defence against the express desire of this House and the country; and it will be hard, indeed, to have 2,500 armed men there, and to refuse to allow them to assist their fellow-countrymen. It is one thing to refuse here on grounds of policy to despatch ships or troops to assist a colony, it is another, when the ships or troops are there, to refuse assent to their employment in defence of those so closely allied to us by so many ties. Well, the squadron having fanned the embers of civil discord in New Zealand, is to proceed to Japan. We all know the difficulties of our policy in those seas, and I feel sure that the squadron being there, some belligerent office will be found for it to perform. Thence it goes to Otaheite, and I can only say that so large a force in those seas will be sure to excite the jealousy or the emulation of France; nor can I believe that it will conduce to cordial relations with the United States of North America that so large a force, with so ill defined an object, is roving at large in the Pacific Ocean. For these reasons, Sir, I desire to enter my protest against this mode of employing the men voted by Parliament for the sea service. My right hon. Friend may feel pledged to let it visit the Australian colonies, but I advise him to order it home from Sydney by way of Cape Horn, so that it may speedily again be in the Atlantic, and ready, if wanted, for the service of the State. A great deal has been said, Sir, of the advantage to be derived from practice in fleets and squad- 311 rons, and, no doubt, this description of training is occasionally desirable; but the whole responsibility of this long cruize will be on the admiral; and the individual officers and men who compose it would learn more, as single ships sent to perform services, where all the various duties which devolve upon naval officers would be experienced by each, bringing the talents and judgment of each individual into play, so as that they may gain experience and not fear responsibility. For these reasons, I trust that the right hon. Gentleman will be able to assure the House that these rumours to which I have alluded as to the employment of a squadron on a particular service are incorrect.
§ MR. CHILDERSsaid, he did not complain of the matter being brought forward; but he regretted the absence of independent Members who were, he knew, anxious to commend the expedition from a naval point of view. In introducing the Navy Estimates he explained the intention of Government in regard to this expedition; those intentions had not been departed from, and they were not challenged at the time they were stated, or the preparations for the expedition could have been delayed if the House had not been satisfied on the subject. The squadron which was about to leave Plymouth, would consist of six not seven vessels— namely, four wooden frigates—the Liverpool, with 515 men on board; the Endymion, with 485; the Phœbe, from Bahia, with 515; and the Liffey, with 515; and two wooden corvettes — namely, the Scylla, with 275; and the Barrosa, with 275 men, making a total of 2,550 men, of whom 1,763 were officers and men, 416 were boys, and 371 were marines. The squadron would visit all our distant stations with the exception of North America, India, and the Mediterranean, and would take with it for distribution 348 officers and men, including 200 boys, the supply of boys at home being somewhat excessive. The squadron, therefore, included a considerable number of men and boys who were sent for distribution over the distant stations, and this plan of distribution was much more economical than any other. At the same time the ranks of the squadron would be filled up by men whose time had expired and who had to be brought home. The squadron would further take a number 312 of officers and young gentlemen for distribution,—namely, twenty-four for the Brazils, seventy for the Cape, forty-one for Australia, and 121 for China; and it would also bring home a considerable number. The Bristol, which was to leave Plymouth with the squadron, would go to Bahia with cadets and stores, the Phœbe joining her; a corvette would be left at Yokohama, to be re-placed by the Pearl; and a corvette would be left at Vancouver and re-placed by the Satellite. These were some of the objects of the squadron; but there was another of greater importance, for, in the opinion of every naval officer to whom he had spoken, and especially in that of the naval advisers of the Admiralty, there was no question but that there was a great deficiency, both on the part of officers and men, of that sort of experience which was to be obtained only by cruizing, and especially by cruizing in squadron; and it was partly to afford an opportunity of acquiring such experience that the expedition had been fitted out for a cruize of sixteen months. The squadron would contain no armoured vessels that would be available for fighting purposes in the event of an international difficulty in this part of the world; and could the House believe that 2,500 men, out of the 60,000 of which the Navy consisted, was such a large number that they must be kept at home in order that we might be better protected in the event of difficulty? If there were a difficulty in this part of the world — that is, with any nation of Europe or with America—it was not with small corvettes and frigates it would have to be settled, but with our great iron-clad ships; and, therefore, the absence of three or four cruizers of the frigate or corvette class was not a matter of such enormous importance as the hon. Baronet (Sir John Hay) seemed to think. The idea that we could not spare the 2,500 blue-jackets and marines on board these ships for fear of an international difficulty was one the hon. Baronet would scarcely have started if he had sat on the other side of the House. The New Zealand colonists would scarcely seek to be murdered by the natives in order that the squadron might be induced to stay; and, as to Japan, it was complained only the other day that mischief would be done by taking a force away. As to the ex- 313 citing jealousy, the visits of squadrons usually produced a different feeling, which was evinced by officers and men being received with courtesy and hospitality. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office concurred in the despatch of the expedition, and it never seemed to have occurred to him, or any one else concerned, that France or any other nation would be jealous because a squadron of small wooden frigates and corvettes was sent on such an expedition. But there was another side to the question. We were reducing all our foreign squadrons, and fourteen vessels of different classes were now on their way home from the China, Pacific, South Atlantic, Indian West Coast, and other stations. Therefore, while it was true that 2,500 men would be sent out, it was also true that 3,963 were being brought home, and therefore, our strength at home would be increased instead of diminished. It was to be remembered that a squadron was much more within reach than individual ships, and we were within a month's communication by telegraph with Australia, while we could telegraph to California or China in a day; and practically, the stations at which the squadron was to call were as much within reach as the Atlantic, if not more so, for the purpose of strengthening any distant place at which a force might be required. The despatch of the squadron was connected with a policy of reduction which would be approved on both sides of the House; and he hoped the explanations he had given would be deemed satisfactory.