MOTION FOR RETURNS. (Hansard, 27 April 1869)

§ MAJOR WALKER

, in rising to call attention to the fact that the greater part of the Militia and Militia Reserves of Great Britain are still unprovided with the Snider-Enfield Rifle; and to move a Resolution on the subject, said that he would not waste time by discussing the question whether or not the Militia should be supplied with breech-loading Snider and Enfield rifles, for after the experience of the Bohemian campaign he took it for granted that no British troops would ever be sent into action armed with the old-fashioned muzzle-loader. The only point to be decided was, whether or not it was practicable either now or shortly to place the Snider-Enfield rifles in the hands of the Militia and the Militia Reserve. He believed that he was not far from the fact when he said that, by the end of last March, 350,000 stand of old English muzzle-loading rifles were converted into Sniders. How, then, should those arms be disposed of? In the first place they should be assigned for the use of Her Majesty's regular Army. As these weapons were only fit for infantry, he should say that, putting aside cavalry, artillery, musicians, &c, 150,000 stand of the Snider-Enfield rifles would be sufficient to arm all the rank and file of the British Army. A certain portion would be required for Marines and the Navy, and he believed that, when the position of affairs in North America was less satisfactory than at present, it was thought desirable that a certain portion of these arms should be sent out to Canada. Calculating 50,000 for the Royal Marines and the Royal Navy, and 20,000 for the Canadian Militia, the total amount disposed of would be 220,000 stand of arms. It then became a question whether a portion of these arms might not be placed in the hands of the Militia and Militia Reserve. He should be told, no doubt, by the Secretary for War, that it was necessary that a large reserve of these weapons should be kept within reach in case of emergency; but would they not be within reach if placed in the hands of the Militia? If they were kept in the barracks and stores of the different regiments throughout England, they would be more available on an emer- 1760 gency than if they were massed together in some central depot, and they would not be exposed to entire destruction by fire—a calamity, which befell almost the whole of the old stores in the Tower. He presumed that the reserve of weapons was desired for a case of emergency, when a large increase would be made in the regular Army. The means for that increase must proceed from the Militia, and if the Snider-Enfield rifles were distributed among them, there would, upon an emergency, be found the arms in readiness, and, in addition, the men to use them. As to the 3,700 men forming the Militia Reserve, the force was thought by some to be a failure; but he dissented, entirely from that conclusion. The fact was that the conditions of the Militia Reserves were published so late last year that the men and officers had no time to satisfy themselves respecting the terms of service. The conditions had, however, been modified; suspicions had been, or would be, removed; and he had no doubt that in the course of this year the Militia Reserves would swell to 12,000 or 15,000 men. Under the present system, however, supposing an emergency to arise, you would have to draft them into the depôt companies, in order that these men might be taught the use of the breech-loading rifle; whereas, if his suggestion were adopted, they might go at once to swell the service companies. He hoped, therefore, that the Secretary of State would modify the system he had introduced. No doubt this could only now be done to a certain extent; but a large proportion of the English Militia, and a still larger proportion of the Scotch Militia, did not go into training till next month, and he hoped it would be found possible to issue the new arm to a certain proportion of those regiments. If the new arms were not issued to the regiments during their present training, he hoped that, at least, the Secretary of State would prevent the scandal of 70,000 or 80,000 men learning the use of a weapon which they never could be called on to use. The platoon exercise was the most difficult, the most intricate, and the most tiresome part of the soldier's instruction. At least one-fourth of the Militiaman's twenty-seven days of training must be set aside to make him a tolerable master of this antiquated exercise. Now, if it was impossible to arm the Militia with 1761 the new rifle, these 70,000 or 80,000 should, at any rate, not be forced to waste their time in learning that which would be as useless as if they were learning ornamental needlework, and it should be optional with the commanding officers to go through the platoon exercise or not. In conclusion, he acknowledged the efforts of the Secretary of State to raise the Militia force from its present discouraging position. He believed that the right hon. Gentleman was thoroughly in earnest in wishing to make the force efficient, and it was with that belief that he ventured to bring the subject under his notice.

§ MR. CARDWELL

said, that no one could desire more heartily than he did to see the Militia efficient in all respects, and particularly in the skilful use of an improved weapon. He had already stated what had been done with regard to the supply of Snider rifles to the Militia; and the reserve of Snider rifles was probably greater than was stated by the hon. and gallant Gentleman. But our position was this—It was very necessary that we should be always in possession of a sufficient reserve of the best weapon, because, of course, we never knew what emergency might arise. That remark did not apply particularly to the present time, because, fortunately, there never was a time when we need be less apprehensive; but it was a general maxim always to keep in store a sufficient reserve of the best weapon. At present the Snider rifle was, he believed, the best weapon with which any service in the world was armed; but they had also just received and circulated the Report of a most competent Committee, which recommended another rifle in substitution for the Snider rifle. It was necessary that a full trial should be made of the new Henry-Martini rifle before it was finally adopted. That trial was about to be made with as much rapidity as possible, but the machinery had to be altered, and some months must elapse before the new weapon 1762 would be ready in sufficiently large quantities to be tried in the regiments and in the different climates where it would be necessary to try it before its final adoption. Meanwhile it was manifestly not for the public interest to manufacture the Snider rifle more largely than they could help, because, although it was the best weapon in use in any service at present, yet we had in prospect the early adoption of a better weapon. These considerations forced the Government to be economical in the supply of the Sniders in store; but, nevertheless, they had not been forgetful of the desire to arm the Reserve forces with this rifle. At the beginning of the present year the Militia were only in possession of 7,422 of these rifles. That number he had already raised to 25,918; and this was quite irrespective of 11,000 issued to that portion of the Pensioners and second Army Reserve, who were going out for drill in the course of the present year. He thought that this showed an earnest desire to arm the Militia to an increased extent with the best weapons. Those Militia regiments had been chosen which either were going to encamp at Aldershot or Shorncliffe, or which had shown, during the last three years the greatest efficiency in target practice. This selection was intended as an encouragement to target practice, and instructions had been issued that increased attention should be paid throughout the Militia service to target practice. The hon. and gallant Member seemed to recommend that the Militia Reserve should especially be armed with the Snider rifle. As to the Militia Reserve, it was manifestly impossible to select it for the exclusive possession of the Snider, rifle on the ground on which so distinguished an officer as the hon. and gallant Gentleman would no doubt object to having any portion of a regiment under his command supplied with that weapon unless it were supplied to the whole. Such was the course which the Government had pursued. They had been desirous to maintain their reserve at the only point which prudence and considerations of usefulness would suggest with respect to a reserve meant to provide for a case of emergency. He had been very anxious to give an increased supply of the Snider rifle to Militia regiments, especially to those engaged in target 1763 practice, and he wished to encourage that practice throughout the force with a view to a more extensive distribution of rifles next year. He trusted, he might add, that, when a decision had been arrived at in regard to the Henry-Martini rifle, there would be an opportunity afforded of largely arming the whole force with a breech-loading weapon—a result which he looked forward to with as much interest as the hon. and gallant Gentleman could feel in the matter. As to the Return for which he moved, he should be very happy to produce it.