SECOND READING. (Hansard, 20 February 1865)

§ THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, the hon. Gentleman was perfectly right in the manner in which he had read the Bill. It would impose an additional charge upon the public, and on this ground. The Bank of Ireland, at present, performed an amount of work for the public, for which it did not receive adequate remuneration. A clear statement would be found in the short correspondence which had taken place on the subject. The Government thought it but fair to the Bank of Ireland that it should receive adequate remuneration for the performance of duties onerous in character, and which it discharged well. He invited the criticism of hon. Members—Irish Members and others—but the Bill, as it stood, represented what, after full examination, he believed the Bank of Ireland was entitled to receive. He had come to the conclusion that the additional payment should be £4,400 a year. The reason why the Bill was somewhat complicated was, that in conjunction with the rectification of the charge he proposed a rectification of form. At present the Bank of Ireland was under an arrangement which did not belong to the present mode of making up the public accounts. The Bank of Ireland managed the Irish National Debt without any remuneration, but it received an extra remuneration in consideration of doing the work of the National Debt for nothing. Instead of that it was now proposed to reduce the rate of interest on their loan to the same rate as that paid to the Bank of England, and to pay a distinct remuneration for the work it had to do in connection with the National Debt. The effect would be that the whole amount spent would be spent in conformity to the rules which governed the public expenditure generally. The hon. Baronet had asked another question with respect to the arrangement of the charge which 454 appeared to involve an anomaly. If it should happen that the portion of the National Debt under the management of the Bank of Ireland should fall below £30,000,000, it would be paid at the rate of £450 per million; but if it rose above £30,000,000 it would be paid at the rate of £300 per million, thereby receiving less for the management of £35,000,000 than for the management of £30,000,000. That was an anomaly of which he could give an explanation. The nature of the scale corresponded with that arranged for the Bank of England. In 1861, when he proposed to alter the rates for the arrangement of the National Debt under the management of the Bank of England he did not make an entirely new arrangement, but was satisfied with accommodating the old arrangement, and altering it only where he thought alteration essential; and, therefore, leaving as they stood under the old law the rates that were payable to the Bank of England for the National Debt at certain amounts very much lower than it now stood, he made a great reduction upon the excess of the National Debt beyond £600,000,000. In point of fact, what he did was this—he settled the practical part of the question, and left that part of it which was of little consequence under the old arrangement. He now proposed to do the same with respect to the Bank of Ireland. It was not necessary to contemplate the contingency of the amount of the National Debt in Ireland being below £30,000,000. An amount below that would presume that the total amount of the National Debt would be reduced to between £600,000,000 and £700,000,000. Now, considering that we had had half a century of peace with only two years of European war, and had not succeeded in getting the National Debt greatly under £800,000,000—it never having been lower than £760,000,000—it was evident that we need not trouble ourselves with the rate of remuneration to be paid to the Bank of Ireland when the portion of the National Debt it had to manage should be reduced below £30,000,000. We could deal with that case when it arose, and he should be happy to see that time arrive. On the whole he believed the measure would be found to work satisfactorily.