SUPPLY—NAVY ESTIMATES.

HC Deb 25 February 1864 vol 173 cc1103-57

SUPPLY considered in Committee.

(In the Committee.)

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

Sir, I wish before I proceed to deal with the Navy Estimates to express my regret that I had not had an opportunity of answering the observations of the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Walsh); but not seeing him in the House, I was not aware when I proposed that the Speaker should leave the chair that he was going to bring forward the subject with respect to which he had given notice. I may, however, say in reference to the remarks which have fallen from him, that the question of the maintenance of a navy adequate to the requirements of the country resolves itself very much into a matter of detail as to the amount of exertion which is requisite on the part of the Admiralty each year. It was observed by a gallant officer on this side of the House (Colonel Sykes), that in his opinion we had gone on rather too fast; but I think another hon. Gentleman, who stated it to be his opinion that we had neither gone too fast nor too slowly, is still nearer the truth. At all events, I shall, I hope, be able to show that our navy at the present moment stands upon a satisfactory footing.

Before addressing myself to the Estimates, I wish to advert to some alterations which we have made in the form of them, owing to the recommendations made by the Committee on Public Accounts. They, in their Report, very wisely recommended that there should be prefixed to the Estimates a statement showing the net cost of the navy after deducting from the gross amount the extra receipts and repayments in the course of the year. It will by that statement—at page 3—be seen that for the year 1862–3 those receipts and repayments amounted to £297,221, that for the year 1863–4 they amount to £273,710, and that for 1864–5 their amount is estimated at £263,588, consequently those sums should be deducted from the gross Estimates of those years. There is also another alteration which has been introduced, and that occurs in Vote No. 2— the Victualling Vote. That Vote has this year been altogether remodelled, in accordance with the recommendation of the Committee on Public Accounts; and if hon. Gentlemen will turn to page 105 in the Appendix they will find that the Vote is so framed as to enable them to compare item for item the expenditure under this head with that of last year. Having made these few preliminary remarks, I shall proceed to address myself more directly to the task before me, and in doing so I shall, I am afraid, have to trespass on the time of the House at greater length than I could desire.

Sir, the Estimates for the navy for the year 1864–5 amount to £10,432,610. Those for 1863–4 were £10,736,032, thus showing a reduction in the Estimates for the coming year of £303,422, irrespective of some other matters to which I shall have to advert, and which will somewhat qualify this reduction. The way in which that reduction is brought about is first of all by reducing the number of the personnel of the navy, and likewise a reduction in the matériel, qualified by a considerable increase in the Vote for the Wages of artificers employed in our dockyards. There is a small increase in the Vote for New Works, and a considerable increase, I am sorry to say, in the Vote for the Army Department, owing in a great measure to the state of affairs in New Zealand. That is the general character of these Estimates. Now, Vote 1, which relates to the pay of the men; Vote 2, which relates to the victualling and clothing, and Vote 12, in which provision is made for the medical stores, all having reference to one branch of the subject—the personnel—we may group together. We propose to make for the coming year a reduction to the extent of 500 seamen of the fleet, 1,500 coastguards, and 2,000 boys. There is also a small reduction of the civilians in the Coastguard in the case of old men becoming superannuated; that is to say, we propose to take 71,951 men and boys as against 76,000 for the present year. The marines remain at 18,000. The total reduction amounts to 4,050 men and boys. Now, I am quite aware that many hon. Gentlemen will look upon this reduction with some alarm, and, viewing the state of affairs, I am not at all prepared to say that this country should for a moment adopt a retrograde course in the way of her naval defences, Thus far I agree with the hon. Baronet opposite (Sir John Walsh); but I can, I think, prove to him that, so far from pursuing a retrograde course, we are making progress, notwithstanding a nominal reduction in the strength of our naval force. I say nominal reduction, for if hon. Members will look to page 101 they will see exactly the number of men maintained during every month last year, and that the reduction, such as it is, has been going on for several months. First of all, everybody knows that armour-plated ships require a smaller complement than line-of-battle ships; so that in proportion as you increase the number of those ships, the necessary complement becomes decreased. I will now read to the Committee a paper which will show the number of ships we have in commission this year as compared with last, and I shall take the 1st of February in each year as a fair period for comparison. The statement will show that the fears of the hon. Baronet opposite are unfounded. On the 1st of February last year we had eleven line-of-battle ships in commission, on the 1st of February this year we had ten. On the same day last year we had four armour-plated ships in commission, this year we had seven. Last year we had forty-one frigates, corvettes, &c, this year forty-two. Last year we had ninety-eight sloops, gun-vessels, ? this year ninety-nine; making a total of seagoing ships on the 1st of February last year of 154 against 158 this year—a small increase of numbers, but a vast increase of power. We have besides a number of harbour guard-ships, coastguard ships, troop and store ships, surveying vessels, floating batteries, tenders, &c., eighty-five this year, as against eighty-two last year, making a total of all classes of 243 on the 1st of February this year as against 236 on the same day last year. I think I may state that as a proof that we have not reduced our fleet. How, then, have we been enabled to reduce the number of men? I have given one reason— namely, that as we employ armour-plated ships in lieu of line-of-battle ships we are able to diminish the number of men. But there is another reason, and a very interesting one, because it shows the great change which is coming over our navy. An old sailor would remember that in former days no captain of a ship was allowed, unless in cases of great emergency, to discharge objectionable men. It was supposed if you were to discharge objectionable men it would be a premium for bad conduct, and that the ships would become, so to speak, unmanned. That being the policy pursued in former days it was very difficult to get rid of a bad man—he had to be flogged over and over again. But now we have found it the best policy if you get an objectionable man to discharge him. We are now, therefore, engaged in weeding the fleet, which has been an immense advantage, and we are enabled to do so because the service is popular. That circumstance also will account to some extent for the small reduction in the number of men. We also reduce the number of boys by 2,000, and upon this point the Committee will expect some explanation. For the last three or four years I have been coming down and asking for an increase in the number of boys, and describing the immense advantage of those boys, and how they have really formed the nursery of our navy; and, therefore, you will naturally inquire why we propose to diminish the total of 9,000 boys by 2,000. If the Committee attend to the details which I will give, they will see how it comes to pass. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole), who presided so ably over the Committee that inquired into the State of the Navy, will remember that one of the complaints of the officers was that they had not proper servants, like the officers in the army—that they had nothing but those little boys, and they asked the Admiralty to put them on the same footing in that respect as the officers of the army. That was a perfectly just grievance. On the other hand, the second class of boys who come into the navy dislike as a rule doing servants' duty; they find it very irksome, and they want to learn the duties of seamen. The Admiralty, therefore, said, "We will allow the officers a limited number of servants," and that change is just coming into operation. It is considered that from 700 to 800 servants will be required for the officers of the fleet. I have stated one reason which induced the Admiralty to do away with second-class boys in seagoing ships. But we propose another change—that, instead of second-class boys coming into seagoing ships there should be none but first-class boys, and that the second class of boys should be kept in training ships, but they are to be entered later, at 15½ instead of 15 years. I will show that this is a matter of policy. We have found practically that the great number of boys we have had in the navy has led to this — that our navy has been almost shut against the merchant service, and that is not desirable. I will go very shortly into the statistics. In our fleet we have 25,000 seamen, and it is very curious when you have eliminated artificers, stokers, officers, and marines, and boys, to find that in our immense navy we have only 25,000 actual seamen. We find that the annual waste, some 12 per cent, is gradually growing less, because desertions are declining, and the sailors are becoming more attached to the fleet. But I will call our waste 12 per cent, or 3,000. Now, out of that 25,000 a vast proportion are continuous service men. We are going this year to take 7,000 boys in-stead of 9,000, and according to the statistics which we have been able to gather, we find the 7,000 boys will supply about 2,000 seamen annually—that is, judging from the experience of the last few years, since the boy system has been fairly developed. The waste of seamen is 3,000. Now, that leaves 1,000 to be supplied from other sources; and we think it desirable there should be an opening for at least 1,000 seamen coming from the merchant service. That is the principle upon which we reduce the boys. We have given the circumstances due consideration. We believe 7,000 boys will keep the navy up to its present numbers; but if we should find that additional boys are required, I am sure this House will be always willing to increase their numbers. Now, let me state to the Committee why we have taken off 1,500 coast-guards. We paid off within the last two years 13,305 men, When these men come home we say to them, "You shall now have six weeks' leave on full pay, and you shall then have a choice. If you are continuous service men you will naturally remain in the service; if not, you may, if you please, leave the service." But I am dealing now mainly with the continuous service men. We say to them, with a view to give them a run on shore, "You may go for a year into the coast-guard ships, or the harbour ships." And that is one of the reasons why we are building naval barracks to allow our men some relaxation after they have been abroad for a time. But out of those 13,300 men whom we have paid off —such a curious creature is the sailor—a little above a thousand have volunteered for the harbour ships, and about a thousand for the coast-guard ships; the remainder go to sea again. Our coast-guard ships are now kept as a home squadron, and partly as a means of relaxation for the seamen. I do not say they have not done good service in the merchant ports, because the crews by mixing with the men of the merchant service throughout the country have made the navy more popular. But, as far as the wants of the country go, those ships may be reduced to a certain extent. The men did not like being penned up in the coastguard ships, but preferred having their six weeks' leave and going to sea again; consequently, we have found 1,500 vacancies in our coast-guard ships. That is the reason why we propose this reduction of 1,500 in the coast-guard. This makes the total reduction of the number of persons in the navy as compared with last year 4,000. While on the subject of men for the navy, I should like to give the Committee a proof of the change that has taken place within the last few years with respect to manning the navy; and I will quote from a very admirable and comprehensive speech delivered by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich, when First Lord of the Admiralty, in moving the Navy Estimates in 1859. The right hon. Gentleman then stated that— The Renown, commissioned in November, 1857, was detained 172 days for the purpose of completing her crew, and then sailed with sixty-two men short of her complement; the Marlborough was delayed 129 days; and the Euryalus, 121. The right hon. Gentleman went on to say that one of these ships had been detained six months, but that they were delayed on an average four months before they were fit for sea after being commissioned, for want of crews. The right hon. Baronet went on to say— Now, I ask the House, whether it thinks the ingenuity of any enemy could devise anything more humiliating, or more calculated to impress foreign nations with a conviction of the decay of the naval power of England, than the fact, that our ships-of-war remain in port, four, five, or six months together, unable to obtain their complement of seamen? I trust there will be but one feeling in the House as to the necessity of putting an end to a state of things so humiliating."—[3 Hansard, clii. 895.] Such were the right hon. Baronet's words in 1859, and now let me show how things stand in 1863 and 1864. I avoid mentioning the names of small ships, because everybody knows that they could always be manned; but I will refer to line-of-battle ships and frigates. Last year we commissioned the Leander on the 14th of April, and she went to sea on the 17th of May, or little more than a month afterwards. On the 27th of April, the Royal Oak, a heavy armour ship, was commissioned, and she went out to sea on the 5th of June. The Liverpool was commissioned on the 30th of April, and went to sea on the 14th of May, or in about a fortnight. On the 24th of November the Conqueror, a 90-gun ship, was commissioned, and went to sea on the 14th of December, or in about three weeks. On the 12th of September the Gibraltar, 81-gun ship, was commissioned, and went to sea on the 28th of September, or in about a fortnight. The Aurora frigate was commissioned on November 18, and went to sea on the 11th of December. The Duncan, 81-gun ship, was commissioned on the 7th of January in this year, and went to sea on the 1st of February. On the 13th of last month the Hector was commissioned, and went to sea on the 19th of February. On the 14th of January in the present year the Prince Consort was commissioned, and went to sea on the 15th of February. Scarcely a ship remained more than a month after being commissioned before being ready for sea; and even that delay did not arise because men were being waited for, but because it was thought desirable to give the men and officers time to get themselves ready and make themselves comfortable before they went to sea. This, then, is a marvellous improvement in so short a time. Before proceeding further, I must frankly state that, admirable as our naval organization is, we are behind in one respect. It is most desirable that some body of sea-going artificers should be organized. I have no doubt that the arrangements just made with respect to the engineers will produce the best class of men; but where we feel a want, and where I think we are behindhand, is in respect to artificers. I admit that the present is an exceptional time. There is a great demand for men all over the country. Trade is flourishing, and every skilled artisan is in demand, and obtains high wages. Therefore, at the present moment, the want we feel is, perhaps, only temporary; but the fact is, there is no organization with respect to artificers for the navy, and what we must have is a corps of organized artificers for the fleet similar to that which we have in the army. It has been suggested to attach a body of artificers to the corps of marines, or to attach to the sailors a body of artificers, or to bring up a large number of artificer boys. I am not at present prepared to say what course should be adopted, but it is absolutely necessary, particularly with our armour-plated ships and complicated machinery, to have first-rate artificers for the fleet. I am sorry to say, that at present there is a great lack of them; but, with this exception, our condition is very satisfactory. We have at this moment disposable in the home ports, to put on board ship, 2,510 men. We consider that to be rather below our mark, but a great many ships are on their way home, and will bring up the number, no doubt, to 3,000; which is generally the number of disposable men in the home ports ready to be put on board ship. I take great pride in stating, that the conduct of our seamen is annually improving. The education they are now getting, and the increased comforts and conveniences they obtain, are raising them to a higher social position. In 1858–9 one-fifth of the men wore good-conduct badges; but in 1861–2, being the last period for which there is a Return, more than one-fourth were wearing them, and every year we are taking a larger sum in the Estimates for good-conduct badges. With respect to the allotment of wages by the men, I may state that, though that matter is not entirely as we might wish, one-half of our seamen allot to their families, and that is some test of respectability in their case. There is one point, in reference to the condition of the seamen, on which I wish to address a few words to the Committee. With respect to mor- tality and general health, I do not think that any public service in the world would appear better than the English navy; but there is a class of disease, especially about our home ports, which is so frightful, and the loss we sustain from it is so great, that I do hope the Government will be enabled to propose some measure on the subject. We subscribe to Lock hospitals, and are ready to increase the subscriptions; but something more is wanted. If you keep masses of young men together in the ports, you are bound to look to their health. The hon. Member for Bedford (Mr. Whitbread) and several other gentlemen have carefully investigated this matter, and have made a Report; but I dare not place it before the Committee. I will, however, show it to any hon. Gentleman who may desire to see it. I will not say more on this painful subject now, but I thought it my duty to advert to it. I have stated that, though we were somewhat reducing the number of men, there is, nevertheless, no cause for alarm; and I will now give another reason why small and gradual reductions here and there may be made. We are paying large sums for our Naval Reserve, and therefore we must take that into account in voting the number of men. We have 16,000 men in the Naval Reserve. Are we not to take this into consideration in framing our Estimates? We go to an enormous expense in ships and officers for drilling in our merchant ports. Surely, this must be taken into consideration, especially when we know positively that upon any emergency the Naval Reserve are ready to come forward and serve under our flag? Let me be permitted to read from a document which came into my hands a few days ago. It is a report of the seamen in the Naval Reserve in the port of London. It is not made up for the occasion, but came to me by accident. It is the report of Captain Gardner, Inspector of the Royal Naval Reserve, to Commodore Ryder, Controller General of the Coastguard, and is dated the 13th of February in the present year— I consider it right, in addition to sending in the report of Inspection of the Royal Naval Reserve on board Her Majesty's ship President yesterday, to call your attention to the following statement made to me by Commander Mould, and which is of so satisfactory a nature in respect of the conduct of the men who have been drilled on board since July, 1862, a period of eighteen months. During that time 4,258 men have been drilled, and out of that number only fifty-three men have been punished by fines, principally for being absent from drill, a few for being drunk and unfit for drill, and two for being insolent to the instructors. I think the above speaks for itself as showing the orderly respectable body of seamen who have entered the Reserve at the port of London. Commodore Ryder adds, in a minute, that he had inspected them himself, and that the gun drill was quite as good as it possibly could be. This shows what valuable material we have for the navy, and surely it may be taken into consideration when we frame our Estimates? I am glad to see the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) in his place, because I am able to inform him that I trust in a few days an Order in Council will be issued containing new regulations for officers of the Naval Reserve, reducing the number of drills annually for those who have become perfect in their drill. The constant occurrence of drill was one of the few complaints made to the Admiralty, and I hope the inconvenience will now be removed.

Passing over Vote No. 3, I address myself to Vote No. 5, for the scientific branch of the service. There is an item in this Vote not large in itself, and a sum to which the Committee will gladly agree. As the subject is one in which the noble Lord opposite (Lord Robert Montagu) has taken great interest, I think he will be pleased to find that Her Majesty's Government propose to establish a school of naval architecture. The right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) called on me last year to express his views upon the subject, and several hon. Gentlemen have also taken an interest in it. The difficulty was as to the whereabouts of the school. If we put it at any of the dockyards or in any Admiralty building it would be looked upon as a Government school, and it would be said, "This is a Government concern. It is not open to the public. We shall be too much in the power of the Admiralty. What we felt at the Admiralty was, that provided we could feel sure proper instruction would be afforded to our own students, we should be glad to see the public generally availing themselves of the school, so that it might become a great national institution. The way we set about it was this:—Lord Granville, who is at the head of the Science and Art Department at South Kensington, took a great interest in the matter, desired Mr. Cole to communicate with the Admiralty, and immediately put at our disposition proper apart- ments for naval models and classes, and, in short, everything that could be desired. In consultation with Dr. Woolley, the Government Inspector of Schools, and Mr. Cole, it was determined that there should be instructors and lecturers on chymical and physical science, and on the properties of all materials used in shipbuilding, such as wood and iron; that during the winter months the school should be located at South Kensington, where the pupils would undergo this theoretical education; that during the summer months the students should attend the dockyards under and with such instructors as were necessary; and that the Government pupils should be on the same footing as pupils of the private trade. I mean that all the privileges which the Government pupils enjoy shall be enjoyed equally by the public pupils. We give the entire direction to the Science and Art Department. All we ask is a guarantee that our own pupils shall be instructed in such matters which we think advantageous for Her Majesty's service. The private pupils will undergo such instruction as the officers of the Science and Art Department determine, and they will be received on payment of certain fixed sums in the way of fees. That is what we propose, and if successful, I can only say it will be one of the most valuable institutions in this country.

I pass on to Votes 8, 9, 10, which, as the Committee are well aware, are the great shipbuilding Votes; Nos. 8 and 9 being for the workmen, and No. 10 for materials. Upon Vote No. 10 there is a reduction in the Storekeepers' Section of £169,951, in consequence of the satisfactory condition of our principal naval stores. Hon. Gentlemen on this side of the House have very often cavilled with the great amount of this Vote; but I believe now that every one will be disposed to agree that we have done a wise thing in replenishing our dockyards. We have now a large stock of seasoned timber, and I am going to show the Committee what we want to do with it. The satisfactory state of the stores has enabled us to reduce the first section of the Vote by £169,951. On the second section—that is to say, the Controller's Vote, there is a reduction of £195,137. That reduction is owing to the fact that we are making very good progress in our iron armour ships, which we are building by contract. But there is a new item in that Vote, for which I may as well now take the opportunity to ask the sanction of the Committee. We propose to build six gunboats. We propose to build them on the twin screw principle. They are to be of about 700 tons, and to carry two powerful guns. They will be armour-plated throughout to the water-line, and have a limited space on deck to carry two guns. We expect to get thus six vessels well adapted for river purposes, and all purposes for which a light draught of water is necessary. If the Committee agree to the proposal, we shall ask for £64,000 this year for these vessels, the total cost being £120,000. That is really the only new thing which we propose to do by way of shipbuilding by contract during the coming year. Let me now advert to the important question of the armour ships building in our own dockyards. On Vote No. 8 there is an increase of £162,438. I wish to state briefly on what grounds I confidently ask the Committee to agree to that increased sum. Let me here state that we have now altogether twenty-five armour ships built and building, exclusive of these six gunboats. Of this number there are seven in commission. There are six which can be ready by the middle of this year. It is possible that if there is no necessity they may be put off beyond that, but they can be ready by the middle of the year. Six more will be ready by the end of the year, and in the course of next year the remaining six will be ready for sea, being twenty-five in all. This time last year we had twenty-one armour ships built and building, so that four have been added to the navy during the year. The hon. Baronet (Sir John Walsh), who so emphatically mourned the decay of the navy, and, looking back at the old array of line-of-battle ships, asked what we had now to show, must surely acknowledge that it is a marvellous creation to have made such important additions to the navy in so few years. [A MEMBER: It is only seven in five years.] We have twenty-five now under construction, and at the end of the year we shall have nineteen ready. That seems to me most satisfactory progress.

I now come to Vote 8, for workmanship in the dockyards, and will state upon what ground we ask for that large increase. In order that the Committee may be able to make a comparison between the last year and what we propose to do during the coming year, I will quote a Return of tonnage of armour-ships built between the 1st April and the 31st December last. I find that the amount of armour-ships constructed between the 1st of April and the 31st December last—nine months—was equal to 5,807 tons, and non-armour ships 683 tons. Now, during the next year we propose to build 13,604 tons of armour-ships, and 4,404 tons of vessels without armour. We have got in our dockyards seven armour-ships under construction. We shall be much more active in that way than during the past year. With regard to non-armoured ships, we are going to build a new class of vessel, which will not be armour-clad, but which, we trust, will be capable of doing as much service to their owners as the Alabama. In fact, we are desirous of constructing a class of vessel of great speed for the purpose of cruising and replacing some of our smaller class of vessels. That will, of course, entail a considerable amount of expense. The next service for which we require an increase in this Vote is for repairs and refitting of ships. I will tell the Committee frankly that our reserves of ships—I am speaking of those without armour—are not in so satisfactory a state as we could wish. They are getting old, and require very large repairs, which we have hitherto been obliged to put off, being so much engaged with the armour-ships. We expect this year to commission no fewer than sixty-four ships. What does that imply? It means that as many ships are coming into our hands for thorough repairs. This is a serious increase for the year, because the number of reliefs is about fifty-fire for this year as against sixty-four next year. There is another source of increase in this Vote. It is caused by the circumstance that drill and training vessels are more largely required. Hon. Members fall foul of me in the lobby on this subject, and demand drill vessels for the Naval Reserve at this and at that port. An hon. and gallant Friend of mine opposite told me yesterday that one of these vessels must be stationed at Aberdeen. All that represents labour and involves expenditure, and, as these demands are arising all over the country, there will be an increased expense. Yet, I am very glad of it, because it proves that the Naval Reserve is extending. The transition state of the steam engines and boilers is another cause of outlay. Every day there is a new invention in regard to surface condensing, the generation of steam, economising fuel, and a variety of other matters, which tends to secure greater speed and economy of fuel, and the consequence is, that we are constantly compelled to alter the engines at great cost and to adopt new contrivances. There is this year a proportionate increase in the Vote on that account. I now come to another item. During the last five years I find there has been an increase of 20 per cent in the outlay for ventilation, cabin furniture, fittings, and for comforts and conveniences of every description for the officers and seamen of the navy. Much more pains are now taken to make them comfortable, and all that represents money. I think I have now explained to the Committee why we ask for an increase in this Vote. We want to effect more rapid progress in the construction of armour ships; we shall have to execute some very heavy repairs this year; and we also require to increase our first-class steam reserve. An argument which is often used is, that now we have got armour ships we need not keep so many other large vessels at sea. An armour-ship, it is said, is equal to a great number of the old wooden ones. It is perfectly true, no doubt, that these new ships are much more powerful than the old ones; but I can show that that does not enable us to reduce the number of vessels. I lately called for a Return of the number of detached single vessels among our foreign squadron on a particular day, and I now hold it in my hand. By detached vessels I mean those which are detached from our foreign squadrons on the application of consuls when any merchant or sailor has been wronged, and on similar missions. I find that out of 153 ships on foreign stations, there were 117 detached singly in that way. It is obvious that we cannot have 117 armour-plated ships, and therefore we must still maintain a considerable force of the smaller vessels. It is only deceiving the public to pretend that the increase of armour-plated vessels will lead to a material diminution in the lesser non-armoured ones. Hence we are obliged to keep up our dockyards, our plant and stores, wood, copper, &c. In regard to iron ships I will just mention a circumstance, which I do not say is conclusive, but which is rather curious. Hon. Members are always telling us to build iron ships, because they last so long without repairs. This was said even so late as last year. But these vessels are not without their disadvantages. The Megœra, an iron troopship, after having been only a short time out of dock, came home, and suddenly one day it was found she could not get up any steam, and she was therefore perfectly powerless, so far as her steam-power was concerned. If an enemy had met her, then she would have been unable to escape. Upon examination it was discovered that the accident was due to shell-fish having destroy the action of the supply-pipes which went to the bottom of the vessel—they had actually blocked up the "rose," so that of course no steam could be got. That is an illustration of the difficulties which attend iron ships. I should like to ask the hon. Member for Birken-head (Mr. Laird), whether the Alabama, which he knows something about, could have cruised so long without being docked and undergoing repairs if she had been an iron ship? Why, she must have been docked half-a-dozen times before this. I must now say a few words in justification of the course the Government has taken in regard to the form of armour-ships; I wish to show the progress the country is making in regard to this class of ships. What we are now building is an entirely new class of ships—I speak of the successor of the Achilles, which is just now out of dock—the Bellerophon. This Bellerophon will be a remarkable vessel. This is what we expect her to do. First of all she is 4,200 tons, against the Warrior's 6,000 tons; she will carry plates of 6 inches in thickness along her entire length, against the Warrior's 4½ inches, with 18 inches backing; she will have a lining of1½ inches of steel, and a backing of 10 inches, and she will throw a broadside of three-quarters of a ton of iron or steel, which is greater than the Warrior's broadside, with 2,000 less tonnage. I should like to show the Committee how we have got to this. Five years ago, in the early days of armour-plated vessels, when, as my right hon. Friend opposite (Sir John Pakington) in the famous speech in which he introduced the subject, stated that he had consulted all his own constructors and all the eminent constructors of the country, and told them he wanted a ship entirely plated with 4½ inch plates, of great speed and seaworthy qualities, and they all agreed that nothing under 6,000 tons would do, and that only partially plated. The Warrior was then commenced by my right hon. Friend; and when the present Government came into office they immediately adopted her, and thought the sooner they began to build another vessel the better. The four and a half years which have elapsed since that time have been a period of great pressure. We had no time to wait to see whether this thing or that thing would do. Everybody knows that two or three years ago constructions were going on in the French dockyards of such a nature that it was necessary we should go ahead. The competition is not at the present time so rapid, but for several years the exertions made in the French dockyards were enormous, and they obliged us to proceed. We then ordered immediately the Black Prince. But it occurred to us that though these ships were of great speed, and had excellent sea-going qualities, they had great defects. Naval officers said, "You will never be able to get them to turn round quickly enough; they are all very well for race-horses, to catch a fleet, but when it comes to the mêlée they will be run into —they never can turn quick enough." That was a defect, and the Duke of Somerset thought it necessary to order something handier, cheaper, and with less draught of water. Vessels were ordered of 4,000 tons —the Resistance and the Defence—and they certainly were handier and cheaper than the Warrior and the Black Prince; but they laboured under the disadvantage of being of less speed. Still we felt that we could not have every thing. Then it occurred to us that all these vessels had one defect — they had only a limited fighting area; being only partially plated, they could not carry their guns round the entire of their fighting deck protected by armour, and it was suggested to build vessels plated all round on the fighting deck. Hence rose the Hector and Valiant, somewhat larger than the Defence and Resistance. During this time all we had to contend against was the 68-pounder and the Armstrong 110-pounder, and all the world knows that the pivot of the whole is our guns. It was considered that a vessel was impregnable for all purposes if it was impenetrable to these, for though my friend Mr. Whitworth had shown a great power of penetration with his guns, we as yet had only the 68-pounder and the 110-pounder. In 1859 began an epoch which finished in 1861, which I will call the 68-pounder epoch. After having built the Hector and the Valiant, we thought the time was come when we must be prepared to have some check on the contractors, and to commence to build iron plated ships in our own yards. It was not that we doubted the honour of the contractors, but we felt that it was incumbent on us to have some check, and that to build a vessel in our own yards would be an experiment of great interest. It was of equal importance that we should have some navy establishment where we could repair our iron-plated ships; whereupon it was determined that Chatham should be a Government establishment for building iron-plated vessels. I met with great opposition from some Gentlemen in this House, but I believe that all will concur now that it was a wise measure on the part of the Government. Accordingly, it was decided to create an iron-building establishment at Chatham, and to lay down there the frigate Achilles. At this time, likewise, it became necessary that we should ascertain what was the best quality of iron for plating, and that we should have a systematic and contiguous series of experiments as to the proper thickness of iron, and as to the backing. Accordingly, a Committee was appointed, presided over by the gallant Officer opposite (Sir John Hay) which has done good service to the country. We desired that they should make all kinds of inquiries and experiments, and that they should give us all the assistance in their power. One of the first things they reported was, that whereas we were building ships with 4½ inch plates and 18 inch backing, the experiments showed them that it would be better to build with thicker iron and less backing. The resistance of plates, they said, increases as the square of the thickness; consequently, it is obvious that a 5½ inch plate would be more than proportionately efficient for resistance than a 4½ inch plate. Then came the construction of the greatest men-of-war ever yet built, or which, probably, ever will be built—the Minotaur, the Agincourt, and the Northumberland. The Government thought that it was absolutely necessary that we should have a perfect man-of-war of great speed, great fighting area, and armour-plated all round. The builders said that it could not be done for less than 6,800 tons. Those ships have 5½ inch plates with 9 inch backing. That is the history of these ships which have been so much criticized. It is perfectly true that afterwards there were trials of the plates which did not give the results we expected as to the advantages of the 5½ inch plates; but let me inform the Committee we had not the same know- ledge of the manufacture of plates that we have now. It is ascertained beyond a doubt that the 5½ inch plates were not so good in quality as the 4½ inch plates with which the experiments were made, and the trial, therefore, was not conclusive against them. The Admiralty adopted the system on the recommendation of the Iron-plate Committee and of their own officers. About the same time we were much pressed by what was going on abroad. It was absolutely necessary that we should go on building armour-ships, and as we had five line-of-battle ships in course of construction—the Royal Oak, the Caledonia, the Prince Consort, the Royal Alfred, and the Ocean, it was resolved that these should be iron-plated. I believe these ships will be exceedingly valuable, though I admit that they are no longer impenetrable. But I believe that scarcely any of our ships are impenetrable against the guns which are coming. Now we come to a new era. About the middle of 1861, or rather between 1861 and 1862, it was manifest that we were coming to a new style of gun, and likewise to a new style of projectiles. The Admiralty felt that the future position of our armour-plated ships was very precarious. It was manifest that we could no longer keep out shot though we might hope to keep out shell. All the world remembers the great experiment with the 300-pounder which it was thought had penetrated the Warrior target. I was asked a question next day, and I was myself under the impression that it had penetrated the target; but it turned out that it never had actually penetrated it. Nevertheless, it was manifest that we must increase our powers of resistance. Here I must introduce the name of Captain Coles. He is a very excellent naval officer, and had long been desirous of constructing what were then called "cupola ships," but what are now termed, in consequence of his own alterations, "turret ships." At that time our great object was to reduce the tonnage, because we had long believed that the main defect of our ships was their vastness, which was not suited altogether for war, nor for our docks and harbours. Captain Coles undertook to build a ship of 2,500 tons; he was ordered to prepare drawings, and the Prince Albert was commenced. That was in the beginning of 1862. It is important to mention the date, because when the encounter between the Monitor and the Merrimac afterwards took place we were asked why we had not ordered turret ships. The fact is, we had already given orders for the Prince Albert, and she was progressing at that very time. Moreover, immediately after the affair of the Monitor and the Merrimac, the Admiralty ordered the Royal Sovereign to be cut down, and reconstructed upon the principle advocated by Captain Coles. With respect to those two ships, I have no doubt that during our discussions the Admiralty will be blamed for not completing their construction. I accept the challenge, for I am prepared to show that the blame is not due to any default on the part of the Admiralty, but is due to two circumstances, which I shall mention. One is that there has been great difficulty in getting proper plates and all the various component parts of the turrets: but I am bound to say also that the delay is partly due to the earnest desire of Captain Coles that, as we got more knowledge of the power of guns, he should be allowed to improve upon his original plans. He was not satisfied that the vessels should be completed as they were begun, but was frequently making suggestions, and those suggestions undoubtedly have caused considerable delay. I think it only fair to the Department to say so; but, at the same time, I do not blame Captain Coles; on the contrary, I think he was entitled to ask that he should be permitted to turn out the best article which he could produce. In the same year appeared another gentleman, Mr. Reed. Mr. Reed is well known to my right hon. Friend (Sir John Pakington). He came to the Admiralty and said, "You are building ships of an enormous tonnage, at an enormous cost. I am sure I can build a vessel for you very much smaller, very much handier, very much cheaper, and yet completely armour-plated and safe from shot." Mr. Reed is a very scientific man, and a man greatly respected, and his view was that our first object should be to protect the water-line of our ships. "It is all important," he said, "that you should build your ships with their water-line safe, even though you are obliged to sacrifice some of their fighting qualities." At that time almost all our iron ships were without iron-plated ends. The arrangements which had been made for keeping out water were, I admit, very clever and ingenious, but still every practical man knew that they were defective. Mr. Reed offered to construct for the Admiralty a ship to carry a few heavy guns, and plated fore and aft, under 1,000 tons" That is the ship which was lately launched at Devonport. A similar vessel, but somewhat larger, has been launched at Pembroke. Those vessels have realized the anticipations of the builder, and, as far as I know, we have every reason to be contented with the plans of Mr. Reed.

I now come to the events of last year, including the debates which took place in this House on the subject of armour-plating. There actually were discussions followed by divisions in this House as to whether it was advisable to build in wood or in iron, and I think the House arrived at a wise decision when it resolved to give the Government full liberty to take what steps they thought fit. First of all we commenced two wooden ships, called the Lord Clyde and the Lord Warden, with respect to which, though I have all the particulars with me, I shall only state that they are rather larger than line-of-battle-ships, will have considerable speed, will carry heavy guns, and are plated throughout. They have this further advantage over other wooden ships — they have not only got 4½inch plates, but have likewise a skin 1½ inch thick, inside the backing of the plates, which increases their power of resisting shot and shell. Their battery is carried right along, and, upon the whole, they may be regarded as an improvement upon the Royal Oak class. In addition to the Lord Clyde and the Lord Warden, there is a small line-of-battle-ship called the Zealous, which is to be fitted on the principle propounded by Mr. Reed. A fourth vessel will be, if she succeeds, one of the most remarkable that this country ever possessed. Hon. Gentlemen who are fond of yachting ought to visit the Pallas, because she is a vessel of a very peculiar form, which we have adopted from the French. All the reports we receive from France agree in representing that the best ships they have are the Solferino and the Magenta. They go well in head seas, and plunge less than other vessels, and this is due to a remarkable peculiarity in the construction of their bows. Each is provided with what may be described as an elongated bow under the water. We have adopted the principle. There are two small vessels, one of which is built and the other nearly so, and we are putting an elongated bow upon one of them, so as to give the principle a fair trial. The Pallas will have great speed; we believe, indeed, that she will be the fastest ship in the navy, and she will be supplied with a limited battery. She is 2,300 tons, and is expected to go fourteen knots. I now come to the Bellerophon. She is entirely of iron, with a limited battery, but carrying no less than 6 inch plates, with a 1½ inch skin inside a backing of 10 inches, the whole extending fore and aft. She is the most powerful ship in the navy, possessing the heaviest broadside, and it is said that her speed will almost equal that of the Pallas. Such, then, is the present state of the navy. We have twenty-five ships built or building, and I have given you all the particulars respecting them.

Let me now advert shortly to the question of guns, because, after all, that is the pivot of the whole. The Admiralty have not been happy in their guns. It is important, in dealing with the question of guns, that we should distinguish between ships and forts. With respect both to armour-plating and to guns, we are limited, as I have often stated, to a certain weight in a seagoing ship. Such a ship cannot carry a gun above a certain weight. What we may come to in future I shall not pretend to say, but at present practical men have arrived at the conclusion, that a gun weighing more than 6½ tons, if not 6 tons, cannot be worked at sea. The Duke of Somerset, finding that we had no prospect of a gun for the navy, communicated with the late Lord Herbert on the subject, and the result was the issuing of an order for a simple smoothbore gun capable of carrying a charge of from 25 lb. to 30 lb. of powder, and of throwing a 100 lb. projectile. Such a gun has been prepared, and has been most successful. It weighs 6 or 6£ tons, carries a charge of 30 lb., and throws a spherical projectile of 100 lb. I shall tell you what it has done. It is a simple muzzle-loading gun, and it has pierced plates 5½ inches thick, and the side of a line-of-battle ship at 200 yards with steel shot. When such a result was effected we felt satisfied that we had got a powerful gun, and we gave orders for fifty guns of the same description, which are now being made at Woolwich, I think. We expect to receive the whole of them by July. At the same time, the Admiralty thought that we ought not only to have some smoothbore guns, but also some rifled guns, still, however, limiting them to that weight, and Admiral Frederick's gun has been ordered, and is about to undergo a trial. It is a rifle, 7 inch as against the 9 inch bore of the smooth gun, while weighing the same and carrying the same weight of projectile as the smooth gun. That is the prospect we have now for the navy; but, at the same time, such has been the success of the Armstrong 300- pounder—which, in fact, throws a 150 lb. spherical projectile, though it is called a 300-pounder — that, though it weighs 12 tons, we think it fair to try it experimentally. We have a stock of them, and, accordingly, guns of this description are to be put on board some of our ships, including four on the Minotaur, ten on the Bellerophon, five on the Royal Sovereign, and four on the Prince Albert. Having now wound up the story of the ships and the guns, I may observe that Mr. Whitworth's 7 inch gun was fired at a target of the thickness of the plates of the Bellerophon, and it did not pierce it. Neither did the 300-pounder with a steel projectile. I believe the distance at which the firing was made was over 200 yards, but I do not remember the exact distance. The House will perceive, therefore, that the Bellerophon is a virgin target so far. I think the course the Admiralty have taken has been very fair and consistent. We have put the public to great expense; we have consumed seventeen targets and five or six target-ships; but we have done so in a careful endeavour to produce for the country the best ships it was possible to procure; and I believe I may say that, on the whole, we have been very successful.

And now I pass on to Vote 11, which is for docks and basins. This Vote shows a considerable increase. We are building no less, I think, than three barracks for marines—building or enlarging to such an extent as that they may be said to be new barracks. That is due to the large increase in the number of marines which has taken place of late years. Likewise, we are constructing large works at Chatham. Then, with regard to Portsmouth, we propose to make a great basin there very similar to the enlargement at Chatham. This is so great and important a scheme that we have thought it right to propose a Committee of the House to examine it and report their opinion to the House. I shall move for that Committee this night. Now, at the same time that we are increasing our dockyards in some directions, where we can reduce them in others we do not neglect to do so. I am sorry to say my constituents were not satisfied that we should be reducing Deal dockyard, but they have the good sense to see that the place is too exposed to keep stores in. In spite of the whole fleet of England, an enemy's gunboat might come there and set fire to the stores. The dockyard at Deptford will be got rid of when we have Chatham. I must also advert to the sum of money which we propose to take for Malta dockyard. I shall not go into particulars concerning the dockyard at present, because an hon. and gallant Gentleman (Captain Talbot) has given notice of a Motion to oppose our proposal, and I shall be perfectly prepared, whenever the Motion comes on, to defend the course which the Government have taken with regard to the Malta dockyard. Nor, indeed, should I revert to the point on which I am now about to trouble the House for a moment, if merely a personal question was involved in it. The other night, in a debate we had on Malta dockyard, I said that two ships which had lately gone out to the Mediterranean could be docked in Her Majesty's dockyard there. It so happened that when I read The Timesthe next morning I saw it reported that Lord Clarence Paget had said the Royal Oak and the Resistance had been docked at Malta. Knowing as a matter of fact that they had not been docked there, and that I had only said that they could be docked there, I wrote to the Editor and requested a correction of the report. The correction appeared, and I thought that would have been sufficient. I need scarcely observe that as Secretary to the Admiralty I must have known that those ships had only just been ordered out, and, of course, could not have been docked at Malta. To my surprise I read in The Times of this morning the following letter:—

"To the Editor of the Times

Sir,—I observe that the Secretary of the Admiralty has corrected the impression under which we all laboured—namely, that he had stated that the Royal Oak and the Resistance had been in dock in Malta. He still, however, seems to be under the erroneous impression that the Royal Oak could go into Malta dock with her stores on board. Malta dock has 22 ft. 6 in., or thereabouts, over the sill. The Royal Oak draws 26 ft. A ship of her size and tonnage requires the removal of nearly 30 tons to lighten her one inch. She would require to be lightened three feet and a-half at least to enter Malta dock, which would necessitate the removal of about 1,200 tons of stores. This involves the removal of men, guns, coals, and a large proportion of her stores and provisions— work which occupies time, labour, expense, and destruction of property and efficiency. The Resistance would require the removal of about 300 tons to lighten her for admission to Malta dock. All the ships of the Minotaur class would require the removal of nearly 2,000 tons of stores, &c. All the ships of the Warrior and Royal Oak classes would require to be dealt with like the Royal Oak. All these ships would require to be lightened from one to three feet, to reduce their draught to 25 ft., and enable them to approach the site of the proposed new dock in the Marsa. I stated these facts, as may be seen on referring to the report of my speech during the discussion, which is to be found in most of the morning papers. I am, Sir, your obedient servant, Feb. 24. J. C. D. HAY. Now, Sir, I think it is usual in this House when we have debates that we argue with our opponents here. We do not enter into newspaper controversies with one another; but when an hon. Member makes a statement from which we differ, we avail ourselves of the opportunity we have of stating face to face the points with respect to which our difference arises. That course has not been adhered to in this instance; and on reading these words— I observe that the Secretary of the Admiralty has corrected the impression under which we all laboured—namely, that he had stated that the Royal Oak and the Resistance had been at dock in Malta. I thought I would like to see whether any of the other newspapers reported me to have said those ships had been docked at Malta. I looked into the paper which represents the party to which the hon. and gallant Member belongs— The Morning Herald—and I found my observations reported correctly. The same was the case in The Daily News and The Morning Advertiser. These are the three papers which I consulted, and every one of them gave a correct report of that portion of my speech. Therefore, I think the insinuation implied in the words of the hon. and gallant Gentleman which I have just quoted is entirely unfounded. I should have thought it utterly beneath me to notice an insinuation of the kind, had it not been accompanied by a grievous misstatement on a matter respecting which the public are most anxious to be correctly informed—that is, the dock accommodation for our men-of-war, The House will give me leave to read a report on the Malta dock which I received this day from the Controller— The sections of the dock at Malta (the old dock enlarged and now ready for use) are as shown on the accompanying drawing, received from the Director of Works' Department. The section of the Royal Oak has been drawn in, and from that it appears that she would require to be lightened 13½ inches (by the removal of 418 tons), so as to bring her to 23 feet 6 inches even keel. But it would be desirable to have the bilge pieces more clear than as shown. The draught of water should be reduced still more — say six inches — giving 23 feet even keel, to effect which the weight to be taken out would be 604 tons. The quantity of coals which she stows is 600 tons, and the quantity of water in the boilers 100 tons. Therefore, all that she requires to lighten her to go into the Malta dock are her coals and her water. Now, inasmuch as we generally go into harbour with our coal bunkers empty and with little water, that ship would have very little to take out. The hon. and gallant Gentleman said, I believe that this dock has only 22 feet depth of water. In his letter to The Times, he puts it at 22 feet 6 inches. Now the fact is, that the depth of water in the Malta dock is 25 feet. I ask, therefore, whether an officer of the navy who conies down and tells us that, from having commanded ships, he knows what ships are, ought not to be more accurate before he reflects upon the Secretary of the Admiralty. I, however, put the personal matter out of the question. I do not mind his insinuations, but what I am really anxious about is, that the public should not suppose that our docks at Malta are totally unfit to receive our armour-plated ships.

I think, Sir, that I might now sit down, having, I fear, wearied the Committee with a long statement; but there remains to me a duty which I confess is very pleasing. It has been my lot, during the time I have occupied a place on these benches, to have to resist appeals from all classes of officers in the navy—appeals, in opposing which I had naturally to sacrifice my own personal feelings. Well, it is not without gratification that I announce to the Committee that there will be some increase of charge proposed hereafter, on account of the improved pay of different classes of naval officers, including petty officers. The Committee over which my right hon. Friend the Member for the University of Cambridge (Mr. Walpole) presided, went very carefully into all the matters on which it was allowed to enter. It was not allowed to touch the question of the pay of the navy, but had to confine itself to the subjects of promotion and retirement. But I am bound to say that I believe the feeling of that Committee was, that it would be very acceptable if any improvement in pay such as we shall submit were granted. Many other proposals were suggested by that Committee, but they are so important that the Government thought they ought to be the subject of a full detail and special discussion in this House; and I only allude to them now because of the undoubted effect this recommendation would have upon the reduction of £303,000, which I have announced. Therefore, without going further into these matters at present, and thanking the Committee for the patience with which they have listened to me, I will content myself with moving the first Vote— That 71,950 Men and Boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, including 18,000 Marines.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That 71,950 Men and Boys be employed for the Sea and Coast Guard Services, for the year ending on the 31st day of March, 1865, including 18,000 Royal Marines.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he should not have intruded on the Committee immediately after his noble Friend had spoken, but for the special manner in which his noble Friend had directed his observations to him a few moments ago. And, first of all, he would address himself to the personal matter to which his noble Friend had alluded. He was glad that his noble Friend had read the letter to The Times, as he had done, because he thought there was nothing in it at which he need have taken offence. He had certainly been under the impression, and so also were two of his hon. and gallant Friends sitting beside him, that the expression used by his noble Friend was that the Royal Oak had been in the Malta dock. However, he was quite willing to believe that his noble Friend had a better recollection of what he himself said than they had, and he was quite ready to accept the information which his noble Friend had accorded to The Times newspaper, in the letter which he wrote to it on the following morning, correcting its report. When he spoke the other evening of the depth of water over the sill of the dock—he had himself placed his ship in dock at Malta, and he had also the letter of Admiral Codrington on the subject in his hand—he was not then aware that the dock had been deepened by three feet, as his noble Friend said it had been, since the last papers relating to the matter had been laid upon the table of the House at the end of last Session. If it had been so deepened, then it would be of so much more advantage to certain ships, as it would enable them to get into that dock without lightening themselves to the extent which he had supposed would have been necessary. Still, it was manifest that the Royal Oak, and still less those ships which drew more water than she did — it was manifest that first-class iron-plated ships, drawing twenty-five or twenty-six feet of water, would be unable to avail themselves of Malta dock, being ready for sea, as they ought to do. He trusted that would satisfy the House that in writing the letter to The Times, in which he ventured to correct that newspaper's report, or rather its want of any report of his speech, his object was that he might not appear to yield to his noble Friend the point he claimed as to the utility of that dock at Malta, which he still believed to be useless for the purpose of maintaining our navy in the Mediterranean in a state of efficiency. There were a few other points in his noble Friend's statement to which he wished to advert; and first, as to the proposed reduction of 2,000 boys. In spite of the reason given for that reduction, he did not deem it a prudent thing to reduce the boys in the way proposed in the Estimates. True, it might be desirable to induce merchant seamen occasionally to join the navy; but he should be very sorry to have to depend upon them to any extent. The time at which they would be most wanted would be the time when it would be necessary to have a number of men trained in their youth for the navy, so as to give them confidence, discipline, and a knowledge of those points which should be attended to by seamen of the navy. And here he would call his noble Friend's attention to what he thought was rather a mistake as to the boys of Greenwich school. Considerable expense had been incurred in instructing these boys to join the navy; and he understood that an order had been given that they should be discharged at 13½ years old, and not retained there for the purposes of education. He trusted that was not true. His noble Friend had assured them that no boys were to join the navy till they were 14½ years of age—that there were to be no more second-class boys, but only first-class. Therefore the boys at Greenwich would be discharged at 13½ from the school where they were educated, and he should like to know what was to become of them during the year that must elapse before they were 14½. His noble Friend did not quite correctly explain the building of the Minotaur. The three ships of that class constructed by the Admi- ralty were not constructed in consequence of a report of the Iron-plate Committee, but in default of a report from that Committee. He did not blame the Admiralty for constructing those ships. Under the circumstances he did not know that the Admiralty could have done anything else than they did. The impression entertained at that time, both by the Admiralty and the other officers consulted, and also by the Iron-plate Committee itself, was that, if possible, a reduction of the wooden backing and an increase in the thickness of the iron plates would be advantageous. But the Committee did not report without experiment that it would be satisfactory. They endeavoured to obtain a plate of 5½ inches thick and a target to test the plan. These were not ready till the 25th of July, 1862, and, in the mean time, the Admiralty, without waiting for the Report, had determined to build these ships. He believed that was in consequence of some necessity in regard to the contractors; but he was bound to say experiment proved that these ships were not by any means equal to a side constructed on the Warrior principle. The Report of the Committee stated that the reduction of the wood backing from 18 inches to 9, as in the case of the Minotaur class of vessels, did not appear to be sufficiently compensated by one inch more of iron. The general character of the Report went to show, that the impression which the Committee had before, and which the Admiralty had, was an erroneous one; and it would have been advantageous to the country if the necessity had not arisen for commencing those ships on the plan adopted, instead of that which had been proved to be superior. He also wished to allude to the case of the Bellerophon target. It had certainly not been a proved success. The advantage of a 6 inch iron plate was very great if they could get a good one; but of the two on that target one only was good, and moreover the firing at that target was not with the same charges as the other targets, being only 35 pounds of powder against the Bellerophon target, and 45 pounds and 50 pounds against the Warrior and Chalmers' targets respectively; and, therefore, the velocities could not be compared. Although he had not condemned the Bellerophon target, he should be sorry that it went forth on the authority of the noble Lord, that the experiment wag arranged by the Iron-plate Committee, or the target was put to the same extent of strain or tested at the same velocity as other targets. He trusted, however, that the Bellerophon would still be a good ship. With reference to what had been said about guns, he conceived it by be means impossible that guns' above 6½ tons could not be used in ships for broadside firing. It was very desirable that we should make our ships to carry guns that would do the work required, and he could not believe that there was any great difficulty in arranging mechanical contrivances and the fittings of a ship so as to make what was merely a floating platform for guns, to carry those which would do the service required. He was sorry it appeared to be supposed impracticable to overcome the difficulty of coppering an iron ship. There seemed no reason to him why it should not be done— there was no reason why wooden sheathing might not be attached outside an iron bottom, and copper fixed to it by some method to prevent that evil occurring to which the noble Lord alluded in the instance of the Megœra. One suggestion was specially held forth as capable of success. He alluded to the proposal of Mr. Grantham, who had succeeded in coppering iron ships now at sea. The experiment was about to be made of building gunboats with twin screws. He thought by that means we should succeed in making our steamships much more manageable than they now were, and even long ships might be turned in their own length, which was the great desideratum in naval manœuvres. He trusted that at least one of those six ships mentioned by the noble Lord would soon be ready, so that they might see the advantage of the adoption of the twin principle, and that before long they would see two screws attached to every ship in Her Majesty's navy. He was very glad to hear from his noble Friend, that the Report of the Committee over which the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Cambridge University presided last year was not to be allowed to fall to the ground; and that some of those ameliorations pointed out would be adopted. He had intended to allude to some of those recommendations, but as the noble Lord indicated that the Admiralty were about to attend to it, he should postpone to a future occasion any observations he had to make on that question.

MR. STANSFELD

said, he merely rose to correct a misapprehension under which the hon. and gallant Member for Wake-field (Sir John Hay) appeared to labour. He seemed to be under the impression that boys were to leave Greenwich School at the age of 13½ and not to enter the navy till 14½. It was precisely the reverse, the time during which they were to remain at school had been extended till 14½, at which age they would enter the navy.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

Sir, the annual statement of the condition of our naval force, and of the intentions of the Government with regard to those forces, is always one of great interest, and I must say that the statement which we have heard from the noble Lord forms no exception to that rule. It is not my intention to follow the noble Lord through the great variety of subjects on which he has touched; but there are some parts of his statement on which I desire to offer a few remarks. The first, and, in my opinion, by far the most important topic on which he touched, was the reduction of the naval strength of the country to the extent of 4.000 men this year. Now, considering the present state of Europe—considering the present state of America, I cannot refrain from expressing my astonishment that Her Majesty's Government should have thought it desirable to effect a very great reduction in the number of men in the navy. I admit that this is a matter to be submitted to the House on the authority of the Government. The Government are, of course, responsible for the force which they propose to this House for a Vote, and, I presume, they have come down to the House to propose this great reduction of the naval strength of the country on grounds which appear to them to be sufficient. But I cannot help remarking upon it as a matter of considerable surprise, and I very much doubt the wisdom of that decision both in fact and in theory. Considering the language used in the despatches of the noble Lord at the Foreign Office— considering the fact that the Prime Minister came down only a few days ago and used expressions of most unusual strength with regard to the conduct of some continental Powers, I cannot help thinking that, when simultaneously with the use of such language, the Government come down and propose a reduction both in our navy and our army, the effect must be to impress on the Powers of Europe the belief, which I fear has obtained too much already, that the louder we talk the less we are disposed to act. There is an obvious danger that the course which the Government are taking is likely to produce a painful impression on both sides of the Atlantic, both in appearance and in fact; and I cannot refrain from expressing my doubts whether this is the moment at which the Government ought to have proposed to Parliament anything like a reduction of our military and naval forces. Whilst I doubt the wisdom and policy of the Government in proposing to reduce the strength of our navy and army, I feel no less surprised at the manner in which, as the noble Lord has now explained to us, the Government intend to make that reduction. The difference of 4,000 men in the strength of the navy consists, in the first place, of the reduction of 500 seamen. I very much doubt, notwithstanding the explanation of the noble Lord with regard to the fact, that the armour-covered ships do not require such large crews in proportion to their tonnage as the old line-of-battle ships did. I very much doubt whether that explanation is sufficient to induce us to knock off 500 seamen from the strength of the navy. Still more do I doubt the propriety of the reduction of 2,000 boys. If there is one thing more than another for which the noble Lord has taken credit in former years—and I have always concurred in giving him credit for it, and for which credit is justly due to him—it is for the extent to which he has carried the system of training boys for the navy. I believe there is no one conversant with the affairs of the navy of England who does not know that the best seamen we have are those which we raise and train from our boys for the service. And what is the explanation which the noble Lord has given for the reduction in the number of these boys? The noble Lord tells us—what we knew very well before— that the boys grow up to be men, and that when they so grow up we have such a quantity of men as to render it unnecessary to open the navy to the mercantile marine; and he went on to state that, by reducing the number of boys, we should reduce the number of men, and leave an opening for admitting sailors from the mercantile marine. I did not understand whether the noble Lord wished to reduce the strength of the navy or the number of boys, in order that he might bring strength from another source. If the latter be the intention of the noble Lord, as I believe it is, I think he is making a most serious mistake. I by no means underrate the value of deriving strength from the mer- cantile marine; I concur in the policy of keeping up the Naval Reserve, which is drawing strength from the mercantile marine; but, I think, the Admiralty could not have made a greater mistake than in displacing those boys, who become most valuable seamen, in order to replace them by any accidental addition to be derived from our mercantile marine. The next reduction proposed by the noble Lord is in the coast-guard. I think this a most unwise reduction. Whilst the noble Lord has taken credit from year to year for training the boys to strengthen the navy, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India, who preceded me as First Lord of the Admiralty (Sir Charles Wood), always took credit—and very justly took credit — for having founded the present system of coast-guard service, and on one occasion he charged me with not supporting the coast-guard efficiently. Now, I have never denied the value of the coast-guard as a reserve. I believe they are our best reserve. They are a reserve not like the Royal Naval Reserve, consisting of men constantly engaged in the merchant service, and not accustomed, except for very short periods, to the discipline of a man-of-war. We trust to them for an emergency, but our first and most valuable reserve is the coast-guard, consisting entirely of trained and disciplined seamen, and I think the Government are making a great mistake in reducing their strength. The noble Lord went on to tell us of the popularity of the service; and then said, that throughout the past year the strength of the navy has constantly been several thousands below the amount voted, and that the coast-guard has averaged about the number to which he proposes to reduce it. So that instead of judging what the real requirements of the country demand, he proposes nominally to reduce the coast-guard and the number of seamen altogether to the number we have actually had; in fact, bringing down the numbers to what we have got. That is a very poor reason for the course he is pursuing, and I am afraid it does not tell much for the popularity of the navy, for it is clear that the Government have been unable to get the number of sailors Parliament thought necessary for the service of the country last year. The noble Lord did me the honour of reading a very long extract from the speech which I made on moving the Navy Estimates in 1859, and adverted to the strong terms in which I then commented on what I considered the disgraceful fact which occurred at that time, that some of our ships of war were lying at our ports, and waiting in vain for men to join them. When I made that statement I am sure the noble Lord will admit that, whilst I condemned the unfortunate state of things that led to it, I expressed my earnest hope that no future Board of Admiralty would allow that state of things to again occur. I did what I could to prevent it then, and I am sure my noble Friend will admit that I have never failed to support him in his attempts to prevent its recurrence. No part of the noble Lord's speech gave me more satisfaction than that which informed us there was now a reserve of 2,400.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

2,510 men and boys.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

A reserve of 2,510 men and boys ready to be put on board any of our ships that may require manning, and to prevent a recurrence of that very discreditable state of affairs. The noble Lord, in the latter part of his speech, referred to a most interesting part of this subject, in which I am afraid Her Majesty's Government have not been so cautious as they should have been — namely, the efforts which France has made to procure an armour-plated fleet, and he used the expression that it was absolutely necessary for us to go ahead. I have always felt and admitted that; and I have never for a moment thrown blame on Her Majesty's Government for trying any experiment which our present extraordinary transition state in this matter might have rendered necessary. We have been obliged to feel our way. The noble Lord adverted to the Black Prince and the Warrior, which were built when I was at the Admiralty, and it has been a subject of equal gratification and astonishment to me, that those experiments should have been so successful as they have been. And I say it with more freedom, because it was not to me as the Minister of the Crown who ordered them — all I could do was to take the greatest possible trouble and pains I could, to get the best advice on the subject—that the credit of their success was due but to the officials of the Admiralty and Constructors of the Navy, and the advice we received from the various shipbuilders of the country. The main peculiarity between these ships and those to which my noble Friend has referred, as constructed by the present Board, is, that whilst we held that the first desideratum was high speed, I decided, in order to obtain seagoing qualities, not to apply armour all round the ships, but only amidships in our first experiments; whereas the present Government have tried the experiment of carrying armour all round the ships, both fore and aft. Up to this moment, however, the success of the latter experiment has not been tested, at least in England. But, if I may believe the newspapers, it has been tried in the French navy, and the result has been to establish the wisdom of the first idea, that ships can only, with a due regard to prudence and safety, be plated amidships. I do not know if those reports have come to the noble Lord's knowledge, and if he can say whether they are correct or not; but they are very important reports, and those which I have read do show that the French ships, armour-plated all round, do not possess the requisite seaworthiness in heavy weather, and the French Government had even talked of removing the armour-plates from the bows in consequence. The noble Lord did not refer to a very remarkable circumstance, which caused at the time much excitement and much public anxiety— namely, the case of the Prince Consort, which so narrowly escaped foundering. It was a most providential circumstance that this ship and her crew were not all lost in her trip from Plymouth to Liverpool; and I should like to ask the noble Lord whether, in his opinion, he thinks plating that ship fore and aft had anything to do with her extreme danger? As this is by far the most interesting question in regard to the construction of our navy, I wish the noble Lord had given us some few facts in connection with it. Another point on which I think the noble Lord touched lightly— and whilst I give Her Majesty's Government credit for trying all fair and reasonable experiments, I think they have been rather precipitate in what they have done —the noble Lord spoke of the Defence, the Resistance, and three or four other armour-plated ships, which were ordered by the present Government shortly after they came into office. Now, I think they made a mistake in ordering ships of such small speed; but in point of arming them fore and aft, the Defence and Resistance were exactly on the same plan as the Warrior and the Black Prince. The next ships the present Board of Admiralty ordered were three 500 tons larger each than the Warrior—namely, the Minotaur, the Northumberland, and the Agincourt; and the noble Lord has told us that, instead of following the armour-plating of the Warrior, 4½ inches of iron, backed by 18 inches of wood, he had decided to alter the armour to 5½ inches of iron and 9 inches of wood. Well, Sir, in Vote 10, I find a Vote of £30,000, a similar sum to that which was taken in the Estimates of last year for experiments. I take no exception to that Vote, but I presume that, as the noble Lord did not allude to it in his statement, that those experiments have reference to the building of targets for testing the most effective kind of armour-plating. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: Yes.] Before the Government decided on spending so vast a sum of money as must have been spent on the Minotaur, the Agincourt, and the Northumberland, I think it is a pity they did not try them, and see whether or not the armour used on those ships was or was not the best that could be applied. The fact, I believe, is, that that armour has turned out very defective, and that it is a very common fact that the additional inch of iron is no compensation for the loss of the nine inches of wood, and that eighteen inches of wood with thinner iron resists shot better than thicker iron and less wood. I think we have some right to complain that the Government did not try it before they decided on building these ships. I speak under correction, but I am informed that, pending the building of these costly ships, an experiment was tried, and the armour was found not to answer, but that the Government refused to make any alteration in their construction on the ground that it was too late, the contracts having been made.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

The Government left it open, and they gave themselves three months' law to decide, whether they would have them built of 4½ inch iron and 18 inch wood, or 5½ inch iron with 9 inches of wood, both being of the same weight. At the end of that time, on the recommendation of the Committee and the Admiralty advisers, we decided on the 5 inches of iron and the 9 inches of wood.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

I think the noble Lord's statement has made the matter worse than I at first thought it was. I thought the excuse was that the contracts were made, and that it was too late to alter them. Now the noble Lord says they were not made, but that they were kept open till the experiments were tried, and it would appear they deliberately se- lected the weaker and worst of the targets. [Lord CLAEENCE PAGET: NO.] Then I do not understand the noble Lord's explanation. The noble Lord does not deny, that on the trial at Shoeburyness the additional inch of iron was shown to be no compensation for the reduction of the thickness of the wood; and if the Admiralty kept the contracts open till after the trials in order to know which was the best, I cannot understand how it was they decided on what appears to be the weakest. Am I to understand that the Government were bound to accept the recommendation of the Iron-plate Committee in the face of actual experiments? I cannot for a moment suppose any person would contend for anything so preposterous. I rather doubt the recommendations of that Committee, and I am disposed to believe—

SIR JOHN HAY

I endeavoured to explain to the House, not long ago, what the facts were. What happened was this: —The Iron-plate Committee endeavoured to make the experiment, but the 5½ inch plates were not ready at a given date in July, The instant the experiment was made, however, the Committee reported that the 5½ inch plating with 9 inches of backing was inferior, and much inferior, to the Warrior target with a 4½ inch plating and an 18 inch backing.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

Yes; but it was too late.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

It appears the Iron-plate Committee did report the other way, though the noble Lord says they adopted the 5½ inch armour in deference to the Committee. I attach very great weight, indeed, to the Report of any Committee of which my hon. and gallant Friend is the Chairman; and I cannot but think that, after the experiments at Shoeburyness, which proved the inferiority of those plates, it ought to have been sufficient to deter Her Majesty's Government from applying them to their ships. The result is, that we have a most unsatisfactory state of things, as I think, from the want of due caution on the part of the Admiralty—namely, three ships, the most important that have ever been added to the navy, covered with these inferior armour plates. It was not a case in which they were feeling their way and were bound to run some risk. They had the means of judging, and they ought to have come to some more satisfactory conclusion. My noble Friend talks very much of the Bellerophon class of ships, and has told us what a wonderful ship she is to be. I want to know if I am not right in saying, that the Bellerophon target is not, with a very slight difference indeed, the Chalmers' target? I am assured that it is substantially so; but it is a matter on which I will not now dwell, as it will, probably, come before the House on some future day, in consequence of the manner in which the Admiralty has treated Mr. Chalmers. He is a very scientific man, and has, I believe, invented the best target that has ever been made for the resistance of any kind of projectiles yet invented. I believe that the Bellerophon target will turn out the best yet used by the Admiralty, and for it the Admiralty will be indebted to Mr. Chalmers, although they have refused to remunerate him the expenses he has been put to out of pocket in constructing his target. With regard to the increased Vote of £162,000 for workmen, I am bound to accept the noble Lord's assurance that it is necessary for the public service. I will only remark, after all we have heard and read lately in the newspapers, of the great reductions made in our dockyards, effected by the zeal and activity of the Junior Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Stansfeld) who, I have no doubt, has devoted his ability to dockyard reform, that it is not a new subject. I think it was an unfortunate fact—I do not say that it was any proof that his exertions have not been successful—still I think it was unfortunate that when we had heard so much about reduction in our dockyard expenses we should find that those dockyard expenses have increased by £162,000. I think it requires some explanation, that while the aggregate number of workmen employed is increased from 14,200 to 16,500 there is a continued reduction going on in what are called the establishment labourers. This requires some explanation, for if the country requires that vast amount of labour, as I have no doubt it does, why are there the continued efforts to reduce the establishment labourers?

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

An explanation is given in a note.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

It is necessary that it should be explained, because the fact is somewhat anomalous. There was one part of the noble Lord's speech which I heard with unqualified satisfaction, and that was the decision of the Admiralty to ask for £2,500 for the establishment of a School of Naval Architecture. The noble Lord frankly admitted that I pressed that on the Committee last year. I pressed it on the Admiralty in this House, and in private, and I even went so far as to suggest the mode by which that important object should be carried out; but I was disposed to think that the Admiralty did not like the idea of any such suggestion proceeding from me. They seemed rather to prefer that it should proceed from themselves; and, therefore, anxious as I was to see the object attained, I said no more. But what I did suggest to the Admiralty was exactly what the Admiralty propose—that a school of naval architecture—which I believe to be most essential to the naval interests of this country—should be so established as to work beneficially for the service both of the Royal Navy and of the mercantile marine. That is, I understand, the intention of the Government, and I sincerely rejoice at the decision to which the Admiralty have arrived, and I hope the attempt will be as successful as they expect. I had intended to remark on certain omissions to be found in the Estimates; but, to my great surprise, the principal omission to which I had intended to refer was supplied in the last few words which fell from the noble Lord. There was a Committee of the House of Commons last year, presided over by my right hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge University (Mr. Walpole), the object of which was to investigate the present system of promotion and retirement in the navy. That Committee made several not unimportant recommendations. I hold in my hand a paper, showing what their recommendations were, and I am sorry to say that to those recommendations the Estimates do not contain the slightest reference. Those recommendations were all made after very laborious investigation, and I am free to say, agreed to in the most impartial spirit. The Committee, of which my noble Friend himself was a member, arrived at a series of recommendations on a variety of points, all bearing more or less on the interests of the navy, and when I look through these Estimates, I arrive at the conclusion that the Admiralty have decided to treat with contempt every one of the recommendations. I hardly know whether I am right in making exception even of the few words at the close of the noble Lord's speech, because they adverted to the pay of naval officers. Now, the pay of the naval officers was a subject which, very unfortunately, was excluded from our deliberations. It was on that account that I always urged that we ought to have had a Royal Commission, and not a Committee, because a Royal Commission could have dealt with the inquiry into the pay. I think our inquiry was imperfect on that account. We were not able to deal with the most important question of naval pay. But in the Report of that Committee I find that they in some degree directed attention to the subject by recommending for consideration the question, "Whether allowances for outfit, or the supply of furniture on more advantageous terms, should not be made, to enable an officer to take the command of a ship without incurring pecuniary loss?" When I was at the Admiralty, two things that struck me most as requiring correction were, the difficulty of manning our ships and the no less discreditable, no less unfortunate, no less unworthy the naval service of England, that your officers cannot accept the command of ships without great pecuniary loss to themselves. I have before stated, that when I was First Lord of the Admiralty this fact occurred to me frequently—that when I offered the command of ships to distinguished officers, they came to me and said, "We should like to take this command, but we cannot afford to take it." Now, at the end of his speech, in the last few words that he spoke, the noble Lord told us that hereafter, at some future time, upon some plan and to some extent that he did not even shadow forth, there is to be an increase in the pay of the Royal Navy. Let me ask, why is not that in the Estimates? This is no new subject. It vitally affects the interests of the navy; and although we could not inquire into it in our Committee, we touched upon it, and after a debate my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) carried, upon a division, a Motion to inquire into the system of pay, as well as the system of promotion and retirement; and I say, we have great reason to complain of the extraordinary way in which this subject has been brought before us to-night. I am very happy to hear the conclusion at which the Admiralty have arrived; but, considering the months that have elapsed since the subject was last under discussion, I cannot understand why the Admiralty did not make up their minds as to what they meant to do at an earlier period, so that any proposal which they intended to make might be included in the Estimates before us. I presume that it will now be made the subject of a Supplementary Estimate and a subsequent statement. I am glad to hear that some- thing is to be done. I shall wait with anxiety to hear what is the nature of the decision which has been arrived at, but I cannot understand why the matter has been brought before the House in this irregular manner.

SIR MORTON PETO

said, he regretted to hear that Her Majesty's Government had determined to increase the dockyard and diminish the expenditure on the personnel of the navy, for he thought this was a most ill-chosen time for such a reduction. Those hon. Members who advocated economy, did not require economy at the expense of efficiency—what they maintained was, that extensive establishments did not mean strength unless conducted with efficiency. In whatever aspect the expenditure in the dockyards was viewed, there was much to lament, and but little cause for congratulation. He was glad to hear that his hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) had spent so much time during the recess in investigating the state of the dockyards, and he trusted that the country would derive much benefit from his able administration. It was not, however, merely by a minute examination of accounts that we should arrive at dockyard reform. What was wanted was some master mind, who would bring to bear upon the work to be performed there the economy of labour, by which great undertakings of this country were characterized. He was, therefore, pleased to hear that his hon. Friend had visited that great establishment at Birkenhead, which was at once an ornament to the place and a monument to his hon. Friend the Member for that town (Mr. Laird), and where every expedient for economizing labour was applied as soon as it was discovered. Large dockyard expenditure indicated a centralizing disposition on the part of the Government, and he was sorry to see that these Estimates tended entirely in that direction. If Government could build ships better and cheaper than they could be constructed in private yards, let them do so; but, in his opinion, all that was necessary was to maintain in the dockyards such an establishment as would be sufficient for repairs, and, it might be, for testing the prices of private builders, though, in his opinion, even that would be better accomplished by private competition. He had been very glad to hear the satisfactory statement made by the noble Lord as to the morale of the navy. Last year, when the Army Estimates were under discussion, be called the attention of the Committee to a subject to which the noble Lord had referred to-night, which vitally affected the well-being of the navy, and with regard to which the hands of the Government needed strengthening. Admiral Bruce stated to a Committee which inquired into the subject that, when the Warrior was in Portsmouth harbour, the number of seamen who were entirely disabled from service from this cause exceeded thirty-two daily. When the "unfortunates" were placed in hospital, there was no means of retaining them there until they were free from disease; and Admiral Bruce said that as soon as a ship came into harbour and was about to be paid off, they all went out only to return again in a short time. In this respect, at all events, some additional power ought to be given to the Government. The evidence of the Deputy Inspector General of Hospitals showed, that although in foreign services the proportion of suffering from this cause only extended to sixty or seventy men in every 1,000, in the British service it was no less than 442 per 1,000 annually. These were most distressing facts, and although their nature forbade the possibility of dealing with them advantageously in a public discussion, duty required that even at a sacrifice of feeling attention should be directed to the matter. In Malta, from the year 1825 to 1859, very stringent police powers were granted, and applications to the hospital arising from this particular class of disease were unknown; but from 1859 to 1861 that judicious sanitary law was neglected, and the hospitals, in consequence, became crowded, and, in fact, unequal to the reception of the patients. Upon the urgent representations of the medical men, the rules previously existing were re-established, and not a case was known in the island for months together, except when ships from home arrived, and from forty to eighty men were taken out at one time for treatment, some of them being unfit for service. The noble Lord deserved the earnest thanks of the House for the attention which he had given to the matter. The public mind was not yet prepared for legislation in the principal cities; but in garrisons, seaports, and camps the Government ought at least to insist upon similar precautions to those adopted in the case of other contagious diseases. A single fact spoke volumes. In the town of Plymouth, according to the evidence of physicians, there were 900 unfortunates under the age of 15 years. Turning to the question more immediately before the House, and to the advice which had been given about "going ahead," he urged that they should only go ahead in the right direction. He had consulted many eminent practical engineers, and the majority held that it was impossible to fasten on to a wooden frame a totally different material—to hang, in fact, a dead weight upon the ship's sides—and then to expect that the vessel could be depended upon for continued service. As regarded the gunboats, he congratulated the Government upon having adopted the twin-screw system; and, being anxious to give them credit whenever it was possible, he would also express approval of the contemplated abandonment of Deptford dockyard. It was exceedingly difficult to control the expenditure in such large establishments, and therefore whenever concentration could possibly take place, it was highly desirable that it should do so.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU

said, he wished to occupy the attention of the Committee for a very few minutes in the consideration of a subject which he had brought before the House, and pressed upon the Admiralty early in last spring—namely, the establishment of a College of Naval Engineers, not of Naval Architects merely, but of Naval Engineers, for the speech of the noble Lord opposite (Lord Clarence Paget) had furnished him with additional and very strong arguments. The noble Lord had enumerated seven "transitions" in the form and build of ships, during the last five years. In 1859 we built two large ships, the Warrior and the Black Prince. These were armour-plated for only two-thirds of their length, the rest being quite unprotected. They had also proved to be too large and long to turn quickly. The noble Lord said, that to catch a fleet they were very good; but that in action they would be speedily crippled, because they could not manœuvre. The Resistance and Defence were therefore constructed. Next came the Hector and Valiant. These were wholly armour-plated at the gundeck, but were vulnerable at the waterline. At this time the Iron-plate Committee had to be established, to investigate the various problems which crowded upon the attention of the Admiralty. This was a step in the right direction. A body of Naval Engineers would not only undertake the tasks which his hon. Friend (Sir John Hay) now so ably discharged, but many other scientific problems also. Now the Minotaur class was begun, the armour - plates being much thicker. On this ground, these ships were made not less than 6,800 tons. This was a mistaken notion. It was unnecessary; and was the mistake of the Warrior over again. Then the Royal Oak class was begun. After which, as the noble Lord has just now proclaimed, a "new era" was inaugurated. Turret ships came into vogue, the Royal Sovereign was cut down to be converted into a turret ship. The most valuable change, however, had been introduced by Mr. Reed. He saw that his predecessors' ships had been "too large and costly," to use the noble Lord's words, and desired to build smaller ships, which should be "quite safe," because armour-plated throughout. He constructed the Enterprize, the Pallas, and the Bellero-phon. The noble Lord had spoken of "a spur" in the Pallas, and had said that this was an invention which had been "taken from the French." This was hardly a fair description; it was Mr. Reed's invention. Here lay the superiority of Mr. Reed's ships to the Warrior class. The right hon. Baronet (Sir John Pakington) had plumed himself on having built the Warrior with her ends undefended, because he thought that, with a heavy bow and stern, her pitching would be so violent. Now, the Pallas was heavily armour-plated at both bow and stern, yet her bow does not weigh more than the water which it displaces, while the bow of the Warrior weighed (he believed) 600 tons more than the displacement of that part of the ship. Therefore, the criticism of the right hon. Baronet did not apply to the Pallas, which is wholly armed, but falls with full force against the undefended Warrior. The invention of Mr. Reed was this:—The flat floor of the ship was carried right forward to the forefoot, and the bow was much elongated below the load waterline, like the Thames yachts before the tonnage laws had been altered. Hence a vertical section of the bow (in the body plan) was not of the shape of a V, but was more like a U. Therefore, although the Entry was very fine, yet the displacement of the bow was greater in proportion than in the Warrior, and the bow, when coming down upon the water in pitching, met with great resistance to its flat floor in its descent. This was a remarkable yet most simple invention in the science of naval architecture. All these transitions during the short space of five years, and the vast improvements immediately effected by a naval man, surely proved the necessity of establishing some college to educate scientific men for the solution of all the problems which presented themselves with regard to the navy. The noble Lord had said that he would "not have such a college in the Royal dockyards, because that it would then become a Government concern; and he would rather that all the public should enter." To this he (Lord Robert Montagu) utterly objected. He desired a Royal College for the navy, on the model of Woolwich. In the first place, it would be cheaper; there were already suitable buildings in the dockyards, so that expense would be saved in this way; besides, as there were more younger sons desiring to enter some branch of the public service than there were careers open to them, and as there were many men of sufficient means who merely desired some position in society and situation in life for their sons, such a College and body of Naval Engineers could easily be made self-supporting. Such a body, the Committee was aware, had long been established in France. He had explained that to the House last April, when he had also adverted to the effects of it. The French were snatching from us some of the carrying trades and lines of steamers, which we deemed exclusively our own. He need not remind the House again of the English school of naval architecture, from which had proceeded all the men who knew anything of shipbuilding—such men as Reed, Morgan, Creuze, Abethell, Peake, Watts (the designer of the Warrior), Fincham, Chatfield, and others. He need not remind the House of the regret which Sir James Graham had expressed, before his death, at the dissolution of that College, and of the woful deficiency which had been thereby occasioned. He would rather rest on the testimony which the noble Lord's speech had afforded. And he trusted that next year the noble Lord would ask for a Vote somewhat more in proportion to the importance of such an institution.

MR. LAIRD

said, there was one subject in which he had taken particular interest, and to which he desired to direct the particular attention of the Committee — namely, the extension of dock accommodation in Her Majesty's dockyards. He believed that a larger outlay than that contemplated by the Government would ultimately turn out the best economy. The total Estimate in 1861 for the exten- sion and improvement of Chatham Dockyard was £943,000. The works were commenced three years ago after the strongest evidence had been given to the Chatham Committee as to the necessity of an immediate increase of accommodation at that port. Yet the amount already voted did not exceed £88,000, and the Vote proposed for the ensuing year was only £27,000. The Report of the Chatham Committee was drawn up by an hon. Member (Mr. Whitbread) who was then one of the Lords of the Admiralty. It showed that increased dock accommodation and facilities were required at Chatham. One passage from the Report was as follows:— It is obvious that, in the event of this country being engaged in a maritime war, the existing means for fitting out ships, inadequate as they are to even the present wants of the navy, would render it wholly impossible to equip, rapidly and safely, such a fleet as would then he required. Apart from all questions of cost and inconvenience, delay might terminate in disaster; for it must be borne in mind that the facilities for fitting out ships of war rapidly and safely, possessed by other Powers, are incomparably superior to those afforded by the naval establishments of this country. He regretted that so little had been done to carry out the recommendation, and that only £88,000 had been asked for by the Admiralty during the last three years. It might be said that the extension of the dockyards would involve the House in the outlay of large sums of money, but mercantile men knew that they must have tools and conveniences as good as their neighbours. The Chatham Committee examined Admiral Robinson, the Controller of the Navy, who showed that the existing dock accommodation was insufficient, and that it would be real economy to extend it. He would beg permission to read two or three questions and answers from Admiral Robinson's evidence— Do you consider, from your knowledge of the dockyards, that there is at present sufficient dock accommodation for the existing fleet of this country?—No; there certainly is not anything approaching to a sufficient dock accommodation for the requirements of the country; and I do not hesitate to say that I consider it is a national danger that we are incurring, being so badly provided with dock and basin accommodation for our large steam ships. Do you consider that it would be safe to rely upon that one dock at Birkenhead? —By no means; I do not hesitate to say that after a naval engagement the country that can first repair its damaged ships in action will thereby double its force. In such a case, one ship with proper dock and basin accommodation is equivalent to two. At the present moment, I believe that other countries have exactly that power of doubling their force over and above what we possess?—I am sorry to say that it is exactly the reverse at present of what we should wish it to be. That was sufficient to show that the extension of their docks would enable the Admiralty to save a great portion of the sums now spent in repairs. If any further arguments were wanting, let the House look at the Thames, the Mersey, and the Clyde, and observe how many millions had been spent in dock accommodation on those rivers. It would be a judicious expenditure, and would ere long pay itself. When a ship was repaired in the stream every day's work cost double the money compared with repairs in dock, and, though the cost of the docks might be great, the money would be made up by the saving. It was said that private dockyards would supply the necessary dock accommodation in time of war. This, however, was quite a mistake. Merchantmen rarely drew 22 feet of water; the great object was to limit the draught of water to 19 or 20 feet. But a large man-of-war seldom drew less than 26 to 28 feet. Most expensive docks were required for such ships, and such as were not likely to be provided by private individuals. In order to see what was doing across the water, he had lately visited the docks at Toulon, and in the south of France. At Toulon there were two or three docks which would take ships drawing 29 feet of water every day of the year. They would, in fact, take the largest ship of war with all her stores on board. These docks were supplied with coal wharves and other conveniences, in order to enable ships to proceed at once to sea. At Marseilles, too, there were twelve graving docks constructing, some of which would contain the largest vessels. These docks were partly commercial and partly constructed by the Government. He saw one of the largest vessels of war yet built in the floating dock at Marseilles. What had we in the Mediterranean? There was one graving dock at Malta and another was promised. More accommodation was, however, wanted not only in the Mediterranean, but also at Bermuda and Halifax. It was quite clear that if we were at war with America and France, it would never do to bring home vessels that had been in action, to run the gauntlet through the Straits of Gibraltar, or across the Atlantic. There ought to be the means of docking and repairing these ships on the spot; and this outlay, depend upon it, would have to be met at no distant period. The Orlando frigate, lately arrived from the North American station at Chatham, had to unship her guns and stores before she could enter Chatham harbour. The amounts asked for additions to dockyards for the present year were: Chatham, £27,000; Portsmouth, £20,000; Devonport, £7,000; and Keyham, £30,000. If docks existed at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and along the west coast, so that the ships could be docked and promptly repaired, half the navy would do the work. A question had arisen, as to the relative value of wood and iron ships, and the noble Lord had referred to the case of the Alabama. He did not say that all our vessels ought to be of iron, but if the noble Lord wanted vessels for the police of the seas, he could get thirty Alabamas built for less than £2,000,000. There would be, however, between sixty and seventy ships repaired next year, which would cost almost as much as they originally did. An important question was also raised last year as to the value of wooden ships, armour-cased and copper-bottomed. He had heard from the hon. Baronet (Sir Morton Peto) that the iron armour-plates were eaten into by the copper, and that the bottoms were much fouled. He held in his hand a statement, made by one of the first naval architects in France, in reference to La Gloire, which was one of the first of those vessels which the French built and which was docked at Toulon, and he would, with the permission of the House, read that statement. It was as follows:— One of the greatest advantages brought forward in favour of wood was the cleanliness of the bottoms, and it is indisputable as regards ordinary ships' hulls; but in armour-plated ships, that portion of the plating which is below the water-line occasions a galvanic current of such power, that it was remarked when the Gloire was docked a few months since, that the copper was as much covered with barnacles and weeds, as if the hull had been of iron, and that the armour-plating was greatly affected by oxide, and showed holes five or six millimetres (nearly a quarter of an inch) deep in many parts. He had himself gone alongside an iron-plated ship at Toulon, and had observed that the iron plates were eaten into. But it was unnecessary to dwell further on the subject than to mention the case of the Royal Oak, which, after a six months' voyage, had her iron plates so damaged that means had to be taken to restore and refasten them on the ship. Indeed, he had seen by the papers, that armour-plates were to be covered over with teak, with the view of preventing the action to which he referred; but that process would not, he believed, answer the purpose. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: What we are trying is the covering of armour - plates with wood, leaving the wood exposed.] That wood would, of course, foul the same as iron. And what, he would ask, was the case of Her Majesty's ship Orlando? She went out to Halifax, was much shaken in the passage, and had to come home for a complete overhaul, after using up the principal part of the naval stores at Halifax, and then at Bermuda, during the time she was repairing damages. That, however, was not a singular case—it furnished but one instance out of many — and for his own part he thought that these armour-plated wooden ships, if continued to be built, would prove to be the source of very serious expense. The question, he might add, of cupola ships had been raised that evening, and he, for one, thought it a great pity that more strenuous exertions had not been used to complete that class of vessel. If cupola ships should prove a success, it would turn out that we had been expending a great deal of money in another direction very foolishly. From the information he had obtained, the cupola ships were admirably adapted for going to sea, but it now appeared that these vessels were not to be used for that purpose, but were to be kept for harbour defence. It would, he thought, be a great injustice to Captain Coles, as well as a great loss to the country, if their powers in that respect were not put to the test, and he hoped the Government would reconsider the point. He would further observe, that it was a, great mistake to place Captain Coles's ships in the same category as the American iron-clad vessels. They were, he maintained, entirely different, inasmuch as the American vessels were mere rafts, never intended for seagoing purposes. He thought that the Americans, both North and South, deserved great credit for the efforts they had made to improve this class of vessels. He thought the Government ought to try whether the heaviest class of guns could not be worked on board vessels built on Captain Coles's principle. If he were mistaken in his views with respect to the excellence of Captain Coles's plan, he should only have fallen into the same error as a great many others; but it was, he thought, at all events, the duty of the Government to test the invention, and, if it answered, to go on with it; if not, to try something else. They heard a good deal about Mr. Reed's new system of ships. Mr. Reed was a very clever man, and might do all he had promised, though that remained to be seen. Mr. Reed had delivered a lecture on the construction of ships in which, though he admitted that great mistakes had been committed, he contended that the Admiralty were not to be blamed. There were several vessels being built on Mr. Reed's plan—the Bellerophon, the Lord Warden, the Lord Clyde, the Zealous, the Favourite, the Pallas, the Enterprise, and the Research; and he trusted that gentleman might be able to do all that he expected; but he thought further experiments should be made before the country was committed to further expense. His own opinion was, that we had large armour-plated ships enough, and that what we required was a smaller class of vessels of that description, so that in the event of war breaking out we should have ships of all classes to go to sea with, and be prepared to meet any emergency. He hoped before proceeding with so many ships upon new and untried plans, the Government would test by experiment whether they could work guns of sixteen or twenty-two tons, not in the harbour, but in the open sea, otherwise they would have gone to enormous expense, perhaps, only to end in failure.

MR. C. P. BERKELEY

said, that with regard to the number of men that had been voted a good deal had been said. It appeared to him that the reduction was merely nominal. In fact, if the Admiralty succeeded in getting the whole number now asked for they would in reality be in excess of the number upon our ships books, at any period during the last financial year. With regard to the vacancies in the coastguard, he wished to be informed whether they existed in the bonâ, fide service ashore, or in the coast-guard afloat. He wished to know in what branch of the service the difficulty of filling up the vacancies existed. [Mr. STANSFELD: In the coast-guard ships.] He was glad to hear that it did not exist in the service ashore, where the bonâ fidequalified men were engaged. There was one item of these Estimates to which he desired to call attention. It was spread over many Votes, in no less than thirty places, and amounted to £15,000 odd, namely, the sum paid for the temporary employment of clerks and writers. It was rather on the increase; but he had no doubt it could be explained by the large number of Returns and documents called for by hon. Members of that House. The present system bore hard upon the temporary clerks. Many of them were able men, but from the fact of their sticking to their work and not having time to cram, they were placed in an unfavourable position for passing the examination required for a permanent clerkship. He wished to say a word or two with regard to the annual account relating to the expense of ships. It appeared that there were two ships that were in last year's annual account, and which had disappeared altogether from this year's annual account. He could find no trace of them, and he would like some information upon the subject. In the Appendix to these Estimates was an account of "Old Naval Store Money, and extra Receipts brought to account between the 1st April, 1862 and the 31st March, 1863." Among the items were two for the sale of old ships amounting to £73,000. This required explanation. It appeared to him that a considerable number of the vessels rendered in the account this year were also returned in last year's statement. The first ship, the Africa, was sold to the Chinese Government for the sum of £22,800. That was brought to account in this year's statement; but a similar sum was placed in last year's statement. He fancied that the solution of this mystery was to be found in the fact that last year's account was made up from the 1st January to the 31st December, 1862, but this year the statement was made up from the 1st April, 1862, to the 31st March, 1863, thereby including nine months' receipts which were accounted for in the statement of last year. If that was the case, the Admiralty had paid twice to the Exchequer a sum of about £23,000, which they must try to get refunded.

MR. KINNAIRD

said, he was anxious to say a word in support of the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird), who dwelt on the importance of improving our docks and increasing their number abroad. The French Government were at this moment engaged in building very large docks in Algeria, and it was very important in the event of war, that such docks as the hon. Member had recommended should be built. The question was one to which the attention of the Government ought to be directed. With regard to the subject upon which the hon. Baronet the Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto) had spoken, he (Mr. Kinnaird) was one of those who had supported the hon. Gentleman in bringing the attention of the late Sir George Lewis to the fearful moral contagion surrounding our barracks and dockyards. They were all greatly indebted to the hon. Baronet for the way in which he had brought to the notice of the Government this most painful, but necessary subject. He held in his had a Report of the Commission presided over by the hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), and hon. Gentlemen would find that the state of things described in that Report would justify the interference of Her Majesty's Government. The noble Lord would be entitled to the commendation of his hon. Friend, if, as he believed, he was prepared to submit to the House some remedial measures at a later period of the Session. The Commander-in-Chief was fully aware of the importance of the subject, and was quite ready to co-operate with the Admiralty in some remedial measure. He trusted that the observations which had fallen from the noble Lord on this point would soon be followed by some legislative enactment.

COLONEL DICKSON

confessed he did not regard the present Estimates with any great degree of satisfaction, and was inclined to agree with the hon. Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto) that, stripped of the oratorical tactics of the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty, it would be found that these Estimates exhibited reductions in a direction likely to interfere with the efficiency of the service. The Government could only point to having built seven ships, and in that department in which so many anticipations of economy had been vaunted on the accession of the Junior Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Stansfeld) to office, there had been an increase of expenditure. He rose principally to do justice to the noblest ship in the navy — the Prince Consort. There seemed to be an opinion that she was nearly lost on a recent trip; but she proved, on the contrary, to be in every way a most complete success. She started at a sudden notice and fell in with a violent gale, and she steamed eight knots an hour in the teeth of it. She shipped some water, but he was told that she behaved as nobly as any ship possibly could, and he thought it right to make this statement in justice to the ship and her gallant captain.

MR. H. BERKELEY

gave notice that upon the House going again into Committee on the Navy Estimates he would call attention to the defective state of the armament of the Royal Navy.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

expressed his satisfaction that the Government admitted the importance of the subject of docks, and were willing to try the principle of the twin screw. With regard to the latter, he believed that the twin screw would be the means of getting over that unwieldiness and impracticability which were incidental to long ships. He complained, however, that the Government did not deal with the dock difficulty in a comprehensive manner. Whilst the French could dock at Marseilles, Algiers, and other places, we were confined to Malta, with respect to which the most conflicting statements were made. He understood that it had been in some degree improved; but it could not be improved much. He saw nothing in the Estimates with respect to a naval college. At present, young men who were being brought up to the naval service were cooped up in a ship where, he believed, more sickness prevailed than in any school in Her Majesty's dominions. It was a crying disgrace to bring up the naval youth of the country in such a way, at an age when their forms were liable to be contracted by living in a confined space. With respect to naval barracks, he did not observe that any progress was being made on that point. It would be perfectly easy, until the final system was adopted, to fit up temporary buildings for the accommodation of men when ships were paid off. It was a sad spectacle when a ship came into harbour, with a crew perfectly fit for sea service again if they were only kept together, to see the ship pulled to pieces, the men paid off and dispersed, rendering it difficult for them to find their proper position again. The officers, after great pains in bringing the machine as it were to perfection, were scattered in every direction, and when a ship was commissioned, all the work of disciplining the crew had to be begun over again; and then, when her commission was over, everything was torn to pieces again. The cost to the country of such an absurd system was enormous. The Government provided huts for the army, and they might provide temporary barracks for seamen at the different ports. As to Captain Cowper Coles—although no one, perhaps, would ever know the history of his invention—he had provided a plan which produced easiness of motion and speed, while carrying guns so high out of the water as to give a greater radius of fire than any other mode with which they were acquainted. It was the duty of the Government to have made Captain Coles laid down a complete plan of a cupola ship, and to have finished a ship upon the plan so given, so as to test that principle. No one knew what the primary principle of the cupola was, and no American iron-clad had brought that principle into operation. He protested against the reduction of men, and still more against the reduction of boys, because it was cutting off the best source of supplying able seamen. He hoped sufficient money would be taken to remove all the just grounds of complaint which were now felt by naval officers. As an instance, the Admiralty stopped £5 a year from the wardroom officers for the use of the mess traps. The cost of those traps was £120, and in two years the Government made a clear gain of £146, which he thought a sufficiently Hebrew transaction to make the officers grumble. He believed that unless a considerable addition was made to the pay of the officers, the injustice from which they suffered would not be obviated.

LORD FERMOY

said, he would not advocate anything which would press unfairly on the tax payers; but a distinguished Admiral had said that increased dock accommodation would enable one ship to do the duty of two, and that assertion was endorsed by one of our moat distinguished shipbuilders, the hon. Member for Birkenhead. If that were so, the expenditure would be a relief not a burden to the taxpayers. Economically speaking, it was the right thing to spend money on dock accommodation in the West Indies and the Mediterranean, and he begged to direct the attention of the Admiralty to the claims of Cork. Man had done nothing, but nature had done everything for the harbour of Cork. After storms he had seen the ships of Her Majesty's navy in that harbour of refuge, and he had seen them towed away to be repaired and refitted in one of the dockyards, because there were no means to effect those repairs, as there ought to be, in the harbour itself. At Hawlbowline docks could be constructed with ease, which would accommodate the largest ships of war. In time of war such accommodation would be invaluable, both to the Royal Navy and to the merchant service; and something, in his opinion, ought to be done.

CAPTAIN TALBOT

expressed his gratification at having heard the speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird), and he entreated the Committee to think seriously of the question of dockyards and basins; for upon it the safety of the country was involved to a greater extent than many hon. Members imagined. If an action were to take place in the Channel, there were no means of affording the dock accommodation which the fleet would inevitably require, whilst a French fleet could find everything necessary at Cherbourg. Two or three years ago a Committee sat, and they recommended the expenditure of about£1,000,000 in the extension of Chatham dockyard, but the Votes proposed by the Government were wholly inadequate for the purpose. Last year only £22,000 was voted for that object. The present year the sum was increased to £27,000. Portsmouth had still greater claims upon the Government, for it might be called the eye of England to watch France, as Cherbourg was the eye of France watching this country. The improvement of Portsmouth dock would be really sound economy, and would prove of immense advantage to the navy, yet they only proposed to lay out £33,000 for Portsmouth. He contended, that even as a question of economy, more money should be spent in this direction. Beyond this there was the still more important question of efficiency. As to Captain Coles's ships, it seemed to him extraordinary that they should not have a fair trial. Before they expended an enormous sum of money in building ships, they should know whether they would or not succeed. The Northumberland class of ships showed the importance of having proper experiments; for it seemed that the Admiralty ordered three ships to be constructed, and after they had gone so far that they could not recede, they tried experiments. He must express his regret that it had been resolved to make a reduction of the number of boys for the navy, because it had been found that the best sailors were those who had been trained in the service; and it seemed to him that the decreased expenditure was proposed to be effected upon wrong items.

MR. STANSFELD

explained that why they proposed to spend only £27,000 upon Chatham extension was, that the tidal work could not be finished before another year, and therefore the sum they asked for was all that could be beneficially expended during the present year. As to the double entry of balances which had been referred to, it had arisen simply from one quarter's accounts having been repeated in the second statement. He was anxious to give a full explanation to the House in regard to the accounts and general organization of labour in the dockyards, but could not enter upon the question at that hour of the night. He would, therefore, defer his observations to a more convenient opportunity.

MR. LINDSAY

said, if a single Vote were taken, the discussion on the general question must close. He therefore begged to move that the Chairman report Progress.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Chairman do report Progress, and ask leave to sit again."

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

said, all the subjects to be discussed were in subsequent Votes; they only to-night asked a Vote for men, and on that the discussion had virtually closed.

MR. C. P. BERKELEY

said, the question which he had asked applied to the present Vote; and perhaps the hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) could give an explanation about it when the House met again. There was an error in the matter.

MR. STANSFELD

said, there was no error.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

hoped the Committee would agree to the Vote. This was a Vote for men, and questions about dockyards could only arise when the Votes on the subject came before the House. If an hon. Member should be going into a discussion on matters which belonged to a subsequent Vote, he hoped the Chairman would call him to order. [Ironical Laughter.]

Question put.

The Committee divided:—Ayes 31; Noes 28: Majority 3.

House resumed.

Committee report Progress; to sit again To-morrow.