§ SIR JOHN PAKINGTONAccording to my notice, I rise to ask from Her Majesty's Government some explanation with regard to the war in which this country is engaged with the King of Ashantee—a subject which requires explanation no less than the more important question of the state of our relations with China which has just now been under discussion. I very much doubt if many lion. Members were aware of the fact that we are at this time engaged in a war with Ashantee, until a question relative to it was put the other night by the hon. and gallant Baronet the Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay). At that time I did not consider the answer of the right hon. Gentleman the Colonial Secretary was quite satisfactory; and since that time I have not only seen some very interesting and remarkable letters and statements in the public papers, but I have myself received private communications relative to the subject, and I have also had an opportunity of reading some private letters, which have convinced mo that the time is come when the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government ought to be directed to this subject, and when Parliament has a right to expect that some information should be given re- 546 garding it. I want to ask, what are the causes and what are the objects of this war—if war it can be called—in which, according to the information which I have received, our brave countrymen are being sent to die, not by the hands of the enemy — for an enemy they have never seen— but through the effects of exposure to the deadly and pestilential climate of that country? Statements have reached me, which I hope will be contradicted, that it is the intention of Her Majesty's Government—or I might say of the Government of Cape Coast Castle rather than of Her Majesty's Government, for I almost doubt if Her Majesty's Government are very fully informed of what is going on in that country—I understand it is the intention of the local Government to invade the territory of the King of Ashantee, a prince who, I believe, has always evinced a friendly disposition towards the people of this country, for the purpose of taking possession of his capital. If this be a true story, I think that of all the wild visionary schemes I ever heard of this seems one of the most hopeless and impossible. I have heard that the King of Ashantee has at his disposal a very considerable army; but whether he has or not, I believe his natural position makes him entirely independent of the services, of any army—at all events, to resist our attack; for he can have no army so strong nor any fortress so impregnable as the dreadful climate and the pernicious atmosphere that prevail over the 150 miles: which lie between his capital and the sea coast. The accounts which have reached me—I may be told the facts are exaggerated, but of that I cannot judge; I can only give them as I have them—are that the effects of this climate on the European constitution are of a most peculiar and painful kind. Life appears to be worth in the interior of the country not more than three weeks' purchase. When the dreadful disease of the country attacks an European the too deplorable consequence is loss of life. And another most painful peculiarity is, that in those cases in which life is not sacrificed reason very often is sacrificed, and many of our officers are said to have left that country in a state of idiotcy the most painful and depressing. Another peculiar fact is, that the negroes who have been bred and reared in the West Indies appear to suffer as much from the effects of the climate as Europeans. I have seen a gentleman who 547 lately left that country, who informed me that the wing of a negro West India regiment taken there in order to aid in the prosecution of this distressing war, numbering 700 strong, was landed on the Gold Coast, and five days after no fewer than 120 of these 700 negroes were hors de combat. I will only mention one other fact to illustrate the hopeless circumstances under which this war must be carried on. It is well known that the interior of the country is still more pestiferous and deadly than the coast; but in order to prosecute their idea of invading the territory of the King of Ashantee, I am told that a force of 400 men was sent 100 miles up country, and encamped on the banks of the river Prah. Out of that number, when the accounts I received left, 200 of these troops were hors de combat, and there were not, I was assured, more than eighty who could, in case of an action coming on, carry a musket into the field; out of nineteen field officers fifteen were disabled. These are most painful facts, and it is obviously the duty of the Government to take some steps in the matter. Brave men ought not to be exposed to such a dreadful fate. The letters I have seen have been written by officers attached to our forces, and more touching — more distressing letters I have never read—letters written by men with a spirit of endurance and calm resignation honourable to our army, but by men who felt they were sent to die an inglorious death. One officer, in writing to his family, said that he almost wished he could be exposed to a volley from his own company, for he should then know the worst; but no man could anticipate the horrors of being quartered in this deadly climate for an indefinite period. And then let me ask what is the expense of this war? I have heard it calculated that the military expenses of this absurd expedition is not less than £1,000 a day, and from reliable information I have received I should say the outlay must be at any rate from £12,000 to £14,000 per month. I hope the Government will be able to give a satisfactory explanation in regard to this subject; and to offer some assurance that this folly—I may say worse than folly—will be put a stop to. I trust the language of the right hon. Gentleman may afford some comfort to the many unhappy persons in this country who are daily expecting to hear of the sacrifice of dear friends or relatives in Africa, who have perished not like soldiers 548 in the field, but under the fatal effects of a horrible climate.
§ MR. CARDWELLI entirely recognize the justice of the appeal which has been made to me, that I should state fully and frankly to the House all that I know on this subject. I am also glad that the right hon. Baronet has taken the opportunity of introducing the topic on the Question of the Motion for Supply rather than by a Question in the usual form, because I am thereby enabled to give a fuller explanation than I could have given to a Question to which the rules of the House permit only a categorical answer. The state of the case is as follows: As hon. Members are aware, the British forts on the Gold Coast constitute the whole of the actual possessions of the British Crown in those parts; but there is a wide territory, extending for some seventy miles up the river Prah, which separates what is called the British Protectorate from the territory of the King of Ashantee. In December, 1862, the Governor of the Gold Coast wrote to the Duke of Newcastle that the King of Ashantee had demanded the surrender of two persons fugitives from his dominions. One was a boy—an escaped slave—and the other was an older person, charged with having misappropriated a piece of rock gold, which by the law of Ashantee is the property of the Sovereign, and has to be accounted for to the King of Ashantee. The Governor of the Gold Coast examined into the allegations against the two fugitives, and found that there was not a tittle of evidence that either had been guilty of any crime which would justify his being given up to the King of Ashantee. There was, on the contrary, abundant reason to know that death was the fate that awaited them should they be surrendered. He accordingly declined to surrender these fugitives, saying that if he did so their blood would be on his head—a feeling in which I believe every Member of this House will sympathize, for no one would wish to see fugitives who have sheltered themselves under the protection of the British flag surrendered under such circumstances. The conduct of the Governor received the approval of the Duke of Newcastle. In the spring of 1863 a force of the King of Ashantee invaded the protected territory. They were met by forces partly organized and commanded by British officers and partly consisting of Native troops. The army of the King of Ashantee extended its ravages 549 to within forty miles of the British possessions on the Gold Coast. About thirty towns or villages, as they are there called, consisting of Native settlements, some very small, and others comprising several hundred families, were destroyed. Many lives were sacrificed, and much agricultural produce was carried off. In the autumn of 1863 the Governor announced that the Ashantee forces had retired, threatening, however, to renew their incursions into the British territory as soon as they had; planted their own crops. As a measure of defence the Governor suggested to my noble Friend that he should be authorized to carry on war, if necessary, across the river Prah, and attack the territory of the King of Ashantee. To this request my noble Friend gave his assent in terms which I will read to the House —
The principle of all military proceedings on the West Coast of Africa should be that of defence, and not of aggression. It is upon this principle alone that the Governors are authorized to make war, and no invasion of neighbouring territories can be sanctioned, unless it can be shown that it is really a defensive measure, safer, less costly in blood and money, and more likely to be decisive in its results than waiting for an attack which is being prepared. His Grace feels, therefore, that he cannot refuse to Governor Pine a conditional authority to strike a blow within the Ashantee territory, if such a blow can be struck without making any other or further advance than, in his own opinion and that of the officer in command, may be consistent with the utmost consideration for the safety of the troops.I am prepared to lay the whole document on the table, but I have read that passage in order that it may be seen that the principle authorized by my noble Friend was defence not aggression, and that no aggression on the territory of the King of Ashantee was contemplated by him. Reinforcements were ordered to be sent from the West Indies to assist the Governor of Cape Coast Castle in the proposed expedition, and every precaution was taken to secure the health and wellbeing of the troops, so for as having a first-rate commissariat, medical aid, and proper means of transport was concerned. When a Question was put to me the other night by the hon. and gallant Member for Wake-field (Sir John Hay) this was the amount of the information which had reached the Colonial Office—that our military commander was on the Prah, waiting for reinforcements, which he expected, but which had not reached him, from the West Indies, and that on their arrival he 550 intended to begin the operations authorized by the Duke of Newcastle. Since that time, however, we have received another mail from the West Coast of Africa; and now I have to relate the story up to the latest advices. Last year the rains were unusually light, but whereas they commonly begin in May, this year they set in with unusual violence and severity in March, and the consequence was that the transports with re-inforcements from the West Indies had not reached the: Gold Coast when the rains began. With the rains came sickness, and with sickness came the necessity for sending back to the coast all the troops which had been gathered upon the Prah for the purpose of making the intended expedition into Ashantee, excepting those companies—three in number—which were left to protect the stores and provisions collected upon the banks of the river. The last despatch I received from Governor Pine, dated April 5, contains a statement to the effect that he was afraid it would not be practicable to leave those companies upon the Prah, and the last despatch of all that has reached me, written only two days later, was not from Mr. Pine himself, but from an acting Governor, and it informed me that the Governor not having been able to carry into effect his purpose of having a personal conference with the military commander as to the state of affairs and the proper measures to be taken, had been compelled to take a cruise in the Rattlesnake for the restoration of his health. Such is the state of information in which we find ourselves placed by the last mail. I may be fairly asked what is the course we intend to take in these circumstances? The last mail, as I have said, has only reached me within the last few days; but since its arrival I have been in communication with my noble Friend at the head of the War Department, and also with his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief, as to what ought to be done in the present state of affairs; and now I have to inform the House that the determination at which we have arrived, and which I propose to announce to the authorities on the spot by the mail which leaves England on Monday next, is this—that transports shall be immediately despatched to remove from the Coast troops to the amount of those who have recently been sent there, so that the number may be reduced to that which can be accommodated with the means ordinarily available upon the Gold Coast, due regard being had to health and comfort: that the 551 forces shall be altogether removed from the interior; that the stockades which hare been erected shall be handed over to the Native chiefs interested in the protection of the country; and that the stores shall be removed so far as the circumstances of the case may render it practicable to do so. I believe, however, it will not be any considerable pecuniary sacrifice to give those which cannot be removed to the friendly Native forces which may be told off to garrison the stockades erected on the banks of the river. But even if such an act did involve a considerable pecuniary sacrifice, I am sure the feeling of the House will be that a sense of duty would compel us to incur it rather than to put in peril the lives of our officers and men in such a climate. I have stated what was the origin of the war. I have stated what were the views and objects with which my noble Friend the Duke of Newcastle sanctioned an incursion on our part into the territory of the King of Ashantee, and that it was not any aggression upon the territory of the King of Ashantee. I have stated that he had no intention to undertake any war of conquest or of vengeance; that his only desire was to ward off a threatened attack, and that no measures have been taken except with that view. With respect to what has occurred since I have had the honour of filling the office I now hold, I have stated the contents of the mail received only a few days ago, and have informed the House that, in conjunction with the War Office and the Horse Guards, I have taken measures for withdrawing our troops from the interior of the country and placing the defence of the Prah in the hands of those Native chiefs whose duty and interest it-is to protect their own territories from hostile incursions. We also propose, as far as possible, to provide for the safety, health, and well-being of our troops on the Gold Coast. Though it is impossible to speak with any certainty as to unknown and unforeseen occurrences, I entirely sympathize with the feeling that it is not our duty to make expeditions into the interior in such a climate as that of Africa. We have no desire whatever for any extension of territory; we have no wish to make wars of conquests or of vengeance; and as the rains have put an end to the late warlike preparations, so it is not our intention to renew them for the purpose of invading the territory of the King of Ashantee. I have already presented a Return, which, so far as I know, will give the information asked for by the right 552 hon. Gentleman, but if any further information is required I shall he most happy to furnish it.
§ SIR JOHN HAYsaid, he was sure it would be extremely satisfactory to the House to know that the war with the King of Ashantee was about to terminate. He was afraid, however, it would not terminate with either honour or advantage to our arms. It appeared to him that some blame attached to the Government for the want of provision for the troops sent to the hot climate of the Gold Coast. The Colonial Secretary had talked of having sent an excellent commissariat officer to Cape Coast; but it was not possible to provide supplies for British troops in such a country, and the excellence of the officer would hardly make up for the want of food. He knew from personal experience that cattle could not live on the Gold Coast, and that it was necessary to kill and salt them as soon as landed. In that hot climate, where a fourth of our men were within a short period laid up with dysentery, how was it possible to feed them with salted provisions? He trusted measures would immediately be taken to remove our officers and men to some climate in which they would have a chance of being restored to an effective state. There was one point upon which the Colonial Secretary had not touched. At present the friendly Native forces were subsidized to assist us in the Ashantee war. He was informed, however, by persons recently returned from the spot, that the chiefs never expressed any desire for the protection we were affording them, and that they were only induced to aid us by liberal pay. He was also informed that the value of all the villages destroyed by the Ashantee forces, which appeared so formidable to English notions, did not exceed £400, and that the friendly Native chiefs would rather have that sum paid in money than the defence and protection of our arms. If that information were correct, the House would probably agree with him that the payment of £400 would be far more economical than either the prolongation of the war or the continuance of the subsidy to the Native chiefs.
§ Main Question put, and agreed to.