HC Deb 27 June 1864 vol 176 cc373-85
MR. ADDERLEY,

who had given notice to move— That in the opinion of this House it is inexpedient that detachments of British troops should be stationed upon exposed posts on the Canadian frontier unless adequately supported by Canadian Forces"— said, that when he mentioned that there were at this moment along the North American frontier 9,000 British troops, it would be seen that the subject was not one of slight importance. Still, in the present state of the House, he could not expect to raise a debate; he would content himself by making a brief statement, which he hoped would induce an expression of opinion from the Government. These British troops were scattered in battalions, half-battalions, and companies, along a frontier of about 1,000 miles, with little power of communicating with each other, still less of communicating with the mother country. That was a hazardous position for British troops to occupy, and it endangered also the honour of this country should any emergency arise. These troops were not placed in Canada to guard against a rebellion. Canada could no longer rebel—for this simple reason, that she had nothing to rebel against. In common with most of our other colonies, she was now her own mistress almost completely; and this country was very little more than her tributary in respect of soldiers and money. The northern frontier was safe, for it was bounded by the Hudson's Bay territory, and was only liable to the invasion of polar bears. The western frontier along the sea was also free from danger. The southern frontier was in reality the only part where forces were needed for the defence of the country. That frontier embraced a territory 1,000 miles in extent, and it could not be imagined that such an area could be defended by troops from England further than in aid of the Canadians themselves. He might fairly presume that both parties desired to maintain that frontier. He believed that England was desirous of maintaining her connection with Canada from the fact that the noble Lord opposite was sanctioned by the opinion of this country in sending reinforcements to the rescue of the Canadians in 1861, when it was supposed that the Trent affair might possibly involve us in hostilities with America. Parliament approved his sending troops across the Atlantic at the most trying period of the year, and he believed he might conclude from that fact that we had no intention of allowing that frontier to be invaded with impunity. On the other hand, he believed he might conclude that Canada was equally desirous of maintaining that frontier and her relations with us from the way in which she had lately raised Volunteer and Militia forces. The question, however, was whether the present state of things was safe in spite of the precautions that had been taken; whether the precautions were at all sufficient. It had been maintained by some that there was no danger; but, if such were the case, they were hardly warranted in incurring the expense which they had already sanctioned. If there were no danger, we ought to withdraw our troops, and not leave 9,000 soldiers scattered needlessly through the country. But would anybody maintain that there was no danger in the present state of the American continent? A perusal of the publi- cations of the country would suffice to dispel such an illusion, and show how strong was the feeling against England. Anybody who observed the preparations which America was at present making must perceive that such preparations were dictated by the anticipation of a rupture with this country. It was maintained by some that even if there be danger, it is wholly the affair of England, but that was a position which he entirely disputed. Apart from the fact that it would be impossible for us to defend the country alone, he believed that the affair was far more theirs than ours; the Canadians were much more likely to involve us in a war than we to inflict one upon them. They had as free a constitution as ourselves, the Executive represented the same Sovereign power of peace and war, and their legislative action was as likely to lead to war as ours, and as capable of refusing or granting supplies. It was again urged that allegiance and protection were reciprocal duties, but military service was part of the British allegiance. The English could not undertake the defence of all their fellow-subjects over the world, relieving them of raising troops of their own for that purpose. The noble Lord had said only a few minutes before, in reference to the Danish question, that England could not adopt the course to which her natural impulse might prompt her, because she had not the force sufficient to hazard a European war; and if England were involved in an European war, she certainly would have to withdraw her troops from Canada. Canada must look to her own defence, for the very situation rendered the protection of the Canadian frontier by England impossible. Out of the 1,000 miles of frontier 600 miles were along the lakes, and these lakes were largely covered with an American mercantile marine ready for warlike use. A large extent of the remainder of the frontier was composed of a river averaging two miles in width, but studded with islands, while the river during a considerable portion of the year was so severely frozen as to allow of the carriage of the heaviest artillery. For the rest of the distance the boundary was merely imaginary. He wished also to point out the fact, that though it might be desirable to have a few British troops stationed in Canada as a nucleus for the defence of the country, it would be very dangerous to have them scat- tered in distant positions. They ought to be concentrated in one spot, and that spot ought undoubtedly to be Quebec. And yet Quebec at that moment was utterly insecure. The right bank of the river was, he believed, wholly unfortified, and the fortifications of the place generally were in such a state that a well-disciplined army with present means of war would, he believed, find little difficulty in making themselves masters of it. The duty of the local troops was to drill and to acquire something like training and organization, which, at present, they did not possess. Their basis of operations ought to be either Montreal or Toronto, which places should be immediately put into a state of defence, but that should be clearly stated to be their own affair. Sir Francis Head, some years ago, had recommended Toronto as the real military basis for Canada, and had also recommended the fortification of Montreal as a connecting link with Quebec. With respect to the navy, although the English fleet could render valuable support to Canada, yet it could not act in the interior, and by treaties we were debarred from keeping gunboats upon the lakes. Sir Francis Head had stated that in the event of a contest the Americans would be able to wage war at a cost of a shilling where it would cost us a guinea. When the antagonists were equally matched in courage and skill the elements of additional cost was not to be overlooked. It was true the English navy might retaliate on the seaboard for any injuries done to Canada, but it would be very unsatisfactory to have to trust to that kind of warfare whilst the interior of the country was ill-defended. He would say that before any emergency arose the troops of England should be placed in garrison at Quebec, leaving the Canadian troops to defend all the rest of the frontier; and if the Canadians were not disposed to take measures for the defence of their own country, then he would recommend the withdrawal of the English troops; but as those troops were now placed it would be impossible for them even to withdraw in case of sudden war without disaster or disgrace. With respect to the navy, he would observe that in these days of iron-clads it was much better to build ships of war on the spot than to have to transport them 3,000 miles across the Atlantic; and if we undertook the naval defence of Canada against the United States from this country the Americans would have a great advantage in this respect in the proximity of their resources. It was often put as a reason why the connection between this country and Canada should be maintained, that if Canada was annexed to the United States she would become the nursery of a great marine for that Power. He would ask why Canada should not now become a nursery for seamen for us? Why should we not develop her naval power? Reverting to the troops in Canada, he found that they numbered about 9,000, of whom 6,000 were at Montreal and Quebec, 1,000 at Kingston, and the remainder at Toronto, London, and other places. The Volunteer militia amounted to 35,000 men, the number having been raised under recent Acts from 5,000, which was the original proposal. That circumstance, he thought, showed that Canada, if properly called upon, was willing and able to develop her own resources. Nothing prevented that development but the ill-defined relations existing between Canada and the mother country. We allowed indefinite and deceitful expectations to paralyze their action. If England undertook to garrison Quebec and to maintain a certain amount of naval force, leaving the remaining defences to be provided by Canada, there was no doubt that there was sufficient spirit in the Canadians to insure these defences being provided as soon as they saw clearly that the responsibility rested with them. The Volunteer militia were now distributed—15,000 in the west, 5,000 in the central districts, and 15,000 in the eastern, but the drill was only for six days in the year—an amount of training that was obviously insufficient. In addition there was the ordinary militia, which amounted upon paper to 150,000 men, but which force, at present, was nothing but an abstract; liability existing only upon paper. The results of such a system had been seen in the United States at the beginning of the present war, when an enormous militia, upon paper, afforded neither officers nor men. Lord Monck had shown his usual good sense in applying the small sum voted by the Canadian Parliament for the militia to the instruction of officers, who were even of greater importance than men. He trusted that the emergencies to which he had alluded would never arise, but it was neither safe nor prudent to close their eyes to possible dangers. He wished the Government to remove from the minds of hon. Members a feeling of anxiety as to the position of the troops in Canada, and to assure them that our troops in that important colony, and at that critical period, should not be left in a position which would expose them to the risk of a discreditable withdrawal.

MR. CARDWELL

said, he entirely agreed in the statement and language of the Motion— That it is inexpedient that detachments of British troops should be stationed upon exposed posts on the Canadian frontier, unless adequately supported by Canadian Forces; and with respect to the observations made by his right hon. Friend, there was really much in which he was also enabled to concur. He began by paying a just tribute to his noble Friend at the head of the Government for the decision and vigour he displayed in sending, at a moment of emergency, a large reinforcement of British troops to Canada. His right hon. Friend also admitted that the main defence of Canada must ultimately rest in the spirit, vigour, and determination of the people of Canada, as must be the case in every country. He therefore held with his right hon. Friend that a nucleus of British troops, supported by the energy and determination of the Canadians, was the natural and just defence of Canada; and such he believed to be the feeling of the Canadians themselves. His right hon. Friend had paid a just tribute to the Governor of Canada, and did justice to the improved spirit of Canada itself. In all these points he entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend. Perhaps, however, it would not be uninteresting to the House if he were to state the changes which had recently been made, leading in the direction of insuring the defence of Canada by the Canadians. In October last the Canadian Legislature passed Acts for the new organization of the Militia and the Volunteers, declaring that the public defence was a duty binding on every member of society, providing the machinery for insuring the performance of it by each individual; making provision for securing the thorough education in military duty of all militia officers, and compelling all candidates for commissions to attach themselves for instruction to British regiments. Provision was made for additional pay from provincial resources for the officers and men of Her Majesty's forces who should assist in this training. Lord Monck, in one of his despatches, described that legislation as Sound in principle, calculated to have a most beneficial effect on the present efficiency of the militia force, and to create and foster in the future a taste for military pursuits among the population. The general effect of these measures will be to give us in the province service battalions of militia to any amount the Commander-in-Chief may from time to time think desirable, with a machinery constantly in existence for the indefinite increase of their numbers; a body of thoroughly well-trained officers attached to the service battalions of militia, living among men of their battalions, and competent to train them in their drill, and command them when called out for exercise or duty. For the purpose of training officers the House would be glad to learn that schools had been established at Quebec and Toronto for the reception of candidates for the militia, and the attendance had been as large as was considered desirable. Writing in the month of April last, Lord Monck said— The schools for the instruction of the militia officers are working well. The officers of Her Majesty's army who have charge of these schools appear to me to work with great energy and judgment, the candidates for commissions are coming forward in larger numbers than we can at the moment admit to the schools, and display great industry and intelligence in the acquisition of military knowledge; and I am very sanguine in my expectations that we shall have, before long, scattered over the entire colony, a body of well instructed men capable of commanding the provincial militia should their services be required. He entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend that the first and foremost object was to provide trained, energetic, skilful, and spirited officers; but his right hon. Friend spoke of the numbers of the Volunteers without any allusion to the number fixed for the Militia. That number had been fixed at 88,000. There was, therefore, now an organization usefully existing in Canada which contemplated the provision of a body of trained officers—a body of Volunteers to which his right hon. Friend had referred, and a body of Militia capable of indefinite extension according to the discretion of the Governor General, but at the present moment fixed at 88,000. That was only a preliminary organization; but it proved that at least the Canadians were alive to their duty and interest, and he hoped they would soon see existing in Canada a Native force capable of rendering efficient aid to the Queen's trained soldiers, which, in the opinion of both sides of the House, was the proper mode of providing for the defence of Canada. He entirely agreed with his right hon. Friend that, without entertaining any special fear as to any danger to the foreign relations of this country with our neighbours in that part of the world, the dispersion of British troops in small numbers in distant parts of Canada was not a policy wise in itself or expedient under the circumstances. That was his opinion, and it was also the opinion of his noble Friend the Secretary of War. When the Guards were withdrawn from Canada, an opportunity occurred for greater concentration, and he would read an extract from a despatch written by his noble Friend to Lieutenant General Sir F. Williams, dated May 25, 1864— This decision will render it possible to concentrate the troops remaining under your command by the withdrawal of those now stationed to the westward of the very extended line of the Canadian frontier; and I am directed to inform you that Lord De Grey requests that you will take the earliest steps to effect such a concentration, as Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it is highly desirable to retain the troops in Canada in two principal masses at Quebec and Montreal, and to diminish as far as possible the number of scattered stations in that colony other than the small posts occupied by the Royal Canadian Rifles for the purpose of checking desertion. His right hon. Friend, indeed, went further, and would concentrate the troops exclusively at Quebec. That was an opinion in which he could not entirely concur. The Government thought that Montreal and Quebec were the natural points for the concentration of Her Majesty's forces in Canada. He also thought it might be very wise and expedient that a clear and definite policy should be laid down by Her Majesty's Government, and communicated to those in Canada who were responsible for the well-being of the province; and that the co-operation of the Canadian people should be invited in any measures which they thought it expedient to provide for the defence of the country. It was an important question. It had engaged the serious attention of Her Majesty's Government, and he had stated the principles on which it ought to be conducted. He cordially agreed in those views, and he cordially concurred in thinking that this country, in directing the foreign policy of her colonies, ought to furnish the nucleus of the force for the defence of those colonies, but that their main defence must turn upon the spirit and energy of their own people; and he thought that a frank communication between the Imperial Govern- ment and the Government of Canada would suggest the best mode of arranging the just proportion of the burdens to be borne by the Home Government and the dependencies of this country.

LORD ROBERT CECIL

said, that the House and the country would be disposed to concur in the principles which the right hon. Gentleman had just laid down, and to be of opinion that the line of policy which he indicated that it was his intention to take was the safe one for this country to adopt. But his fear was, that the right hon. Gentleman and the Canadian Government were not sufficiently alive to the exigencies of the period in point of time. No doubt if they all lived long enough, and if peace should last as long as they hoped it would between the United States and this country, the measures which he had sketched out would bring a satisfactory solution of the difficult question of the local defence of Canada. But his fear was, that the right hon. Gentleman's plan contained the germs of great delay, and the right hon. Gentleman's tone made him fear that he was not sufficiently alive to the great promptitude necessary, and the imminent risk of dangers which no one liked to contemplate. The right hon. Gentleman began by describing the preparations which the Canadians were making for defence. As he understood the right hon. Gentleman, the Canadians were contemplating a training college and a militia.

MR. CARDWELL

I said that the training schools are actually in progress, and are training so great a number as to lead the Governor General to express a hope there would shortly be a sufficient number of trained officers to lead the Militia.

LORD ROBERT CECIL

said, it appeared that, as soon as the schools had trained the officers, and as soon as the Canadian Government had got round them the organization of the militia, and as soon as the Canadian Parliament had proceeded to vote sufficient supplies, then by that time the militia would be in existence. But his fear was, that the emergency would be a little too pressing for such a lengthy process. The right hon. Gentleman and Earl De Grey agreed that our forces ought not to be scattered, but that with the exception of a certain number of posts they were to be massed in Montreal and Quebec, in neither of which cities he believed were any fortifications that would enable a small number of troops to hold their ground against a large force. They all hoped that hostilities would not break out with America; but still they were possible, and they ought to look to the dangers that awaited them if war were declared. They knew the dangers which they had to face. They knew that the Northern army in the field was estimated by hundreds of thousands, and that it had been able, in spite of the resistance of another army almost equally large, to force its way through an extended frontier, and, at all events, to occupy a considerable portion of territory. There was no force in Canada equal to that of the Confederates. Suppose that at the end of the year there should be a termination of hostilities between the North and South—suppose the exigencies and existence of a large armed force, the pressure of political difficulties, and the confusion consequent upon the termination of a civil war, should lead the Northern statesmen to find an issue from their difficulties in making a raid upon Canada. He would not say that was likely, but it was possible, and then Ave should have to defend that enormous frontier, partly without natural defence and partly consisting of lakes upon which we were forbidden to have warlike ships, but which the warlike ships of America might reach. The British Government and the Canadians would in that case have to defend that enormous frontier against the army which had crushed the heroic army of the South. That was a very serious danger; but if the Canadians did not choose to make preparations, and allowed their territory to be overrun, it was their affair and not ours. If the result of the neglect and delay, after the warnings they had received, should be that their country was overrun, then, although of course the people of England would be sorry for what might happen, yet he did not think we could cast any great blame upon ourselves for the result. But the terrible thing would be if any considerable body of British troops were surrounded and made prisoners. The feeling which such a disgrace would occasion would be very humiliating; it would stimulate us to enormous exertions; it would embitter the war between the two countries, and make us feel that we bad contracted a stain on our escutcheon, which it would require some very extraordinary military achievements to wipe out. He thought the right hon. Gentleman's measures were perfectly sound, but he was not sufficiently alive to the imminence of the danger of our position—namely, that while the British troops were slowly massing in Montreal and Quebec, the whole of the coast would remain unfortified and exposed to the attacks of any such army as the Northern States might bring against them. While that was going on, and while the Canadians would be going through these dilatory preliminaries and these measures of rudimentary self-defence, some great disaster might fall on our arms which no one would regret more than the right hon. Gentleman, but for which regrets would be a vain and idle remedy. Perhaps it might be owing to the suavity with which the right hon. Gentleman habitually conveyed everything to the House that he had misunderstood the tendency of the right hon. Gentleman's remarks. [Mr. CARDWELL. The orders have already gone out!] Yes, but what he doubted was whether the orders were sufficiently prompt for the occasion. He should be happy to hear that orders had been sent out to fortify immediately the two posts of Quebec and Montreal, or, if that was not possible, that one only should be occupied, and that not one post should be held except what British troops might safely hold with such aid as Canada might furnish. Anything short of that would expose the British army to the risk of almost irreparable disgrace. The House could not hope for a more detailed account of the right hon. Gentleman's policy, but he would venture to press upon him the suggestion that precautions of that kind ought not to be left until the moment when danger arose. The requisite concentration which the military policy of the Government would require would then wear an aspect of fear, and it would look as if we were deserting our colonists. Promptitude in these matters was requisite above all things, and if he might refer to the debate of that day week he thought the right hon. Gentleman would recognize that if the virtue of promptitude had been more thoroughly exercised; and if, in the moment of security, something more of forethought had been shown in regard to the impending dangers, the disgrace and the disasters which were then discussed would never have occurred. He trusted that no such disgrace and disasters would occur to our army in Canada.

Mr. CHICHESTER FORTESCUE

said, he would remind the noble Lord that in his estimate of the dangers to which Canada was exposed and her means of protection, he had omitted one of the most important elements of her safety. The noble Lord seemed to have forgotten that war with Canada on the part of the United States meant war with England also, and that the United States in deciding upon an invasion of Canada, would have to take into account not merely the preparations made for the defence of Canada, but the serious and tremendous consequences to herself, her coasts, and commerce, consequent upon engaging in war with England. With regard to the arrangements made for the improvement of the militia of Canada, he believed them to be of a very valuable character, although still imperfect. The whole province of Canada would now be covered by a military organization, and would be defended by militia of a certain class, containing no soldiers above the age of forty-five. Every man would know the battalion to which, he belonged, where he must resort for purposes of drill and muster, and the officers under whom he was to serve. They would be drilled for a period of the year which, he would admit, was not sufficiently long, but still drilled so as to give them such a knowledge of soldiering as would in a short time turn them into good troops. Lord Monck and his Government were engaged in providing a number of first class-officers, and the result, it was expected, would be a highly efficient militia in Canada. In Toronto and Quebec, where two of the finest regiments in Her Majesty's service had been placed, there were military schools in which as large a number of officers as there were means of instructing were undergoing military training. With respect to another question, which was now one of great importance, the House, as the right hon. Gentleman knew so well, had long looked with great suspicion upon the subject of colonial fortifications, and those who had charge of colonial affairs in this country had been very shy indeed in proposing to the House any expenditure for that purpose. It was admitted, however, by the right hon. Gentleman, and would be allowed by the House, that Quebec was an exception to the general rule, and there was hardly a place within our colonial dominions in which Parliament would see with less jealousy the expenditure of money for making the place fit for the reception of Her Majesty's troops. The Government had recently received a Report from a skilful officer on the defences of Canada, and especially with regard to Quebec and Montreal. With regard to the concentration of the troops, he believed they were 'actually, or with a slight exception, in Quebec and Montreal—that exception being small parties of the Canadian Rifles, who were sent to certain parts of the colony to prevent desertion. Preparations had thus been made to prevent future danger. Some of them were already in progress, and the remainder were under the serious consideration of Her Majesty's Government.