HC Deb 25 July 1864 vol 176 cc2022-34

Order for Third Reading read.

Moved, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

MR. BERNAL OSBORNE

observed that, in popular theory, the House of Commons was responsible for the keeping of the public purse. That was a delusion which was fast passing away; for what was the state of the representative system in the month of July? After two and a half hours' discussion on the Standing Orders, which came to nothing, they were exhausted, and were prepared to pass a Bill involving millions of money. What was really the state of the question regarding fortifications? At half past two in the morning during the last week the Bill went into Committee; that was to say at a time when it was impossible for those who were not present to know what had been done, for those able men who sat in the Reporters' Gallery were naturally us much fatigued as the House, and they were totally unable to record any remarks if they were made; the consequence was a blank in the discussions of the question, which involved first and last an expenditure of £20,000,000. How did the question actually stand at that moment? A material alteration had been made in the original plan for the defence of Portsmouth Harbour and Spithead, which he believed would not be effectual for its purpose, but would lead to a great increase of expenditure. The original plan, as given by the Defence Commissioners three years ago, proposed to flank the entrance to Spithead with two forts on the Horse Shoe and No Man's shoals. The House approved and adopted that plan. That was the outer circle of defence 6,000 yards from Portsmouth Dockyard. But within that outer defence the Commissioners proposed that midway between Ryde and Portsmouth another fort should be erected called Sturbridge, to command the anchorage at Spithead. From the Report of the Commissioners it appeared that was a most material point in the inner circle of defence. What, then, had been done? Mr. Hawkshaw, the engineer at that time, made a Report in which he stated he was very much afraid he would not find a foundation sufficient to carry the heavy guns intended for that fort. At the time Mr. Hawkshaw had already penetrated 30 feet, and he stated that if he went 15 feet further without finding any solid foundation he would have to give up the work. That depth was reached without the discovery of any solid foundation, and the consequence was that after the House had been misled and a large sum of money expended, Sturbridge Fort was abandoned. By the abandonment of that fort he maintained that the recommendation of the Defence Commissioners, as indorsed by Parliament, had been materially altered, for the result was that an enemy would be able to steam up a channel 2,000 yards in width and shell the dockyards with comparative freedom from molestation. The Defence Committee, with the addition of another officer, Sir Alexander Milne, after the want of success at Sturbridge in finding a solid foundation, were called upon for another Report, and he could not, when he considered the amount of money involved, avoid characterizing the haste which the matter had been dealt with as most extraordinary, if not indecent. The Committee were only called upon to report on the 15th of July, and on the 19th the Report was presented. No explanation was given with it. They had only that morning received the plan which should have accompanied the Report involving the alteration of the whole of our national defences, and which, if agreed to, would burden the country with a positive expense of £11,000,000, according to the estimates, and they were asked that evening to consent to the third reading of the Bill, which would give a Parliamentary sanction to the new plan. He believed the House was blind enough to pass anything, and the excuse they would urge would probably be that they shuffled off all the responsibility upon the Ministry. What did that responsibility amount to? The House voted the money, and its application might be found some years hence to have been of no service at all; and that was where the responsibility, as it was termed, began and ended. Three years ago they were told it was of vital importance that the country should be put into a state of defence, but what was the actual result? The result was that on shore they had enormous lines of trenches and casemates with neither men nor guns to defend them, while they were so much the weaker by the increased area which they had to defend; and at sea not a single floating battery had been made for the last three years. But the state of the gunnery was a question of still greater importance. The expiring moments of Parliament could not be better devoted than to the consideration of the state of the weapons which were placed in the defences, and by which the integrity of the country was to be preserved. He found that in the last five years, between 1858 and 1863, the country had expended £2,539,547 17s. 8d. upon the construction of new ordnance, and that the result had been an issue to the army and navy of 2,370 guns, of which number 799 were the 100-pounders, and to the efficiency of those guns he would allude. No doubt we possessed some excellent iron-clad ships, but had the Admiralty any guns fit to put into them? He held in his hand a most extraordinary pamphlet by a flag officer of great reputation on the active list, Admiral Hal-stead, in which that officer stated his opinion that "the British navy at present possesses no guns adapted for iron-plate warfare." The Duke of Somerset, too, on being asked by the Ordnance Committee as to his opinion of the 100-pounder, said that for naval purposes at 200 yards it certainly had not the greatest power for penetration, and that in that respect the old 68-pounder smooth-bore was the most effective weapon in the service. The Report of the Committee, after a review of the whole subject, was to the same effect, that the 100-pounders were of no service. The fact was that we had consumed two and a half millions of money during the last five years, and that we were as far from having an effectual naval weapon as we were at the outset. If the House thought that that was a subject with which it was entitled to meddle, it ought not to consent to the third reading of the Bill without having some more definite idea as to the future than was to be gathered from the Reports laid before Parliament. He wished to do full justice to Sir William Armstrong, and he must say that he could not think that he had been particularly successful in his large guns, but at the same time justice had not been done to him. They should remember that, as Mr. Armstrong in 1859, he never undertook to make any large guns; he only undertook to contract for the supply of light breech-loading field guns to the army. It was very true that a most extraordinary contract was entered into, but the House should remember the original circumstances. At the same time, subsequent experience and experiments had shown that the breech-loading system as applied to heavy guns was a complete failure, and fit that moment Government was occupied in doing with their artillery exactly the reverse of what they were doing with the small arms. At that time 250 breechloaders were being rifled upon the shunt principle, which was, in reality, nothing more nor less than an adaptation by Sir William Armstrong of the French principle, with a slight alteration. The House would easily understand the principle, which was the insertion into the gun of a projectile with ribs or buttons, but the material difference was that the shot entering by one chamber was discharged by another set of grooves. Complaints had been made, and most justly, of the great partiality exhibited by the Select Ordnance Committee with reference to Sir William Armstrong. Nothing appeared to go down with the Committee but Armstrong guns. Every inventor who had come before the Committee complained of the conduct of its members in that respect. On comparing our Select Ordnance Committee with a similar committee in France, he could not help arriving at the conclusion that its members had done wonderfully little in contributing to the service of gunnery. It was a most remarkable fact that with the one exception of Captain Blakeley, all the improvements in gunnery had been effected by civilians. Mr. Whitworth, Mr. Lynal Thomas, and Sir William Armstrong were all civilians, and Captain Blakeley was the only artillerist connected with the improvements. The House, perhaps, imagined, that these 110-pounder guns were tested by experiment before being adopted. No such thing. Sir William Armstrong was made a director of the Artillery; and when he was asked before the Committee to state upon what series of experiments these guns were approved, his answer was, "None at all. There was such a pressure that there was no time for experiments." Yet a great number of guns had been made which were utterly condemned in the navy, and he believed that no great confidence was felt in them by the practical men of the Royal Artillery. He now wished to draw attention to a comparison between the French gun and ours, because really we seemed to be in a sort of fool's paradise with regard to our gun, which was thought an invention superior to any in all the world. He was sorry to see that the Duke of Somerset ridiculed altogether the idea of the French gun, though his Grace gave no reasons; but a remarkable paper had lately appeared in the Edinburgh Review, evidently written by an artillerist of high standing, in which a very favourable account was given of this French gun, which, as compared with our 68-pounder,—the only one available for the armament of our iron-clads—was said to be as superior as cheese to chalk. Had the noble Lord (Lord Clarence Paget), above all men in the world—he who was such a great naval reformer in opposition, and who discovered then a waste of £5,000,000 which he had never proved — had that great naval reformer who had reformed nothing, sanctioned an expenditure of £2,500,000 upon a gun, while the navy was left without any except what was called the good and wholesome old 68-pounder? Captain Blakeley, who was an artillery officer of great attainments, and was driving an enormous trade in guns with foreign countries, where his guns were highly approved, was asked before the Committee whether he thought that the Armstrong gun would be effective against a side of La Gloire. His answer, in effect, was, "By no means. The French possess a gun so superior to the Armstrong, that if we unfortunately went to war with them at the present time our iron-clads would not stand a chance against that gun." Captain Blakeley went on to say that we had spent millions upon the formation of an iron-clad fleet, and if we sent the fleet to sea at the present moment it would cut a very sorry figure against the French gun. Was that a proper state of things? Could the House he content to go to what were called its duties in the country, not knowing at any time, if a war broke out, what would be the result? He could not rest content without making a last struggle to draw attention to the subject. As to the forts, he doubted whether there was a gun for them; and, after all, recent experience bad not been such as to afford much encouragement with regard to heavy guns. At the siege of Charleston, where these monster guns had been employed, they had never fired above forty-eight rounds without bursting, though to that day Fort Sumter had never been taken; and an American paper took much credit for a heavy gun which was fired seventy-six times and did not burst till the seventy-seventh. Expensive experiments were going on at Shoe-buryness, which, as the writer in the Edinburgh Review said, were made without precision and without judgment, and yet we now had no naval gun, while it was very much doubted whether we had a gun which was fit to be mounted in the forts when they were built. From the first he had always argued that the proper defence of our shores was the navy, and the navy alone. But although the House supported him by their cheers, they had withheld their votes from him. These fortifications had lingered, the original plan being altered, while it might be altered again. If it were not for the lateness of the Session he should be almost inclined to resist the third reading, to stop the digging of holes in which we were burying millions, and ask the House to pause in the rash outlay, and see whether they could not lay out the residue of the money to better advantage upon naval defences. Exhausted as the House was, he felt indebted to them for listening to his short explanation, but he felt the question to be one of such vital importance that it could not be pooh-poohed from the Treasury Bench, and was worthy the deepest consideration of the House.

THE MARQUESS OF HARTINGTON

said, he was very glad that the hon. Gentleman had not carried out his intention of opposing the third reading of the Bill, especially as it had reference to the completion of a scheme for the defence of Portsmouth and Spithead. The subject had been so fully discussed in several former years, and the House had so distinctly asserted its determination that Spit-head should be defended by a system of forts in combination with its floating defences, that it would be scarcely worth while to occupy time at that late period of the Session in discussing once again the merits of the scheme. It was true that it had been found necessary to abandon the site of one of these forts, and a modification of the plan had been rendered necessary, but that modification was very slight. But if the hon. Gentleman would look at the evidence before the Defence Commission, be would see that the Government had sufficient grounds to go upon with regard to the foundation for the Sturbridge Fort. Sir Charles Fox strongly supported the opinion that a site would be found; and although Mr. Hawkshaw expressed more doubt, still his evidence pointed rather to the probability of very great outlay being necessary than to the conclusion that a good and safe foundation would not be found. The hon. Member accused the Government of not having made greater progress with the works. But the House would remember that it was owing to the opposition of the hon. Member that the whole scheme for the defence of Spithead was suspended for more than a year, and that not only the work was suspended, but a great deal had to be gone over again. If, then, anybody was to be responsible for the delay in building the forts, and for the fact that the foundations were not yet above the level of the water, it was the hon. Member himself and the House. The hon. Member complained that the scheme had been presented in too hurried a manner, Now, the Report was presented the day before that fixed for the Committee on the Bill, and although the explanatory plan was not ready on the same day, the plan was conspicuously displayed in the House early that morning, and was tolerably certain to be seen by hon. Members who came down prepared to discuss the Bill. Hon. Members had not been asked to read a long and complicated Report; the Report presented was a very short one, and he did not know what possible benefit could have resulted from its being placed in the hands of Members at an earlier period. With regard to the plan, the object was that if the enemy's ships should succeed in penetrating the outer line of defences, they should be exposed at any spot where they might anchor to bombard the dockyard at Portsmouth to so concentrated a fire from the several forts that they would be unable to devote themselves to that object. By the Report of the Committee, without referring to the plan, it would be seen that those four works averaged about 3,000 yards' distance from each other, the greatest distance being a little over 4,000 yards. The experiments which had taken place a few days ago at Shoebury-ness showed that the expectations of the Committee with respect to the ordnance which might be placed in our forts had been fulfilled to the letter. The experiments made on that occasion showed that at 3,000 yards a projectile fired from the 600-pounder gun with a full charge would break the plates of any iron-clad vessel. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: What! At 3,000 yards?] The experiments which had been fully reported in The Times showed that to be the fact. No ship could possibly pass between the forts at a greater distance than 1,500 yards from one of them; and no ship could take up a position to shell the dockyard at a greater distance than 2,000 yards from the combined power of the forts. The hon. Gentleman said we had not a gun to put in these forts; but the House would perceive that the experiments with the 600-pounders showed that when mounted on the forts those guns would do all that they had originally been expected to do. Though he quite admitted we were not as far advanced in the matter of ordnance as might be wished, still there was no reason that when those forts were finished they should not be armed with a certain proportion of 600-pounders, and a proportion of smaller guns. The foundation of the forts would not be ready till next summer, and another year or two must elapse before the structures would be ready to receive the guns. Surely, then, the hon. Member would not have had the Government manufacture more of those 600-pounder guns without instituting experiments to test their performance. In reference to what had been said by the hon. Gentleman on the subject of breech-loading guns, he was quite free to admit that, as explained by him, the breech-loading system of Sir William Armstrong, which had proved so successful in the case of smaller ordnance—of field guns—had not been found so successful in guns of a larger description. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: Hear, hear!] But the hon. Member had mentioned that the Government were altering some of the old breech-loaders into muzzle-loaders. That statement was not strictly accurate. No finished breech-loaders had been altered. Certainly 250 guns which it had been intended to finish as breech-loaders had since been ordered to be finished as muzzle-loaders. The barrels had been formed, but they were in the state in which it was possible to finish them on the muzzle-loading system or as breech-loading guns; and considering that the system of breech-loading guns had not been found to answer satisfactorily, orders were given to finish them as muzzle-loaders. The hon. Gentleman had referred to the Duke of Somerset's evidence before the Ordinance Committee of the previous year, in which his Grace said that at 200 yards the 110 lb, gun was not effective against iron places; but the House must recollect that when that gun was ordered it was not intended to be used against iron-plates. There had been an opinion prevalent in the country that our ships should be armed with a rifle gun, throwing a ball a long distance. Accordingly those guns were ordered, and except with the few exceptions of their trials against iron-plates, they had been found to answer exceedingly well. The hon. Gentleman said that those were important exceptions. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: Hear!] But he must repeat it had not been intended that those guns should be used against iron-plates, and there were a great many situations in which they could be exceedingly useful. The Duke of Somerset had given his opinion that the navy had not got too many of them. For all purposes of long range, and for use against wooden ships, those guns were most desirable; and unquestion-ably they would be most valuable on shores which were not exposed to the attacks of iron-clad ships. They could not be adopted as the staple arm of our ships; but both naval and military authorities concurred in thinking that too many of them had not been made. The hon. Gentleman said that we had not got anything better than the old 68-pounders against iron-clad ships. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: The Duke of Somerset said it.] The Duke of Somerset made that statement last year; but since that a number of guns from 6½ to 7 tons weight had been made—that being, as we were told, the heaviest weight of broadside gun which a ship could carry, if heavier guns were put aboard, it must be to be used as other than broadside guns. The Government were also making some of the 12-ton guns, which, when smooth bore, had a calibre of 10½ inches, and when rifled a calibre of 9.22 inches. It might be said that they had not got any large number of those guns. They certainly had not; but surely the hon. Gentleman did not think the Government were wrong in making experiments before they introduced either the 7-ton or the 12-ton gun as a general arm of the navy. They had gone on with such haste in the case of the, 110-pounder that no experiments had preceded its adoption; but the result taught them that they might go too fast, and those large guns which were being tried were very expensive. Next Session, if the House thought fit to vote the necessary sums, the Government would be prepared to go on faster in producing those large wrought-iron guns for the army and navy. He could assure the House that the hon. Gentleman was mistaken when he said that the French navy was better armed than ours. If the hon. Member was right, would he tell the House what this formidable weapon was which the French service possessed? [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE: Read the article in the Edinburgh Review.] He had read it. The hon. Gentleman said that evidently it was written by a man possessing very great knowledge of the subject. He thought it quite evident that it was written by a person who was very friendly to the inventor of the gun to which he presumed the hon. Member referred. That gun was a weapon of great range, power, and accuracy, but it was a mistake to suppose that the French navy was armed with that experimental gun. He believed the French ships were armed with old 32-pounder guns which had been rifled, and which did not carry a charge of more than 8 1b. or 9 1b. of powder. If it was a fact that any other nation was very much ahead of us in its ordnance, that would be an argument to show that we should proceed to manufacture a large number of the best gun we had; but as that was not the case, there was no such necessity for such hot haste. If there was reason to believe that we could arm our ships with as good a gun as any other nation could bring against us, and that we could construct improved guns as fast as anybody else, that was a reason, not, perhaps, for delay, but for not proceeding with undue haste. The hon. Member said that recent experience seemed to be against large guns, and he referred to the short lives of the American guns at Charleston. The fact was that the Americans did not possess a wrought-iron gun at all, and experience had shown that east-iron, however well made, was not suitable for large guns carrying a heavy charge of powder. Wrought-iron or steel was the proper material for the purpose; and although it might be more expensive in the first instance, yet as it lasted much longer than cast-iron, there was in the end not much difference in respect of cost. Therefore, he did not think we were in so deplorable a condition in regard to the armament of our ships as the hon. Member wished the House to believe. Heavier guns were being made, and he hoped that before long we should have a number of iron-clad ships armed with a gun much superior to the 68-pounder. As to the forts which would be exposed to attack by iron-clad vessels, an armament would be prepared for them before they could possibly be finished. In the course they had pursued, the Government had been carrying out the wishes of the House, and he thought that at so late a date, it would be a pity to stop the works then going on and resort to another mode of defence.

CAPTAIN JERVIS

said, he regretted that, in attacking the Government for not paying proper attention to the defences of the country, the hon. Member for Liskeard should have cast reflections on a body of officers who deserved well of their country—the Ordnance Select Committee. [Mr. BERNAL OSBORNE disclaimed any intention of doing so.] The hon. Gentleman had accused the Committee of being prejudiced in favour of one system, which had disappointed everybody. The truth was that since the subject began to attract attention the Committee had been changed three or four times in order to please the hon. Gentleman and others. First of all it was composed of artillery officers, but a complaint was made that it was not purely an artillery question, and that engineering science should be brought to bear on it. Accordingly, engineer officers were put on the Committee; but even that did not satisfy people, and a mixed Committee was formed, comprising officers of artillery, engineers, and civilians, among the number being such men as Professor Wheat-stone and Mr. Gregory. Objections, however, continued to be made, and further changes took place. The Committee now included artillery officers, engineer officers, line officers, and naval officers, Surely, when such a body of men, consisting of the best officers in the service and eminent engineers, concurred in a certain opinion, even the hon. Gentleman might be expected to bow to it. Great improvements had been effected during the last six years. In 1858, when the gallant General the Member for Huntingdon (General Peel) was at the War Office, there was a great cry for a rifled gun, and every effort was made to procure the best. Sir William, then Mr. Armstrong, a man quite unknown at that time, came forward with a plan, and after a long course of experiments he was pronounced to be the victor, and his gun was adopted. Indeed, such was the enthusiasm that the House and the country believed this inventor knew more about rifled guns than anybody else, artillery officers being quite ignorant on the subject; and so he was appointed Director of the Rifled Ordnance Factory.

MR. BERNAL OSBORNE

The House did not make the appointment.

CAPTAIN JERVIS

No; but when it was announced in the House that Mr. Armstrong was to be Director and K.C.B., and all the rest of it, the intimation was received with plaudits. Well, Sir William Armstrong having gained a high position, was naturally attacked by a number of men who tried to grapple with him and to take his place. Then came the question of a possible collision with France, and an alarm was raised that we had no naval guns. He recollected the Secretary to the Admiralty refusing to give Returns of naval guns, be cause we had then none at all. Sir William Armstrong succeeded in introducing 40 and 70-pounder guns which could blow any wooden ship out of the water. The French and other Governments finding that such powerful ordnance could be constructed, turned their attention to iron-plated ships; and as they went on from two, four, and six inches of iron, Sir William Armstrong ! kept up to them. We had now a gun which could pierce a ship plated with any thickness of iron that, as far as experiments had gone, could probably be used. It was for the Government to decide how many of these guns should be ordered; but hon. Members should not go on blowing hot and cold as they were doing. At one time they complained that the Government had done nothing, and then that they had done too much. Where should we have been, he would like to know, but for the money which had been spent? If the 100-pounder had been given up, it was because something better had been found. We had proceeded on step by step from one gun I to another. It was only within the last few years that the great manufacturers bad learnt how to make iron-plates at all. He recollected a year or two back when a ½-inch plate was deemed quite a wonder; and it was much to have found out in so short a time how to roll such enormous plates as were now produced. It was not a mere military question, but one which interested every man who worked in iron, whether master or mechanic; and he was not sure that as much credit was not due to the labourers at the furnaces as to any-body else. He trusted that the House would discuss the question without any party feeling, and that when it was found that we had got a good weapon, the Go- vernment would stick to it and carry it out.

Bill read 3o and passed.