CENTRAL ASIA.—QUESTION.

HC Deb 09 July 1869 vol 197 cc1544-82

MR. EASTWICK*

Sir, I rise to ask a Question as to the state of affairs in Central Asia, and to the remarkable changes that are going on there; and I wish, before doing so, to explain why I desire to refer to the subject. Some hon. Members may, perhaps, think that at a time when so many home questions of the utmost importance are pressing for decision, the consideration of a question relating to a region so remote and inaccessible, and of which we know so little, as Central Asia, might well be postponed. But I would remind the House that the remoteness of a region, its difficulty of access, and our ignorance concerning it, are no sufficient guarantees that it may not unexpectedly become a grievous burden upon our finances. Witness the case of Abyssinia, of Persia, and of Affghánistan. I believe that had our relations with those countries been brought under the notice of the House at the proper moment, we should never have heard of the Abyssinian, Persian, or Affghán wars, nor have had to lament the enormous expenditure they entailed. In that belief I would ask the House to take up this question of Central Asia in good time, and in particular I would ask those hon. Members who expressed such extreme dissatisfaction at the discrepancy between the Estimates for the Abyssinian expedition and the actual outlay to be beforehand with this question, and to take care that there shall never be a necessity for drawing up any Estimates at all regarding it.

Sir, I believe I am right in saying that it was the intention of a late hon. Member of this House—who is, perhaps, better acquainted with the Central Asian question than any other Englishman —I mean the late Member for Frome (Sir Henry Rawlinson)—to have brought the subject under the notice of the House last Session. That intention was frustrated; but I think the very fact that one so conversant with the subject was desirous of bringing it forward, is good evidence that the consideration of it ought not to be deferred now, more particularly as every circumstance, that could have been mentioned then, has acquired increased gravity in the interim. I suppose that Sir Henry Rawlinson's principal motive for wishing to bring the subject forward was that which also actuates myself—I mean the desire to remove some erroneous impressions on the question, which have been created and disseminated by the public Press. I am not speaking of the Press of this country, though there has been no inconsiderable interest awakened on the subject even here. But I refer chiefly to the Russian Press, and would say of the articles which have appeared on the subject in such papers as the Moscow Gazette, using the words of an Edinburgh Review for 1867— How many a blunder to Russia no less than to England might be saved, if, on the common ground of Central Asia, the political intentions of either party were more clearly understood by the other. In India, too, the progress of Russia has become a very absorbing topic, and has given rise to considerable anxiety, and even alarm, which it is very desirable should be dissipated by a full and frank discussion in this House.

I will now hasten to notice, as briefly as possible, the events which have occurred in Central Asia; but I must first define the region of which I wish to speak under that title. I mean by Central Asia, then, that vast region which is conterminous with the northern frontiers of Persia and Affghánistan, is bounded on the west by the Caspian Sea, on the north by the frontiers of the Russian provinces, Orenberg and Omsk, and on the east by the mountains of Chinese Tartary, and the ranges which succeed them, up to Bakhtarminsk. In order to simplify my statement, I shall say what I have to say of Chinese Tartary at once, so as to eliminate that country from the discussion. It has been called Little Bokhára, Eastern Turkestan or Chinese Tartary. The second name is that which should now be adopted, since the Russians have established a new province to the west which they have called Turkestan. The name of Chinese Tartary is no longer applicable. The Chinese have been massacred or expelled. The whole country has been revolutionized and Muhammedinized, and is under the sway of Yakúb Kushbegi, a native of Kokand, whose capital is Kashgár. This is the same individual who commanded the Army of Kokand against the Russians some fifteen years ago, and is said to have been secretly favourable to them. Be that as it may, it is certain he now rules at Kashgár, and the Russians have advanced their frontier from Bakhtarminsk in the direction of Kashgár 500 miles to the south, to the Syanshan Mountains, which bound Kashgár to the north, and have annexed all the territory to the west. Were the same rate of progress continued, Russia would in the course of a few years—I have heard one great authority say in one year — advance to the Kuen Lun range and the frontiers of Kashmir, and, for my part, I do not see why such an event should be contemplated by us with any feeling of dissatisfaction. The Chinese Government of Eastern Turkestan was cruel and exacting, and that of the natives when they succeeded to power was no better, as witness the pyramids of heads set up in Kashgár in 1857, by Vali Khan Turia, on the summit of one of which he is said to have placed the head of the celebrated traveller Adolphe Schlagentweit. If the Government, therefore, should pass into other hands, I can see no reason for regretting the change. As to the Indian frontier in this direction, although the discoveries of that enterprizing officer Mr. Forsyth and others have dispelled the illusion once entertained even by the President of our Geographical Society, that it is fenced with such stupendous and impassable mountain ranges that the movements of the most formidable hostile power in the region beyond it might be viewed with complete indifference, I nevertheless consider that there is no ground for alarm. It is true Mr. Forsyth and others have shown that about seventy miles east of the Karakorum Pass there is a route over a high plateau passable even for wheeled carriages between the frontier of India and Yarkand. It is true, too, that the frontier of India has twice been invaded in that direction, once in 1686, and again in 1841; but the territory belongs to our faithful ally the Rajah of Kashmir, who sent a brigade to assist us at the siege of Delhi, and whose loyalty and fidelity are well known, and with our assistance he could render all attempts at invasion over the difficult country I have mentioned impossible, and therefore we need have no anxiety on that head. I must mention that Mr. Forsyth has succeeded, with the aid of the Rajah of Kashmir and his Minister, in developing a trade between the Pan- jab and Yarkand in this direction, which cannot but prove most beneficial to our Indian tea plantations. On that account and in the interest of science I trust the Government will see reason to publish the correspondence and Papers which have passed between Mr. Forsyth and the Indian Government on this subject. To return to the great tract to the West, which I have called Central Asia, and the boundaries of which I have mentioned. This is marked out by nature in three great divisions. To the north there is the Great Kirghiz Steppe, extending 1,500 miles from west to east, and more than 500 from north to south. This is, for the most part, desert, and wandered over by 2,500,000 of nomad Kirghiz. Next comes the rich tract between the rivers Jaxartes and Oxus, which extends from the Sea of Aval, in a south-easterly direction some 800 miles,. up to the mountains of Badakhshán and Kábul, and comprehends the three Uzbek States, Khaiva, Bokhára, and Kokand. Lastly, there is, to the southwest, the great Turkuman Steppe, with a population of 2,000,000 of nomad Turkumans. The area of the whole region I am describing exceeds 1,000,000 of square miles, with a population of less than 9,000,000. Its area surpasses that of British India, and might even be compared with the whole of the vast tract from Peshawar to Calcutta and Cape Comorin. This scanty population is mainly owing to misgovernment, for the country between the rivers possesses a soil of singular fertility, and is capable of supporting many times more inhabitants than it at present has. Indeed, the immense armies of Chengiz, and of Tamerlane, were maintained and recruited there. Sir, twenty years ago the whole of this vast region was interposed as an independent country, inhabited by free and independent tribes, between Russia and Persia, and Affghánistan. The Russian frontier was then marked by the so-called Orenberg and Siberian Lines, a series of military posts which extended from Gouriev, where the river Ural falls into the north-west part of the Caspian, to Orenberg, Orsk, Troitska, Petropalovsky, Semipalatinsk, and Bakhtarminsk, a distance of 3,300 versts, or 2,200 miles. But in 1847–8 the Russians commenced a great movement to the south; they built three forts in the centre of the Kirghiz Steppe on the Turgai, Irgiz, and Karabut rivers, established lines of communication from Orenberg to the Sea of Aral through the Steppe, and built the Fort of Aralsk or Eaimsk, where the Jaxartes flows into the Aral Sea, on which they launched three vessels. From that time to this their advance has been sometimes slow, but continuous. I will not weary the House by detailing their military operations, which were uniformly successful, and reflect much credit on the Russian soldiers. Suffice it to say that the advance was made in two directions; from the Aral along the course of the Jaxartes, where a line of forts, erected by the Kokanians since 1817, were captured and destroyed, or re-built and garrisoned, and from the Siberian lines to effect a junction with the troops ascending the Jaxartes, and to capture the forts that intervened between the two Russian lines of advance. The progress of these two lines was delayed by two events, one of which was a serious insurrection of the Kirghiz of the Steppe under one Izet Kutebar, which lasted from 1853 to 1857. I may mention that these tribes are now again in revolt, and have been joined by the Bashkirs. But the present insurrection will assuredly be put down as was the last. However, in 1853, the Russians took Ak-Mesjid, the principal Kokanian fort on the Jaxartes, and in 1854, they founded Fort Vernoe, on the Issikul Lake, on the eastern line of advance, which became the capital of the Great Kirghiz horde, who must now be reckoned as Eussian subjects. The other great event was the Crimean War; but, as soon as it was over, Russia made immense efforts to reduce Circassia to complete submission. An army of more than 100,000 men was employed in the Caucasus—Gaunib was taken in 1859, and Shamil sent prisoner to Russia. The Circassian exodus followed, and the great army of Trans-Caucasia was set free to reinforce the troops in Central Asia, or to act in any other direction. In 1864, the two Russian lines of advance were brought into communication by the capture of Turkestan and Chemkend, two important cities above the forts on the Lower Jaxartes, and by the storming of all the Kokanian forts to the East. In November of that year, Prince Gortschakoff issued a circular, stating that Russia had been constrained by imperious necessity to advance thus far, but that the Empire had now reached its limits, which would be settled by negotiation. In 1865, the recently conquered territory was erected into a new Government, which was called the Province of Turkestan. But in the summer of that year hostilities were resumed; General Chernaief engaged and defeated the combined forces of Kokan and Bokhára, and advancing south ninety miles, took Tashkend, a city with 100,000 inhabitants, and the most important commercial town in Central Asia. He was recalled, but presented, it is said, with a diamond-hilted sword by the Emperor. His successor, General Romanoffsky, followed in his steps, and in May, 1866, defeated the Amír of Bokhára at Idfar, on the left bank of the Jaxartes, marched south, and took Khojend, a city directly between Kokan and Bokhára. With this blow, the independence of Kokan, one of the three principal Uzbek States, was extinguished, half its territory being incorporated with Russia, and the other half reduced to a dependency under Khudáyar Khán. In 1867, Romanoffsky invaded the territory of Bokhára, and established a tâte de pont at Jizzik, within sixty miles of Samarkand. On this, he was recalled, and even degraded from his military rank and sent to Moscow, where he devoted his time to the preparation of a pamphlet on the means of consolidating the Russian conquests in Central Asia. Meanwhile, General Kaufmann in command of Jizzik, defeated an army of observation, which the Amir of Bokhára had assembled in the vicinity, and took Samarkand, which is now garrisoned in force by the Russians. Thus expired the independence of Bokhára, for the Eussians can, at any time, occupy the capital and overrun the remaining territory; but, ere they do this, they will probably wait for the construction of a railway from the Caspian to the Oxus, which, at the recommendation of General Romanoffsky, has been sanctioned by the Russian Government, and the surveys for which are now being made. It is said that General Romanoffsky will shortly arrive to superintend the construction of this line, by which the troops in Bokhára can be re-inforced in a few weeks either from the Caucasus or from Astrakhan. Russia being now dominant in Bokhára and Kokan, and the whole of the rich country between the Jaxartes and the Oxus having been virtually absorbed into the Russian Empire, it may be asked —What will be the results? The first result will, of course, be that, as the Orenburg and Siberian Lines are now useless, the whole of the Cossacks and other troops that guard them will be pushed forward some 1,200 miles to occupy a new frontier from Krasnovodsk Bay, or wherever else on the Caspian the railway may be commenced, to the Oxus, and along that river to the foot of the Kábul mountains, and so on to Port Vernoe, in the Kashgár mountains, and thence to Siberia. The army of Central Asia will also, no doubt, be greatly augmented, and the resources and revenue of the new country will be fully adequate to meet the increased expenditure. The railway from the Caspian to the Oxus will enable the Russians at any time to reinforce their army on the Oxus to any extent from Trans-Caucasia. This is expressly stated by General Romanoffsky in words which, with the permission of the House, I will now read. General Romanoffsky, after speaking of new roads, projected, by the Russians, from the Caspian into Central Asia, says— Since the above was written preparations for the construction of a railroad have begun on this route. After the completion of the line, which, may be expected within two years at latest, communications by steam will have been established between St. Petersburg and Khojend, in the very heart of Turkestan. Another advantage of the projected roads is that they would put the Caucasus in direct communication with Turkestan, it being probable that we shall have to keep a large force in the Caucasus for many years to come, and that, on the other hand, there will be no lack of opportunities in Central Asia of achieving grand results with small detachments, the importance of providing a short cut cannot be over-rated. At present, it takes two months to march a body of troops from the Volga to Turkestan; after the construction of the new road, a couple of weeks will suffice. In future, then, the Caucasian army will be regarded by our Generals as the reserve of the Turkestan force, and being always so strong that it can easily spare some battalions without injury to the service entrusted to it, its sphere of action will, in fact, extend to both countries alike. The second result will be that the Russians will acquire a predominant influence at Kábul. Those who question this do not perhaps consider how intimately Bokhára and Kábul are connected, both geographically and politically. The districts of Balk, Khulum, and Kunduz, which have been held by the Affgháns of Kábul for the last thirty years, belong properly to Bokhára; while Maimanah, Sir-i-Pul and Andkoi are in dispute between the two States. These circumstances must lead either to a collision between the Russians and Affgháns, or to great concessions on the part of the latter. In either case, Kábul is sure to become dependent on its powerful neighbour. It must be remembered, too, that Bokhára has repeatedly, in the last quarter of a century, decided the fate of Kábul. Both Dost Muhammed, and Akbar his son, took refuge in Bokhára, and returned from it to reign at Kábul; and, in 1867, Abdu'r rahmán Khán, the grandson of Muhammed, who is married to a daughter of the Amír of Bokhára, expelled Sher Ali Khán, the present ruler of Kábul, from his capital, with the help of a Bokhárian auxiliary force. We may fairly argue, then, that in the hands of Russia Bokhára will play a more influential rþle at Kábul than it did in those of a comparatively weak native chief. Sir, I cannot but think, from the tone of at least one article which has appeared in the Moscow Gazette, that the Russians themselves anticipate such a result, otherwise they would hardly have informed us that the Passes up to Kábul are practicable for siege guns, or have supposed that we should attach so much importance to their occupation of Bokhára as they seem to think we do, by anticipating that we would have recourse to diplomatic, or even military interference, to prevent their advance. Sir, I believe these notions are quite false, and I imagine I am expressing something of the general feeling here when I say that I rejoice that the odious tyranny of the Uzbek chiefs has been superseded by a Government which has already done so much to civilize an immense portion of Asia, and develop its natural resources, and which hospitably receives and protects travellers, instead of plundering and imprisoning, or, perhaps, murdering them. The whole region of which I have spoken, as just occupied by the Russians, is rich in minerals, and large portions of it in agricultural and other produce, and, under a settled Government, we may expect to see the uprise of a flourishing commerce, which by enriching Russia must indirectly benefit us. With regard to Kábul, although I conceive it to be our duty to cultivate friendly relations with its ruler, as well as other neighbouring Princes, I can see no reasons which should induce us to embark in any fresh alliance with him; still less can I understand why we should be apprehensive of any danger from that quarter. As soon as the railway is completed to Pesháwar from Lahore—and I am glad to hear that two-thirds of the lines, as far as Rawul Pindee, are nowbeing made—and as soon as the line from Hyderabad to Multán is finished I should look upon. Pesháwar as about the safest place in all India for us to encounter an enemy. Supposing, for the sake of argument, a hostile force to descend from Kábul to invade India, it would, as Sir Henry Lawrence remarked long ago, emerge from the Khyber Pass, necessarily in some disorder, in the face of a first-class fortress and a powerful army, with all the resources of India at their back. It is quite within our own power to make Pesháwar absolutely secure against any force that under any circumstances could be brought against it. It stands to reason that, as this place is one of the two doors of India, and as there are salubrious hill stations within a convenient distance, as at Rawul Pindee, and Campbellpore, we should here mass our strongest European force, say 15,000 men, under the very best General the English army can produce, and that he should have unlimited powers to establish defences on the banks of the Indus, and to deal with the hill tribes in the neighbourhood. If we wish to solve an Affghán problem, let us begin with these tribes, who are amongst the most warlike of their nation, and if united could, it is said, bring into the field 100,000 fighting men. I am informed that a medal is about to be given for fifteen actions fought by our troops in fourteen years with these tribes; and it is notorious that, in the campaign of 1863 alone, we lost against them 900 officers and men, killed and wounded. Sir, I hope the Government will propose another medal for the General and troops, who shall maintain our North-western frontier for three years without a single engagement with these tribes. I have no doubt such a medal could be won, but not till after a judicious mixture of severity and conciliation, maintained for some time, had brought these tribes over to our side. In order to effect this object we must select the very best General we have for the command of the frontier, and place under him a sufficient number of European troops. At present we have at Pesháwar and on the frontier a force of 25,000 native troops—the very flower of our native Army—and it appears highly impolitic to have with them no more than 6,500 Europeans. There are, at a convenient distance from Pesháwar, the most salubrious hill stations in, perhaps, all India, and there I would mass a force of not less than 15,000 Europeans, drawing 2,000 from each of the minor Presidencies—from such places as Madras, Hyderabad, and Punah, and the rest from such stations as Cawnpore in Bengal. Such a European force could at once crush any opposition on the frontier, and would make it absolutely secure; and, in case of any unforeseen emergency, a division of it could be moved by rail to any part of India. I think, therefore, that it is entirely in our own power to make our frontier at Pesháwar secure, and I am against any fresh alliances with the Affgháns of Kábul. I know it has been said that the neutrality of the Affgháns during the great Mutiny was owing to the subsidy paid to Dost Muhammed; but I am convinced that it is to be attributed to the stern and decisive measures taken by our General and the political authorities at Pesháwar, rather than to any forbearance on the part of the ruler of Kábul. In short, I am entirely opposed to any agreement to supply the Affgháns with money or with arms, because our motives in such a course would be certainly misinterpreted, and because, from the notorious fickleness of the Affgháns, such supplies would be just as probably used against us as for us. Besides, our unfortunate antecedent relations with the Affgháns have left on their minds a blood feud. Above all, such a measure, without conciliating the Affgháns, would indubitably give great umbrage to our old and natural ally, Persia.

Having mentioned Persia, I come to mention a third result, which must necessarily follow from the recent conquests of Russia, and that is a considerable amount of apprehension, and perhaps disturbance, amongst the Persians. I know that, in one respect, the Russian advance will be beneficial to Persia. The slave markets of the Uzbek capitals will be now closed, and thus one great inducement for the forays of the Turku- mans will be removed. We may even hope that the Russians may be induced, in the cause of humanity, to enforce the liberation of the myriads of Persians who are now pining in slavery amongst the Uzbeks. I know, too, that the Sháh is too conscious of his dignity, as the representative of one of the oldest monarchies upon earth, and too confident in the loyalty of his people, to have any anxiety; and I suppose that his Government and our own would be as willing to accept, as the Russians would be willing to offer, assurances of the groundlessness of any apprehension of a fresh advance on their part. But still unreasonable panics prevail in the East; and I cannot but think that the advance on the East of the Caspian of a great Power, which has already deprived Persia of some of her fairest provinces on the West of that sea, will cause considerable alarm in the frontier provinces of Persia, and especially in Khurásán. The Persians will point to the island of Ashurádah, in the south-east corner of the Caspian, close to Astarábád, which was occupied by Russia so long back as 1841, and converted from a mere sandbank into a naval depÔt and a station for war steamers. The Persians have long since been informed by one of their own European instructors, M. Ferrier, that a Russian expeditionary force might with ease, and almost without the knowledge of the Persian Government, be landed from Báku or Astrakhan, at Ashurádah, concentrated at Astarábád, and marched along the Perso-Turkuman frontier all the way to Herat. Indeed, the Persians might allege that such a step could not be prevented, for by the Treaty of Paris the Persians are prohibited from entering Herat territory, and it would take many weeks for a force from Kábul to reach Herat by the circuitous route of Ghazni and Kandahar. The Persians will also point to the fact that there is an Affghán contingent serving in the Russian camp, commanded, it is said, by Sikandar Khan, son of the late Ruler of Herat. Above all, they will dwell on the circumstance that the immense strategic importance and general value of Herat is thoroughly well known among the Russians, who had a scientific mission there in 1858, which explored all the neighbouring country. In fact, every Russian officer must know that Herat possesses a soil of unrivalled fer- tility, a salubrious climate, and abundance of water; that all the roads from the principal cities to the north, west, and south centre in it; that it is surrounded by formidable earthworks, which might be strengthened by European science to any extent. In short, Russian officers know well that Herat is a position of the highest strategic importance, and possesses unrivalled advantages in other respects. The Persians, therefore, will imagine that, just as three Russian Generals in succession disregarded the manifesto of Prince Gortschakoff, and advanced to fresh conquests, so a fourth, in imitation of his predecessors, may be found to make a sudden and unexpected advance upon Herat. Now, it will be said that these apprehensions of the Persians are quite groundless, and the whole notion of a fresh movement on the part of Russia illusory, and many, therefore, will recommend a policy of complete inaction, and, no doubt, that was our true policy thirty years ago. But I contend that a system of interference on our part, as regards Herat, ever since 1837—wars waged, and millions of money expended, and above all, Treaty obligations incurred—render an inactive policy now inconsistent with justice to Persia and with honour. Sir, the House will, I hope, pardon me if I show, by a very brief resumé of our relations with Persia, the manner in which the Herat question arose, and the grounds on which I believe our former interference in it, and our present neglect of it, alike unjustifiable. It is, perhaps, not generally known that our friendly relations with Persia are of older date than those with Turkey, which commenced in 1675, while those with Persia began in 1602. In that year two valiant English Knights —Sir Anthony and Sir Robert Sherley —entered the service of Abbás the Great, and became the instructors of the Persian Army. It was in great part owing to them that he gained that signal victory over the Turks, in which 23,000 Turks were left dead on the field of battle, and ten Pashas were slain or taken prisoners. In 1622, friendly Embassies were interchanged between England and Persia. In 1625, the combined forces of Persia and of the East India Company took Gombroon, which has ever since been called the Port of Abbás. An English factory was maintained there till 1761, and during all that time the agents of the East India Company were well received at the Persian Court. The successors of Abbás, whatever their follies, or whatever their crimes, were uniformly favourable to Christians, and especially to the English, and their conduct in that respect contrasted most advantageously with the cruelty and intolerance of the Turks. Even Nádir, that great conqueror so terrible to others, showed especial favour to Englishmen; treated Hanway with respect, and made Elton his Admiral in the Caspian. In 1763, Karím Khan, then Sovereign of Persia, granted to the English exclusive trade privileges and the right of establishing a factory at Bushire. Those privileges were enlarged and confirmed, in 1788, by Jáfir Khán. From 1801 to 1814, under the dread of an Affghán or a French invasion of India, the English sought the alliance of Persia with extraordinary persistence, and Fath Ali Sháh responded to their advances with the utmost cordiality, and thereby established, in behalf of Persia, an enduring claim on the friendship of England. In the repeated Treaties which were contracted during that period between the two countries, it was especially covenanted that Persia should prevent any invasion of India by the Affgháns, or by a European Power advancing by Samarkand or Bokhára. But as the dread of invasion passed away, the friendship of England grew cold. I shall not allude to what took place between us and Abbás Mirza in 1826 and 1828, because I am quite unable to justify it. It is enough that our policy towards Persia underwent a complete change, until, in the beginning of Muhammed Sháh's reign, our alienation culminated in positive interference and repression. Then arose, and was officially expressed, the idea—the preposterous idea, I will call it—that Persia was the "pioneer of Russia." That notion received some colour from the fact that Haji Mirza Aghassí, born a subject of Russia, had risen to be Prime Minister of Persia. But it is absurd to suppose that so astute a people as the Persians could have ever believed in any special identity between their own interests and those of Russia. I will not pursue this theme, but will only say that Russia is her own pioneer, and stands in need of no assistance from any quarter to accomplish her objects. However, at this time the Herat question arose, and the erroneous doctrine I have mentioned prevented our diplomatic officers from giving to the arguments of the Persians, in favour of the expedition against Herat, their duo weight. I believe the value of Herat to Persia has never been properly understood in England. In order to view the question aright, it must be observed that the mountains, which form an impassable barrier to the north of Khurásán, after running several hundred miles from the Caspian in the direction of Herat, sink down before they reach that city, and leave a level country quite open, to the forays of marauders. The Turkumans, who have desolated Persia for centuries, and have carried hundreds of thousands of Persians into slavery, cannot be repressed by Persia without the occupation of Merv, and Merv cannot be retained without the possession of Herat, as from no other place is there between Persia and Merv a well watered and practicable route. Merv is a colony of the family of the Sháh, and is, in consequence, called "Merv of the Kajars." It was for these reasons, and not out of a foolish ambition, that Fath Ali Sháh, Abbas Mirza, his son, Muhammed Sháh, and his grandson, the reigning Sháh, have desired and attempted to occupy Herat. But there were other and just grounds for Muhammed Sháh's expedition. The House will be surprised to hear it, perhaps; but it is the fact, that the population of Herat is more Persian than Affghán. I will go further than that— I will prove to the House that the Affgháns are in a small minority; that they are mere invaders, and are as odious and detested as any invaders ever wore in any part of the world. I establish this by the impartial testimony of a celebrated traveller and Orientalist, who has been the last European visitor at Herat, M. Vambery. He says— Never was ruler or conqueror so detested as is the Affghán by the Heratí. The original inhabitants of the city were Persians, and belonged to the race that spread itself from Sistán towards the North-east. The fortress itself is inhabited, for the most part, by Persians. As for Affgháns, one cannot find in the city more than 1 in 5. They have become quite Persians, and are, particularly since the last siege, very hostile to their own countrymen. A Kábulí is as much detested by them as by the aboriginal natives of Herat. It needs only some attack, no matter by whom, to be made upon Herat, for the Heratís to take up arms against the Affghans."—[Travels in Central Asia, p. 283.] I was employed in the neighbourhood of Herat during the last siege, and I was in daily communication with Heratís, and I confirm that statement. But even our own political officer at Kábul acknowledged that Muhammed Shah was justified in marching on Herat. Burnes wrote from Kábul to Lord Auckland, on the 14th of October, 1837— The most outrageous conduct of Kamran and his Minister in having sold into slavery the greater part, if not the whole Shiah population of Herat, would justify any attack on the part of Persia. But Burnes did not add that, by the 9th Article of the Treaty of 1814, England was expressly debarred from interfering. The Article is— If war should be declared between the Affgháns and Persians, the English Government shall not interfere with either party, unless their mediation, to effect a peace shall be solicited by both parties. But in spite of this express covenant— in spite of the most just grounds and even necessity that Persia had to occupy Herat—England interfered, and in favour of whom?—of a man who had sold a whole population into slavery, and who requited us by immediately tendering his allegiance to Persia. Sir, it would occupy too much time to continue the story of Herat. Suffice it to say that it is all of the same kind, and has resulted in great expense to ourselves, and in great loss and expense to Persia, counterbalanced in some degree, to Persia by the fact that even the Affghán chiefs that we have imposed upon the Heratís, have all been, avowedly or secretly, the vassals of the Sháh, and have some of them even read the prayer for the Sovereign, and coined money in his, the Sháh's, name. Sir, I contend, that, as our policy of repression and interference with Persia has entirely broken down in the case of Herat, we should abandon it as regards Merv, Sístán, Bahrain, and other places, where we have no legitimate right to meddle. I would also urge that we should again recognize the fact that the interests of Persia are entirely identical with our own; and that we should return to the former cordial alliance with, that country which we maintained for many years. As for Herat, we are, of course, bound to observe the Treaty of Paris, but let us at least interpret it as favourably as possible to Persia; and to that end let us send a British officer of experience to Herat, who may act as mediator for the Persian interests. There can be no objection to this, as our name has always stood well with the Heratís, and there have been many European officers at Herat since the time of Eldred Pottinger. Colonel Taylor, and Captain Clerk, were there in 1857; the Russian Mission in 1858; Colonel Pelly in 1860; and Dost Muhammed himself invited me to Herat during the siege of 1862–3. In every other respect let us assist to strengthen Persia. I understand that there is an intention of sending officers to instruct the Sháh's battalions, in accordance with the application which I had the honour to submit from His Majesty, in 1863; but I must own I am surprised at the delay which has taken place in acceding to so reasonable a request. There is no better soldier than the Persian, and under English officers —to whom he has always been respectful and attached—he would be equal to any undertaking. If the House will permit me I will establish this by undoubted evidence. The first evidence I will quote is that of one who saw the Persian soldier in action, and whose testimony cannot be disputed—I mean Eldred Pottinger. He says— Muhammed Sháh's troops were infinitely better soldiers than ours (the Sepoys), and twice as good troops as the Afgháns. The non-success of their efforts was the fault of their Generals. The men worked very well at the trenches, considering they were not trained Sappers, and the practice of their artillery was really superb. They simply wanted Engineers and a General to have proved a most formidable force. It is my firm belief that Muhammed Shah might have carried the city by assault the very first day that he reached Herat."—[Kaye's Lives of Indian Officers, Vol. 2, p. 182.] The second authority is Sir Justin Shiel, who writes— The Persian soldier is active, energetic, and robust, with immense power of enduring fatigue, privation, and exposure. He is full of intelligence, and seems to have a natural aptitude for a military life. Half-clothed, half-fed, and not even half-paid, he will make marches of twenty-four miles day after day, and when needs be he will extend them to forty miles. He bears cold and heat with equal fortitude… … … … … is full of life and cheerfulness, and has always displayed the most complete submission to his English commanders, for whom he has ever had a special veneration. In the last contest between Persia and Turkey 3,000 or 4,000 Persians of the regular army put to flight 30,000 or 40,000 Turks at Toprah Kalah, between Baízíd and Erzerúm." —[Shel's Persia, p. 382.] Having indicated the desirableness of a change of policy as regards Persia, and of non-interference with her territorial claims, I must make one exception, and that is as regards the dominions of our faithful ally, the Khan of Kelát. Sir, it is now thirty years since we acknowledged the independence of Kelát, and entered into an alliance with its ruler as with an independent Prince. I may say that I drew the first Memorandum for the first Treaty myself. Ever since then the Khans of Kelát have been our faithful allies, and I think their country may fairly be regarded as an integral part of India. Indian names of places still remain in it. The Hindus go in multitudes on pilgrimage to Hingláj, which is within its limits. We have a special interest in protecting Kelát, as it forms the frontier of Sindh, and we have already some small military posts in it, as well as our telegraphic stations. I think, therefore, that we ought to interpose our good, offices to put an end to the war which is now carried on between the Persians and Kelatís along their frontier. In order to remove all ground for quarrel a Boundary Commission should be appointed under our mediation, which would settle the line of demarcation once and for ever, all the way from the Makran coast to Quettah. Should it be acceptable to the Khan of Kelát, I would also move up all the Sindh horse, except half a regiment, to Quettah, and even locate with them the European regiment now at Karachí. This is a measure recommended by that great military genius, General Jacob, and by many other authorities. The climate of Quettah is infinitely preferable to that of Sindh for Europeans, and by the move we should have the control of the Bolan and Khojuk passes. The Bolan might be made absolutely secure by the yearly expenditure of half the sum we paid as subsidy to Dost Muhammed. The only objection I have heard to this step is that it would give umbrage to the Affgháns. But why should the Affghans, who submit so quietly to our appropriation of a large part of what is really Affghán territory—I mean Pesháwar—take umbrage at our fixing an additional post in a country which is entirely independent of them! The truth is, the objection is worse than ridiculous—it is false. The Affghans do not object, and Saiyid Nur Muhammed, the present Prime Minister of Kábul, when he resided for some months at Quettah, used, while deprecating our so much as sending a single officer to Kábul, to recommend our occupation of Quettah. With a change of policy towards Persia, I would urge, as a first step, the transference of the superintendence of our relations with that country from the Foreign to the India Office. At present there is a conflict of authority, the officers in one part of Persia being under one Department, and in another part under another. This is extremely detrimental to the public interests, and productive of delays and embarrassments. Then, without in the least depreciating the great merit and ability of the officials at the Foreign Office, I must say that they cannot possibly know so much of Persian affairs as men like Sir Henry Rawlinson, Sir Bartle Frere, Lord Lawrence, and others, who are, or have been, Members of the Council of India. Indian officers, too, are more fitted for employment in Persia than the regular diplomatic attachés, who pine for Paris and Vienna, and are only anxious to get away from Teheran as soon as possible. It is mainly with regard to Indian interests that our Legation at Teheran is so important. Indian trade with the Persian Gulf alone amounts to £5,000,000, and it is on that account that India defrays the greater part of the expenses of the Legation, and would, no doubt, willingly defray all. Therefore, as the India Office pays for the Legation, it ought to have the control of affairs. The Electric Telegraph, with all the officers attached to it, is now under the India Office; and if it be true, as I hope may be the ease, that there is a prospect that English officers will be again sent to Persia to instruct the Sháh's army, they would most probably be under the India Office. The hon. Gentleman concluded by asking the Under Secretary of State for India, If he has received any recent Despatches as to Central Asia, and whether he has any objection to lay them upon the Table?

SIR CHARLES WINGEIELD

said, that as regarded the policy of this country in view of the present position and presumed designs of Russia in Central Asia, two divisions of opinion were entertained—the one representing the policy of action, the other that of inaction; in other words, intervention and non-intervention. The idea of advancing our troops into Affghanistan and taking up strategical positions would be utterly repudiated in this country, and had even fallen out of favour in India; but, generally speaking, the policy of action might be described as one leading us to enter into close alliance with Affghanistan, with the view of creating, on the one hand, an independent power to hold Russia in check, and, on the other, entering into negotiations with Russia to induce her to refrain from aggression, and to guarantee the neutrality of Affghanistan. Neither of these measures recommended themselves to his judgment. As regarded Affghanistan itself there never had been—at all events for a time long past—a settled government in that country. It was true that Dost Mahommed secured supreme authority, but he could not transmit it to his son. He (Sir Charles Wingfield) did not believe that the whole military power of Affghanistan, even in the hands of one man, could hold Russia in check. Nothing short of sending our armies into that country would avail if Russia was bent on conquest. Neither did he see any chance of arriving at a satisfactory result by entering into negotiations with Russia to limit her conquests. How could they ask Russia to do so when they did not propose to give up anything themselves. She might also answer that she desired no extension of territory, although she might be compelled to take more in order to keep what she had. He would attach no value to the disclaimer of Russia with respect to interfering in Affghanistan, because she was not in a position to do so, and would not be in a position to do so for some time; and no power could bind posterity. He quite agreed with Sir Henry Rawlinson that we were '' strong enough in India to hold our own." Those who advocated the policy of inaction alleged that Russia had no temptation to interefere with Affghanistan, and that, if she entertained so wild an idea as that of invading India, we should be in a better position to meet her if we kept within our own territory. The policy of inaction was, he believed, the right one for us to pursue, and the adoption of any other would be likely to precipitate a collision. The policy which he advocated was that which was pursued by Lord Lawrence up to the close of his viceroyalty, although he could scarcely reconcile with it his treatment of the Ameer. For some years after the death of Dost Mahommed the policy of non-intervention was strictly adhered to, but last year Shere Ali renewed the contest, and obtained some advantages, and Shere Ali then sought the assistance of this country, and Lord Lawrence, after repeated solicitations, at last resolved to give him some aid for the purpose of affording him a chance of recovering his power, and he sent the Ameer a present of money and arms, but declined to enter into a treaty. He promised, however, further assistance from time to time, as the conduct of Shere Ali might deserve. The House was aware that Shere Ali had since met Lord Mayo at Umballah, and received from him a sum of £60,000, in addition to the previous sum of £60,000, and a battery of guns. He thought this was a departure from the policy which Lord Lawrence had followed, so long, notwithstanding much pressure, of leaving the Affgháns to settle their own differences. What was a gift of money and arms to Shere Ali but taking a side in the struggles of the contending parties? Besides which this might be regarded as an earnest of future assistance, and of something very like a subsidy. There was one thing that might be confidently relied on, which was that when this money was gone Shere Ali would want more, and that if he did get it his dissatisfaction would be greater than if the money was refused from the first. It may be said that his father Dost Mahomed had received aid from the Government of India. But there was a very material difference between the positions of the father and the son, because the former was undisputed ruler of Afghanistan, while Shere Ali was hardly able to hold his own. The position of an Affghan ruler was always precarious, and if Shere Ali were to lose his life or his throne, it might be deemed necessary to take the country under our direction. This gift of money would not secure the friendship of the Affghan people, who were notoriously treacherous, and would take our money and Russian money too. But the loss of the money would be the least loss; the probability was this gift of ours would give rise to intrigues on the part of Russia, who, seeing our policy, would set up a candidate of her own for the throne of Affghanistan. This was a subject on which feeling was very strong in Russia, as the columns of the Moscow Gazette sufficiently proved. The Press of England had been studiously moderate on the recent interview between the Ameer and the Viceroy, but the Press of India had flourished it as a great diplomatic triumph gained over Russia, and a proof that the policy of non-intervention was at an end. The policy of non-intervention which he approved of might not be the right one. It might be right to rise up a strong power in Affghanistan to oppose Russia; but let us not delude ourselves into the belief that this was a policy of non-intervention, and embark this country in relations with Affghanistan which might prove highly embarrassing, and a source of future difference and difficulties with Russia. He did not believe that Russia had any hostile intentions against Affghanistan — if she adopted any policy of aggression it would be by way of Herat and Candahar. He did not regard the extension of Russia's conquests as at all menacing to this country. On the other hand he saw one material advantage which might be derived from it, and that was the establishment of a Christian power in Central Asia, especially in Bokhara, which had been the hotbed of Mahomedan bigotry. It might have a depressing effect on Mahomedan fanaticism in our own territories, and every one must wish to see the surrounding peoples relieved from that religious and political despotism under which they had so long suffered. In his opinion we were very apt to exaggerate the effect produced on the native mind of of India by the advance of Russia. He did not believe that her advance was viewed with satisfaction by any except the low Mahomedan population of the towns and those classes who looked forward to the gratification of their predatory tastes. But these persons were, happily, diminishing. "We must finish the railway from Peshawur connecting the Ghaut between Mooltan and Hyderabad, and construct a railway between Delhi and Bombay; and then, with the mountain barrier and river on our front, and the railways open on our rear, we might feel confident of being able to put down any aggression in India. He was quite in favour of cultivating friendly relations with Persia, but not of an aggressive alliance. He thought the Persian Embassy should be placed in a different position, and, men, such as Sir Henry Rawlinson should be got, instead of men whose tastes led them to look to Berlin or Paris. After all, the real security for the maintenance of our rule in India was a just and liberal system of administration. Not merely that which promoted the material prosperity of the masses— for in that the Government had not been wanting during the last twenty years— but a system that would give an opening in the public service for the upper and educated classes of India, and by associating them with us in the administration of the country would make them feel that their interests and our own were identical. The natives knew well the alternative was not between English and national rule; and the policy he recommended was that laid down by the late Lord Canning, whose memory would always be held in respect and veneration, since he was magnanimous in the hour of triumph, and generous in all his dealings. That policy was to show the people of India that although the reins of government were not in their hands it was carried on exclusively for their good, and that it was to their interest to continue the loyal subjects of Her Majesty. If we could insure Governors General in India such as Lord Canning, whom every chief in the country was ready to give his life to defend, there would be no fear of our future in the East. In conclusion, he would observe that the discussion would show that the House deprecated any course of policy which would oblige us to support any dynasty in Affghanistan; it would do much good in allaying the fears of our countrymen, and in showing that we were confident in our ability to repeal aggression from whatever quarter it should come, and that we could afford to look calmly on the progress of Russia in her work of civilization in Central Asia.

MR. GRANT DUFF

said, he was glad that his hon. Friend the Member for Penryn (Mr. Eastwick), whose connection both with the literature and politics of the East was well known, and whose courtesy and kindness in twice postponing this Question at the request of Government he had to acknowledge, had at last succeeded in bringing it before the House. And yet the first idea which struck him when he heard that he proposed doing so was that since the end of last Session the Legislature had been deprived of the services of the two men who were better fitted than any others to enlighten it upon all that relates to Central Asia. The long experience of Sir Henry Raw-linson—gone from the House of Commons—had been gained, he was happy to say, to the Indian Council; but the vast knowledge and the many gifts of Lord Strangford were lost for ever to his friends and to his country. His hon. Friend had, as was to be expected, devoted a considerable part of his speech to our relations with Persia. Against the practical conclusions at which he had arrived he had little to advance. He was as anxious as the hon. Member could be that we should keep, not only on amicable but even upon cordial terms with the Government of the Shah; but he wished it to be distinctly understood that in advocating close relations with Persia, he was guided chiefly by the following considerations:—Firstly, it seemed desirable that we should support that Government from motives of good neighbourhood, and because it was the obvious interest of a country situated like Great Britain that every civilization should develop itself in its own way. Secondly, it was desirable that we should be acceptable to and influential at Teheran, in order that we might work in the interests of peace. When Persia quarrelled with Turkey or with Russia we suffered more or less; when she quarrelled with the small potentates of the Gulf we suffered more or less; but when she quarrelled with the Affgháns or Beloochistan it was proximus ardet Ucalegon, and we were put to infinite expense and inconvenience in ordering out the fire-engines. Thirdly, it was desirable that we should be strong at Teheran, in in order that we might give all possible support to the material development of the country. The trade between Persia and India was already considerable, but he was assured by those most intimately acquainted with its details that it was not likely to increase until better roads were made from the interior to the seaboard of Persia. For this and many other good things for that country nothing was wanted but external peace, internal strong government, and. the counsel and support of a thoroughly disinterested and highly civilized Power. His hon. Friend was in favour of lending Indian officers to drill the armies of the Shah. There were many precedents for this; and if in these times of peace redundant officers could be spared from India, and if Persia would make it worth the while of officers who would do our Army credit, to go thither, he saw no reason against letting them go, provided always it was distinctly understood that they were only allowed to go in consequence of a direct application from the Shah, and that they were not allowed to take part in any war against Powers with which this country was at peace. With regard to the affairs of Seistan, very few persons could claim to be as well informed as his hon. Friend; but was not the state of things pretty much this? From 1509 to 1749 Seistan was Persian territory, but about that date it was added to the new kingdom of Affghanistan by Ahmed Shah. During his reign, which was a long one, it remained subject to Affghanistan. Then it revolted and remained for a considerable period independent; and independent it was when Captain Christie travelled through it in 1810. Persia took advantage of the English invasion of Affghanistan to put forth her long dormant pretentions to it, and, in 1853, the Persian standard was hoisted with the goodwill of, at least, one of its chiefs. From that time to this there had been a Persian party and an Affghán party, who had struggled together with various fortunes. Her Majesty's Government had not, so far as he knew, ever given a very positive and final opinion as to which of the two Powers had the best claims on the disputed territory, nor, indeed, as to whether either Power was de jure master of Seistan, and he did not feel justified in saying anything positive on the subject. His hon. Friend had spoken of the importance of Herat. No one who knew the facts would underrate its importance, and Her Majesty's Government had certainly never done so. It was a great, and in the hands of a European Power might become a unique fortress, and it was surrounded by a very fertile country where an army might encamp, and whence it might, no doubt, advance towards Scinde. It was, however, possible to over-rate as well as to under-rate, not the importance of Herat as a place for a conqueror to hold, with a view to be strong in Western Asia, but its special importance with regard to us. It should not be forgotten that from Herat to the Indus there were 818 miles, and, reflecting on what an army would have to go through when advancing from Herat to our territory, he was reminded of the words of the poet— But many a banner shall be torn, And many a knight to earth be borne, And many a sheaf of arrows spent, Ere Scotland's King shall cross the Trent. His hon. Friend spoke of the advantage to Persia of possessing Herat, in order to defend her frontier against Turcoman raids. He agreed with him as to the object, for there were few human beings whose lot was more to be compassionated than those unfortunate Persians who were carried off by the Turcomans to the slave market of Khiva, but he demurred to the Persian theory as to the way in which it was to be effected. What Persia wanted for the protection of her people against the Turcomans was not Herat, but a strong Government and an effective military administration on her frontier. He could not agree with his hon. Friend when he advocated an advance from our side to Quettah. He was persuaded that an advance to Quettah would be very far from being really agreeable to Khelat, while it could not fail to irritate both Persia and Affghanistan, and wake up old fears of annexation. Looking at it from the English point of view, it would be frightfully expensive, and very unpopular in the army when the first novelty was over. It would involve throwing a considerable force, 257 miles—say, twenty long marches—in advance of our present frontier posts, and it would turn the Bolan Pass into a difficulty behind us, instead of leaving it as it is—a defence in front of us. Our relations with Russia were at present of the most cordial kind, and the communications which had lately passed between the two Governments with regard to Central Asia—communications to which undue importance had been attached—had been most friendly. He had always been an advocate for the co-operative policy in the relations of England and Russia in Asia, but that was a question for the future. It was early to talk of anything more than the most general good understanding. We were still separated from each other by vast distances, and the orbits of our policies did not yet touch. There were, however, some matters of fact with respect to the Russian position in Asia which, were not sufficiently known, and which ought to be known before a just idea could be formed of the present state of things in Central Asia. And first he would give the most positive denial to three stories which had been frequently repeated. It had been said that the Russians were in force at Charjui, on the Oxus. It was not so. The Eussians had never been within many days' march of Charjui. It had been said that the Russians had established a post at Gumah, between Yarkand and Khoten. It was not so. They had never been within some hundred miles of that place. It had been said that a Captain Reinthal had been with a party surveying in Afghanistan; that was a fiction, founded upon his having been—not with a surveying party—at Kashgar, so that the tale had about as much foundation as if it had been noised abroad that a Russian officer with a surveying party had been examining the Chiltern hills, whereas in deed and in truth the Russian officer in question had been at Galway. The two furthest points to which the Russians had penetrated in the Khanate of Bokhara were Bokhárá itself and Karshi, which last place they took from the Ameer's rebel son and restored to his father. From both these points they had now fallen back, and it would appear that their outposts at present were Samarcand and two smaller places not very far from it. He should not be at all surprised if they even withdrew from Samarcand, at least for a time, for Samarcand was cut off from the Jaxartes by a desert tract very difficult to traverse. It was far from improbable that they might place for a time their advance post at Khodjend, far in the rear of their present advanced posts, a place from which they would still be able to dictate both to Khokan and Bokhara. Samarcand might be taken as, to all intents and purposes, the extreme point of Russian advance towards British India on the Affghanistan side for some time to come. Their furthest point of advance towards British India, on the side of Eastern Turkestan, was a small detached fort on the Naryn—that was, on the head waters of the great Jaxartes, far, far away from any support, so far away as really not to be an advanced post, in the ordinary sense, at all. Persons who looked at the map of Central Asia and knew that the Russians were at Samarcand, and that they had also an outpost only 167 miles from Kashgar, high up on the Naryn, very naturally concluded that these two extreme points of their advance towards Affghanistan and Cashmere were connected with each other. But this was as far as possible from being the case. The whole independent part of the Khanate of Khokan lay between these points of advance, and in addition there was a huge mountain knot of hardly peopled country. Roughly stated the position was this—Suppose some Power advancing from the north towards Italy. Let it have one body of men, say 2,000 strong, at Clermont, in the heart of Au-vergne. Let it have another body of men, say 1,000 strong at Zurich, in Switzerland, and let the military connection of this body of 1,000 men be kept up with Clermont only by a route leading round through Southern Germany to a point to the north of the Lake of Constance, say Augsburg, and so southward to Zurich by Constance. That was about the state of affairs if, instead of Clermont, Zurich, and Augsburg, you read Samarcand, the outpost of Kurtka, and Fort Vernoe, the most southern point in which the Russians are in anything like strength in the direction of Cashmere, from which it is separated by many hundreds of miles, and by some of the most difficult country on the face of the earth. And there was this difference between the European and Asiatic regions which he was comparing — in France, Germany, and Switzerland there were good roads, in Central Asia there were none. In all the huge province to which was lately given the name of Eastern Turkestan, and of which one centre was at Samarcand and the other at Fort Yernoe, the Russians might have on a liberal computation some 25,000 men, for the most part scattered in lonely posts engaged in keeping up communications. Transfer the scene again to Europe. Would the existence of such a force between Clermont and Augsburg, with its reservoir of strength 1,800 miles to the north-west of Clermont—that is, far in the Atlantic behind the British Isles—be sufficient to frighten the holders of the Venetian Quadrilateral out of their propriety? The idea of invasion of British India by Russia was really so preposterous that he could not for a moment entertain it. But suppose for the sake of argument that the whole western half of Northern Asia were occupied, not by the outlying provinces of a great European power, but by a substantive empire which had no cares to distract it from the one thought of pushing southwards. Suppose, again, that the forlorn and far-off towns of Siberia, Orenburg and the rest, were busy and crowded centres of national life, and suppose further that all this national life were directed by a man of vast military ambition who, burning for the battle-fields of British India, had already advanced on the Affghanistan side as far as Samarcand, and on the side of Eastern Turkestan as far as the small fort on the Naryn, which now forms the outpost of Russia in that direction. This conqueror, supposing he marched by Herat, which would be his easiest road, would have, before he reached that fortress, 613 miles to traverse. That is to say, he would have to pass over something very like the space between London and Inverness, and would not in doing so, be able to take advantage of the "limited mail." We need not follow his route from Herat to Candahar, and from Candahar onwards, about 818 miles more, making more than 1,400 in all. Suppose he traversed it with as little loss as could reasonably be expected by an army traversing so vast a distance, the last stage of the journey must be sixty-six miles of the weary Bolan Pass, and behind the Bolan Pass a strip of desert, and behind the strip of desert a large and well-appointed army able to choose exactly its own ground, absolutely fresh and un-tired, having traversed, with every appliance of modern science, nearly the whole of the distance from which its most far-drawn regiments had come. That was the grand route—incomparably the easiest of all the routes. Take another. Let the supposed invader march from Bokhara to Balkh — 310 miles, from Balkh, through the tremendous Bamian Pass, to Cabul 347 miles, from Cabul to Peshawur about 194 miles more, through the Khyber Pass, and meet behind it the drilled and iron ranks of the same army. Take a third and last route from Tashkend, across the still independent State of Khokan, and over the Thian Shan mountains, by the Terek Pass, down upon Kashgar; that must be about 477 miles; then, from Kashgar to Yarkand, as the crow flies, must be about 130 miles. Prom Yarkand a short journey would bring him to that agreeable Pass, of which we had heard so much lately, the Chang-chin-Moo, no doubt less difficult than the old Karakorum route, but for which the best that could be said as a route for an army was that, given every condition of season, skilful commissariat, and the rest as favourable as possible, and imagining that Eastern Turkestan had become absolutely an integral part of the dominions of this great West Asiatic Empire, and, further, was bristling with troops like the Rhenish frontier, it might not be wholly impracticable to a man of the temper of Alexander the Great or Charles XII. Since our relations with Affghanistan had been last alluded to in this House the whole story of our recent policy towards our unruly neighbours beyond the Passes had been told in "another place," very succinctly but very clearly, by the chief mover in that policy. A friend said to him early this Session—"I am sorry you have given that money to Shere Ali; you are only buying the air." Well, if the transaction were to be looked upon as one of sale and purchase, his friend was quite right, but that was just what it was not. Ever since the death of Dost Mahomed the India Government had been longing for something like stability in the affairs of Affghanistan. We had troubles enough with the wild tribes along 800 miles of our North-Western frontier, with whom our relations were precisely those which existed in the days of James V. between the Lowlanders and Highlanders of Scot-land, without having behind us this surging, raging Affghanistan, out of which no one could know what form of trouble might not arise. Those who had followed the tangled story of the events which had occurred there in the last few years knew perfectly well that what the Viceroy was always wishing for was some prospect of prolonged peace. This was the burden of all his communications, and in consequence he did not scruple to recognize Afzul Khan as de facto ruler, although his sympathies, so far as he can be said to have had any sympathies in the matter other than a sympathy for quiet, were with Shere Ali, who was the favourite son of Dost Mahomed, and was first recognized by us. It was not till last October that Lord Lawrence thought the mobile minds of the Affghan people had at last turned distinctly towards Shere Ali, and that he was really likely to obtain such an amount of support as to enable him to hold the country in his grasp as his father had held it, and then it was Lord Lawrence determined to give that amount of assistance which would, in his opinion, just make the difference between Shere Ali's having a thoroughly assured and a doubtful supremacy. People had written as if he had been moved to do so by some apprehension about Russia, but that was utterly opposed to the fact. If they could go back to 1730, when Russia first began that long march of conquest—and, he would add, of beneficent conquest—which had taken her from the banks of the Ural to Bokhara, a wise ruler of India would —given the existing circumstances of Affghanistan— have done the same. To have plunged into the seething gulf of Affghan politics only a few months before would have been most unwise; but Lord Lawrence seized the favourable moment, when a little assistance might be expected to act as oil had been said to do at the bar of the Tagus, and turn the seething gulf into calm water. The Government did not dream of erecting Shere Ali into a bulwark against Russia or against anybody else. If any bulwark was wanted in that part of the world, nature had planted bulwarks enough in all conscience, as we once found out to our cost, and as anybody else would soon find out to theirs. What was wanted was a quiet Affghanistan, just as we wanted a quiet Burmah. The Government wanted to be able to use every penny they could scrape together in India for the moral and material development of the country. They wished to stimulate commerce round the whole of the land and sea frontier, and it did not at all suit to have one of their trade gates locked up by a burning house, the cellars of which were known to be full of highly explosive compounds. They wanted Shere Ali to be strong for the suppression of lawlessness, and rich, if possible, into the bargain. They wanted him to understand that they did not covet a square inch of his territory or ask any kind of assistance from him, other than the sort of indirect assistance which a civilized Government must always derive from being known to exercise a pacifying and semi-civilizing influence around its own borders. If they effected this object, the money they had given, and the money they might give, would be an uncommonly good investment. It would be honourable to Shere Ali to receive it, because he was asked to do nothing for it except what it would be to his interest and honour to do if he did not receive one farthing; and it would be honourable to them to give it, because their only object was to get that done which every benevolent man would wish to see done, even if his own interest were in no way affected—that was to see a fine country rescued from miserable anarchy. The experience of the past in India told us that we were never safer than when a strong man kept his house on our frontier. The danger came when the strong man was gone, and the house was divided against itself. Contrast the period of Runjeet Singh with the period that immediately followed it. Was it in the days of the old Lion or in the days of his weak successors that wave after wave of war broke upon our border, until we were obliged fairly to incorporate with our dominions a territory as large as the kingdom of Italy? Did our last experiment of making it worth while for the Affghans to be peaceable neighbours turn out so badly? If Dost Mahomed had not been eating our salt in 1867, was it quite so certain that he would have resisted the pressure, the very strong pressure, that was put upon him by the fanatical party at Cabul to swoop down upon the Punjaub? It was the custom to talk scornfully of Affghan faith as another great Imperial nation used to talk of Punic faith, and probably, in the main, we spoke truly; but if the transactions of the last forty years between us and the house of Dost Mahomed were carefully added up and compared, he was not so sure that the balance in our favour would be so great as it ought to be. Before leaving the affairs of Affghanistan there was just one other point to which he alluded a moment ago, and on which he wished to say a few words more. He did not think that the majority of their country- men rightly apprehended our position in North-Western India. They thought of us as in immediate contact with Affghanistan, and when they heard of our wishing to be on good terms with that country, they thought that it could only be because we wished for assistance against the Muscovite spectre that was moving slowly southwards. But that was a pure delusion. Between us and the Affghans proper there was an inner ring of wild tribes, numbering many thousand fighting men, who gave us infinite trouble, and against whom we had every few months some little fighting to do. Prom time to time the little fighting became great fighting, and we had a really serious campaign like that of Umbeyla, in 1863. Now, as long as we were on thoroughly good terms with the Affghans, we exercised a far greater check over these people than we could do at other times, and we paralyzed the efforts of the disaffected Mussulman fanatics in the Ganges valley who were in communication with some of them, and used their known zeal for Islam as a means of exciting disquiet among our own subjects. He desired to say one word about the Umballah interview. He saw that some very able writers in India imagined that that was the starting point of a new policy. He could not too emphatically deny that. There was no new policy. Circumstances in Affghanistan had changed; the spirit in which the Government regarded them had not changed. The policy of Her Majesty's Government with reference to Central Asia, in so far as it was connected with India, might be thus summed up—First, they desired to live on the best possible terms with all their neighbours, by which he meant that they desired not only to do no harm to them, but that each one of them should not only be but feel himself the stronger and happier for being in contact with Her Majesty's Indian Empire. Secondly, they intended to strengthen, in every possible way, our North-Western frontier they intended to make, and were making, Kurrachee as good a port as modern engineering science could make it; they looked forward to the completion, at no very distant period, of the missing link of railway in the Indus valley; they were already pushing the railway onwards towards Peshawur. Thirdly, they meant to give every reasonable encouragement to the extension of trade with Central Asia, which was at present small; and they looked with considerable favour upon the efforts that were being made by Mr. Forsyth and other energetic officers on the frontier to extend that trade. They were extremely glad to observe that in this matter the Maharajah of Cashmere and his able Prime Minister were acting thoroughly with us, and they would look with the most friendly feelings on any judicious and not too ambitious efforts that might be made to increase our knowledge of the countries to the north-west as well as to the northeast and east of our dominions. It was, perhaps, not altogether creditable to Great Britain that the geographer should have any work still to do so near British territory, but the difficulties had been and were still great, and considering how recent an acquisition the Punjaub after all was, we might, he hoped, plead not unsuccessfully before the science of Europe the res dura and the regni novitas. Lastly, they were firmly persuaded that if we could believe in the possibility of any danger from the side of Central Asia threatening us at present in India—if, in short, that great, substantive, conquering empire of which he had spoken a little time ago did exist and were not a mere fiction of the brain, and even if there were a Napoleon at the head of it—our best protection, a better protection even than the vast spaces which a hostile army would have to traverse, or than the strength which that hostile army would have to meet, lay and would ever lie in the good government of India, in the development of the material prosperity and general well-being of the people. They believed that their first duty was to take care that our rule there should be increasingly sympathetic as well as increasingly enlightened, and while they would crush and stamp out every, the slightest, attempt at resistance to authority, they would not forget that authority in India, as in Europe, had sometimes "beat with his staff the child that might have led him." By these arts, they believed, if by any, empire would be deserved and would be held; and while they would watch and were watching with the deepest and minutest interest the development of events in Central Asia, and while they would thank the hon. Gentlemen who had spoken that night, and any other hon. Gentlemen, for giving them from time to time the benefit of any information which they might have, or any ideas that might occur to them, they wished it to be distinctly understood that they had not a feeling of uneasiness or alarm about this matter. And the fact that Russia had advanced to a point between Samarcand and Bokhara had not induced them to do any one thing which they would not have the strongest motives for doing if she had never passed a verst beyond the Ural or the Orenburg line. With regard to the Papers for which his hon. Friend had moved, he thought the Government could give him nearly all of them except the last; but Ms hon. Friend's long official and diplomatic experience would tell him that it might turn out that when the Papers for which he asked were examined, certain passages might have to be omitted. He could assure him, however, and the House, that he was anxious to give everything he could possibly give without inconvenience to the public service.

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

said, he thought the House would not regret the time that had been bestowed upon the discussion of this subject, especially when they considered the character of the three speeches to which they had had the privilege of listening, coming, as they did, from Gentlemen well acquainted with the subject, and approaching it as they had done from different points of view, and illustrating in a remarkable manner the points on which all agreed, and indicating in a very inoffensive manner the points on which there was considerable difference of opinion. He could not but feel that with regard to this very great and important question, as touching the Imperial interests of England, of all things the most to be deprecated was a policy of mystery. He rejoiced that the hon. Member for Falmouth (Mr. Eastwick) had been able to obtain a night for this discussion, because he knew that there existed an unfortunate impression in many quarters, to the effect that there was some disposition on the part of Parliament to put this matter aside as if there were in it something dangerous and inconvenient to discuss. Now, he was perfectly convinced that when the result of that debate came to be known to the public a very excellent impression would be produced, because it would be evident that the matter would be treated frankly, and that there was no desire to conceal anything. This discussion, too, ought to do a great deal of good in clearing up the differences and jealousies that many people supposed to exist; and though this was a source of satisfaction to him, he rejoiced still more at the clearing away of any mystery for the sake of the people of India; for he was well aware that there were many persons who busied themselves in India in spreading rumours and getting up suspicions, as if there were something behind the scenes which it was dangerous to discuss. After listening to the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Falmouth, approaching the question from a Persian point of view, after listening to the speech of the hon. Member for Gravesend (Sir Charles Wingfield), approaching it, as he did, with some jealousy of what had occurred with regard to our relations in India and Affghanistan, and after listening to the eminently judicious and satisfactory speech of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State for India, he believed that those speeches were calculated to do great good in Russia, in India, and perhaps even in this country. When he heard that the House was asked to discuss the policy of England in Central Asia he was tempted to say that the only answer we could give was that England had no policy in Central Asia. In point of fact, we ought not to have a Central Asian policy. It ought to be an Indian policy. We had enough in our hands with the management of our own interests. And, however interesting the questions connected with the development and civilization of those regions might be, he did not feel that the policy of England ought to be directed to the condition of those countries; but should be influenced mainly by a consideration of the interests of our own Indian Empire. And looking at it from an Indian point of view, this debate had been eminently satisfactory, both in the opinions that had been expressed and the opinions that had not been expressed. There had been no advocacy of a policy of annexation, of a policy of extending the British dominions, or of a policy of advancing in order to meet Russia midway between our frontier and theirs. The general feeling evidently was in favour of the policy of keeping within our own frontiers—of developing the internal defences, extending the existing railways, and improving the harbour of Kurrachee, rather than attempting to go into the country of Affghanistan. In addition to the other reasons which might be stated against such a proceeding as the latter, there was the danger of creating suspicion in the minds of the natives. He believed the hon. Member for Gravesend had given expression to the feelings of Englishmen of all parties, when he said that we ought to keep free from the imbroglio of Affghan policy. There was a general feeling that we ought not to repeat the mistakes we made in 1840; that we ought to keep ourselves entirely free from entangling alliances. What we should do was to maintain friendly relations with the natives on our borders, to desire the existence of a good Government in Affghanistan. It was a misapprehension to suppose that we wanted to erect Cabul into a bulwark against Russia. What we desired was that there should be peace on our frontiers, and that the States bordering on those frontiers should be well governed in themselves. Any disquiet in a Mahomedan State on our border must necessarily affect a Mahomedan population within our own frontiers. He believed that the advance of Russia had been to a great extent forced on her by the circumstances in which she had been placed. She had found herself constantly in contact with countries in a state of anarchy, and for that reason it became necessary for her to make incursions into those countries. If we wished to give Russia an excuse to go into Affghanistan, we should let that country fall into a state of anarchy; but we were doing what we could to strengthen the ruler of Cabul. There seemed every prospect that he would be successful in maintaining a strong Government; but there was no engagement on our part to support his dynasty. If Shere Ali could support himself, well and good. As long as he did so the British Government would maintain friendly relations with him. We had made him presents in order to assist him in governing his country, and the same thing might be done from time to time; but Shere Ali must manage his own affairs, for we would not enter into an imbroglio in the affairs of Affghanistan. We must do nothing that would outrage the feelings of any of our European neighbours, and, in respect of commercial matters, we must remember that grave dangers might arise from pressing forward the trading interests of British merchants with too great rapidity. Whatever reliance was to be placed on harbours and railways, he attached still greater importance to the respecting of the rights of the independent States that yet remained in India, and to the giving educated natives a fair share in the administration of the affairs of their own country. If that policy were steadily pursued the period of our rule in India would, he believed, be prolonged and prosperous. He knew that the question of connecting the Persian Embassy with the India Office had been repeatedly brought under the notice of the Government, and he was aware that there had been a difference of opinion on the point between the Foreign Office and the India Office. His own opinion was that the balance of advantages was in favour of connecting the Embassy with the latter Department.

MR. GLADSTONE

Sir, in answer to the remark made by my right hon. Friend (Sir Stafford Northcote) at the conclusion of his speech, I wish to say that Her Majesty's Government have come to no conclusion adverse to the opinion which he has expressed. Indeed, no conclusion has as yet been arrived at. With reference to this debate, I agree with my right hon. Friend that its general tone has been favourable and advantageous. I think it will tend to propagate in the public mind of this and other countries the impression, which I hope is a just and true one,—namely, that the policy of England in India, and in the East generally, is to exercise her great powers for the benefit of those over whom she rules, and on principles of equity and good-will to those beyond our own frontiers. I hope the tendency of the debate will be to impart confidence and tranquillity to the public mind at home, and to disabuse it of a natural, but at the same time, inconvenient, susceptibility. There are only two things I wish to add to the very able statement made by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In the first place, I am able to confirm what has been said by my right hon. Friend opposite (Sir Stafford Northcote), that the recent transactions between the representatives of the British Government and the Ameer of Cabul involve us in no engagements. What they have done can have no binding effect in determining the future policy or proceedings of England, or in causing her to depart in the slightest degree— either by exceeding or by falling short— from that which the circumstances and the policy of the moment may appear from time to time to demand. The principle laid down with perfect truth is not that a political object properly so called with reference to a third Power should be sought, but that we are to promote peace, contentment, and good government, if possible, in a country neighbouring to our own. And I wish also to state, with respect to Russia, that communications have recently passed as well as at former times, between the Government of Her Majesty and that of the Emperor of Russia on the subject of the progress made by Russia in Central Asia. We have not conceived that anything has occurred on the part of that Power which has given us any title to complain; and the tone of those communications on the part of the Russian Government have been altogether friendly. More has been projected on the part of that Government— perhaps in some degree echoing back an opinion that had unofficially fallen at a certain, period from my noble Friend the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs—the idea that it might be for the convenience of both countries and for the general advantage if it were understood that between that portion of Central Asia in which Russia exercises influence and the territories in which we hold a dominion, there was interposed a neutral zone in which there should be no contact, and therefore no rivalry, between the action of those two Powers. And the Russian Government has itself stated with reference to Affghanistan—a name to which they have not given any precise geographical definition, and therefore I am not authorized to assign to it— that Affghanistan ought to be regarded as a region lying beyond the range of Russian influence. There is nothing in those communications of a nature approaching to a mutual engagement or agreement, nor have they arrived at anything which can be called a conclusion. But the House will, I think, be of opinion that the spirit manifested on both sides and the suggestion in respect to interposing a neutral zone between the dominions of the two Powers are an indication that both Governments are sensible of the desirableness of harmony in their action, and wish to avoid anything that would disturb the public mind or would create apprehension of future danger or mischief. I was desirous to make these two statements to the House; and I need not, with any further remarks, detain the House from the other business of the evening.