HC Deb 29 February 1864 vol 173 cc1260-77
MR. DISRAELI

As there is now a Question before the House, I take this opportunity of making some inquiry of Her Majesty's Government respecting our relations with the Continent of Europe. They appear to me, since I last addressed a Question to the Government on the subject, to have increased in anxiety and perplexity. I understand that Her Majesty's Government have been successful, after some fruitless efforts, in a new proposition —namely, that a Conference should be held by the great Powers, and those interested in the difference between Denmark and Germany, without an armistice. I understand that the noble Lord has made an announcement to that effect, and that the proposition had been accepted by the French Government. I have myself great distrust of Conferences pendente lite. I think it in the nature of things that these efforts should be generally fruitless, and sometimes productive of great disadvantage, however bonâ fide may be the intentions of those who go into council under such conditions. It stands to reason, that nothing can be more difficult than to come to a decision upon circumstances perpetually changing. And, if we study the history, not only of this country, but generally of diplomacy, we shall find that in nine times out of ten, where negotiations for peace have been carried on during war without an armistice, those Conferences have failed; because, though there may have been the greatest anxiety on the part of all present to come to a pacific solution of affairs, yet when they have arrived at some basis which promised a satisfactory result, a strong place has, perhaps, been taken, a battle fought, or some individual who exercises a leading influence on events—a Minister or a Prince—dies; the whole materials are changed in their aspect and character, and, with all the efforts exerted to bring the matter to a conclusion, failure has generally been the result. But, Sir, in the present case, I confess that I have more than an abstract objection to a Conference pendente lite, because we have experience of the influence of the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs under circumstances of an analogous character, and they are not of a favourable or flattering character. Nine years ago there were Conferences held at Vienna at a time of war, and without an armistice, with the view of bringing about peace under circumstances which many considered not unfavourable. The noble Lord, now Foreign Secretary, but not then filling that office, was, though unusual, without any occupation at the moment. He was, therefore, chosen by the noble Lord opposite, then Prime Minister, to manage the negotiations. I need not remind the House—for it is part of our history—of the amount of indiscretion and disaster which was accomplished under these circumstances. I believe there is no page in the annals of our time—at least of the last twenty-five years —to which we can look back with less satisfaction. The noble Lord was sent to the Conference to negotiate a peace without an armistice. He came back to this country to recommend to his Colleagues that they should accept a peace, under conditions which were kept completely secret. Suspicions were excited in the House of Commons. I myself was requested by my friends to bring forward a Motion, calling the attention of the House to the ambiguity both of expression and conduct on the part of the Government in regard to the proceedings which were then taking place. The Government were vindicated on that occasion by a very large majority— not less than 100—expressing their confidence in the negotiations of the noble Lord and the conduct of Her Majesty's Ministers. The noble Lord himself appeared in the House, and made a powerful speech in favour of carrying on an uncompromising war against Russia. Yet, a few weeks afterwards, the secret came out that at that very period he was recommending a peace under conditions which the House of Commons deemed disgraceful. These negotiations at a Conference pendente lite led to a change of Ministry in France, and to other changes of great importance. So far as the English Government were concerned, although they had a majority of 100 on the vote of confidence before the Whitsuntide holidays, yet after that brief interval they were in such a position that the noble Lord who conducted the negotiations could save his Colleagues only by an ignominious retreat. Therefore, speaking both generally and particularly, there is nothing very encouraging to the country and the House of Commons in learning that Conferences are to be held with a view of terminating the deplorable hostilities in Denmark, and that they are to be conducted without the preliminary and salutary condition of an armistice. Besides these objections to the course which the Government are about to pursue, there is another reason why I think it my duty to request some information on this point from Her Majesty's Ministers. I daresay hon. Gentlemen have all of them more or less examined the papers respecting the Schleswig-Holstein question which we so anxiously urged the Government to produce; and I doubt not they have observed, that the noble Lord, who nine years ago conducted so disastrously and fruitlessly the Conferences at Vienna, now, as Secretary of State for the Foreign Department, impressed with the difficulties which every day surround him with regard to the Danish question, made a proposal to the French Government. I need not go into the despatch of the noble Lord in September of last year. It is a despatch characteristic of the writer, who, having to encounter great difficulties, suggests every feeble expedient that can be imagined. Affairs might be settled by a Conference; they might be settled by propositions; they might be settled by identic notes—by single notes—by joint notes— by all that diplomatic rubbish which characterizes, to use the happy language of the noble Lord the Prime Minister, a Government of antiquated imbecility. What was the answer of the French Government? No doubt hon. Gentlemen are perfectly familiar with the answer of the French Government, communicated by the English Chargé d'Affaires to Earl Russell. It is No. 126, I think, in the diplomatic Correspondence. M. Drouyn de Lhuys speaks with a very intimate knowledge of the character of the Foreign Secretary. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had been his colleague at those celebrated Conferences at Vienna, where he negotiated for a peace without an armistice, and had lost his eminent post in consequence of the arrangements he then made with the noble Lord. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had also been in frequent communication upon many very important questions with the noble Lord during the last year or two. Well, what was the answer of the French Government? I am sure hon. Gentlemen are familiar with it, for it is really the key to the whole of this voluminous Correspondence, part of which we have already received. The French Government reply—All this is very well—these propositions for conferences, for identic, joint, or separate notes, these means of conveying to Powers, pursuing a course which we think impolitic and unjust, our sense of their misbehaviour; but we have not forgotten that, under your influence and in your company, we have taken these same measures only recently in regard to Poland; and what was the result? It ended in the humiliation of both countries — to use M. Drouyn de Lhuys's own words, which I quote from memory, "in impairing the dignity both of France and England." Therefore, say the French Government, we will have nothing to do with these propositions, we will not interfere with these things; the Emperor is resolved on this, unless you are prepared to proceed further, and enter into a course of action. Now, Sir, what more legitimate question can we ask—especially before we go into Committee of Supply, which is the business of to-night—than this—What is the exact state of affairs? If, as the noble Lord tells us, France has listened with favour to this proposition of a Conference, and is ready at last to co-operate with us in that direction, is it not our first duty to ascertain from the noble Lord on what conditions the assent of France has been given, and whether the noble Lord has agreed with the French Government to go further and to enter into a course of action in order to effect a common object in Denmark? That is a question of vital and urgent importance. I will assume, however, for the moment, that the conditions of France have been mentioned and complied with— I will assume that France and England at least, have determined to enter into a course of action. I say it is also a matter of very great interest and importance to the House of Commons to know if these conditions have been agreed to, what that action is intended to effect, and what object we are to accomplish. So far as I can form an opinion, having listened to a variety of statements in both Houses from Ministers of the Crown on this question of Germany and Denmark, there seems so much inconsistency, so much contrariety, not only of views but of facts, that at last I feel quite in a cloud, and am at a loss to understand what, if the Government are going to act, it is that they intend to do. If I am to believe the noble Lord, there is a great and common object upon which the Powers are agreed and decided, and that is to maintain the integrity and independence of Denmark. Everybody, according to the noble Lord, is in favour of the integrity and independence of Denmark, and nobody more so than the Austrian and Prussian Governments. Sir, it is a great point, especially in conferences pendente lite, that there should be one, position upon which all parties are agreed; but then, unfortunately, very different meanings are attributed to the phrase, "The independence and integrity of Denmark." If, for example, by maintaining the independence and integrity of Denmark, you mean a union between the Kingdom and the Duchies, subsisting merely by the personal tie of being ruled by the same Sovereign, I, for one, should say that that, so far from being an arrangement to secure the object in question, would produce constant disunion and ultimate anarchy. Are we to adopt the alternative that aimed Europe is to interfere, and by force of arms to render the inhabitants of Holstein and Schleswig loyal and contented subjects of the King of Denmark? That is a solution not consistent with the principles of British policy, nor, to my mind, perfectly in harmony with the spirit of the age in which we live. Hence this is a situation which requires much explanation. But, Sir, it is possible—for I wish to view the question in every light, in order that we may, at this anxious moment, elicit some information from Her Majesty's Government—it is possible that France has generously consented to attend the Conferences without exacting those conditions which the French! Minister in the autumn said were a sine quâ non. What will happen then? In my opinion, what probably will happen will be that a great deal of time will be wasted, and then the spring will at last arrive. When the spring arrives that Power which, from our continual blundering, has had the oppor- tunity of assuming a position of so much forbearance and so much moderation, and of offering, through its Emperor, so many conciliatory suggestions, will, perhaps, be called upon to settle these perplexed and harrassing disputes, some of which are to be brought before this very Conference. I cannot doubt that, under the circumstances, the Emperor of the French will be very successful. People will be so tired, Governments will be so exhausted—they will have appealed so often in vain to England for a solution of these difficulties — that they naturally will turn to one who, to use a common phrase, will find himself "master of the situation." I dare say the Emperor of the French will not act in a very ferocious manner under the circumstances. No doubt in this civilized age France, like every other country — France, too, so enlightened — will feel the advantage of moderation even in ambition. Perhaps the revival of the Confederation of the Rhine, perhaps the rectification of the long and anxiously considered question of the Sarre-Louis frontier might be thought a sufficient compensation for the extreme anxiety which the Emperor of the French will naturally feel in settling disputes which we ourselves have assisted so much to complicate. What will happen then? There will be a great noise in this House, and probably in other Houses of Parliament, upon the matter. If we find some new arrangement of the map of Europe similar to that in the case of Nice and Savoy, we shall have screaming despatches and terrible invectives—terrible invectives, like those that have not yet succeeded in expelling the Pope from Rome or the Austrians from Venice, but which are recognized for their power and for the appropriate manner in which they are always introduced into the discussion of public affairs. But I should like to know what will be our position under those circumstances. I know the noble Lord opposite will say to me—" You make these remarks upon the Government in the difficult position in which we are placed, but you never make any suggestion of what you would do if you found yourself responsible for the conduct of affairs in the same situation." I should be very sorry to be in the position in which the noble Lord finds himself: and I cannot but believe that if we had been upon the Treasury bench instead of the noble Lord and his Colleagues, we should not have been in the situation which Ministers now occupy. That, indeed, is the whole matter. The sole cause of the present imbroglio may be found in the answer which the French Minister made to the plaintive representations of our Secretary of State. It is quite clear, that if Her Majesty's Government had not taken that unwise course with respect to the affairs of Poland — if they had not entrapped France into a false position, and when she was in a false position made no effort to extricate her from it—and if there had not been that consequent estrangement between the two Governments, France and England could have prevented those events which have occurred in the North of Europe. Therefore, those frequent taunts, that we criticize the conduct of Ministers, but do not say what we should do if we were in the same position, really come to nothing; because I believe that Her Majesty's present Ministers have themselves brought about the difficulties with which they are unable to deal. When we are asked whether we are advocates for war in favour of the integrity and independence of Denmark, my answer is, that I cannot say what the policy of England ought to be with respect to going to war for the integrity and independence of Denmark until I am acquainted with the engagements which Her Majesty's Government have entered into. But irrespective of that point—which I reserve—I assert, that if our affairs had been managed with due firmness and conciliation, with straightforwardness, and with common sense, the integrity and independence of Denmark would never have been endangered, and there need have been no question of war to preserve the integrity and independence of Denmark. That is the real issue. I cannot, I repeat, give an opinion as to what should be the ultimate course of this country on this question, because Parliament is not, at the present moment, fully in possession of information upon the subject, and because we do not know what engagements Her Majesty's Government may have entered into with the Danish Government, what expectations they have held out, and under what understanding, verbal or written, all parties may have acted. Nor am I too sanguine that we shall find that information in the papers which have been promised by the Government, and which are now appearing in instalments. I wanted those papers, not so much for the information they would give us as for the information I take for granted they omit; because, let me remind the House, it has twice happened with the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, at critical periods in the history of this country, when he has been obliged to furnish Parliament for its decision with voluminous papers, the questions at issue have been decided, not on the papers which were laid before Parliament by the Minister, but on papers, which, in consequence of their publication, appeared abroad. That is a very remarkable thing to have happened twice to the same Minister. In 1853, when alarm first broke out respecting probable hostilities with Russia, which ended in the Crimean war, we had papers enough, as I told the House the other night. On the first day of the Session, the present Earl Russell appeared at the Bar, and gave us that surfeit of State Papers which the noble Lord opposite threatened and hoped might baffle the understanding of the House of Commons. He gave us 800 pages of Correspondence within forty-eight hours. What was the consequence? You had questions from all parts of the House; you had answers from Ministers; you had debates and discussions: but the House remained, as it remains now upon the Danish question, unable to fix the Minister, but with a deep conviction prevailing both sides that they were not masters of the real merits of the case. The noble Lord, in one of his speeches, with a great want of caution as it afterwards turned out, denounced the policy of Russia—the ambitious, irrational, and unexpected policy of Russia—for which the Government of Lord Aberdeen had not been prepared. What occurred? There appeared in the official journal of St. Petersburg a statement to the effect that, whatever might have been the errors of Russian policy, one thing was quite clear, that Her Majesty's Ministers from the first had been aware of the intentions of the Emperor of Russia, and had approved the principle upon which he had acted. What, then, happened? A Member of this House having some other information, made such an appeal that the noble Lord the Secretary of State was obliged to produce the confidential communications of the Emperor of Russia with Sir Hamilton Seymour, from which it appeared that at the very moment of the formation of the Government of Lord Aberdeen the Emperor of Russia, with the utmost frankness, had explained his views to the English Minister. Nay, not only had that occurred, but the Secretary of State had answered that confidential communication with such a total ignorance of the merits of the question, with such a total want of appreciation of the exigency, that he made an admission of the right of the Emperor of Russia to interfere in the Turkish dominions as protector of the Greeks, although it afterwards turned out that the very treaty under which that right was claimed gave no sanction whatever to the pretension, and must have been perfectly unknown to the Minister, who had, perhaps, neither the time nor the temper to examine it before lie gave the solemn verdict of the British Government upon its value and importance. I should have thought that that was enough for a Secretary of State to have done to entitle him to the lasting confidence of his Sovereign and of Parliament. But, what happened in those very negotiations at Vienna, which terminated so fruitlessly? I can remember no period when there was more anxiety, more disturbance and disquietude, in the mind of Parliament, as when those negotiations were going on at Vienna. Her Majesty's Government then was not constituted precisely as it is now, The Chancellor of the Exchequer, for example, did not then sit on the Treasury Bench to denounce a statement of facts as "fireworks." On the contrary, the right hon. Gentleman was perfectly alive to the importance of the question then before us; and he was pressing the Government, as we were—though for a different object—in order to obtain the truth which was withheld and concealed from this House. What happened then? We had despatches and papers laid before us, as at the period before the commencement of the Crimean war, and as at this moment, in reference to the Danish question; for the noble Lord is always ready to produce papers enough to confuse the Parliamentary mind, and to prevent Members from complaining of the want of ample information from the Government. But it appeared to us on this side of the House, as well as to many hon. Gentlemen opposite—among the rest the present Chancellor of the Exchequer—that those papers indicated great ambiguity of conduct, and that some secret had been withheld from us. I myself brought the matter before the House; but I was defeated, as I said, in a full House by a large majority —a majority of not less than 100—who voted confidence in the intentions of the present Secretary of State and in Her Majesty's Ministers. We dispersed for the holydays. What happened afterwards? In consequence of some of the statements made in the House, the Prime Minister of Austria, Count Buol, published a confidential circular, in which he stated that the noble Lord the present Secretary of State, who had come back to England and made a ranting speech in favour of a vigorous prosecution of the war, had previously settled with him what he thought reasonable terms upon which peace might be concluded, and, in fact, had returned home for the express purpose of recommending and sanctioning that peace. Under these circumstances, what became of your majority of 100? I have already reminded you, that the noble Lord only saved his Colleagues by a precipitate and ignominious retreat. Thus, then, twice—once at the commencement of the troubles with Russia, and once in carrying on the negotiations with Austria, for the re-establishment of peace—you find that the House of Commons, with the most voluminous materials supplied by their own Ministry, have never been able to arrive at the truth, and it is with the forced publication of documents by foreign Governments that the secret policy pursued has been revealed. Let us, then, look at our present position. We have a mass of papers before us. There are none that have met my eye yet which throw any light on those engagements which it is, I will only say, rumoured about, that Her Majesty's Government have entered into with Denmark, but still rumoured by persons of authority. I hope I shall not be answered on this occasion by any quibbling about words. When I talk of engagements, I am not talking of solemn and formal treaties, which can, of course, be appealed to; but I want to know what have been the expectations which we have held out to Denmark? What has been the encouragement that we have given her? What has been the advice we have offered? What has been the moral obligation, at least, that we have incurred, which will explain the whole course of Danish policy at the present moment, or from the commencement of these troubles? Sir, we were reminded, before I made these inquiries, that the holydays were near at hand, and I do not suppose that before the holydays we shall find out this. But I have great confidence in the revelations which holydays bring forth. It was during the Whitsun recess, I think, that Count Buol published his confidential circular; and I shall not be surprised if, in due course of time, we have some remarkable documents published by Denmark, or some statement made by some person in authority there that will throw that light on the present position of Europe which, in my opinion, is now extremely wanting. If we gain that information, I have no doubt it will produce the beneficial results which always may be experienced by arriving at truth. At present, I can only say—and it is my duty, in the want of that information, to remind the House of the position in which the country is now placed— that that position is most unsatisfactory. It is impossible to suppose that, whether we may have entered into conditions with France, accepting her conditions probably, or whether France is entering into this Conference without any conditions—it is impossible to suppose that, before the summer passes away, something may not occur which will be both inconvenient and mortifying to this country. I hear nothing from Her Majesty's Government to guide, to enlighten, to animate the House and the country at the present moment. The drivers have lost the road; the reins have fallen from their hands; the horses are wild. And now we shall hear their answer to my inquiries.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Sir, the right hon. Gentleman never is so great— never in his own opinion so successful, as when he has an opportunity of attacking an absent man. He was pleased the other day to take advantage of my temporary absence, I having been detained somewhat later than usual by public business that could not well be postponed, to attack me; and now he takes that which suits him still better—namely, the opportunity of attacking my noble Friend in the other House of Parliament. I am here; but my noble Friend cannot be. But the right hon. Gentleman chooses with wonderful dexterity and with somewhat of, I will say, simplicity of mind, the ground of his attack. The right hon. Gentleman has been absent from his place for the last three or four days. He has been studying, pondering over, getting by heart, making extracts from, and turning dog's-ears down in the papers presented upon Danish affairs; and finding little or nothing in them upon which to found an attack on my noble Friend, he ransacks Hansard, he turns over the pages of the Annual Register, he goes back to the blue-books of ten years ago for the purpose of founding a charge against my noble Friend as to what happened at Vienna in 1853. Well, Sir, I congratulate my noble Friend that the right hon. Gentleman has found the ice so hard in Danish affairs that he has been obliged to go back ten years for his topics of accusation. Why, Sir, my noble Friend performed with ability and fidelity the duties which were imposed upon him at that time at Vienna. By the admission of the right hon. Gentleman he did his utmost to bring about a peaceful solution of the then pending questions. Unfortunately, the proposals which he and M. Drouyn de Lhuys agreed upon failed, and war ensued, not by their fault, but by the fault of others. My noble Friend went on that occasion as far as it was possible for him to do in the performance of his duty, in concert with the representative of France, for the settlement of those affairs, and that attempt on his part is now made a charge against his conduct. The right hon. Gentleman has talked to-night of "diplomatic rubbish." Why, Sir, there is such a thing as Parliamentary rubbish, and that we are very often doomed to receive from men whose genius and ability ought to qualify them for better things. But the right hon. Gentleman says that the Government are in what he thinks very unfortunate circumstances, and he seems to regret that he and his friends have not had the management of these affairs. "Very different," he said, "would be the condition of the country if we had the management of matters." Very different, indeed, if we are to believe in the sincerity of the line of argument taken by Gentlemen on the other side of this House. What are the circumstances in which we have placed the country? Why, we are at peace; we are prosperous; we have been occupied in communications with all the Powers of Europe in endeavouring to settle differences without war. If we were to be led by the language of those who sit opposite, we ought to have made war against Russia for Poland, and we basely abandoned France on the Polish question when she was ready to make war with Russia. That is the charge against us, if we are to believe the right hon. Gentleman's arguments to-night. He further says, "France proposed to join us in making war against Germany in defence of Denmark, and you shrunk from accepting her proposal." Well, the right hon. Gentleman would not have shrunk from that I suppose. I say, Sir, that in my humble opinion, and without, I am sure, begrudging any success, official or otherwise, which the right hon. Gentleman and his friends on those seats may be anxious to obtain here or elsewhere, the country is just as well served by those who are now in office as they would be, according to the doctrine of the right hon. Gentleman, if he and his friends, occupying our places, had acted up to the reasonings they have used on this grave and important European matter.

But the right hon. Gentleman says the House is uninformed on this subject, and he asks the Government to enlighten his mind. Why, Sir, some people like to run away with half a story, because they find it far more convenient to express an opinion on that half than to wait and know the whole, being fearful that when they know the whole, the conclusion they wish to arrive at may not follow so legitimately from the premises laid before them. The right hon. Gentleman certainly puts the House in a very embarrassing situation, because when no papers are given he says, "How unfairly you treat the House; you leave it in the dark without any documents or information; we are unable to arrive at a conclusion." Then, on the other hand, he tells us this evening that, "If you overwhelm Members with 800 pages of information the House is then more unable than ever to come to any definite conclusion." How we are to please the right hon. Gentleman it is really very difficult to say. If we give him no papers, he complains of the absence of papers; if we give him the papers, he says he is unable to digest them and come to any rational result. Well, it is a natural fault with some minds that they are so constituted that they either do not choose to come to a conclusion, or they are unable to do so. But, one way or the other, it is quite clear that it is of no use giving the right hon. Gentleman papers, because he says, with or without them, he is equally unable to understand anything with regard to our foreign affairs. But the right hon. Gentleman, I assume, was speaking for others, and not for himself, for of course I have a higher opinion of the acuteness of his mind than to believe that if even ten times 800 pages at a time were offered to him he could not arrive at a clear and definite conclusion upon them, according to his own opinion. But I think he is quite right in the course which he now pursues. In common with the rest of the House, he has had delivered to him papers coming down to the latter end of last September. It was evident that these papers could only contain a portion of the communications which had passed between this and other Governments upon the Danish question; but the right hon. Gentleman thought, and he was quite right, that it was more convenient to get up and to make, upon imperfect information, a flourish about the conduct of the Government upon the Danish question rather than to wait until he should receive the papers to-morrow, which will bring these communications down to a later period. I can only say it would be a long story to tell the right hon. Gentleman what are all the contents of the mass of papers which he will be able to read for himself to-morrow; but I say let him wait, and let the House wait for these papers before coming to any conclusion as to the course we have pursued, either in accepting proposals or in answering proposals or in making proposals to other Governments. Let him wait until he gets the whole statement, which he will receive in the course of a few hours, and then he and the House will be better able to judge what the course of the Government has been. Our object has been from first to last to endeavour to conciliate differences, to bring together parties who are holding opposite and apparently incompatible opinions, to endeavour to modify exasperations, and to obtain a peaceable settlement of that which threatens to be the cause of a European war. Why, the charge which the right hon. Gentleman brings against my noble Friend is, that he was too abundant of suggestions for the attainment of these ends. That having failed with one suggestion he proposed another, and that is what he called "diplomatic rubbish." My noble Friend is fertile in expedients. Not succeeding in one suggestion, he proposed another; that other being unsuccessful, lie proposed still another, hopeful that he would eventually attain the desired end. Instead of that being urged as a charge against my noble Friend, it is really a compliment paid to him by one who is at the same time endeavouring to run him down. The right hon. Gentleman asks whether we accepted the proposal of France made at one period, and whether we made at another period a different one. I ask him to have the kindness to wait only a few hours, when he will have the whole Correspondence in his hands, and I am satisfied that in a week's time, and when he again gets up on the question of going into Committee of Supply, with all the knowledge in his head which he has not got in his head now, we shall not have the same language from his lips which we have heard from him to-night.

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

I think, Sir, that no one who has listened to the noble Lord could have conceived it possible that that speech was a reply called for by the observations of my right hon. Friend, who was not so much referring to the various circumstances and events that have passed between this country and France and Denmark, with reference to the disputes now going on, as specifically desiring information as to the proposal of the Conference, and who, consequently, inquired of the noble Lord what information he could give the House as to the conditions upon which the Conference was to proceed. My right hon. Friend commenced by observing that the present condition of affairs was one of great anxiety, that the very proposal of the Conference, as the whole history of past years showed, was one not likely to conduce to any good effect, and, consequently, more likely to add to the humiliation in which this country is now placed, than to lead to any satisfactory solution of the difficulty; and the noble Lord has made a speech in reply to my right hon. Friend, and has not given the House any information of any sort, kind, or description with reference to this proposal of a Conference. Is not this information somewhat required? The noble Lord told us only a very few nights ago that there had been a proposal for a Conference, that he rather fancied France agreed to it, that he was not quite sure whether Russia would fall into it, and that as regards the Diet of Frankfort he rather considered that they had been asked to attend but was not quite sure about it, and since then he has told us that whether they had been asked or not it was obvious that there would be considerable delay, because there would be difficulty in giving instructions to their Minister. I asked the noble Lord the other night, whether any basis had been laid down upon which the Conference was to proceed; and what was the noble Lord's answer? He said that the principle of the Government was that the independence and integrity of Denmark should be respected. But, as my right hon. Friend has pointed out, and as we know by the speeches of the noble Lord last year, and the speeches of a noble Lord in another place, and by all the despatches laid upon our table, the interpretation put by the English Government upon the words "the independence and integrity of Denmark" is not only different from, but altogether inconsistent with the interpretation of the same words by the German Governments. Therefore I think the question of my right hon. Friend was one that ought to have been answered by the noble Lord or some other Member of the Government—that is, what is the present condition of affairs with reference to this Conference? Has it been accepted by France, and if so, has it been unconditionally accepted? What is our position with reference to Russia, and has the proposal been unconditionally accepted by her? The noble Lord, the other day, told us that Denmark had required a short delay on account of some local reasons. Now we are informed by the organ of the Danish Government what the local reason is—that she would decline to enter upon the Conference as long as any part of Jutland is occupied by German troops. I want to know if Denmark has been invited to the Conference, and if so, upon what terms? When we are told that Austria and Prussia have agreed in principle to this Conference, I want to know what is meant by that? Has any basis been laid down? Have they made any statements to Her Majesty's Government as to the conditions upon which alone they will agree to the Conference? Because, as my right hon. Friend said, so long as there is no armistice and military operations are going on, the conditions will change from hour to hour. If the Danes gain a great victory, do you suppose that they will be as ready to listen to counsel as they are now —that they will put the same interpretation upon the cant words "the independence and integrity of Denmark" in the hour of victory as they would be willing to accept in a moment of defeat and disaster? Are we to expect a really pacific solution, or is this to be the last crowning act of humiliation, that having made proposal upon proposal, and having never found a single ally who would back up our proposals for Conference, for mediation, for an armistice, or whatever they might be, that this being the only arrow left in our quiver, we are about to expend it as fruitlessly as all our other efforts have proved? I think of all the extraordinary commencements of speeches that I ever heard the speech of the noble Lord was marked by the most extraordinary. What did he attack my right hon. Friend for? Because he said, "You are making an attack upon an absent man." Does the noble Lord mean to say that because a Member of the Government is a Peer that therefore he is to be privileged from criticism in this House, and that in the just exercise of his privilege here the leader of the Opposition is to say, "I could say a great deal more about the conduct of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he is an absent man, and therefore I am obliged to leave his conduct without comment?" I must beg leave also entirely to differ from the noble Lord as to his recollection of those proceedings, which both the noble Lord and my right hon. Friend referred to, with reference to the Conference of Vienna. The noble Lord now says that all that passed at that time redounded to the credit of the noble Earl now the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. If it redounded to the credit of the noble Earl, I wonder why he left the Government. The reason that the conduct of the noble Earl was impugned at that time was, not that he was anxious to secure peace between this country and France and Russia, but that he went to Vienna and entertained propositions for peace; that he came back to this country and urged them upon his Colleagues; that all his proceedings behind the curtain were in favour of peace, while at the same time, knowing that such a policy was not likely to be popular in this House or in the country, he went on making warlike speeches. It was because he deceived the House by leading them to believe that he was a Minister who would do what they desired—that he would urge on the vigorous prosecution of the war— while at the same time he was urging peace propositions on the Cabinet; and it was because that was discovered at last by a chance question put by the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden); and the noble Lord made a clean breast of it, explaining all that he had done—it was upon these grounds that the noble Earl was compelled to leave the Government; it was not, as the noble Lord at the head of the Government said, because his proceedings did great credit to him, but because the House of Commons felt they could have no longer any confidence in a Minister who made speeches in one sense, but whose policy was of a totally opposite character. What does the noble Lord say with regard to the present condition of affairs? He tries to fix upon this side of the House a desire to go to war, and claims for himself the credit of desiring to maintain peace. I believe the one imputation is just as much deserved as the other. For those who sit on this side I will say, that there is no more desire for war than there is on that side of the House. What we feel is a distrust of the Government, who by their conduct have brought us to the brink of war. And I believe equally that the credit of desiring to maintain peace is as little deserved by the noble Lord. Is there anybody who can have noticed the tone of the public journals, and particularly of those which are considered to be in the confidence of the Government, or of important members of the Government, without knowing that the tone always held out to Germany was, "Take care what you do, because if you advance in this course of aggression, you will find yourself arrayed in hostile action against England, France, Russia, Sweden, and Italy." And it is only now, when France will not go with you, when Sweden distrusts you, when Italy looks rather to France than to England, and when Russia, remembering the correspondence with the noble Earl at the head of the Foreign Office, will not go with you in anything— it is not until they find themselves alone and deserted by all their allies, that the Government begin to talk of peace, whereas before they were talking of war. I believe myself that we are at this moment in a most critical position. I believe that the country attributes this critical position to the want of firmness, to the vacillation, to the bragging language at one time and to the subservient language at another, of Her Majesty's Government. I believe that the country attributes our position at the present moment to this policy on the part of the Government; and I am sure that the speech of the noble Lord this evening will not have contributed to disabuse them of that impression.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

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