PAPERS MOVED FOR.

HC Deb 18 March 1864 vol 174 cc343-89

MR. GREGORY

in rising, pursuant to notice, to call attention to the demolition of the fortress of Corfu and the neutralization of the Ionian Islands, said, he should despair of obtaining the attention of the very few Members now present in the House, were it not that the proceedings to which he was about to refer were attended with injustice, violence, and bad faith. It was because the nation in question was weak and unprotected that he appealed to the House of Commons to assist him in obtaining justice for it. He was convinced that what the Chancellor of the Exchequer had, a few minutes previously, called "an adverse presumption" against the foreign policy of the Government existed, and that public opinion was not in favour of a system under which a kind of balance-sheet was maintained, exhibiting on one side concessions to the strong and on the other violence towards the weak. If they turned their eyes upon the map of the whole world now they would hardly find a spot where the name of England was regarded with friendly feeling—a state of things which was almost entirely owing to the manner in which foreign countries had been treated by our Foreign Office—yet there was one spot where the name of England was cherished and revered only a few months ago, and that was Greece and the Ionian Islands. Now, however, owing to circumstances to which he was about to refer, all that was changed; and he believed there were few parts of the world where this country was viewed with greater distrust and dislike. It was recently remarked in the French Legislative Assembly by Monsieur Thiers, that France never interfered with Greece after her revolution, and was honoured and liked in that country now; whereas England, which had professed herself to be the friend and patron of Greece from the commencement, was now regarded with peculiar aversion. He taxed the Foreign Office with illegality, with violence, and with bad faith upon this question; and, although the papers which, in his opinion, ought to have been produced were refused by that Department, he believed he had in his possession sufficient information to bring home that charge. Had the Ionian Islands belonged to us, had they been a colony with which we were about to part company, as some day we might have to part company from Canada, it would have been bad taste and bad policy to destroy their fortifications and to devastate their country before bidding them farewell; but we are actually now blowing up and laying waste property over which we have not, and never had, the smallest right, and against the destruction of which the owners protest. We addressed strong language to Austria and Prussia about the "outrage and injustice" of which they had been guilty towards the weak and unprotected Denmark, whilst we ourselves had been equally guilty towards a weaker Power. The impression which prevailed that those Islands formed part of the possessions of England was utterly unfounded. From the time when the French were driven out in 1800, and they were erected into a republic with the Sultan for their suzerain, their rights as an independent State had been recognized in I successive treaties; and when England took possession of them in 1809 the official despatches and proclamations declared that we went "not as conquerors, but as allies," and recognized "the independent Government of the Septinsular Republic." The 6th article of the Treaty of Vienna was to I this effect— His Britannic Majesty contends that a convention with the Government of the Ionian Islands should regulate all matters in relation to the maintenance of the fortresses and as regards the keep and pay of the troops. It contained a distinct recognition of the right of the lonians to the fortresses, which clearly revived as soon as the Protectorate of England came to an end. Even in those high-handed days His Britannic Majesty consented that a convention with the Government of the Ionian Islands should regulate everything relating to the maintenance of fortresses and to the keep and pay of British garrisons. Yet now the Ministers of the Queen proceeded to demolish those fortresses not only without the consent but against the protest of the people of that country. But has this independence ever been denied? Some years ago a Lord High Commissioner stated in a memorable despatch, that the population was so hostile to the English Protectorate, that it would be better to hand over the whole of them to Greece with the exception of Corfu. In replying to that suggestion, the noble Lord now at the head of the Foreign Office said, "it would be a breach of good faith to a State under our protection to take any portion and make it an element of our strength." If we could not retain any portion of the country without breach of faith, whence comes the right to destroy any portion of the country without equal breach of faith. He was present at a debate in the House of Lords on the 16th of April last, when Lord Malmesbury, in speaking of the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece, gave it as his opinion that it was desirable the fortresses should be destroyed and that the Islands should be neutralized; and he recollected the tartness which Lord Russell infused into his reply. Lord Russell said that, although, no doubt, Lord Malmesbury understood the subject on which he had spoken, yet from what had fallen from him one might imagine quite the reverse; that the noble Earl had referred to Corfu as if it were one of Her Majesty's colonial possessions which it was proposed to cede; that, on the contrary, the Ionian Islands were a free and independent republic, under a British protectorate, and that they were in no sense a possession belonging to Her Majesty. Then Lord Russell used these important words:— "If the people of the Ionian Islands were united to Greece, it would be for them to decide whether the fortress of Corfu should be maintained." After that the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary of State could hardly, without something like sheer blasphemy towards his Chief, deny the illegality of the acts we were committing. It might be said that we had spent considerable sums of money on these fortifications; but so also the Ionians had done. On the 19th of March, 1825, the Lord High Commissioner, in an address to the Ionian Legislature, represented to them the ruinous condition of these fortresses, and specially of Vido; whereupon they voted £164,000 to restore and complete them. In 1833 the Ionian Parliament voted £15,000 more for the same purpose. In 1836 their regular contribution for the maintenance of the fortresses and the support of the garrisons was fixed at £35,000, which was afterwards diminished to £25,000. It was said that the Ionians had not paid up their contributions. He admitted that it was so; but if it was an argument in this case it ought to have been brought forward against the Ionians before they were called upon to vote "aye" or "no" to the annexation. Instead of that these people were told by the Lord High Commissioner at the time the annexation was proposed, that they would receive a full acquittance for all the arrears then due from them to Her Majesty. But even if we had spent millions, and the Ionians had not spent one farthing on these fortifications, still, when we gave up the protectorate we were in the position of outgoing tenants, who had no right to create rack and ruin on the property they were about to leave. He maintained then from these facts, that in this matter our Government had been guilty of violence and illegality towards these people. Moreover, he accused the Government of bad faith in its dealings with the Ionian Islands. It was not till November, 1863, that the Ionians knew anything of the treaty by Which their fortresses were to be demolished and the Islands neutralized; and it was not till the same period that the young King George, having made the cession of these Islands a sine quâ non to his acceptance of the throne of Greece, heard one word about these conditions so calculated to make him unpopular at the very outset with his new subjects. At the Conference held in London on the 14th November, 1863, everybody had representatives but Greece and the Ionian Islands. True, Greece was invited to send a plenipotentiary; but when he arrived the whole affair was over and the first treaty signed, leaving the four Powers afterwards to make a distinct treaty with Greece and thereby imposing on her King the humiliation of accepting a treaty with conditions so galling to his future subjects the islanders. Our Government had thus dealt with the interests of Greece, without Greece, and against Greece. They had sedulously concealed from the Ionians what the conditions were that would be attached to the annexation, and they had also concealed from the young King of Greece conditions the execution of which had excited a painful feeling against His Majesty among his people. The despatch from Lord Russell to Lord Bloomfield, of June, 1863, had not one word about the neutralization of these Islands or the demolition of their fortresses, neither was there such a word in the treaty of August, on the faith of which the young Danish Prince was induced to accept the throne of Greece. By the terms of that instrument the young Prince accepted the throne on the express condition that the Ionian Islands were to be "effectively united" with the Hellenic kingdom. Was the neutralization now spoken of the way to make the union with Greece "effective?" But on the 3rd of October, little more than a month before the treaty of November last was promulgated, when the Lord High Commissioner put it to the Ionian Legislature to say "aye" or "no" whether they would be annexed to Greece, His Excellency told them that they were then fully cognizant of all the conditions attached to the proposed annexation; and as if to show that there were to be no after-claps, he specified certain conditions, among which was a Vote of £10,000 for the King of Greece's Civil List, and a stipulation that all previous contracts were to be observed, and that the English cemeteries should be protected. The last act in that disreputable drama was the treaty of the 14th of November last. By it the King of Greece and the Ionians were informed of the decision of the great Powers. No wonder the new King of Greece was astonished and deeply pained when he heard of it. He might quote to the House the letter of the 9th of December, 1863, from Count Sponneck, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the President of the Ionian Parliament. In this letter the Count stated that His Majesty had heard of the dismantlement of the fortress with profound grief, and that the Government had taken steps to obtain a modification of the Resolutions come to by the five Powers in London on the 14th of November. Of course, the King had heard of the measure with grief. Our Government had induced him to accept a throne which they had made ridiculous by hawking it round Europe; and now they made him unpopular in the eyes of the Ionians and odious to his own subjects for accepting terms which they thought derogatory to the dignity of the Crown and of their country. And what had been the result? Already the words "traitor" and "treason" were being applied to the person and the conduct of the King; pamphlets were being published recommending him not to tolerate this disgraceful and perfidious treatment, but to abdicate the throne and return to Denmark; and if another revolution broke out in Greece and a catastrophe occurred, it would be all in consequence of this disreputable proceeding. He would now say a few words about the Articles of the treaty. By the second Article, inserted, he believed, to meet the requisitions of Austria and some English partisans of Turkey, these Islands were to be neutralized; but he now understood that that measure was to be confined to Corfu and Paxo. What advantages would Europe in general and Turkey in particular gain from that neutralization? It was said that Corfu was neutralized because it was so near the mainland of Turkey—but in that case why were not the provinces of Phthiotis and Acarnania dealt with in the same manner? He did not know what was the exact meaning of the word "neutralization." It was explained by the treaty to some extent, because the second article said, "consequently no armed force, either naval or military, shall at any time be as- sembled or stationed upon the territory or in the waters of those Islands. "What would be the effect of the condition if Greece were involved in war? Are not Greek vessels to take refuge in Corfu? Are they forbidden to enter Corfute ports? Or have they only the same right of entry and departure as the enemy's vessels? It was clear, at all events, that it was not a measure which rendered necessary the destruction of the fortresses, because, although Belgium was neutralized in the year 1831, the fortress of Antwerp was not destroyed, and Belgium now had a large army, and might, if she pleased, have a fleet. If the whole country was neutralized he could understand it, but he could not understand the neutralization of one limb, leaving the rest in a different position. The real object of all these conditions seems to have been to prevent the consolidation of this new people, and to afford a pretext for the interference of the protecting Powers. How clearly this was the case was shown by the proposal of Russia, in connection with the fourth Article, that the Greeks and Ionians should have separate flags. The fifth Article, stipulating for the tolerance of different religions, was most insulting to the sovereignty of the King and utterly unnecessary, because it was notorious that in no country in the world was there greater toleration for all religious opinions than there was in Greece, and that not merely a legal tolerance but a tolerance arising from the feeling and sentiment of the people. The third Article provided for the destruction of the fortresses; and this, he understood, was attributable to the fears and jealousy of Austria, who was afraid lest these fortresses should be taken by a coup de main by the Italians, and become the bases of hostile operations in the Adriatic. Never was argument more illogical. In this country we were erecting fortifications at Portsmouth, Chatham, and elsewhere, to avoid a coup de main, and in the Ionian Islands, to avoid the same thing, we were destroying them. And to put the climax to the absurdity and stupidity of this treaty, it was notorious that, as soon as our troops marched out, the Ionians might, if they could get the money, restore all those fortifications. He thought he had now shown that Her Majesty's Government had been guilty of illegality, violence, and bad faith towards the Ionians. The treaty was offensive to the Ionians themselves, lower- ing to the dignity of their King, whom we had inveigled into accepting the throne; dangerous, because of the pretext it would give for foreign interference; and a notable specimen of bad policy. He was ready to admit, for the sake of argument, that, unless these fortresses had been destroyed, Austria would not have consented to the abandonment of the protectorate. But, if that was so, let Austria take all the discredit of this proceeding, which was stigmatized in every part of Europe in language much stronger than any which he had employed. Why should we allow our name to be execrated, our good faith impugned, and our influence impaired wherever the Greek tongue is spoken, in order to satisfy Austrian apprehensions and jealousies. Was the oppressor of Venetia and the invader of the Danish duchies so dear to England, that we ought to take all this odium upon ourselves in order to please her. It was at this moment of great importance that the name of England should stand high among the Christian populations of the East. They were restless and discontented, and it was most desirable that we should be able to press upon them counsels of peace and moderation. A little while ago we had that power. When, on the 10th of December, the Acroceraunian mountains opposite Corfu were lit up with fire, fires of joy, in answer to the illuminations in that island, they were as the lighting up of hope in the breasts of the oppressed at the deliverance of their brethren, and the people of the East believed in the generosity and disinterestedness of England, and would have obeyed her councils. Now the feeling was exactly the reverse. We had lost all hold on the popular mind in Greece, and that was a great misfortune with reference to the future settlement of that country. Yet how easily all this might have been prevented. If the Lord High Commissioner had gone before the Legislative Assembly at Corfu before the Vote for annexation had been taken, if he had said, "My Government has all along been willing to abide by the clear understanding which it had with you, but Austria is afraid of the dangers which may arise to Europe by the existence of your fortifications, and she insists on their destruction, and the neutralization of your islands. It is for you to decide whether you are willing to accept annexation on these terms, and, if so, be your own executioners, for we are not prepared to devastate your Islands to gratify Aus- tria;" that would have spared us all the odium which had been heaped on our heads. He had been recently on the Continent, and he must say that no transaction among all our numerous failures that had lately occurred had created so strong a feeling in Italy and France as this. If an Englishman wishes to be comfortable abroad, he must divest himself of the very senses which God has given him. If he goes into the streets, he must shut his eyes to avoid the caricatures which flaunted in every window representing this country as debasing herself before the strong and indemnifying herself by bullying weak Ionia and weak Brazil, and receiving with complacency the retributive castigations of Prince Menschikoff and Secretary Seward. If he goes into a club he must close his ears, or he will hear on every side comments on his country as painful as they are unjust. He knew that our wish was to be honest and courteous in all our dealings —to act as gentlemen; but the impression that prevailed abroad, since Lord Russell had been at the head of the Foreign Department, was, that we were acting in a very different manner. He asked his hon. Friend to give him the papers up to November 14, 1863. He had refused them before on the ground that negotiations were pending, but he (Mr. Gregory) asked them now only to the date of the treaty which had been signed. It was by our willingness to become the instruments of carrying out that treaty that we had brought upon ourselves the stigma of violence without law, and of diplomacy without faith; and he wanted to ascertain from the papers what on earth could have been the pressure that could induce Lord Russell thus to have dirtied the character of his country. The hon. Member concluded by moving for papers connected with the demolition of the fortresses of Corfu and the neutralization of the Ionian Islands.

CAPTAIN JERVIS

seconded the Motion.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, that She will be graciously pleased to give directions that there be laid before this House, Copy of any Correspondence up to the Treaty of the 14th day of November, 1863, on the subject of the annexation of the Ionian Islands to Greece, between the Foreign Office and the Governments of Austria, Prussia, Russia, France, and Greece,"—(Mr. Gregory,)

—instead thereof,

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

MR. SMOLLETT

said, he was not one of those who thought the renunciation of the protectorate of the Ionian Islands by Great Britain was a matter to be much lamented. It had existed for nearly fifty years, and had been exercised with such singular incapacity, that our withdrawal would not leave fifty persons in the Islands who were friendly to British rule. Yet primâ facie it did not seem a difficult matter for a maritime Power like Great Britain to manage successfully seven small islands with a population of 160,000 souls, and yet the Government had signally failed. Our withdrawal, however, was justifiable on two grounds. In the first place, our Governments had been odious to the people, and none more so than since Colonel Storks had become Lord High Commissioner; secondly, we were right in withdrawing, because our protectorate had always been a source of expense to this country. That fact, however, although true, was most discreditable to us. The Treaty of Paris provided that the Islands should defray the expenses of their civil administration, and they had done so. By the treaty it was also provided that a garrison of 3,000 men should be maintained—a force that was more than sufficient for the occupation of the Islands. In 1824 the revenue of the Islands amounted to £140,000, which was sufficient to defray all the civil charges and the military expenses if we had only acted with common sense; but owing to our own extravagance, the protectorate had come to be a considerable charge upon the British Exchequer. The Islands contained a population hardly exceeding that of a London parish, and yet this little dependency was provided with a Senate, a House of Representatives, a Speaker, and all the paraphernalia of representative governments, and they paid these persons salaries for creating mischief. Large sums were spent upon palaces, more was wasted upon fortifications that were useless. A Lord High Commissioner was maintained with a salary equal to that of the President of the United States, and the office was bestowed not upon men with colonial experience, but upon decayed politicians. He did not include the Chancellor of the Exchequer among decayed politicians, but he had been Commissioner and a bad one for a short time. The office was jobbed away to parties to whom a good palace and a residence in a fine climate, with £6,000 a year, was a godsend. Now thirty years ago Sir Charles Napier had pointed out how these Islands should be governed. He recommended the appointment of a governor with a salary of £2,000 or £3,000, to reside at Cephalonia, that all the pomp and paraphernalia of the House of Representatives should be suppressed, and that a small body of ten or twelve representatives of the people should be appointed to assist the governor. If the semi-regal Court of Corfu, the Senate, and the House of Representatives had been got rid of, and the waste of money upon fortifications stopped, we might have had a Government respected and respectable. But as such a wise arrangement could not be expected after fifty years of folly, he was rejoiced that we were ridding ourselves of the responsibility; his only wonder was that the Protectorate had continued so long. For the last fifteen or twenty years the Islanders had been clamouring for annexation to Greece, as they, like King Otho, had a notion of some future great Greek kingdom; in the Levant. Emissaries were sent into the Islands to foment discontent, in which they were successful; but King Otho was unfortunate in his endeavours to extend his dominions, having been unlucky enough to incur the antipathy of the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, The House would remember how the late King Otho was snubbed by the noble Lord, and a British fleet was sent to the Piraeus, not for the protection of English citizens, but to enforce the preposterous claims of a Maltese Jew named Don Pacifico. That was, he believed, a monstrous swindle. A national quarrel, too, was nearly being forced upon King Otho, because he claimed a small island called Sapienza, lying off the coast of Greece. That island was about the size of Palace Yard, and was quite uninhabited. The House, too, would remember the odium which was incurred by King Otho during the Crimean war, because he wished to enlarge his dominions at the expense of Turkey, then apparently on the eve of dissolution. The Greeks were a quick-witted people, and when they saw that King Otho was an obstacle in the way of the accomplishment of their cherished objects, they intimated to him that "it was no longer" — to use the expression of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary—"expedient that he should reign over them." No sooner had King Otho taken his departure from Greece, than the noble Earl (Earl Russell) intimated to the Provisional Government at Athens, through Mr. Elliott, the fact that England was perfectly ready to relinquish the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands in favour of Greece, on condition—first, that its government should be monarchial; secondly, that the new King should rule constitutionally; thirdly—and the condition was a very hard one—that he should be a person omni exceptions major, a person to whom no exception could be taken; and lastly, that he should not seek to extend his territories or entertain insidious designs against his neighbours the Turks. The Greeks were perfectly delighted with the proposal. Their revolution had been perfectly successful, and from the fact that the offer to which he referred was made so soon after the departure of Otho it would seem as if that revolution had been brought about by English intrigue. In the enthusiasm of the moment the vacant throne was offered to a scion of the Royal House of England, who was at the time a young gentleman serving on board one of Her Majesty's ships. This offer, which did not savour altogether of absolute wisdom, was, however, graciously declined; and then overtures were, with the concurrence of the English Government, made to the male scions of almost every petty Court in Germany; but not even one of that hungry lot would accept the throne on any conditions whatever. In the extremity of their distress, however, the present King of Denmark accepted the throne for his second son, William Christian, but only on certain conditions, the first being that the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece should be made pari passu with the accession of the new King; the second, that pocket-money to the extent of £12,000 a year should be provided for the young gentleman by the great Powers of Europe. It took some months to obtain the assent of the protecting Powers to those conditions; but they were finally agreed to, and then — and not till then—the Prince, who was now called George, proceeded to Athens, where he was introduced to his constituents and thanked them for his election, but told them what Members of that House never told their constituents—that he had come among them without the slightest capacity and without any experience. It was folly to contend that a young gentleman, then seventeen and now eighteen, who accepted the throne under these conditions was a constitutional monarch. He would ask whether, under these circumstances, the conditions which Earl Russell had in contemplation when he made the offer to cede the Ionian Islands had been in any way complied with. We were, he supposed, under the impression that we had been governing those Islands constitutionally, though our rule there was a perfect despotism; but so far from its being his opinion that the King of the Greeks was a person to whom no exception could be taken, he must confess he knew very little which could be said in his favour. He believed, indeed, that any Gentleman selected by lot from the benches opposite—any Philhellene—for instance, the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory), if he came under that category—would fill the throne of Greece much more ably, and keep under control much more effectually than the present King the most licentious and intriguing population in Europe. Be that, however, as it might, he felt perfectly assured that if we expected that that young Prince would settle down quietly in Athens, drawing £12,000 a year, giving dinners and fattening on his pay, without entertaining any desire to extend his dominions, or any insidious designs against the territories of his neighbours, we should find ourselves much mistaken. If he were to do so, his Government would become contemptible in the eyes of his subjects; the treaty which placed him on the throne of Greece, accompanied, as it was, with a mass of diplomatic rubbish, would not last so long as that which placed his father on the throne of Denmark, and which was now violated by two of the parties to it, and was not thought worth defending by the remainder. With respect to the fortifications, he must say that he was very glad that they were to be destroyed. He had heard it said that a great deal of Ionian money had been expended on them; but he did not believe it. They were in ruins when we took them, and Sir Thomas Maitland who was one of the first Lord High Commissioners, and who was one of the very few persons who held that office who knew his business, never expended a shilling on them. He went by the name of "King Tom," and was a very excellent ruler. During his sway from 1816 to 1824, when he died, a sum of £87,000 a year was upon the average spent upon the civil administration of these Islands, but this sum did not include the expenses of 3,000 men, which they ought to maintain. Sir Thomas Maitland left behind him at his death in the treasury of Corfu a largo sum of money; and when his successor, Sir Frederick Adam, came into office, an arrangement was entered into with the English Government to the effect, that if the Greeks would vote the amount in the Treasury, £160,000, for the repair of the fortresses, then entirely neglected, the Government would ask for no further sum for the maintenance of troops due up to that date. The arrangement proved to be satisfactory to the Parliament of the Ionian Islands, then entirely subservient to the Lord High Commissioner, and they at one sitting, he believed, voted the whole amount to be spent on fortifications. The sum so spent was, however, really and truly British money, which should have been paid into the British Treasury in part payment for keeping up 3,000 men. That statement he made on the authority of Sir Charles Napier, and he never heard of the Greeks having spent any other money on those fortifications, while we had expended something like half a million sterling. If they were to be kept up they would be a source of great expense; but if they were to fall into other hands—and could they insure the throne of Greece to the young King who now occupied it for two years, even in one of the Government offices—then they would be a menace to Turkey, the maintenance of which country in its present integrity many statesmen deemed to be essential to the preservation of the peace of Europe. Under all these circumstances, he was very glad that the Ionian Islands were made over to Greece—whether to a monarchial or a Republican Government he did not care, hut he was heartily glad that we had got rid of them.

MR. LAYARD

said, his hon. Friend the Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory) seemed to have made himself the mouthpiece of all the discontent and disaffection which existed in the East. He did not, certainly, mean to imply, that he in any way supported or countenanced the intrigues which there prevailed; there was, however, a kind of sweet simplicity about his hon. Friend which made him take for gospel almost everything which was told him; and, as he was not a man to do anything by halves, he did not hesitate to accept every kind of exaggeration as truth, and every report which happened to reach him as a fact. It was no matter of surprise that there should be persons in the East who had an object in making it appear that the act of generosity—if so he might be allowed to call it—performed by Her Majesty's Government had in it some deep design; he was not surprised that there should toe persons in the East, jealous of the influence and good name of England, who endeavoured to counteract the effect likely to be produced by the surrender of the Ionian Islands, because, as his hon. Friend ought to know, there was in the East a host of petty intriguers, who were constantly attempting to make political capital out of every event which happened in that quarter. But he was surprised that a man like his hon. Friend, an English Gentleman and a Member of the English Parliament, should come forward to support those views, and to make Europe believe that we were not actuated by an honest policy and by the most sincere desire to promote the interests of Greece, but by some unworthy and underhand motives which we did not dare avow. Our surrender of those Islands was an act of generosity unprecedented in history. We had voluntarily surrendered a territory, and that surrender was made in good faith and with the utmost loyalty. [Mr. GREGORY said, he did not deny it.] Yet the hon. Gentleman accused the Government of pursuing towards Greece a policy of "injustice, violence, and bad faith." His hon. Friend had argued, although disclaiming the intention of doing so, as if the Ionian Islands were a possession or colony of this country. But the Ionian Islands were placed under the protection of Great Britain by a solemn treaty made with the concurrence of the great Powers, and especially of Austria, and we held them upon certain conditions to which those Powers were parties. When we undertook the Protectorate, we were bound to govern the Islands as a separate State, in a liberal and constitutional manner. In the early times of our connection with them he was ready to admit that we did not carry out all our promises, for after the termination of the great war an order of ideas reigned in Europe not very favourable to liberal government. The hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. Smollet) had alluded to Sir Thomas Maitland, more generally known as "King Tom," who certainly ruled somewhat despotically, but who, nevertheless, did a great deal of good for the Islands. In his time roads were made, other public works were carried on, and the Islands attained to a great state of prosperity. After some time public opinion began to make itself felt, and a liberal constitution was granted to the Islands— a more liberal one it would be difficult to conceive. These concessions, instead of having promoted a good understanding between the Ionian people and the protecting Power, had increased disaffection. The liberal institutions granted to the Islands were made use of by local intriguers, who in a short time got up movements not only in the Islands, but in Greece, At that time the question of nationalities began to be much agitated in Europe, The claims of the Islands to be united to Greece, on the ground of a common nationality, were put forward; but the singular thing was that those who were at the head of the party which put forward these claims were not Greeks at all. There was scarcely one who had not an Italian name, and who was not descended from the Venetian settlers in the Islands. The town of Corfu and a considerable part of the Islands was not inhabited by people of the Greek race. Over and over again the Ionian Parliament voted annexation to Greece; but, of course, this country could not consent to an annexation, and the Parliament was prorogued or dissolved. At that time it was nearly impossible to give the Islands to Greece. Greece was then almost verging on bankruptcy [An hon. MEMBER: She is still]; brigandage prevailed, and the country was in a state of complete disorganization. A fixed policy of the Greeks too, at this time, was aggression on Turkey, which had put against them the great Powers of Europe. It would have been most unfair, therefore, to hand over the Islands to Greece. What we had always foreseen happened at last, and the Greek people, exasperated by bad government, compelled the King to leave. What took place in Greece ought to be a warning to his hon. Friend. For a long time we had been held up to odium in the East as the chief obstacle to the prosperity of Greece, and Sir Thomas Wyse, our representative at Athens, a Philhellene in the truest sense of the word, had incurred great disfavour by constantly warning the Greek Government of what would take place, exhorting them to abstain from aggression upon their neighbours, and to devote their attention to developing the resources of the country. The King fell; and then, notwithstanding the bad name which accord- ing to some we had earned for ourselves in Greece, the Greeks united as one man to offer their throne to an English Prince, thus showing their belief that our policy had always been directed to promoting their true interests. It was not considered expedient that the throne should he accepted for an English Prince; but after the tribute which had been paid to this country we felt under a moral obligation to assist the Greeks in finding a Prince competent to fill the throne. At that time Mr. Elliot was sent to Athens to explain to the Greek Government the reasons why their offer of the crown to Prince Alfred could not be accepted; and at the same time he was instructed to advise them to retain a monarchial and constitutional form of Government, to give up aggressive designs upon Turkey, and to develop the resources of the country. If the Government would pledge themselves to this policy, he was instructed to promise that England, with the assent of the great Powers, would give up the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands in favour of Greece. It was true that from various circumstances it was not easy to obtain a person eligible in every way to fill the throne. The three great protecting Powers had determined that it should not be filled by any member of their Royal families, and that of course limited the number of eligible persons. At length the throne was offered to Prince William of Denmark, and accepted, on his behalf, by his guardian, and the choice was subsequently ratified by all the great Powers. To carry out the change, of dynasty, it was necessary first of all that a treaty should be concluded between the three Powers who had made Greece what she was and had guaranteed her independence. Her Majesty's Government succeeded in obtaining the consent of Russia and of France to the change of dynasty, and in placing Prince William on the throne as King George. In the treaty it was agreed that the Ionian Islands should be surrendered to Greece, and it was further agreed that the three Powers should each give up £4,000 a year of interest due to them upon the Greek debt, and that £10,000 a year should be appropriated to the civil list of the King from the revenue of the Islands. The next step was to obtain the assent of the parties to the Treaty of 1815 to a new treaty which gave up the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands, confided by the great Powers to this coun- try. His hon. Friend said that the conditions contained in that treaty were unknown to the new King of Greece and to Count Sponneck, and to the people of the Ionian Islands, and of Greece, until after October. This was an extraordinary statement, for the fact that the fortifications were to be destroyed and the Islands neutralized was a matter of common notoriety all over the East. Moreover, he held in his hand despatches which showed that in August the matter was discussed at Copenhagen long before the King left that city; and both His Majesty and Count Sponneck were well aware of what was proposed to be done, Count Sponneck in the middle of the summer not only acceding to the proposal, but suggested that the whole of Greece should be declared a neutral State. On the 30th of June his noble Friend (Earl Russell), speaking in another place, spoke of the probable destruction of part of the fortifications, because Greece maintained a very small army, and therefore large fortifications would be only a temptation to a foreign Power to take them. Our Minister at Copenhagen had had a conversation with Count Sponneck upon this very question, so that he was perfectly justified in saying that it was well known both to the King and his Minister, that the demolition of the fortifications was one of the conditions of the cession of the Islands. His hon. Friend said that Her Majesty's Government were doing the dirty work of Austria in this matter. But his hon. Friend forgot that Austria had a perfect right to a voice respecting the conditions on which the Islands should be surrendered, for she was a party to the original treaty which gave England the Protectorate, and we were bound to consult her. Austria said, "You are going to give a very strong place to a country which we believe to be incapable of defending it. These Islands will be exposed to a coup de main, and if taken by a strong Power at enmity with us, our possessions in the Adriatic might be endangered. They may also be a great source of danger to Turkey; and on all these grounds we think it dangerous to the peace of Europe that these fortifications should remain as they are." She had a perfect right to start these objections. His hon. Friend said that if Austria did not assent to the conditions of the treaty she might have been left out. But Her Majesty's Government had reason to know that the views of Austria were shared by both Russia and Prus- sia, both of which would have refused to accede to the treaty if Austria had declined to do so. France also entirely approved the views of Austria. Would it have been an advantageous arrangement for Greece to have left Austria and the other Powers, or even Austria alone, out of the treaty? Suppose Prussia, Russia, and Austria had said, "We decline to have anything to do with the treaty, we decline to accept the responsibility of handing these Islands over to Greece, we shall reserve our rights, and when the time comes shall take care to vindicate them." If the Islands had been conceded under these conditions the gift would have been a fatal one to Greece and a source of constant anxiety to Europe. Another point submitted by Austria was that the Islands should be declared neutral, which in some respects might have been an advantage to Greece and to the Islands themselves, and was not altogether an unreasonable proposal, although its value may be doubtful. Another condition was that the conventions of Austria as to commerce and trade with the Ionian Islands should not be affected by the annexation to Greece. To this condition Austria was entitled, because there was a clause in the Treaty of 1815 which guaranteed these rights to her. She was the only Power in the east of Europe which had extensive commercial relations with the Ionian Islands. The Austrian Lloyds' boats touched at Corfu, and the other Islands. The trade was to a certain extent a coasting trade, and had no reservations been introduced in favour of Austria, great injury might have been done to an important commercial company. Well, then, there was the clause as to religious toleration. It was well known that the Greek was not the most tolerant of religions. The great antagonism in the East was between the Roman Catholics and Greeks, and as the French Government had obtained certain rights in favour of Roman Catholics in the Ionian Islands, there was a natural wish on its part that those rights should be guaranteed by treaty. His hon. Friend (Mr. Gregory) said, it was a most unexampled thing to declare the independence of a country and destroy part of its fortifications, and he quoted the case of Belgium. But he could not have quoted a more unlucky instance, because the treaty which gave independence to Belgium provided for the destruction of five fortified places. Then his hon. Friend said they ought to have delayed the signa- ture of the treaty until the people of the Ionian Islands had agreed to the conditions. But the people had really no voice in the question. It was their duty to say "aye" or "no," whether or not they assented to the union with Greece. They had no right to go further and interfere in European arrangement arising out of a European treaty. It was, therefore, not necessary to lay the conditions of the treaty before the Ionian Parliament. Her Majesty's Government thought it best, for the interests of the Islands and of Greece, to put a stop to the state of uncertainty-then existing, and to have the treaty signed as soon as possible. It was true that the Greek Government objected to the terms of the treaty; and the English Government had steadily, faithfully, and loyally endeavoured to serve Greece by inducing the Powers to make the modifications which she desired, and render the stipulations of the treaty as little onerous to her as possible. Accordingly, many modifications had been effected. In the first place, instead of the whole of the Islands being neutralized, the neutralization was confined to Corfu and another. Again, Her Majesty's Government had succeeded in inducing Austria to give up altogether her demand, that only a certain number of troops should be maintained in the Islands, and now there was to be no limit to the number of troops. The original agreement was that all the fortifications should be destroyed; but we represented to Austria that this was not necessary, and that in the work of destruction and dismantling no more need be done than would remove the danger to which the Islands would be exposed if the present fortifications were maintained. Accordingly, the old fortifications would remain untouched. Only two forts would be destroyed and another dismantled. With regard to Fort Neuf, he might observe that for several years there had been an agitation to get the British Government to destroy that fort, in order that a certain road uniting the town and a suburb might be made; and now the agitators in the Island made its destruction a grievance. As to the question between the Ionian Islands and Austria, with regard to a separate flag under which the Ionian commerce was to be carried on, we had explained to Austria the objections to carrying out what she wished for, and that when the Ionian Islands came to be united to Greece, a distinction could not be made with respect to flags, but that the Ionian should be merged in the Grecian flag. It had been at length agreed that Austria should enjoy her commercial privileges for a limited period, and that when that period expired other arrangements should be made. Next, as to the £10,000 which was to have been paid annually out of the revenue of Corfu to the civil list of the Islands, that proposal had been modified by allowing the Greek Government to make that sum chargeable upon the whole revenue of the kingdom. He contended that the destruction of the fortifications would be no loss to Greece. The fortifications of Corfu, if defended properly, would take about 10,000 men. Would it be desirable to call upon a young Power like Greece to incur such an expenditure as that force would involve? If, on the other hand, the fortifications were not defended, at any moment a lawless hand might take possession of them, and hold the Island against the Greeks themselves. It had been said, in the course of this debate, that the destruction of the fortifications was a violation of the 4th, 5th, and 9th Articles of the treaty; but it was not so, for the fourth Article of the treaty referred to recited that the cession of the Islands to Greece should take place with the concurrence of Austria, France, Russia, and Prussia; and the destruction of the fortifications was to take place in fulfilment of one of the conditions on which that concurrence had been obtained. The destruction of the fortifications was, therefore, a literal fulfilment of the 4th Article; and it was no violation whatever of either the 5th Article or the 9th. The hon. Member would have the House believe that all this was a trick on the part of the British Government, and that we had no intention of benefiting Greece by giving up these Islands. But if the British Government was not acting in good faith in this matter, we might have taken advantage of the objections made to the conditions as a ground for backing out of our proposal; but, on the contrary, we had acted most loyally to Greece throughout in carrying out our intentions.

MR. GREGORY

What right had you -to destroy the fortifications?

MR. LAYARD

There was no article in the Treaty of 1815 about giving up the fortifications, either in the condition we received them or in any other condition, and the spirit of the Treaty of 1815 required that they should be destroyed. Among the many complaints that were now brought forward against us, one was that we were removing the historical Venetian guns from Corfu. But that was not true—the guns we were removing were guns we had put there; and he did not think we were called upon to make a present of those guns to Greece in addition to giving up arrears amounting to £90,000. The hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. Smollett) had characterized the Government of England in the Ionian Islands as one of odious oppression, and the only Government he lauded was that of "King Tom." [Mr. SMOLLETT: He acted constitutionally and with the Senate.] He did not think that was the character generally given of "King Tom's" rule; but, be that as it might, the hon. Gentleman had gone on to speak of our having employed none but decayed politicians as Lord High Commissioners. Now, Sir Henry Storks was not a decayed politician. [Mr. SMOLLETT: His government is most odious to the people.] He had known the gallant gentleman for a very long time, and he could assure the House that he did not know whether Sir Henry Storks was a Liberal or a Conservative. All he knew was, that he had been employed in most important public services, and had well deserved the rewards which his country had bestowed upon him. The hon. Member said Sir Henry Storks was the worst governor the Islands had ever been ruled by; but the government of Sir Henry Storks did not deserve the character which the hon. Gentleman had given it. In a time of great difficulty, and in the face of great opposition, he performed his duties in a manner that deserved the gratitude of the country; and his memory would be cherished in the Islands themselves when the names of the intriguers who found mouthpieces in this House were forgotten. It had been said that there were not twenty persons in the Islands who would regret the departure of the English. His impression was quite otherwise. He believed their departure would be deeply regretted. There might be persons who lived by agitation who would not regret it; but the great bulk of the people would regret it, for his belief was, they would never be so prosperous and happy as they had been under English rule. His acquaintance with the Islands taught him that there was no people on the face of the earth who might have been more happy, prosperous, and truly free than the people of the Ionian Islands under our Protectorate, had they not been misled by designing and unprincipled men. He only trusted the time might not come when they would deeply regret that they had ever acceded to the wishes of a few persons to withdraw from our protection. His hon. Friend had spoken of the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs in terms which be ought to have blushed to use, for he said that Lord Russell had "dirtied the character of England." He (Mr. Layard) believed the noble Lord had raised the character of this country. He had had some opportunity of judging of the policy and opinions of his noble Friend, and he believed there was no man in this country who had more truly liberal opinions and was more anxious to promote them, while, at the same time, maintaining due respect for treaties. It seemed to him (Mr. Layard) that liberalism in these days was supposed to consist in an entire disregard for international obligations and international treaties. But let hon. Members look at the career of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office. While promoting to the best of his power all over Europe liberal opinions and constitutional government, he had endeavoured to maintain treaties in perfect good faith. What his hon. Friend charged the noble Lord with was this—that, instead of violating treaties, he bad acted in accordance with them in consulting Austria, Russia, and Prussia about the cession of the Ionian Islands. He would say, as regarded Greece herself, they had done the best for her interests. They had her interests only at heart; they desired that she should have a constitutional Government, that would develop her resources, and contribute to the welfare and liberty of her people. They deprecated aggression upon other States, and they took only a wise and just course when they made it one of the conditions of the cession of the Islands to Greece, that she should renounce all attempts at aggression upon her neighbours. Those Islands, inhabited by an industrious and intelligent population, might add much to the strength of Greece; but if Corfu were to be made a nest of intrigue, and to become the basis for carrying on aggressions on neighbouring countries, then the cession could only tend to make her position worse, and to embroil her with the nations of Europe. With respect to the papers, he thought it would be advisable to give them to the end of November, and he hoped after Easter that the treaty would be signed, and that be should be able to give the rest of them.

CAPTAIN JERVIS

said, he had heard with surprise the admission of the hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that this country had handed over, at the instigation of a few individuals, a happy and contented people to a country that was in a state of bankruptcy and anarchy. He had always protested against handing over these Islands to Greece; but he had done the Foreign Office the justice of supposing that they believed that, by so doing, they were about to add to the happiness of these Islands and not to their misery. They had been under our rule for the last forty-five years, and they had enjoyed a state of contentment and civilization, which was unknown to the rest of Europe; but now it seems they had been handed over to a country which was in a state of anarchy and bankruptcy, overrun with brigands, and in so turbulent and disorderly a condition, that the foreign Ambassadors had three times threatened to leave the country. But having agreed to hand these Islands over to Greece, Her Majesty's Government ought to have acted in a straightforward and honourable manner. They had no right to enter into a treaty with a young prince, stating that those Islands were to form an integral portion of his dominions, and then emasculate them as they were about to do. If the Islands were to form part of a constitutional and independent State, as would appear from Article 3, what was meant by laying it down that an army or navy was not to be kept on the Islands? He had looked into the various treaties and protocols that bore upon the question of our Protectorate, and he had been unable to discover any authority which would entitle us to insist upon such a condition. The hon. Gentleman (Mr. Layard) had said, that the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, had distinctly stated in the House of Lords that the fortifications were to be destroyed. It was true he had stated that it was doubtful whether some of them should not be destroyed, because Greece had but a small army, and it would be a temptation to some foreign Power to seize upon the fortifications if they were allowed to stand. But the noble Lord had stated quite the contrary of what the hon. Gentleman had alleged. It was true there were fortifications, such as those of St. George, in Cephalonia, and fortifications in Zante and Cerigo, which might be demolished, but these were to remain untouched. It had been said that having paid for the fortifications at Corfu, we had a right to destroy them; but he held in his hand a Return made by the Board of Ordnance in 1848, from which it appeared that, of the total expenditure from 1815 to 1848 of £456,000, the sum of £307,000 had actually been contributed by the Islands themselves. It was all very well to say that a part of the money expended ought to have gone to the payment of the troops; but by the Treaty of 1815 we were bound to see the fortresses maintained in a state of efficiency, and with regard to the men themselves, by whom the Ionian Islands were to be protected, they might have been much better protected by a small body of police. Was it right, because we had required a strong force in these Islands for our own purposes, that the people there should be called upon to pay for them when they did not require a single man for their own protection? He should like to ask what precautions had been taken for the protection of the English officials in these Islands and the retention of their pensions? He believed that not a single measure had been taken for this purpose, but that we had done our best to crush the interests of the people. We had not taken a single step to protect the claims of those who had served us for years; and he should like to know, what was the real state of Greece and of these Islands as to fortifications, and also as to the interests of those personally concerned, when we handed them over to Greece?

MR. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE

said, he could relieve the mind of the hon. and gallant Member with regard to security of pensions and compensations when the Protectorate should cease. The British Government had made provision in the treaty for those pensions with great care; but, with reference to meeting present payments when quarter-day should arrive, representations on the subject had been made at the Colonial Office, and the answer was that we were in communication with the Lord High Commissioner upon that point, and though at this moment of great political change the finances of the Ionian Islands were temporarily affected and diminished, yet Sir Henry Storks was using every exertion to provide for the salaries and pensions, and there was every reason to believe that they would be punctually paid. With respect to the future pensions and compensations of British subjects who would lose their offices in consequence of the cession, he explained fully to the House not long ago the course that had been taken. He stated that the Greek Government would be bound by the treaty to pay those pensions and compensations regularly in the case of the former to the British Consul at Corfu, and in the case of the latter to the British Minister at Athens. The greater part of the hon. and gallant Gentleman's remarks had been answered by anticipation by his hon. Friend (Mr. Layard). The hon. and gallant Gentleman took it for granted that everything in the treaty between the Great Powers was to be carried out literally. But his hon. Friend had explained that by the friendly exertions of the British Government many of the restrictions which were at first sought to be imposed on Greece had been relaxed, and that the conditions that were now being actually carried into effect were of a much less stringent character. Without debarring the Crown of Greece from sending soldiers and ships to the Ionian Islands, and keeping them there, provision was made for their general neutrality, and that was a much greater advantage to a weak Power than it could be to any other. His hon. Friend the Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory) was a warm and sincere friend of the Greek people, and it was well known that they had proved their sense of his friendship by electing him a vice-president of a society for the union between the Islands and Greece. His hon. Friend, however, might have employed that exceptional position much more usefully than he had done by acting rather as a mediator between the parties concerned than as the advocate of one. His hon. Friend might have pointed out to the Ionians that when they made up their minds to demand a great change of this sort and had at last attained their wishes, they could not expect everything to be couleur de rose. He might have pointed out the difficulty of a great Power carrying out a thing unexampled in history—the voluntary cession of a territory in its own hands—when there were other Powers whose consent was necessary, and various conflicting interests to be reconciled. He might have told them that they had after all but a trifling price to pay for that condition of national life which they had been so long demanding, and their agitation for which had made all useful British rule in the Islands impossible. He (Mr. C. Fortescue) must remind his hon. Friend that this was a critical moment in the history of the Ionian Islands. It could not but happen that so great and serious a political change must greatly affect the interest of many persons in the Islands. It affected for the time being the credit of the country; it diminished its commerce and revenue, and no doubt had a prejudicial influence on the livelihood of many in Corfu who had long been dependent upon the Protectorate and the garrisons; it spoilt the trade of the political agitator, who found himself "cursed by a granted prayer," and led to a temper on the part of the Ionians which rendered them not very easy to please, and made them ready to find fault with those conditions which England had found necessary in order to carry out, the cession. Under these circumstances, it would have been satisfactory if his hon. Friend had shown a temper more English and less Ionian in this matter. His hon. Friend seemed disposed to treat the pecuniary part of the question as of little or no importance; but the fact was that the amount of Ionian or British money expended on the fortifications was an element of considerable importance in the equitable question between the two Governments, He spoke, of course, of the modern works, and not of that venerable structure the citadel of Corfu, which it was not intended to touch. In annual instalments spread over many years, the Ionian Government had spent on the fortifications of Corfu some £250,000. [Captain JERVIS: £300,000 up to 1848.] The hon. and gallant Member was mistaken. The amount he mentioned included other military expenses besides the cost of fortifications. [Captain JERVIS: It is for fortifications alone.] He believed the hon. and gallant Gentleman was under a mistake. The amount of Ionian money expended on the fortifications could not have exceeded £250,000, while the amount of English money expended for the same purpose was much larger. The fact was, that the British Government had not enforced the rights they enjoyed under the Treaty of Paris to the full extent, and had, on the whole, been extremely moderate in their demands for military expenses. Taking the whole period of the Protectorate, the British Government had not obtained from the Ionian Islands above £25,000 a year, upon the average, for their military purposes of every kind, fortifications included, while they had expended three or four times as much. He would now say a word as to the administration of these Islands by the Colonial Office, and the position in which they parted company with them. He was far from saying that that administration had been free from errors and blots, or that in all respects it would bear a strict and rigid scrutiny. Judging it fairly, however, and comparing it with the conduct of other Governments under similar circumstances, there was no reason why it should be condemned by Parliament, or by the Ionians themselves in their calmer moments. The difficulties under which England undertook the management of these Islands should be remembered. We found the people corrupted by centuries of misgovernment and a long period of anarchy life and property were insecure; agriculture and commerce were almost in abeyance, and there was scarcely anything resembling law and order in the country. For some time our Government was, no doubt, despotic enough, but it was firm, efficient, and on the whole unselfish. The object of the British Government had always been to promote the welfare of the Ionians, and Ionian interests had seldom, if ever, been sacrificed to those of the protecting Power. At length, in consequence of a desire manifested by the Ionians themselves, a constitution of an ultra-Liberal character was conferred on them. It was an anomalous form of Government, but the intention was good. The first use that the islanders made of the new system was to turn it against the protecting Power. After some experience of the operation of this state of things, Her Majesty's Government, then under the guidance of Lord Derby, sent the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer (Mr. Gladstone) to visit the Ionian Islands, and through him proposals were made for an amended constitution to the Ionians; but they refused to accept it, with the view of hastening that consummation which had at length arrived. Under that state of things what was left for the British Government to do? We had very little, if any, active power. The position of the representative of the British Crown was passive rather than active. He could only try faithfully and loyally to carry out the constitution, and endure with as much patience as he could muster, the irritations and provocations to which he was constantly subjected. Such had been the behaviour of Lords High Com- missioners for some years past, and especially of his gallant friend Sir Henry Storks. He did not know whether hon. Members had read an interesting account which was to be found in one of our Parliamentary papers written by a leading member of the Greek Assembly, who had visited Cephalonia at a time when a general election was going on. He says that he found some of the candidates bitterly hostile to the protecting Power. He expresses his astonishment to find that the protecting Power, which was all powerful if it chose to exert its strength, was absolutely impartial between the contending parties. He found that the voters voted as they pleased, and that the Returns were honestly made. He gays that this state of things would have been utterly impossible in his own country under the late régime. He expressed his astonishment and admiration at a state of things he never saw before — the excellent roads — the good order of the villages—the happy smiling appearance of the country — and he contrasts with this, as he says with tears in his eyes, the condition of his own country. That was an instance of the kind of testimony that might be produced, of what, with all its shortcomings, was the well meant and unselfish efforts of the British Government to carry out the Protectorate of the Ionian Islands. Well, the time had now come when the British Government had seized a favourable opportunity of granting the prayers which had been so long urged upon them. No doubt the Ionian people would have to make some sacrifice of ease, comfort, and security for the sake of obtaining the object of their patriotic wishes—wishes which, though stimulated by political agitators for their own purposes, were, he had no doubt, sincerely felt both by many enlightened Ionians, and by the simple and well-disposed peasantry of the Islands in general. Her Majesty's Government hoped and believed that the Ionians would soon pass through their crisis of trial, and that by union with a kindred race they would be developed into a prosperous and well governed people. It was their hope also that the irritation attending the change, and caused by the conditions which the British Government had been compelled to impose would pass away, and that the Ionians would look back with good and kindly feelings to the Power which had so long ruled them, and at last had granted them that which they so warmly desired. It was to be hoped that they would forget those invectives against England which they still heard from certain parties in the Islands, and from some to-night in that House. His advice to the Ionian people was that they would put out of their minds those eloquent incentives to ill-feeling towards this country which they had heard that night from his hon. Friend the Vice President of the Union Society.

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

Sir, I regret very much that a question of so much importance should have been discussed to-night in so thin a House. The question is one of importance not only to this country — not only as regards our relations with foreign Powers, but of particular importance to the country of which the hon. Gentleman who has just sat down has spoken, and which—fatally, I think, to its own prosperity—the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office had taken under his own special protection. We are now discussing this question probably for the last time, and therefore I am unwilling to allow this opportunity to pass without some observations. I am not going to discuss at all the propriety of this cession of the Ionian Islands. Upon that question I have a very, very strong opinion, and I have expressed that opinion very strongly in this House. But this has now passed—it is a matter of history, and I am not going to revive the question. But the hon. Member who spoke last (Mr. Chichester Fortescue) has referred to a portion of the history of the Ionian Islands, and he has said that the result of English dominion there has been to establish a kind of Paradise. [" No, no!"] Will the hon. Gentleman allow me to proceed? He said this—that, where there had been disorder, where there had been no regular Government, we had established a regular Government, that agriculture had flourished, that roads had been made, which had conferred the greatest benefits on the inhabitants. The hon. Gentleman contrasted this state of things with the condition of Greece. But has there been that freedom? Has there been that constitutional government developed? Has there been that agricultural prosperity? Have public improvements ' been made? The very reverse. Of all countries in Europe there is not a country where so little has been done for the prosperity of the people as in Greece. And yet the hon. Gentleman, for the glorification of the policy of his Government, has pointed out this as the result of their policy—that whereas we have made the Ionian Islands specially prosperous under our rule, and whereas their condition was particularly contrasted with the condition of Greece, we have now severed our connection with the Islands, we have deprived them of the benefits of that established and regularly-organized government which gave them all those benefits, and we have united them to a country which has long been in a state of anarchy, in which, whilst it had a Government, according to the description of those who found fault with the late Greek Government, no improvement had been made, and which, since the late Goverement has been overthrown, has gone far to relapse into that anarchy and disunion which so lately distinguished it under the Ottoman Government. I come now to deal with the Motion of the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory), which is, to call the attention of the House to the demolition of the fortresses of Corfu and the neutralization of the Ionian Islands. I am entirely in accordance with his opinion in reference to those points, and I regret the more, on this ground, that the House is so thin, because I think this is one of the many instances of the policy of the Foreign Secretary and the Government altogether—for the noble Lord at the head of the Government said the other night that he identified himself with the policy of the noble Earl, I say that the policy of the Government on this question is just one of those they have meddled, and where in meddling they have done no good to those in whose favour they have interfered. On the contrary, I say they have compromised the character of this country. First, let me point out the course of the Government in reference to the Greek question, in reference to the abdication of the late King. I pass over the fact that the Government went all over Europe hawking the Crown of Greece to any body whom we could find willing to make a good bidding; that they offered it first to one and then to another; and I say that Her Majesty's Ministers greatly compromised our own position by allowing the name of one of the members of our Royal Family to be introduced into the discussion, it being well known that the Prince would never accept it, and that his name was only put forward for the moment to oust the claims of a Prince who might have been put forward by the Court of Russia. But having hawked the Crown of Greece all over Europe, at length we obtained a candidate; we obtained somebody who would accept it, the present King of Greece. Upon what terms did that Prince accept the throne of Greece? It was specially provided that he only accepted it upon the condition of an effective union of the Ionian Islands with Greece. Well, of course, that Prince was perfectly entitled to lay down that position, and we were entitled, as far as we could, to carry out that agreement; but we were not entitled — that agreement having been made and that condition having been laid down — to take any step, which, on the one hand, would compromise the position of the future King of Greece, or which, on the other hand, should disappoint the expectations of the Greek people, or of the people of the Ionian Islands. But what has been done? The agreement being that the crown should be accepted only on the condition of the effective union of the Ionian Islands with Greece, what was done? The present King of Greece was induced to hurry off to Greece before that effective union was completed. And the British Government ought to have known, that at the time it was stipulated that the union should take place, that was a condition which they had no power to make and an engagement which they had no power to fulfil, without the consent of the other Powers of Europe. And not only that, but it was expressly stated by the noble Lord opposite, and by the noble Earl who is at the head of the Foreign Office, that the effective union of the Ionian Islands with Greece could not be accepted without the adhesion and consent of the other Powers of Europe. Yon induced the present King of Greece to go to Greece, there being no union effected between the Ionian Islands and Greece, and then your difficulties arose; because you were perfectly well aware that you could not unite the Ionian Islands with Greece of your own mere motion. It was quite out of your power to do it. You induced the King of Greece to go there, and then your difficulties arose. You applied to the other Powers of Europe, the parties to the Treaty of 1815, and what was the answer? At first they were not inclined to agree; but other great political questions being at the time pending, they did not raise difficulties, and therefore they agreed to the union of the Islands to Greece on certain terms—and those terms you have been compelled to carry out. The first fault I find with the policy of the Government is that they were unable to fulfil their pro- mise that the King of Greece should go to Greece under an effective union of the Ionian Islands with Greece, they not having first obtained the assent to it of the great Powers of Europe. [Mr. LAYAED: No, no!] It is not a courteous way for the hon. Gentleman to answer me in that manner; he should rather give any information he possesses to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who, as I see he is taking notes, is to follow me in this debate, who, no doubt, will give me a suitable answer. I now come to the terms upon which this effective union has been completed, and here I may say Her Majesty's Government have conducted themselves more blame-ably than in the instance to which I have already alluded. The Ionian people and the Greek Government were told that there was to be a union effected between them, but not one word was said to them as to the condition, and that it was to be one that would turn out to both parties, not an advantage, but a disgrace. You had to enter into negotiations with Austria and the other Powers of Europe, and they have made stipulations under which alone the Ionian Islands can be united to Greece. The first is the demolition of the fortresses. Now, I ask you to point out to me under what treaty, or on what stipulation in any treaty, rests your right to destroy those fortresses. Under the treaty by which you became possessed of the Protectorate of those Islands, and under which you were entitled to occupy the fortresses, you were hound to apply certain monies you received from the Ionian people towards the maintenance of the fortifications, and I want you to show me your right to demolish them. I entirely deny that you have any such right whatever. I perfectly admit that it would be legitimate on the part of the Austrian Government to say they would not consent to the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece unless they were demolished; but when that proposition was made to you, it was your duty to say that, under such circumstances, the union of the Ionian Islands to Greece was impossible, because we have no right whatever to destroy those fortresses. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for the Colonies has argued that we have a right to destroy what we have built up for a number of years past with British money; but I entirely deny it. By destroying what you have built up you do not restore the forts to their original position, but by pulling your improvements down you make those forts that remain valueless. And what I say is, that you have presumed on your power to do that which you have no right to do, and in this respect the Ionian people and the Greek people have the greatest grounds of complaint against you. Further, when you spoke of the union of the Ionian Islands with Greece, you told neither the Ionian people nor the Greeks that they were to have a possession where all that which we had been doing for a series of years, and which we considered to be of importance for the security of the Islands, was to be destroyed, and that we were going to hand over to them not great military strongholds, but mere heaps of ruins. What, again, is the state of the case as regarded the neutralization of the Ionian Islands? You told the Ionian people that they were to be united to Greece; you told the Greeks that they were to have this great addition to their kingdom; but you did not tell them that in order to preserve it they would not be entitled to send a single regiment there beyond what was necessary for police purposes; nor did you tell the Ionians that, except a few policemen, they were not to have that which, of course, after a long occupation such as ours, they would look forward to —namely, a garrison, with all the dignity and splendour which naturally attached to the presence of a garrison. But there is something even worse and more objectionable behind. I refer to the commercial stipulations annexed to the cession of the Islands. When you said you would cede these Islands to Greece, the Greeks naturally considered that you intended that they should be joined to Greece as a part of the kingdom, subject to the same laws, having the same relations with foreign Governments, with the like aspirations and interests for the future. But you have done nothing of the kind. You have told the Greek Government that, with respect to commercial arrangements and the admission of foreign vessels to the ports of the Ionian Islands, they were to be absolutely powerless. You had no right to do that. To sum up the whole matter, you have abused your power as regarded the fortresses. With respect to the neutralization of the Ionian Islands, you have done that which is dangerous to them and dangerous to Europe, while in the matter of commercial regulations you have done your best to impede the future prosperity of the Islands. You had done all this without a shadow of authority, without any ground of right. In doing it you have deceived at once the Greeks and the Ionian people; and the result will be that you would hand over that which had been a prosperous possession of the British Crown to a long future of anarchy and revolution.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

Sir, I am afraid it would not be for the convenience or advantage of the House that the debate should be carried on in the manner which has characterized it hitherto—that is to say, by hon. Gentlemen who, appearing at one portion of the evening, were not present during the other portions, who reply to speeches they have not heard, and who advance arguments which, totally out of place, they would have spared if they themselves, instead of being also out of place, had been in their seats during the speeches of the responsible officers of the Crown. I am always glad to hear the hon. Gentleman who has just spoken (Mr. S. FitzGerald), but I believe the House would have been deprived of a great portion of the immense advantage of hearing his speech, if he himself had been present when my hon. Friends the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the Under Secretary for the Colonies addressed the House. I admit that I am somewhat in the same condition myself; but I am not volunteering to instruct the House — I am simply rising, on the part of the Government, to notice the observations which fell from the hon. Gentleman. At any rate, I had the advantage of hearing the excellent speech of my hon. Friend the Under Secretary for the Colonies; and I must say, so far as I can recollect the terms of that speech, I would wish to he bound by it as a manly, just, impartial, and liberal exposition of our policy with respect to the Ionian Islands, worthy of my hon. Friend, myself, and of the Department which he represents in this House. The hon. Gentleman opposite appears to think that there was a great inconsistency in the representation made by my hon. Friend. The representation was this—that the people of the Ionian Islands had reaped great benefits and advantages under British rule, and yet, notwithstanding, they were seized with a kind of itch for political union with Greece. That appears to the hon. Gentleman opposite to be a paradox and inconsistency; I contend, on the contrary, that there is no paradox or inconsistency in those statements. It is perfectly true that the English Government has conferred great benefits on the Ionian Islanders, and yet they may cherish a sincere desire for union with Greece. For after all it is not material advantages that form the entire life of a people. There is something in the heart, the mind, the traditions, and the history of man, and I have always maintained that these Ionians being of the same blood with the Greeks, the great parents of civilization, would have been the basest of human kind if they had entertained no desire to share their political and national fortunes. No doubt the base men of the Ionian Islands traded on that rooted sentiment of the honest and good portion of the Ionian people; but having mixed with all classes, all political sects, and all ranks of that people, I never found any distinction between them, except in this — that all men professed the desire of union with Greece, that the good men felt it, and the bad men traded on it. The policy of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the Ionian Islands has long been before the country. When the resolution was first taken by the Cabinet it was not concealed, but was at once made known to the country and to Parliament. There was a disposition in some quarters to complain that this matter was going to he transacted in the dark and done in a corner, and that England was going to be cheated out of the possession of the Protectorate. But the facts confute that allegation. All last Session the intention of the Government was as notorious as day. If hon. Gentlemen objected to the cession, why did they not address the Crown on the subject? There was no premature engagement to bind the Crown, until long after it was in the power of Parliament to interfere and check the action of the Executive. Why was not the opinion of Parliament fairly challenged at an earlier day? It is quite possible that hon. Gentlemen opposite were not of one mind on the subject. There is one eminent and distinguished man who sits on the opposite benches, and with whom I was brought into relation on this subject. He ought to be the organ of hon. Gentlemen opposite if he objects to the cession of these Islands. I refer to the Colonial Secretary in the Government of Lord Derby (Sir E. Bulwer-Lytton). Why s he not in his place to-night? Why does le leave to the hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. FitzGerald), and to the noble Lord the First Commissioner of Works in the Government of Lord Derby, to vindicate the title of the Ionian people to remain under the British Crown? The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Hertfordshire has never opened his mouth in objection to the policy of the Government upon the cession of the Ionian Islands; yet he is the person who, if he had objected, should have been in his place to-night—and from my knowledge of his high character and feeling he would have been in his place —to impeach the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Gentleman has flinched from grappling with this question, and with the policy of the Government, but he made objections to certain particulars of our proceedings. He says that it was the condition of these arrangements that the Ionian Islands should be effectively united with Greece, and that we undertook to affix conditions which it was not in our power to fulfil. It is undoubtedly difficult in this, as in other transactions, to make a satisfactory arrangement of details. We had many parties to consult, who were standing in a different category. We had to consult first the people of the Ionian Islands, then the people of Greece, who were for the moment without a regular and organized Government; we had to deal with the person who was about to become the Sovereign of Greece; we had to deal with the various Powers who were parties to the treaty of protection, who entertained widely different views, and stood in widely different positions. How were we to do otherwise than fix our eyes on the main question, whether it was or was not the desire of the Ionian Islanders to be united to Greece? Would it not be paltry and frivolous, when we had ascertained that this desire really existed, if we had, on account of any minor questions, shrunk from giving effect to that desire? I do not, however, admit that there has been any failure in the details, or that any one has been induced to act by expectations that have turned out to be delusive. I do not admit that the hon. Gentleman has made out the charge which it was perhaps his ex-official duty to bring against Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Gentleman says that it is not in the power of the Government to fulfil their promise to the Ionians of an effective union with Greece. But is not that promise about to be fulfilled? Are we to be told, because Corfu is to be neutralized, that the union of these Islands with Greece is Ineffective? You may tell me that the neutralization of Corfu is a bad arrangement. On that point there may be much to be said; but if Her Majesty's Government had enforced the completion of these arrangements without the neutralization of Corfu, the hon. Gentleman would have been quite as eloquent in pointing out the danger of allowing Islands to pass into the possession of Greece, which are remote from her territory, one of which is divided by only two miles of sea from the territory of the Ottoman Porte, and contains a fortress capable of holding 20,000 men. Then there is the question of the demolition of these fortresses. As regards the works that have been erected by England, I must confess that if the Austrian Government had confined its demand to the demolition of Fort Neuf, it might reasonably have been expected that the feelings of the people of Corfu would have been effectively consulted, and that none of those powerful sentiments which have been enlisted in this matter would have been excited. I will not say that Austria has inflicted any injury on the people of Corfu; but they are particularly attached to those fortifications—they are bound up with their traditions; they remind them of the times of the Ottoman domination; and to see the mine driven, the axe, and the mattock at work in destroying them must undoubtedly be painful to the population of the Island. I do not think that the course taken by the Austrian Government has been injurious, but I do admit that it has been painful. But would Her Majesty's Government have been justified in making such a condition a ground for withdrawing the assent of Great Britain from the fundamental points of the arrangement, and thus defeating the great desire of the people for union with their neighbours and fellow citizens? Clearly what we had to do was to act in perfect good faith in giving effect to what we believed to be the desire of the people as far as was compatible with the general objects of European policy; and to sacrifice all interests of a secondary character to the attainment of that end. Although I must confess that I look with suspicion and with some degree of aversion on the policy of Austria towards the Christians of the East—which I do not consider to have been at any time a fraternal, a generous, or a confiding policy—in this particular instance I do not believe that it has been the means of inflicting a wrong or a wound on the real political interests of the people of the Islands, It is not for their interests, or for those of the people of Greece, to be in delusive possession of the attractions of a great fortress, lest they should feel themselves prematurely stimulated or driven in to the political arena, and urged to anticipate, by forced and unnatural efforts, what may, in the counsels of Providence, possibly be the future fortunes of their race. As one who is sincerely attached to that people, I confess my earnest desire that they may be induced resolutely—and it will require resolution— to lay aside every dream of conquest, to cast away every temptation to aggression, that they may set themselves to the prosecution of peaceful industry, to the establishment of good laws, to the cultivation of union among themselves, and to the peaceful development of the resources of their people. And I further hope that in this important crisis of their history they may eschew that vain ambition and pride of military establishments which, undoubtedly, was the great misfortune and vice of the late Government of Greece, and which might be stimulated to even a higher intensity if that people, numerically so small, were enabled to boast of possessing fortresses of so high a rank even among the great fortresses of Europe, But there was another point more distinctly put by the hon. Member — he seems to think that a delusion was practised, first on the King of Greece, and, secondly, on the Ionian Assembly, by our keeping back the knowledge of these important conditions of union until both these parties were effectually committed to them. My information on this point is not as full as I could wish, for my mind has not recently been given to the subject, but I hope to be able to make the matter clear to the House. The acceptance by the Ionian Assembly of the preferred union with Greece is dated last October. The King did not commit himself finally by taking his departure until a later date—in fact, His Majesty did not arrive in Greece till November. The treaty was made in August, and in that month the King was perfectly aware of its conditions.

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

asked, if the conditions of the demolition of the fortresses and the neutralization of the Islands were made known in the month of August?

THE CHANCELLOR OP THE EXCHEQUER

That was so. The conditions were communicated to Copenhagen from the British Government in the month of July; and as early as the 10th of August despatches written from Copenhagen recited in detail conversations of the British Minister with the Danish Government on, these two subject. This was before the preparation of the final treaty, before the Ionian Assembly was invited to commit itself by an acceptance of the union, and long before the King committed himself by setting out for Corfu. The hon. Gentleman has referred to certain conditions with reference to commerce. Perhaps he had chiefly in view the important line of steamers, called the Austrian Lloyds. I believe it was originally asked that a perpetual concession should be granted, guaranteeing the possession of their privileges in perpetuity to that line. Such an arrangement would have been, I think, very disparaging to the kingdom of Greece, and in itself essentially a deviation from the rules of justice. The terms of the agreement, as it now stands, I am informed, continue the line for fifteen years, and at the end of that time the Greek Government will be bound to negotiate for the renewal of the general covenant; but the conditions of that renewal will be as free to the Greek Government as to any independent Crown. With regard to the Ionian Assembly, Her Majesty's Government accepted the declaration of the will of the Assembly as the most competent organ of the people in those Islands; and I do not think they could do more. Her Majesty's Government did not invite, and I do not think by their acts they have ever given their sanction or expressed concurrence in the favourite modern doctrine of plebiscite, or, as we should call it, national suffrage. I think I may fairly appeal to the right hon. Gentleman whether, with the complexity of affairs and the diversity of persons and interests we had to deal with, he could have pointed out any order of proceedings more reasonable in itself, more conformable to public law, or more likely to attain the object in view than that which we actually followed.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

said, the right hon. Gentleman commenced his speech by a violent attack on his hon. Friend (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald) for the indiscretion — a word of which they had heard much that night—he had shown in speaking in a debate during the whole of which he had not been present; but the right hon. Gentleman then proceeded to admit that he had not himself been present through the debate, and that therefore he was himself guilty of the very same offence with which he charged his hon. Friend. And really from the speech which he had delivered it was to be inferred that he had spent very little of his time in the House during the debate which had been raised by the hon. Member for Galway. Did the right hon. Gentleman require to be told that this question was raised, not upon the great question of the policy of the cession, but as to the manner in which the Government were carrying it out? One would have supposed, listening to the right hon. Gentleman, that the debate had been originated by his hon. Friend or himself, and that they had come down to raise a great debate on the policy of the cession of the Ionian Islands. On the contrary, it had been raised by those who, unlike them, had not objected in limine to the cession of these Islands, but who, like the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory), had been among the most forward and determined supporters of that foolish policy — and a foolish policy he (Lord John Manners) did not hesitate to say it was, as he had taken the proper occasion to say so last year, almost at the commencement of the Session. The right hon. Gentleman taunted them with not having challenged the policy of the Government at the proper time, alleging that no step which had been taken by the Government previous to the meeting of Parliament would have prevented Parliament from giving a formal vote. Did the right hon. Gentleman mean to say that Her Majesty's Government had not announced to Europe that negotiations were pending for the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece before Parliament met? Did he mean to tell them that the noble Viscount, almost in as many words, had not denied the right of Parliament to interfere in the matter of the cession of these Islands, which had come under the protectorate of the Crown merely by virtue of a treaty? In what circumstances, then, were those placed who objected to the policy of that cession? and with what justice could the right hon. Gentleman taunt them with not having brought forward a Motion on that subject? If the right hon. Gentleman had been in his place he must have known that the question raised that night was raised by the hon. Member for Galway impugning the mode and manner in which the cession was subsequently carried out. After all the virtuous indignation which the Chancellor of the Exchequer had expended upon his hon. Friend he had not condescended to answer his arguments and facts. He had not made any reply to his hon. Friend's argument as to the right of the Government to demolish these fortifications; but he gave reasons why the Ionian people might be unwise in retaining fortifications requiring 20,000 men. The arguments of the right hon. Gentleman went to the length of asserting that it was bad policy on the part of the Ionians to wish to maintain them. What, however, his hon. Friend had contested was the right of the English Government to destroy those fortifications. He would not himself give any opinion on that point; for, entertaining the views which he did of the cession of these Islands, he did not wish to mix himself up with these—as he held them to be—minor questions. But the right hon. Gentleman had made no answer to the challenge of his hon. Friend; and as to these considerations of policy, surely the Ionian people and the Greeks might be allowed to be the best judges. If, as the right hon. Gentleman said, they were so well adapted to spread the name and fame of their Greek ancestry throughout a remote posterity, why might they not he trusted to decide these questions for themselves? He confessed he was a little amused at finding that the right hon. Gentleman who lectured his hon. Friend for not being present at the whole of the debates, had in one of those eloquent speeches in which he so often delighted to indulge, enlarged upon the virtuous determination of the present Ionian population to recover the connection with their own glorious Greek ancestry. Surely the right hon. Gentleman could not have been in the House when the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs was enlightening them on that very question about half an hour before, taking care to tell them that these modern Ionians were in reality nothing better than Venetians.

MR. LAYARD

begged the noble Lord's pardon. What he might have said was that some of the leaders and a good part of the population of Corfu were so.

LORD JOHN MANNERS

If they took away Corfu from the Ionian Islands they took away a considerable portion of the subject-matter of that debate. Having done what the right hon. Gentleman had not done—namely, listened to the greater part of that discussion, he came to the conclusion that in the cession of these Islands a very foolish thing had been done, and done, too, in the most ungracious manner, in a manner which had dissatisfied everybody and contented nobody. They had heard from the hon. Member for Galway (Mr. Gregory) a statement of the grievances and the feelings of the Greek and the Ionian people in that matter, The statement had been corroborated on that (the Opposition) side in an amusing speech, which the right hon. Gentleman did not hear, by the hon. Member for Dumbartonshire (Mr. Smollett), who did not dissent from the policy of the cession. They had seen, also, in all the public papers the feeling which animated the King of Greece and his Ministers. On the other hand, three official Gentlemen had expressed satisfaction that night with the cession. The chief ground of the satisfaction expressed by the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs amounted to this—that the Ionian Islanders were a most discontented, turbulent, bad Venetian people, who were, however, extremely happy under the rule of England, but who, he seemed rather to anticipate, would find that they had made a bad bargain by the exchange. That was the hon. Gentleman's only proof of the political sagacity of Her Majesty's Government, and the only ground of his satisfaction, The other Under Secretary who had spoken had dilated on the happiness, the contentment, the liberty, the material, moral, and social development which these Islands had enjoyed under our Protectorate, and there fore the satisfaction that he could feel in handing them over to a State in which, as he said, freedom was unknown, the Under Secretary himself could hest explain. And, lastly, they had heard from the Chancellor; of the Exchequer himself—as he humbly believed, the real cause of the cession of the Ionian Islands—one of those glowing harangues which he doubted not would greatly please people out of doors, concluding with a very sensible piece of practical advice to the Ionians and Greeks generally, which, it was much to be questioned, from all that had been seen of their antecedents, whether they were very likely to profit by. But the sum of it all was, that a very foolish and imprudent thing had been done in a most unsatisfactory and ungracious way; and he believed that neither the people of Greece nor the Ionian people, nor those who were interested in the welfare and prosperity of the Greeks, would have cause to bless Her Majesty's Government for having ceded those Islands at all, and still less for ceding them in the manner they had done.

MR. CHILDERS

said, that hon. Gentlemen opposite not having committed themselves in any way on this question last year derived one advantage perhaps from that course—namely, that they were able now that the cession had taken place and the thing was done, to take whatever side they pleased in the matter. But although last Session there had been no formal debates on that question in that House, in the other House the distinguished leader of the Conservative party had expressed definite opinions with regard to the conditions of the cession of these Islands. He was bound to say, that if anybody was to blame about those conditions to which the hon. Member for Hoi sham (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald) had just objected it was Lord Derby himself. Speaking in a debate on the 30th of June last — a debate antecedent to the signature of the treaty, and still more so to the imposition of the terms complained of by Count Sponneck, Lord Derby was, he believed, historically the first English statesman who referred to the neutralization of these Islands, as being one essential condition for the proper carrying out of the proposed cession. His hon. Friend the Member for Horsham complained of the disgust felt by the Ionians at their ceasing to have the advantages of garrisons and military expenditure; but Lord Derby had foreseen this and "wished the Ionian Islands joy of the change." The demolition of the fortifications was suggested by Lord Derby as necessary to the proper carrying out of the cession. The noble Lord said — There is another point of minor importance on which I should like some information from the noble Karl. I presume that when we cede the Islands we shall not hand over the extensive works which we have constructed at Corfu at so much expense. Those works will probably be demolished, for it is obvious that the Greek army, which, I am told, consists of 8,000 men and 4,000 officers, will find it very difficult to garrison these extensive works." [3 Hansard, clxxi. 1726.] And, so far from the Greek nation and the people of the Ionian Islands being taken by surprise, the course to be pursued was indicated in the reply of Earl Russell, who said— With regard to the fortifications, it is doubtful whether some of them should not be destroyed, because Greece maintains a very small army, and therefore large fortifications in the Ionian Islands would only be a temptation to a foreign Power to take them." [3 Hansard, clxxi. 1733.] That was long before the date of the treaty, so that the Greeks had ample information of what was intended to be done. Who- ever was in fault it was not Her Majesty's Government, and it seemed rather hard that they should be taunted for carrying out suggestions made by their opponents. As to the general question, he was confident that the country was satisfied that considering the expense to which we were put and the complications in which we were involved by the Protectorate of these Islands, their cession was a great boon; and if hon. Members opposite or his hon. Friend behind him (Mr. Gregory) would put that question to the House, he had no doubt that it would by an overwhelming majority pronounce, as the country had already pronounced, in favour of the policy of Her Majesty's Government.

MR. CAVE

said, that his hon. Friend (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald) did not object either to the neutralization of the Ionian Islands or to the demolition of the fortresses. What he objected to was, that the Resolutions in regard to those matters, which were come to at an early period, were not sooner communicated to those who were most interested in them. He (Mr. Cave) had already expressed his opinion fully on this question, and he should not have risen had it not been for the attack which had been made upon Sir Henry Storks by the hon. Member for Dumbartonshire. He should be the last to object to perfect freedom of debate, and he entirely dissented from the doctrine that a public servant should be spared because absent. The character of public servants was the property of the country which employed them, and it was the duty as well as the right of the representatives of that country to discuss it. Still, moderation was necessary. It was not right that a public man whose acts had been adopted by the Government should be spoken of as Sir Henry Storks had been in the last Session of Parliament in terms which Cicero might have employed in denouncing Verres, or Burke have applied to Warren Hastings. Perhaps, therefore, even at that late hour, the House would give him a few minutes to defend an absent man; and as he had heard some of the circumstances which had been referred to discussed upon the spot, he might, perhaps, be allowed to give his view of the matter. Before Lord Seaton's Reform, the Administration of the Ionian Islands was practically in the hands of the Lord High Commissioner. Afterwards it was thrown, or intended to be thrown, into the hands of the Ionian people, or rather of their Parliament, which, perhaps, was not quite the same thing. The intention was that there should be government by party, but that, in a small community, was obviously impossible. In England each class is divided, and class not arrayed against class (though some have endeavoured to bring this about); but in the West Indies for instance, party conflict would be conflict of races; in the Ionian Islands that of classes. If, therefore, the party system were impossible, the Government would be in the hands of one class, and become oligarchy or ochlocracy, unless controlled by a strong hand for the good of all. The Lord High Commissioners before Sir Henry Storks, instead of holding this position, governed the country by the great families into whose hands they threw all the offices, and who made things, comfortable, ruling by monopoly of patronage but causing great and just discontent in the mass of the people. Sir Henry Storks went out in troublous times. He had a perfect knowledge of the Oriental and semi-Oriental races, and was determined to put an end to that state of things, and not only to reign but to govern. That caused great discontent against him among the higher classes, who immediately began to intrigue against him, and who raised the cry of union with Greece, not that they wanted it, but in order to obtain a return to the old régime, in order to get rid of a master. They wanted, to use an apt illustration, though it sounds like a bad joke, they wanted to get King Log instead of King Stork. But who were they who thus conspired against the Lord High Commissioner? Were they in open opposition? No; the people who got up this agitation were actually Members of the Government. It was as if one-half of the present Cabinet, which was said not to be quite in accord upon all questions, was plotting to turn out the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Under such circumstances, how was it possible that the Government should be carried on? He mentioned this among many instances to show the difficulties with which the Lord High Commissioner had to contend. The man who had to govern diverse races under such highly exceptional circumstances as those under which Sir Henry Storks had to rule those Islands ought to be treated like the general commanding an army, and to be judged by the results. We should not look at such transactions from an English point of view. We had done mischief enough already, by supposing our English system to be like a general fitting saddle which would suit the back of any horse. Vigour and justice were the qualities which, in the eyes of all Eastern races, constituted the beau ideal of a ruler, These qualities characterized the first, and he believed they characterized him who was apparently to be the last of the English Presidents of the Septinsular Republic; and as the name of Sir Thomas Maitland was a household word throughout the seven Islands where his administration was regarded as a kind of golden age, so he believed that the present Lord High Commissioner would be remembered with no unkindly feelings by the great majority of the Ionian People, when they regretted, as they would do a thousand times, the just and beneficent Protectorate of England.

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

said, it did not follow, though they might be in favour of the cession, that they were, therefore, precluded from objecting to the mode in which it had been carried out. The objection which he had taken last Session to the policy of the Government was that the House was kept in the dark with respect to it. He complained that Her Majesty's Government had thought proper, instead of consulting Parliament, to act upon the prerogative of the Crown; and that this had given rise to most of the difficulty which had arisen. If Parliament had been consulted there would have been a probability of avoiding the vacillating policy which had been pursued. Her Majesty's Government had first demanded £10,000 for the late King, and the repayment of £90,000 to this country; but the first demand had been modified so as to be nearly abandoned, and as to the £90,000 that demand was abandoned altogether. These were instances of the vacillating policy to which he had alluded.

MR. GREGORY

said, he would withdraw his Motion.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn,

Main Question put, and agreed to,