SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 05 April 1869 vol 195 cc181-217

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

(1.) £80,671, Victualling Yards and Transport Establishments at Home and Abroad.

MR. ALDERMAN LUSK

said, he must take exception to the item for slaughtering and curing meat at Deptford Dockyard for the Navy. He objected to the system as carried on there. Government, as a rule, were not successful manufacturers, and in this instance they could not be fortunate. They went to the dearest market in the world—namely, the metropolitan market—whereas they might get better and cheaper meat in Ireland, in America, and at Hamburg. They entered into competition with all London, and the consequence was that they paid, as shown by a Return he held in his hand, £10 a tierce for beef, though the same quality for the last five or six years had been obtained by other persons for £6 to £7 a tierce. Govern- ment could get plenty of salt beef to purchase by contract as they did salt pork. In reference to preserved meat, which they also manufactured, they were equally at fault, as it cost nearly a half more than the Australian meat, for example. The Duke of Edinburgh had given a testimonial to the Australian merchants that this article was exceedingly good. A great quantity of it had gone into consumption in this country. Not less than 380,000lbs of it had been sold in Birmingham alone in one week lately. But he particularly referred to the Scotch preserved beef, which was the best, and might be had at 7d. or 7½d. per pound, while that made at Deptford cost 11d. The Government said the beef preserved at Deptford was better; but he was told that in point of fact it was inferior to that preserved by private firms. Those who were engaged in business, having to provision ships of their own, very well knew the best market to go to for the goods they wanted, and they were not to be pooh-poohed by those who had only a theoretical knowledge. Let the Admiralty go into the open market and buy by tender goods of the description they wanted, just as they did in the case of salt pork. A Government officer could surely survey the goods if he could manufacture, although there were instances in which it was said that what had been rejected at Deptford was sent to Haulbowline and passed there. He hoped this matter would be thoroughly looked into, for he was quite sure £20,000 or £30,000 a year might be saved by going into the open market and purchasing by tender.

LORD JOHN HAY

said, he was very grateful to his hon. Friend for having introduced this subject. The Admiralty had for some time been giving considerable attention to it, and it was due to the late Government to say that they had taken an opportunity some time ago of obtaining a quantity of preserved meat in order to try whether the use of it would be of advantage to the public service. But his hon. Friend said—and in this he did not agree with him—that they ought to take his advice, being in the line of business—that they, not being men of business, ought to take the advice of those who were. It should, however, be remembered that they represented not only those who paid for the provisions but those who consumed them. At the same time he had no doubt great advantage would result from the introduction of a certain portion of preserved meat into the Navy. With that view they had asked for tenders in the course of the present year for a very large amount, about 200,000lbs, but from some little misunderstanding as to the conditions it had been thought advisable to put the matter off. They proposed to call for tenders for perhaps a still larger amount, if it could be had of a sufficiently good description for the Navy and on terms that would offer the advantages anticipated on the score of economy. His hon. Friend seemed to be under the impression that they had always been manufacturing salt meat in the Government yards. But that was a great mistake. They began to manufacture salt meat at Deptford in 1863, or rather in 1861, and it was begun because they found they were unable to obtain meat of sufficient goodness and to last good a sufficient time by the very process which his hon. Friend now recommended. The loss in boiling down the salt meat between 1861 and 1863, when the meat was cured by contractors, was about 4 per cent; since then the loss was only a trifle over 1 per cent. He did not say that was conclusive—he did not say they might not buy conveniently and advantageously for the public interests. There was something to be said on both sides. They were considering the matter with very great care. They had found no reason to change the present plan; but, following out the policy indicated by the late Government, they were quite disposed to experiment on the subject, believing that, if they succeeded, a considerable sum of money might be saved.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he agreed in the opinion that there was a great advantage in the curing of their own meat for the Navy, although it might entail a greater cost to the Admiralty, because such meat would probably remain good for consumption for three or four years. There was, no doubt, now a great improvement effected in the preservation of Australian meat; but, though it might prove excellent for short voyages, he must strongly protest against it being used in ships that were proceeding to the Pacific or other long voyages—where there would be no opportunity of changing them with any provisions except those cured at the Government yards.

MR. ALDERMAN LUSK

reiterated he was quite sure they would get excellent American beef, as good as they prepared at Deptford, for £3 less per tierce than the Government could produce it.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he concurred in what had been said by his noble Friend (Lord John Hay) on this subject, and he was glad to hear that the present Board of Admiralty were not going to obtain the meat for the Navy entirely by contract. The necessity for the adoption of the system of curing their own meat at Deptford was occasioned by the very inferior quality of meat which had been furnished to the Navy by the contractors. According to the Report of the Committee that had investigated the subject it appeared that the meat furnished by one contractor named Goldner was extremely bad; on many of the tins being opened their contents were, in many instances, found to be wholly unfit for human food. The process of preserving meat for the sea service ought to be carried on with the greatest care, because the food of the sailors was taken to the most distant parts of the world, where there was no means of obtaining other provisions for use at sea, and the men would either starve or contract scurvy and other diseases if the Admiralty sent them to sea with unwholesome provisions. An hon. Member remarked that fresh fish would be a good substitute, but he had always found that fish were not particularly anxious to be caught when wanted at sea, and neither would the hon. Member if he knew he were wanted as a substitute for preserved meat. He, therefore, did not think that the Board of Admiralty ought to trust to fresh fish or to articles furnished by contractors, because it was almost impossible to investigate closely the quality of such articles on their receipt.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he did not know anything that would disgust a sailor with the service more than supplying objectionable provisions. Any change, therefore, in the victualling arrangements must be tentative. The quantity of meat preserved both at home and abroad was much greater now than formerly, and it was, he believed, true that some of the finest meat could be procured from Australia and elsewhere at a cost on the spot of a third of that for English meat. Delivered here the difference, of course, would not be so great. If the investigations which were now being made were successful the Committee might look for a considerable diminution in Vote 2, and also partially in Vote 17.

Vote agreed to.

(2.) £54,757, Medical Establishments at Home and Abroad.

MR. CORRY

said, he could not allow this Vote to pass without congratulating the First Lord of the Admiralty on the discrimination he had shown in appointing Inspector General Armstrong to be Director General of the Medical Department of the Navy. He felt bound on public grounds to say he believed that this appointment would be conducive to the best interests of the Navy.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that having little personal acquaintance with the senior naval medical officers, and as he had been glad to have the opinion of civil medical men as to the organization of the hospitals, he had taken three months to make this appointment. He was glad to hear the testimony borne by the right hon. Gentleman to Dr. Armstrong's claims.

Vote agreed to.

(3.) £16,566, Marine Divisions.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said. he wished to know what were the reductions made or contemplated by the Admiralty? The large discharge of officers at forty-eight hours' notice had been productive of the greatest alarm and hardship. The officers on so short a notice had had no means or power of providing for themselves.

MR. CHILDERS

said, it was unnecessary to repeat the explanation he had given on Vote 1, but he would remind the Committee that in 1867 a reduction of 200 men in round numbers, and an increase of twenty-three officers, was made. In 1868 there was a further reduction of 1,700 men and no reduction of officers. In 1869 he found an Admiralty arrangement for the reduction of 700 men, and it was left to him to reduce the number of officers. He had, therefore, been obliged to provide in round numbers for the reduction of 100 officers, besides refusing, at present, commissions to those who had passed the examination a few days before he took Office. That was a very painful and disagreeable task, and he could not understand how it happened that when the reduction of 1,700 men was made last year the proper reduction of officers was not made. However it was not done, and he had to do it. The way in which the reduction of the corps had been effected was by breaking up the Woolwich division, and by incorporating the officers and men, as far as possible, with the remaining three Light Infantry divisions, and by transferring some to Deal. The officers were disposed of as follows:—In the Royal Marine Artillery one lieutenant-colonel, two captains, and two second captains were placed on reserved half-pay. Two lieutenants, at their own request, were also put upon reserved half-pay. In the Infantry one colonel-commandant retired on full pay; one colonel second commandant received the command at Deal; one lieutenant-colonel and three captains retired on full pay. Three lieutenant-colonels, twenty-five captains, and thirteen second captains were placed on reserved half-pay. Twelve lieutenants, at their own request, were also placed on reserved half-pay. The remaining lieutenants were borne as supernumeraries on full pay. No officer below the rank of second captain had been placed upon half-pay. He had been as moderate as the circumstances of the case admitted in the reduction of officers, and he had been as tender as possible in the arrangements he had made. With respect to the officers transferred from Woolwich, he had done what he could to give them some allowance for their houses. He did not know that it was in his power to do more.

MR. CORRY

said, he had arranged all the details as to the reduction of officers, and if his official existence had been spared a few weeks longer, his plan would have been carried out by an Order in Council. He was. however, cut off in the middle of his career, and the work was, therefore, necessarily left for his successor.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he did not blame the right hon. Gentleman in respect to the officers who had to be retired this year, but only as to those who ought to have been retired last year when the reduction of 1,700 men was made, and also for nominating young gentlemen for commissions when there were so many superfluous officers. There was, therefore, an accumulated reduction of officers necessary for two successive reductions of men.

Vote agreed to.

(4.) £801,572, Naval Stores.

MR. CANDLISH

said, he wished to ask what securities the Government had to offer that the sum asked for would not be exceeded at the end of the financial year; and whether the Estimates submitted under Vote 10 for the year ending 1868–9, had or had not been exceeded. He would call attention to the immense discrepancy between the estimated amount and the sum actually expended under this Vote for 1867–8. A statement had been put in the hands of hon. Members of the savings and deficiencies upon the grants for Navy services for the year ended March 31, 1668. One of the items, for paint materials, oil, pitch, tar, tallow, and other miscellaneous articles, was estimated at £ 187,194, while the actual expenditure was £229,654, or an excess of no less than £42,460, or 22½ per cent. A note appended to the Estimate stated that this excess was due to a larger purchase of miscellaneous stores than had been anticipated, and to a rise in the price of oils and materials in the market. As far as any unforeseen rise in prices went, the excuse was valid, but it was the business of the Department to anticipate accurately the wants of the year. For coals, in like manner, the Estimate was £207,531, and the actual expenditure £345,520. Of that amount £36,000 apparently were paid for coals sent out to the Cape of Good Hope for the transport service connected with the Abyssinian Expedition; but, after deducting that amount, there was still an excessive expenditure of £101,409, or 50 per cent on the sum voted by Parliament. The note to the Estimate again explained that the purchases on foreign stations had greatly exceeded the anticipations formed at home as to their probable requirements; but it was the duty of the Department to be as well informed about the probable wants upon foreign as upon home stations. The total sum granted by Parliament upon the 1st section of Vote 10 was £855,511, and the total expenditure under the same head amounted to £1,085,926, being an excess of £230,415, or 27 per cent on the sum voted. On the 26th of March, 1868, application was made to the Treasury by the Lords of the Admiralty, setting forth that from Reports received from the Storekeeper and Accountant General of the Navy there was reason to believe there would be an estimated excess of £100,000 on Vote 10, section 1, and also some minor excesses. The Treasury was accordingly asked to authorize a Supplementary Estimate for £111,000; but were, at the same time, informed that no material alteration was to be expected in the other Votes. That official letter was dated the 26th of March, just before the close of the financial year. But only five days later this excess of expenditure, which was officially placed at 111,000l., hadgrownto230,000l. Upon the whole of the Navy Estimates, there appeared to be an excess of £366,000. He wished to ask his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty what explanation could be given of these circumstances—whether there was any reason to apprehend inaccuracies of a similar nature in the Estimates for the year 1868–9, and whether any guarantee could be given that the present Estimates would not be subject to a similar expansion in actual expenditure?

MR. CORRY

said, that although the Estimates were prepared before his appointment to the Admiralty, yet, as he held the office of First Lord during the year in which the considerable deficiency referred to had accrued, he should like to give some explanations respecting it before the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty replied. The Admiralty always laboured under this difficulty that they never knew actually how they stood till the expenditure during the financial year on foreign stations was brought to account; and in the year 1867–8 a combination of unforeseen events most unfortunately frustrated their calculations. Exclusive of the expenditure on account of the Abyssinian Expedition, the total excess amounted to £366,545, the whole of which had arisen from circumstances which the Admiralty could not by any possibility control. Upon Vote 2, where an excess of £97,000 was shown, he had calculated upon a saving of £28,000, in consequence of the smaller number of men borne than voted. Of this excess no less than £35,000 was owing to the rise in the price of flour for biscuit. Moreover, for the first time, and as an experiment, soft bread had been issued as a general ration to the ships' companies in port in lieu of biscuit; it could not by any means be foreseen how they would like the change; but the men liked it so well that, instead of so much biscuit being left and entered as savings—which were purposely fixed at rates considerably below the cost prices—when soft bread was issued they ate the whole of it, and this made a difference in the figures of £16,000. A rise in the price of rum accounted for £4,791; stores purchased for the War Office, but not taken off the hands of the Navy and paid for during the year, occasioned a deficiency of £4,053. The new rations of preserved meat, issued, for the first time, in lieu of salt beef, were found so palatable that the men ate whole of them' instead of leaving, as they had done in former years, meat to the value of £38,000. In all these matters the Committee would perceive that the Department had really nothing to guide them. The sums which he had enumerated made up £97,844, the excess upon this Vote being £97,058. He came next to the excess of £48,918 upon Vote 6. This excess had been foreseen and authorized by the Treasury under these circumstances—In the course of the autumn the department of the Controller represented to him that upwards of £50,000 of the Vote for building contract ships would remain unexpended, principally owing to the late period at which the contracts had been taken up. Being very much dissatisfied with the state of the reserves of ships in the ports as he found them, and having then no reason to expect that there would be an excess of expenditure under any other head, he wrote to the Treasury, and obtained their sanction to apply this estimated surplus, under Vote 10, section 2, the greater part to the hiring of temporary artificers in the dockyards for the purpose of expediting the ships being Brought forward for the reserves, especially the ironclads, and the remainder towards building the Active, a sister corvette to the Volage—a class of ships in which the Navy was very deficient. He had explained this in moving the Navy Estimates last year. Unfortunately it so happened that, from causes which again could not be foreseen, the saving which was anticipated under Vote 10, section 2, did not accrue. The admiral on the station, without authority from home, expended a large sum in repairing gunboats in China. This was a system not to be encouraged; but, at the same time, it ought to be remembered that the admiral was sent to a distant station to protect commerce amounting to the value of £100,000,000 a year, and if any considerable number of his ships proved unfit for that duty without extensive repairs, it was not unnatural that he should undertake the responsibility of putting thorn into serviceable condition. This sum of £49,000, therefore, instead of being recouped from Vote 10, section2, remained as an excess under Vote 6. On Vote 10, section 1, there was a gross excess, exclusive of the Abyssinian excess, of £193,915. The first item of this excess was on account of some pitch pine delivered in 1867, under a contract which had been entered into some years before, but the execution of which had been delayed in consequence of the Civil War in America, and the blockade of the ports of export. When the ports were reopened at the close of the war the contractors proceeded to fulfil their engagements, and the Law Officers of the Crown having given the opinion that the contract still remained in force, the Admiralty was compelled to receive the pitch pine, and had thus to pay unexpectedly the sum of £11,100 in excess of the Estimate for the purchase of stores. The next item of the excess was £14,500, in consequence of the rise in the price of oil, while the excess of £80,915 was due to an unexpected expenditure of coals and other stores—chiefly on the China station. This was occasioned by political events of great magnitude which occurred in Japan during the course of the year, and led, as the Committee was aware, to a civil war. At the urgent request of the British Minister, Sir Henry Keppel proceeded from China to that part of his station with the greater portion of the force at his disposal—including his flagship the Rodney—the Ocean (an armourclad), and several corvettes. Other nations, including Franco and America, Portugal, Holland, and Spain, also collected a considerable force in Japan, the whole amounting to no less than twenty-seven pendants. The unforeseen employment of so many of our ships at a distance of nearly 200 miles from their depôt of stores, necessitated large purchases of coals—more especially in Japan—at exorbitant prices, and to this cause the greater part of the excess is attributable. An excess of £25,930 on Vote 14 was occasioned by the Go- vernment having to pay damages for the sinking of the Osprey by the Amazon, which was not known when the Estimates were under preparation. On Vote 17 there was a total excess of £84,000, composed of £50,000 for the carriage home of troops from New Zealand provided for in 1866–7, but not expended until the following year in consequence of the troops having been unexpectedly detained in the colony; £10,000 for the naval proportion of the charge for the Crocodile and Serapis, troopships, under the arrangement entered into between the Imperial and the Indian Governments subsequently to the period when the Estimates were prepared; £15,000 for arrears of old War Office claims standing over for many years, but which had been brought to a settlement in consequence of changes effected in the system of accounts. There was also £9,000 for expenses incurred under the recent arrangement for landing of Indian troops intended for the western districts, at Plymouth, which necessitated the establishment of a second depot at that port, for the special descriptions of provisions with which troop-ships are supplied. It would be seen that the figures he had enumerated amounted to within £3,000 or £4,000 of the total excess over the Estimates. On the other hand he had anticipated that savings on the Estimates under Votes 1, 2, and 11 would have amounted to something like £100,000, but in the place of there being that sum in hand at the close of the financial year there was, he was sorry to say, a balance the other way of £366,575. That, of course, was the amount of the difference between savings and deficiencies, and among the latter there was an excess of £55,000 above the Estimate for the purchase of "miscellaneous stores." That item provided, among innumerable other articles, for the purchase of metal fittings for gun carriages made in the dockyards, slides, racers, and for armour-clad ships themselves—nearly the whole of new types and patterns, on which it was absolutely impossible to calculate with any degree of accuracy what the expenditure would be. This item was usually exceeded, as it was the practice to keep the Estimate low, with the view of discouraging expenditure as much as possible. He thought he had shown that the excess had resulted from causes which could not have been foreseen at the time when the Estimates for the year were prepared.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that not having been concerned in any way with the preparation of the Estimates for the year 1867–8 he could add but little to what had fallen from the right hon. Gentleman opposite upon this subject. He could, if necessary, have verified most of the right hon. Gentleman's statements. One considerable item of the excess arose from the increase of the expenditure at the dockyards at the end of 1867. In October, 1867, the right hon. Gentleman engaged 2,000 additional men in the dockyards, and in the following March he discharged 5,000 men from them, a course which he (Mr. Childers) felt bound to say, was intimately connected with the distress now existing among the dockyard labourers. It would have been far better to have spread that additional outlay over two years than to have expended it in the short space of six months. An hon. Member near him (Mr. Candlish) had inquired whether the Votes of 1868–9 would be exceeded, and particularly whether there was any security that Vote 10 would not be exceeded. As a question of fact he was not in a position to state definitely the exact condition of Vote 10, because the expenditure under that Vote was dependent so much on the action of officers on distant stations. He did not think that the expenditure under that Vote, under the former system, under satisfactory control. The whole of the expenditure in the first part of Vote 10 would be in future distinctly under the responsibility of the Controller of the Navy, a reform which he believed would be a very useful one. He could not, however, at the present time, accurately give all the particulars he would wish to give respecting thi3 Vote, because the information received from distant stations respecting the stocks and issues of stores was not wholly satisfactory. He and his hon. Friend the Member for Montrose (Mr. Baxter) had, however, been endeavouring by all means in their power to procure precise information on that head, and they hoped to be able at a future period to control expenditure for stores both at home and abroad more effectually than was now practicable. No little economy might be effected in the purchase, custody, and sale of stores, and he trusted that when the new arrangements were matured there would be a decided improvement in the construction of Vote 10.

MR. ALDERMAN LUSK

said, he should be glad to have some explanation as to why they were called upon year after year to vote much larger sums for the purchase of timber, anchors, cables, and cordage than were actually required, and what became of the surplus. The sum taken last year for cables was £150,000, the quantity issued, £24,000; for anchors, £182,000, quantity issued, £25,000, and he gave many other similar instances.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that in reply to his hon. Friend he could only repeat that he and his Colleagues had taken very great pains in preparing this Vote, and that, considering the short time they had to deal with it, they had already effected very considerable reductions. It was not intended to buy a single ounce of oak timber this year, and only £10,000 worth of teak would be purchased. Neither was it proposed to buy any new anchors during the present year. The supply of canvas about to be bought would be much less than formerly, but the supplies of hemp, yarn, and cordage would be placed on a more satisfactory footing.

MR. SAMUDA

said, he wished to ask what would be done with the very large stocks of timber which must have accumulated in the dockyards which were to be suppressed? In his opinion considerable reduction in the Estimates ought to be effected by transferring those stores to other yards where timber was required. He was doubtful whether at least £12,000 worth of timber would not be found in the dockyards, and his impression was that there was a considerable quantity at Woolwich. He quite concurred as to putting the stores under the control of the same officer who took charge of the building, and thought great advantage would result.

MR. CHILDERS

, in reply, said, that most of the stock of timber at the yards which were to be suppressed had been used up. There was but a very small quantity of teak timber at Woolwich—not more than 100 loads.

Vote agreed to.

(5.) £767,070, Steam Machinery and Ships built by Contract.

MR. SAMUDA

said, he thought the reduction of the sum set apart for experimental purposes from £12,000 to £2,000 was very injudicious. In these days of new projectiles, new guns, and new modes of covering vessels with armour it was necessary to make a large number of experiments at Shoeburyness to see how those inventions were likely to answer; and yet they were placed in the position of giving up all, or nearly all, the valuable information to be obtained in that way for the sake of a matter of £10,000. That he could not regard as at all a wise economy. Again, while that item had been largely decreased, there had been an increase from £2,000 to £8,000 for the inspectors who superintended the building of contract ships. That was 5 per cent on the cost of construction. This year they were to pay only £161,000 for ships built by contract, against £435,000 paid last year, and yet the cost of inspectors was quadrupled. This was a matter which required explanation.

MR. CHILDERS

said, the reduction in the Vote for experimental purposes did not proceed from motives of economy. That Vote had fluctuated up and down from year to year perhaps more than any other Vote in the Navy Estimates; and in the present financial year they did not look forward to its being necessary to spend much in experiments. The cost of the experiments on guns at Shoeburyness did not fall upon the Admiralty, but on the War Office. [Mr. SAMUDA said, he believed the cost of the targets fell on the Admiralty.] The cost of the targets was only a small part of the cost of experiments. As to the increase from £2,000 to £8,000 for the superintendence of ships building by contract, that was only an apparent, not a real, increase, because formerly the salaries of those officers were borne on other Votes. He did not understand what his hon. Friend meant by the item of £161,000, The Vote for ships building by contract was £420,000, and for engines, £295,000; in all, £715,000; on which, £8,000 was a little over 1 per cent.

MR. CORRY

thought that it would not be an inconvenient moment for him to say a few words on the subject of our foreign squadrons. In the speech made by his right hon. Friend (Mr. Childers) two years ago on that question he assigned only one corvette and one small vessel for the service of Japan, and that alone would have been sufficient to satisfy him how ill-considered the whole scheme of the distribution of our ships on foreign stations, as then proposed, had been. Such a force was obviously insufficient for the protection of British interests in a country strongly averse from communication with foreign Powers, with which we had treaty rights to maintain, and the internal affairs of which were then, and still continued to be, in a very unsatisfactory state. Soon after his right hon. Friend spoke, a civil war broke out in Japan, and the presence of no less than twelve of the vessels of Sir Henry Keppel's squadron, and of fifteen vessels belonging to other nations, was deemed necessary to the security of commerce, and of the lives of those engaged in it, and of the ministers and consuls representing the various Powers. For himself he greatly regretted that the chief reduction proposed to be made by the Government in our foreign squadrons would fall on the China station—the foreign station on which of all others it was perhaps most important that the strength of our squadron should be maintained. It was now proposed to reduce the naval force there from thirty-four ships to twenty-five, and the men from 4,000 to 2,800. He was surprised to hear that the Foreign Office concurred in any large reduction of the squadron in China, because our ministers and officers in those distant quarters had always written home in a very different sense. On what authority was the proposed reduction based? Certainly not on that of Sir Henry Keppel, for he had asked for more vessels just before he (Mr. Corry) left the Admiralty; neither on that of Sir Harry Parkes, for on January 30, 1868, Sir Harry Parkes wrote that the force in Japan was not larger than usual—namely, one ocean iron-clad, four sloops and three gunboats; making together eight ships, in lieu of the two which his right hon. Friend proposed to keep there. Sir Harry Parkes added that "the United States had four heavy vessels, and France one frigate and four corvettes, so that it would be seen that the force maintained by those two other Governments was not generally dissimilar to our own." In the month of February, 1868, Sir Harry Parkes wrote to Sir Henry Keppel in these terms— I think it is my duty to represent to you the importance of Her Majesty's naval force in this country (Japan) being maintained at a standard of not less than six or seven effective vessels, in which I do not include gunboats. We have already six points to protect—Osaka, Hiogo, Na-gaski, Tedo, Yokohama, and Hakodadi. In July last, Sir Henry Keppel wrote thus— The protection of our vast trade, the suppression of piracy, and the large number of consular ports in China and Japan render it apparent that the number of pendants cannot well be less than at present. And in a more recent letter Sir Henry Keppel referred to the unsettled state of affairs and the necessity of maintaining, and even adding to, the strength of the squadron. He confessed therefore that he was surprised to find his right hon. Friend proposing to reduce, by something like one-third, the whole force in that part of the world, with which we had an enormous trade, which, as well as the lives of those engaged in it, would be exposed to great peril if not properly protected. With regard to the flying squadron, he wished to know what the intention of the Government on that subject was. It was doubtless important that our crews should be taught evolutions and seamanship as they already were in the Channel and Mediterranean squadrons; but at the same time there were objections to a flying squadron. He believed that squadron would be composed of some of the finest ships in our Navy, and he should like to know where, in the case of emergency, they were to be found—on this or the other side of the Cape, in the Atlantic, in the Pacific, or where? When the Russian War broke out the Government of the day was able to recall the Channel squadron, then commanded by a gallant relative of his own, and cruizing in the Atlantic, without delay; because there was an appointed rendezvous where it was to be found; but this would be impossible in the case of an expedition circumnavigating the globe. Our officers and men, he believed, would derive more advantage from the actual work on a station than by going on a sort of excursion all round the world. Wars now-a-days were finished in a single campaign—as, for example, that against Abyssinia and other recent wars—and if our squadrons were reduced down to starvation point, and a sudden emergency arose, how was it to be met by a flying squadron, which would, probably, be everywhere when it was not wanted, and no where when it was? The advantage of having a few ships to spare on the several stations was strikingly illustrated in the case of Abyssinia. We had no reserve of ships at home, but we were fortunately able to reinforce the East India squadron by four ships from other stations. One of these was commanded by the late lamented Captain Edye, and it was not too much to say that it was more than doubtful whether the war could have been finished in one campaign, if it had not been for the skill and the energy displayed by him in the landing of troops and stores, and obtaining a supply of water. Millions may thus have been saved. Again, the moral effect of a flying squadron would be absolutely worthless; and the sight of a single pendant, flying, in a port where British honour had been insulted, or British interests endangered, even from a gunboat, would be more efficacious than a fleet of armourclads, to be found Heaven knew where. He wished therefore to know what the intentions of the Government were with respect to the flying squadron, and what was to be the composition of that squadron? He would now turn to another point, although one which was intimately connected with the maintenance of our squadrons abroad. The late Government had been much blamed, during the Recess, for building unarmoured vessels, but the present Government ought to be much obliged to their predecessors for what they have done; because, without it, the reduction in the present Estimates could not possibly have been made. He would give a few figures which would vindicate the policy of his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) and show that it would be absolutely impossible to maintain even such squadrons as the right hon. Gentleman opposite proposed but for what had been done by his right hon. Friend when at the head of the Board of Admiralty. He found that in seven years, from 1860 to 1866, there were either sold or broken up 244 unarmoured ships, of which 139 were steamers—namely, seventeen steam frigates and corvettes, thirty steam sloops, and ninety-two gun-vessels and gunboats. During the same period only twenty three un- armoured ships had been built and converted—namely, seven frigates and corvettes, nine sloops, and seven gun-vessels and gunboats. But that was a very imperfect representation of the state of things in 1866, because his right hon. Friend knew very well what the condition of the remaining unarmoured steam vessels was, and that a large number of them were so unsound that they never could be again put into commission. In addition to the 139 steamers removed between 1860 and 1866, no less than fifty-five steam vessels, exclusive of line-of-battle ships—which he excluded as they were considered obsolete—were also removed up to last Christmas, when the late Government resigned—namely, ten frigates and corvettes, seven sloops, and thirty-eight gun-vessels and gunboats. But that was not the whole story, because before he left Office he called for an account of the number of effective unarmoured vessels we had on the list, with the number estimated to be worth repairing, again, exclusive of line-of-battle ships, and he was informed by the Controller's department that of the older steam vessels of all classes, built before 1860, there were seventy-nine above the rank of gun-vessels—namely, thirty-one frigates, twenty-one corvettes, and twenty-seven sloops, but of these only one-half, or, say, forty were repairable; of twenty-five gun-vessels, only one-third were likely to be repaired; and of seventy-three gunboats only ten were in a state to be again commissioned. Therefore, exclusive of line-of-battle ships, only fifty-eight of the old unarmoured vessels remained in a state fit to be re-commissioned. If to these were added the twenty-three built between 1860 and 1866, and the forty ordered to be built by the late Government, that would give a total of 121 unarmoured vessels fit for service in two or three years from the present time. Now, as his right hon. Friend opposite proposed to maintain sixty-four in commission, exclusive of the two largest stations—that of the Mediterranean and that of North America—and as no more than one-third could be in commission at the same time, because the rest would be either going out as reliefs, or would be under repair or fitting for service, he would like to know how his right hon. Friend could maintain his squadrons had it not been for the policy of the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich? That was a most complete vindication of his right hon. Friend's policy, because, if he had not built those forty unarmoured ships, it would be absolutely impossible for his right hon. Friend opposite to maintain his squadrons even at the reduced standard which he proposed to maintain them. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld), had said that the unarmoured vessels built by his right hon. Friend the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) were small, weak, slow, ill-armed, worthless. It was true many of them were small, but if they had not been small they would have been worthless for their purpose, as they could not have gone up the rivers in China where their services would be required; and so far from being weak and ill-armed, they were very powerful vessels and carried 6½-ton guns, that is to say the heaviest guns carried by corvettes of the largest classes. He thought, therefore, that the policy of his right hon. Friend, instead of deserving the uncourteous remarks that had fallen from right hon. Gentlemen opposite, should have met with much better treatment, and that his right hon. Friend, himself, and the late Government were entitled to the thanks of the First Lord of the Admiralty for having enabled him, by their policy, to effect a reduction in the amount of the Navy Estimates, which no minister could otherwise have ventured to propose.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that if his right hon. Friend had been good enough to give notice that he was going to discuss this subject, which was hardly germane to the present Vote, he should be in a much better position to answer the questions he had put; but he should try off-hand, with the Papers he happened to have with him, to give the best explanations in his power. His right hon. Friend spoke of the China station, and complained, that two years ago, he (Mr. Childers) proposed to keep only two ships in Japan; and having made that assumption he compared that small force with the squadrons kept there by other countries at this time. He was speaking now from memory, but he thought the number of ships he and his right hon. Colleague (Mr. Stansfeld) proposed, without any official knowledge whatever, but only tentatively, and with much caution, two years ago for the whole China station, was seventeen or eighteen, and the number they proposed to keep on the China station now, including harbour ships, was twenty-five. Whatever he might then thought enough for Japan, we certainly now proposed to keep there more than two ships. On the whole station there would be twenty-five ships, with from 2,700 to 2,800 men, as contrasted with the 4,000 men which was the programme of his right hon. Friend last year. Then his right hon. Friend said that he did not understand how the Foreign Office agreed with the Admiralty in that proposal. He was not responsible for the late Foreign Office, but he could speak for the present Foreign Office, and say that the arrangements were entirely in accordance with their views, and that he and Sir Sydney Dacres had taken great care in concert with the Foreign Office, to determine the exact force for the China station. He thought his right hon. Friend was entirely in error as to the force kept in Asiatic waters by foreign nations, for it appeared, from the latest Report of the American Secretary to the Navy that the United States had on the Asiatic station at the present moment eight ships and one store-ship, nine in all, as compared with the twenty-five which we kept there.

MR. CORRY

I said that the American Government had five vessels in Japan.

MR. CHILDERS

said, they had altogether nine vessels on what was called the Asiatic station, whereas we had twenty-five, or taking all in Asiatic waters, thirty-one. Then his right hon. Friend came to the flying squadron, and asked for information about it. First of all his right hon. Friend said he assumed it would consist of some of the finest ships in the fleet, which was the case, but then he asked how was the Admiralty to know where the squadron was, supposing it was wanted on any occasion. His right hon. Friend must be aware that before any such squadron was sent off, very careful arrangements would be made with the aid of the Hydrographer of the Navy, by which it would be known to the Admiralty at what point the squadron ought to be at certain dates; and it could be communicated with accordingly. His right hon. Friend doubted whether flying squadrons were good for the Navy, and was of opinion that both vessels and men would be better trained if they were kept on foreign stations, as they were now. But there were but few naval officers who shared in that opinion. The almost universal opinion of naval men, especially those in command at present, was that to keep our fleet, as it was now kept, in foreign harbours, might, as his right hon. Friend said, make our officers good diplomatists—possibly a little too good, but would not make them good sailors. He had said in opening the Estimates that one of the faults he was bound to find with the present state of our Navy was, that while our officers were most gallant and zealous—there were none better in the world—they stood in need exactly of that kind of training which a flying squadron would give them. His right hon. Friend had also referred to speeches made in the Recess, and had remarked with reference to them that some want of courtesy had been shown to the right hon. Member for Droitwitch, a remark which he would probably have withheld had he reflected. Speaking for himself, he was unconscious of having alluded to the right hon. Baronet in any but the most respectful terms. It was true he had once or twice had occasion to comment upon the policy of the late Boards of Admiralty; and in doing so he had expressed the opinion, which he did not hesitate to repeat, that it was a mistake in 1866–7 suddenly to build a very large number of unarmoured ships when part of that money would have been much better appropriated to building armoured ships. It was a mistake, also, suddenly to discontinue building unarmoured ships and to commence building a large number of armoured ships, spending much more money in a few months than Parliament had voted, and then suddenly to discontinue that work also. All this work should have been spread over several years, and that would have prevented suddenly taking on 2,000 men and afterwards discharging 5,000, a proceeding which had produced a great deal of the existing dockyard distress. It was these sudden fits of building and stopping which had caused all the mischief. He had objected to this policy in 1867, and again in 1868, and he had only renewed his objection during the Recess. Such vacillating policy had largely contributed to the discharge of numbers of men in the early part of last year, and to the consequent distress so often lamented in the House.

MR. LIDDELL

said, before the Vote was agreed to, he trusted the Government would afford them some information respecting their relations with China. He wanted to know whether it was necessary to keep twenty-five ships and 2,000 men in China waters? England had entered into treaties with China and carried on a large and valuable trade with her; it then became the duty of the Chinese Government to protect that trade against pirates. If our representatives in China could not by mere diplomatic action insure the due observance of our treaties, it was quite time our relations with China were put upon some different footing. If we were to maintain our treaty rights in China by force of arms, we should never be safe from war.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he would not have risen but for the remarks of the First Lord of the Admiralty on the policy of the last Board, in 1866–7, which he had characterized as vacillating.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that in using the word vacillation he had alluded to the period between October, 1867, and June, 1868, when the dockyards were first increased by 2,000 and then reduced by 5,000 men.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, he understood, then, that the charge of vacillation was preferred against his right hon. Friend (Mr. Corry), but, as he had taken part in the preparation of the Estimates, he did not shrink from sharing the responsibility of the policy then adopted—on the contrary, he thought it a sound and wholesome policy. Without bringing any charge against the Admiralty that was in power before 1866, he must remind the Committee that soon after taking Office he had felt bound to state that our fleet had been much neglected, that the Admiralty had not the means of sending out proper reliefs; and he contended that, in the event of war with a maritime Power, nothing would prove more serviceable than the fast-sailing fully-armed wooden ships the late Admiralty had provided for defending our own commerce and assaulting that of an enemy. Possibly the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman had fallen from him in the heat of electioneering time, when perhaps they were not always as nice or cautious as they should be; he had, however, some re- collection of having been charged with extravagance both by the First Lord of the Admiralty and the Prime Minister, but his best answer to that was the admission made recently, when the Estimates were brought forward, that one-half of the saving shown by the present Estimate was owing to the economical arrangements he had made.

MR. CORRY

said, as the charge of vacillation was made against him, he begged to say that his policy had uniformly consisted in applying every energy of his mind and every halfpenny he could scrape together for the purpose of developing the power of our armour-clad Navy, to which he had added seven vessels, in addition to three ordered by his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington), and to rescue the reserves of ships from the deplorable condition in which they had been left by the preceding Government. The reason why he had taken on 2,000 men in 1867 was because he had found that the whole of the reserve left him by the Government that had preceded him in Office was a single frigate, which was the only ship he could have commissioned if a war had suddenly broken out with France or America, and the salvation of the country had depended on it. He immediately set about bringing the reserves up to something like a respectable condition—for he belonged to the old school, having served at the Admiralty with Sir George Cockburn, who could not have slept in his bed if he had not a reserve of thirty line-of-battle ships, some ready, and others in an advanced state of preparation for being commissioned, if the safety of the country should require it. Having obtained the permission of the Treasury, he had at once set to work to bring forward armour-clads for commission, and had put on men to hasten the equipment of the reserves, so that by the time he had left Office he had ready for any service, instead of one frigate, four armour-clads, four heavy frigates, three or four corvettes, and seven or eight gun vessels, and this reserve would have been materially increased, as respects armour-clads, if he had continued in Office. He could not understand how giving employment, although temporary, to a body of workmen, could have added to their distress. If his policy had been a vacillating policy, it was one which he hoped the present Government would imitate.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that the observations of the right hon. Gentlemen fully justified what he (Mr. Childers) had said. If, instead of, in a panic, building a large number of wooden ships, and then a large number of iron ships, and if, instead of increasing the dockyard men by 2,000, and then suddenly reducing them by 5,000, these operations had been distributed over two or three years, they would have had quite as efficient a fleet and a not less economical administration of the dockyards without the distress which was now deplored on both sides of the House.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, the discussion had taken a turn which raised the whole question—Have we yet an efficient fleet? There had been laid on the table a most able Report by his gallant friend Admiral Warden; and any one who studied that Report would be of a very different opinion from the First Lord of the Admiralty as to our having such a fleet. We had ships that would neither sail nor steer, and he believed the Admiralty did not know what kind of ships they were going to construct. The gist of Admiral Warden's Report was that the ships of the Achilles type were the best ships we had; that we had only four good ships, but they were too large, and that it was reduced copies of this Achilles or Minotaur we ought to build now. Now, however, we were going to build ships without masts, although we knew nothing whatever about such ships. He could only hope and trust that they would soon have a discussion of Admiral Warden's most able Report, and that they would come to some decision as to what kind of ship was to be built in the future. If the fleet were now ordered out to Madeira and back, he believed there would be a week between the return of some vessels and that of the others. [A laugh.] Hon. Members might laugh, but such a difference in the speed o£ vessels as would lead to that result was a most serious thing. However, let hon. Members read Admiral Warden's Report, and they would see what a position we were in. The Hercules and the Bellerophon were, perhaps, the best ships we had, and they were a little handier than others because they were shorter; but they were moved at much greater expense than ships of finer lines, and, therefore, Admiral Warden recommended the building of reduced copies of the Minotaur. But were we building ships of that kind? It had been remarked that the sum voted for experiments had been reduced from £12,000 to £2,000; and that was not a prudent measure, because there were points in reference to which we ought to be continually making experiments, until we had arrived at something like a final and satisfactory conclusion. Among other things we had to devise some means of keeping the bottoms of ships clear of barnacles. Then, the consumption of smoke had been too much neglected in the Navy. Again, we had to develop the hydraulic turbine principle, which must in a few years supersede the screw. The principle had been tried with perhaps the worst and the most unseaworthy ship in the Navy—the Waterwitch—belonging to a class the two or three other members of which had been smuggled out of the country, had never been heard of since, and probably never would be, because no one would go to sea in them; but this trial—touching the greatest question of the day in regard to motive power—had been no experiment at all. It was well known that vessels had been worked up to ten knots an hour upon the hydraulic principle, and the most eminent engineers of the day declared there was no reason why a greater speed should not be obtained with the turbine than had been obtained by the screw. With the turbine you got rid of the immense swag of the screw and of the fouling of the screw, and the vessel was perfectly handy, and if you made sail the motive power obtained went to increase the speed; whereas, if you made sail with the screw, you had. to get up to the horse-power of the screw before the sails were any good to you. These were matters upon which experiments ought to be made until conclusive results were arrived at. Again, there was the question of liquid fuel and of the economy that would be effected by the use of oils obtained from petroleum. We could not use the oils at present, because they were inflammable at certain temperatures; but he had the greatest possible confidence that it was in the power of chemistry to discover some means of making them available, and the application of such oils to the production of steam power would be an enormous benefit to navigation. It was a mistake, he feared, to suppose that the Chinese Government could control the hordes of pirates who infested the 3,000 miles of Chinese coasts and resorted to the adjacent islands. They were ferocious and skilful; they preyed not only on Chinese vessels, but on vessels carrying the British and every other flag, and it was our own trade which we protected as well as the Chinese trade. At the same time, it was clear that if the Chinese Government was not able to protect its own coasts, it ought to pay a large subsidy to the Power which provided the necessary defence.

ADMIRAL ERSKINE

said, that without following his gallant Friend through the discussion of the hydraulic principle, and of the best form of ship, he believed all the points involved were as yet in the experimental stage; and the misfortune was that success or failure on one point threw no light on the principle of another. He thought the discussion showed that he was not wrong on Friday night when he abstained from giving a personal opinion on those points. In spite of the strong observations made by the hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) he voted on Friday night for the building of the two iron-clads, and that fact seemed to suggest the question whether we were to be guided in building our Navy by minute details relating to ships, or by other considerations such as might have induced the hon. Baronet to vote as he did. It was to be presumed he desired to see a ship built at Portsmouth [Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE: Hear, hear!]; but if we were to adopt a particular class of ship, let the Committee consider the reasons which had been advanced for and against particular classes, and let us abstain from these experiments which were loading the Navy with vessels that would certainly become obsolete, and involving us in expense of which we could not see the end.

MR. GRAVES

said, he wished to correct the statement that he had said the twin screw had failed. He carefully guarded himself against expressing such an opinion; but what he said was, he had received an opinion from one of the highest practical authorities upon the twin screw, and that opinion was highly unfavourable to it in a vessel with a large draught of water; and not a single word had fallen from any Member during the discussion of the Estimates to remove from his mind the impression which he had derived from the opinion he alluded to. Reference had been made to the twin screw for vessels of light and of moderate draught, with which it had answered well; but the only vessel with a draught of twenty-two feet that it had been tried upon was a vessel built for the Dutch Navy; and one of the constructors of that navy told him that which he communicated to the House—namely, that the twin screw had failed, and must fail with vessels of a large draught, for the reasons deduced from the experiments made with the Dutch ship in question. We had now six or seven of those vessels. Two or three of them would be tried in the course of a few months, and all he would ask his right hon. Friend to do was to pause until their principle had been shown to work satisfactorily. These new vessels were only estimated to make 12½ knots an hour, and it was usual for ships when tried to go a knot less than the estimate. He was quite aware that the twin screw gave a greater power of turning and, if it did not interfere with the speed and steering power, it would be valuable; but they must remember that with the adoption of the turret principle, the rapid turning of the vessel was a secondary consideration, however important it might be in the case of broadside-vessels. With respect to masts—which had been alluded to in the course of the debate the other evening—he believed a vessel, by the proper distribution of weights, could be as safe at sea without as with them, although, if they dispensed with sails as motive power they must remember that they would have to place all their reliance upon their engines, and if those broke down the ship would be helpless. There was, therefore, all the more necessity that the machinery should not be merely experimental, but adequate for all emergencies. Notwithstanding the Vote that was taken the other evening, he believed his right hon. Friend would pause before he went on with these vessels, though he had obtained the money to build them with. He trusted, at any rate, that his right hon. Friend would proceed with caution, and satisfy himself thoroughly as to the working of the principle. We have had enough of experimental buildiner—half our shins are mere experiments and failures. There could be no reason for injudicious haste, and he warned the First Lord of the responsibility which would now attach to him. He was glad to find that the importance of carrying on board a sufficient quantity of coal—a principle for which he had always contended—was being recognized, and that these new ships were to be capable of carrying seventeen days' coal. At present there was in our Navy a great extravagance in the consumption of fuel, combined with a very small space for carrying of coal on board the vessels themselves. The Admiralty, for some reason or another, appeared entirely to ignore the principles which were adopted in our mercantile marine—principles by which a large saving of fuel was affected. If the right hon. Gentleman would grant him a small Committee, he would undertake to prove that the engines in use in the Navy were in this respect of such a character that if employed, in the vessels belonging to any public company they would effectually prevent the company from being remunerative. He would simply, as an instance of what could be done, refer to a vessel that had sailed some fortnight since, to which he had already called his right hon. Friend's attention. That vessel, of 3,000 tons, was on her way to the Pacific—9,000 miles. She had reached Lisbon with a consumption of Scotch coal, which was 10 per cent worse than Welsh coal, of thirty-three tons, making the passage at the rate of twelve knots an hour. If his right hon. Friend would but institute a comparison between what was done in the mercantile marine of this country and in the Navy, he would find that there was something to inquire into. One firm, he understood, were now making fifteen engines upon this improved principle, which only showed that the managers of the mercantile marine had their eyes wider open that the Admiralty. Then, with reference to coal, he would venture to suggest that a great saving might be effected by the increase of railway communication between some of our collieries and coaling stations. Indeed, under the present cumbrous way of bringing the coals round the coast, it cost more, he believed, to coal a vessel at Portsmouth than at Malta. A small line of railway run from the existing Lines to Portland harbour would, he be lieved, be so advantageous that the saving effected in the course of a few years would more than pay the expenses which would be incurred. The same thing might be said with regard to the coaling depots on the Thames. He held it to be of the highest importance that arrangements should be made by which a continuous supply of coal could be maintained in cases of emergency especially, and that ships should not be dependent, as at present, on the arrival of colliers and fair winds. There was another point which he wished to urge upon the Government. His hon. and gallant Friend (Sir James Elphinstone) advocated the building of vessels at Portsmouth. He was scarcely surprised at the recommendation made by his hon. and gallant Friend, but he would suggest whether it might not be advisable to build some of our vessels in Ireland? The Admiralty got ships built in Scotland and Wales, and on various parts of the English coast, but they got none built in Ireland; and he asked, why was that? We had heard a great deal about what should be done for Ireland; and in this direction we could confer a material benefit on the people of that country. Ample facilities existed, as might be seen from the splendid 4,000-ton steamers running to Alexandria, which were built at Belfast. In Cork there was a naval yard. As an Irishman himself, and as having had practical experience in this matter, having himself had ships built in the North, South, and centre of Ireland—at Dublin—he trusted his right hon. Friend would not, in dispensing his favours, forget that there were shipbuilding yards in that country fully equal to the work which might be required.

MR. ALDERMAN SALOMONS

said, that he was not an Irishman, but a Greenwich man, and he hoped that his right hon. Friend (the First Lord of the Admiralty) would not abandon Woolwich.

ADMIRAL SEYMOUR

said, he could corroborate the remarks of the hon. Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves), as to the facilities for shipbuilding in Ireland. A vessel was built in Ireland by the directions of the late Admiralty, and she was not only built as cheaply as others, but was superior to those turned out from other places.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he desired to to apologize to his hon. Friend for having misrepresented him the other evening. He would not enter again into the question of the turret-ships. With reference to the last part of his hon. Friend's suggestion—that the Government should build ships in Ireland—he would receive it with the attention it deserved. He could quite understand that his right hon. Friend who had preceded him as First Lord of the Admiralty being himself an Irishman, might have hesitated to give contracts in Ireland. [Mr. CORRY: We did give a contract there.] It was true that the late Government had given a contract for one gunboat in Ireland; but he could quite understand that a Board on which there were two Irishmen might have a delicacy in respect of giving contracts in Ireland, which the present Board, on which there was no Irishman, would not have;. With respect to engines he had already caused an inquiry to be made in consequence of a communication from his hon. Friend (Mr. Graves), and he could assure him that any representation he might make on a subject with which he was so conversant would be received in the best spirit by himself and his Colleagues.

Vote agreed to.

(6.) £749,816. New Works, Building, Machinery, and Repairs.

MR. MAGUIRE

said, that the suggestion of his hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool (Mr. Graves;, might very well be left to the consideration of the First Lord of the Admiralty. In Ireland they got but few crumbs from the Treasury, and they accepted gratefully what came to them. He wished to call attention to the state of the Government dock in Cork harbour. It was now nearly four years since this work was undertaken, having been sanctioned by a Committee of the House. When it was commenced, it was said that the work would take six years for completion. Stones had been quarried, but, practically speaking, nothing had yet been done. The real cause of the little progress had been that there had been no adequate supervision. The works were under the direction of an eminent engineer, but the person who supervised them was little more than a clerk of the works. Only 100 yards of the coffer-dam had been carried out, and even that part of the work was imperfectly executed, and the sea had broken in several times. Spike Island and Haulbowline being so near, it was thought that convict labour might be rendered available, but that supposition had not been realized, the number of convicts having diminished. The Government had been compelled to fall back on free labour, and of the 150 men employed, only thirty were mechanics. The work was carried on in the most lingering manner and, if the present rate of progress were continued, the work would take fifty years for completion. There had been a grant of £150,000 for the work, but of that sum only £38,000 had been expended, and he did not think proper value had been obtained for the expenditure. All naval authorities agreed that it was most important that they should have a dry dock in that part of Ireland, so that iron vessels might be examined and cleaned. He hoped his right hon. Friend at the head of the Admiralty would give him an assurance that these works would be carried on more rapidly, and completed within a reasonable time.

MR. ALDERMAN SALOMONS

said, he wished to make a few observations with reference to Woolwich and Deptford Dockyards. It appeared that the work of Woolwich Dockyard was to be transferred to Chatham. He would not dwell upon the policy of this, but he could speak of the great distress that was consequent upon such a decision. If the transfer must take place, why should that valuable shipbuilding space immediately opposite the river be left to lie waste and unoccupied? Great facilities for shipbuilding had been provided both at Deptford and Woolwich, and, both as regarded the national resources and the interest of those localities, he thought some promise ought to be made by the Government that this valuable space should be used for some purpose, if possible, equivalent to that for which it had been turned to account for so many years. He hoped his right hon. Friend would be able to give him a satisfactory answer. The distress at Woolwich was very great, and he was daily receiving letters from men who said if they could not get work here they were willing to emigrate. He understood that Government were going to send out transports to Canada to bring home the troops which were no longer needed there, and he hoped that he might receive a promise that some portion, at all events, of these vessels might be utilized for the purpose of carrying out the distressed artizans of Woolwich and Deptford.

MR. TREVELYAN

said, in reply to the hon. Member for Cork (Mr. Maguire), that the House of Commons had assented to the construction of the dockyard at Cork only on the understanding that the works were to be executed by means of convict labour. At first that labour was not found to be available, and the construction of the dockyard proceeded very slowly; the number of convicts employed at the outset for a period of eighteen months or two years being not more than eighty. Of late, however, the Government had recourse to free labour, and at the present moment 589 convicts and 189 free labourers were engaged. Not only, he might add, had £20,000 been expended on the works last year, but also a sum of £14,000 spared out of another Vote, and he could assure his hon. Friend that they were now being prosecuted pretty quickly. He was, moreover, informed on high professional authority that they were likely to be completed within a period, not of fifty, but of five years.

MR. MAGUIRE

said, he was a Member of the Committee which had reported on the subject, and could most distinctly assert that it formed no part of the conditions on which the works were to be undertaken that they should be executed solely by convict labour. It would be an insult to say anything of the kind and no Irish Member would submit to it. He could also state on the best authority that, owing to the want of adequate local superintendence, a great deal of the money granted by Parliament for the purpose of carrying out those works had, as it were, been thrown into the sea, so imperfectly were they prosecuted.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, that as a Member of the Committee to which the hon. Gentleman referred, and having the Report before him, he felt bound to corroborate his statement as to no stipulation having been laid down in their Report that the docks at Cork should be constructed by means of convict labour.

MR. CHILDERS

said it was true that there was nothing in the Committee's Report about convict labour, but it was also true that the first Votes had passed the House with the understanding that the work was to be performed by convict labour, and this was mentioned in the Appropriation Act. That condition was omitted, in the last and present Estimates, and the Government were therefore at liberty to employ free labour in the construction of the dock. He would inquire into the matter of superintendence of the works, but those who knew Cork harbour would admit that it was one of the most difficult places in the world to carry out hydraulic works of this kind. The hon. Member for Greenwich, (Mr. Alderman Solomons) had asked him whether the Government would take care, in reference to the closing of the dockyards at Deptford and Woolwich, to utilize to the best of their power the dockyards at those places? The Government were doing so, and he had taken steps which had induced inquiries as to whether the Government would sell or let the dockyards to private persons. He hoped that something would come of this, and Government were using their best energies to that end. As to the question whether the Government would convey some of the discharged workmen to the colonies, it was their intention to give the workmen at Woolwich the same opportunities as had been given to those at Portsmouth and Plymouth. They did not propose to take distressed persons generally, but only a limited number of artizans discharged from the dockyards, of good character, and whom they hoped the colonists would be glad to receive.

MR. SAMUDA

complained of the growing item for new machinery, new works, and new foundations at the various dockyards. In 1861 it was understood that Chatham Dockyard was to be the place for the purpose of ascertaining whether the Government could manufacture iron vessels as well and as cheaply as they could obtain them from private dockyards. But the fact was that not only two or three yards had got new machinery, but that there was not a single yard out of the seven that had not got it. There was a sum of £16,000 for new machinery, and £55,000 for repairs in the different dockyards. It was unfair to the community generally that, while the Government were not issuing a single order to a private yard, although the work could be done more cheaply outside than in the Royal Dockyards, they were adding immensely to their own means of production by increasing the machinery in their own establishments. The expenditure upon machinery ought to be looked after and prevented. With regard to the distress at Woolwich, he thought that the Government ought not to confine their assistance to their own discharged mechanics. The funds were those of the nation, and ought either to be placed at the disposal of all in that unfortunate position or of none. He had before protested against the closing of these yards, and he asked the House now not to accept the decree as one against which nothing was to be said or done. In his opinion the policy was a mistaken one, especially as regarded Woolwich, which possessed many advantages. In the case of a threatened invasion Woolwich required no special protection, because the lines for the defence of the metropolis must of necessity include it. Again, it was situated close to the great offices of State; and the great manufacturing establishments of the country. The Admiralty possessed there an area which was, he believed, only exceeded by that at Chatham. There was very little difference with regard to the draught of water; and on all these grounds he contended that Woolwich ought to be retained. We had spent £7,000,000 in protecting Portsmouth, and probably it would be necessary to spend £7,000,000 more before the works were perfect. Yet distinguished military authorities assured him that it would be impossible to carry on the work of naval construction or maintain a fleet at Portsmouth, in the event of serious war, unless we had absolute command of the sea, and in that case of what use would these forts be? The chances were that we should be unable to spare the troops to man them, and then we should have to abandon the dockyard which we were now spending so much money to protect, while we were giving up a dockyard which possessed a natural defence. In his opinion, the three best dockyards to maintain were Pembroke, Woolwich, and Chatham; but, at all events, Sheerness ought to be sacrificed before Woolwich, and he would also give up Pembroke rather than Woolwich, because Pembroke, however much it was fitted for our purposes in the days of wooden shipbuilding, was at present of comparatively little value. He thought it was absurd for the Government to give up Woolwich Dockyard to a private firm, and expect to be able profitably to reclaim it at some future period. In the first place the dockyard was upon too large a scale for the requirements of any private firm, and the alterations which would have to be made in it would quite destroy its usefulness as a public yard. Should the Government plan, therefore, be carried out, and should it be found necessary hereafter to take back the yard, the expense would be very great, and what was saved just now would be more than lost ultimately. It would be much better to preserve such dockyards as were shut up in a state of proper efficiency, so that they could be easily and quickly re-opened again should the requirements of the public service demand such a step.

MR. LAIRD

said, he had been a Member of the Dockyard Committee which sat in 1864, and he could state that the whole subject had been very fully and carefully considered. That Committee unanimously recommended that Deptford and Woolwich should be closed, and by a large majority the Committee also recommended that Pembroke should be shut up. He was sorry that the case of Sheerness had not been brought forward, because he believed that the Committee would also have advised that it should be closed. The Committee, among other things, had considered whether the work of the country could not be efficiently done if concentrated in the three great dockyards of Chatham, Portsmouth, and Devonport, and the opinion prevailed that it could. His own belief was that the work would be as well done, and £250,000 a year would be saved. He hoped that the Admiralty would take into their serious consideration the advisability of closing Pembroke and Sheerness.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that the process of abolition, whether in respect to dockyards or clerkships, was not a very agreeable one for anyone to undertake. The abolition of Deptford and Woolwich Dockyards was an operation of great difficulty, and he was not prepared to take in hand, besides, the closing of Portsmouth and Sheerness. His hon. Friend behind him (Mr. Samuda) had made some remarks in reference to the expenditure on new machinery, but the amount, £16,000, was not very large, when it was considered that the dockyard work represented £2,000,000 a year out-turn. The greatest part of this charge for new ma- chinery was for the factories, the tools in which required expenditure as improvements were made. The amount for shipbuilding machinery was very small.

MR. BREWER

said, that the Government, in assisting their employés to emigrate, only took on themselves the responsibility which attached to employers of labour, but it would be a great blunder if they undertook to relieve the distress existing among all other classes.

Vote agreed to.

1. (7.) £79,300, Medicines and Medical Stores.
2. (8.) £18,144, Martial Law.
3. (9.) £120,650, Miscellaneous Services.
4. (10.) £723,331, Half-pay, &c.

SIR JOHN HAY

asked whether it was intended to take the Vote that night, as some discussion would arise on the proposal which the First Lord of the Admiralty intended to make with reference to a scheme of retirement for officers?

MR. CHILDERS

replied that he proposed to bring in a Bill on the subject of compounding half-pay and retired pay, and the subject could be discussed on the introduction of the Bill.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, he hoped the Vote would be postponed. Some discussion would arise on it.

MR. CHILDERS

said, the Vote was word for word what the right hon. Gentleman opposite proposed. No change had been made. It was a mere formal Vote for Half-pay.

MR. CORRY

said, he wished to know whether any increased expenditure was contemplated in the Bill to which his right hon. Friend had referred?

MR. CHILDERS

replied, that if there should be any increased expenditure it would be put into an Estimate and brought before the House in the usual way.

Vote agreed to.

1. (11.) £569,728, Military Pensions and Allowances.
2. (12.) £222,566, Civil Pensions and Allowances.
3. (13.) £316,348, Freight, &c. (Army Department).

MR. LIDDELL

said, he wished to put a question to the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord of the Admiralty. The Estimates for Greenwich Hospital usually followed the Navy Estimates, and as an impression prevailed out-of-doors that a Bill was in preparation on the subject of the general arrangements of Greenwich Hospital, he wished to know whether the Estimates relating to it would be postponed till the House had an opportunity of considering the Bill?

MR. CHILDERS

said, the proposal of the hon. Gentleman was an exceedingly proper one. They intended to introduce a Bill on the subject of Greenwich Hospital, which would take effect on the first of October; but they would only i propose the Estimates for six months, so that the House would have an opportunity of considering the Bill before the Estimates for the remaining six months were taken.

House resumed.

Resolutions to be reported To-morrow.

Committee to sit again upon Wednesday.