OUR NAVAL FORCE.—RESOLUTION. (Hansard, 25 February 1864)

§ SIR JOHN WALSH
rose to call the attention of the House to the inadequacy of our state of naval preparation to the present exigencies of political affairs; and to move that, in the opinion of this House, the great changes in naval warfare, and the critical state of our foreign relations, require the most vigorous and immediate national efforts, on a scale calculated to maintain the maritime supremacy of England. Sir, the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty appeared to assume that no other Motion would be interposed to prevent you, Sir, from leaving the chair, so that the House might be enabled in Committee to hear the able and interesting statement which he will, I have no doubt, make in bringing the Navy Estimates under our consideration. I regret very much, however, that I must disappoint that expectation. A due consideration of the subject induced me to place the notice of Motion on the paper, and I feel the subject 'o be very important, and I am impelled by so strong a sense of duty to call the 1089 attention of the House to this subject, that even the wish I have to accommodate him, and to facilitate the progress of public business, cannot induce me to remain silent upon this occasion. I must say, that I do not approve of these Estimates—not because I object to any of their special details —not, for instance, because I think that the dock at Malta will not afford the accommodation that is desirable for the repairs of ships—but on much larger grounds of public policy, which lead me to believe that these Estimates are totally inadequate to the emergency for which we are now called upon to provide. The first observation that suggests itself to my mind in perusing them is, that they afford a stereotyped sample of the policy which has prevailed in this country for the last thirty years—that they are a repetition of a policy which was formerly advocated under totally different circumstances, that they bear no relation to our present position, and that they, therefore, have a primâ facie aspect of being unsuited to the attainment of the very object for which they have been framed. With the exception of the short but costly episode of a Crimean war, we had happily for a period of fifty years enjoyed a state of profound peace; and I fear that that long period of repose has made us altogether oblivious of the stern necessities which war may one day impose upon us. I fear that it has made us look upon any provision for war as a provision for a remote contingency, which, in our time at all events, is unlikely to arise. There are in this country and in this House gentlemen of great ability, and, as far as I am able to ascertain, of no doubtful sanity, who have gone the length of believing that no war would ever again arise on the face of the globe. I do not think their views meet with any general acceptance on the part of the House; but, coming as they do from gentlemen of great ability and energy, capable of urging their extraordinary paradoxes with consummate eloquence and skill, I think that they have produced a sensible effect on the policy of this country during the last quarter of a century. I do not, however, at all wish to question our past policy. I do not wish to question the wisdom of that economical spirit which has prevailed among us for so many years It has no doubt been productive of many beneficial effects; and I think also that it was very well suited to that for which it was adopted. I believe that for a considerable period there was 1090 really no appearance of war; Europe enjoyed the most profound tranquillity; and it would have been injudicious and improper to have taxed our resources by any great preparations against an evil which was so unlikely to arise as an European struggle in which we should be engaged. But the state of things is now changed, and it seems to me that these Estimates are framed without reference to this change of circumstances. I find that these Estimates contain a considerable reduction upon those of last year; and the contrast when compared with those of the previous year is still more remarkable. I cannot doubt, and the House will hardly doubt that, under such circumstances as the war in Denmark and the disturbances in America in the Confederate States—in such a threatening conjuncture — special care ought to be taken to provide for our safety. I cannot think that the course taken has been a wise one. I cannot bring myself to believe that the state of peace which has existed so long is likely to last much longer. I cannot blind myself to that menacing and lowering picture of the future which appears to be hanging over us, and I cannot think it wise to bring forward Estimates on the present occasion which have no reference to the special state of things. If the Estimates for the present year be proper, the Estimates of previous years must have been extravagant and burdensome. Now, Sir, the peace of Europe has now existed for fifty years, and has existed mainly from three causes, every one of which has now ceased to operate. First, there was the great exhaustion of Europe after the wars of the Revolution and of the Empire. War had swept from Paris to Moscow, and back again from Moscow to Paris. War had overturned every Government, and had devastated every hearth, and had created misery and privation throughout Europe, and the exhausted and tired peoples, as well as Governments, were in a state of weariness and alarm which made them willing to return to a state of peace. This continued for a long time; but it happens, unfortunately, that the martial instincts of mankind have again revived, and the lessons of this experience have been forgotten by those ignorant of the miseries of those times. There is again a restlessness among the populations of Europe, which seem to be inciting their rulers to fresh acts of ambition. There was formerly existing that most unpopular alliance — I 1091 mean what was called the Holy Alliance— of which I can never be the advocate or apologist. I consider, as every Englishman must, that it was a dangerous league against the liberty of the nations and of mankind. But still it had one redeeming feature. The sovereigns who composed that league entered into various and binding engagements with each other, that they would abandon all object of territorial aggrandizement whatever. They knew well that the very moment that any of them stepped beyond the limitations of the Treaty of Vienna, that that very instant they would destroy that alliance, and that their object would be defeated. They determined to make no war except against revolutions. They maintained these engagements and principles for a very long time; and, I must say, though not favouring them, that their mutual conduct and engagements was one great foundation of the long continued peace which existed in Europe, and which was preserved till the Emperor of Russia broke it in his attack upon Turkey. From that time the alliance has ceased to exist, the desire for territorial aggrandizement has been excited, and various Sovereigns and nations have been seeking how they could extend their boundaries and annex fresh provinces. The effect of that movement may be seen in the north of Germany at the present time. Another of the grounds on which the peace of Europe rested was the cordial understanding, and perhaps I might say the virtual alliance, between England and France which followed the accession of Louis Philippe; for it must be admitted that the Bourbons, much as they owed to us, were not by any means friendly to the English people. Louis Philippe was a sagacious monarch, and, I believe, was well inclined to us; and, in spite of the events connected with the events of 1840 associated with Mehemet Ali—in spite of the troubles at Tahiti in connection with the case of Mr. Pritchard, and in spite of the affair of the Spanish marriages—there was a co-operation for mutual purposes which existed during the whole of the reign of Louis Philippe. But when the Emperor Napoleon succeeded to the rule of France, that alliance received a fresh impulse— the Emperor was moved by a still greater desire to promote and strengthen that alliance. The Emperor Napoleon had, I really believe, personal esteem and affection for the English people—at any rate he endeavoured to mark such a sentiment in every 1092 possible manner. Whether we look to the royal alliance which he maintained with us through the whole of the Crimean war; whether we look to the forbearance which he showed in the time of our difficulties and perils in the Indian mutiny; whether we look to his relaxation, in the case of Englishmen, of that obnoxious system of passports which was so peculiarly repugnant to our feelings; whether we look to the commercial treaty which he, with that iron will which he has inherited with his mighty name, has secured, and which no other power in France could have carried out, and which he has fulfilled loyally, completely, and effectually—we find emphatically that in his conduct towards Englishmen individually, and the English nation, he has shown himself anxious to fortify the English alliance. I must express my extreme regret that that good understanding and cordial feeling has been destroyed by what I must consider the most uncourteous proceedings of the noble Lord now at the head of the Foreign Office. On three occasions he has thought it proper to repulse and rebuff the overtures of the Emperor for concerted action, in the case of Mexico, in the case of the Confederate States of America, and in the proposal for a Congress. I will not go into the matter, but I will say that while there were great difficulties in the way of the proposition for a Congress, at the same time I will say that England would have risked little, under proper modifications and limitations, in consenting to that Congress, and I think it might, under proper conditions and qualifications, have prevented or delayed the outbreak in Northern Europe; and I believe the rejection of this proposition, and the manner of the rejection, have inflicted a deep wound on the sensibility of the Emperor Napoleon, and I believe I am correct in stating that the proposal was rejected in a manner pointedly offensive to himself. Under such circumstances we now find that all the securities upon which the peace of Europe has rested for fifty years have been swept away. Now, Sir, I come to the pie-sent state of things. I must now deal with a totally different state of things. We must consider the risks that we now have to run, and the complications that are before us, and at the same time we must consider the means we have to meet them. If we wish for peace, it is necessary that we should be strong. If unhappily war should break out in Europe, if we succeed in preserving our neutrality, it will be necessary 1093 that the neutrality should be armed and powerful, and that it should be almost as extensive and as complete in preparation as if we were engaged in actual war. Whatever may be the prospects of the future, I feel convinced that we are at present in a crisis of our affairs which renders it necessary that England should buckle on her armour, and show herself prepared for war; that England should show that she does not hold out the hand of fellowship in time of peace, and withdraw it when times of peril arise; that England should show herself ready to vindicate her honourand redeem the pledges given by her to other nations. I see nothing in these Estimates to indicate any sense of this state of things. I see nothing in them different from those which have been brought forward for several successive years. Now, Sir, what is the state of the navy? Why, for the time, we are almost disarmed. Most Members of this House will recollect that noble passage in a speech of Mr. Canning at Devonport, when he had been looking upon the three-deckers and other huge vessels which crowded the Hamoaze, and drew a comparison between one of these three-deckers, lying majestically upon those waters, and the sleeping life and power of England. I do not remember his exact words, but the argument that he used was that, as he gazed upon the grand vessel then calmly floating on the water, but which could, if occasion arose, put on all the pride and power and panoply of war, and become instinct with life and motion— in all this they might see an emblem of the power of England. Nor was this, then, a mere figure of speech. At that time the boast was founded in fact. If they had gone then to Portsmouth or Sheerness, to the Medway or to Pembroke, they would have found long lines of these great vessels —three-deckers, two-deckers, frigates, and corvettes, laid up in ordinary, but very capable of being called into action in a very short time. At that time there existed an immense reserve strength which cost scarcely any money, which was a cheap defence, while, if any emergency arose, in a few months these vessels could be fitted out, they merely needed to have seamen put into them, and the country would speedily have been in a state of defence. If such a condition of things had existed now, I should not have interfered to prevent the statement of the noble Lord; but this is not the case now. Since then we have made great progress in these 1094 matters, and all these noble ships have ceased to be a source of strength to us. The first change was when screw vessels succeeded sailing vessels. That was an immense change, which rendered all these ships in ordinary useless. That necessitated a corresponding change on our part, and it is to the eternal honour of the right hon. Member for Droitwitch (Sir John Pakington), that he led the way in that great alteration— that he felt and acted on the conviction that it was necessary to alter the system then prevalent, and to set afloat a powerful screw navy, so that in the course of the Crimean war our screw ships maintained the honour of our flag, and England was still dominant over all the seas of the world. But since that time science has made great progress. No sooner had the task of the right hon. Gentleman been performed, when fresh improvements took place. Great improvements had been effected in the screw ships, but they were now rendered as useless as sailing ships had been rendered before. The fact is that two great changes had sprung up in naval warfare within very few years: one was the construction of armour-plated ships, the other was the fabrication of a new kind of shell, which possessed the power of igniting a wooden ship, and which could be directed with great effect even against armour-plated vessels. Thus the wooden navy was rendered useless. The hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden), whom I do not see now in his place, made one of those luminous and perspicuous statements which always fix themselves in the memories of those who hear them, in the course of last year; and one of his arguments was that to put our seamen and marines into wooden ships would be an act of absolute cruelty, and a wanton waste of the lives of brave men, where their courage and their skill could no longer avail them. From this the hon. Gentleman argued that we must give up wooden vessels altogether. Assuming this to be correct, I think the hon. Member was successful in establishing that part of his argument, though I do not think he was so successful in the second portion, in which, because these ships were useless, he proposed to pay off our 70,000 seamen and marines and to have no navy at all. There I should join issue with the hon. Gentleman. I say, Sir, that England should accommodate her navy to these changes. I say that England ought to maintain her position among the nations of the earth by making fresh 1095 efforts to keep pace with every improvement in science and naval construction; and I say further, that England has perfect power to do so, owing to the facilities we possess in the possession of all the necessary materials. If we possessed peculiar facilities for the construction of wooden vessels, we possess them in a still greater degree for the construction of iron vessels. England possesses iron and machinery in abundance, and her artisans and engineers are unequalled in the world; so that Confederates, Turks, men of all nations, indeed, come to this country for iron ships, and there is no difficulty in building them here. So far from these improvements tending to the decay of the naval supremacy of England, they should rather tend to enhance her supremacy; and, under these new conditions, she ought to be more powerful than she has ever been at any previous period of her history. All that is wanting is that England should take advantage of these opportunities. What England requires is the creation of an iron-plated navy. But the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, if he does me the honour to reply to my observations, will no doubt say, "Well, that is just what we are doing—precisely what we are carrying out. We do not want the hon. Baronet to tell us that. We are building these ships; we are creating this ironclad navy; and really the hon. Baronet is only preventing me from stating all that the Government is doing in this praiseworthy direction." To a certain degree that is true: at the rate we are going on, in ten, fifteen, or twenty years we shall be a very respectable naval Power. But, Sir, we cannot wait ten, fifteen, or twenty years. We require to be a very good naval Power now, or very shortly. The Emperor Napoleon once said of the Austrians that they never knew the value of time in military operations. Time was quite as important in naval operations. It is quite as necessary, if we are to have a powerful fleet at all, that we should have that powerful fleet now, as it ever was that the Archduke Charles should march a certain number of miles in a shorter time than he did. I think I heard from the opposite side of the House a hon. Gentleman (Colonel Sykes) say a little time ago that our present steam navy was so powerful that we are an overmatch for any two nations on the face of the globe. ["Hear, hear!"] I daresay, supposing we had a quarrel with France and America, that the hon. Gentleman 1096 who made that assertion might be correct in this sense—that if we sent a challenge to France and America, and proposed to fight a duel off Ushant, for instance, it is possible we might produce a greater number of ships and be stronger than those two nations put together. I will assume, for the sake of argument, that that statement is correct; but I want to know if that is sufficient, considering all that England has to defend, and considering the position in the scale of nations that England has to occupy? Supposing, likewise, for the sake of argument, that we were involved shortly in some great maritime war. Well, Sir, I will ask the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty how many fleets should we require to maintain the honour of our flag, to support our interests, and to guard our commerce in all parts of the world? I think, supposing we were at war, that we should want a very good fleet in the West Indies. I have rather the idea that it would not be prudent altogether to leave the Pacific without a very efficient squadron. It appears to me that the Indian seas, the Indian Archipelago, and our communications with cur Indian Empire, would, under those circumstances, require a very large and powerful fleet. I am quite sure that in the Mediterranean it would be absolutely necessary that we should have a very powerful force; and I think it would scarcely be disputed that, after all these deductions have been made, after all these points of weakness had been defended, it will still be necessary that England should have full and undisputed command of the Channel. Now, I wish that the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty and the hon. Gentleman who chooses to entertain that strong opinion, would be kind enough to say whether, after all these necessities have been attended to, and England has guarded herself in all those points which are absolutely requisite, they still think that the present amount of ships is sufficient to meet every possible requirement for a state of war. Of course, if we remain at peace it will be very well. If these ships are only sent to cruise about the Channel in terrorem there is no occasion to argue the subject; but I am assuming the possibility of a state of war, and that is a possibility which, I think, in discussing a subject of this kind, we ought to assume. I confess I look at this state of things with great alarm. It is not now so chimerical a supposition 1097 that we may be engaged very soon in a state of war; and it is impossible, when a war is once kindled in Europe, to predict where it will stop and what nations it may involve, and therefore to foresee in what circumstances England may shortly be placed. Then I say this contingency ought not to take us by surprise. We ought not to look back to the past, and because we have had half a century of peace to suppose that we shall have half a century of peace to come. Now is the time to exert ourselves, to take time by the forelock, and to place our naval power upon the same footing in these altered conditions that it formerly occupied. It is a mere question of money. I know that money is a very sensitive point in this House. I know that economy has been so popular, and so long popular, and that hon. Members have stood upon the hustings, and used that cry until they have become so accustomed to utter it that I believe it will be just like Reform—hon. Members will be going on talking of economy here long after economy has ceased to be popular out of doors. I do not oppose a wise economy; but I say it would be an eternal disgrace to England, if by a mere petty, paltry looking at details, at expenditure, she should suffer the trident of the ocean to slip from her grasp. The question is—Are these iron-clads necessary or not? Can we do without them? Can we be a naval Power without them? Is the hon. Member for Rochdale right in supposing that wooden ships are entirely superseded? Is our reliance for the future to be upon these ironclad ships, and upon upon them alone? If it is, then I say we have not half sufficient—we have not a quarter sufficient. We have a few fine ships, but I cannot help having some apprehension that in this direction we have almost outgone the proper limits. I have sometimes feared that these very large ships, which draw a large quantity of water, may be found practically inconvenient—that they will not be able to enter ports, or pass through straits which other ships can enter and pass through; and they will not be able to approach shores which an enemy may invade by being adapted to sail in shallower water. But, of course, upon such a subject it would be presumptuous in me to offer an opinion; but I am quite sure of this, that although we may require a great number of these very large ships, which will replace what were our great three-deckers, you will want a great many other ships of a similar character and 1098 size, corresponding to our old frigates, our old corvettes, our old seventy-fours and two-deckers. Where are they? Where are all those ships which will be absolutely necessary in a naval war to protect our commerce and spread their wings over the whole world? Where are they, I ask? Do they exist; or are they still in the dockyards in course of construction, or are they still in unknown space? I say that if these Estimates were doubled, we should not do more than meet the exigencies of the present year. The noble Lord at the head of the Government came down two or three years ago, and made an admirable statement, and induced us to vote £12,000,000 or £13,000,000 for naval fortifications. Sir, I gave the noble Lord a very cordial support on that occasion. I felt that coming from him such an appeal could not for a moment be resisted. I have sometimes feared whether the noble Lord is not extending his fortifications a little too widely, and whether they might not be liable to share the fate of the Dannewerke, which fell because there was not a sufficient number of men to defend it. I hope that that apprehension may not be realized; but I say that if you lay out £12,000,000 sterling upon fortifications, it is a great deal more necessary to lay out £10,000,000, or £12,000,000in constructing ships. Ships can defend fortifications, and fortifications may be of no use without ships. The first point is to create your navy, and the second to defend it. Now, I do think that this is a state of things which requires the most serious attention of the country. My right hon. Friend the Member for Buckinghamshire has been very anxious to obtain the papers on the Danish Question. I must say that I have not shared at all in that anxiety, because I know perfectly well that all that protocols, all that despatches, all that protests, and all that remonstrances can effect has been effected by the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Affairs. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Affairs is a great master of brave words, and I have no doubt that there has not been any deficiency in the supply of that article; but I am quite sure that his negotiations have failed, and I am quite sure that his negotiations will fail so long as there exists throughout Europe and the world at large the belief that England is no longer strong, and that England has no longer the public spirit to remedy the deficiency. It is in the hope that the few words I have been 1099 permitted to utter may awaken some feeling to the dangers to which we are exposed by this supineness, and the critical state of our naval defence at the present hour, that I have ventured to interpose these short observations before you, Sir, leave the chair.

§ COLONEL SYKES
would repeat, that our navy, both in ships, armament, and manning, were competent to encounter all the navies of the world combined. That was his deliberate opinion after going through all the facts, and if he bad any complaint to make it was, that the Government had rather overdone than underdone their duty in regard to the expenditure upon the navy in the present Estimates. Every year some "bugaboo" was put forward, some kind of bête noire, as an excuse for increasing the fleet. Every year the House was told that the dimensions which the French fleet was acquiring would sweep British vessels off the ocean. He would prove to the House that this was an utter fallacy; and he' would do so from the French official statements, the naval Budget for 1864 laid before the Legislative Chambers of France, and a copy of which was then in his possession, and which Budget greatly excelled our own in clearness, notwithstanding the improvements introduced this year by the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, and his hon. Friend the junior Lord. The British navy consisted of 592 vessels, of which 506 were steam afloat, and 86 sailing ships also afloat, and 38 steamships were building; total 630. According to the Report of the French Minister of Marine, the French had 214 vessels in all, of which 131 were propelled by steam, 81 being screw vessels and 57 paddle. Of the British 56 were steamships of the line, frigates 51, block-ships 9, corvettes 26, sloops 35, gun-vessels 47, gunboats 143, and some smaller vessels, making the total 506, besides 65 mortar sailing vessels, 12 frigates, and 1100 2 of the line, and sloops, making 86. Among the screw steamers in the French navy there was only one first rate, with a complement of 32 officers and 1,138 men, and 11 of smaller rates, 6 of which had a complement of 713 men each, 6 frigates of all rates, two corvettes, 33 despatch boats from 15 to 250 horse power, 18 gun-vessels, and 10 armed transports, of from 200 to 1,200 tons. Of paddle-wheel steamers there was only one frigate of 400 horse power, five corvettes of 500 horse power, and 50 despatch boats of from 60 to 220 horse power. Of sailing vessels the French had 50, the largest of which was a fourth-rate, 3 transport frigates, and 17 sailing transports, of which the largest was but 800 tons, with a complement of 110 men, which, of course, would not compare with the Himalaya and vessels of that class. Then, of armour - cased ships the British had 20. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: 25.] Well, he was glad to hear it. But the French had only 6 experimental screw frigates and corvettes, with 10 reserve ships and 10 frigates. It might be urged that the number of ships merely was an inadequate test; but be was prepared to follow out the comparison. Coming to the question of crews, he found that the English navy for the present year consisted of 53,000 seamen, including 7,000 boys and 7,800 coastguards; these, with 18,000 marines, made a total of 71,000. The crews of the French navy afloat, including officers, sailors, and marines, amounted to 28,881, and adding the 1,592 officers, or Etât Major, as they called it, there was a total of but 30,473, in which 1,710 boys were included. But 71,000 men and boys were not the whole number available for manning the British fleet, for, including the Naval Reserve, the total number was 85,163. The French had on shore a reserve of 4,160 marines. We had also 38 vessels building, 21 of which were in the dockyards, 17 of which were being built by contract, and 8 of which had been launched. The British navy this year would cost £10,432,610. The French navy last year cost £5,975,337, and this year it would cost £6,141,695, the increase being only about £160,358, or not half the price of a single iron-clad. He thought he had now shown that there was some foundation for the statement he had made, that we really were in a condition, taking our vessels afloat, our vessels ready, our vessels ready for launching, and our 1101 vessels building, to meet the combined navies of the world.

§ MR. C. C. CLIFFORD
said, he had met the other day with a passage in an old author which he read with so much interest that he could not forbear from inflicting it upon the House. Lord Coke, speaking of the English ships of war of his time, said— To conclude, the King of England's Navy doth excell the shipping of all other Foreign Kings and Princes; for if you respect beautiful statelinesse, or stately beauty, they are so many large and spacious kingly and princely palaces. If you regard strength and defence, they are so many moving impregnable Castles and Barbicans, and were termed of old the Walls of the Realm. When our English Navy is among the ships of other nations, it is like lions inter pecora campi, and like a falcon inter phasianos, perdices, et alia volatilia timida cœeli. No doubt the description that the ships of war of that day were for strength, like castles and barbicans, was equally applicable to the ships of the King of Spain, which were quite as large and splendid. But these immense ships that struck all mankind by their beauty were no longer applicable to naval warfare, and had been of late more properly entitled "slaughter-boxes." He trusted that no expense would be spared by the Admiralty in adopting the latest improvements in science. They ought also, he thought, to turn their attention to the building of a small description of ships. He was glad to Bee that the deficiency pointed out by Admiral Denman, as to the necessity of new docks at Portsmouth, would be remedied. In the event of an engagement at sea, our fleet would have been at a great disadvantage, but with our present navy and the new forts, and with sufficient dock accommodation at Portsmouth, if we were called upon to undertake a naval war, he, for one, should have no fear for the maritime supremacy of England.