HC Deb 19 July 1864 vol 176 cc1749-71
SIR FREDERIC SMITH,

in rising to move an Address for a Commission to inquire into the system of Building Ships of War in this Country and in other countries, and to report what beneficial changes may be made, begged to state that he had been in hopes that some of his gallant Friends connected with the navy, or hon. Members interested in shipping, would have brought forward the question, and he for that reason had delayed taking it up till now. He felt he was hardly competent to give a professional opinion on the matter, yet he believed his Motion would be of use in eliciting a discussion that would prove useful to the service. At that moment we were building ships of various kinds" and the question was, which description would be of most value to the country? He had no desire to censure the Board of Admiralty. No member of that House had a greater respect for the noble Duke at the head of the Admiralty, who carried out his duties in a manner creditable to himself and advantageous to the country, but he was anxious to ascertain whether in the fleet they were constructing they were pursuing the wisest and most economical course. They were now building ships of wood, of iron, partly of wood and partly of iron, some of them iron-cased partially, and others iron-cased wholly. Over and over again the House had been told that the time of the Lords of the Admiralty was so occupied that it was impossible for them to devote to the subject the attention which it deserved. He had been Chairman of the Committee to inquire into the state of the gunboats, and Sir Baldwin Walker told the Committee in what manner the authority was given for the construction of a ship, He stated that he desired the constructor to make drawings of a ship, that he examined those drawings, and signed them, and made what was called a submission to the Lords of the Admiralty, laying his plans on the table. They were discussed as such things could be discussed in a board, and generally the first naval Lord signed his name to the drawings, and the work was performed; and yet the builders stated that, however faulty the plans submitted to them for their construction might be, they never presumed to make the slightest alteration in them. Under these circumstances the only security the country had was in the talent and experience of the Chief Constructor of the Navy, and he wished to ask if they had in the Chief Constructor recently appointed that experience in shipbuilding and that description of talent which justified them in placing the fleet under his entire control. He had heard from many quarters that the new Constructor was a man of considerable ability, and he had no doubt that he was so, but talent was not all that was required. The Constructor ought to be a man of great experience, who had been employed continuously in the construction of ships, and who would be able to say at once where strength should be added and blemishes removed. Vessels from 6,000 down to 700 tons were constantly being built. They were constructed in very different ways, and varied in proportion, in material, and in armament in a most extraordinary manner. It was impossible to say when a ship was ordered to be constructed what guns she would carry, and it appeared that this point, this vital point, was never settled till after the vessel was launched; instead of the only rational course of building a ship suitable for a definite battery. That magnificent ship the Warrior was built to carry 40 guns, yet she was now only to carry 20. He was old enough to remember when the cost of a ship was estimated at £1,000 per gun, That sum not only found the ship, but the armament and the entire equipment. A vast change had since taken place in that respect. It appeared from Returns presented to the House by the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, that the Agincourt, the Minotaur, and the Northumberland, each of which were of 6,621 tons, were only to carry 26 guns. They were of iron but only partially plated. The Warrior and Black Prince, of 6,109 tons and originally intended to carry 40 guns, were now to carry 20 only. These two were only partially iron-plated and of iron. The Achilles was of 6,121 tons, and was to carry only 20 guns; she was of iron and only partially iron-plated; but he hoped the noble Lord would correct him if he was wrong. He had heard, but he did not know, that she was now to be more completely plated than originally intended. Then the Hector, of only 4,020 tons, was to carry 24 guns, while the Achilles with a third more tonnage was to carry only 20. What was more remarkable was that the Valiant, although smaller than either, was to carry 34 guns. He had no doubt the Admiralty Return he quoted from was quite correct. Then, again, the Bellerophon, which was larger than the Valiant, being of 4,446 tons, was only to carry 14 guns. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: Her guns are of much larger calibre.] That would enable her to throw a heavier broadside, and was therefore a point which must be borne in mind, but the Returns did not give the information. The Caledonia, of about 4,000 tons, was wholly armour plated and a wooden ship. The Bellerophon was an iron ship and partly armour-plated. The Royal Oak was of wood, and wholly armour-plated. The Ocean was of wood, of a little more than 4,000 tons and wholly armour-plated. The Prince Consort was of 4,000 tons, and was to have 35 guns. Why was the Caledonia to have much heavier guns than the Bellerophon? If the Bellerophon's armament was good for a man-of-war of 4,000 tons it ought to be applied to the Caledonia also. But nothing was ever more capricious than the present system of armament; every thing about it was complex and costly where simplicity was required. He doubted whether the noble Lord had the guns of large calibre in sufficient quantity. If we were in the right groove, let us continue in it; if not, let us change it. If the Government had nothing to hide, nothing to stifle, they would grant the inquiry for which he asked; and as Parliament was about to break up, it was very important that the House and the country should know how the enormous sum to be spent before they met again was going to be laid out. A French author of some celebrity stated what the right hon. Member for Droitwich would no doubt be slow to admit—namely, that the Warrior would Have no chance, through not being protected at the bow and stern, against a vessel like La Gloire, which was armour-plated all round. He hoped that was not so; but the Warrior was an experiment, and he would ask, was it not intended to disarm the bow and stern of the Black Prince and the Warrior? His right hon. Friend said his object in regard to the Warrior was to get a great speed, and he believed that with a clean bottom she would steam from 14 to 15 knots an hour. His right hon. Friend would say that if the bow and stern had not been made so sharp she would not have attained that velocity. That was one of the points which required investigation. The proper way to deal with a question of this kind was not to leave it in the hands of the noble Lord and his colleagues on the Treasury Bench, because in a year or two they might be replaced by other Gentlemen with totally different views. He wanted something specific to be laid down, not for the purpose of controlling the Government or the Admiralty, but with the view of advising and assisting them, and it is lamentable to see how much they want that assistance. A vote of the House, so far from being a reproach to the Admiralty, would strengthen them. He knew nothing except from the newspapers, but he had read that two vessels recently constructed, and called the Research and the Enterprise, were fitted up, not with the ordinary broadside batteries, but with guns in a sort of box, 33ft. by 32ft. square, in which four guns were used. Any man acquainted with the requirements of ventilation would know that space would be quite inadequate. These four guns ought to be capable of being used at the same time, supposing the vessel to be attacked simultaneously on both sides. It was reported that experiments had been made with these guns; but he would be glad to know at what angle they were fired. It appeared that they were not loaded with shot, but only with powder, and he was told that they were fired at an elevation, and could not be fired in any other way. That was a bad system. He found fault with these two vessels being fitted up with that box, at great expense, without having the box tried on terra firma. He had a letter in his possession from the commander of the Rolf Krake, belonging to the Danish Government, which was built on Captain Cowper Coles's system, and which had been three times in action, receiving 150 shot wounds, and that letter gave a very good description of her performance, with which the writer was perfectly satisfied. He understood that the Research, a vessel with the same armament and of the same size as the Rolf Krake, could only fire two guns in any one direction at the same time, whereas the Rolf Krake could fire her four guns at the same time and in the same direction. All that he had gathered from naval men of experience and ability gave him a bad opinion of the Research and the Enterprise. The public mind ought to be set at rest one way or other as to their real character. Then there was another important point, The ship for which they were indebted to the right hon. Member for Droitwich would steam 14 or 15 knots an hour, but they did not hear that the small vessels by which so much was promised to be done would steam 10 knots. Suppose, then, we were engaged in war. In making up our squadrons we must recollect that speed was one great element to be kept in view. What would be the consequence of sending out the Warrior along with the Research and the Enterprise? The Warrior, with her superior speed, might run up to an enemy possessing perhaps an equal armament, when her two slower consorts could not come up to her support. Length was the first element of speed; and if we were to have iron-plated ships as nearly as possible shot-proof, by plating them from stem to stern on both sides, it was clear we must, in order to obtain the proper amount of displacement, have a breadth of beam incompatible with high speed. Then there was the great question of armour-plating with regard to which a great deal of uncertainty prevailed, and many experiments had been made. First, the Warrior had 4½in. of iron with 18in. of teak backing; but they were not content with that, which was very nearly shot proof with the guns they then had in use. They next determined to build the Northumberland, the Agincourt, and the Minotaur. They proceeded on what they supposed to be a better target. But, if the target was not so good as that of the Warrior, the Government had made a mistake, and they have made a mistake. After all, did they want an invulnerable ship? They had not quite got it in the Warrior, but it is pretended that they would have it in the target proposed by Mr. Chalmers. It appeared that that target was supposed to be a success; and they heard, also, that it was copied or nearly copied in the Bellerophon. Had it been properly tested with full charges and under the same circumstances as other targets? This is to be doubted. Then there was another target for the Lord Warden. That was the most complicated structure he had ever seen. It was first of iron, then of wood, then of iron, and then of wood again. If that turned out better than the Warrior he should rejoice, but he heard it had been tried and failed. If it had failed, they did wrong to adopt it. The noble Lord would excuse him, however, for saying it had not been very fairly tried. The target actually tried did not represent that portion of the ship it was intended to represent. He wanted to know under what advice our ships were built. Sir R. Seppings made great improvements; Sir William Symonds, it was supposed, had also made improvements. Then came three men who had been brought up in the College of Naval Architecture at Portsmouth, Mr. Crew, Mr. Chatfield, and Mr. Reed—not the Mr. Reed of whom they had heard so much of late. They were admirable men—men of talent. They were employed one day in actual shipbuilding, and another day in scientific studies, thus combining theory with practice. That was a good and sound system for bringing forward practical men. But now the new Naval College was to be conducted on a different system—the students were to spend the six winter months at Kensington, and the other six months in the dockyard. Were they to be employed at the ship's side learning the duties of a shipwright? He was told they were to make drawings at Kensington, but they ought to make drawings from the ships under construction and not from models. He feared the system would turn out a bad one, for though at Kensington they might ac- quire mathematics in the higher branches and the other elements so much talked of, but which often turned out unpractical, they would lose a great deal that was practical. No one stickled more than the noble Lord (Lord C. Paget) for examinations. At the present moment every one raised from one grade to another in the dockyards had to undergo a competitive examination. It was a great pity the noble Lord had not applied that principle to the case of the appointment of Constructor of the Navy. Had he done so, he might, indeed, have got the same man, but the whole country would have been open to him. The selection might have been made from the most eminent private yards, such as that of the Messrs. Laird, of Birkenhead, that of Messrs. Green, that of the Thames Company, and many other establishments. The best practical man would have been got, but instead of that a gentleman was taken out of an office who had not been employed in shipbuilding for ten years. He did not think that that was right. Then, again, was it intended that the able men at present employed in our dockyards should give way to the students at the Kensington school? If so, great heartburning would be occasioned. First of all, then, they had to determine the question of armour-plating. Then, again, was there sufficient strength in the Admiralty to take up all the great inventions of the day, or did they require more advice? He did not doubt the sea talent of the naval Lord of the Admiralty, or the administrative talent of the hon. Member for Pontefract, who, he had no doubt, would do his work well, but did he pretend to decide what should be the construction of a ship? Had the naval Lords time to turn their attention to the construction of ships? He had heard that the late Controller, a distinguished officer, had said he did not understand shipbuilding. Did the present Controller profess to be able to decide on the lines of a ship? It is believed he did not. They were then in the hands of the new Constructor, and who was his adviser? A connection of his own of very limited knowledge. They wanted as their advisers men of great talent, great energy, and great experience—men who would have the confidence of the country. He feared they had not got them. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, as chairman of Committees, had often to investigate less important matters; were not those of much more importance to be investigated? They could not bring together a sufficient number of Members who had the requisite practical knowledge on this subject, they must therefore look beyond the walls of the House. He had great doubts whether that information could be found even within the walls of the Admiralty. The Warrior carried 20 guns, her tonnage was 300 tons per gun, and her cost was £18,050 per gun. The Defence, which carried 18 guns, or 207 tons per gun, cost £13,373 per gun. The Achilles, of 20 guns, had 306 tons per gun, and cost £16,093 per gun. We ought to have numbers of these ships, and it was of great importance to know that they were being built in the best and cheapest way. Would the noble Lord, therefore, tell the House whether he was aiming at speed, at armament, or at power of resistance? Had the noble Lord entered into the question of constructing ships of steel? Steel was pierced by shot, but it did not splinter, whereas iron splintered, and the splinters were more dangerous than the shot themselves. If it were found impossible to construct at a moderate cost a vessel that would keep out shell and shot, was it worth while to sacrifice speed, and would it not be wiser to let the shot go through if it could not be kept out by any vessel that would go 12 knots an hour? The difference in the construction and cost of these vessels was most remarkable. The Lord Clyde, 24, would have 169 tons per gun, and the cost per gun would be £11,600. The Pallas, 6, would have for each gun 395 tons flotation, and would cost £22,690 per gun. Why were these ships built apparently hap-hazard, the cost per gun being double in some cases to what it was in others? He wanted to know whether, when a ship was ordered to be built, directions were given what her draught of water was to be, her number of guns, her tonnage, and cost per gun. With every respect to guns and soldiers ashore, he looked upon the navy as our main defence, and the way to keep our navy uncrippled was to economize and build at the lowest price and in the most judicious method possible. But how could the difference between these ships be reconciled? The Vixen was to carry four guns, and was to be of 754 tons. The Prince Albert was also to carry four guns, but was to be 2,529 tons. As to the Research, Admiral Fremantle's Report, for which he had moved, would show what the construction of vessels was. He said— The space in the battery is so confined that the men have not room to work the guns with that facility that is required. The battery is thirty-three feet in length by thirty-two feet in breadth inside; within this space are four heavy guns, upwards of eighty men, funnel, wheel, hatchway for supplying powder and shell. There is a difficulty in traversing the guns from the broadside to the bow and quarter ports. When the broadside guns were fired with extreme train, foremost ones to the left, after ones to the right, the captains of them could not stand to direct and fire them. These points being of great importance, I have considered it right to bring them before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty. He wished to know what was to be done with the Warrior, the Black Prince, and vessels of that kind, which were not plated from bow to stern? If Captain Coles's turrets succeeded, as he hoped and believed, he would suggest whether the spaces in the bow and stern could not be occupied with turrets. These ships were known to be the finest in the world, and they ought to have an armament worthy of their reputation. If his Motion were granted, he was certain that a great saving of public money would follow, and he therefore begged the favourable consideration of the House.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to issue a Commission to consider the various systems now existing of constructing and Armour-plating Ships of War for the British Navy, as well as for the Navies of other Maritime Powers, and to report what, in the opinion of such Commission, should be the system to be now adopted for the British Navy."—(Sir Frederic Smith.)

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, that if he thought the granting of a Commission would have the effect which his hon. and gallant Friend anticipated, he would be the last to object to it. But he thought that the hon. and gallant Gentleman in the course of his able speech had shown that in the first place any Commission that might be appointed would be led into a sea of difficulties, and next, that by the time it had presented its Report, there would have been such alterations and improvements in guns, shot, armour-plating, and all things connected with fighting ships, that it would really be out of date. He had carefully listened to the speech of his hon. and gallant Friend with a view to ascertain whether he could lay down a line for future action. He had told them truly that, of the 27 armour ships we were now constructing, scarcely two, and in no case more than three or four, were of anything like the same dimensions, and he had found fault with the Admiralty for adopting a number of plans.

SIR FREDERIC SMITH

said, he did not object to the class of ships that were built, but he did object that those ships did not appear to be performing the duties which those classes of ships should perform. Where there were ships of the same kind there was not the same armament.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, his hon. and gallant Friend seemed to think that, according to tonnage, ships should carry a given number of guns. [Sir FREDERIC SMITH: Yes,] The answer to that was, that although fewer guns might be put on board, yet those guns might be of a heavier calibre, and the Admiralty studied not so much the number of guns as the weight of metal. The hon. and gallant Gentleman stated that the Warrior was built to carry 40 guns, while in fact she only carried 20. The fact was that the Warrior carried more than 20 guns, because she carried a certain number on her upper deck, but it was true also that the guns had been taken away from that part of the main deck of the ship which was not armour-plated. It was, however, also true that the guns which were left on board were of heavier calibre; so that if the number of guns had been diminished the weight of metal fired from those remaining had been increased. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had compared the Warrior with the Gloire; but the fact was that, although the Warrior carried fewer guns than the Gloire, yet she would deliver a heavier broadside in the weight of shot. The great value of guns was the weight of shot they sent. The real object of the Motion appeared to be to find fault with the Research and the Enterprise. [Sir FREDERIC SMITH: No.] The hon. and gallant Gentleman said, why was not a Chief Constructor of the Navy chosen by competition? He (Lord Clarence Paget) was a great advocate of competition, and it had been his desire to apply that system as far as possible, but it had its limits. We did not appoint our high officers by competition. When a man of great talent and knowledge was required, the Government must undertake the responsibility of selecting a man in whom they had confidence. The history of Mr. Reed's appointment was briefly this—Mr. Reed was originally instructed in one of our dockyards, and he afterwards took a high place among naval architects. That gentleman was employed by the Admiralty to build two vessels, the Research and the Enterprise, and to do what the Constructors of the Navy had hitherto believed to be impossible, to construct armour-plated ships of moderate tonnage. When the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Sir John Pakington) inquired what sized ship was required to carry armour-plating, he was told that nothing under the size of the Warrior could do it. The Warrior was a great success, no doubt, but there were certain defects connected with that ship, such as her excessive length, and it was thought most desirable if possible to reduce the size. The Admiralty wished to reduce expense and to diminish the draught of water; but they had not been able to get below vessels of 4,000 tons. Mr. Reed proposed to adapt the frames of vessels already in course of construction, and said he could construct a vessel of 1,000 tons to be armour-plated, especially on her vital part near the water line. That was the history of the Research and the Enterprise. The plans of these vessels were sent in, and Mr. Reed was employed to build them. He would not venture to prophesy that the Research and the Enterprise would be found faultless, because in all experiments, such as they were, improvements in matters of detail would always be discovered. He would pass over what had occurred at Devonport, because he held that the Research had not had fair play. The fact of sending her out in a hurry, with her four guns really firing over her decks, exactly as in Captain Coles's ship, was a great novelty, and in his opinion should have been carried out on the first occasion with great care and precautions. The shock did damage to some crockery, and some trifling damage was done to the ship. Those damages, however, were so slight that the Admiral did not report them, but he said the quarters were too confined. It must be borne in mind that those vessels carried men sufficient to full man all their guns, while on other ships there were only sufficient men to man fully one broadside. When the two broadsides were fired one-half of the men were taken from the full number at each gun. In the ships we now possessed the number of men to guns was fewer than in Mr. Reed's vessels. Bearing that fact in mind, it was not surprising that the batteries of these latter vessels should be more crowded; but to make a fair comparison with other ships, one half of the crew should be sent below. There were other defects of detail, such as the funnel and the wheel, which had been remedied. There was, too, the gun slides. He was surprised to hear the hon. and gallant Gentleman ask why they had not adopted Mr. Anderson's slides, when, in fact, these slides had not been invented at the time these vessels were planned. Captain De Horsey, a very intelligent officer, had those two vessels under his orders, and they had been sent singly in order that they might have a satisfactory trial. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said, "Why not send them to the Channel Fleet?" For the same reasons that Captain Coles's vessels were not sent to the Channel Fleet. It was desirable that those new ships should be tried by themselves first. [Sir FREDERIC SMITH: The trial should be public] They were public, for his hon. and gallant Friend might go aboard if he liked, but the ships were always sent out by themselves in the first instance, just as a racehorse was tried. Captain de Horsey had not been sent to make a favourable report, but to make a faithful one, and he had not known that his report would ever be brought under the notice of that House. He reported on every part of those vessels, and he described them as a success. Having gone through various details, as to their performance under canvas, their wearing and tacking, and their capabilities in running before the wind, and showing that in all respects they were sea-going vessels, he said the accommodation, the stowage, and the ventilation were good, as were the whole internal arrangements of both ships. He said that the ventilation of the Research was not so good as that of the Enterprise, and that the upper deck was too close to the water; and that the fore and aft deck of the sister ship were elevated above the fighting deck, which he thought was a better plan. There was no concealment, for Captain de Horsey observed that the Research was too deep waisted, a fault which the hon. and gallant Gentleman knew was very common in corvettes. Those ships bad not been in a gale of wind, but, from a conversation which he had had with the captains, he believed both vessels would be good seafaring ships. Mr. Reed had constructed them, and at a moment when the Admiralty required a Chief Constructor the Duke of Somerset took upon himself to appoint that gentleman. His hon. and gallant Friend said that the Admiralty put their faith in Mr. Reed; but it so happened that there were other constructors of the Navy, very rising men, not to mention Admiral Robinson, who, though not a thorough constructor, was one of the best officers in the navy as regarded an acquaintance with the details of a ship. He wished his hon. and gallant Friend and the public to remember that the mere building of a man-of-war did not represent but half of what was necessary to make her efficient. For equipment, armament, stowage, rigging, magazines, and other points, the judgment and superintendence of a practical sailor were required. His hon. and gallant Friend found fault with the Admiralty because they did not appoint some marvellous man, such as he supposed his hon. and gallant Friend had in his own eye; and another charge brought against them was that they did not inquire sufficiently. Why, several Committees of Inquiry on several different points had been appointed. For the last three or four years they had had a Committee on Armour Plates, presided over by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay); and now they were going to have a Committee to inquire into the novel and interesting proposal submitted by Captain Coles for rigging ships on the tripod system to suit the cupolas. They had had many Committees on points of detail, but to appoint a Commission or Committee and tell them they were to construct ships for the navy would be absurd and impossible. His hon. and gallant Friend as the Member for Chatham must know, if he ever visited the dockyards, what the Admiralty were doing with steel, and yet he came to that House and said to the Admiralty, "You are behindhand, and do not use steel." To justify the Admiralty, he would read a letter, dated July 8th, from an independent gentleman, whose authority no one would question—Mr. Fairbairn. The letter was I marked "private;" but he was sure that the writer would not object to its being read I to the House. At all events, he could not I resist reading portions of it. Mr. Fairbairn went into details, which it was unnecessary to bring before the House, though they were most interesting to nautical men; but the following portions of his letter, which was directed to Admiral Robinson, could not fail to be gratifying to every hon. Member:— Some days previous to leaving town I visited Chatham along with Mr. Reid for the purpose of examining the iron ship Bellerophon, now in frame at the dockyard. In this inspection I was highly gratified to find that you had adopted what I have all along considered the true principle of construction in the formation of the hull with double bottom, or double sheathing in the cellular form. Longitudinal kelsons united to transverse frames from 3ft. to 4ft. asunder is, in my opinion, the only secure form in which wrought-iron as a material for shipbuilding can be employed; and I have to congratulate you on the prospect of having one of the strongest and lightest ships ever yet constructed for Her Majesty's service. I offer no opinion as to the armour-plating, that is already determined experimentally, and I must leave the lines and form to better and wiser heads than my own. One thing I, however, observed, namely, the capacious breadth of floor at midships, which, I think, is a great improvement. He thought hon. Gentlemen were too apt to take up newspapers and read some story of the French having advanced beyond us, and of American ships, wonders of the world, which were to completely eclipse anything which we had afloat. He assured the House that as regarded the French he spoke with the greatest respect of their ships, because we owed to those ships many improvements; but he was not at all afraid of our ships; for they were equal if not superior to those of any other nation. He did not deny that their cost was great. They cost perhaps more than they would if constructed in private yards, but he believed they were of superior workmanship, and that their superiority in that respect more than compensated us for the extra cost. He could assure his hon. and gallant Friend that steel shot and the construction of guns were matters not lost sight of by the Admiralty, and that in regard to both we were not behind any other nation. As to the Lord Warden target, it was quite true that target had been roughly handled, but it had not yet been pierced by any gun in use in the service. He did not mean to say that it had not been much shaken.

SIR JOHN HAY

The noble Lord must be speaking of some other target.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

No, he was speaking of the Lord Warden target, which was fired at by the 10.5-inch 12-ton gun, on board the Royal Sovereign—the biggest gun we had got—and which was not pierced by it. It was true that the target had not yet been taken to pieces, and, consequently, the exact amount of damage could not be ascertained. In the Lord Warden and the Lord Clyde, we had ships of the very strongest construction. They had the scantling of a line-of- battle-ship, and the only distinction between them and the armour-plated ships built of wood previously was that they had an inner skin of 1½ inch. To call that construction complicated was a misapplication, of terms. He would not follow the hon. and gallant Gentleman into the various details of the construction of ships, but he would only say that it was a subject which constantly engaged the attention of the Admiralty, and where they found that any branch of the subject required accurate and detailed information they appointed a committee of practical men. But to throw down on the table instructions to a Commission to construct ships for our navy would be perfectly futile, would lead to vast and extravagant expenditure, and, instead of leading to efficiency, would be a most unfortunate thing for the navy.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, that though he did not agree with his hon. and gallant Friend as to the expediency of referring this general subject to a Commission, he did not think that the noble Lord had given reasons which would induce the House to reject the Motion. With regard to the Lord Warden target, the noble Lord and himself must be at cross purposes. If the noble Lord had been present at the experiment, he never could have said that the Lord Warden was not pierced. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: It was not pierced by the 300-pounder.] He was sorry that he had not the Returns with him, but the noble Lord would see that the target was exposed to a very severe fire, and was not only pierced but destroyed in a most wonderful manner. It was exposed to the fire of four of the heaviest guns in existence. One shell struck it, broke in the target, made a hole four feet in diameter in the front, and eight feet diameter in the rear. The fire was exceedingly heavy, but it was quite possible that our ships might be subjected to such a fire. He quite agreed with his noble Friend that it would be unadvisable to appoint a Committee to go into the general subject of the construction of the navy, but there were points of detail on the subject of construction which might properly be referred to a Committee or Commission. What the public were disposed to find fault with the Admiralty for was, not that they made too many experiments, or that they did not do their duty in endeavouring to ascertain what was the best description of ships, but that their inquiries appeared to be aimless, and that they did not set before them any definite object. There were several points on which a definite decision might be wisely arrived at, and which might be referred to a Committee or Commission. First of all, there was the question of speed. The object of a ship was to be able to carry the best possible guns with the greatest possible speed into the required position, and that the vessel should be capable of being manœuvred with facility when she was got into that position. The ascertained speed of some ocean-going steamers was from 16 to 17 miles an hour, and it would be desirable to ascertain what speed our men-of-war could reasonably be expected to attain. The speed of a fleet or squadron acting in concert was measured by the speed of the slowest vessel in it, and it would be necessary, therefore, to come to some definite understanding as to what should be the slowest speed given to vessels intended to act in concert. Then, again, there was the question of the draught of large ships. Great disadvantages had arisen from the large draught of some of our large ships, which did not permit them to approach the shore, and which made them unable to enter any of our docks. Another point was the difficulty of turning some of our new long ships with a single screw, and the consequent difficulty of manœuvring them in action or in a narrow channel He was not prepared to affirm positively that the twin screw had solved this difficulty, but he believed in his heart that it had. By means of the twin screw the longest ships might be manœuvred in their own length, and if the Admiralty adopted that principle, he believed they would have solved the difficulty. These were questions which might be wisely referred to a Committee or Commission. He was fully aware of the difficulties the Admiralty laboured under in regard to the question of armament; but he believed we were pausing a little too long over our experiments. This point, at least, had been made pretty clear, that, in a conflict with armour-plated ships, no gun lighter than the 12-ton gun would be of much service. If it could be proved that we could have a 12-ton gun which could be rifled for rifle projectiles, and at the same time used as a smooth-bore gun, let us have a supply of those guns at once sufficient to arm the number of ships we intended to commission, or which we might commission, in the event of a war. There was another point which would require the attention of the Admiralty, and that was, how those new iron ships were to be coppered. His hon. and gallant Friend (Sir Frederic Smith) was not sanguine that that could be done. It should be borne in mind, however, that the ships of Her Majesty's navy must keep the sea for a very long period in time of war, and therefore the question was well deserving the attention of the Admiralty. He was of opinion that when the talent of the country was brought to bear upon it the difficulty might be overcome. There was another subject which had not been alluded to, but which was of deep national importance. We were protecting our ships by iron, and making the hull fireproof; but, after all, the great danger in battle was the danger of fire. Once that we had a certainty that our enemies would be provided with steel shells, we might be equally certain that if the fittings were made of deal the bursting of such a shell would cause not only considerable destruction on board, but even a panic among the crew. Therefore it was necessary that combustible materials should, as far as possible, be got rid of. He had heard with some surprise that after certain trials the Royal Sovereign was about to join the Channel Fleet. But unless the Royal Sovereign was masted, she would hardly be in a condition to be employed as a seagoing ship. They had been asked to give the Royal Sovereign fair play. But what Captain Coles complained of, and what the general public had been led to believe, was that Captain Coles had had not fair play from the Admiralty—that he had not had entire control over the ships which he was to build. Would Captain Coles be satisfied that the Royal Sovereign should be sent to join the Channel Fleet without masts? [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: She has light jury masts.] But not such masts as it would be desirable to send her to sea with. To talk then of sending her to make a trial of her sea-going qualities with the Channel Fleet was, to sea-going men, absurd. As to the Prince Albert, which Captain Coles was building, though it was not for Members of that House to take exception to the number of persons employed upon her, yet he thought everything ought to be done to get her forward, with a view to make a requisite trial. It was hardly judicious to parade before the House the charge that fair play had not been given to the Research and the Enterprise, and to challenge hon. Gentlemen to give fair play to the Royal Sovereign and the Prince Albert, particularly when the latter vessels had hardly received at the hands of the Admiralty all the consideration to which they were entitled. In the unfortunate Danish war the Rolfe Krake, a ship of the same description, had been tried, and the manner in which her guns had been used, her speed, and the way in which she had manœuvred, were admirable. The experiment in the case of that ship ought to induce us to push forward vessels of the same description, so that we might be able to ascertain what class of ships was best adapted for the public service. His noble Friend had told the House that in the Research the funnel and wheel were matters of detail. But a steamship without a funnel, and any ship at all without a wheel, would not be in a favourable condition for going to sea. Let it be assumed that in action there were forty men below and forty other men with a funnel and wheel in a space about as large as a good-sized dining room. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: The funnel would be taken away.] Then it would be deprived of the protection to which it was entitled, and so would the wheel. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: The wheel would be below in action.] He did not think that would be a convenient place for it. However, the Admiralty originally approved of a place about as large as a good-sized dining room for some forty men, a funnel, and a wheel. And besides these they had four large guns in this space requiring forty men to work them, and the ports of the guns were so placed that there was a largo space over which the guns could not be trained. Now, an authority whom all would respect, the late Sir Howard Douglas, had laid it down that in no action had any good been done by the guns unless where there was a stable platform, and where the gunners had means of knowing how much or how little the vessel was likely to roll. In Captain Coles's ships the guns would be trained all round the compass, but in the Research the position of the ship must be altered before the guns could be brought to bear, and unless the vessel was in perfectly smooth water an efficient aim could not be taken. The first object should be to make the guns available, and the idea of constructing a ship with such a defect as he had described showed a great want of judgment. Although a good case had been made out for inquiry, he could hardly agree with his hon. and gallant Friend that the whole subject should be handed over to one Commission. There were, however, a few points of detail which were well worthy of the attention of the Admiralty, which might be sent for inquiry to a Committee or a Commission, and which it would be well to have settled as speedily as possible.

MR. LAIRD

said, that it was hardly advisable to appoint a Commission, as in naval matters changes were made from day to day. After the large sums of money expended upon the navy, however, the House had a right to ask what position the navy was in if the country were now called upon to go to war. The noble Lord had rightly said it was desirable for the Admiralty to turn their attention to the subject of vessels of light draught of water. If we went to war with Russia, France, or America, we had only two armour-cased vessels—the Research and the Enterprise—that would go at all into shallow water. The Research could only throw a broadside of 170 lb. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: 220 lb. J He had put a question some time ago with regard to the Enterprise, which was the successful vessel, according to the noble Lord's statement, about the depth of the armour-plating. At the request of the noble Lord he went to the Admiralty to see the plans, and he found that the armour-plating was only one foot above the water. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: That was a confidential communication.] The Enterprise was a wooden vessel, and he would ask what would be the effect if a shell such as those fired by the Kearsarge were to hit that vessel one foot above the water r They were not to suppose that vessels were always to fight in smooth water. They must take some account of a little swell, and he maintained that as an armour-cased vessel the Enterprise was perfectly useless. The result of sending Captain Coles's ship, the Royal Sovereign, to sea without being properly masted would be in his opinion a total failure. He trusted that the Government, for the sake of the country, would do justice to Captain Coles, and allow that vessel to be masted, so as to make her an efficient sea-going ship. Much had been said of the difficulty of getting effective vessels of a light draught on the cupola system. Now, having paid some attention to this subject, he was prepared to state that vessels of about 1,200 tons could be built with a speed of twelve knots an hour, to carry two of the heaviest guns, two 300-pounders, and throwing a broadside of 600 lb. against the 220 lb. of the Research. Such a vessel could be completely armour-plated, fitted on Captain Coles's plan, masted, rigged, and arranged, so that she should be available not only for harbour and coast defence, but able to go round Cape Horn or any other part of the world. He did not profess much knowledge of gunnery, but he believed that the only method of carrying the heavy guns now proposed was on the plan of Captain Coles, because the guns could be trained in the simplest and easiest manner, and worked with fewer hands than in any other ships. He trusted that the Admiralty would consider the subject, because if they would use all possible appliances for working the yards, rigging, and guns of their ships, they would require fewer men to man the navy, and might then reduce the Navy Estimates. The Admiralty would also, he hoped, give their attention to vessels of a smaller class. The cost would not be great, and if they were to go to war to-morrow they would have suddenly to apply all the resources of the dockyards and private yards to provide themselves with vessels of light draught, capable of going across the Atlantic or to cross the Channel, in order to compete with what on the other side of the Atlantic were called turret vessels. But if the Admiralty were to send such vessels as composed their African squadron—if they sent out slow, wooden vessels—they would meet with the fate that befell the Alabama. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: Those vessels go to the bottom, too sometimes.] He was not alluding to regular sea-going vessels, but if we went to war we must not wait to be attacked, but must have the means of attacking the enemy on his coast. He challenged the noble Lord to contradict his statement that this country was in a very unsafe condition in that respect. On the rivers of France there were floating batteries of great power and slow speed, which were more than a match for any vessels we could send out, except vessels like the Warrior, which would not float in shallow waters. To make our fleet efficient in this way would not cost a large sum. The Admiralty could not assert that it was enough to have two experimental vessels of wood merely cased to the water-line. The Admiralty would have to do what they had been urged for years to do—namely, to follow private enterprise, and construct our navy entirely of iron.

SIR MORTON PETO

said, he did not think a Commission would be useful. The only way of meeting the difficulty of the case was the reconstruction of the Board of Admiralty itself. He did not dispute the talent of Mr. Reed, the present chief constructor of the navy, but it was not right and proper that the Admiralty should be guided by one mind. The constructor should design the vessels, and submit those designs to practical men, so that any defects, such as were discovered in the Research, might be found out before the ships were constructed. That was done in other countries, and practically we had simply adopted what had been initiated in other countries. The great problem to be solved was how the greatest force could be most judiciously employed. As the Admiralty was at present constructed it could not, he believed, deal with that problem; they were too much in the hands of a single individual.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, the question which had been raised was of the highest importance, but he was sorry that he was obliged so far to differ from his hon. and gallant Friend that he could not be any party to recommending Her Majesty's Government to appoint such a Commission as he had recommended. He was opposed to the appointment of a Commission, both because he would not be a party to any step which would relieve from its proper responsibility the department of the State to which Parliament had intrusted the management of our naval affairs, and also because he felt the unanswerable force of the argument that we were in a state of transition with regard to the subject, that new inventions were being brought forward every day, and when the Commission had made their Report they would probably find that something had been devised which would entirely supersede their recommendation. The only safe course was to leave matters to the responsibility of the Admiralty, in which he was sure that his noble Friend would admit that Parliament had of late years placed great confidence. He had always expressed the opinion that the Admiralty were right in trying any experiments or adopting any course which had a reasonable prospect of success. All that was desired was that they should to the best of their ability adopt all the improve- ments which might be devised in regard to the armour-plating of ships. He was afraid that on some occasions they had not carried out their experiments with all the caution that was desirable. He referred especially to the manner in which they had dealt with Captain Coles's invention of cupola ships. It was a great mistake to cut down the Royal Sovereign instead of building an entirely new vessel. Perhaps, however, there could hardly be a more striking illustration of the change which was now taking place than was to be found in the fact, that there was good reason to believe that the Royal Sovereign, reduced in size and carrying five guns, was a more valuable and effective ship than before she was cut down, and when she carried 130 guns. His noble Friend had spoken of her joining the Channel Fleet.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

explained that he did not mean that the Royal Sovereign was to be considered as a seagoing ship, but only that she was to be placed under the orders of Admiral Dacres, who commanded the Channel Fleet. She would be a coasting ship.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, that that showed the mistake which had been made. Although the Royal Sovereign was intended for harbour purposes she drew 27 feet of water. He did not intend to cast any censure upon Mr. Reed, who deserved the credit of having first tried the experiment of applying armour-plating to small vessels, but he could not help contrasting the Research with the Rolfe Krake. These two vessels were as nearly as possible of the same size, tonnage, and armoury. They each carried four guns, but while the Rolfe Krake could use them all on either side, the Research could only fire two on each side; and while the Rolfe Krake drew only 10 feet of water, the Research drew 15. There could be no question as to the superiority of the vessel built in the Clyde by Messrs. Napier to that built for the Admiralty by Mr. Reed. He thought that the Admiralty had made a great mistake in the style of rigging which they had adopted for our larger class of armour-covered vessels, such as the Defence and the Hector. He did not lay much stress upon the fact that the rig of those vessels was so unsightly that it seemed as if the Admiralty had exercised their ingenuity to see how ugly a man-of-war could be made; but he was told that the masts and yards of these vessels were so deficient in size and power that they could not go to sea under canvas. That was a great misfortune, both because in the case of any accident to their machinery they would become helpless, and because the system of compelling vessels always to steam was a most expensive and extravagant one.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, that the French ships spread less canvas than those of the rig of which the right hon. Baronet was complaining.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

said, that he was dealing with this as a positive question, and not as a matter of comparison. His complaint was that these vessels would not be effective under canvas. The House had a right to expect that the Admiralty should call to their aid all the greatest talent that they could command, should devote every care to the consideration of this subject, and should boldly and freely try any experiment which held out a reasonable prospect of success. If they would persevere in that course, it would be better to leave these questions to their responsibility, and not to incumber them with inquiries or commissions which could lead to no practical good.

SIR FREDERIC SMITH,

in withdrawing his Motion, said that the discussion which had taken place had been a useful one, and he, therefore, trusted that the House would not blame him for having introduced the subject.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.