HC Deb 26 May 1865 vol 179 cc879-905
VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Among other Motions to be made this evening on going into Supply is a Motion by the hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Darby Griffith) with respect to the case of Colonel Dawkins. I think that after the discussions which have already taken place on that case it would be expedient, if possible, to give the hon. Member's Motion precedence of the other Motions on going into Supply. There are, I think, four Notices on the paper which precede that of the hon. Member for Devizes. Among them is one of a Motion relating to the Colonies, a subject which is likely to lead to a long discussion. If it be taken first it will probably throw the discussion on the case of Colonel Dawkins back to a late hour, and that, I think, would not be desirable. I would ask, therefore, the hon. Members who have precedence of the hon. Member for Devizes to postpone their Notices till after his; and I hope that they will still have an op- portunity of moving their Motions at an early hour in the evening.

MR. NEATE

said, he was the Member who stood first on the paper, and he was prepared to yield to what seemed to be the wish of the House upon the matter.

MR. MARSH

said, he stood next on the paper with a Motion on the subject of the protection of our Colonies, and he would also give way to what appeared to be the wish of the House; although he believed that the question to which he had to direct their attention was a much more important one than any relating to Lieutenant Colonel Dawkins and although he even thought that the latter subject ought not to be discussed at all in that House, or, that if it were to be discussed at all, it ought not to be discussed at the present time.

Mr. BLAKE and Mr. W. O. STANLEY also agreed to waive their right of precedence.

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

rose to move an Address for certain papers relating to the case of Colonel Dawkins. In the first place, he desired to express his obligation to the noble Lord for asking, and to the hon. Members who had consented to waive their precedence on the notice paper in order to afford him the opportunity of at once bringing the case of Lieutenant Colonel Dawkins under the notice of the House. It was a request he should not himself have ventured to make, and he had known nothing about the noble Lord's intention to make that appeal in his favour till the Secretary for the Treasury came and informed him that it was the noble Lord's intention to do so. As to the question which he was about to again bring under the notice of the House, he admitted that, as a general rule, it was not desirable to bring the discipline of the army before the House of Commons as a tribunal. The same might be said in respect of judgments in criminal courts; but extreme cases justified a departure from a general principle, and he contended that as the Imperial Parliament was, in fact, the highest appellate jurisdiction in this country, it was not expedient, where a proper and sufficient occasion arose, that that power should remain unexercised. In discussing the present question he must be allowed to observe that, so far as he knew, there was no precedent for an officer being put on half-pay against his own remonstrance, and against his refusal to make any election between going on half-pay and selling out, without a court martial. There were two well known cases in which measures of that kind had been taken by the authorities, but in both these there bad been a court martial. On those occasions important facts had been brought out which had strongly attracted public attention, and public opinion had pronounced its verdict on the case. In bringing the matter before the House he had not been actuated by personal considerations, but merely by a desire to support a principle of great importance to officers generally, both those now in the service and those who might enter the service in future generations, and he thought such a question was worthy of being settled by the highest tribunal. The highest military authorities had not been exempt from the influence of that House in days past, in proof of which he might refer to what took place in 1809, when a Royal Personage Commander-in-Chief was arraigned before the public opinion of this House—no case could be quoted which would show more distinctly how the highest military authority could be made amenable to the power of that House. He contended that the power of the House of Commons in such cases was predominant. To show what has been the opinion of this House on the subject of the Office of Commander-in-Chief, in the year 1858, when the present Government was in Opposition, a Resolution was moved by Captain Vivian as follows:— That although the recent consolidation of the different Departments of Ordnance, Commissariat, and Secretary at War has, to a certain extent, improved the general administration of military affairs, a divided responsibility still exists, and that in order to promote greater efficiency the Departments of the Horse Guards and War Office should be placed under the control of one responsible Minister."—[3 Hansard, cl. 1336.] That Resolution was carried by a majority of 106 to 104, and it happened that his (Mr. Darby Griffith's) vote turned the scale in favour of the Resolution; for if he had voted the other way the numbers would have been equal, and then the Speaker would have been called upon to give the casting vote, which in a question involving an important change of principle would probably have been in the negative. On that occasion Mr. Sidney Herbert said— The Secretary of State was responsible for everything done by the Commander-in-Chief—the Commander-in-Chief was, in fact, his subordinate officer. He (Mr. Sidney Herbert) was not making this assertion without book. When Viscount Hardinge was examined before the Sebastopol Committee, he said 'The Secretary of State's authority is supreme—he overrides me in every respect.' When he (Mr. Sidney Herbert) held an office very inferior in authority to that of the Secretary of State for War, he generally succeeded in carrying his point. In one instance he was obliged to yield, and why? Because Viscount Hardinge brought to bear against him a direct order of the Secretary of State, of which he had not been aware, and he was obliged to succumb."—[Ibid. 1349.] Mr. Sidney Herbert thus endeavoured to show that indirectly the House exercised control over the military authorities, and that therefore there was no necessity for altering the law upon that point. The noble Lord now at the head of the Government also said— Hon. Gentlemen spoke of the Commander-in-Chief as an irresponsible officer. He was irresponsible in so far as he was not represented by any person in that House; but he (Viscount Palmerston) could not constitutionally admit that any person who gave advice to the Crown upon the public service was an irresponsible officer. The truth was that the Cabinet—the Ministry of the day—were the parties who were responsible for everything that was done in any Department of the State; and though they might not and ought not to interfere in the daily and ordinary administration of the office of the Commander-in-Chief, yet, on any material points affecting the interests of the army, there would always be previous communication between the Commander-in-Chief and the responsible advisers of the Crown; and, in case of differences, their opinion, if deliberately, fully, and firmly expressed, was sure to prevail."[Ibid. 1357.] The language of the noble Lord, therefore, fully bore out the principle that the Commander-in-Chief was to be amenable to some superior authority. It was a singular thing that the present Secretary of War had been one of the Tellers for the majority on that occasion, and he was anxious to know whether his opinion had undergone any change since that period, or whether he still held the doctrine embodied in that Resolution? When, in 1857, his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief condescended to appear before the Commission appointed to inquire into the system of Purchase in the Army, he gave the following answers to the questions put to him by Mr. Sidney Herbert:— There has I believe been no instance lately (of the exercise of the veto of promotion)?—No, not in my time. Nor in Lord Hardinge's time?—No, I think not. In the present state of public feeling your Royal Highness thinks that that power could not be exercised?—I think it would be extremely difficult to exercise it now. If the inspection returns were satisfactorily made, there would be no difficulty in your Royal Highnes's knowing whether an officer ought to be stopped in his promotion or not?—I see no difficulty whatever; but, as I said before, it must be backed by public opinion, otherwise, no man, in my opinion, could exercise that power. Was it the fact that the action of the military authorities had been backed up by public opinion on the present occasion? On the contrary, both the public, the daily press, and the House had expressed a strong opinion adverse to the course which had been pursued. He would now turn to the Judge Advocate. When a question in reference to the subject before them was put the other evening in that House to the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Headlam) who was a Member of the Government, and who was the peculiar organ of the military authorities, got up, and with all the feminine vacillation of a lady's waiting chambermaid, replied, something after such a fashion as this, "Oh, dear! Mr. Corkscrew, I know nothing at all about this subject. There was a row in the servants' hall, but it is as much as my place is worth to say anything about it, and I'm sure I can't give any opinion upon the matter either one way or the other;" and the matter had arrived at this stage without the House knowing what really was the hon. and learned Gentleman's opinion as to the law of the case. If such was to be the course of proceedings in the case of a man who was admitted to be an officer and a gentleman, and of whom even one of his accusers, Colonel Stepney, said that he was quite efficient for the duties of command, why should the House go through the solemn farce of passing Mutiny Acts and Acts for the regulation of the army when they were told that the Commander-in-Chief, or any other paramount authority, could by the misuse and perversion of the Royal prerogative —he was going to use a stronger word, but his respect for the Royal function restrained him — set them all aside? The Royal prerogative was at the present day merely a pious fiction, and the persons who were really responsible for its exercise, and who did really exercise that power without control, were the Ministers of the day. Another very remarkable case had recently occurred in the army. During the operations consequent upon the mutiny in India a gallant officer was ordered to maintain a certain most important post while Lord Clyde hurried on to Lucknow, and he was afterwards accused of having failed in his duty by abandoning that post. For many years he had suffered under that imputation; but it now appeared that there was in existence a despatch from Lord Clyde, dated the 29th of October, 1854, which fully vindicated that gallant officer at the expense of another, whose name he would not mention. That despatch had been kept in the recesses of the War Office precisely as the correspondence for which he was now moving, and other documents were kept back, and it was only after years of waiting, disappointment, and trial that this gallant officer, now Sir R. Windham, obtained from the military authorities permission to publish it, and had been thought worthy to receive the rank which had been withheld from him. Was not that military and social tyranny of the severest kind? There was another important point in this case. Until it fell to his lot to divulge the circumstance, it was entirely unknown that there was any want of unanimity on the part of the members of the Court of Inquiry. The other day he received a letter from a gallant officer, who had shown great moral courage in writing it, stating that he only signed the judgment under protest, and now he had obtained negative evidence which he thought justified him in assuming that another member of the Court had acted in a similar manner. It was generally reported that that gallant officer had signed the judgment under protest, and when inquiry was made of him his reply was as follows:— I received your note the day before yesterday, and the servant who brought it was distinctly informed that there was no answer to it. A negative answer like that was, he thought, quite sufficient for his purpose; if he declined to contradict the rumour, the natural presumption was that it was true; and it, therefore, appeared that the case was decided by the casting vote of the Chairman, who was undoubtedly a gallant veteran and an officer of great reputation and honour in bygone days. Of course, the House would understand that it was not his wish to say anything disrespectful of that gallant officer; but, as he received his first commission in 1794, the House would see that he must now be at least eighty-six or eighty-seven years of age, and it was, therefore, not right that the life—if it had been a court martial the life of an officer might have been at stake—fortune, or reputation of an officer should depend upon his casting vote. The charges which were made against this officer, of infirmity of temper and unpopularity, were so vague that it was, of course, quite im- possible to disprove them. If hon. Members depended for their seats upon their popularity in that House, he should like to know how many of them would be returned again? He was convinced that he, for one, should soon create a vacancy. Fortunately, however, he had to refer to a more impartial tribunal, and they would see what would be the result. In order, however, in some way to meet the charges against him, Colonel Dawkins addressed the following brief circular to officers who had served in his regiment:— Dear—,—A point which has arisen in the present Court of Inquiry renders it necessary that I should ask you to be so good as to inform me whether I have ever quarrelled with you. The circular was couched in those terms, because it was thought that the fact whether a quarrel had ever taken place was one which could be definitely ascertained. The number of replies which had been received was fifty-eight; of these fifty-two were favourable to Colonel Dawkins, and only six were unfavourable or questionable. Among others, the noble Lord the Member for Galway (Lord Dunkellin) sent this answer—

"March 26.

Dear Dawkins—Certainly you and I never quarrelled while I was in the Coldstreams, nor did oven an unfriendly word ever pass between us."

There was also a letter from another noble Lord, who said—

"My Dear Dawkins—In reply to your letter of the 24th instant, received by me this morning, I beg leave to state that to the best of my recollection no quarrel occurred between us while I was in the regiment.—Yours truly,

DANGAN."

Those were two out of the fifty-two letters to which he referred. There were others which were much more favourable to Colonel Dawkins, but he would not trouble the House by reading them. He did not like to trespass upon the time of the House, but he wished briefly to call the attention of hon. Members to those letters which were of an unfavourable character. One was from Colonel Freemantle, who alluded to his only cause of quarrel with Colonel Dawkins as having occurred at Rome five years ago, and it was thus worded—"Dear Dawkins—I had a quarrel five years ago with you at Rome." [A laugh.] He was not surprised to find the House laugh at a charge of so old a date. Solvuntur risu tabulœ? and he himself certainly thought it was absurd to rake up a matter which had occurred so long since; but the letter did not impute anything in the slightest degree dishonourable to Colonel Dawkins. The next letter was from an officer who, he supposed, was now a lieutenant-colonel, who said, "I cannot say that we ever quarrelled, because it takes two to make a quarrel, and I was not willing to be one." That was the epigrammatic way in which the matter was explained by that gallant officer; and it was somewhat curious that another officer, the hon. Percy Fielding, availed himself of the same formulary, and replied in precisely the same words; so that it looked as though these two officers had laid their heads together, and agreed what reply they should send, which no doubt appeared to them to be one of a very pointed and pungent character. He would not trouble the House with any further extracts, the charges of which were all of a trivial kind. There were only six letters which could be considered at all unfavourable to Colonel Dawkins, whereas there were fifty-two bearing the highest testimony to his honour, character, and good temper. As to the charge of unpopularity then, it was reduced to little or nothing. Colonel Dawkins had served some time abroad, and had thus been enabled to acquire a good knowledge of languages. It was always considered desirable that officers should make themselves acquainted with foreign languages, and therefore the fact of his having inadvertently not returned in time from abroad on one occasion was a venial offence. As an instance of the advantage of such knowledge he (Mr. Darby Griffith) could refer to the case of a gallant officer now returning from a command in India, Sir Hugh Rose, who owed his elevated position and appointment to attend at the head-quarters of the French army while in the Crimea to his being an accomplished linguist. As to the point relating to the Queen's Ball he (Mr. Darby Griffith) had already explained that matter. In that case the discourtesy was exhibited against him, and not on the part of Colonel Dawkins. In reference to the remaining charge, that Colonel Dawkins bad refused to shake the hand of his superior officer on a certain occasion when the latter had offered it, he (Mr. Darby Griffith) believed that that arose also out of a mistake, But surely it formed no part of the discipline of the army that one officer was bound to shake the hand of another officer, even if proffered. A man's hand ought to be as sacred a portion of his person as a maiden's heart. To require a man to shake hands with another as an act of military duty was totally unknown to military law. Why it might as well he required that a girl should marry the man she did not love. But it was for that quasi-offence Colonel Dawkins was placed under arrest and for the illegal period of eleven days, his demand for a court martial having been refused, and all redress denied to him. He would now leave the subject in the hands of the House, and make the Motion of which he had given notice.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, a Copy of all Correspondence relating to the first Court of Inquiry on Lieutenant Colonel Dawkins in or about July 1864, including all Communications which have been made on the subject, from the Field Marshal Commanding in Chief to the Major General commanding the Brigade of Guards, during the interval between the first and second Courts of Inquiry which have been held on Lieutenant Colonel Dawkins, and up to the present time,"—(Mr. Darby Griffith,) —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I do not know whether it is necessary in the opinion of the House that I should follow the hon. Member who has just sat down through the first part of his speech, in which he attempted to defend the course he has taken in bringing a matter of this nature before the House for discussion; because when upon a former occasion the hon. Gentleman brought the subject forward almost every hon. Member who rose to speak—especially those upon his own side—commenced their speeches by observing that the question was one which, under no circumstances, ought to be introduced for discussion in the House of Commons. ["No, no!"] The arguments, I may add, which the hon. Gentleman employed this evening to justify the course which he has taken appears to be that inasmuch as the Commander-in-Chief is subordinate to the Secretary of State for War, and the Secretary of State is responsible to this House for the manner in which he administers the affairs of the army, therefore this House has a right to enter, when it pleases, into all the details of military administration. I quite admit the authorities which the hon. Gentleman has cited in support of his proposition that the Secretary of State is responsible for the administration of the army, and that the House has a perfect right to hold him responsible and, if necessary, to call him to account. It seems to me, however, that there is the greatest possible difference between the principle of holding a Minister responsible and maintaining the right of the House of Commons to express its confidence or want of confidence in that Minister, and the course now taken in entering into the details of the management and administration of the army. But as the opinion of the hon. Member on this point appears to he shared but by very few of those by whom he is supported, I do not think it necessary to pursue that part of the question any further, and the House will, I trust, allow me to proceed to the main subject at issue. Before doing so I must repeat the protest which I made the other night against what seemed to mo to be the extremely unfair and scarcely courteous manner in which that subject was first brought under our consideration. I do not recollect an occasion on which a question of this kind, involving as it does considerations, not only of public importance, but also the character and reputation of several officers, some of them of high rank and position in the army, has been brought forward, and statements affecting them made, without due notice being given. It is quite true, as I admitted at the time, that the hon. Member gave me notice that he was going to put a Question on the subject; but, knowing as I did that according to the ordinary forms of the House no discussion could take place on the Question, I certainly contented myself—perhaps I ought not to have done so—with answering that part of the Question which it was in my power to answer, adding that I was not prepared to follow him through the details of the case. If the hon. Member considered that it was a question of such urgency as to lead him to take the extremely exceptional course of moving the adjournment of the House, it would have been easy for the hon. Member to inform me that he meant to do so at the same time that he mentioned he was about to put the Question.

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

I did not make up my mind till the afternoon of that day.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

But whether the hon. Member gave me notice or not, I should equally have thought it necessary to protest against the introduction of the discussion without the fullest and most public notice, in order that those officers whose names were mentioned might have an opportunity of meeting the allegations. But what was the excuse made by the hon. Member for bringing forward this question in so unusual a manner. It was stated that, owing to the shortness of the notice which the Commander-in-Chief had given to Colonel Dawkins, it was indispensable that the Motion should be brought forward without delay. A very brief reference to dates will show how unfounded that assertion was. On the 26th of April Colonel Dawkins was sent for by the Adjutant General. The opinion of the Court of Inquiry was read to him and likewise the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief on that finding. He was personally informed of the course which it was intended to adopt, and the alternative offered for his acceptance was put before him. On the 4th of May the same information was sent to him in a written form; and Colonel Dawkins then requested that he might have further time allowed to consider the course which he should take. On the 9th of May Colonel Dawkins addressed an appeal to the Secretary of State for War against the decision of the Commander-in-Chief. On the 12th of May another letter was sent from the Horse Guards to Colonel Dawkins, requiring him to come to some conclusion on the matter; and on the 17th of May a letter was sent to him from the War Office stating that Lord De Grey declined to interfere with the decision come to by the Commander-in-Chief. On the 19th of May a final letter was sent to Colonel Dawkins, stating that in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief sufficient time had been allowed for him to make up his mind, and requesting that he would at once intimate which alternative he was prepared to adopt. From the 26th of April to the 19th of May the subject was under the consideration of Colonel Dawkins; I do not think, therefore, that the charge of undue haste or precipitation in these proceedings can be supported. I believe I shall be able to show that all the other assertions of the hon. Gentleman imputing misconduct to the military authorities have as little foundation in fact as the one I have just referred to. I must ask the House to consider what is the nature of the power exercised by the Commander-in-Chief and which, in this instance, has been called in question; and, in doing so, I must ask the House to refer to the Report of the Commission on the system of Army Purchase in 1857, a passage from which has been read by the hon. Member for Devizes. In answer to a question put by the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley)— May not cases often occur in which a man has some notorious defect; it may be want of temper, or he is notoriously below the average understanding, a man whom it is very undesirable to appoint, and yet a man of whom it cannot be said that there is anything against his character to justify you in putting a stigma upon him and forbidding him to receive the regular promotion which he expected by right of seniority? The Commander-in-Chief said— Certainly; but I am in hopes that by good inspection the Commander-in-Chief will be informed by the inspecting general, as I think it is his duty to inform him, that a man is from his temperament unsuitable for the command of a regiment; and if such a report came to me as Commander-in-Chief I should have no hesitation in saying, 'There is nothing against your character, but you are unfit from natural defects, and therefore you cannot be promoted.' I see no difficulty in it. At present there is the power, hut it is not exercised. The Commander-in-Chief, in reply to another question, said— I see no difficulty whatever, but as I said before it must be backed by public opinion, otherwise no man, in my opinion, could exercise that power. I should not have referred to that answer if I did not think that the hon. Member for Devizes—unintentionally, no doubt—had misrepresented the meaning of his Royal Highness. Any one who will take the trouble to read the whole examination will see that what the Commander-in-Chief meant was, that public opinion must back up the ordinary and usual exercise of the power, and not that the Commander-in-Chief should in each particular instance be backed up by public opinion. I am quite sure it never occurred to the Commander-in-Chief, when examined before that Committee, to suggest a proceeding of this nature, one of the most delicate that a Commander-in-Chief can be called on to engage in, should in every instance be submitted to public opinion. I believe that in this case public opinion will back up the Commander-in-Chief in the use which he has made of the power intrusted to him, and I am equally convinced that if public opinion does back him up it will be for the benefit of the public service. The Report not only recognized the existence of the power of veto, but expressed regret that it was not more frequently used; and went even further, for it recommended that a totally different system should be adopted, and that the appointment of lieutenant-colonels of regiments should be matter of selection. This, of course, would be very different from the system now in force. The Government of that day did attempt to carry into effect the recommendations of the Commission, but they were not supported by any party in the House to such an extent as would have been necessary to accomplish the suggested alteration. There were only two alternatives before the Commissioners—the one was that appointments should be made by selection, the other that the appointments should be made by seniority and purchase; and in the carrying out the latter system it was deemed necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should have power to exercise a veto in exceptional cases. I believe it has been stated in this House that the power of veto, although undoubtedly possessed, has now been exercised for the first time. But that is not the fact. I quite admit that it has not often been exercised. It is a power which obviously can be exercised only in extreme cases; but it has been exercised to a still greater extent than in the present instance—namely, in the case of officers actually in command of battalions, who have been removed without any court martial or inquiry, simply because, in the opinion of the Commander-in-Chief, they were unfit for the position. And there have been other instances in which senior officers of regiments have been placed on half-pay to prevent their succeeding to positions of greater responsibility. I am not going to name the instances in which this has occurred. It would, of course, be extremely invidious to point out individuals who were removed, not on account of any misconduct or for having committed any military offence, but simply because of want of qualification. There are two questions before the House—first, whether the House thinks this power ought never to be exercised at all, and that the command of a battalion—one of the most responsible positions in the army—is to go entirely by seniority, without any reference whatever to the qualifications necessary for the proper discharge of the duties; secondly, whether the House is prepared to remove from the Commander-in-Chief the responsibility of placing a veto on the appointment of particular officers, and to take upon itself the responsibility of saying when an officer is and when he is not fit to command a regiment. I believe there are Members who think this House would be quite competent to exercise this responsibility, and that it would be beneficial and for the interests of the House that it should exercise this power. I cannot say that I agree with those hon. Members. Still, if the opinion be entertained to any extent, the proposal ought to be discussed on its general merits, and not with reference to an isolated and particular case. For these reasons I think I should be justified in declining to discuss with the Member for Devizes the question of Colonel Dawkins's fitness or unfitness. But the line taken by the hon. Member and his Friends to prove that an injustice has been committed has been such that it is impossible for me to refrain altogether from entering into particulars. The line of defence appears to be this—that a cabal—

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

I beg the noble Lord's pardon. I never used the word, nor did I suggest it.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

I do not wish to impute to the hon. Member the use of that particular word. But it was certainly alleged that Colonel Dawkins had been very hardly treated by his brother officers. [Mr. DARBY GRIFFITH: I said by the authorities.] The impression left on my mind by the discussion the other night was, that the complaint was that certain officers in his regiment had in the first instance taken a dislike to Colonel Dawkins, that they had persecuted him and made against him a series of trifling charges which were finally investigated by an incompetent tribunal, and that on the report of that incompetent tribunal he had been ejected from the service. That appears, as shortly as I can put it, to be the line of argument taken in defence of Colonel Dawkins. I think that in the interests of truth and justice, and for the reputation of those officers whose conduct has been assailed, it is necessary that I should enter very shortly into the history of this case. It is a great error to suppose, as many Gentlemen seem to suppose, that the Court of Inquiry was appointed to inquire into any charges which might be made against Colonel Dawkins; the fact is that the Court was appointed to inquire into certain allegations made by Colonel Dawkins against his superior officers. The facts of the case are these. For a great many years—in fact these things began in 1859—Colonel Dawkins had had serious misunderstandings, and sometimes disputes, with different officers in his battalion, some of whom were his superior and some his inferior officers. These were generally, as has been stated, of a nature extremely trivial—so trifling, in fact, that they were capable of being disposed of, and generally were disposed of, by the commanding officer of the battalion in the battalion orderly room; and they would have continued to be so disposed of, and nobody would have heard anything of them out of the regiment; but Colonel Dawkins was not willing that these occurrences should be so disposed of, and he himself, ever since 1859 or 1860, has addressed a series of letters to the Adjutant General, recapitulating the history of his differences with his brother officers, and requesting that the facts might be laid before the Commander-in-Chief, that what he considered to be the bad feeling of certain officers against him might be investigated, and that the Commander-in-Chief would give his opinion on the subject. Those complaints were investigated by the Adjutant General from time to time with such information as he could obtain, and Colonel Dawkins was informed of the result of the investigation. Colonel Dawkins never appears to have allowed any complaint he had once made entirely to drop, he might withdraw a letter and for a time appear satisfied with the decision; but as soon as a fresh difference of opinion arose he always brought forward and reiterated the whole of the charges which lie had ever made before against any of the officers. One of the subjects of dispute between Colonel Dawkins and Lord Frederick Paulet at last became the subject of a Court of Inquiry last year, and a great part of the correspondence between Colonel Dawkins and the Adjutant General was laid before that Court of Inquiry for their investigation. They went into the subject, particularly with reference to the dispute which had occurred between him and Lord Frederick Paulet. In the particular instance which Colonel Dawkins had complained of, the Court came to the conclusion that Lord Frederick Paulet had misunderstood an order of the Commander-in-Chief with reference to Colonel Dawkins, and that lie had somewhat exceeded his authority in declining to allow Colonel Dawkins to assume the command of a wing of the battalion at a review in Hyde Park. That opinion of the Court of Inquiry was concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief, and Colonel Dawkins. Lord Frederick Paulet, and the other officers of the battalion, were informed of the opinion of the Court and the concurrence in it of the Commander-in-Chief, and all the notice that could be taken of such an occurrence was taken. But the Court added to its report on this point an expression of opinion, that although they were not prepared to state that Colonel Dawkins was unfit to command a battalion, still the command by him of a battalion of his own regiment would not be beneficial to that regiment. That opinion appeared to the Commander-in-Chief to be extremely vague, and one on which he would not act, and he, therefore, directed Colonel Dawkins to return to his duty, and he addressed him himself, cither personally or through the Adjutant General, stating that he was to return to his duty, and hoping that the disputes between him and his superior and inferior officers would henceforth cease. A few weeks only elapsed before Colonel Dawkins again brought forward complaints of exactly the same nature as the previous ones—reiterating, in fact, the previous charges which had been investigated by the Court of Inquiry. It then became necessary, and it had been necessary for a considerable period, in the opinion of the superior officers of the battalion, concurred in by the Commander-in-Chief, that on account of the peculiarities which he had shown, the command of the battalion should not devolve on Colonel Dawkins, although he was one of the senior mounted officers, oven temporarily. Orders were given that arrangements should be made that, during the temporary absence of the officer in command of the battalion, the temporary command should not devolve on Colonel Dawkins—that he should be on leave, or some other arrangements should be made. This naturally appeared to the Duke of Cambridge to be a state of things which could only be temporary, without seriously prejudicing the regiment; and that Colonel Dawkins must either be released from this position, or more serious steps should be taken against him. His Royal Highness, therefore, sent for Colonel Dawkins, and stated to him that, after the charges he had made against his superior officers from time to time had been investigated by a Court of Inquiry, in his opinion he had failed entirely to make out any charge in the sense in which he had brought it forward, and he hoped, therefore, that Colonel Dawkins would withdraw at once and for ever all those charges, and would let bygones be bygones, and begin anew. His Royal Highness added, that, if he was willing to give such a promise, he would accept it as an earnest that he was more fitted than he had been to command the battalion, that he would withdraw the prohibition against his assuming the temporary command even, and that he would be placed in the position of any other officer of the battalion. It was hoped that Colonel Dawkins would assent to this proposal. He did not assent in words, but it was understood that he did virtually assent. However, soon after a letter was received from him, stating that he wished it to be understood that, with regard to the allegations he had made he withdrew nothing and retracted nothing. The matter had then come to such a point that nothing could be done but to have a full investigation of all these charges. One of the principal points was that Lord Frederick Paulet and several other officers had made false charges against Colonel Dawkins, which tended to his prejudice. Efforts were made to induce Colonel Dawkins to retract the charges he had made, or if he persisted in them to refrain from pressing them in an offensive manner. However, he insisted on placing the most offensive posssible meaning on the charges which he brought against these officers. There was nothing left, therefore, but to have an inquiry into the charges, and if a primâ facie case had been made out against Lord Frederick Paulet and the other officers implicated they would have been brought before a court martial. This is the Court of Inquiry which terminated a few weeks ago. The whole of the correspondence was laid before the Court. Colonel Dawkins was invited to state in what particulars he charged these officers with falsification, he was allowed the fullest opportunity for examining and cross-examining the witnesses, and he was allowed to make a final statement at the close. He himself, at the conclusion of the proceedings, expressed to the President and the Court his thanks for the patient manner in which they had heard him, and the full opportunity which they had given him to bring forward his case. The Court had not only to inquire into the truth of the assertions brought forward by Colonel Dawkins, but they were also directed by the Commander-in-Chief to state whether, in their opinion, his command of a battalion would or would not be beneficial to the service. The Court re- ported that in their opinion Colonel Dawkins had failed to substantiate the truth of the charges brought by him against his superior officers; in some instances that he had entirely failed, and that in every instance he had entirely failed to substantiate the charges of falsification in the sense in which he had made them. The Court also came to the conclusion, that under all the circumstances, the command of the battalion of Guards by Colonel Dawkins would be injurious to the public service. They added, and the Commander-in-Chief was most anxious that full prominence should be given to this addition—that nothing had come before them which was in any manner prejudicial to the character of Colonel Dawkins as an officer and a soldier. They were convinced that he had acted conscientiously and was fully persuaded of the justice of his complaints, and although they deemed them to be without foundation, they yet fully acquitted him of having knowingly brought forward any false charges against his brother officers. I now come to the alleged want of unanimity on the part of the officers conducting this inquiry. The report of the Court, the substance of which I have stated, was signed by the President and by every member of the Court. No written protest whatever was attached to that report, and the first intimation which the Commander-in-Chief or any other person had of any protest whatever was the letter of Colonel de Bathe, which, to their great astonishment, was S read in this House by the hon. Member for Devizes. Of course, after that letter was read, it became necessary for the Commander-in-Chief to inquire under what circumstances this signature under protest was attached by Colonel de Bathe. Sir Alexander Woodford, and the other members of the Court, have been consulted by the Commander-in-Chief, and I have myself had an opportunity of seeing them. It has been said that Colonel de Bathe in every point of the inquiry advanced an opinion opposed to that of the other members of the Court. Now, I am informed that when the time arrived for signing the Report the President pointed out to the members of the Court in what way they could make their protest, if they wished to offer any against the opinion of the majority, and that before signing the Report Sir Alexander Woodford invited any member of the Court to make such protest if he desired to do so. Colonel de Bathe declined to make any protest, and signed the report as agreed upon by the majority without any protest whatever. It is also stated that another member of the Court, although he declined to write a letter to the hon. Member for Devizes on the subject, also signed the report under protest. I have seen three members of the Court, and the Commander-in-Chief has seen the whole of the members of the Court, and the whole of thorn have given the assurance that, with the exception of Colonel de Bathe, there was perfect unanimity on every point of the inquiry. Colonel de Bathe did, on one or two occasions, say "I protest," but these words were not used by any other member of the Court, nor was anything whatever said about a protest, either in regard to the signing or drawing up of the report. The allegation, therefore, as to a want of unanimity in the members of the Court is, it appears to me, utterly unfounded. The Court having thus reported as I stated, and the Commander-in-Chief being of opinion that Colonel Dawkins had failed to substantiate his allegations against his superior officers, was of opinion that there was no ground whatever for bringing those superior officers to a court martial. And, acting on his own knowledge of the transactions in the regiment for so many years, and upon his own knowledge of Colonel Dawkins' character, and being no doubt supported by the opinion of the Court of Inquiry, the Commander-in-Chief did decide that Colonel Dawkins was unfitted to take the command of the regiment, and that it would be prejudicial to the interests of the public service to allow him to remain in the regiment. He therefore decided on giving Colonel Dawkins—as had been done on former occasions—the option cither of retiring on half-pay or by the sale of his commission. The Commander-in-Chief acted in this instance chiefly and mainly on his own responsibility, and his own knowledge of the circumstances, and from the reports he had received from the inspecting and other officers; and he does not wish to shelter himself behind the opinion of the Court of Inquiry, although, no doubt, their Report strengthened and fortified his conviction that Colonel Dawkins was unfit to command the regiment, These are the facts, and I submit that the Commander-in-Chief had the power, and was justified if he thought fit in using the power, of preventing Colonel Dawkins from obtaining the command of the battalion. I have shown that the statements which have been made in defence of Colonel Dawkins are erroneous, inasmuch that he has not been removed from the regiment on account of the trifling occurrences which are said to have occasioned the decision against him, but simply because a long series of correspondence and communications in which Ire has been engaged with his superior officers and with the Horse Guards has proved, to the entire and complete satisfaction of the Commander-in-Chief, that his notions of military discipline and subordination, and the terms on which he has lived with the officers of his own regiment, have been such that it would be highly injurious to the public service that he should he intrusted with the command of his battalion. I will not go into the trivial incidents that have been related, and the only one to which I will shortly refer is one that has been made the subject of attack upon a noble Lord who formerly commanded the Brigade of Guards. It has been said that Lord Rokeby acted illegally in placing Colonel Dawkins under arrest for refusing to take his hand. In the mess tent at Camp Ash, Lord Rokeby, having had occasion two days previously to speak somewhat severely to Colonel Dawkins on some matters of discipline, and wishing to show that he did not entertain any personal feeling towards him, twice held out his hand to Colonel Dawkins, and made some civil observation to him. Colonel Dawkins' attention was called by Colonel Chesney to the fact that Lord Rokeby was speaking to him; but he took no notice, except by rising from his seat and saluting him in a manner which was considered by Lord Rokeby and Colonel Chesney as highly insubordinate and disrespectful. Lord Rokeby did not take immediate action. He considered for half-an-hour or air hour what ought to be done. He consulted some officers, who agreed that the manner of the action was extremely disrespectful, especially considering that it took place before a number of junior officers. Lord Rokeby, as he was bound to do, then placed Colonel Dawkins under arrest. He immediately reported the circumstance to the Commander-in-Chief. [Viscount PALMERSTON here made an observation.] Yes, I ought to state that this arrest only entailed an absence from military duties. [Mr. DARBY GRIFFITH: And from mess.] He was not subjected to confinement. Lord Rokeby reported through the Lieutenant General commanding the camp to the Commander-in-Chief, and the matter was then out of his hands, and he had nothing further to do with it. From some cause which I am unable to explain—the Commander-in-Chief was either out of town or some other reason prevented the matter from receiving his immediate attention—the decision of the Commander-in-Chief was not received for eleven days after the original arrest. Lord Rokeby was not responsible in any manner for the delay, and the Judge Advocate General is, I believe, prepared to state that, under these circumstances, there was no illegality in ordering the arrest. The Commander-in-Chief, after inquiry into the subject, was of opinion that there was not sufficient ground for bringing Colonel Dawkins to a court martial, and ordered his release from arrest. It was purely accidental that the arrest was not taken off sooner. It is not to be imagined that Colonel Dawkins suffered any confinement whatever. On the second day, Lord Rokeby, finding that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief did not come down at once, said it was of no use keeping Colonel Dawkins any longer under arrest, and that until the decision of the Commander-in-Chief was received he had better go to London, where he could have a personal interview with his friends. Colonel Dawkins accordingly spent the eleven days in London, doing as he liked. I believe there was no illegality, and I am certain there was no hardship in the matter. That is the case as regards the story about Lord Rokeby. The explanation of the other circumstances would be quite as trivial—some are more so—and I do not think it necessary to go into them. Under these circumstances, I decline to lay the papers on the table. I do not think this House is a tribunal before which such questions ought to be argued, and except in so far as I have thought it my duty to clear the character of Lord Rokeby from imputation, I decline to enter into the other charges that have been raked up. The House will scarcely be prepared to hear that these circumstances happened five years ago. Seeing that the Commander-in-Chief has acted within his competence, and upon his responsibility, and that no case of injustice has been made out, this House would not be justified in taking the responsibility out of the hands of the Commander-in-Chief. I have now stated the real and true facts, as far as I have been able to learn them. I am not prepared to believe, nor will the House believe, as the hon. Member for Devizes and those who agree with him wish them to believe, the statement of tyranny and hardship towards Colonel Dawkins, or suppose that a number of officers belonging to the Brigade of Guards—men who have served all their lives in the Brigade, who are not only attached to the service generally but especially to that branch of it to which they belong, men against whose character no reflection was ever made—would combine together to make false statements affecting the character and prospects of an officer junior to themselves. Until I hear that such allegations are supported by very different proofs from any that I have yet heard, I prefer to believe that Colonel Dawkins, owing to some peculiarities of temper, has entirely misunderstood the acts of these officers, and that he has taken an entirely erroneous and mistaken view of their character and proceedings. I hope the House will decline to give these papers by such a majority as will prove not only that they do not believe those statements of tyranny and hardship, but also that they do not approve of cases such as this being brought forward for discussion in this House.

GENERAL PEEL

There are two points on which I think the House are almost unanimous, although, at first sight, those points appear perfectly antagonistic to each other. One point on which I think we are unanimous is that it is not proper nor convenient for this House to interfere in questions of discipline or to constitute themselves a court of appeal from the decisions of the military authorities. The other point on which I believe we are equally unanimous is, that if any individual has a grievance to complain of he has a right to come to this House for redress, let the consequences be what they may. Now, how are we to reconcile the action of the House so as not to interfere with the discipline of the army on the one hand, and at the same time not to refuse to hear those who may have a grievance to complain of on the other? The question may appear to be one of some difficulty, and it is to its solution I propose, with the permission of the House, to address myself. Nothing is more delicate or inconvenient than to interfere with the discipline of the army. It is a grave question, trenching on the prerogative of the Crown; because I think it is perfectly incontestible that the Crown has the power to dismiss or dispense with the services of any officer in the service. But you have a Minister responsible for the way in which the prerogative is administered; you have a right to demand from that Minister an account of his conduct; and I do not know how better to explain I the difference between the exercise of the power by a responsible Minister, and the exercise of it by the House itself, than by quoting an authority which none of the hon. Gentlemen below the gangway on the other side will he disposed to dispute. Here is an opinion of the late Earl Grey delivered in 1812, and quoted in the Report on Military Organization. He says— The whole notion of there being anything unconstitutional in bringing the army more under the Ministry of the day, seems to me to arise from a confusion between the powers exercised by responsible Ministers of the Crown, and powers exercised by Parliamentary Committees or some mode of that kind. Undoubtedly it was very unconstitutional in the Long Parliament that all the powers of the State should be assumed by Committees of the House of Commons, but that power over the army should be exercised by a responsible servant of the Crown, appears to me to be an absolutely essential principle of our constitution. I agree in that opinion. The power of the Commander in-Chief to exercise a veto on the appointment of commanding officers is clearly laid down in the Report of the Royal Commission on Purchase in 1857, and the very case now before us was anticipated in the question of the noble Lord the Member for Lynn which has been read to you by the Under Secretary for War. I have quoted one Earl Grey; I will now quote another. The present Lord Grey, in his answer to question 3,983 by that Commission, said— I am bound to say I think in our service hitherto there has been want of sufficient firmness in refusing promotion to those who did not deserve it. Some very remarkable instances of that came under my notice when I held the office of Secretary of War. In reply to Question 238, Sir Charles Yorke said— Not unless he was qualified; an officer would not be allowed to obtain it by purchase who would not be allowed to obtain it without. Again, Mr. Ellice asked this question— If the Commander-in-Chief did not conceive that a major reported ready to purchase was not fit to be intrusted with the command of a battalion, he would not permit him to purchase? To that question General Browne made this reply— Certainly not; he would fail in his duty if he did. Another question was asked in these terms— It would be a very strong case, would it not, when a General made a report that an officer having risen to the rank of major, was not fit to purchase the next step on? Colonel Stuart replied— Very strong, indeed, and I think it is a pity it should be so. I think if those things were more looked into, and less delicacy and indulgence exercised, it would be better for the service. The hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. Darby Griffith) without any notice whatever in the first instance—a proceeding which he has since endeavoured to justify by stating that it was impossible for him to give notice, though I think the noble Marquess has shown that at all events the impossibility did not exist so far as Colonel Dawkins himself was concerned—asks the House that the decision of the Commander-in-Chief may be suspended until there is further inquiry. I ask what further inquiry? The hon. Member says a court martial. I ask you, are you prepared in direct opposition to the Report of the Royal Commission, and in direct opposition to the opinions of the authorities I have quoted, to say that no person is to be prevented from taking the command of a regiment unless he shall have committed a military offence? Are you prepared to hold that unless lie has committed a military crime, for which he ought to have been cashiered, no officer is to he hindered from advancing to the command of a regiment? And if you are prepared to say that, are you still prepared to hold the Commander-in-Chief responsible for the efficiency of the army? It is argued that this is a hard ease, and, therefore, that it justifies your interference. No doubt any officer who was prevented from purchasing the next step would consider the case a hard one, and no doubt he would be able to put forward ex parte grounds to show it was a hard case. But are you prepared to go into those cases, and reverse the decision of the Commander-in-Chief? How is the Commander-in Chief to answer you? By laying on the table of the House the confidential Reports of the Inspecting Officer? If these Reports are to be laid on the table, for how long a time do you think they will continue to be confidential and made with the freedom and fulness without which they are useless? I say that hardship is not sufficient. You must have a grievance, and there is no grievance as long as what has been done is in conformity with the rules of the service and within the authority of the Commander-in-Chief. You must show that the Commander-in-Chief has exceeded or abused his authority—then any Member of the House of Commons has a right to come down to demand justice. My hon. Friend the Member for Devonshire asked, the other night, whether what had been done in this case is legal—because if it is you have nothing to do with it—if it is not, let inquiry be made, The way in which I would solve the difficulty is this—I would not inquire into individual cases of hardship; nor would I act on ex parte statements of a real grievance; but if it is shown that there has been a gross violation of the rules of the service, then move a Vote of Censure on the Minister. Votes of Censure ought not to be brought forward on light grounds—they ought to be supported by a strong case; but if you can show that there has been guilty conduct, I for one would be ready to make the Secretary for War responsible, and censure him. With this view of the matter it is not necessary for me to go into the case of Colonel Dawkins. I do not know him. I know other officers who have been referred to, and I may have a feeling against him from what I have heard from them. But this is not the case of Colonel Dawkins; it is the case of the military authorities. The Minister had no difficulty in dealing with it, because the noble Earl the Secretary for War had all the papers submitted to him, and had, therefore, an opportunity of coming to a contray decision to that arrived at by the Commander-in-Chief if he thought fit to do so. I am totally against the Secretary for War interfering with the discipline of the army; but when he is appealed to he has his own military authorities to consult independent of the Horse Guards; he has an opportunity of forming an opinion; and he is responsible for it. And here I would observe that I think this case affords another illustration of the inconvenience arising from the circumstance that the Secretary for War is not in this House. No one can be more ready to do justice to the great ability of the noble Lord opposite (the Marquess of Hartington) than I am; but when the question about this affair was asked the other night, he was obliged to admit that he knew nothing about it; and, in saying he knew nothing about it, he led the House to believe that the noble Earl the Secretary for War knew nothing about it either. If the Se- cretary for War were in this House, he would have been able to tell you that the decision was not a hasty one, but a matured decision of the Commander-in-Chief, approved by the Secretary for War. I believe if that statement had been made, there would have been no division; I think if the Judge Advocate had answered what I think was the simple question put to him, there would have been no division; for the House would have been able to come to the decision to which I hope they will now come, not to interfere in this particular case and to refuse the papers which have been asked for.

MR. HEADLAM

said, he wished to explain that the reason why he did not answer the question put to him the other night was that when he came down to the House on that occasion he had no official knowledge of the case, and though he had heard statements respecting it buzzed about, he had refrained from making inquiries, thinking that it might come before him in his official capacity. On that occasion it was stated by the hon. and gallant Member for Dungannon (Major Knox) that he had given a legal opinion on the case. Upon that he (Mr. Headlam) stated that there was no foundation whatever for the statement, and that he had given no opinion whatever upon the subject. When the hon. Member asked him whether he would undertake to say that the proceedings before the Court of Inquiry as well as the sentence were strictly legal, he, knowing nothing whatever about the matter, gave no opinion, or perhaps replied in a vague manner. He did not think it would have been right for him to have stated absolutely that the proceedings were regular or irregular when he had received no information on the point.

COLONEL DICKSON

said, that having already on the former debate expressed a decided opinion with regard to the treatment of Colonel Dawkins, he now rose only to express his regret that the Government had not interfered to put a stop to the unfortunate cause of dispute between that House and the military authorities, which must be most injurious to the service, and which might eventuate in one of those great military scandals which were so much to be deplored. He perfectly agreed with the observation of the Under Secretary for War as to the inconvenience which would arise were that House to interfere with the authorities at the Horse Guards in reference to the discipline of the army. The army was a Royal, and not a Parliamentary army, and the interference of the House should be limited to the discussion of the annual Vote of Supply in which they had an opportunity of expressing their approval or disapproval of its general administration. In his opinion it was beneficial to the State that the army should be commanded by a Prince of the Blood, who was above party influence, and who by his zeal and ability had proved himself worthy of his position, and by his amiable qualities had endeared himself to every portion of the community. But, while deprecating direct interference with the discipline of the army, he thought the case of Colonel Dawkins was one deserving consideration, and perhaps redress. All he asked was that the military authorities should further consider the question and that the papers asked for should be laid upon the table, so that the country might have an opportunity of forming an opinion upon the subject.

MR. W. O. STANLEY

said, he should have had no fault to find, had the Commander-in-Chief refused to permit Colonel Dawkins to take command upon private information only; but he felt bound to protest against the tribunal before which that gallant officer had been tried, and against the trumpery charges brought against him. The Commander-in-Chief was bound to make inquiries to satisfy himself that the officers commanding Colonel Dawkins had done their duty.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.

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