§ Copy presented, of Protocols of Conferences held in London relative to the Affairs of Denmark [by Command]; to lie upon the Table.
§ VISCOUNT PALMERSTONSir, I rise to move that these papers be printed. In doing so, I am quite aware that there never was an occasion, probably, on which a Minister of the Crown had to make a statement—short and simple as I intend to make it—to this House of Parliament, and through it to the public, on which the feelings of the country, the sympathies of the country, the aspirations, and, I may say, the anxieties of the country, were more deeply engaged than in the question on which it will be my duty for a short time to detain the House. Sir, the sympathies which the British nation feel in the cause of Denmark will do honour to them in all time wherever they are recorded. ["Hear, hear!"] I stand here, however, not to excite those sympathies or to profit by them. I stand 338 here upon this occasion simply to communicate to the House in a short abstract the substance of those proceedings of the Conference, which are recorded in detail in the papers now laid upon the table—and although on Friday I doubted whether the record of the proceedings of Saturday would be sufficiently ready to be laid before Parliament in conjunction with the papers relating to the preceding events, I am now able to say that they will be delivered to Members to-morrow morning, together with the papers relating to the other proceedings of the Conference. Among them will be found an abstract of the proceedings of the Conference drawn up by one of the Plenipotentiaries, which will greatly assist hon. Members in making themselves masters of the more detailed negotiations recorded in the Protocols.
But, to explain more fully, and to make this House understand completely the nature of the questions which were treated of in the Conference, it will be necessary for me to go a little further back, and to offer some remarks as to the points upon which the subsequent controversies and the proceedings of the Conference turned. The House, however, is sufficiently familiar with those transactions and their origin to make it unnecessary for me to do more than give a general outline of the affairs to which I refer. The Treaty of 1852 was negotiated by myself and by Lord Granville, who succeeded me, and was concluded by Lord Malmesbury, who succeeded him; so that, as far as the policy of that treaty is concerned, all parties in this country are equally bound by it. It was founded upon European considerations. It did not originate simply with England—it was an arrangement dictated by European interests. ["Hear, hear!"] The state of the matter was this:—The law of succession in Denmark admitted females to the throne; the law of succession in Holstein confined the right to males. If, therefore, any case should arise in which there was a default of issue male in Denmark, it was clear that, by the operation of those conflicting laws, Denmark and Holstein would be separated. But the late King of Denmark, being advanced in years, had no offspring; the Prince who would have been his immediate successor, had he outlived the King, had no offspring either; and therefore the Powers of Europe felt it necessary to take into consideration the threatened splitting up of the Danish 339 monarchy, which they held to be inconsistent with the general interests and the balance of power in Europe. For this purpose it was necessary to assimilate the law of succession in the two parts of the Danish monarchy. To alter the law in Holstein was impossible, because it was the law of the Germanic Confederation of which Holstein is a member. The other expedient therefore was adopted, and it was agreed that the lex regia of Denmark should be altered so that males only should succeed to the Crown. It was also agreed that the King of Denmark should have the power of naming his successor to the throne of Denmark, and that arrangements should be made by which that successor should inherit the Duchy of Holstein. These arrangements were the object of the Treaty of 1852. The King of Denmark chose as his successor Prince Christian of Glucksburg; and there being a question of the right of the Duke of Augustenburg to Holstein, that right was commuted by a pecuniary indemnity. The Duke of Augustenburg having been in rebellion against his Sovereign on a former occasion, his estates were confiscated; but the value of those estates was now given to him on condition that he renounced for himself, his heirs, and successors all claim to the Duchy of Holstein. The Treaty of 1852 provided, therefore, as far as the foresight of the parties to it could go, for the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish monarchy as then constituted, by the possession on the part of Denmark of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. That treaty was greatly approved by all the parties who were concerned in it. A question, however, arose whether, as Holstein was affected by the treaty, it should be submitted for the concurrence of the Diet at Frankfort? The asking for that concurrence was at first objected to by all the Powers concerned—by the German Powers, by Russia, by Sweden, and by Denmark. My noble Friend Lord Granville, when he held the seals of the Foreign Office, did, however, propose that the treaty before it was concluded should be submitted to the Frankfort Diet. But that proposal met with no assent. On the contrary, as will be seen by the papers now in the hands of Members, some parties expressed their dismay at such a proposal—dismay arising from the delay which they held would be the consequence of such an application—and a different course was adopted, namely, 340 that, whereas the Diet consists only of representatives of the different German Powers, application should be made to those Powers themselves to accede to the treaty which had been concluded. The application was made, and several States acceded; but it is right to say that some other States, including Bavaria and Baden, declined to assent to the treaty in consequence of feelings connected with German opinion as bearing upon the Duchies of Holstein and Schleswig. Well, Sir, that treaty was preceded by certain diplomatic communications between Germany and Denmark, which led to various arrangements; but the material arrangement was this—that whereas, on the one hand, the great object of Denmark had always been to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, and whereas, on the other hand, the great object for which the Germans had always contended was the political and administrative union of Schleswig with Holstein, both should give up their respective pretensions—that the King of Denmark, on the one hand, should engage not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark, and the Germans, on the other, agree no longer to require the political union of Schleswig with Holstein. So stood matters at the conclusion of the treaty, in which, if all the parties had been equally animated by a spirit of conciliation—and I must say of justice—it would have been better for them, and I am not aware that any serious complications would have arisen. But during the ten years which elapsed between the conclusion of that treaty and the death of the late King of Denmark a series of mutual complaints arose between the parties. The Germans contended, and I am afraid not without some reason, that the Danish Government had not acted fairly in its treatment of the German population of Schleswig—that in their extreme desire to extend Danish influence and rule they had in some degree interfered with the free exercise by the German population of that duchy of those privileges which belonged to them as the subjects of a free State. It is also to be borne in mind that in March of last year a Patent—that is to say, a Constitution—for Holstein was proclaimed by the late King of Denmark, which the German Confederation stated to be in its details at variance with the general laws of the Confederation. Moreover, in November a Constitution was passed by the Parliament at Copenhagen for Denmark 341 and Schleswig which the Germans contended was at variance with the engagements given by Denmark in 1851–1852 not to incorporate Schleswig with Denmark. It was contended that an arrangement for united representation and the united action of deputies at Copenhagen was virtually an incorporation pro tanto of Schleswig with Denmark, The late King of Denmark died while these questions were still under discussion between Germany and Denmark. The Patent of March for Holstein in the meantime remained in force; and the present King, from considerations connected with internal matters, found it necessary upon his recent accession to the throne to give his sanction to that Constitution of November, which up to that period had wanted the Royal Assent, and was not complete until the Royal Assent had been given. Germany remonstrated against all those arrangements. In October the Frankfort Diet had passed a Resolution that Federal troops should enter Holstein for the purpose of compelling the late King of Denmark, as Duke of Holstein, to revoke the Patent of March.
I will deal with the political question first. Matters stood in the position which I have described towards the conclusion of the year. Her Majesty's Government, thinking and believing that there were grounds for the German objections to that Patent, urged the Danish Government to revoke it, and by so doing to place them selves in the right in regard to that question. The Danish Government did so, ["Hear, hear!" from the Opposition.] But the Diet changed its ground, and, instead of contenting itself, as it had done up to the death of the late King, with disputing the right of the Duke of Holstein to give a Constitution which they maintained was at variance with the Federal law, they took up another ground, and contended that the question had fairly arisen who should be Duke of Holstein; they denied that the King of Denmark had succeeded legally to the Duchy of Holstein; and a proposal was made in the Diet to occupy Holstein by Federal troops until that question should be decided by the Diet. In my opinion the Diet had and has no right to consider and decide that question. There is nothing, in my opinion, either in the Treaty of 1815 constituting the Diet and giving to it birth and origin, or in the final Act of 1820 completing the Diet arrangements, which entitles the Diet to 342 determine who should succeed in any State within the Confederation; and I am not aware that when an Emperor of Austria resigned, and was succeeded by a member of his family, the Diet claimed any right to interfere in that matter. But Austria and Prussia moved in the Diet, not that the Federal troops should not enter Holstein, but that the entrance of these troops should be what is called an "execution" and not an "occupation." By the term "execution" is meant an act of the Diet, in accordance with the Powers of the Diet and German law, to compel any Sovereign of territory belonging to the Con-federation to adapt his legislation to the laws of the Confederation, if those laws should have been broken. Austria and Prussia carried their proposal, and the Diet resolved, not that the entrance of the troops should bear the character of an occupation to hold the Duchy of Holstein until the rightful heir should be determined, but that the entrance of the troops should be an act of execution, to compel the existing Duke to alter the Patent and revoke it as not being in accordance with German law. The entrance, therefore, of the Federal troops into Holstein as a measure of execution was a distinct acknowledgment by the Diet at that time that the King of Denmark was Duke of Holstein, and it was to compel him to alter or revoke the Patent of March that that execution took place. It is also to be remembered that whereas it would have been perfectly legitimate for an execution to take place if the King of Denmark had persisted in refusing to revoke the Patent, yet in point of fact the Patent was revoked before the German troops entered the Duchy of Holstein; and consequently that entrance was unjust in itself, though founded on a plea which would have given a warrant to it had the plea still held good. Well, these troops having entered on the distinct understanding that they were there to compel the King of Denmark (Duke of Holstein) to revoke the Patent, those proceedings then took place which are known to everybody, and which led to the super session of the authority of the King Duke, and to a declaration in favour of the Duke of Augustenburg.
Then came the case of the Constitution, uniting to a certain degree, as we were compelled to admit, Schleswig with Denmark, in violation of the engagements entered into by Denmark in 1852. Her Ma- 343 jesty's Government felt all the evils which would arise from an occupation of the territory of Schleswig by the German troops. I should say that though the Government of Denmark had engaged, at the suggestion of England and, I believe, the other Powers, to take the earliest means constitutionally possible to revoke that Constitution, the Germans determined to enter into and take possession of Schleswig as a material guarantee for the performance of that engagement. We proposed that some diplomatic transaction—some engagement on the part of Denmark taken in the presence of the other Powers parties to the treaty—should be accepted by the Germans as a sufficient security that the engagement would be fulfilled: but that proposal was not accepted, and the German troops entered Schleswig. When the Federal troops entered Holstein, the Danish Government, partly on advice and partly from considerations of prudence, refrained from offering any resistance to the Germans, and there was no war arising on that occasion; but when the German troops entered Schleswig the feelings of the Danish nation were too strong to admit of a similar course being pursued, and resistance—an obstinate and heroic resistance—was made against the very superior numbers which the Germans brought to bear. Up to that time, all the parties who had signed the Treaty of 1852 continued to admit its validity, and to acknowledge that they were bound by its engagements, so far as related to the acknowledgment of Christian IX. as King of Denmark and to the maintenance of the integrity of Denmark, and all the territories then held by the King, Even Prussia up to that time did not refuse to admit the binding nature of the treaty; but it is only fair to say that she intimated that if resistance should arise, and if different events should take place, then it would be possible that the German Powers might have to reconsider the engagements of the treaty. Not to weary the House by a recital of military operations which are familiar to everyone, I will state that the course of war led to the occupation by the Germans of the whole of the continental part of Schleswig, and such part of Jutland as they thought fit and expedient to occupy.
In this state of things it occurred to the Powers who were parties to the treaty and not engaged in the war, that it was desirable that a Conference should assem- 344 ble, composed of the Plenipotentiaries of the belligerents, and of the four neutral Powers—England, France, Russia, and Sweden—to consider the means of reestablishing peace on a solid and permanent footing. That proposal was agreed to, and on the 25th of April the Conference met. It continued its labours until last Saturday. The first proposal made in the Conference was for a suspension of hostilities, because it was felt by the neutral Powers, England, France, Russia, and Sweden, that until the fighting ceased there was no fair prospect of a satisfactory conclusion being come to. We wished that a suspension of arms should precede the Conference; but we found it impossible to obtain an assent to such an arrangement. Well, after some delay, and a good deal of discussion when the Conference had met, a suspension of hostilities was agreed upon, to take place on the 12th of May, and to last for a month. The next thing was, that the belligerent Powers were asked on what conditions they were willing to put an end to the war and come to an amicable conclusion. The Germans, of course, were the parties on whom the question was pressed. There was some delay in extracting from the German Powers what their intentions were. They first proposed—still maintaining the principle of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy as settled by the Treaty of 1852, or at least not departing from it in words, though in substance they were thought to do so—that there should be a political and legislative union between Schleswig and Holstein, and that the connection between these united Duchies with Denmark should be the link, simply, of the Crown. They coupled that, however, with another condition, namely, that the arrangement should be reserved for the approbation of the Diet; and there was some reason to suppose that under that condition it was intended to include a discretion on the part of the Diet to decide whether the united Duchies should still continue united with Denmark, or whether the claims of some other party pretending to their possession should be considered. The Danish Government would not agree to that proposal. The German Powers then made a different proposal, but one far more objectionable—namely, that Schleswig and Holstein should be separated from the Danish Crown. That, of course, the Danes would not agree to. The neutral Powers con- 345 certed among themselves, and—seeing that Schleswig and Holstein were actually in the occupation of an overpowering military force, that it did not suit the views of Franco or Russia to take any active steps to dislodge that force, that Denmark was unable to do so, and that, I need not I say, England was not willing singly to enter into the undertaking ["Hear, hear!"]—agreed to propose to Denmark the separation of Holstein from the Danish Crown, together with such parts of Schleswig as might be agreed upon; and the line of separation settled and proposed on the part of the neutral Powers was the line running along the Schlei down to Husum on the other coast. That proposal, coupled with other conditions which I shall not trouble the House by going into, but which will be found in the Protocol, was accepted by Denmark. Denmark said that, however unwilling to make a territorial cession, she was willing to agree to the proposal ["Hear, hear!"]; that, feeling all the inconvenience of perpetual disputes between herself and Germany, she wished to be quit of all interference on the part of the Diet in her internal affairs; and, provided she had assigned to her a frontier which in a military and commercial point of view was consistent with her interests, she was willing to accept the line I have mentioned, separating Holstein and the southern part of Schleswig from the Danish territory. The German Powers refused that arrangement. [Opposition cheers.] They asserted that the line would not include a sufficient amount of the purely German population; that there would still be a large number of Germans subject to Danish rule, and that their desire was to draw such a boundary that the great bulk of the German population should be included with Holstein. In regard to Schleswig, the fact, I take it, is this—that the extreme northern part is entirely Danish; that the extreme southern part is purely German; and that between the two there is a large extent of district in which the population is mixed—mixed not only as villages, but even as streets in the villages. It is, therefore, absolutely impossible to draw any line in the centre of Schleswig which shall entirely separate the German population from the Danish. Consequently the ground taken by the Danish Government appeared to be a fair one—that, it being impossible to draw the line with regard to nationality, it should be drawn so as to give to Denmark such 346 a frontier as was susceptible of military defence, and would insure those commercial advantages which she was naturally anxious to secure. The Danish Government, therefore, I say, accepted the line of the Schlei. ["Hear!"] The German Plenipotentiaries, on the contrary, having given up part of Schleswig, were directed to insist on the line from Apenrade on the cast to Tondern on the west coast. Between these two lines lies a district of considerable extent as compared with the extent of Schleswig, but in an European point of view of no great importance. In the course of the discussions the Prussian Plenipotentiary, Count Bernstorff, on his own authority, stated that, seeing how small the difference was which prevailed between the two parties, he would undertake to recommend to his Government to depart from the northern line of Apenrade and Tondern, and to be content with a line drawn from Flensburg to the west coast. That recommendation, however, his Government rejected, and he was obliged to say that his Government and Austria stood by the northern line, originally proposed, from Apenrade to Tondern. In the meanwhile, time pressing, the Plenipotentiaries naturally wished for a prolongation of the armistice—or, rather, I should say—for there is a technical difference between the two—the suspension of hostilities, which was to expire on the 12th of June; and with great difficulty Denmark was induced to agree to an extension for another fortnight. The German Powers were willing, as might have been expected, to extend the suspension to the beginning of winter. [Opposition cheers.] Denmark, on the other hand, grudged every fortnight of the summer that was withdrawn from her naval operations. ["Hear!"] The Danes, therefore, said they would not prolong the suspension beyond the fortnight, unless in the meanwhile some agreement should have been come to, with regard to the frontier and other things, that gave an assurance that the negotiations would result in a peaceful and satisfactory arrangement. The suspension was accordingly extended for a fortnight, which ended yesterday.
In the whole course of these negotiations I may say there was perfect unanimity between the neutral Powers—[Ministerial cheers]—between England, France, Russia, and Sweden; and although my noble Friend Earl Russell was chosen as President by the Conference at 347 the outset, and although it may therefore have fallen to him to make several of the proposals which were submitted, these proposals must all be regarded as the proposals of the neutral Powers, because they were discussed, arranged, and settled, at meetings of the neutral Powers before they were brought before the Conference. [Ministerial cheers.] That is a very important point. ["Hear, hear!"]
As there was no possibility of bringing Germany and Denmark to agree upon any middle line between the two lines which they respectively stood by—the Schlei line being demanded by Denmark, and the Apenrade line by Germany—a last attempt was made by the neutral Powers to induce the belligerents to refer the question in dispute to arbitration. The dispute, it will be observed, had really been narrowed to a comparatively small point. It was no longer whether Holstein should be governed in a particular manner; it was no longer whether or not Schleswig should be united politically and administratively with Holstein, and whether the two Duchies should be connected by the link of the Crown with Denmark. Denmark had consented to the alienation of territory, Germany had been content with that arrangement, and the only question was, whether that arrangement should be carried out by dividing Schleswig in one part or by dividing it in another. It appeared to the neutral Powers that the territory lying between the two lines proposed was not so important to either party as to justify the resumption of the war, and that it might fairly be deemed, in accordance with the recommendation of the Conference of Paris, a question for the decision of an arbiter. Accordingly my noble Friend, as the organ of the neutral Powers, proposed that arrangement to the belligerent Plenipotentiaries. Each party, naturally, took time to refer the question to their respective Governments, and on Friday their answers were to be given. The answer of the German Powers was that they looked to the words of the Conference of Paris, which recommended the "good offices" of a friendly Power, and that the Protocol having been quoted by the neutrals, they accepted the reference of the question in dispute to a friendly Power, provided they were allowed to reserve their decision as to whether they should accept or refuse the line which the friendly Power might fix upon. [Laughter, and ironical 348 cheers from the Opposition.] That was at variance with the proposal made ["Hear, hear!"]; because my noble Friend, as the organ of the neutral Powers, in recommending the adoption of a reference as suggested by the Conference of Paris, distinctly stated that it was with the object that a friendly Power might decide and determine the line to be drawn between the two parts of Schleswig. ["Hear, hear!"] Therefore, the answer of the German Powers would have been more frank and candid if they had simply declined the proposal, instead of accepting it with a condition which nullified it. ["Hear, hear!"] On the other hand, the Danes, who throughout the whole transactions have certainly clung more to their decision and principles than they have shown pliability in adapting themselves to the force of circumstances, declined the arbitration, and said that they had accepted the line of the Schlei, and further north they would not consent to go. [Opposition cheers] There seemed now to be an end to all further attempts to effect an understanding; but the Ambassador of France, by order of his Government, made another and a last effort. He proposed that, whereas the Danes had agreed to give up as far as the Schlei, and the Germans not to pass northward beyond the Apenrade line, an appeal should be made to the population of the intermediate district in order to ascertain, first of all, their relative nationality, and then what their wishes were and what arrangement they would like. ["Hear!"] That proposal the British Plenipotentiaries agreed to; but it was negatived by Denmark. [Opposition cheers] A proposal of the same sort had been made in an earlier stage of the negotiations, but had not found favour with any party, except Prussia, who was willing to try it; Austria and Russia had decided objections to it [a laugh]; and, therefore, the idea of ascertaining the views of the population in that way was not adopted at any time in the course of the proceedings. My right hon. Friend near me reminds me that a portion of the proposal was, of course, that there should be perfect freedom of choice on the part of the population, and that such freedom could not exist unless the occupying troops were withdrawn during the voting. Prussia, as I have said, would have been willing to accept, but Austria took a different view, and thus the labours of the Confer- 349 ence were brought to a close. We have endeavoured by every possible means, in conjunction with the other neutral Powers, to bring the two parties to an agreement, and we now lament, as everybody must, that war should begin again, for a matter which might so easily, we think, have been adjusted, and on a question not involving the existence of a nation or of a Government, but simply relating to the possession of a comparatively small strip of territory.
Sir, the Conference having unfortunately ended in the manner I have stated, it became the duty of Her Majesty's Government to take into serious consideration the course which it behoved them to adopt. We felt great sympathy for Denmark; we remembered that, although she had at the beginning been in the wrong, yet another Sovereign had succeeded to the throne, a different Ministry had the direction of her affairs, and that there had been manifested by acts a strong desire to set right that which had been wrong [cheers]; we believed that, from the commencement to the end of these last events, Denmark had been ill-used [cheers]; that might had overridden right [renewed cheering]; and we knew also that the sympathies of almost the whole of the British nation were on her side. [Continued cheering] There is a natural disposition in all who have proper feelings to take part with the weak against the strong, especially if the weak are oppressed, and if the strong are acting unjustly and tyrannically. We should, therefore, for these reasons have been glad if we had found it possible to advise our Sovereign to take part with Denmark in the approaching struggle, lint then, on the other hand, it was to be considered that, whatever wrongs Denmark may have sustained—and they are many—she had in the beginning been wrong herself ["Hear, hear!"]; that at the very last of the Conferences she had rejected a proposal reasonable in itself, and one which, if accepted by the two parties, would necessarily have led to a peaceful solution of the question in dispute. ["Hear!"] Her fault in that, no doubt, was equally shared by her antagonists [cheers]; but still, in considering the position which England ought to occupy, that matter could not altogether be left out of sight. we had also to consider what really was the matter in dispute for which hostilities were to be begun, and it did not appear to us to be one of very great im- 350 portance. It did not involve the independence of Denmark; it went little beyond what Denmark had herself agreed to, and related simply as to whom a particular strip of territory should belong. On the other hand, as men who were considering what advice in a very important European crisis—and I do not wish to disguise its importance—should be given to their Sovereign, we could not lose sight of the magnitude of the resistance which had to be overcome, and the comparative means which England and her supposed antagonists would be able to bring to bear in the struggle. It had been ascertained early in these transactions that France—for reasons of which she was entitled to be the judge—declined to take any active measures in support of Denmark, and we knew that her resolution in that respect still continued unchanged. We had likewise ascertained that Russia, for reasons of which she also was entitled to be the judge, was not inclined to take any active measures in support of Denmark. We knew, therefore, that the whole brunt of the effort, whatever it might be, requisite for dislodging the German troops and those which might come to their assistance from the rest of Germany, from Schleswig and Holstein, would fall upon this country alone. Under the circumstances, we have not thought it consistent with our duty to advise our Sovereign to undertake such a task. We know the honourable sympathy which the people of this nation feel for the unhappy condition of Denmark; but, at the same time, we do not think it consistent with our duty to recommend Parliament and the country to make those great exertions, and to undergo those great sacrifices, which would have been the necessary consequence of entering into a conflict with the whole of Germany. I assume that, in the present state of things upon which our decision was made, the real contest lies between Germany and Denmark with respect to—I am afraid I can hardly say that part only of Schleswig which was in dispute before the Conference closed, because it is not impossible that the whole of Schleswig may be involved in the struggle. It would be more honourable on the part of the German Powers to be satisfied with that they have demanded, but we know that strength and success frequently carry men beyond the line which, on cool reflection, they might be disposed to stand upon. Still, the contest is as regards Schleswig, and not as regards 351 the independence of Denmark, or the safety of the capital of the Danish monarchy. I do not mean to say, therefore—I think it right, indeed, to put in this reservation—that if the war should assume a different character; if the existence of Denmark as an independent Power in Europe should be at stake; if we had reason to expect to see at Copenhagen the horrors of a town taken by assault, the destruction of property, the sacrifice of the lives, not only of its defenders, but of its peaceful inhabitants, the confiscations which would ensue, the capture of the Sovereign as a prisoner of war, and other humiliations of that kind—I do not mean to say that if any of those events were likely to happen the position of this country might not be a subject for re-consideration—[Renewed cries of "Oh!" laughter, and ironical cheering from the Opposition followed by counter cheers from the Ministerial Benches]—we might then think it our duty to adopt another course. But this I say on the part of the Government, that if any change of policy be thought advisable, such change shall be communicated to Parliament if Parliament is sitting, and in any case the earliest opportunity shall be taken of asking the judgment of Parliament upon the matter. ["Hear, hear!"]
I have now to apologize to the House for having gone so much into detail. It was not my wish to provoke discussion. My desire simply was to explain as fully as I could the state of the matter. The papers, which will be in the hands of hon. Members to-morrow morning, contain full accounts of all that passed in the Conference. All the events which took place before are recorded in the papers which have now for some time been before Parliament; and, therefore, every hon. Member upon looking at those two sets of documents, will be capable of forming a proper opinion of the conduct pursued by Her Majesty's Government in regard to Danish affairs. [Cheers]
§ MR. DISRAELII quite agree with the noble Lord that it would be very inconvenient if the House on this occasion were to enter into a general discussion respecting the transactions that have taken place between Denmark and Germany, and the policy of the English Government with regard to them. One of the reasons why I now rise is to remind the House of the exact position which it occupies at this moment. As far as the negotiations of Her 352 Majesty's Government with respect to the dispute between Denmark and Germany are concerned, the House has incurred no responsibility whatever. ["Hear, hear!"] Since the end of last Session the House has given no opinion upon the subject. ["Hear, hear!"] Considering that I have myself taken some part in bringing about the position which the House now occupies, I trust I may not be deemed presumptuous in reminding the House of it. On the first night of the Session, interpreting the feelings of Gentlemen on this side, I expressed my want of confidence in the foreign policy of the Government, and my disapprobation of the manner in which their negotiations had been carried on, especially in the North of Europe, as well as of the results which had been realized. Had the papers been presented to the House on the meeting of Parliament, according to custom, and as we now know they might have been, there would have been no difficulty before April in asking the opinion of the House upon the conduct of these negotiations; and, indeed, what has occurred in the Conference—judging from the narrative, perspicuous though not satisfactory [a laugh],which the noble Lord has given of it, and from what otherwise has reached the ears of many Gentlemen—has very little to do with the great question upon which the House ought to give its decision. I may say here, by the way, that the origin of the Conference has not been correctly described by the noble Lord. The Conference was not called at the desire of the neutral Powers, but was called by one neutral Power, and that Power was Great Britain. ["Hear, hear!"] It met without hope, and it rises without hope; it met without a basis, and therefore it leads to no result. ["Hear, hear!"] But let me remind the House that from the period when Parliament met until the meeting of the Conference the House expressed no approbation whatever of the conduct of Her Majesty's Government with respect to these transactions. On one occasion alone its opinion was asked for in the shape of a formal Motion by an hon. Gentleman opposite. On that occasion I myself interposed, and moved the Previous Question, on the ground that the circumstances which prevailed rendered it, in my judgment, not expedient for Parliament to give any opinion on the subject. And, therefore, Her Majesty's Ministers did not enter the Conference with the confidence of Parliament, but with the Previous Question. That 353 was the basis, as far as Parliament was concerned, on which they entered into the Conference. Well, it is necessary that the House should understand clearly they are not in any way committed to any approbation of the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers in the matter. But, Sir, I think that the time has arrived when some opinion ought to be pronounced by this House. [Cheers] Although five months have elapsed since the period at which, as it now appears, that opinion might conveniently and properly have been taken, I myself do not regret the delays that were occasioned, because they were occasioned on both sides of this House by those feelings which, I think, do honour to the House of Commons. I have always believed that one of the principal reasons why the House of Commons, as a political institution, has been so successful and so marked out in its practical character from all other popular assemblies may be found in the respect which it entertains for the prerogatives of the Crown and the functions of constitutional Ministers. Therefore, Sir, I think that the course we then pursued was a wise, a temperate, and a patriotic course. ["Hear, hear!"] At the same time, I must say it is my conviction that we should forfeit all claim to the respect of our countrymen, and not fulfil one of the most important functions of Parliament, if, in the present critical position of affairs, we hesitated to give our opinion upon the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers on this question. [Cheers] And having on several occasions expressed that conviction, I must say now that it is my intention on an early—I would say even the earliest—opportunity to ask the opinion of the House on that subject. I have no doubt that I shall find no difficulty raised by the noble Lord opposite in fixing on the period which I may think most convenient to the House for that purpose. [Viscount PALMERSTON: Not a bit.] Sir, I would add no more were it not for the closing observations of the noble Lord, which, it appears to me, ought not to pass unnoticed. I must say that I heard them with astonishment. [Renewed cheers] Are we, then, to be taught to-night by the noble Lord that it is the Islands only of Denmark that are necessary to the independence of that country? Then why is it that we have been committed to a policy which has so long and so pertinaciously declared that the possession of Holstein and Schleswig by the Crown of Denmark 354 was necessary to the balance of power and to the maintenance of the public law of Europe. Sir, it is too much for us now to hear, under those circumstances, that war may be impending at any moment, and that the Parliament, which is soon to be prorogued, may be suddenly called together because the noble Lord and his Colleagues, who for a considerable period have been defining the grounds upon which the balance of power and the maintenance of the public law of Europe alone depend and ought to be vindicated, find at the last moment, while they recede from the scene of action, the possibility of a smaller issue which may arise, and in the interval agitate Europe and distract the public mind. ["Hear, hear!"] After the experience that we have had on this subject, I can really look on this only—and it is some consolation to adopt that view of the question—I can look on this only as a continuation of those senseless and spiritless menaces [loud cheers], which have impaired the just influence of this country in the councils of Europe, and, by impairing that influence, have diminished, the most effectual means of maintaining peace. [Cheers] I think that the noble Lord might have spared that contingent menace to the House, to the country, and to Europe. I must say myself that, judging from the past, I would prefer that the affairs of this country should be conducted on the principle of the hon. Members for Rochdale and Birmingham than on the policy which is avowed and announced at least by the noble Lord. [Cheers] I think that in that case, as the consequences would almost be the same, our position would be more consistent; it would certainly be more profitable and in my opinion it would really be more dignified. At least those hon. Gentlemen would threaten nobody ["Hear!"]; at least, they would not tell Denmark that if she is attacked she will not find herself alone [cheers]; at least they would not exasperate Germany by declaiming in the full Parliament of England against the "aggravated outrages" of her policy [cheers]; at least they would not lure on Denmark by delusive counsels and fallacious hopes. [Renewed cheers] I declare that, in my opinion, the position of England would be more dignified if the policy which those hon. Members profess regulated our affairs' rather than the policy by which the noble Lord seeks to guide us. Why, have we not now, for months upon months, been 355 menacing almost every country in the world? [Laughter and cheers.] And yet, when we thought that we had at least secured the blessings of peace—when we supposed from the gloomy narrative of disappointment and discomfiture which we have received this evening, we were at least in an intelligible position, and enjoying what some may have thought to be purchased at a great cost, but which was a clear result—namely, the possession of peace, we are at the same time to have that announcement accompanied by the continuation of these unsatisfactory menaces, and told that absolutely at this moment the whole country is to be agitated by the possibility of Parliament being called together suddenly in order that the noble Lord may commence a policy of action which, if ever justified and called for, ought to have been commenced long ago. [Loud cheers.] Sir, I trust, however, that these questions will be entered into fully and completely. When I listened to the narrative with which the noble Lord favoured us to-night of these transactions—of the continued sacrifices of Denmark—of the continued approaches of the enemies of Denmark—I confess, Sir, that I was not myself much surprised—though the point naturally awakened some curiosity and interest—that the noble Lord should have entirely omitted any notice of the inducements which made Denmark submit to these sacrifices, or any mention of those menaces addressed to the aggressive Powers which were always treated with contempt. But I should certainly have liked, while his précis of the proceedings on this question was being given us by the First Minister, to have had some account of the causes of the dreary consequences which he communicated to us. ["Hear!"] Sir, we shall soon have an opportunity of entering into that matter. I accept the noble Lord's courteous promise that he will make no difficulty respecting the day on which I shall venture to ask the opinion of the House of Commons on the policy of the Government, and I shall take care that no unnecessary delay occurs before I avail myself of it. [Loud cheers.]