HC Deb 30 July 1869 vol 198 cc1032-48
MR. BAINES

said, he rose to draw the attention of the House to Memorials presented from several Chambers of Commerce, recommending the construction of a Railway from Rangoon through British Burmah to Western China. The question might not have attracted a very large amount of public attention, but the interests involved were of vast importance. The object in view was the construction of a cheap route, chiefly through our own territory, from Rangoon, the commercial capital of British Burmah, to the western provinces of China, and thus bringing our manufactures within comparatively easy reach of the 300,000,000 or 400,000,000 of people inhabiting the Chinese Empire. It was superfluous to speak of the civilization, industry, and fertility of China. Suffice it to say that the actual exports and imports of the five treaty ports of China in 1868 was £38,564,880, of which six-sevenths came from England and India and other English possessions; but the whole of this commerce was with the south and eastern seaboard of China; very little went into the interior, and scarcely any part of it reached the remote western provinces, which vied with the eastern in fertility and manufacturing importance. It was true the western provinces of China were mountainous, but they were rich in minerals, besides being extremely fertile, and inhabited by an industrious population. Lord Elgin estimated the population of the six western provinces at something under 100,000,000, and nothing but their geographical position prevented them being our customers to an unlimited amount. In exchange they had to offer us tea, silk, wool, dye wares, and drugs, cereals of all kinds, cattle, and precious metals, all of the utmost value to us either as raw material or manufactures. But the whole country was practically cut off from England from want of easy communication, although it was only some 500 or 600 miles from Rangoon— the distance from London to Inverness, and 300 from the frontier of British Burmah. British territory, indeed, was only 250 miles from Western China, and it was across this narrow strip of land that the Government was asked to facilitate the construction of a railway, so as to bring the two points within a few hours of each other; whilst the sea voyage from Rangoon to Shanghai, round the Malayan peninsula, was 3,000 miles, and could not be traversed by the fastest steamer in. less than from two to three weeks. It would be his duty to prove, by good authorities, first that this object was desirable, and se- cond, that it was practicable. Sir Stamford Raffles, who had gained large experience on this subject as Governor of Singapore, said— It is idle to talk of the cheapness and extent of our manufactures unless we carry them into fair competition. There is no reason why all China should not he in a great measure clothed from England, the cold parts as well as the warm. Colonel M'Leod, who visited Western China and the Burman Shan States, in 1837, with Dr. Richardson, under orders of Governor General of India, said— Many Chinese merchants with caravans continuously pass to and fro through Esmok, trading between China and the Laos country, and the Siamese and Burman Shan States. The Chinese authorities on the frontier had offered to Colonel M'Leod every facility and encouragement for trade; and the chiefs of the Shan States expressed an ardent desire to cultivate trade and friendly relations with England. Captain Sherard Osborne, another high authority, when writing, in 1860, pointed out the dangers of navigating the Chinese seas, especially in time of war, and strongly recommended opening the land route to Western China. Now that the French had the coast of Cochin China, the injury to our commerce in those seas in times of war would be most disastrous, but with the land route we should have nothing to fear. But the route was shown to be as practicable as desirable. Captain Williams, Engineer and Inspector of Public Works in Burmah, and resident there during ten years, reported, in 1865, as follows:— Of the three routes the direct land route from Rangoon to Kiang Hung is the one which, if feasible, must, owing to its directness, be the best; and there is no doubt, from the same cause, it would be the cheapest to construct. The Report of Captain Williams, who was afterwards appointed to survey this route, was conclusive in its favour. He said that upwards of 250 miles, a full moiety of the entire line, would be within British territory, and the remaining portion would pass through country occupied by people who were, with their chiefs, well affected towards the British Government, though tributary to the King of Burmah. Captain Watson, another English officer, from personal examination, recommended the same line. From some inexplicable cause, the Indian Government set its face against even a survey of this route. The memorials presented to the Government simply asked for a survey of the country. They did not ask for the construction of a railway, or that any vast expenditure should be incurred, but the memorialists would have been satisfied with a single tramway. At length a man of force of character came to be Secretary of State for India, and the good bold sense of Lord Salisbury decided that a case had been made out for a survey, ordered one, and persisted in his order, notwithstanding the opposition of the Indian Government. Accordingly, in 1867, Captains Williams and Luard made a survey of 245 miles of the route up to the British frontier. Of this they found that 200 miles were good country and 45 miles would be difficult, though not to compare in difficulty with other Indian routes. In the whole 245 miles it was probable that not more than one tunnel would be required. Beyond this there remained only 250 miles to be surveyed, but the Indian Government stopped the survey. The Report of Captains Williams and Luard encouraged the belief that a railway could be made at a small cost compared with the enormous magnitude of the object to be attained, and a cost which the revenue of British Burmah would enable it easily to bear. The work would be beneficial, not only to the manufacturers and merchants of England, but to the merchants of Rangoon and the whole native population. Two towns alone, Rangoon and Moulmein contained populations, the one exceeding and the other approaching 100,000, and each had a splendid commerce. The population of British Burmah had nearly doubled within the last ten years, its revenue had doubled, and its imports and exports had increased from £5,000,000 to £10,000,000. In July, 1868, Colonel, now General, Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, who was formerly opposed to the making of the proposed railway, but had since changed his views, wrote a despatch in which he recommended that the survey should be resumed on commercial, political, and scientific grounds, and in deference to the Chambers of Commerce. He further recommended the adoption of the line to Kiang Hung as the shortest and best line of communication with Western China. In competition with this was the Bhamo route, the one on which Captain Sladen had been directed to report. One objection to it was that it was the longer route. While the length of the lower route was only 500 miles, the Bhamo route included a distance of nearly 1,100 miles up the valley of the Irrawaddy, and then a journey across a mountainous country before China was reached. He believed the engineering difficulties of the Bhamo route would be found much greater than those of the lower route, and the political difficulties were immensely greater, obliging Captain Williams to leave Captain Sladen's party and to return. While the lower route was through British territory, the Bhamo route was through Burmah and Chinese territory; and, as far as he could judge, the advantages of the lower route were immense. At length the India Office again changed its policy for the better, and. on the 29th April, this year, the Duke of Argyll, in a despatch to the Governor General of India, said— Her Majesty's Government are desirous of promoting any measure which may have the ultimate effect of facilitating intercourse between India and China, with a view to the interchange of mercantile commodities and the development of the resources of the two countries The settlement of the present question is regarded with considerable interest by large and important mercantile communities in this country, and I should be glad, therefore, if the proposal now before me, which has the support of Colonel Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, could be carried into effect; provided that the necessary operations of the survey can be undertaken without entailing upon your Government any embarrassment or inconvenience in the shape of political complications, and if they should not involve any undue expenditure of the public money. On behalf of the Chambers of Commerce he would say it was their wish that these conditions should be observed. They did not wish for any extravagant expenditure of public money, nor for foreign annexation, of which there were too many advocates. They wished for peace and friendly commerce; they detested war and annexation, and they recommended the adoption of prudent measures, such as the sending of an embassy to the Court of Burmah. The people of this country had so much need of fresh markets that they had a right to claim that these routes should be surveyed. They were not opposed to the Bhamo route, or any other; but they pressed for a survey of the cheapest and best route. He had simply to impress, in conclusion, upon the Government the importance of not allowing a matter of such great consequence to be any longer delayed. Since this project had first been proposed, we had seen two lines of railway thrown across the Alps,—two lines of submarine telegraph sunk across the bed of the Atlantic,—a railway constructed across the breadth of North America, ascending and descending the Booty Mountains,—£70,000,000 spent on the railways of India,—the Isthmus of Suez pierced by a ship canal,—and the greatest geographical problem of history solved by the discovery of the sources of the Nile; and yet, whilst these wonderful enterprizes had been effected by ourselves and other nations, our Indian Government refused even to survey a short route on our own frontier, although its accomplishment would be the means of bringing us into communication with a population who would be customers to an incredible extent for the produce of the industry of England. The hon. Gentleman concluded by asking the Under Secretary of State for India, Whether the Survey authorized by the Secretary of State for India, and commenced in 1867, is ordered to be completed, or what is being done for the construction of a Railway or Telegraph through British Burmah to the Western Provinces of China?

MR. SERJEANT SIMON

said, he wished strongly to urge on the Government the expediency of constructing the proposed route, which would in all not exceed in length 500 miles, and would in the main lie through our own territory. As things at present stood, we had no other inlets for our commerce with China except the three seaports included in our treaties, and in order to penetrate into the interior of the country we had to travel over thousands of miles through districts presenting considerable difficulties. There was a vast commercial population in the western and southwestern provinces of China, which now carried on a large trade with Burmah, and that was the field which he desired to see opened up to English commerce. And what, he would ask, were the objections to the opening of the route? During the Government of Lord Derby Lord Cranborne stated in a letter, which he wrote on the subject, that he considered the case to have been made out for making a survey on behalf of the commerce of this country. On the 8th of December, 1866, however, the Governor General of India wrote a letter, in which he deprecated the expenditure which even a preliminary investigation would involve, stating that he believed it would lead to no satisfactory result. Yielding to the remonstrances of the Governor General of India, the right hon. Gentleman at the head of the India Office (Sir Stafford Northcote) consented to have the survey stopped. The Governor General of India had objected to it on the ground of the financial position of India, and because, in his opinion, it had no object but that of showing what the features of the country were. Now, he ventured to think that was a very important object. All the Chambers of Commerce asked was, that the Government should use the means in its power to afford them information on which they might act hereafter. For some reason or other another survey had been commenced of a line which, instead of being 500 miles, would be 1,250 miles in length, and which for a very great distance would run through. the territory of the Sovereign of Burmah. The report of this route, as far as it had been surveyed, was very unfavourable. There was a third route in contemplation, which would describe two sides of a triangle, of which the base was part of the route of 500 miles which the British merchants advocated. This third line also ran through the Burman Empire. He could understand either of the longer routes—the one forming a semicircle and the other two sides of a triangle—if intended for strategic purposes, or with a view to a policy of annexation; but if a line was wanted for commercial purposes, he could not see why either one or the other of them should be countenanced by the Government. He hoped the Government would do what was asked by the Chambers of Commerce on a question so important to the commercial interests of this country.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

said, he felt that he stood before the House in this matter rather in the capacity of a culprit, because from the speeches just delivered it was obvious that the two hon. Members charged him with having taken a retrograde step, when he filled the Office of Secretary for India, in stopping the survey directed by his noble Friend the Marquess of Salisbury. He did not think any apology was needed by hon. Members representing great mercantile constituencies for having brought the subject forward. No doubt, for the commerce of this country, the matter was one of considerable importance; and no one would be better pleased than he to see a good inland communication established between British India and China. He was anxious to say a few words in justification of the course he had adopted. In the first place, he would wish to put this before the House—that, in the consideration of this question, they should bear in mind it was one which was not only interesting to the commercial world, but was also of great interest for our Indian Empire. The Chambers of Commerce had been for a long time asking the Indian Government to undertake a survey through a country which did not belong to us, with a view to the construction of a railway. His hon. Friend the Member for Leeds (Mr. Baines) now spoke of a tramway, but he believed that a railway was what the Chambers of Commerce had been asking for. The survey commenced was one of a line from Rangoon through British Burmah and the Shan States to the western frontier of China. Was it a prudent thing to have undertaken that survey? He put aside the small matter whether the finances of India could afford the survey. He thought Lord Salisbury rightly put aside that matter by saying that the revenue of British Burmah could bear the expenditure. But were hon. Members to put this before them as if the survey were one in Yorkshire, or as if it was one through any thoroughly civilized country. The Shan States had been spoken of as if there was no difficulty in carrying a railway through them; but the Shan States, though nominally under the government of the King of Burmah, were in a continual state of rebellion against that Sovereign. No doubt the King of Burmah would have been glad to promote any enterprize which might have brought him British support in his quarrel with the Shan States; and, on the other hand, the Shans would also have been very glad if any proceeding on the part of the British Government in making a railway would have given them a title to claim assistance in enabling them to hold their own against their legitimate suzerain, the King of Burmah. The Government of India thought it was not desirable that anything of the kind should occur, and it would certainly have been a strong measure on the part of the Secretary of State for India if he had attempted in that state of things to overrule the Government of India, and had compelled them, against their own judgment, to carry on a survey which might have produced such complications. At that time there was a very considerable amount of opinion in India in favour of annexing Burmah to the British Empire, and naturally the carrying on a survey would have been exactly the sort of step which would have given countenance to the idea that the Indian Government contemplated annexation; but nothing could have been more undesirable than that such an idea should be created. All that was asked was that a survey should be carried through the country for the purpose of seeing whether it was practicable to make a railway there; but what was the use of such a proceeding, unless the Indian Government saw their way to construct a railway? Supposing the survey had been made, and that the country was found practicable for a railway, the next request would naturally have been that Government assistance should be given for the construction of one. Was it possible for any company to be formed in this country for that purpose without some assistance or guarantee from the Government, and was it likely that the British House of Commons would have sanctioned a guarantee? He put out of the question the idea that anything like an Imperial guarantee or Imperial assistance would have been given for such a railway; and, therefore, the Indian Government must have been applied to. Now, the back of the Indian Government was a very broad one, and he had no doubt that great pressure would have been brought to bear upon that Government to induce them to afford the required aid, but was it possible to suppose that the Government of India would have been able to give a guarantee for the suggested railway, seeing the claims which existed for railways in India and the great expense which the finances of India had to bear to give effect to the most necessary lines within the Indian territory? Lord Cranborne, when he authorized the survey, observed that he was not prepared to commit the finances of India for any railway of the kind. Such being the state of circumstances when the matter came before the Indian Council and himself, he, though aware that he might subject himself to great obloquy on the part of the commercial interests of this country if he acted on the recommendation of the Governor General of India that the survey should be stopped, yet, looking at the matter as dispassionately as he could, and having every desire to promote railway communication as far as possible between India and China, thought it right to follow the advice of the Governor General, who was responsible for the peace and prosperity of India, and to stop the survey. Nothing would give him greater pleasure than to learn that the state of circumstances had altered, and that the Secretary for India was able to undertake this work; but he pressed on the attention of the Government that it was not their duty to listen, in the first instance, to the representations of commercial bodies in this country, but it behaved them to consider the political aspect of the question, and to keep the country from entangling itself in foreign complications which might lead to difficulties and to, perhaps, war. They ought to be particularly anxious to avoid anything which would give umbrage to the neighbouring Powers of India, and anything pointing to annexation. But supposing all difficulty got over with respect to the construction of the railway, and supposing the railway made, how was it, passing through disturbed districts, to be kept open? It would be necessary to have British soldiers stationed at particular points of the line or some other mode of protection. That would be quasi annexation of that part of the country through which the railway passed. Unless you could see your way to some protection of that line, he was afraid they would only be opening the door to difficulties of which it would be impossible to foresee the end. The hon. Member who last spoke made some remarks on the curious fact that immediately after the survey of the southern route was put a stop to another survey was commenced by a very different route. That measure was ordered by the Government of India on their own responsibility, without any communication with the Secretary of State. But it was a route of a very different character from the one of which they were speaking. No doubt it was a much more circuitous route; but there was no idea of making a railway or any communication at all, but merely of restoring an old caravan route that had fallen into disuse. It would have been easy to revive the use of that route, and one of its advantages was that there was a direct interest on the part of the King of Burmah to encourage that route. It was a matter rather for him than for us to consider how that communication could be restored, and no doubt it would have been an advantage to us to have it restored. But that was altogether different from what was pressed upon them before, of what was called Captain Sprye's route, which was to depend on the construction of a railway through a country entirely under the dominion of the King of Burmah. They had also heard of a third route, and he could tell of a fourth—a more northerly route, by way of the Bramahputra, and which would give a more direct communication between Calcutta and China than any other. He believed it was the interest of the British Government and of the Indian Government to encourage in every possible way the improvement of the land communications between India and China. All he would press on the House was to abstain from embarrassing the Government of India by any injunctions which it might be inconvenient for that Government to comply with. It was quite right that they should have all commercial considerations impressed on them. No doubt the Secretary of State paid great respect to all that was said in that House; but he earnestly hoped the House would be cautious in not pressing on the Government of India what might be seriously embarrassing to our relations. He hoped to hear from his hon. Friend that progress was being made; nobody would rejoice more than he should at the prospect of these communications being effected.

MR. GRANT DUFF

said, he would be very glad to explain to his hon. Friend (Mr. Baines) as briefly and clearly as he could how this matter stood, for he well knew that it excited in some of the Lancashire and Yorkshire towns an interest altogether disproportionate to its real importance, and he had no doubt that a little less reticence a few years ago would have prevented the growth of many wild hopes. The attention of the present Secretary of State in Council was first called to this matter by a despatch from the Governor General of India, enclosing a correspondence between the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah and the Government of India. The Chief Commissioner of British Burmah had conceived a project for carrying the telegraph from Rangoon to Kiang Hung, a Shan city close to the frontier of China, with the view to its being extended right across China to the eastern seaboard. He need not say that this proposal met with favour neither at the hands of the Government of India, nor at the hands of the Secretary of State in Council; but the correspondence which had been lately laid on the table of the House raised other questions, and more especially whether it would or would not be desirable to continue the survey which, wisely begun under the orders of Lord Salisbury, was wisely stopped, after a change of circumstances, by the order of his right hon. Friend opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote), at the urgent entreaty of Sir John Lawrence and his Council. The result of long and very careful consideration was a despatch to India, from which he would read an extract— Her Majesty's Government are desirous of promoting any measure which may have the ultimate effect of facilitating intercourse between India and China, with a view to the interchange of mercantile commodities and the development of the resources of the two countries, and they are anxious also to advance, by such explorations as are here suggested, the interests of geographical science, The settlement of the present question is regarded with considerable interest by large and important mercantile communities in this country, and I should be glad, therefore, if the proposal now before me, which has the support of Colonel Fytche, the Chief Commissioner of British Burmah, could be carried into effect, provided that the necessary operations of the survey can be undertaken without entailing upon your Government any embarrassment or inconvenience in the shape of political complications, and if they should not involve any undue expenditure of the public money, With respect to the latter point, I should wish to receive from you some estimate of the probable expense. This question of communication between Rangoon and Kiang Hung divided itself into three parts—1. What is the character and what are the commercial capabilities of that part of our own Burmese territory through which the pro- jected railway or telegraph is to be made? 2. What is the character of the country between our own frontier and the frontier of China? And, 3. What is the character and condition of that part of China which would be reached by the projected route? Only two plans had been suggested for taking the railway across our own territory which he need notice. The first of these was the line surveyed up to the frontier by Messrs. Williams and Luard. Their official Report had been laid before Parliament, and might be summed up by saying that the line taken as a whole would be a difficult but not an extraordinarily difficult one. The first part would be very easy, the second less so, the third very arduous. The general character of the country as described to him by Captain Luard, who was now in England, was a good deal like Wales, but with the hills higher in many places. The local traffic of this portion of the line would be absolutely trifling. A little rice might come down to the coast, but that would be all. From the point where the survey of Williams and Luard stopped to the Takau Ferry, on the Salween, the country had not been regularly surveyed, but we knew a good deal about it. There would be difficulties of various kinds — great difficulties, but difficulties in no way insuperable, if a great object were to be attained. The other plan for getting a communication across our own territory which he would mention was to go from Rangoon northward to Tounghoo, and from there to reach the Takau Ferry. There were a good many advantages about this line, and even if it never got further than Tounghoo it would be useful for local purposes; but it was far too early to decide between the two lines. It would be long before either of them would be proposed by anyone willing to find the money; and in the meantime they need not be jealous of each other. He now came to the second part of the journey —to the question how we were to get across the Eastern Shan States from the Takau Ferry to Kiang Hung. About the first portion of this line extremely little was known; indeed, hardly anything at all. At Kiang Hung the direct route from the Takau Ferry would fall in with the route followed a generation ago by Captain M'Leod on his journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung. That officer kept a good deal to the southward of the route last proposed until he reached Kiang Hung. His experiences—and, as far as he (Mr. Grant Duff) knew, he was the only European who had reached Kiang Hung from British Burmah— were not very encouraging. They might be read at length in his diary which was about to be laid upon the table of the House; but he might perhaps be allowed to give a summary of them from his own lips, for he had been good enough to allow him to vouch, on the authority of his name, for the following statements made to him (Mr. Grant Duff) in conversation. First, then, the Shan States which he traversed were very thinly peopled. For days and days together he journeyed through a mere jungle without meeting a soul. The mountain ranges were numerous, high, and precipitous, and the only roads to be found were often the beds of dried-up torrents. The people were mere barbarians, anxious to trade, no doubt, in their own small way, but with very little to exchange, and the so-called caravans that came down from the frontiers of China were on a very small scale. General M'Leod had never countenanced the idea that a railway or telegraph could be made from Rangoon to Kiang Hung in our generation with the slightest advantage or profit, though of course, like all reasonable men, he was in favour of exploration, provided that exploration could be carried out without great expense, sacrifice of life, or political inconvenience. He (Mr. Grant Duff) did not himself believe that the expense need be great, and he did not believe that if the survey were to be carried out by our own officers there was much danger of any considerable sacrifice of life or of getting into difficulties either with the rulers of the petty Shan States themselves or with the King of Burmah. That, however, was a mere individual opinion formed after some study of the subject, which he offered for what it was worth. Well, but when we should have got to Kiang Hung and were looking across the Cambodia river to the Chinese post on the other side, we should be looking at a country about much of which we had just about as authentic information as we had about the country on the other side of the Styx. He could imagine that he saw some enthusiast for this scheme, on reading what he (Mr. Grant Duff) was now saying, rush to his shelves and indignantly opening a thick pamphlet by the prime mover in this project turn to the pages where information about the huge province of Yunan, as this part of China was called, had been industriously collected. Well, but what did it all amount to? That in this enormous region there was a certain amount of wealth and there were a certain number of valuable products. Who ever doubted it? But what did we know of the local distribution of that wealth and those products which could lead us to believe that they would find an outlet by Kiang Hung? Was not the natural outlet of that province the great valley of the Yangtze, or the Canton river? And why should its products come wandering over the high rough region which we knew lay to the north of Kiang Hung in order to seek an outlet towards the Bay of Bengal? The amount of recent information about the province of Yunan possessed by anyone in Western Europe, except the survivors of the French exploring expedition which lately ascended the Cambodia river, was small indeed. Of the information acquired by these gentlemen very little, mere fragments, he might say, had become publici juris, and he was afraid some time would pass before the work on which they were engaged would appear, for it was to be, he understood, on a very extensive scale. His belief about the Yunan of the present day, formed from such morsels of knowledge as he could obtain, was that it was a large, and in parts, prosperous province, but that even in the best times most of its south - western trade flowed down to Burmah by Bhamo and the Irrawaddy, not by Kiang Hung. That trade was respectable—say £500,000 a year—till in 1855 a great insurrection broke out against the Chinese authority among its Mahommedan population, since which time the through trade from Northern China was dead, and nothing survived but a local traffic of no importance. Further, he was assured by General M'Leod, who reached, as he had already mentioned, the Chinese border at Kiang Hung, that in that part of Yunan the population was extremely poor. No doubt it was a more civilized region altogether than the Shan States, but it was as far as possible from being a region which it was worth going through the Shan States to get at. If any member of any of the numerous Chambers of Commerce who had sent memorials to any of the Departments of Government about this matter could give one single scrap of first-hand information about South-western China or about any of the countries between British Burmah and South-western China, the Government would be most grateful for it; but if the Chambers of Commerce, into whose hands the Government was most anxious to play, made themselves mere speaking trumpets through which a projector shouted facts and views with which the Government was perfectly familiar, they could not be surprised if the Government merely acknowledged their letters, wondering that British merchants and manufacturers, with all the world before them, should have so little to do as to be able to find time for so dull an amusement or so vain a labour. He would be very sorry to be understood to discourage the idea that a profitable trade might one day be established with South-western China through our Indian dominions. He held the diametrically opposite opinion, and believed that the day would come when we should have first a small trade, then improved roads, and finally, for all he knew, even a railway from Rangoon to Kiang Hung, but that last only in the far future. He thought we should see a renewal and improvement of the trade down the Irrawaddy, which, as he had said, died out in 1855, and he had a very strong impression that it might be possible to have a trade from Calcutta through Munipore to Bhamo and Talifoo. Further, he believed the day would come when we might be able to communicate through the absolutely unknown country between Sudiya in Assam and Bathang, and that we might have consuls in at least four great towns of Western China. All that, however, was for our children and grandchildren to carry out. The duty of this generation was only to explore these outlying regions, and to make straight the paths for our successors. There were two kinds of projectors in the world—those who saw for what the times were ripe and led the way to it—and those who, neglecting the real work of their own age, kept querulously anticipating the work of the age that was to follow, being born, as Lammenais would have said—"with repeaters in. their heads which were always striking the hour." Some friends in the North of England had in this matter of the route between Rangoon and Western China fallen, to their detriment and to the sorrow of the Government, into the hands of the latter kind of projector. In conclusion, he would once more specially direct the attention of the hon. Gentlemen who were interested in this matter to the words of the despatch from which he read an extract. The two motives of the Government in directing the survey to be continued were—first, to extend geographical science and our acquaintance with the frontier lands of our own territory; secondly, to oblige the many mercantile communities which had addressed the Government on the subject. He admitted that it was not satisfactory, after having held Pegu for some sixteen years, that we really knew as little of the countries beyond it as we did some sixteen years before we possessed it. The French, with a far inferior base of operations, and more than twice the distance to traverse, had passed through Yunan, visiting both its Chinese and. its Mussulman capital. That was greatly to their credit, and he hoped, before long, we should, through an increase of friendly and confidential intercourse with our allies at Pekin, Bangkok, and Mandalay, know the Indo-Chinese peninsula much better than we did now; but this particular question of communication with China through Rangoon, which seemed, so to speak, a star of the first magnitude to many in the North of England, seemed to the Government, considered as a project for the immediate benefit of commerce, a star of the fifteenth magnitude —should he not rather say a mere will-o'-the-wisp?—which, if we were to follow it to the neglect of our own real business in India would lead us only into trouble and disgrace.