SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 21 March 1867 vol 186 cc321-62

SUPPLY—considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

Question again proposed, That 67,300 Men and Boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services, for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1868, including 16,200 Royal Marines.

MR. CHILDERS

Mr. Dodson—No one, I am sure, could have examined the present Estimates, and considered them by the light of the very interesting statement of my noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Henry Lennox), without being impressed with their importance, especially with reference to their amount. I will subject them, in the first place, to the smile test of comparison which was applied by the gallant General the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) to the Army Estimates—that is, I will compare them with the audited account of naval expenditure for the last completed year—namely, 1865–6. The total sum now asked is £10,926,523. The audited account for last year amounts to £10,209,840. The increase from this point of view is there fore £716,683. Or I may compare these Estimates with the original Navy Estimates of 1865–6 and 1866–7. The former amounted to £10,432,610; the latter to £10,392,224. We may say, then, in general terms, that the present Estimates are about £500,000 in excess of those proposed on the last two occasions by the lame Admiralty, and £700,000 more than the amount actually spent. But, as a matter of finance, this is not the only consideration which should weigh with the House on the present occasion. We have now on the table all the Estimates of expenditure for the approaching year; and it may be %veil to compare them with those of the current year. The House will be asked to vote £15,252,200 for the Army, £10,926,253 for the Navy, £8,202,953 for the Civil Services, and £5,852,428 for the Revenue Departments; in all £40,233,834. Last year the Budget of the Chancellor of the Exchequer was founded on the following amounts of the original Estimates:—£14,095,000 for the Army, £10,388,153 for the Navy;£7,856,836 for the Civil Services; and £5,842,866 for the Revenue Departments; or a total of £38,182.855. The difference, therefore, between the original Estimates of last year anti, this year is no less than £2,050,979. Nor is this all. Last year we had, in aid of the Budget, two considerable items of receipt—£500,000, a windfall in the shape of bonds from New Zealand, which have been converted into cash; and nearly as much on account of the China indemnity. Neither of these amounts will come into the approaching Budget; and the result must be, that if the expenditure proposed by the Government should be adopted by Parliamemt, improvements in revenue or in some other respects must be looked forward to, to the extent of above £3,000,000. Now the normal increase of the revenue cannot, at the very best, be taken at above £1,500,000, and the partial falling in of the Dead Weights annuity is sure to be balanced by inevitable Supplementary Estimates of expenditure. The Supplementary Estimates for the current year, proposed by the present Government, amounted to some £800,000. We shall therefore be, beyond a doubt, with reference to the finance of 1867–8, by £1,500,000 in a worse position than in 1866–7, and unless the revenue should be exceptionally buoyant, I fear that the country may be called upon to bear increased taxation. It is, on these grounds, of the greatest importance that the items of the several Estimates for the Army, Navy, and Civil Services should be jealously scrutinized; and that any increases not essentially necessary should be refused.

I now come to the Estimates themselves. They may be, I think, divided into those for the personnel of the navy, in the shape of pay, wages, and pensions; and for the materiel, in the shape of naval, victualling, and medical stores, ships, engines, and works. The first class is in- cluded in Votes 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, which are for Establishments, and also in the later Votes for Half-Pay and Pension. Now, having looked through these Estimates carefully, I am bound to say that, in dealing with the establishments, I can see no traces of that economical hand which is so much required in all the great spending Departments. There never was a truer remark than that made recently in the debate on the Army Estimates, to the effect that, while in particular branches or divisions of any service increases of expenditure will here and there be necessary, it is the special duty of a good administrator to discover, by constant watchfulness, where simultaneous reductions may be made. The Departments will be always pulling at, the Executive Government for more expenditure in every quarter; and if I notice no signs of reductions in some establishments, I am entitled to conclude that the watchfulness of which I have spoken has been dormant. Now, in these Establishment Votes, there is an increase over last year of about £35,000. There is also an increase upon a certain class of retirements to the extent of £3,200. I shall, however, allude more particularly to the details of these increases at a subsequent time. The great changes effected in these Estimates are in Votes 10 and 14. The first of these is commonly called the Store Vote, and contains in its two parts provision for the supplies required by the Controller of the Navy and the Storekeeper General. The increase on the cost of ships, building and to be built by contract, including engines built by contract, is £502,000. There is also an increase of £20,000 in the cost of building dockyard tugs; and in the Miscellaneous Vote there is a special item of £50,000 towards the construction of an armour-plated ship for the colony of Victoria. These items of increase amount to £572,000. On the other hand there are certain items for which less is asked this year, but none of them are establishments, all stores. There is a diminution of £46,000 for timber, of £15,000 for metal articles and iron, of £27,000 for hemp, canvas, paint, tar, &c. There is also a diminution in the Vote for coal, but I think that my noble Friend has made a mistake in saying that it was £100,000. His mistake arose, probably, from an alteration that seems to have been made in the arrangement of Votes 10 and 17. Last year the whole Estimate for coal was stated in Vote 10, but this year the Vote for the fleet and the dockyards is kept entirely distinct from that for transport ships. The real decrease is not £100,000 but £26,000; and when it is considered that for many years past the coal Estimate has always been exceeded, I fear that even this small sum will not really be saved. Taking, however, the items according to the Estimates, there will be a decrease under the four heads I have named of £114,000; and deducting this from the £572,000 increase for shipbuilding, the net increase will be £458,000, or, with £33,000 increases on minor items, in all £491,000. My noble Friend has claimed several small economies, and has alluded to some minor changes adopted by the present Board of Admiralty, and to some of these I should like to refer. He said that they had reduced the number of cadets, observing that for some years past the first-class cadets have been entered in excess for the ranks into which they were to go. If so, I heartily approve of the reduction; but I should be glad to know whether, in speaking of this reduction, my noble Friend has taken into account the second-class cadets. The late Board of Admiralty discontinued the entry of second-class cadets, when they determined to let the Masters' line die out. The number of first-class cadets was therefore settled with reference to the increased number of lieutenants who would in future be required for navigating purposes. If, however, the present Board of Admiralty have reversed the decision of their predecessors, and have recommenced the entry of second-class cadets. I should like to know whether the economy claimed by my noble Friend has any real foundation. I entirely approve of the decision to enter and keep an additional number of boys, and, indeed, I think the number 418 might be carried much further. My impression is that, on an actuary's calculation, far more than the present number of boys are required to fill up vacancies in the number of men, and I am satisfied that you get more efficiency as well as economy by this means, than by entering men from the shore. I also am glad to hear of the increase in the number of trained gunners; but I should like to know how it is that no increase is proposed in the number of artificers of the fleet. No class is more required, and my belief is, that the Board of Admiralty might safely reduce the number of Red Marines (the Light Infantry Marines), who are now comparatively useless afloat, and, out of the saving thus made, increase the number of artificers. Indeed, I would inquire why the policy of the late Board of Admiralty, gradually to reduce the number of Red Marines, has been abruptly reversed this year. My noble Friend has referred to the heavy charge for the freight of stores, and I am glad to hear that his Board has appointed a Committee to look into the Returns which he himself did not understand. I should be glad if this Committee would also inquire into the whole question of dockyard and victualling yard small craft, which, to my mind, is in a very unsatisfactory state. But while on the question of freight and transport, I would refer to an anomaly connected with the movement of troops from one part of the kingdom to another. When troops are moved by land, the cost falls on the War Office Estimates: when by sea on Naval Estimates. Each Department is thus interested in throwing the expense on the other when a regiment has to be moved between two seaport towns; and I think the time has come for looking into this question simply with a view to economy irrespective of the two Departments. I cordially agree with the policy of the Admiralty in increasing the provision required by the Contagious Diseases Act, which I am confident will conduce to economy in the end. But I am sorry I cannot say as much for the next item to which my noble Friend alluded. He spoke of a slight increase in the number of men placed on the dockyard establishments. I find in the Estimates that provision is made for fifty-two additional artificers at Woolwich, and for forty-three at the other dockyards; in all, ninety-five. The number is small; but the increase involves two principles to which I entertain the strongest objection. One is that, as what are called the established labourers die out, their places are to be taken by additional established artificers. On the contrary, I believe that our establishment of artificers is ample, if not in excess; and all that is necessary is to increase the number of hired labourers, instead of established labourers. My other objection is to the special increase at Woolwich. Upon a Report by a Committee of this House, the late Board of Admiralty had provided for the future abandonment of the dockyard at Woolwich, and no fresh building work was to be taken in hand there; but I fear that this policy has been reversed, and I cannot approve a step which will only result in additional expense when the day for abandoning the dockyard arrives, as it most certainly will. My noble Friend has given the House some very satisfactory statistics in reference to the adoption of piece-work, and I entirely concur in the wisdom of the experiment that has been made. But while on dockyard economy, I should like to ask a question with reference to a statement I saw in the newspapers this morning, that it was contemplated to reduce or abandon the establishment of female spinners at Chatham. If anything of the sort is done, I can only say that it will be the very reverse of economy. After a long controversy, with the dockyard people and in this House, the late Board succeeded in introducing machinery for spinning yarn, both at Chatham and Devon-port, superseding the former expensive system of spinning by hand, If the result be that more yarn is now spun than is required, surely the reduction should be first made in the hand-spinning establishment still kept up at Portsmouth, and I think in part at Devonport, not in the women and girls at Chatham.

I have now gene through the smaller matters alluded to by my noble Friend, and running through the Estimates myself, I must say that I see but little noteworthy in the way of reductions, though I notice several petty increases. I do not mean so much increases of salary, to which I rarely take exception, as additional allowances and numbers. There is, indeed, one salary about which I should have asked a question, connected with the establishment of the First Lord of the Admiralty, but I understand it is not to be acted upon. I notice, however, such increases as these:—Three additional clerks in the Secretary's office, Whitehall; an additional clerk at Greenwich, an additional inspector-general at Greenwich; additional house rent allowances at Chatham, Devonport, and Pembroke; and similar increases at several foreign stations. But the worst of these is, I think, the increase of Greenwich. I do not know which member of the Board of Admiralty looks after this establishment, in which I used to take much interest; but I am sure that a little pruning is very much required there. I find that, without taking into account the clerks who are employed at the Admiralty on Greenwich business, or the superannuations, the maintenance of the 380 old men left in the Hospital costs no less than £42,500, or above £110 a man. Surely this is not the time to add an officer of the rank of Inspector General to this underworked establishment. I will now refer to a much more important item in the Estimates, in the nature, however, of a reduced charge, which the House ought to look upon with some jealousy. The expenditure for the extension of the Chatham and Portsmouth Dockyards has been made the subject of a distinct statute, and, according to the Estimate which was the foundation of this Act, the sums to be spent this year were to have been £205,000 upon Chatham, and £312,000 upon Portsmouth. In the present Estimates, however, the sums are given as £149,500 at Chatham, and £228,800 at Portsmouth, making a difference of £138,700 for the year. I do not say that this change of policy may not be justified, and I think I can guess what my noble Friend's answer will be; but when he explained so many comparative trifles, I think it is to be regretted that he did not allude to so important an alteration as this. I must also say a word about the extra receipts; and, in the first place, I deny altogether the doctrine that an increase in extra receipts is any justification for increased expenditure. If ships or iron, or stores, ought to be sold, let them be, whatever expenditure in other respects has to be incurred, and vice versâ. But I still want a little more information about the "pigs" of which we have heard so much. We know nothing as to the amount proposed to be sold, or as to the pavement which is to be substituted for that which now consists of iron ballast. Indeed, from the entire omission of any provision for new pavement, I very much doubt whether the experienced officials under the Board of Admiralty know any better than this House what is proposed to be done. At least, if they do, some carelessness has been shown in the preparation of the Estimates. I cordially approve of the proposition, as far as I understand it, to sell a large amount of timber and old ships, though I do not think that my noble Friend gave sufficient credit to the late Board for what it had done in these respects. I know that an opinion prevails that the late Board was remiss in allowing so large an amount of timber to accumulate in the dockyards; but if any hon. Member will refer to the debates in 1860 on the subject of the stock of timber, and especially to the speeches of the right hon. Gentle- man the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), on the 16th and 19th of April, he will see that it was this House, and not the Admiralty, on whom the fault primarily rests. Indeed, the late Board, while I was a member of it, took upon itself the responsibility of stopping the delivery of timber, so that the present Government is only carrying out, and most rightly, the policy of their predecessors.

I now come to the great question of these, and for many years past, of all Navy Estimates: I mean the amount of shipbuilding proposed for the coming financial year. The policy of the Government may be stated in a line to be this: to spend the whole of the increase in the Estimates, £502,000, on additional shipbuilding and engine-building by contract. Their programme is as follows:—The two great ironclads, Hercules and Monarch, now building at Chatham, are to be advanced to 6/8ths and 4/8ths. The iron-clad Penelope is to be launched at Pembroke, and the armoured wooden ship Repulse is to be advanced to 6/ths at Woolwich. As to contract work, a £83,000 is to be spent on Captain Coles' ship Captain, and two new iron-clads on the half-turret principle are to be commenced. Passing now to unarmoured ships, the Inconstant is to be advanced to ⅜ths at Pembroke, and a new Inconstant is to be built by contract. Of the Juno class, which my noble Friend oddly enough described as "dear to the hearts of sailors," the Juno herself is to be launched, and the Thalia to be advanced 2/8ths. The Amazon class is to be made up to twelve in number, three being finished, and four laid down, at a total cost of £142,000. The Plover class of twin-screw gunvessels is, with the Myrmidon, to be made up to thirteen, six of which will be finished in the year, at a total cost of £144,000. Finally, not to speak of two or three smaller vessels, we are to build twenty China gunboats—ten in the dockyards at a cost of £139,000, and ten by contract. I think I have stated the programme fairly. Now, on this, one or two very serious questions arise. In the first place, I think some explanation should be given by the Admiralty why, in the present year, they have made so small an advance in building the Monarch and the Hercules. According to the programme published last year, the Hercules was to have been advanced on the 31st of this month to 4/8ths, and the Monarch to 4/8ths. According to the programme in the present Estimates, the Hercules will have only reached on the same day 2/8^3/4 ths, and the Monarch 1/8^1/2ths. The difference between the two programmes is no less than 1,800 tons in the Hercules, and 1.600 tons in the Monarch, and I think that when, as I shall soon show, we are wasting both time and money on non-fighting small ships, the House ought to be informed why so great delay has been allowed by the present Admiralty to occur in the construction of our iron-clad fleet. Again, I regret that it is seriously proposed to commence a second Inconstant. These vessels be it remembered, are unarmoured ships of no less than 4,000 tons and ten guns of the largest calibre, with a complement of 600 men. This is, to my mind, like putting far "too many eggs into one basket." I do not object to the Admiralty completing the first Inconstant, which they are building at Pembroke Dockyard; but, until she is afloat and tried, I think they ought not to contract for a second vessel of such size, liable to be destroyed by a single shell. Coming now to the smaller craft, the proposals of the Admiralty appear to me very extravagant. It is intended to commence or finish in one year no less than thirty-five gunboats or gunvessels, of 700 tons or less. Now we have had no explanation as to the necessity for anything like so great a number as this being taken in hand in one year; and when the House considers that the construction of these vessels is the real cause of the increase in the Estimates; that it involves the reversal of the decision taken by the late Board, and virtually approved by the House, as to the gradual closing of Woolwich Dockyard; that it will interfere with the more rapid construction at Chatham of our iron-clad fleet; and that it will tend to perpetuate the policy of keeping up unnecessarily large squadrons in distant seas, I trust that they will pause before adopting the plan of the Admiralty. Let me point out the objections to building too many vessels of one class in one year. Not to mention the increase in the Estimates which it involves, it has this great fault; that all, or nearly all, these vessels will come for repair in one year; and I may say, in passing, that there is no part of the scheme of the present Board which I so highly approve as their determination to keep a due proportion between the cost of repairs and of building in our dockyards. The second fault is that, having exhausted in one year the demand for small vessels, we shall be obliged next year to find some- thing new for the dockyards to do; and I confess I dread some new proposals for Inconstants, or other unarmed vessels. Our policy, it seems to me, ought to be vigorously to keep up, and even increase, the building of armour-clad or fighting ships in our dockyards, spreading the construction of our smaller craft, over a series of years.

I now come to a larger question. I wish to call the attention of the House to a subject which has been but little discussed for many years past; I mean the state and extent of our squadrons in distant seas. We have been so busy discussing the merits of different systems of armour and of gun, the economy of our dockyards, and the constitution of the Board of Admiralty, that we have almost lost sight of the main question, that is to say, what force is it necessary for us to maintain in all parts of the world? and it is this question which I will ask the House to discuss. Indeed, my noble Friend, in introducing the Estimates the other night, almost challenged us to take this course. On that occasion he said— While upon this subject I may, perhaps, though only a subordinate Member of the Government, he allowed to say that it is in my opinion a grave question whether the time has not come for the House of Commons and the country to consider what is the absolute necessity or advisability of keeping up large squadrons in all parts of the world of small unarmoured ships, which, when a more formidable ship than they approaches them, must what is vulgarly termed, cut and run.' At the present day, especially when, very properly, the principle of non-intervention is in the ascendant, no captain of one of these vessels would take upon himself, in the event of any dispute arising between British subjects and the Government of a country in whose waters his ship happened to be lying, to demand or exact immediate reparation. He could, in fact, do nothing until he received instructions how to act horn Her Majesty's Government at home."—[3 Hansard, clxxxv. 1838.] I cannot suppose my noble Friend used these very pregnant words without the entire approval of the Board of Admiralty; and the challenge thus thrown out I hope that both sides of the House will take up and debate with the moderation, and, at the same time, the interest, which the importance of the subject demands. As to the proposals which I shall make, while I have the satisfaction of knowing that they have the entire support of my hon. Friends near me, the hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld), the noble Lord the Member for Ripon (Lord John Hay), and the hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw-Lefevre), in concert with whom they have been pre- pared, yet I feel strongly that persons who are not in office ought not to speak on a question of this sort with anything like the same certainty and positiveness as hon. Gentlemen opposite; who tone have access to many reliable and official sources of information. Any proposals, therefore, that we may make will be I hope received by the House only as suggestions put out tentatively and with modesty; and if, on any point, I may appear to dogmatize, I can assure the house that nothing can be further from my intention. What, let us consider, are the different kinds of fleets which this country has to keep up? They are three. The first comprises what may be called our stationary fleets, intended for defence at home, and, if necessary, for offence in Europe. The second, the fleets employed in the defence of our colonies, and in communications. The third, the fleets maintained for the protection of British commerce on the coasts of some civilized and all barbarous countries. (I omit occasional experimental or surveying squadrons.) In the first class are, of course, our Channel and Mediterranean fleets; in the second, those we keep on the coasts of our North American Provinces, in the East and West Indies, and in Australia; and the third class comprises our fleets in China, in the Pacific, on the West Coast of Africa, and on the East Coast of South America. Now, I will say at once, that in the present state of affairs, I do not believe that this country could give up any of these squadrons. I am not prepared to impugn the policy which carries the British flag to every part of the world, and which protects our commerce,' whether in our colonies, or with either civilized or barbarous foreign countries. But my object is to inquire, whether the extent which some of these squadrons have reached is, or is not, excessive; and to see whether, while we really strengthen our fleets, and the influence of England through them, we may not at the same time render them both more popular and less costly. Now, with respect to the first class, I mean our home squadron, so far from diminishing its strength or numbers, I believe our true policy, as l will show, is rather to augment it. But, with respect to the others, I will place before the House the figures at which they have stood in former years, and discuss the reasons for their increase or reduction. Let me premise by pointing out the general influences which are brought to bear on this question. There are two causes leading to the increase of our squadrons. The first is that, after a war in any quarter of the globe, it is very difficult to return to the status quo ante. Nothing is so easy as to justify a sudden increase for fighting purposes; but when the fighting is over, a sort of vested interest is created, which it is not a little difficult to overcome. The second, and the greater, cause of increase is the pressure constantly exercised by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office (who are not responsible for the expenditure) on the Admiralty, in the real or supposed interests of our increasing commerce. On the other side there are four reasons which point to reduction in the number of our sailors, being feasible and egredient. The first is the increased value of men compared with the tonnage and weight of broadside of our ships; the second is the saving effected by steam over sailing for our communications; the third is the increasing employment of the telegraph; and the fourth the inclination which our colonies are exhibiting to establish local means of self-defence, well exemplified as this is in the item of the present Estimates for the iron-clad for the colony of Victoria.

Let us now look to the strength of our fleets at the present date in 1856 and in 1846. I cannot, of course, give the exact figures at the present time; but I believe those I shall state are within a very few of those in possession of Gentlemen opposite. In 1846 our naval force in the East Indies, including China and Australia, consisted of 3,505 men; in 1856 of 3,331; in 1867 of 6,500. At the Cape and on the West Coast of Africa, we had in 1846, 1,428 men; in 1856, 2,232; and in 1867, about 1,700, besides the flag ship on its way. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: The total number is 2,085.] Our North American and West Indian fleet comprised in 1846, 2,457 men; in 1856, 4,346; and in 1867, about 5,400. On the South East Coast of America we had in 1846, 1,823 men; in 1856, 1,182; and in 1867, about 1,100. In the Pacific the number was 2,855 in 1846; 2,217 in 1856; and 2,700 in 1867. In 1846, therefore, the total strength of these stations was 12,068; in 1856 it was 13,308; and in 1867 about 17,400; showing an increase of nearly 5,400 during the last twenty years. I will now suggest, though as I have said before, with great diffidence, and with no desire to speak positively, what strength I believe we actually require on these stations. I will take first the China, East India, and Australian stations, where as now we should have an admiral and two commodores. The China station proper includes the whole of the Eastern Coast of Asia as far South as Singapore. North of the Gulf of Pecheli we require nothing but occasional visits by the squadron. For Japan we require two vessels—a corvette at Jeddo, the seat of our Legation, and a smaller vessel at Nagasaki. Let me remind the House that Japan is now visited by mail steamers both from China and San Francisco, and does not require as large a force as it did. Coming to the Gulf of Pecheli, which would be visited periodically by the admiral, two gunboats will be necessary at Tien-tsin and Chefoo. At Shanghai and in the Yangtse river there should be a hulk or stationary ship for the senior officer, two gunboats, and probably two despatch vessels. At Foochowfoo a gunboat, and another at Swatow and Amoy. At Hong Kong we should have a receiving ship, a hospital ship (the Melville), an iron-clad for the flag, a corvette, and probably three gunboats for the suppression of piracy. At Singapore we should require a despatch vessel and a gunboat. This would make our fleet in the China seas consist of an iron-clad, two corvettes, four despatch vessels, nine or ten gunboats, three receiving ships, and one or two troop ships, in all twenty-one ships, with 1,900 men, as against thirty-six which we keep there now. The reduction may appear considerable; but let me remind the House of the special causes which have led to so great an increase during the last few years. Not only have we ourselves been at war with China, but we still appear, most unnecessarily, to have some fear of Russia in connection with the Amour, forgetting that, if we really were involved in hostilities with her, our fleet of little gunboats would be useless against a single iron-clad ship. But the main cause of the increase is the fact that we are keeping the entire police of the China seas. Considering that we are by no means the only traders to China, and that we have not even got the greater part of the river and inland sea trade either of China or Japan, I hope that Her Majesty's Government will, by agreement with the other Powers interested in China trade, relieve us from the Quixotic duty which we appear to have taken upon ourselves, that of sole protectors, in one quarter of the world, of the commerce of every civilized nation.

I come now to the East Indian station, where we keep a frigate, two corvettes, a sloop, and three gunboats. Here we have two good grounds for prospective reduction. The first is that, at Bombay, the local Government are building Monitors for the defence of the harbour; and the second, that within the next year the new line of troop ships will be running for the conveyance of our soldiers between England and the East viâ Suez. Though not strictly vessels of war, they will carry our flag, and may be, if necessary, heavily armed, I think we may well reduce our force on this station to six vessels and 1,000 men; and, even then, I trust that pressure will be brought upon the Indian Government to bear some part of the cost of this force.

I turn now to the Australian station. When I was there in 1856, our strength was 230 men; we have now there five ships with 1,100 men. To what cause is this increase attributable? Solely, so far as I ant aware, to the New Zealand war, which is now entirely over. But two of the reasons which I assigned for the general reduction of these squadrons especially apply to this station: one is, that all the Australian colonies are now, I believe, connected by the telegraph; the other is the energy with which measures for naval defence are being adopted by the leading colony—Victoria; measures which I am glad to see that the present Admiralty, acting upon the views of their predecessors, are furthering; and which I believe will tend greatly not only to the strength of the navy, but to the increased attachment of the colonies to the mother country, The force on the Australian station may therefore very well, in my judgment, be reduced, say to three large corvettes: one to be stationed at Melbourne, one at Sydney, and a third at New Zealand; besides, if necessary, a surveying vessel. Our force on the station would still be about 750 men, or three times as many as we had there in 1856. The total effect of the reductions which I have proposed in the China, East India, and Australian stations, will be a decrease of 2,800 men, the difference between 6,500, our present strength, and 3,700, a number by 400 in excess of our force in 1856.

I come next to the Cape of Good Hope station. There we keep a corvette, a sloop, and a receiving ship, with 450 men; and, considering the requirements of the station, I do not suggest any reduction. But the next station, the West Coast of Africa, involves considerations of consider- able difficulty, with which I shall deal very cautiously. My noble Friend said— I, for one, should feel the greatest satisfaction if the moment should arrive when Her Majesty's present Advisers or any other Government should deem it to be consistent with the interests of humanity and of the public service to modify or remove altogether the African coast squadron."—[3 Hansard, clxxxv. 1838.] I think I may interpret this language as meaning that the Government have under their consideration such a modification; and I will therefore limit my remarks to the simple expression of belief that, instead of the sixteen ships which, with the flag ship, now compose our force, we need only keep on the coast one corvette, eight despatch or gunboats, two small steamers, and two receiving ships, or altogether 1,000 men; thus effecting a reduction of 300, or including the flag ship, of 700 men.

I come across the Atlantic to a far more important station; our force on the North American coast, and in the West Indies. In the northern division, which has its head-quarters at Halifax, I propose no reduction; but I would suggest, for the consideration of the Admiralty, whether the number of our ships kept in the West Indies could not be, with advantage to the service, very considerably diminished. It is too large for the police of those seas. It is utterly useless for war. Should we unfortunately be entangled in a war with the United States, there is not a ship in the West Indies which would not be obliged, in the emphatic language of my noble Friend, to "cut and run." Well, we had on this station in 1846, 2,450 men; in 1856, 4,350; and in the present year the number is 5,400. I propose to reduce the squadron, without touching the part of it kept on the North American coast, to 3,000 men, and the distribution which I would suggest is as follows:—an iron-clad flag ship, a smaller iron-clad, three sloops, and three gunboats at Halifax; a sloop and two gunboats at Bermuda; a receiving ship, a sloop, and two gunboats at Jamaica; and two corvettes and two gunboats in the Gulf of Mexico, and at the other islands. In this way we should effect a reduction of 2,400 men.

Coming now to the South East Coast of America, I find that we have at present, under a separate admiral's command, nine ships—that is to say, the flag ship, one sloop, six smaller vessels of different classes, and a receiving ship. The station consists, practically, of two distinct divisions, one of which protects our commerce in the River Plate, and the other is the force which we maintain on the Brazilian coast, as a sort of rear-guard to our African squadron. All we require for the station is a force consisting of two corvettes, two gunboats, a despatch-boat, and a receiving-vessel, with 800 men instead of 1,100; and we should be thus saved the great expense of a flag ship, which I venture to say, except for the purpose of carrying a flag, is, on this station, utterly useless at the present time. I pass now to the Pacific Station, which is in two divisions; the northern under an admiral in an iron-clad, and the southern under a Commodore in a 31-gun frigate at Valparaiso. We have there, besides, three corvettes, four sloops, two gunboats, and a storeship; in all, twelve vessels. This force may, I think, be reduced to a frigate, two despatch vessels, two corvettes (one at Panama and the other at Valparaiso), and three sloops for the service of the coast and across to the islands; or altogether to eight instead of twelve vessels. This would effect a saving of 1,000 men—the difference between 2,700 and 1,700. In passing, let me ask the Admiralty whether they have recently had under their consideration the propriety of abandoning the employment, of Her Majesty's ships, both in the Pacific and on the other side of Mexico, in the conveyance of treasure. I believe the use of the navy for this purpose to be the remains of a vicious system which, as it is often the excuse for increased force, I hope will be put an end to.

Let me now recapitulate the changes which we have suggested. In China, the East Indies, and Australia, we reduce 2,800 men, on the West Coast, 700; on the North American and West Indian station, 2,400; on the South East Coast of America, 300; in the Pacific, 1,000; in all, 7,200 men. But we still leave everywhere, I believe, a force sufficient to protect our colonies and our commerce, to restrain piracy, and to be at hand for general service. But that is not the whole of our proposal. Instead of frittering away our force at these distant stations, we propose as a substitute a powerful squadron, which would be, I believe, very popular with the navy; and in suggesting which we are only recurring to the policy of former times. Our naval strength would be, in our opinion, greatly increased by the formation of a new flying squadron, with complements amounting in all to from 2,500 to 3,500 men, consisting of six or seven ships, some armoured and some not, with nearly equal sailing and steaming powers, with two flags (thus employing two more admirals), which, rendezvousing off Lisbon, would be ready at a moment's notice to be ordered by telegraph to any part of the world where an increase of our permanent squadron might be required. It is of great importance that such a force should be sent to sea at any moment with out weakening the Channel or the Mediterranean squadron; and I will say no more at present in its favour, hoping that the idea will be thoroughly discussed and weighed, both in the service and at the Admiralty. Taking the strength of this new squadron at something over 3,000 men, anti deducting that from the saving which I have suggested of 7,200 men, it will be seen that the total reduction proposed is 4,000 men. Let me repeat that I and my Friends near me throw out these suggestions tentatively and with diffidence, and I hope that they will be well discussed and criticised by gentlemen, whether in the service or connected with commerce, who have much more acquaintance than we have with many of our foreign stations.

I come now to the third and last question upon which I wish to address the Committee today. I mean the state of the navy lists. Nothing can be more unsatisfactory than the position of the questions connected with promotion and retirement in the navy. Every year the Board of Admiralty is besieged by officers asking that something may be done to "increase the flow of promotion;" and the usual result is the formation of a new list. Let any one wade through the little blue hook issued every quarter, and he will find that the number of these lists is so great as to Lave taken up all the letters of the alphabet; and I will venture to say that outside the Admiralty nobody, and inside it not half-a-dozen officials, really understand why they were created or what some of them mean. Now, it is high time that this question should be taken up, and that we should not postpone it till, in a financial point of view, bad dines come—when any sudden change would be attended by great distress to many deserving officers. Let me say at once that in all questions of this kind I am not for reductions of pay, but of numbers; and to show what we have reached as to numbers, will the Committee bear with me while I read to them some figures which I think will startle them. On the admirals' list we have 13 employed, whose pay is £32,700. But there are 82 admirals on half-pay drawing £48,300; 108 on the reserved list drawing £52,000; and 127 on the retired list drawing £55,400; in all, 317 unemployed admirals whose pay amounts to £155,700. On the post captains' list there are 114 employed whose pay amounts to £85,800. But there are 180 on half-pay drawing £38,100; 80 on the reserved list drawing £18,000; and 386 on the retired list drawing £93,700; or in all, 646 unemployed post captains whose pay is £149,800. There are 128 commanders employed afloat whose pay is £51,700; and 65 employed on shore in the coast guard whose pay is £23,700; giving a total of 193 employed commanders receiving £75,400 a year. But of unemployed commanders there are 214 on half-pay receiving £35,900; 78 on the reserved list receiving £13,900; 492 on a retired list receiving £63,600; and 256 retired as commanders from other lists receiving £41,000; or in all, 1,040 retired commanders whose pay is £154,400. Of generals of marines 1 only is employed at £1,400 a year; but 42 are unemployed at £26,500. To sum up all these ranks, there are employed 321, their pay being £195,300; and unemployed 2,045, costing £486,400. In other words, the case is this—if you name a commander, the chances are 6 to 1 that he has nothing to do; if a captain, 6 to 1; if an admiral, 24 to 1; and if a general of marines, 42 to 1. This is a state of things which I venture to say, when compared with the navy list of any other country in the world, or when judged by the rules of common sense, loudly calls for reform. But there is one, a very salient and marked case, which shows the impolicy of the present arrangements—I mean that of the younger post-captains. According to the navy list of the present quarter, there are 297 post captains on the active list, of whom 167 are of 6 years' standing, or less. Now, of these 167 only 35 are employed; in other words, it is about 4 to 1 that a captain, when posted, will have nothing to do for six years. But what does this mean? The average age at which an officer is posted is about thirty-five. Well, then, between thirty-five and forty-one, when a man is at his best, both as to physical strength and as to powers of command and organization, you turn round and tell him that he shall have nothing to do. This is a blemish, and I may say disgrace, to our system of administration, which absolutely requires the immediate attention of Government and of Parliament, Well, for these evils what remedy do I suggest? All our, recent schemes for improving the flow of promotion as it is called seem only to end in giving additional retirement to the upper ranks for the moment, but not in permanently preventing the "block," and the disappointment of the younger men. Take, for instance, the Order in Council of last year—the most liberal scheme of retirement ever proposed. I hear already rumours about the lists being clogged, and some new relief and consequent expense to the country being necessary. What we really want is some means of enabling younger men, who are tired of the service or unsuited for it, to leave it. When a naval officer reaches thirty or thirty-five, he knows pretty well whether be will ever do any good in his profession. If not, or if he is tired of the service, the best thing would be to get rid of him. But our policy has been to give him a miserable half-pay, upon which he cannot live, but which prevents him from obtaining employment elsewhere. Instead of this, I would propose to buy him out with a sum of money down. The capital cost need not appear in the Estimates, as his half-pay might be paid over to the Commissioners for the reduction of the National Debt, who should be authorized by law to make the commutation. I believe that in this way not only should we get rid of a number of nominal officers who clog the lists and interfere with the flow of promotion, but that by degrees we might bring down the numbers of the superior ranks to some reasonable proportion to the amount of employment for them. We might, I hope, reduce our admirals' list to 40; our post-captains' to 180; and our commanders' to 300; and, retaining the present system of age-retirements as applicable to these ranks, we should insure greatly increased efficiency, and prospectively considerable economy.

I have now, Mr. Dodson, discussed, at I hope not too great length, the three questions which appear to me of the greatest importance in these or in any other Navy Estimates. I have pointed out the saving which I think can be effected in the proposed programme for shipbuilding, in the numbers of our foreign squadrons, and in the lists of our officers. Towards the end of last Session, the Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) said of me, that I was always ready to defend Admiralty misdeeds, and that I should do better to indicate now fields of research for naval re- formers. Perhaps the House will accept that suggestion as my apology for the proposals I have made. I have made them in no unfriendly spirit; for although I do not agree in polities with Gentlemen opposite, I am disposed to give a general support to the present Board of Admiralty. I beg to move, but only as a matter of form, that the Vote be reduced by 2,000 men.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That 65,300 Men and Boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services, for the year ending on the 31st day of March 1868, including 16,200 Royal Marines."—(Mr. Childers.)

MR. CORRY

said, that as he was not concerned in the preparation of these Estimates he hoped that the House would not expect him to enter into all the details to which the hon. Gentleman had referred. It was not possible for him to be familiar with all the views which had influenced his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) in the preparation of the Dockyard Estimates, or that had guided the Cabinet in the distribution of the seamen and marines over the various home and foreign stations. But he desired to follow the hon. Gentleman in some of the criticisms which he had offered to the House; and there were some points on which he would give all the information in his power. The hon. Gentleman had complained of the considerable increase in some of these Estimates, and had intimated his suspicion that they were not prepared with a due regard to economy. He had no doubt but that his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) would be able to vindicate his own conduct in that respect. The hon. Gentleman had next adverted to what he alleged to be an erroneous statement that was made by his noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Henry Lennox) in moving the Estimates, when he stated that a reduction had been made in the number of the naval cadets. The hon. Gentleman argued that this was incorrect, because the noble Lord had omitted to add the second-class cadets, who ought to have been added, in consequence of the decision of the present Board of Admiralty to keep up the rank of master by the entry of second-class cadets, which had been discontinued by the late Board. However this might be, and he had no doubt that his noble Friend could satisfactorily explain it, he desired to take the opportunity of saying that he heartily concurred in that decision, for he believed that nothing could happen more disastrous to the navy than the abolition of the rank of master. The maintenance of that rank was absolutely necessary in his opinion, as well as in that of the vast majority of naval officers, to the safety of the ships belonging to the navy, and the late Board of Admiralty never made a greater mistake than when they decided to abolish it. There was hardly a naval man in the House who would not agree with him in that. The hon. Gentleman had complained that the number of artificers in the fleet was too small. He believed it was; but he could not concur with the hon. Gentleman that it would be wise to increase their number at the expense of the Royal Marines. He had felt it to be his duty two or three years ago to call the attention of the House to the reduction which it was then proposed to make in the number of the coast guard and of the Royal Marines, for He considered that it was most dangerous to diminish the strength of those two most valuable naval reserves. De was still of the same opinion. The hon. Gentleman had next criticised the discharge of a certain number of female spinners in Chatham Dockyard, a point of detail that his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay), the Superintending Lord of the Department, would be able to explain satisfactorily. The next cause of complaint advanced by the hon. Gentleman referred to the diminution in the Estimates this year, as compared with the amount which ought to have been proposed under the Treasury Letter of 1865. The Estimate for Chatham would have been, according to the letter, £205,000 instead of £150,000, as proposed to be voted, and £312,000 for Portsmouth, instead of £228,000 for the extension of Chatham and Portsmouth Dockyards. The Estimate for Chatham was £205,000 this year, against £228,000 in the previous one; and that for Portsmouth was £228,000, against £312,000 last year. This diminution, however, was not in ally way to be attributed to any disinclination on the part of the present Board of Admiralty to push forward the works in question. The fact was that, in consequence of the commercial crisis of last year, the late Board of Admiralty had not been able to complete all the contracts—some were even now incomplete, and therefore it was impossible to spend with advantage during the ensuing year a larger sum of money than that now proposed. The hon. Gentleman must know that he (Mr. Corry) would be the last person to keep back these dockyard works, because it was in a great measure at his instigation that they were undertaken. He knew that they were not very popular in the House; but if hon. Gentlemen were only acquainted with the absolute necessity of making the dockyards suitable to the altered dimensions of ships of war, and conditions of shipbuilding, they would agree with him that no money could be better laid out. The hon. Gentleman had next proceeded to advert to the shipbuilding charges in the Estimates, and had condemned the policy of building another ship of the class of the Inconstant before that vessel herself had been tried. No doubt, in ordinary cases, it was advisable to proceed in these matters with caution. But it must be remembered that other nations were building ships of this class in far greater numbers than ourselves. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman that the American ships had not been so successful as was anticipated; but he thought, and had always thought, that it was essential for England to have a few ships of extraordinary speed—of course, not armourplated—for certain obvious purposes in the operations of war. He rejoiced, therefore, that it was proposed to build another ship of the class of the Inconstant. Two ships of this character were the very least we ought to have, and ho hoped the new vessel would be constructed as soon as possible. The hon. Gentleman had next adverted to the delay that had taken place in the building of the Hercules and the Monarch. The present Board was not to blame for that. The cause of delay in the case of the Hercules was, he believed, that some of her plates had proved defective, and that a considerable time was lost before other plates could be supplied by the contractors; and the progress of the Monarch had been impeded by an accident to the caisson of the dock in which she was being constructed, which had necessitated the suspension of the work until the damage could be repaired. But the portion of the Estimates which the hon. Gentleman had most severely criticised was that which had referred to the intention to build a large number of small vessels. Now, if there was one proposal in these Estimates more than another that had his (Mr. Corry's) entire approval it was this one. For the last six years the deficiency of small vessels in our navy had been a constant source of anxiety to him, for they were absolutely necessary for carrying on the service at our foreign stations, and also for the protection of our commerce in case of war. The hon. Gentleman had, asked why was it necessary to build so many in one year? The answer was because hardly one had been built by the late Government during the last three or four years, and the consequence was a great deficiency of vessels of this class because hardly one had been built in previous years. He did not make this a matter of reproach against the late Board of Admiralty, for they had had plenty of important work on their hands in constructing the armour-clad fleet. But it was the fact that the construction of these small ships had been almost wholly neglected for the last three or four years, and during all that time their number was being continually diminished by ships belonging to this class, being broken up or otherwise removed. From a Return which he held in his hand, it appeared that since 1860, 151 steam ships of various classes under the rank of frigates—namely, corvettes, sloops and gunboats, had been removed from the list; and all of these were vessels efficient for war though, perhaps, in want of repair. Besides that, seventy-three sailing ships had been removed, so that the total diminution in the six years of old men-of-war of the smaller classes was no less than 224. The consequence, he need hardly say, was that there was an alarming deficiency of those small vessels in the navy, and he entirely concurred in the proposal in the Estimates for the re-construction of vessels of this description, though he admitted that the number intended to be built was large. The hon. Gentleman had next referred to the state of our foreign squadrons, and had proposed a large reduction under this head. The hon. Gentleman had admitted, however, that he was well aware of the pressure always put upon the Admiralty by the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office; and he (Mr. Corry) was able to say, from his own experience, that this pressure was absolutely irresistible. As an example, he might mention that in 1843 or 1844, when they were on the brink of a war with France, the whole of the naval force in commission in the Channel for the protection of the English, Irish, and Scotch coasts, consisted of one second-class paddle-wheel steam frigate. And this was no fault of the Board of Admiralty, which had for three years been endeavouring to organize a Channel squadron, but the moment a ship was reported ready for sea at Plymouth, or Portsmouth, or the Nore, or elsewhere, an application was immediately made for her, either by the Foreign or Colonial Office, on the ground of some specially urgent necessity that had arisen on some foreign station. The ship was accordingly sent off, and all the efforts of the Admiralty to form a Channel squadron were not successful until four years had passed away. He agreed with the hon. Gentleman that it was desirable that the Estimates for our foreign squadrons should be kept down as much as possible. But the hon. Gentleman had overstated, he feared, the extent to which the reduction could be safely carried. He had proposed to reduce the squadron on the China station, but they had an enormous trade to protect out there, and those seas swarmed with pirates. Their depredations had, indeed, been pretty well suppressed of late by our vessels; and four or five captured piratical junks were no longer seen at Hong Kong every month as used to be the case. Still, with such a trade the pirates had to be watched. Their imports in China were upwards of £20,000,000 every year; they had fourteen treaty ports in China, and five in Japan; and for the protection of these extensive interests they had a force of thirty-eight ships-of-war, thirty-five of which were almost of the smallest class; and the number of men composing their complement was 4,447. He should be very glad to reduce the cost as far as possible; and he would do all he could to effect that object. When his hon. Friend talked of the advisability of reducing the strength of their distant squadrons, he must remind bins that he had not proposed anything of the kind when he was in office. On the contrary, the force on foreign stations was larger when the late Government was in office than it was now. Exclusive of the Mediterranean, there were in 1860, 20,000 men on the foreign stations; in 1861, 22,000; in 1862, 27,000; in 1863, 23,000; in 1864, 24,000; in 1865, 21,000; and in 1866 and this year, 19,000. So that the force last year and this was less than in any year since 1860, and there was a reduction of 8,000 men since 1862. He was not prepared to say that some reduction might not be possible on some of the stations; and he would give his attention to the subject, with the anxious wish to bring the force to the smallest possible amount. He did not, however, think it would be wise, under existing circumstances, to reduce the naval force much lower than it was. As to the suggestion of his hon. Friend, that there should be a larger squadron at home instead of a large force abroad, if the Government adopted that view, they would be at once entering into rivalry with naval forces of other Powers, who would also have their large fleets at home, and the old race of competition would be revived, which would not in the end lead to economical results. The foreign squadrons, also, were of the greatest possible use in keeping up the skill of officers and men; and in that respect it would not be wise to reduce them to too low a mark. Home squadrons never saw the same amount of real service at sea, and consequently neither officers nor men had the same opportunities of acquiring a know-ledge of seamanship as when serving on distant stations. With regard to the state of the lists nothing could be more unsatisfactory. In consequence of the scheme of Retirement of 1846, of which he (Mr. Curry) was the originator, and of that which was subsequently introduced by Sir Francis Baring, the captain on arriving at the top of the list from which he was promoted to the rank of rear-admiral, was twenty years younger than under the old system. In 1846, the senior captains were of thirty-eight years' standing which had been reduced to eighteen by the retirements to which he had referred; but although these and other retirements had relieved the list to a certain extent, they had encumbered the retired lists to an almost intolerable degree, until there were almost enough admirals and captains to man one of those fleets on the coast of China. This was an unsatisfactory state of things, and it should have his anxious attention. In considering the state of the lists he could have no better adviser than his hon. and gallant Friend near him (Sir John Hay), and it would give him great pleasure if some plan could be devised to meet the evils to which his hon. Friend had called attention. His hon. Friend had suggested a plan which he (Mr. Corry) believed was the plan proposed by himself in his evidence before the Retirement Committee in 1863. It was that instead of only retiring officers when they had attained to high rank, they should also give encouragement to subordinate officers to retire, which would be attended with greater economy, while it would contribute to the comfort of the officers themselves, enabling some, perhaps, to settle in Australia, others to marry, or establish themselves in other lines of life. It might be more satisfactory to officers than putting them compulsorily on the retired list, which caused many of them to spend the remainder of their lives in grumbling. He would give his attention to this as to the other subjects which had been mentioned. Not having been concerned in preparing these Estimates, and, as his right hon. Friend wished to offer some remarks to the House, he would not intrude himself louver on the Committee, but he would be willing to give any further information that might be required during the progress of the discussion.

MR. SAMUDA

said, that in round numbers £500,000 was asked for in these Estimates in excess of the amount asked for in the previous year. The state of the iron-clad navy at the close of last Session was by no means satisfactory, in July last he had called the attention of the House to its inefficiency, compared with the navies of foreign States—his views were generally concurred in, and he had the satisfaction of observing that the statement which he then made, pointing out the necessity of a very considerable increase in the iron-clad fleet, received the sanction of his right hon. Friend who, till lately, filled the high position of First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir John Pakington), and who was responsible for the present Estimates. He had expected, therefore, to see in the present Estimates some suitable provision for an addition to that portion of our fleet; or, at all events, that any stun asked for the increase of the fleet would be principally devoted to this important object. He found, however, that of all the sums asked fur in the shipbuilding Vote, only the small sum of £570,000 would be available for increasing the iron-clad portion of the fleet beyond the previous provision made in last year's Vote. He wished the Committee to fix its attention on this important fact. No less than £2,751,000 was the amount which the country became engaged to spend in shipbuilding under their Estimates, and it consisted of the following items:—In the contract works £275,000 was to be spent for a turret ship en Coles' system; in screw ships and gun- boats, £745,000; for engines, £634,000; making a total of £1,651,000; in addition to which the dockyards were to undertake works of great magnitude, to the extent of 23,544 tons of shipping, of which only 6,300 represented iron-clads, and this would give a further sum of £1,080,000, or a total of £2,730,000, which the country would be bound to pay now or hereafter. Of this sum the amount to be spent in the present financial year was £1,850,000, out of which only £744,000 were clue to iron-clads; but again this sum has to be reduced by £174,000, because the programme of Estimates of 1866–7 of the late Admiralty provided to advance the two iron-clads Hercules and Monarch 5,652 tons, while they have been advanced only 2,750 tons; and therefore after accepting the obligation of their predecessors, and the Money voted by Parliament to carry it out, they had reversed that policy and diverted the money to other uses, and £174,000 of the present year's money must therefore be spent before the iron-clads are advanced to a stage that we had a right to expect to find them at the present time; and the result is, therefore, that of all this enormous shipbuilding Estimate only £570,000 is applicable to the advance of the iron-clad fleet. Even last year many hon. Members agreed with him that the iron-clad fleet was not making enough progress, but this had thrown us still further back. The objection now was not only that the quantity of work had been diminished very considerably, but that the Vote had been diverted from the purpose to which Parliament intended it to be applied£namely, iron-clads—to a totally different class of vessels, a course only to be justified by a state of war, or by an emergency so sudden and so severe that no opportunity could be afforded to submit so serious a change to the House. Then there were thirty or forty vessels falling within the category of gunboats, and ranging between 600 and 900 tons, on which the Admiralty were about to spend £600,000. He might be told that the vessels to be replaced were rotten. If so, why restore them with vessels likely also to become so? These were wooden vessels. [Sir JOHN PAKINGTON: Composite, with iron plates.] He doubted whether a composite ship was longer lived than a wooden one; because the injury resulting from contact between the wood and iron counterbalanced any benefit that might in other respects arise. The restoration should have been in iron and not wooden ships, and it would have been better to have substituted vessels of 1,200 tons, carrying one or two cupolas, and covered with armour, by which means they would have had real fighting ships most use to in supplementing the navy as well as in acting independently on foreign stations. But the proposed vessels were precisely the description which were referred to by the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) as vessels to be avoided, because they could neither fight nor run away, and a great responsibility rested on those who had recommended the expenditure of so much money on vessels of such an ephemeral description. Again, with regard to the quantity of vessels proposed to be built, after what the requirements had been stated to be by the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Henry Lennox), he thought the building of the thirty-five gunboats might have been postponed. The noble Lord referred to "two" vessels being wanted for Africa, and "some" for the Pacific, and in no way referred to the requirements for this class of ships as being of such magnitude as to necessitate thirty-five new vessels of this generally admitted objectionable class. Ho had not the same objection to make to the eight sloops of 1,250 tons, as they were vessels of moderate size and good speed, and therefore suitable to the protection of commerce; but he should not have expected that his right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington) would have magnified the Lilliputian navy at the expense of the iron-clads; anti looking to the objectionable character of the gunboats, to which he had already referred, it did appear to hint a responsibility of the gravest character to engage the country in an expenditure of nearly—750,000 in such craft, and he hoped Iris right hon. Friend the present First Lord of the Admiralty will be able to tell the House when it reaches Vote 10 that he has re-considered this Vote with a view to its modification. While on the subject of wood vessels, he would refer to the noble Lord's statement of the Admiralty's intention to break up the old wooden first rates, which were treated by them as obsolete, and in accordance with which decision ten had been already sold to the breakers for £85,000. If they were pronounced rotten he should not complain of their being broken up; but reference was made to a proposal the Admiralty had received to convert them into armour-cased turret-ships, which was at great length shown to be impracticable. Now he was not about to propose to convert these vessels into armour-clad turret-ships at once, but he was about to protest against breaking them (or at least many of them) up, and dispossessing the country of them—he had himself turned his attention to the advisability of converting those ships—he had subsequently abandoned that idea, from reasons wholly apart from any difficulty in the operation, but because it was doubtless better to add to the navy from time to time with iron hulls, which are much more enduring and better in every way; but the possession of the old first rates as a lay by and a reserve is invaluable in the event of war becoming imminent, because notwithstanding The condemnation and the declared impossibility of making any conversion of these ships, he had gone carefully into the matter in conjunction with Mr. Oliver Lang, and they both were of opinion that in twelve cases at least, a very satisfactory result would be obtained, and twelve most formidable vessels could thus be obtained in one-third the time it would take to build them, and for a cost of only £100,000 each, and though not possessing the durability of iron hulls, tow persons will doubt the advisability of having such a means of supplementing the navy on an emergency, and the impolicy of dispossessing yourself of it as it exists. The names of the vessels he thought would pay for conversion were (three-deckers) the Howe, the Victoria, the Marlborough; (two-deckers) the Bulwark and the Robust, which were building, the Anson, the Duncan, the Atlas, the Defence, the Renown, the Gibraltar, and the Revenge. To revert to the Estimates, it was also proposed to build two armour-clads of 3,700 tons each, which would be entirely armour clad, aid which would have semi-turrets on their upper decks. He regretted, however, to find that the Admiralty proceeded upon no regular system, all was shifting, there is no stability, no general character that guides and underlies all their productions, and forms a sound base for all their operations. Of the large vessels of our iron-clad fleet they had almost as many classes as ships. Twenty-four ships had been built and were building, and these were divided into six classes. Of the Warrior class there were four; of the Achilles and Bellerophon class, nine; of the Agincourt class, two; of the wooden-plated frigate class, five; of the cupola ships, three wholly covered and one partially covered. They had in these two ships a seventh class, and now the House was called upon to sanction an eighth class—the Inconstant—in which the ships were altogether denuded of armour. He could not approve of this last class. Supposing that a vessel of the Inconstant class came in contact with one of the Agincourt class; the former of these was expected to make fifteen knots, and was supposed to trust to her great fleetness and her powerful guns; but the Agincourt had made fifteen-and-a-half knots, and was wholly plated, and carried guns at least as many and as powerful, with this important difference, that the Agincourt can attack them with shell, and their destruction will be both swift and certain; the Inconstant can only reply with shot, for shell will not penetrate her adversary's sides, and the unarmoured vessel can never live the time necessary to inflict even serious damage with solid shot. How, therefore, could the Inconstant hope to gain an advantage over such a vessel? He protested against placing English lives and English honour in such peril. He entreated the Admiralty not to be led away by the circumstance that some other nations were building similar classes of ships, ft was necessary that we should rely upon our own judgment. He thought the Departments ought to found their general policy on the experience of those whose duty it was to take a large range of view in reference to this matter. Last year he had suggested that a committee of scientific and practical men should be brought together for the purpose of devising some general policy; but if his right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty did not approve that plan, he ought to use his own judgment, and to form a sound and broad policy on which the future re-construction of the navy might be founded.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

said, that at the present time, when science was making advances hitherto unexampled, and when all the great maritime Powers were strengthening their navies, too great care could not be given to the subject of the construction of our vessels of war; economy and retrenchment in careful forethought should be observed before they were commenced, but only as compatible with the integrity of the national defences. Indeed, it must be obvious to all men of common sense and common observation that, looking to the insular position of this country, to our mercantile strength and vast commerce, and to the distance between us and our numerous colonies and dependencies, this was a point of most vital importance. He was glad to say that the nation had always most willingly borne the expense necessary to maintain the navy in an efficient condition; all it at any time had demanded had been a rigid supervision of expenditure, and that under the vigilant eyes of this House the means placed in the hands of the Government should be employed in a manner deserving the cordial support which Parliament affords, and the enthusiastic unanimity of the country, which is its sanction. As regards ships of the Warrior class, his opinion was that their length was so great that they were not handy in rough weather and cross seas. Then, again, in consequence of their great length, a considerable number of men was required to man them. There was already a sufficient number of vessels of this class, and we required ships of not more than 4,000 tons, which would be far more handy, capable of carrying beyond failure their armament, easily to be turned either tacking or wearing—which these lengthened ships very imperfectly perform, and require much sea-room. And let him impress upon the Board of Admiralty, as a point of the first importance, that mode of construction to ensure an identity of speed both when under sail or steam. Some of our timber ships of war had been sold, in number thirteen; no less than 246 still remained. They jostle each other in a state of ordinary in Portsmouth, in Hamoaze, in the Medway. Sell these incumbrances; they only are formidable on paper, decaying piecemeal at their moorings, each year becoming of less value, each year increasing in necessity for repairs, whilst they give a delusive appearance to the strength of our navy. There bad been since the year 1827 no fewer than seventeen First Lords, seventy changes among the Junior Lords, and fifteen Secretaries, having held office under the uncertain tenure, the condition of membership of a Board of Admiralty. Every such change the late Controller of the Navy (Sir Baldwin Walker), when examined before the Royal Commission to inquire into the state of the Navy, conclusively proved had necessitated a different arrangement, and constant alterations in the Royal Dockyards. Economy in such a fluctuation of opinions he pro- nounced to be a simple impossibility; and yet to such constantly changing Boards were committed the sacred trust of our navy, the very right arm of our National strength, with all its manifold departments—the manning of the fleet; supervision of dockyards; building, equipment, and repair of vessels; determination of the best modes and material of construction and naval architecture; supply of stores; control of expenditure; and in a word, the maintenance of our navy in a state equal to any emergency, indispensable to the security of our commerce, the safety of our shores, and the continuance of our honour and freedom as a nation. This plain statement of the mischievous results which are the consequences of the irresponsible constitution of the Board of Admiralty, and the frequent changes at the Board, has a force of argument which no expression of his could deepen; and without party spirit or injurious reflection upon any individual, he could assure the House he merely had spoken for the welfare of a service whose wellbeing was bound up in that of the Empire itself. He believed that the remarks of the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers), though they had occasioned a smile, would be read by the country with regret that the feelings of honourable men had been—though unintentionally, of course—deeply wounded. How did it happen that there were so many retired admirals, captains, commanders and lieutenants living upon the taxation of the country? The reason was this, From 1791 to 1818 no less than 997 men-of-war were commissioned—a number which of course gave employment to a great many officers. When the services of these officers were no longer required they were placed on half-pay, where they remainded from 1818 until the Crimean War, when some of them were called for. They were thus prevented, the most of them, from rising in their profession, from seeking employment in other directions, achieving higher professional honours, while the solitary pittance which they received was not the sort of income which any hon. Member would wish his son to be compelled to live upon. Those men ought not to be treated in an indifferent manner, or to be spoken of as they had been, especially when it was considered and remembered that most of them were as old as himself. They could not live long, and if the country could not employ them they should not be spoken of disrespectfully. If they were referred to at all, it should not be in a disparaging and ungenerous tone, as unwelcome as it Wag undeserved.

SIR MORTON PETO

said, there was no part of the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox's) statement on a previous night which did him so much credit and gave so much satisfaction as the statement with reference to the decrease of the amount for repairs. He trusted that the Board of Admiralty would feel that it was their policy to pursue that course, and at all times to give it their most earnest attention. Enormous amounts had been consumed in repairs, and unless great care was taken in the construction of our vessels, the result which the noble Lord had indicated, and which the House had much reason to hope for, would not be attained. The recent failure of France in her construction of wooden ships armour-plated—they having come home after severe weather in a most unsatisfactory condition—ought to be a lesson to this country. He believed that the real fact with regard to those vessels was that they were constructed of wooden frames, covered on the outside with iron armour. Four vessels, indeed, constructed by the French Government, and one of which was the Gloire, were, he believed, looked upon as inefficient, and that fact ought to set us a warning in the construction of our vessels. Such vessels needed constant repair. It was very undesirable that the stores and controller's departments should be distinct one from the other; because until the controller was entirely responsible for the stores, they would never obtain that responsible management which was necessary both for the efficiency and economy of the service; and he hoped the present First Lord of the Admiralty would give it his serious attention with a view to the amalgamation of the two departments under one responsible head. He was surprised to hear the hon. Gentleman the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) state that the accumulation of timber in the dockyards was owing to the pressure put upon the Department by that House. In 1862 and 1863, reductions of the Vote for Timber were moved in Committee. He had himself moved in 1863 to reduce the Vote on Account of the purchase of timber by £250,000; but although Lord Palmerston stated that no more wooden ships were to be built, there were at that time 112,000 loads of timber, sufficient to supply the navy for five years, taking the average con- sumption as a data. It was a well-known fact that the Duke of Somerset purchased the whole of the timber that was now proposed to be re-sold with money that was distinctly voted for iron vessels, the conduct being justified on the ground that the money was voted under the head of stores The timber so bought without authority from the House was now being re-sold at an immense loss to the country, and this was the result of the manner in which the Duke of Somerset had employed money which was voted for the construction of iron-clad vessels. Such a mistake would, he hoped, be a warning for future Administrations, and no Board of Admiralty sitting on either side of the House would ever, he hoped, again take such a liberty—a liberty which, in this instance, had resulted is very great lass to the public. He had taken pains to inquire into the quantity of iron ballast in the dockyards, and from an advertisement of the sale found that there were about 35,000 tons, chiefly of Swedish iron, fit for malleable purposes, and worth, on the average, £4 a ton, and a further quantity of 35,000 tons used as ballast on board ships in ordinary. As to our colonial dependencies and foreign squadrons, He thought that a great reform was required, and he hoped that the Admiralty would consider whether there could not be a combination with other Powers, so that a joint policy might operate where protection of trade was required. This might, be thought, be done to put down piracy in China, where the French had a number of admirable steamers, and where also they had a large trade to protect. As to the African squadron, he questioned whether it would not be better to have several fast steamers upon the coast than having vessels, as at present, to ascend the rivers. He hoped, also, to see a combination of the offices of the Admiralty, instead of having one set of offices at Whitehall, and another set at Somerset House. He ventured to think that much of the correspondence pressing upon the Department to which the noble Lord (Lord Henry Lennox) had alluded would be rendered unnecessary if Whitehall and Somerset House were brought under the same roof. On the minds of the members of the Committee which recently investigated that subject there had been a conviction no less strong in favour of the concentration of some of the dockyards. He trusted the recent change at the Admiralty would not deprive the House of the prospect held out by the right hon. Gen- tleman (Sir John Pakington) of the reconstitution of that Department with a single Minister in a position of power and responsibility.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

Sir, the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty (Lord Henry Lennox) gave a clear and full explanation of these Estimates on a former evening. His statement has been followed up to-night by my right hon. Friend the present First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Corry), so that very little is left for me to say. Inasmuch, however, as I was connected with the formation of the Estimates, I trust the House will allow me to offer a few remarks. In the first place, I would acknowledge the extremely fair and temperate manner in which, by every speaker on the opposite side of the House, these Estimates have been referred to, especially by my hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers). My hon. Friend, indeed, rather complained of the extent of the Estimates; but he hardly showed his usual fairness in mixing these up with all the other Estimates called for by the requirements of the country with which these have little to do. No doubt the Estimates are, on the whole, in excess of those of last year; but, while my hon. Friend naturally commented upon that fact, the Member for Tavistock complained that the Estimates were not large enough. [Mr. SAMUDA: The portion applied to iron-clad vessels.] I am afraid that if we had increased the building of iron-clad vessels to any extent it would have been impossible, owing to their great cost, to avoid a considerable increase of the Estimates. My hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract referred to the extra receipts of £450,000 in a tone of general approbation; but found fault with us for not making in the Estimate some charge for tramways, or whatever might be laid down in place of the iron taken from the dockyards. The only answer I can give to that complaint is that the arrangements for the sale of the ballast iron in the dockyard up to this time have hardly reached a point at which we are in a position to enter into an arrangement for repaving the dockyards with other material. At this very moment we are carrying on negotiations as to the best mode of bringing the iron to market; and the real point upon which I hope to receive the approbation of the House is, whether we are not taking a wise course in bringing this iron to market instead of leaving it where it is. I throw no blame on the late Board of Admiralty for being misled, as I think they were, with regard to the value of this property. They made inquiries; in fact, they proceeded to sell some of this iron, and could get but a very small price for it; but that was in consequence of the mode in which they set to work. When we first commenced inquiries we were told by persons who ought to be very competent judges, by persons in the Arsenal at Woolwich, that they did not consider the iron to be valuable; but we followed up our inquiries by further investigation, and I think a very moderate estimate is made when I say that, after allowing for any expenses that may be involved in repaving the yards, we expect to receive into the Treasury a sum of no less than £100,000 for this iron. The hon. Member also approved our scheme of selling certain ships; but the hon. Member for Tavistock cautioned us with regard to the sale of ships, and conveyed the impression that these wooden ships could still be converted into valuable iron-clad men-of-war. [Mr. SAMUDA: On an emergency.] Even supposing he is right in his belief, let me remind him that there is no reason why we might not sell a considerable number of these vessels. There are now in our harbours between 90 and 100 line-of-battle ships and frigates; that is to say—58 line-of-battle ships, and between 30 and 40 frigates. A revolution has taken place within the last few years, and those ships are maintained at a cost of £1,000 a year each. They are deteriorating every year, and for the purposes of war they are practically obsolete. Clearly there is no necessity for retaining so many of them. Some of them, no doubt, will become useful for hospitals and other purposes; but we cannot think of retaining 90 or 100 of those wooden line-of-battle ships and frigates at a cost of £1,000 a year each. It was my intention if I had remained at the Admiralty to send more of them into the market, and I had hoped to realize not less than £200,000 in that way this year. But some of them I intended retaining, believing they might be turned to some useful purpose. In consequence of the strong statements published by Mr. Henwood, the Admiralty thought it right to refer the question to the professional advisers of the Board, who, as the House is aware, are very able men; and their opinion was that, looking to the construction of those ships, it would be a waste of money to convert them into armour-covered men-of-war. Then, as regarded the timber in the dock- yards, my hon. Friend asks who is to blame for the large quantity in stock. It is rather late to enter into that question now; but, if I remember rightly, Lord Palmerston was the great advocate of keeping up a large stock of timber in our dockyards. Even in the days of wooden ships it was not thought necessary to keep more than 60,000 loads; but we found more than 100,000 loads in store. I think it will be the best economy to sell this before it is further deteriorated; and I believe that the total receipts to the Treasury on account of the sale of timber will exceed the estimated £400,000. [Mr. STANSFELD: What price will be obtained?] It will vary; but, as well as I remember, the difference between the buying price and the selling price is about one-third. My hon. Friend the Member for Tavistock complained very much that we had not built more iron ships; but if he looks at our Estimates he will see that we do propose to make a considerable addition to our fleet of iron-clad ships. We have just commenced the Captain, which will be for a trial of Captain Coles' arrangement of turrets. She will be a sloop of 4,000 tons, built entirely under the direction of Captain Coles. We determined that a large wooden man-of-war, commenced some years ago, and on which £50,000 had already been laid out, should be converted into an armour ship. We shall have two ships of 3,700 tons, whether they are to be ranked as first-class or second-class I do not know, nor do I think it matters much; but they will be very powerful. They are to have the half turrets on each side—a very valuable invention—and by means of this arrangement will be more effective than the ordinary broadside vessels built on the turret principle. I was very sorry to hear the criticism of my hon. Friend the Member for Pontefract on the second Inconstant. The building of the first ship was part of the policy of the late Board of Admiralty. When we came into office we found that she was in progress, and we had to address ourselves to the question whether she was not a class of ship which the country required. Looking at what was going on in other countries, we found that the United States were building twelve of this class. [Mr. SHAW-LEFEVRE: They are building six of the larger class and six of the smaller.] I believe very much in the vigour of the United States, and when I had the pleasure of seeing the Secretary of the United States Navy in this country some time ago, he made no secret of it that his department looked upon these ships as the most effective men-of-war, and capable of acting against the commerce of other countries. The Government of France also has adopted the policy of having ships of great speed, capable of going to sea as cruisers, and also capable of carrying, as far as their guns go, very heavy armour. As to the Agincourt, she is a very valuable ship; but she is a ship of 7,000 tons only, being 3,000 tons smaller than our Inconstant. Does my hon. Friend really think that such a ship would be as efficient as the Inconstant in protecting the commerce of this country? I wish to say a word respecting the complaint as to the number of small vessels which we propose to build cannot refer to this subject without making some; Illusion to an answer which I made in this House soon after I came into office last year, and which I am afraid was taken for what I did not mean it to be—an attack on the late Board of Admiralty. I was asked by my hon. Friend the Member for Liverpool (Mr. Horsfall) what was the state of our reserves. In reply, I could only say that our reserves were not in a satisfactory state. I had great difficulty in sending reliefs to foreign stations; and this arose from the want of small vessels. For many years there has been, end there still is, a regulation, that in our ports we should retain a certain number of ships as a reserve for emergencies. It appears, however, that the regulation had not been regarded, because when one vessel, the Bombay, was burnt, there was no ship to take her place, and when the Amazon was sunk, there was not one to take up her duty. The hon. Member for Reading (Mr. Shaw-Lefevre) called attention to the Minute of Sir Frederick Grey, which we found at the Admiralty. I regret that the hon. Member's unwillingness to take that Minute in the way it was offered, has prevented it from being laid on the table. I was not aware of the contents of that Minute when I made my statement; but when I saw it subsequently, I found that it confirmed the answer I had given to the hon. Member for Liverpool. It referred only to the small vessels; but as regarded those vessels it said that there was not one to send out. We are now building those small vessels. I think the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Lancashire (Mr. Gladstone) alluded to this point, and I wish to call his attention to these facts. The Board of Admiralty has now only two sloops, two frigates, and three gunboats fit to send out as reliefs to foreign stations. In the years 1864 and 1865, twenty-five paddle steamers, twenty-two screw steamers, and five paddle steamers of a large size, making in all fifty-two vessels, were got rid of from the navy. Fifty-one gunboats were likewise got rid of within those two years, making together upwards of 100 vessels put out of the service as useless. I make no complaint of that; but I say the fact that upwards of 100 vessels having been got rid of within the period I have named, fully accounts for a deficiency. The policy of the present Board has been not to spend large sums of money in the repair of obsolete vessels. [Cheers.] I am glad to hear that cheer, and accept it as the Committee's approval of the Government policy, which has already been commended by the hon. Member for Pontefract. I think I should surprise the House if I were to recount the sums spent in repairing vessels which, after all, were not fit for the service. Compared with the prime cost of these vessels the sum spent in repairing them has been immense. We have, therefore, determined to abandon repairs of this nature, and devote the labour thus saved to the construction of new vessels of a better type. This is the answer to the regret of the hon. Member for Pontefract that we were proposing to build so many small vessels; it is necessary that we should build a good many in order to supply the place of others returning from foreign stations. I now come to what was said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for South Lancashire upon a former occasion, with regard to the policy of maintaining our squadrons upon foreign stations, and also to what has fallen from the hon. Member for Pontefract upon the same subject this evening. The latter referred to three periods, giving the extent of our foreign squadron in 1846, in 1856, and in 1867. That, no doubt, answered the hon. Member's purpose very well; but I think it would be better, considering what has been said upon the matter, to give a full statement, and refer to what has been the policy of the country not at periods of ten years apart, but during the last seven years. I hold in my band a statement which I have had prepared of the number of ships and men and the aggregate tonnage of the ships on the 1st of January in each year, from 1860 to 1867 inclusive, and I should like to give the House a few of these items. This statement, unlike that of my hon. Friend's, includes the Mediterranean and all foreign stations, and I find that, although from 1860 to the present time the change has not been very great, it has been in the direction of a gradual reduction, so that the amount of our force on foreign stations has been considerably less during this year than it has been during any former year since 1860. My hon. Friend adopted the plan of mentioning the number of men; I will mention the tonnage as well as the men. In 1860, then, omitting the tens and units, the men numbered 35,700, and the tonnage summed up 189,800. In 1861 the men numbered 38,500, and the ships' tonnage 202,400. In 1862, the men 48,900, and tonnage 209,300. In 1863, the men 32,500, and the tonnage 187,300. In 1864, the men 32,200, and the tonnage 190,300. In 1865, the men 28,900, and the tonnage 173,600. In 1866, the men 27,000, and the tonnage 167,500. In 1867, the men numbered 24,800, and the tonnage 160,500. Thus, the Committee will see that the aggregate force upon all our stations in the year 1867 is considerably less than it has been during the last seven years. Now, I will refer to that portion of the hon. Member's statement concerning a squadron which excites greater interest and greater doubts than any other—I mean the West African squadron. With regard to that we come generally to the same result. In 1860 the men on the West Coast of Africa numbered 1,900, and the ships consisted of 11,400 tons. In 1861, the men were 1,900, and the tons 10,800. In 1862, the men were 2,100, and the tons 13,700. In 1863, the men were 1,900, and the tons 14,700. In 1864, the men were 1,800, and the tons 14,800. In 1865, the men were 1,300, and the tons 14,300. In 1866, the men were 2,300, and the tons 17,900. In 1867, I find the men are reduced to 1,500, and the tons to 12,700. So that this year the West African squadron is smaller than it has been in any former year since 1860. [Mr. CHILDERS: Does the Return include the flag ship?] The figures I have quoted do not include the flag ship; but with that addition, even the comparison I have drawn would be very little altered. I have made these remarks, Sir, because the right bon. Gentleman the Member for South Lancashire (Mr. Gladstone), referring to my noble Friend behind me (Lord Henry Lennox), alleged, as I understood him, that it was improper to maintain a foreign squadron at so high a rate. The hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Childers) has offered a shinier opinion to-night; but I ask him how it happens that, during the whole seven years in which he or his Colleagues were in office, similar doubts with regard to the propriety of these foreign squadrons seem never to have crossed their minds. The present Government succeeded to office only last summer, so that I do not wish to claim credit for having reduced the foreign squadrons to their present condition. But I wish to point out to the Committee that the recently announced views of the right hon. and hon. Gentlemen were not declared until the invigorating air of the other side of the House prompted them to doubt the expediency of continuing these foreign squadrons, which they maintained in greater force and in greater strength during their term of office; though I do not in the least blame them and their Colleagues for having done so. The question, however, remains as to how far we ought to maintain these squadrons, and to what extent, if any, we can afford to reduce them consistently with carrying out the services they perform in contributing to maintain our position as a maritime Power. If we had not squadrons in various parts of the world, we should be unable properly to check piracy, nor should we be able to carry on other national objects. There is only one more point to which the hon. Member for Pontefract alluded, saying a great deal that is most painfully true, but which has been said very often before—namely, the encumbered state of the Navy List. The hon. Gentleman mentioned the immense burden we have annually to support on the half-pay, the retired, and the reserved lists, which, as he observed, extend over nearly every letter of the alphabet. He knows well how great is the difficulty connected with this subject; for when men have once served the country, you cannot cast them adrift. This state of things results from the great naval power which we were obliged to maintain during the great war; for on the return of peace we found our Navy List so large that we were never able to bring it within the limits that could have been desired. The hon. Gentleman's suggestion—namely, whether some plan might not be adopted for buying out these officers, and so effecting an economical settlement without doing them injustice, is not a novel one; and I confess I think it would be very well worth trying. But there is another thing which it is incumbent on us to do, and that is to be very careful not to introduce into the navy a larger proportion of officers than is likely to be required for the service. Without wishing at all to deviate from that proper absence of party spirit which has characterized this discussion, I must say I think the late Board of Admiralty was not so cautious in this respect as it might have been. The first thing we had to do on coming into office last summer was to make a reduction of one-third in the number of cadets entering the service, through the list of cadets, midshipmen, and sub-lieutenants having become so crowded. We also found that the assistant clerks had been admitted to a very imprudent extent, so that the list was clogged; making it hopeless for them to rise in their profession or to have justice done to them; and we were therefore obliged to put an entire stop to the entry of them. I have felt it my duty, owing to my connection with these Estimates, to make these remarks; and I have to thank the Committee for the attention which it has accorded me.

MR. CHILDERS

said, he wished to ask whether the addition to the second-class naval cadets would not really bring the numbers up to the point where they stood before the first-class cadets were reduced?

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, that when he spoke of the undue admission of cadets, he spoke not so much with reference to the aggregate of officers on the Navy List as with reference to the midshipmen and sub-lieutenants, and other ranks more immediately above them, which choked it up and prevented all hope of promotion.

MR. STANSFELD

moved that the Chairman report Progress.

MR. CORRY

said, he would not then press the Committee to proceed further; and he would fix the resumption of the Navy Estimates for Friday evening. With reference to the flag ship on the African station, the Admiralty had been obliged to send so large a ship there because they had not at the time a smaller one for that particular duty. It was proposed, however, as soon as possible, to replace the Bristol by a smaller vessel, and transfer her to another station.

House resumed.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.