OBSERVATIONS. (Hansard, 23 June 1865)

MR. CORRY

, said, he rose to call the attention of the House to the policy of the Government in relation to the Naval Reserves. There was no branch of our naval organization which offered so great an inducement to short-sighted economy as our reserves of seamen and marines, and there was none, therefore, which required to be more closely watched by those who took a special interest in naval affairs. He was, however, afraid that at a time, when we had so much reason to congratulate ourselves on the formation of a valuable reserve of merchant seamen, the House might find it difficult to understand why he should think it necessary to call attention to the subject. He thought, however, that any such difficulty would disappear on a comparison between the state of the Naval Reserves in general at the present time with what it was three years ago. During this period the Royal Coast Volunteers and the Royal Naval Reserve had increased, but, concurrently with this, the Coastguard, the reserve of Marines on shore, and the reserve of man-of-war's men disposable for the service of the home ports had been reduced. Thus the irregular and imperfectly trained reserves had been increased at the expense of the regular and thoroughly trained reserves, and, as the difficulty we should experience at the commencement of a naval war would lie rather in obtaining the quality than the quantity of men that would be required, he considered this state of things to be eminently unsatisfactory. He considered it to be the more unsatisfactory because his noble Friend, in moving the Estimates, had indicated the probability of further reductions in the Coastguard and the Marines, which were by far the most 739 valuable of all the reserves, and it was in the hope of arresting this retrograde policy that he ventured to direct attention to the subject which he was prevented from doing by unavoidable absence on the night when the Vote for the Reserves was under consideration. The necessity of maintaining large and immediately available reserves at all times, however secure we might feel in the prospect of peace, was forced upon the country by the Russian war. We were then at war only with a third-rate naval Power, and we were in alliance with another naval Power only second to ourselves. Our colonies, our commerce, and our shores were as secure as in time of peace, and the efforts which we wore called upon to make were, therefore, insignificant compared with what they must have been if we had been at war with a first rate maritime State; but, even under such circumstances, we experienced the greatest difficulty in obtaining men for the ships it was necessary to commission, and it would have been impossible to do so without the greatest risk of disaster and disgrace, if it had not been for the reserve of seamen we possessed in the Coastguard. But, although the war showed the great value of the Coastguard as a Naval Reserve, it also showed its deficiencies and defects, and immediately after the peace in 1856 his right hon. Friend (Sir Charles Wood), then first Lord of the Admiralty, introduced a measure, the principal objects of which were to transfer the management of the Coastguard from the Board of Customs to the Admiralty, and to provide for the gradual increase of the force from about 4,500 to 10,000 men. But even this addition was thought inadequate to meet the contingency of a great naval war; and in 1858 Lord Derby's Government appointed a Royal Commission to inquire into the whole subject of the manning of the Navy. The spirit of the recommendations made by that Commission was adopted, not only by the Administration of Lord Derby, but by the present Government. The Commission advised that a reserve of merchant seamen should be formed, consisting of 20,000 men, taken from sailors who were never long absent from their ports, that is to say, of men who would be immediately available, and of 5,000 men usually employed on long voyages, and they also advised that the Royal Coast Volunteers should be raised to 10,000 men. These were the principal recommendations applicable to the irregular reserves, and 740 it was also that the Coastguard should be raised to 12,000, that the Marines on shore should be raised to 11,000, and that there should be always 4,000 sailors disposable in the home ports, of whom 1,000 were to be seamen gunners. In 1860, in reply to the late Sir Charles Napier, who had brought forward a Motion on the subject, his noble Friend said he hoped to be able to satisfy the House, before he sat down, that the Admiralty were carrying out one by one the recommendations of the Commission. He stated that he agreed entirely in the expediency of increasing the number of Marines—that the late Government (Lord Derby's) had taken a Vote for 2,000 extra Marines—that the present Government had added 1,000 more—(the very 1,000, numerically, which had been reduced by this year's Estimates)—that the Coastguard was about to be increased by 500 men, and that it was the desire of the Admiralty to carry out the recommendations of the Royal Commission, and that there should be a considerable number of seamen in the home ports available for any emergency. These early aspirations of the Admiralty for a time influenced its action. In 1862 his noble Friend informed the House that there were 4,400 trained seamen and boys in the home ports available for service, exclusive of the complements of all the ships in commission; and in 1863 the Navy Estimates provided for a reserve of 10,000 Marines on shore and 10,000 men in the Coastguard. This year, however, the reserve of men disposable at our home ports was reduced from 4,400 to 1,500, as had been stated by his noble Friend, but he doubted, from information he had received, whether he could lay his hands on anything like that number. The Marines on shore, who numbered 10,000 in 1863, were reduced this year to 9,000; the Coastguard, who were 10,000 in 1863, were now reduced to 7,750 men. These reductions showed a diminution of 6,150 men in the regularly trained reserves; and while these men were greatly superior in quality to what any reserve of merchant seamen could possibly be, he doubted whether the whole of the Royal Naval Reserve, set down at 17,000 men, would furnish a force even numerically equal at the outbreak of a war. The reasons assigned by his noble Friend for these reductions were so unsubstantial, that he could not help thinking that the Chancellor of the Exchequer could have given a better explanation, and that 741 the Coastguard and Marines, and the men disposable at the home ports, had been required to contribute to his estimated surplus for the current year. His noble Friend said that the reduction in the number of Marines was a natural sequence of the reduction of the fleet; and he added, with the enviable talent he possessed of making things pleasant, that it would be a great benefit to the force, because Marines lose the characteristics of the sailor unless they have the proper turn of service afloat. But the whole reduction in the fleet, by this year's Estimates, was 1,000 men, and it would be difficult for his noble Friend to show that this rendered necessary a reduction of 1,000 Marines; the proportion of Marines to 1,000 seamen would be nearer 100 than 1,000, and he (Mr. Corry) would observe that the Royal Commission did not lose sight of the necessity of the Marines bearing a proper proportion to the fleet. They stated in their Report— There is a limit beyond which the Marines cannot properly be increased, because it is necessary to their efficiency that they should spend a large portion of their time afloat. But the Commission, nevertheless, recommend that the reserve of Marines on shore should be raised to 11,000, although at this time the seamen and boys voted were only 37,000, whereas this year the number of seamen and boys was 42,000, so that, in the opinion of the Royal Commission, at a time when the number of seamen voted was 5,000 less than at present, the reserve of Marines might, with advantage, be 2,000 more. The hon. Member for Sunderland, who was a Member of the Commission, had, in a separate Report, recommended that the Marines should he raised to 30,000 men, which he (Mr. Corry) considered an extravagant proposal. In the whole navy, however, there was probably no officer more distinguished for his ability, his experience, or the moderation of his views, than Sir Alexander Milne, who expressed the opinion, in his evidence before the Commission, that it would be an advantage to increase the number of Marines to 25,000, provided the number of seamen was not reduced, and, as already stated, the number of the latter was now 5,000 more than at that period. But naval officers were often supposed to entertain exaggerated notions on such subjects. He would, therefore, quote the opinion of a civilian who could not be 742 suspected of extravagance on any question of naval administration, This year the Marines had been reduced from 18,000 to 17,000, but, in his evidence before the Commission, Sir James Graham said— I should rejoice to see the Marines raised to 20,000, never to be diminished. I saw with great pain the recent reduction of 1,000 men. I regarded that as an imprudent measure. Hon. Members might think that he (Mr. Corry) attached too much importance to a reduction of 1,000 marines. He was glad, therefore, to be supported by so great an authority as Sir James Graham, and he said, with him, that he saw with great pain the recent reduction (in this year's Estimates) of 1,000 Marines, and that he regarded it as an imprudent measure. He would make only one more quotation from the evidence before the Commission, but it was so apposite to his present purpose that he could not refrain from adverting to it, more especially as it expressed the opinion of an officer of great administrative as well as naval experience—an opinion which his noble Friend could hardly dispute, because it was his own. Lord Clarence Paget said, in his evidence, "I propose to increase the Marines by 6,000."This would have raised the number to 21,000—the Vote at that time having been for 15,000." I should have no hesitation in recommending that increase as a Member of the House of Commons. His noble Friend, after stating other reasons, went on to say— I have a still stronger reason for recommending an increase of Marines. Our present number of Marines is only commensurate with our number of seamen, and proportionate to the actual wants of the fleet; but we have, or soon shall have, a reserve of seamen of 20,000 men, but we have no corresponding reserve of Marines, and for this reason, also, I recommend an increase of 6,000 men. So much for the reduction of the Marines as the natural sequence of the reduction of the fleet; and in this opinion of his noble Friend be entirely concurred, for unless there wore Marines to embark on board the vessels which would be manned by the reserves of merchant seamen in case of war, it would only be another instance of that want of comprehensiveness which had always been a defect of our naval system. But he (Mr. Corry) considered the reduction of the Coastguard still more objectionable than that of the Marines, and it amounted to no less than 2,750 men in the last two years. The noble Lord would probably say that no reduction had taken 743 place this year in the numbers of the Coastguard on shore, which was by far the most valuable part of the force. Comparing the figures, however, with those of 1863, the Estimates showed a reduction of 500, and, if he was not misinformed, there had been a positive reduction this year, although it did not appear in the Estimates, as he believed the number borne on the 1st of January was 300 more than the number voted. A reduction to this extent had been effected, as he had been informed, not by discharging the older men, but by stopping the introduction of younger hands, thereby increasing the average of age and consequently diminishing the efficiency of the force. The reasons assigned by his noble Friend for reducing the Coastguard were that it was a very costly force, and that its numbers might safely be diminished as we had now a magnificent reserve of merchant seamen; but, so far from regarding the Coastguard on shore as a costly force, he regarded it as very economical, considered as a reserve, for it was the only reserve of seamen giving a return for the outlay on it in time of peace. In 1856, when the management of the force was transferred from the Customs to the Admiralty, the Estimate relating to it amounted to £480,000, an amount which the then First Lord of the Admiralty stated to be wholly inadequate to provide for the protection of the revenue. The additional amount then considered necessary by the First Lord for mere revenue purposes was estimated at about £130,000 —making a total of £610,000, and in the year 1863—when a Vote was taken for 10,000 Coastguard men on shore and afloat—the total Estimate was £790,000, or only £180,000 more than what was considered necessary for the mere protection of the Revenue in 1856. It might be said that the treaty with France had rendered it unnecessary to maintain so large a preventive force, but it never was the business of the Coastguard to prevent smuggling at the great emporiums of commerce, but only, as their name implied, on the bare coasts, where brandy and tobacco were the principal articles attempted to be run, and he had yet to learn that free trade had gone the length of admitting brandy and tobacco duty free, He could not pretend to say what was the actual expenditure on the Coastguard now required for the protection of the revenue, but, whatever its amount might be, the difference between it and the entire cost of the force was all that 744 could be charged to it as a Naval Reserve. But the protection of the Revenue was not the only service rendered by the Coastguard in time of peace. It appeared from a return which he had obtained of the value of property saved and protected, and of lives saved by the Coastguard during the last six years, that in that short period the amount of property saved and protected was within a few pounds of £4,000,000, and the lives saved about 4,000, so that the force had in this respect alone almost returned to the country the entire cost of its maintenance, and by diminishing its numbers the Government would be diminishing the means of saving life and property. The other reason assigned by his noble Friend for the reduction of the Coastguard was that he had now a magnificent reserve of merchant seamen. He (Mr. Corry) had always been in favour of forming that reserve, but if he had supposed it was in any respect to supplant instead of supplementing the Coastguard on shore his views respecting it might have been different. It could be no affront to the Naval Reserve to say that it could not be compared, in point of efficiency, with the Coastguard. On the contrary it would be an insult to their understanding to assert that men who received instruction in the special duties of man-of-wars men only twenty-eight days in the year, which might be broken into four periods of seven days each, could be compared with men who must have served eight years in man's ratings in the Royal Navy—many of whom had attained to the rank of petty officers, and the whole of whom were selected in reference to superior qualifications and good conduct. No one had taken a greater interest in, or done more towards the formation of the Royal Naval Reserve than Captain Browne, the late Registrar of merchant seamen; but he held a letter from that lamented officer in his hand in which he stated that, for every 200 of that body embarked for service, from fifty to sixty men should be added from the Coastguard on shore, and this would require from 5,000 to 6,000 of the latter as the proper proportion to a reserve of 20,000 men. Another great advantage possessed by the Coastguard over the Naval Reserve was that it was more immediately available for service. The whole of the Coastguard might be assembled at Portsmouth in forty-eight hours, even from the furthest stations on the coast of Ireland, while he believed the calculation was that not 745 more than one-third of the Naval Reserve could be depended on as being within reach at the commencement of a war. Moreover, the men of the Naval Reserve could not be called out except by Royal Proclamation under an Order in Council. This he had always thought a great defect in the Act constituting the force, for so long as negotiations were going on with a Power with which we had a difference, the issuing of a proclamation calling out the reserves would be tantamount to a declaration of war; and the practical result would be that they never would be called out until after the actual commencement of hostilities. He remembered when he was at the Admiralty, many years ago, and when there was great apprehension of a war with France on the Tahiti affair, the Government would not even allow a single ship to be put into commission lest it should precipitate the war they otherwise hoped to avoid, and, if war had actually occurred, we should have found ourselves in a very dangerous predicament. For those reasons, although he wished to speak of the Royal Naval Reserve with the greatest respect he did not think it ought to be considered as a substitute for the | Coastguard. Both the irregular and the regular reserves were many thousand men below the numbers recommended by the Royal Commission of 1858, and he did not think the increase of the former compensated the reduction of the latter. He saw in this reduction a great want of system. The number of men to be voted for the fleet of necessity fluctuated, from year to year, according to the aspect of political affairs on which the Cabinet were alone competent to decide, but the reserves were intended to meet contingencies which could not be foreseen, but which, although unforeseen, were of frequent occurrence in the history of nations, and often arose when least expected. The reserves, therefore, ought to be fixed according to a well considered and well defined scale, and he trusted that, if his noble Friend should announce, next year, a further increase of the Royal Naval Reserve, and a further reduction of the fleet, he would not also have to announce a further reduction of the Coastguard and Marines.