PARLIAMENTARY REFORM—REPRESENTATION OF THE PEOPLE.

HC Deb 11 February 1867 vol 185 cc214-49

Order for Consideration of so much of Her Majesty's most gracious Speech as relates to the Representation of the People in Parliament read.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

I move that the paragraph of THE QUEEN'S SPEECH that relates to the Representation of the People in Parliament may be read at the table.

Paragraph in Queen's Speech at the opening of the Session read, as follows:—

"Your Attention will again be called to the State of the Representation of the People in Parliament; and I trust that your Deliberations, conducted in a Spirit of Moderation and mutual Forbearance, may lead to the Adoption of Measures which, without unduly disturbing the Balance of political Power, shall freely extend the Elective Franchise."

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

I wish, Sir, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, clearly to convey to the House the interpretation which they put upon those gracious words that have just been read, and which, under their advice, Her Majesty deigned to address to her Parliament. They are significant words. Her Majesty from the Throne appeals to the House of Commons, in deliberating on the most important question of politics—namely, the distribution of power in a State—that they should divest themselves of that party spirit which, generally speaking, is the legitimate and efficient, the customary and constitutional, influence by which all great public questions in this day are brought to a satisfactory settlement. Sir, Her Majesty's Ministers are the last men in this House who would depreciate the importance of party; they are the last men who would wish to derogate from its legitimate function. In their opinion party organization is the condition of Parliamentary government, and without it they see no security for either efficiency or independence in a popular assembly. Nor, least of all, Sir, on this occasion are they inclined in any way to refrain from appealing to the support of those with whom, for long years of public alliance and private friendship, they have been connected in this House. On the contrary, they feel—painfully and profoundly feel—that this is the occasion of all others when they would have most earnestly to appeal for a continuance of that support, of that confidence, of that sympathy, of that friendship, and even of that forbearance on which they before rested with assurance.

Sir, the meaning that they attribute to those words is that, under the circumstances in which the House finds itself, it was in our opinion expedient that Parliamentary Reform should no longer be a question which should decide the fate of Ministries. Sir, we have arrived at that conclusion with the conviction that it is one consistent with our duty and our honour as public men, and we hope that the House of Commons, notwithstanding that expression of opinion from a very limited quarter, after due consideration, will also be of opinion that such a course is compatible on their part with all those principles and all those sentiments that ought to influence public men. And, Sir, we have arrived at that conclusion, that it is not for the advantage of the country that Parliamentary Reform should be a question that should decide the fate of a Ministry, that it should not be what is commonly called a party question, for this simple but to us irresistible reason, that all parties in the State have attempted to deal with it, and all parties in the State have failed. In 1852 there was a pure "Whig Government, headed by Lord John Russell, which dealt with this subject and failed. In the year 1854 there was a Coalition Government, headed by the Earl of Aberdeen, which attempted to deal with this question and failed. In the year 1859 there was a Conservative Government, headed by the Earl of Derby, which attempted to deal with this question and failed. In the year 1860 there was a moderate Liberal Government, headed by Lord Palmerston, which attempted to deal with this question, and failed. In the year 1866 there was a Government which I will not, notwithstanding the present rage for analysis, describe as an immoderate Liberal Government—headed again by Earl Russell—which attempted to deal with this question and failed.

There may be some who will urge these circumstances as arguments to show that the question is one which ought not to have been dealt with, that there was no necessity whatever to draw the attention of Parliament to its consideration. Sir, all that I have to say on the part of my Colleagues is that this is not the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, the seeds for, perhaps, the most considerable portion of those changes that we contemplate, were sown in the memorable Act of 1832. Until the Act of 1832 was passed the claims of the labouring classes to a share in our Parliamentary system were acknowledged, and their rights were enjoyed and practised. Although the mode by which they were asserted may not have been happily adapted to the circumstances of the present century, there can be no doubt that those claims were definitely acknowledged and acted upon. Before the Act of 1832, for example, it was possible for the labouring classes to return both Members for Preston, a town of now nearly 100,000 inhabitants; they might also have returned two for the city of Coventry, then, as now, the seat of an important and ingenious branch of our manufactures; and there were a great many places in England in which they exercised a considerable, if not a preponderating, influence. But it was thought fit at that time to abolish those rights and privileges. I think myself—I thought so then—that was a great error. It is fair to admit that, as they were then enjoyed and practised, those rights were, perhaps, ill adapted to our present social state; and though the labouring classes, in the most considerable seats of labour, might under the old machinery not have been represented, that was not a reason for abolishing the rights, but rather for remodelling them, and adapting them to the new circumstances with which statesmen then had to deal. Nor, Sir, did the abolition of those rights pass unregarded in this House. Those who were the framers of the Reform Bill, and who were supported with enthusiasm by powerful classes, were able then to override the objections from influential quarters. They were warned by some of the most eminent authorities of this House as to the danger and impolicy of the course they were pursuing. The memorable words of Sir Robert Peel on this subject are familiar to the House. He warned the Government of the day that in putting an end to the rights of freemen as they then existed, and terminating all those other means by which the householder in many boroughs registered his vote and exercised it, they were embarking in a course which eventually must involve them in great danger and inconvenience. The rights of those electors which were then attacked were not lost for want of advocacy—and advocacy of the highest and ablest character—in this House. One of the most shining lights of our time, Sir William Follet, brought those claims before the House on more than one occasion with that eloquence for which he was remarkable, and that power of argument for which he was distinguished. The rights of the existing generation were, in another place, not only vindicated, but saved by no less a person than Lord Lyndhurst.

Sir, I would not, especially after mentioning such names, refer to anything I have myself expressed. Under no circumstance, indeed, would I refer to anything I have said here, merely in vindication of myself or my own conduct. But if I have made a declaration upon a public question of importance as the organ of a party; if I have been requested by men of eminence to express an opinion upon some subject of public importance in this House, I think it is no assumption to refer to it, not as the expression of an individual, but, as in a certain sense historic, as illustrative of the conduct and opinion of a party. Now, Sir, in 1852, when I first had the honour of a seat on this Bench, the question of Parliamentary Reform was then rife, though it was then urged in a very different spirit, and with very different ob- jects from those which now animate its advocates. In about the first week—certainly within the first month—of our accession to Office, it was absolutely necessary that we should come to a conclusion respecting the policy we should pursue upon that subject. At that time what was called piecemeal Reform was very much in fashion; and I think it was upon one of the Motions of the hon. Member for Surrey (Mr. Locke King), which he brought forward immediately after the formation of the Government of 1852, that it became necessary for me to consult Lord Derby and the most eminent of his Colleagues as to the line we should pursue respecting Reform. Perhaps the House will allow me to quote one passage from what I said on that occasion. I objected to the Motion of the hon. Member for Surrey, my objection being a broad one—namely, that Parliamentary Reform was not a subject which ought to be treated in a piecemeal manner; and I said, with reference to this Motion, and with the full concurrence of Lord Derby and of my Colleagues— But I have also another objection to this Bill. I have often said to this House—I repeat it now, and it is the expression of a deep and sincere conviction on my part—that I think in the construction of that memorable law, the Reform Act of 1832, there was a very great deficiency, which consisted in a want of due consideration of the rights of the working classes to the franchise. Under our old system, by the suffrages of the freemen, the political rights of the labourer were acknowledged by the Constitution. We virtually destroyed those rights.…I do not for a moment wish now to maintain that there were not strong reasons why the existing arrangements should be interfered with; but, then, I never heard a reason why a more satisfactory arrangement could not have been substituted in lieu of the old one. I trace much of the discontent in this country, which at times has been painfully felt, with regard to the Reform Act of 1832, to the omission to which I have adverted."—[3 Hansard, cxx. 1200.] That will at least show that the question was one which, having been taken up originally, when the Reform Act was introduced into this House, by a party in the State not then successful, has since never been entirely deserted by them. On every fitting occasion there have been expressions of opinion similar to those just quoted; but I have read this extract because the declaration which the House has now heard was made by me as a Minister, after duly consulting those with whom I have the honour to act. Measures of disfranchisement of this kind could not now be tolerated; but in 1832 it was not diffi- cult to carry them with impunity. The position of the labouring classes in 1832 differed from their position in 1867; but such was the excitement produced by the measure of 1832 in the country generally, especially among those influential classes who considerably benefited by it, and whose power was immensely increased by it, that it was utterly impossible that any policy which was projected by the authors of the Bill of 1832 could have been successfully opposed either in this House or by those who, outside the House, were more immediately interested in the question. That, however, which Sir Robert Peel told the Government of Lord Grey inevitably happened. He urged, as time advances and the country prospers, you will find the labouring class whose Parliamentary rights you are now destroying will take the opportunity of claiming again the privileges which you have thoughtlessly taken from them, and for which you offer no substitute. Since 1832 this country has, no doubt, made great progress. But it is during the last ten years that progress has been most remarkable. I will not now attempt to inquire into the causes, the particular causes, which have brought about that great advance. But I think I may say there is one sovereign cause which is at the bottom of everything, and that is the increased application of science to social life. That I believe to be the main cause of the vast changes we have seen in the condition and feelings of classes. We are all familiar with the material results which that application of science has produced. They are prodigious; but, to my mind, the moral results are not less startling. The revolution in locomotion, which would strike us daily as a miracle if we were not familiar with it, has given the great body of the inhabitants of this country in some degree the enlightening advantages of travel. The mode in which steam-power is applied to the printing press in these days produces effects more startling than the first discovery of printing in the 15th century. It is science that has raised wages; it is science that has increased the desires and the opportunities of men; and it is science that has ennobled labour. There are some who say its effects must be to equalize the condition of men. That is a controversy. I am not anxious to-night on that or any other subject to enter into controversy; but this, I think, may be said—there is no doubt that the application of science to social life has elevated the condition of all classes.

Having said this in all sincerity, I must repudiate an opinion which is too prevalent, and, as I think, utterly unfounded—the opinion that, especially in this House, the legitimate claims of the labouring class to their due share in the Parliamentary system have met with vexatious opposition, and have encountered a sinister spirit of neglect and intentional delay. On the contrary, Sir, forming my opinion from what I have seen out of doors, and, I am sorry to add, in some measure within those walls, I should say that these claims have been treated rather with an Epicurean feeling, which, anxious not to be troubled by the settlement of a disagreeable and, perhaps, as some think, a dangerous question, would agree to anything for immediate case without any thought of our duty towards those who may follow us. All I can say of such a feeling is that I think it more dangerous than any of those opinions which perhaps to-day may have alarmed the minds of some, and which, if practised, would injure the future of those who preach them. I have no hesitation in saying that as far as I can form an opinion, and I am sure on this head it is an impartial one, I know of no great question—no question, I mean, that largely influences the history of this country, and touches the principles upon which our Constitution rests—which has met with less discussion and with less difficulty than the one now engaging our attention.

It is sometimes said that Parliamentary Reform has been a Parliamentary question for fifteen years. It is very true that the attention of Parliament has been called to schemes for re-constructing this House; but I deny that these schemes were at all adapted to supply the deficiency which we are now considering, or were at all conceived in a spirit likely to bring about any satisfactory result. I look upon the Bill of 1852, introduced by Lord John Russell, as eminently a premature movement, for it did not even aim at supplying the deficiency to which I refer. I do not blame Earl Russell for bringing forward that Bill. I have vindicated him before in this House when attacked upon that head. I look upon the measure of 1852 as strictly a measure of self-defence. Lord John Russell, who understood the question of Parliamentary Reform, found himself night after night attacked, as it were, by Members of this House who proposed isolated measures applying only to some fragmentary portion of the great question of Re-form. He knew the danger which might accrue if such isolated measures were adopted. He knew that, whether the result were democratic or oligarchic, consequences might ensue from such a course which would probably startle their proposers as much as anybody else. Therefore, Lord John Russell, after five years' campaigning against his Liberal friends, found it absolutely necessary to make some effort for a comprehensive settlement of the question of Parliamentary Reform. Hon. Gentlemen rose night after night bringing forward Motions about the borough, at another time about the county franchise, then proposals which would have completely revolutionized the whole system by which votes are given and recorded, and Lord John Russell eventually proposed a scheme to deal with these points. But I beg the House to remark that the disturbance of the settlement of 1832 did not originate with Lord John Russell. It originated entirely with the House of Commons. It was not Lord John Russell, or his rivals, or any body of public men, who, when they make proposals to this House, make them at least with a sense of responsibility, that they may be called on to carry them into action. That was not the case. It was the House of Commons, it was those whom we habitually describe as independent Members, who commenced the disturbance of the settlement of 1832.

And here I would ask the House to reflect on these two circumstances. The origin of Parliamentary Reform as a question in the House of Commons must be found in the conduct of individuals—of independent Members of this House. This, therefore, is a House of Commons question; it is not a party question. And it is remarkable that the House of Commons, having been the originators of the disturbance of the settlement of 1832, have defeated every attempt that has been made by organized parties, by responsible bodies of men, and by leaders of political connections, to effect a settlement of a question which was then unsettled. I am bringing no charge of misconduct against any Members of the House or against the House of Commons itself; I am speaking historically on the subject. The House of Commons may have been perfectly justified in what it did. I will not enter into any controversy to-night on the course which it pursued. The Members of the House may have been justified in coming forward and sedulously attempting to disturb the settlement of 1832. They may have been justified in defeating any measure which may have been brought forward by successive Ministers to settle the points in controversy. All that I do not deny; but I think all must admit that the House of Commons, with regard to this question of Parliamentary Reform, has incurred, as it were, certain peculiar responsibilities. They originated the question, and at the same time they have prevented it being settled.

Now, though few will doubt that, under these circumstances, the House of Commons itself, as independent of any particular party organization, has incurred a general responsibility with respect to this question, it can, I think, hardly be denied that with regard to the present subject the relations between this House and the Government are peculiarly difficult and perplexing; because it is to be observed that, although the House of Commons defeated all the five measures that were brought forward by Lord Russell, Lord Aberdeen, Lord Palmerston, and Lord Derby, they did in four of these instances permit the measure to be read a second time; but in the case of the Bill of Lord Derby's Government they thought fit—I am not going for a moment to question the propriety of their conduct—not to permit that measure to be read a second time. Now I say, without the slightest soreness on the subject, that it was the opposition of Lord John Russell in 1859 that made Parliamentary Reform a party question. Until the vote taken on that occasion it was not so. Well, no man is so sensible of the advantages of free discussion as myself. I am always ready to acknowledge its practical value. I must, therefore, repeat, and I am now going to prove, the statement that I made just now. I say that until 1859 Parliamentary Reform was not a Parliamentary question. When Sir Robert Peel, in 1834, was called upon to form a Government, there was then considerable odium raised against him owing to the insinuations of what were then called sincere Reformers—that on grounds of party policy he would disturb the Act of 1832. Sir Robert Peel found it impossible to make way against these unfounded aspersions unless he took steps which, from their grave and solemn character, would duly impress the public mind. It was in this House, when called upon to take the responsible position of First Minister, under circumstances of very great difficulty, that he made the solemn declaration, with the complete assent of all his party, that he would never seek to disturb the settlement of 1832. And that engagement was religiously observed. Although the settlement of 1832, with all its virtues, and I have never denied them, was no doubt conceived and carried with extreme party feeling, and in many of its minor provisions highly advantageous to the party that carried them—I do not blame them for that—I say, notwithstanding all that, the compact entered into by Sir Robert Peel and his party was religiously observed; and it was not until 1851 and 1852, when dark rumours were abroad as to the intentions of Lord John Russell, who, in a very solemn manner, in this House had pledged himself, on the faith of the Whigs, to the principle of finality, that the Conservative party had to consider what course to take if Lord John Russell should recede from that undertaking. I believe I may say that was a subject which was considered by the most eminent and leading men—many now departed or lost to us—men held in the highest honour for their integrity and public spirit, like the late Duke of Richmond, Lord George Bentinck, Mr. Bankes, and others who sat in this House—and many who still live and were in intimate communication with Lord Derby, and they came to the resolution that if Lord John Russell gave up the Act of 1832, nothing would induce them to take up a position of opposition to Parliamentary Reform. And their course has been consistent throughout. There never was a Bill brought forward on the subject of which the second reading was opposed by us.

I think I have traced the question now at least to the relinquishment of finality; and I think hon. Gentlemen will agree with me that there was no appearance of Reform being made a party question until that period. Many hon. Members who sat in the House at that time are familiar with what took place with regard to the subsequent Bills. Now, Sir, there is no man whose opinions on Parliamentary Reform are spoken of with more levity than Lord Palmerston. Some would conclude that Lord Palmerston was unquestionably very Conservative in his principles; that he was entirely opposed to any change in our Parliamentary Constitution; and that it was only for political convenience, and in order to make necessary arrangements for indispensable Colleagues, that he ever consented to the introduction of any measure of Reform. Now, there is not the slightest foundation for any such conclusion. In 1857 Lord Palmerston was at the culminating point of his power. He had then dissolved Parliament on the China vote, he had scattered all his enemies—even those who afterwards became his friends. The Opposition, with which I was connected, suffered, but probably less than most portions of the House, in that penal dissolution. Lord John Russell, a great authority in this question, only obtained the representation of the City of London as an act of courtesy, and the most powerful leaders now on the subject of Parliamentary Reform lost their seats in this House on that occasion. Lord Palmerston had, accordingly, an indisputable majority. He had none in his Cabinet at that moment—though all men whom he respected—in a position to dictate a policy to Lord Palmerston. The House met in the autumn of the same year; it was absolutely unnecessary for Lord Palmerston to introduce the question of Parliamentary Reform, and yet he recommended it in the Speech from the Throne. What happened in 1858? Lord Palmerston, who was supposed to be a Minister supported by the most powerful majority that ever appeared in Parliament, suddenly lost his pride of place, within twelve months of his triumphant dissolution; and when Lord Palmerston left office, he was so sensible that "some settlement"—as the fashionable phrase was then—was required, that he said if his successor, Lord Derby, would give his earnest attention to the subject, and could see his way to bringing forward a moderate and well-considered measure, Lord Derby might be certain it would receive from him a fair and candid consideration. Well, Sir, Lord Derby did not conceive that, if he brought forward such a measure, he could count upon any enthusiastic support from his opponents. All parties had not then tried their hand in vain; and no circumstances had then occurred which could justify a Minister in advising the Crown to appeal to Parliament to consider this question not as a party question. Lord Derby, however, did think that he was not putting too favourable an interpretation upon an undertaking that his efforts should re- ceive a fair and candid consideration, when he concluded that if he did bring forward a measure, prepared with care and labour, it should at least be read a second time and receive a fair consideration from Parliament. But that did not prove to be the case. Notwithstanding this declaration of Lord Palmerston, and notwithstanding the efforts that Lord Palmerston made, the House of Commons set at defiance his authority, and a private Member brought forward an Amendment which gave a totally different colour to the conduct of the House. And who was that individual? Why, it was Lord John Russell. Lord John Russell then sat below the gangway; he was not a Member of the Government that had retired from Office; he was not then a proximate Minister. He occupied, indeed, a commanding position, such as a man of his achievements, high character, and talents always would command in this House; but he was then in the position of a private Member of Parliament. Well, the House of Commons followed Lord John Russell, so that it was again the House of Commons that came forward, and by that vote made it, I say, a party question. I do not object to the conduct of Lord John Russell. I am not contending about the decision which the House arrived at, as far as the decision itself was concerned, on the Bill of 1859; but this I do say, that it was a very great responsibility on the part of the House of Commons to throw out that Bill, and then, when they had forced a change of Ministry, to be unable to carry their opinions into effect.

Sir, I have thus shown that the position of the House of Commons, with regard to this question of Parliamentary Reform, is different from that which exists between the House generally and all other great questions, which are introduced and initiated in this House by a body of men who are in the possession of office, or who are candidates for office, and who therefore ought not to shrink from the responsibility of carrying their opinions into effect. I have shown that the House of Commons, as regards the present Ministry and that particular subject, is in a very perplexing position, and this position increases its responsibility. For, with the greatest respect—without the slightest desire of giving offence to any Member of the House, which would be foreign to my nature—I must at once say that the coun- try upon this question cannot bear a repetition of the manœuvres of 1859. It cannot endure that a measure should be thrown out upon some cunning or captious point of detail, and that then those who have incurred the responsibility should shrink from fulfilling their duty by carrying a measure on this subject. Well, then, we have to consider, under these difficult circumstances, what is the course that we ought to undertake; and, Sir, it does appear to us—considering that the House of Commons itself disturbed the settlement of 1832, considering that the House itself on five different occasions baffled the efforts of five Governments to secure that re-settlement which they have rendered necessary, considering also that with regard to those who at present sit on these Benches the House has prevented any measure which they brought foward from being submitted to criticism in detail by allowing it to go into Committee, and thus frustrated the fulfilment of the expectations of the country when they acceded to power—it does seem to us that in a position of so much difficulty it is wise to reflect whether there is not some course that should be pursued which, without diminishing the due responsibility of Ministers, would, at least, insure the House upon this question from such unfortunate mishaps as have on previous occasions been experienced by Governments that have attempted to deal with this question. It does seem to us that this is, from the causes that I have recapitulated, one of those cases—of great difficulty, no doubt, and surrounded by circumstances of exigency which cannot be denied—which have been contemplated by the wisdom of our Parliamentary practice; and that we are pursuing only a constitutional course when we presume to recommend to the House that before we introduce a Bill we may be permitted, upon its main principles, and upon other points of great and paramount importance, to ask the opinion of the House, and see whether they will sanction the course which we recommend. That, Sir, is a course which we believe to be, under the circumstances, strictly constitutional. It is a course which we believe ought not to be resorted to, unless the circumstances are circumstances of exigency; and when we appeal to the House to permit us to adopt that course, we say, without thrusting our individual feelings upon the House, that in so acting we are impelled by as pure a sense of public duty as ever influenced any body of men.

Sir, I will not notice the first and sovereign objection which may be urged, under ordinary circumstances, to a proposition of proceeding by way of Resolution in this House; because, if the circumstances to which I have now fully adverted, if the relations of the House to this subject of Parliamentary Reform, if the necessity of bringing this question to a settlement, are not sufficient, I have no arguments to urge. But there are other objections to that course which have been offered, and on which for a moment I will dwell. It is said that there are disadvantages in proceeding by way of Resolution, independent of the great constitutional objection which nothing but exigency could override, and the first is that to proceed by Resolutions induces delay. Well, Sir, in answer to that I say, with great respect, that I do not think proceeding by Resolutions does induce delay. I have no doubt that there may be circumstances in which men, or even the House, not unwilling to trifle with a question might lose a great deal of time upon Resolutions, and take steps which would make consequent legislation impossible, at least for that Session. But, Sir, assuming a case such as that which exists, and that the Resolutions are brought forward by a Ministry as the basis of legislation to which they will be prepared to proceed when the Resolutions are passed, I cannot myself believe that there is anything even in the theory of Resolutions which leads to delay. It is very true that you seem to do twice what, under ordinary circumstances, it might be necessary only to do once; but, then, the House knows very well that the discussions on principles which take place upon the second reading of a Bill, and upon all the various Amendments which opposition in the case of public measures gives opportunity for—that all those discussions are anticipated by the discussions on Resolutions, and that you may very well pair the discussions upon Resolutions against the discussions upon all the vital points of a measure. Practically, moreover, I do not find that proceeding by Resolutions upon great and important subjects, where otherwise there would be circumstances of great difficulty, has led to delay. The instances are not numerous, because the House has rarely adopted that method, and of course I am only referring to circumstances of an extraordinary character, not to cases where we are obliged by the orders of the House to have recourse to it; but on looking over the few instances that are recorded in the Journals of the House, it does not appear to me that proceeding by Resolutions has induced delay. Of this, at least, I am certain, that it has, I think, in every instance been followed by successful legislation, and that, generally speaking—indeed, with scarcely an exception—in the very year in which the Resolutions have been brought forward. The case of the India Resolutions is the last instance, and one with which we are all familiar; but I may remind those who were not then Members of the House, that there was a very strong struggle upon that measure. In that case, if my memory is not incorrect, between the passing of the last Resolution and the third reading of the India Bill the interval was only a month. Therefore, I do not think that the House upon reflection will object to proceed by Resolution on the groundless assumption that it will produce delay, if the House, should agree, to the principle I have previously advanced, that there are circumstances of extraordinary exigency which necessitate that course. Then it is said that Resolutions are vague. Well, Sir, I admit that Resolutions must be vague to a certain extent and in a certain sense. If you would produce Resolutions with all the precision of clauses in a Bill, there would not be the slightest necessity to go into Committee on Resolutions. The object of Resolutions is to obtain the opinion of the House upon the main principles on which your measure should be founded; and, upon all other questions in which the main principles are not concerned, but which may be of vast importance, to obtain the opinion of the House, and defer to that opinion if it does not approve them. With regard to the application of the principles to details, of course it would be the duty of the Government to submit with pleasure and readiness to all suggestions made by the House which might lead to a more perfect and complete measure.

Well, Sir, upon the ground of delay, I trust that our course will not be opposed. With regard to the vagueness of Resolutions, I will say this, that if a Ministry are determined, if the Resolutions are carried, to introduce a Bill, there is no body of men more interested in the precision of the Resolutions than the Government itself. It is not our interest to bring forward vague Resolutions, We want to get from the House such a sanction of our views, and such assistance by the expression of their own, as that we can bring in a Bill which will pass with promptitude. And therefore these vague Resolutions are exactly what we should avoid, as they would not assist us in our course. I want to meet this question fairly, because I am sure it will facilitate our future course if we can arrive as soon as possible, and as much as possible, at a mutual understanding. I will take one of the most difficult questions which can occur in the Resolutions. Our first Resolution probably must refer to the extension of the suffrage. Well, if I bring forward a Resolution which merely declares that it is expedient that there should be an extension of the suffrage in counties and boroughs, I should call that a vague Resolution. The House is agreed, and has agreed, not only in this but in preceding Houses, and in an unmistakable manner, that there should be a considerable extension of the suffrage in counties and boroughs; but the House, certainly not this House, has never yet formally stated the mode by which the extension should take place. But if a Resolution is brought forward proposing the mode by which extension should take place, either by the creation of other franchises or the reduction of existing tenures of franchise, why then you have a Resolution which advances the question. If, however, I am asked, as I am told I shall be asked, whether it is not useless to bring forward Resolutions on such a question as the franchise without defining and describing minutely the qualification, then I say that is an unreasonable condition. I say an unreasonable condition, because it is a condition impossible for any Government to comply with. If you propose a Resolution which declares that it is expedient the franchise should be extended by its reduction—that is a principle which, when laid down, cannot be misunderstood. But how are you to settle the amount of the franchise? Take your borough franchise—how can you fix in your Resolution, even if you agree to the principle of its reduction, the amount of your franchise, when that must depend upon principles not less important than the extension itself? I wish to illustrate this point. The amount of the franchise depends upon many considerations, but it depends mainly upon one principle of the greatest importance, and that is a princi- ple on which this House has given an equivocal and ambiguous decision; yet without a right appreciation and a clear conception of which it is impossible to make any proposal to the House which can lead to a practical result. I mean the basis upon which your franchise shall rest—namely, the principle of rating. Until you decide what shall be the basis of your franchise, how is it possible in a Resolution to come forward and recommend a particular amount? I mention this because it may be thrown in our teeth if we do not propose the exact amount of the borough franchise that we are trifling with the subject, but I say that it is utterly impossible if you proceed by Resolution. You must have a Resolution to decide whether the basis of your franchise is to be rating or not. I will not trouble the House with too many details of the character of the Resolutions, which, if the House will give me the opportunity, I intend to propose. They will be, I hope, in the hands of Members to-morrow morning; but, perhaps, the House will permit me to advert to one or two points upon which I think it highly important this House should come to a clear and unequivocal decision. And I must say that I am anxious the House shall decide on what principle they mean to construct the House of Commons. Do they mean to re-construct it on the principle of the English Constitution; or do they mean to re-construct it on the principles of the Constitution of any other country? I think it very important that this question shall be decided.

Now, Sir, Her Majesty's Government intend, if they can, and if this House will allow them, to re-construct this House on the principles of the English Constitution. I will not advert to any remarks which I may have made before on this subject, or, at least, I should like not to advert to them, because it is painful to repeat oneself; but it is better to be wearisome than to be ambiguous on this subject. We think that the English Constitution is not a mere phrase. We believe that we live under a monarchy, modified in its action by the co-ordinate authority of Estates of the Realm, and we look upon the Commons of England, whom we represent, as one of those Estates. Sir, I know it has been said that this is merely an archaeological view of the Constitution of England; but I think I can show the House that they will be very unwise if they quit, without due consideration, the ancient traditions of the polity under which they live, and under which this country has so singularly flourished. Undoubtedly, under the great vicissitudes of centuries, the relations between the Estates of the Realm in this country have greatly altered and changed. No doubt, the Commons whom we represent have absorbed the greater part of the authority which those Estates once themselves exercised; but I think I can show the House that this is no reason why we should forget the constitutional scheme under which this country has so long prospered, but rather, if deeply and fairly considered, why we should cling to that scheme as our only surviving guide against the impending perplexities that surround us. No doubt, the Commons of England, by the immense increase of population and property, have assumed a character with reference to the other Estates which never was contemplated in the days of the Plantagenets and the Tudors. But it is a very great error to suppose that it is merely the increase of population and property on the part of the Commons which has brought about the present form of the English Constitution and the present character and functions of the House of Commons. Take one of these Estates. Take the Peerage of England. That is a very powerful body. It is probably the wealthiest body in the world, and it possesses particularly the kind of property which is most popular in England, because it is a tenure connected with the fulfilment of duties—I mean the land. Nor are the power and influence of the Peerage to be measured by their property. Their social influence—I use the word in a large sense—their national influence, is very great. I have often myself felt that the power of the Peerage is greater in every part of England than in their own House. What, then, has placed the Commons of England in the commanding position which they now occupy? It is the development of our financial Constitution. It is the claim that we asserted two centuries ago—partially recognised then, and now completely established, which has practically placed in this House the taxing power. That is the cause of the position and character of the Commons of England. The moment that power was established, every class, every interest in this country, sought representation in this House, and naturally, because in this House alone can they defend their rights and their property. People complain of the influence, the undue influence, of the Peerage, in the House of Commons. Why, Sir, the influence of the Peerage in the' House of Commons is not a usurpation of our rights: it is a deference to our authority. And so it is with all interests. Here they come because here power is reposed, and it is here only that they can be guarded in respect to the exercise of that power by the presence of their representatives. The consequence is that every class and every interest has sought, and to a certain degree has obtained, representation in this House. That is the cause of the variety of our character. But is it the variety of our character that has given us our deliberative power? It is our deliberative power that has given us our hold upon the Executive; and it is this hold upon the Executive which is the best, ay, the only security for our freedom.

Well, Sir, Her Majesty's Government can counsel and countenance no course that will change that varied character of the House of Commons; they respect and reverence the causes which have elevated a rude popular Assembly of the days of the Plantagenets into a Senate which commands the admiration of the world. We do not find that there is any security for retaining that character unless we oppose a policy which gives to any class in this country—I care not whether it be high or low, whether it be influenced by a democratical or by an oligarchical feeling—a preponderant power in this House. And therefore, in any measures that we may bring forward, we shall assert that the elective franchise must be regarded as a popular privilege, and not as a democratic right. If, Sir, we wanted to see what are the consequences of allowing one class in a popular Assembly to have a preponderating influence, what is passing in the world at the present time is fruitful of instruction. I never presume to criticize the institutions of other States. Indeed, I hold, and hold most sincerely, as a general principle, that the institutions of every country are pretty well adapted to the population who live under them. But, take the instance of our nearest neighbour. There is France, in the very van of civilization, perhaps—if I were not in the House of Commons and in England I might even venture to say—the first of European nations, inferior to none in vivacity of mind, in acute intellect, in wonder- ful perseverance, and in that patriotic feeling which always follows. Well, this gifted nation has a popular Assembly, and it is elected by universal suffrage. Does any one pretend that the Legislative Assembly of France is equal in European consideration to the House of Commons? If there be any Englishman who thinks that the Legislative Assembly of France can claim that position, I am sure there is no Frenchman who does so. But it may be asserted that our institutions are not suited to a Latin race, and that the Constitution of France was suddenly and rudely invented under circumstances of disorder and disturbance. Well, then take the case of the United States of America. There you have a House of Representatives, framed by the children of our loins, and certainly under the inspiration of as pure a patriotism as ever existed. That also is elected by universal suffrage. But does anyone contend that the House of Representatives at Washington can equal in authority the House of Commons? And what is the cause of this? Why, no doubt the American nation is inferior to us in no point; it is of the same blood, the same brains, the same intelligence, of equal energy, perhaps of more enterprize; but the House is elected by one class; there is no variety in it. And so the Legislative Assembly of America, like that of France, can neither of them rule the country in which it is established. I would hardly venture to refer to another case, but there is one further example for our guidance. You have now a German Parliament instituted. Now, I am proud of our countrymen, but I do not suppose there is any man in this House at this moment who will pretend that for intellectual power we are superior to the German nation. That gifted people have now a Parliament; that Parliament is elected by universal suffrage, and we find that the Ministers of the King are not to sit in it. Thus we have these extremely popular and representative institutions elected by one preponderating class; and what do we see are the consequences? Why, that the Assembly loses all that which we believe, and justly believe, to be the characteristic of the House of Commons. It loses it from the want of that variety of elements which gives various wisdom, various knowledge, deliberative power, and, by deliberative power, such a moral command over society that it willingly intrusts to it a great portion of the Executive of the country.

Well, Sir, with these views, considering the doctrines that are now preached, the violent, the thoughtless, the pernicious doctrines which are now circulated, we cannot pretend to enter upon the laborious and responsible task which we are otherwise willing to undertake, unless the House of Commons will, by some Resolution, declare an opinion in harmony with the general sentiment I have now expressed. There are other subjects on which I think it is of the utmost importance that the House should come to a decision, and by its coming to a decision upon which subsequent legislation may be greatly facilitated. I need refer but slightly to the principle to which I have adverted as the basis of our legislation on the franchise—namely, the principle of rating. I admit that in the year 1859, having endeavoured to bring forward a scheme which founded our suffrage on that principle, I was reluctantly obliged to give it up, the difficulties were then so great, the anomalies so glaring, and the consequences to which it would have led so absurd. But since that time the course of legislation in this House has greatly lessened those difficulties. A Bill introduced by the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton (Mr. C. P. Villiers) on the subject of union rating, has greatly contributed to this result. But I hope that to-night my hon. Friend the Secretary to the Treasury (Mr. Hunt) will have an opportunity of bringing in a measure which will entirely remove all the remaining difficulties connected with this matter. Under these circumstances, we trust the House will assent to a Resolution affirming that rating shall be the basis of the franchise.

Sir, there are one or two other points to which, if I am not wearying the House, I should like to allude. Among them is one of the most difficult of all questions—namely, the distribution of seats. Now, upon that subject there are two schools of opinion, which are as much at variance as upon the subject of the franchise itself. There is a school that would re-construct the electoral map of England. We hear sometimes that the map of Europe is to be re-constructed. There is also a school in this country which would re-construct the electoral map of England. On the other hand, there are those who approach this question with great hesitation. They find an ancient and complex arrangement, but, at the same time, one which, for a consider- able period, has contributed, as they think, to the representation of a country like England, having a variety of interests, with success. It is impossible in this country to think on this subject and not to be struck by the apparently providential manner in which an almost obscure island in the days of the Norman Kings, with but a limited population and slight resources, has developed itself into a magnificent and unparalleled Empire. Through the rude institutions of the Plantagenets and Tudors, however, the means have been found of representing interests so vast, so various, so infinitely complex, as those which are bound up with the England of the present day. Those who are impressed with that conviction will, I am sure, concur with me in the opinion that upon the question of the re-distribution of seats we must proceed with the utmost circumspection. Any attempt to portion, according to certain symmetrical arrangements, the representation of the country would probably end in altering the character of this House, and, by altering its character, deprive it of its authority. I think that before we introduce our Bill we have a right to ask the House to give us their opinion upon, and I hope their sanction to, certain principles upon which we propose to act. One of those principles is that no borough should, so far as the re-distribution of seats is concerned, be wholly disfranchised. We are in favour of this principle for two reasons. We look upon it, in the first place, as wise and necessary that the representation of the country should, as far as lies in our power, be distributed; and we regard it as unwise and unnecessary to disturb any centre of representation, because it is impossible, in an age of rapid growth, when communities so rapidly rise and vanish, when the changes and alterations of social arrangements are so evanescent, to proceed with too much circumspection. Speaking, then, for myself and my Colleagues, we are of opinion that no borough should be wholly disfranchised so far as the re-distribution of seats is concerned—for I am far from saying that if bribery be proved to exist in a borough, as we have reason to fear and believe it may be in the case of some—we ought to show ourselves more deficient in spirit than our predecessors, and I trust, under such circumstances, we should know how to act. Our main—mind, I do not say our sole—consideration, in altering the apportionment of the representation would, in the second place, be to supply representatives to places now unrepresented, but which are, from a variety of causes, entitled to the privilege. These are the two principles by which we would be guided on the question of the re-distribution of seats; and unless we have from the House their sanction with respect to these two points all our arrangements must prove perfectly useless, for hon. Members must feel that we might then have an Amendment on the second reading of the Bill which we might introduce, founded, perhaps, on the case of some obscure borough, but so ingeniously worded that the fate of the measure might depend upon it. I have to apologize to the House for having gone so much into detail—although I have endeavoured to confine myself to those Resolutions which appeared to me to involve large principles; but there is another point on which I think it my duty to touch slightly—a point with which it has been found difficult to deal, which is a very important element in the settlement of this question of Reform, and upon which I venture to say a greater amount of misapprehension exists than almost upon any other—I allude to the subject of boundaries.

Now, I have, on more than one occasion, not completely, but casually, expressed the views which I entertain upon this subject. It is really a vital subject, and one, it appears to me, on which no dissension ought to prevail, for if clearly understood there would be, I imagine, scarcely any room for a difference of opinion in regard to it. Unfortunately, however, it is not clearly understood, and it has had raised in connection with it objections which have had a very considerable effect on the House, although they are objections based upon false data, and supported by false reasoning. If I again remind hon. Members of the salient facts of the case, it is because I am anxious to place a distinct picture before their minds. The amount of the population dwelling in counties is 11,500,000, and that population is represented in the House of Commons by 162 Members. 9,500,000 is the extent of the population living in boroughs, and the number of Members representing it within these walls is 334. Now, one would naturally say, at the first glance, that there is nothing unreasonable in the 11,500,000 asking the House of Commons that, as they have but a very small share of the representation, the enjoyment of their rights should at least not be interfered with by the 9,500,000 in boroughs. Hon. Members must, it seems to me, feel the justice of that appeal. We know that since 1832 the population of boroughs has greatly increased, and that they have passed the borough boundaries to the extent of millions. The population of the counties has also considerably increased; but they are on that account all the more anxious for the due enjoyment of their privileges. The population of towns, however, has, I repeat, passed their boundaries in millions, and if you greatly reduce, as we propose to do, the franchise in counties, a large proportion of the population of boroughs will become county electors. Well, the 11,500,000 with 162 Members look on that as rather hard, for they naturally think that the surplus population of the boroughs ought to be contented with their 334 Members. This is not an idle apprehension or unfounded complaint on their side. If you reduce to-morrow, as you will do if you follow our advice, the county franchise, you will have half the town of Halifax—I give this as a mere illustration—not more distinct from the other half than the City of Westminster is from the City of London—supplying a large body of electors to the county of Yorkshire. Why should not that body of men vote for a candidate with whom all their sympathies, local and municipal, are bound up? And are the 11,500,000, with only 162 Members, to be visited by an invasion that will still further materially diminish their privilege in sending men representing their views to Parliament? In my opinion, the question is one about which there ought to be no controversy; but there is, nevertheless, with respect to it a great controversy, a bitter controversy, which, like all great and bitter controversies, arises from an ignorance of the subject to which the argument relates. It is contended that no revision of the boundaries between boroughs and counties must be attempted, because it would be difficult rigidly and severely to distinguish one class of population from the other. Now, to do this is not only difficult, it is impossible. No one ever contemplated such a division. Those populations must to a certain degree blend, and it is desirable they should blend. But cases of great injustice like that I have mentioned—and there are twenty such cases which I could name—should not, therefore, be allowed to pass without a remedy, and the remedy, I maintain, can be rendered per- fectly consistent with that natural blending to which I just now referred. The great objection, however, which is urged against a revision of boundaries—and I put it, I hope, fairly in its naked form, for I have no wish to cast a veil over it—is that it is a plan which, if adopted with other schemes of an analagous though not so important a character, such as giving representatives to some boroughs, would throw the 162 county Members entirely into the hands of the landlords, their tenants, and labourers. ["Hear, hear!"] Well, you accept that proposition? I am sorry for you, for it is a totally erroneous proposition. This is a case of great importance, and I do not think that any part of a future Reform Bill can be really more important, or more to the interest of both parties clearly to understand. In the 11,500,000 of population to which I have referred, there will, no doubt, be a considerable diminution, if our propositions are adopted. We shall propose to enfranchise boroughs which may diminish that amount by hundreds of thousands. There would then still remain in England a vast number of towns which by no wise scheme of Parliamentary representation can be or ought to be enfranchised. I give you the advantages of all their population, and still there remain in England, as appears by the evidence on the table, what is termed, in the technical language of statistics, a scattered or village population which does not live in towns, even of towns of 1,500 population, and which amounts to upwards of 9,000,000, being equal to the amount of the population of all the represented boroughs of England. But you say that this is only composed of landlords, farmers, and labourers, and why care for them? The landlords, farmers, and labourers are registered in the Census, and still form alone the most important class in England from their property and numbers combined. That class comprises 2,000,000 of the population, and if you take away all the landlords, farmers, and labourers, what is your duty to the 7,000,000 of the population that remains in the counties, and what are those 7,000,000 of population? They are the backbone of the country. I say that for independence, industry, for the comparative simplicity of their lives, and, whatever may be their creed, whether Churchman or Dissenter, for their deep and sincere religious convictions, there is no part of the population more deserving of esteem. On this subject of the popu- lation of the counties there does exist in this enlightened metropolis a degree of want of information which is perfectly astonishing. I do not like to refer to some opinions which have been lately circulated by one who has always been my political opponent while in this House, but whom I have always respected, and more than respected, who, I think, was a great honour to this House, and whose memorable achievements should never be forgotten. Still I was astonished to learn from that high authority that the cause of all the discontent prevailing in England on the subject of the representation of the people was the enfranchisement of the farmers of this country some thirty or forty years ago. I think that I have rather indicated tonight, at the beginning of my task, the real cause of the dissatisfaction at the present day with respect to the Reform Act of 1832. It has not been caused by the enfranchisement of the farmers of England, but by the disfranchisement of the workmen of England. On the subject of the two kinds of population to which I was adverting, the most extraordinary want of information appears to exist. Look to those 7,000,000 of your population which I just now alluded to. Who are they? Among them are ancient freeholders of England, to whom we are indebted for our public liberties. Without referring to historical recollections, but speaking only in reference to the latest and greatest political measure—the passing of the Reform Act, which, when I first entered the House, was never mentioned except with enthusiasm, but is now only named with contumely;—I say, it was the freeholders of England in the counties of England who carried that measure. There are among those 7,000,000 of the population I have adverted to, 300,000 and more freeholders. If you look to the amount of the county constituency, and if you take away the 100,000 of occupying tenants, as well as all those freeholders who vote for the counties in respect of freeholds in boroughs, you will find that you take away two-fifths of the county electoral body, and you leave more than 300,000 freeholders, who, among the 7,000,000 of population I have mentioned, seem utterly unknown by this House, and not only by this House, but by men occupying the highest position in the State. When I ask justice for those freeholders I am told in return I want to eliminate all the independence and all the intelligence of the counties. I have never recommended any violent destruction of the existing electoral scheme in order that adequate representation might be given to those men, because I felt the disturbance would do them far more harm than good; but if there are to be only 162 county representatives in this country, merely gradually increasing in number when opportunities may occur—if that is to be the principle of your system, then you are bound to let this part of the population enjoy the rights which the Constitution intended, and to provide that the county Members should be elected by the county population and not by the borough population, which also has the power to elect Members to this House. Under these circumstances, the Government have prepared a Resolution which will propose a course calculated, we hope, to do justice on this long-vexed question, as, when calmly considered, it will be acknowledged to be founded on principles of truth and equity. I hope no opposition will be offered to the course we propose, and that we at last shall reconcile this great portion of the people to our new arrangements by making them feel that they are no longer debarred from the enjoyment of the privileges which the Constitution meant to give them. Why, the other day a rampant orator, who goes about the country maligning men and things, attacked the House of Commons under the thin veil of a lecture on the reign of Charles I., and after alluding to two illustrious men who then existed, went out of his way to assail me, saying, "Where now are the 4,000 freeholders of Buckinghamshire?" Why, Sir, they are where you would naturally expect to find them. They are in the county of Buckingham. I can pardon this wild man, who has no experience of life, having probably always lived in the cloisters of some college, making these mistakes; but I cannot pardon grave and eminent statesmen falling into the error of describing the tenant farmers as the preponderating portion of the county constituencies. There is no subject on which so much exaggeration exists as on the subject of occupying tenants in counties. They never at any time exceeded one-fifth of the constituency, and that number is divided between the two great parties in the State. How, therefore, is it possible that they can exercise the influence which is alleged? In my own county, where, according to the lecturer, there are nothing but tenant farmers, there happens to be, in a constituency of 6,000, only 1,200 registered occupying tenants. But you will not do justice to the county constituency, because you have been induced to believe extravagant representations.

I have thus, Sir, endeavoured as far as I could to place before the House the course which Her Majesty's Government propose to take upon this great question, which has been so long discussed, and the discussion upon which they feel it so necessary to bring to a conclusion—I hope, a satisfactory one. I have stated not only the course which Her Majesty's Government propose to the House, and which they earnestly hope the House will adopt, but I have also endeavoured to convey to them so far as I could, without reserve, the spirit in which these Resolutions are framed. I say "without reserve," because I could have signified our policy and waited for discussions upon the matter; but I thought it would rather facilitate our proceedings if I did without reserve impress on the House the general principles on which we wish to act, and the spirit in which we do act. Do not let the House suppose that we are asking them to go into Committee and allow us to propose Resolutions because we are angling for a policy. We are not angling for a policy. We have distinct principles which will guide us, and which we wish the House to sanction. But there are several subjects besides those which I have indicated, if not of equal still of very great importance in the happy settlement of this question, upon which it would be desirable that the opinion of the House should be given; and on these subjects we should defer to the opinion of the House. If we go into this Committee to move Resolutions, in the application of those principles we should consult in every way the sense and accept the suggestions of the House. And although we are not prepared in any way to shrink from the leading principles of the policy that we hope may be sanctioned, we still believe that on a question of this paramount importance, if the House deigns to co-operate with us and come into council with us, many suggestions of great value will be made which may add to the fulness and completion of the consummation. I can only say on the part of my Colleagues that those suggestions will be received not merely with candour, but, if found to deserve the acceptance of the House and appear for the public advantage, they will be accepted with gratitude. We shall enter into the Committee and avail ourselves of all that the learning, the genius, the experience of the House can suggest for the solution of this question; and to all we shall give a cordial and a candid deference. The course we adopt is not one flattering to ourselves [Ironical cheers]; but it is more flattering to assist, however humbly, in effecting that which he thinks is for the public good than to bring forward mock measures which he knows the spirit of party will not pass. And let me tell the Member for Birmingham, who gave me that ironical cheer, that there are others besides himself who think that it is desirable that this question should be settled, but who wish it to be settled in the spirit of the English Constitution. Of course, it would be very agreeable to us to bring forward at once a complete measure, backed by a confiding majority, and having the assurance of settling a question which engages the attention of a great nation. None of my Colleagues pretend to be superior to The last infirmity of noble minds. But, Sir, this is not a time in which we are to consider the complacency of Ministers, or even the pride of parties. I earnestly hope that the House of Commons will rise to this occasion. I earnestly hope that the House of Commons, in unison with that gracious Speech which Her Majesty delivered to her Parliament, authorized by antecedent circumstances, and urged by the necessity of the case, will divest itself of party feeling, and give her Ministers on this, if on no other occasion, the advantage of their co-operation and their cordial support.

Sir, some sharp things have been said about the House of Commons since we parted in the summer—some sharp things, not with reference merely to its present character, but to its past conduct, which I thought had been accepted, sanctioned, and embalmed by history. I do not doubt that this human institution is not free from the imperfections of humanity. It is possible that there may have been periods when the integrity even of the House of Commons might successfully have been impugned. I know well—we all know that there have been times when its conduct has been unjust, violent, even tyrannical. If you search our records, unquestionably you will find conclusions on many subjects that are at variance with those doctrines which are the happier appanage of our more enlightened times. But, Sir, there is no greater error than to judge the morals of one age by the manners of a subsequent one. There is no greater error than to decide upon the passions of perilous times with the philosophic calmness of assured security. There is no greater error than to gauge the intellect of the past by its deficiencies, and not by the accumulated wisdom which it has achieved, and which has become our beneficent inheritance. Those who take a larger and a nobler view of human affairs will, I think, recognise that, alone in the countries of Europe, England now for almost countless generations has by her Parliament exhibited the fair exemplar of free government; and that throughout the awful vicissitudes of her heroic history she has, chiefly by this House of Commons, maintained and cherished that public spirit which is the soul of Commonwealths, without which Empire has no glory, and the wealth of nations is but the means of corruption and decay. Sir, I move that on the 25th of February this House will resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House to take into consideration the 2&3 Will. IV. c. 45.

MR. GLADSTONE

said: Without, Sir, in any manner derogating from the ability of the speech which the right hon. Gentleman has just delivered, I venture to observe—and I think many will concur in the observation—it is one which does not of itself necessarily carry censure—that the House is placed in a somewhat peculiar position. We are to approach the discussion of a subject of unparalleled difficulty, and one which has undoubtedly been embittered in other times by proceedings which, whether justified by the spirit of party and the ordinary usages of Parliament or not, yet certainly has been in a high degree obstructive of public progress—we are to approach the discussion of this question now on the invitation of the right hon. Gentleman in a manner, I think, altogether novel. I am not about to discuss at length the propositions of the right hon. Gentleman, which will be best considered when we hold them, in their express terms, in our hands; still less am I about to offer to the House, as I hope, any one remark which may diminish the expectations or the hopes that any one of us may entertain of making the propositions of the right hon. Gentleman and of the Government the basis of a settlement of the question. But there were remarks contained in the speech of the right hon. Gentleman which I do not feel able to pass by altogether in silence. The right hon. Gentleman, in the early part of his speech, laid much stress upon certain terms contained in Her Majesty's Speech—terms, I think, not very commonly found in Speeches from the Throne—instructing this House as to the temper in which it was to deal with this subject; and the signification which the right hon. Gentleman, no doubt with great authority, attaches to those words is this, that the subject of Parliamentary Reform is no longer to be a question whereon the fate of a Ministry is to depend. Now, Sir, there is no more grave and difficult question that can arise for the consideration of the responsible Ministers of the Crown than to determine what are and what are not the occasions upon which the failure and rejection of their propositions constitute a sufficient cause for the resignation of their offices. If that general proposition be sustained, as I think it is both by opinion and by experience, there immediately follows from it this consequence—that the Executive Government ought on every occasion to retain in its own hands an unimpeded and unfettered power of considering that most difficult question with reference to its own dignity and honour, and to the interests of the country according to the circumstances that may arise. Those circumstances, Sir, it is impossible to define and to forecast in anticipation of the events; and I own to entertaining a doubt whether the right hon. Gentleman has so far conduced to the easier or more satisfactory prospect of settling this question by the announcement beforehand of something like an abstract and binding proposition to the effect that it is to be one which is not to involve the fate of the Government. That, however, is a matter more, perhaps, for the consideration of the right hon. Gentleman and his Colleagues than for those who are less connected with them; but the principle announced by the right hon. Gentleman is one of such importance, and I confess that in my own mind it is one open to so much doubt, that I could not allow it to pass without a remark against it. The right hon. Gentleman then proceeded to give us a lengthened historical disquisition upon the transactions that have taken place in previous Sessions, and in previous Parliaments, with regard to measures of Parliamentary Reform. I wish, Sir, to give the right hon. Gentleman the opportunity of correcting me on a future occasion if I should unfortunately misrepresent his meaning in consequence of having been unable sufficiently to comprehend him. But I did not clearly gather from his speech what was the precise inference that he intended us to draw from that recital. It appeared to me that his object was to show that there was a special responsibility of this House, as distinguished from the Government which ordinarily directs its proceedings, with reference to the subject of Parliamentary Reform. If that be all that is intended to be established by that recital I have no difficulty, as far as I am personally concerned, in subscribing to the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman; for although the opinion, when I expressed it, was much objected to—and objected to, perhaps, in quarters where there may be more sympathy with it to-night—I did entertain, and strongly entertain, the opinion that the House itself—from the action on various occasions of its independent Members—has incurred in the eyes of the country a special responsibility with reference to the question of Reform. But I understood the right hon. Gentleman to go beyond the limits of that proposition, and by his announcement that he leaves us to imply that, together with the increase of the responsibility of the House of Commons there was a diminution of the responsibility of the Government, and that an exceptional state of things had arisen in which it would be expedient for, if not imperative, upon this House to effect a settlement of this difficult question under some guidance or leadership—the right hon. Gentleman does not say in what degree—of Government, such guidance or leadership to be connected with a responsibility different in kind and also in weight from that which usually attaches to the Advisers of the Crown. If that be so, I must confess that I am doubtful whether the announcement of such a view on the part of the Leader of this House will add to the weight or to the authority with which his propositions should be placed before us, and which, attaching as it justly does under all circumstances to the proposals of the Executive in this country, is of itself one of the great propelling forces by which important measures are successfully carried through this House. The right hon. Gentleman has announced, with reference to the subject of Parliamentary Reform, his intention of proceeding by Resolution—an intention with which we were already acquainted from information that had reached us from various quarters. I will not enter into any full discussion of that method of proceeding, although I frankly own my prepossessions to be against it. I think that that method of proceeding is justifiable, and even necessary, in cases of a particular description; in a case, for example, where it is necessary to obtain the concurrence of both Houses, it is obvious that the simultaneous concurrence of both Houses could not be had except by adopting the practice of proceeding by Resolution. I will not, however, ask what are the precise limits to which this method of proceeding should be confined; but the right hon. Gentleman, having dwelt upon the subject fully, has failed to satisfy my mind that this method of doing things twice over instead of once has not, as a general rule, some tendency to cause delay. The right hon. Gentleman, in touching upon the second and more important point, admitted that vagueness was almost inseparable from the nature of Resolutions—that is to say, that if Resolutions are to be passed with greater facility than would be the case were the same propositions embodied in a Bill, the right hon. Gentleman admits that those Resolutions must necessarily be exceedingly vague in their nature. Then, Sir, the right hon. Gentleman has shadowed forth in his speech to-night the principal points which are to be included in the Resolutions that he is about to propose, and I wish to state with the utmost clearness what, as far as my humble opinion is concerned, should be the course of the independent Members of this House. I have already said that, under the circumstances, I do not ask what might be asked on other occasions—how far the Government which makes this proposal is in possession of the general confidence of the House; and I now go further and say that the objections I entertain to this mode of procedure will not stand in my way—and should not, I think, stand in the way of others—if, notwithstanding this mode of procedure, we can use the propositions of the right hon. Gentleman—either by adopting them as they stand, or by altering them—as a means of arriving at a settlement of this question. Those scruples which I felt with regard to the method of proceeding by way of Resolution I shall cast behind me if, upon examining those Resolutions, I find it possible for us to make an onward movement. The right hon. Gentleman has told us something of his propositions, and in reference to them I must observe that I think we are bound to avoid everything that tends to adjourn the settlement of this question. In whatever form these Resolutions are laid before us a long period of time must elapse before this great and fundamental question can be settled. I am not altogether assured, after having heard the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman with reference to the rating franchise, that the matter will be disposed of with the requisite speed. If I am to interpret in the ordinary manner the terms of the notice which stands upon the notice-books of the House, it is clear that very important changes in the law of rating are contemplated, changes such as it is impossible for this House to adopt in a moment. Is it meant that the question of Parliamentary Reform is to depend upon the previous attainment of what the right hon. Gentleman may think a perfect system of rating? I understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that he cannot fix the amount of the reduction in the franchise in his first Resolution, because that may depend upon the points to be disposed of by subsequent Resolutions; but does not the right hon. Gentleman see that many Members would refuse—would justly refuse—to commit themselves to an abstract principle of reduction unless they knew what form that reduction was to take? Again, if it be true that the amount of this reduction is to depend upon some subsequent Resolution with reference to an alteration to be made in the law of rating, I hope I may dismiss the apprehension which I confess a part of the speech of the right hon. Gentleman raised in my mind, that this method of proceeding by way of Resolution is calculated to defer the definitive settlement of the question of Parliamentary Reform. I beg the right hon. Gentleman, if he thinks it worth his while, to consider that as an illustration of what I mean. The very same motives as would lead me, for one, with the utmost earnestness to co-operate with the right hon. Gentleman, and to build on his foundations, if possible, for a speedy settlement of the question, would likewise lead me, I frankly own, to offer a determined opposition to any proposition, or any method of proceeding, which would appear to me to be likely to cast it into the far future. We cannot afford to go on in this country as we are going. It is time that this discord between classes—this tendency to discord—this incipient discord—this tendency to separate interests, from indications of which I must say the speech of the right hon. Gentleman, in that portion of it in which he referred to the paragraph in the Speech from the Throne, was not altogether free—it is time that all this should cease; and not till this question of Reform has disappeared from among the subjects of controversy can we hope to see the people of England what they once were, and what we ought to be desirous they should ever continue to be—a united people. The right hon. Gentleman has told us the day on which he proposes to proceed with his Resolutions. I think it better to reserve till then any opinion on the important question—perhaps the vital question—whether his Resolutions do constitute a plan to which the House can assent if they agree, and on which they can join issue, if they do not agree, with the right hon. Gentleman. No objection will be taken otherwise than as matter of argument and representation with respect to the mode of proceeding. I have just intimated the direction in which we are disposed to look, and the rule by which our conduct will be guided. Our object being to make progress in this question—and we think the country has a right to expect that—we will gladly assist the right hon. Gentleman, if he concurs with us in this view of the matter, in giving effect to his idea so far as we are able consistently to do so. But I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will not expect us to be a party to a course of proceeding which would amount in effect to an absolute betrayal of public duty—that is to say, to the adoption of his Resolutions if we find them to be measures—not measures, but declarations preliminary to measures—a course tending to produce doubt and uncertainty in the public mind—tending to diminish the confidence of the people in Parliament—tending to adjourn a conclusion for which, on every ground, it is desirable that we should look without delay. The right hon. Gentleman asked the question, and I think it was a natural remark to make—"Upon what principle the House of Commons was to be re-constructed?" He answered that it ought to be upon the principle of the British Constitution. Then, spreading his wings for an extended flight, he travelled both Eastward and Westward, and gave us an account of the Representative Chambers of various foreign countries. Sir, I very much doubt the wisdom of those self-complacent allusions to the institutions of foreign countries. It sometimes happens that our views of them are not altogether accurate, and at best they cannot be expected to carry on them the stamp of impartiality. Were this the time and place, I should be disposed to challenge some particulars in the statement of the right hon. Gentleman; but, even if those statements were strictly accurate, I very much doubt whether much is gained by comparisons of this description. The right hon. Gentleman must, however, see that he is engaged in a combat with a phantom; for has any Government in this country at any time proposed to deal with the question of Parliamentary Reform on any other principles than those of the British Constitution? I assert that we have been ready at all times—and never more so than last year—to contend that it was upon those principles we took our stand. It is true there may be differences of opinion amongst us as to various points of detail; but, however widely we may differ upon questions of general policy, I do not believe that any one Member in this House would be willing to depart from the principles of the British Constitution. I frankly own it appears to me that in the expression of his opinions the right hon. Gentleman himself has somewhat departed from the principles of the British Constitution; but am to rise in my place and assume that I have the exclusive possession of the key of those principles? Or am I to charge the right hon. Gentleman or any other Member of this House with the abandonment of all regard for them? I ask the right hon. Gentleman to enlarge his toleration so far as to believe that even those who have differed from him on former occasions, and who may ultimately differ from him in the later development of this question—to believe that whether they differ from him or not, they are animated equally with himself by a regard for that glorious Constitution, the rich traditions and noble inheritance which it has left us, and that whilst upholding their rights of freedom they claim for themselves and their opinions that consideration which we gladly and freely accord to others.

Motion agreed to.