HC Deb 09 February 1864 vol 173 cc335-424
MR. BUXTON,

in rising to move the Resolution of which he had given notice, That this House, while only imputing to Admiral Kuper a misconception of the duty imposed on him, deeply regrets the burning of the town of Kagosima, as being contrary to those usages of war which prevail among civilized nations, and to which it is the duty and policy of this country to adhere, said, he had two objects in view in bringing this Motion before the House. There could be no doubt that in the eyes of foreign nations the character of England for humanity had greatly suffered by the act in question. It had created a very great sensation abroad, and especially in Holland, on account of the connection of that country with Japan; and, as an American gentleman observed to a friend of his, "when an outcry is made by England about the inhumanity of other nations, we must stop her mouth by the one word 'Kagosima.'" His hope was that the House of Commons would take the opportunity he now afforded it of declaring that, whatever rash things might be done by our officers in any part of the world, it was the deliberate resolve of England to treat other nations, whether weak or strong, barbarous or civilized, with unfailing forbearance and humanity. His other object was of still greater importance. Unless this burning of Kagosima, assuming it to have been purposely done, unless repudiated by Parliament, might become a precedent—a most disastrous precedent—too easily followed, if not by ourselves, still by others, in future wars. The events of the last few years, especially in America, showed that there was some risk that the humane usages by which the harshness of war was restrained, and which had almost become universal, might be set aside so often as to retain but a slight hold over men's passions when roused by war. When the passions of men were roused the temptation to use violence was so great, and men would readily catch at the example of such a country as England. Should Parliament not repudiate the burning of Kagosima, England would have taken the lead in flinging these restrictions to the winds. What he mainly desired was that, instead of allowing this occurrence to be thus misused, we should take occasion from it to declare our unfailing adhesion to those usages of war by which its cruelties are held in check, and to make our officers understand beyond the possibility of a mistake, what were the bounds over which their zeal must in no case carry them. It did not fall within the scope of his purpose to assail Admiral Kuper. Many of his hon. Friends who thought as he did on the burning of Kagosima, considered it a piece of weakness on his part to acquit Admiral Kuper. They were inclined to say to him, as Angelo said to Isabella— Condemn the fault, and not the actor of it! Why, every fault's condemned ere it be done; Ours were the very cipher of a function, To fine the fault whose fine stands in record, And let go by the actor! Unless he was much mistaken, he should be able beyond denial to demonstrate that Admiral Kuper shelled the town of Kagosima on purpose. That act could only be explained in one or other of two ways. Either it was a piece of cold-blooded cruelty, or else it arose from misconception of what his duty compelled him to do. He (Mr. Buxton) could not believe that a British Admiral would be guilty of a cold-blooded cruelty. But, waiving that, Admiral Kuper was far away, and could not come back for months to defend himself. He was bound, therefore, and the House was bound, to take refuge in the milder alternative, if it could be done without violence to truth. He rejoiced to say that a careful study of the whole circumstances had enabled him to understand how Admiral Kuper might have been misled into the commission of this terrible mistake. It must be remembered that during the period of our intercourse with Japan a long series of atrocities had been committed on Europeans, culminating in a ferocious assault on the British Embassy. For not one of these atrocities had redress been obtained. It was but natural, then, that the English in Japan should feel that when another abominable murder had been committed, and reparation was stubbornly refused, it was not violence but plain mercy to inflict the severest punishment. Under these circumstances, Admiral Kuper was called upon to exact full reparation for the atrocious murder of Mr. Richardson. That reparation was refused, and the fleet was fired upon. Admiral Kuper no doubt felt that he was called upon to make such an example of those by whom his murderers were shielded as would show the Japanese that English life was not to be trifled with, nor the English flag dishonoured, and, no doubt, the distinction between destroying the capital and destroying the palace of the Prince never so much as crossed his mind. They might truthfully assume that Admiral Kuper is not only a gallant sailor but a man of humanity, although he had been misled into this terrible mistake. He was told by some that if he did not assail Admiral Kuper he must lay the blame on Earl Russell. He feared such blame would not be censure, but calumny. But was the shelling of the town purposely done? He had done his best to look into the question with candour, and he had come to the conclusion that the town was purposely shelled. The noble Lord the Secretary for the Admiralty (Lord Clarence Paget) went down last autumn to address his constituents, and he composed two clever theories for their gratification, the one of which did honour to his head, and the other to his heart. Owing, however, to the imperfections of human nature, the statements of hon. Members during the vacation were not always strictly accurate. The first theory of the noble Lord was this—that as the fortifications lay between Kagosima and the sea, in engaging the batteries, a typhoon blowing at the time, many of our shells went over, and so the town got burnt. That was not only a plausible theory, but was partly true as to the first day's proceedings. Many shells on the first day did thus fall into the town; but eye-witnesses proved other shells were thrown in purposely. But it would not hold at all with regard to what took place on the second day, because, as it was vouched by one who was there, so completely were the batteries on the Kagosima side of the bay silenced on the first day, that we were told that not one of those batteries which were engaged on the first day fired a shot on the second, as the fleet passed by them at slow speed. He entreated the attention of the House to this important point, that on the second day the batteries were silenced and the town lay unresisting, defenceless, before the guns of the fleet. He should prove that it was on that second day that what remained of the town from the first day's conflagration was shelled and burnt. The noble Lord's second theory might be stated in the form of a syllogism. He said no British Admiral could do a cruel thing; it was a cruel thing to bombard a town; therefore no British Admiral could bombard a town. But he (Mr. Buxton) said Admiral Kuper was a British Admiral, Kagosima was a town, therefore Admiral Kuper could not have bombarded Kagosima. The logic of that was unimpeachable but that syllogism, like many other syllogisms, the logic of which was unimpeachable, exploded at the touch of facts. As a matter of fact we knew that Admiral Lambert, contrary to the orders of Lord Dalhousie, bombarded and burnt Rangoon. Again, there was a noble Lord on that (the Treasury) bench (Viscount Palmerston),and there were many right hon. and hon. Gentlemen about him who might have reasons more or less pleasing for remembering the bombardment of Canton. In the Crimean war the allies proposed to bombard Odessa; and, again, last year the following piece of evidence was given before the Ordnance Committee. A certain Commodore, whose name I will not bring forward, sent one of Her Majesty's ships up to the Feejees to levy a fine on the inhabitants of a town called Kemova, for robbing and ill-treating certain British subjects— I told him to allow a certain time for the payment of a fine, and if it was not paid to burn the town down. He carried out my orders, and, previously to landing with his men for the purpose of burning the town, he very properly commenced to clear it by shelling it with Armstrong 12-pounders. These facts showed there was no flagrant à priori absurdity in the idea that a British Admiral might bombard a town. The argument that Admiral Kuper did not shell the town on purpose consisted entirely of those two surmises. Against them he would, first of all, bring the evidence of Colonel Neale and Admiral Kuper themselves. Well, what says Admiral Kuper? On the day before the action, addressing the Ja- panese Envoys, he said, "The settlement of this matter can no longer be delayed. Kagosima is at my mercy. Hostilities once commenced your town will be destroyed, and I should stop your trade both here and on the Loochoo Islands," Colonel Neale says:—"Such is not our wish; but if you compel us, why it will be your own fault." On the 26th of August Colonel Neale, who had been on board the Admiral's ship during the action, in his despatch to Lord Russell, after speaking of "the spirited incidents and all-sufficient results which attended the combat at Kagosima," said— Thus I have the satisfaction to report to your Lordship that the instructions with which I have been charged, having reference to the outrage of last September, have been carried out in letter and in spirit. In respect to the Prince of Satsuma * * * after long forbearance, his capital is in ashes, his foundries destroyed, and his steamers burnt. It remains for me to trust that Her Majesty's Government may deem that my instructions have been thus fulfilled in a manner best adapted to the difficult circumstances with which I have been, and still continue to be, surrounded. Not a word was there to hint, however remotely, that the capital being laid in ashes was the result of an accident—not a word to hint that he so much as dreamed of regretting it. The burning of the capital was treated by Colonel Neale not as an accident but as an achievement. He came now to Admiral Kuper's own words. In his despatch, after mentioning the destruction of the palace, he went on to say:— The fire, which is still raging, affords reasonable ground for believing that the entire town of Kagosima is now a mass of ruins. And he concludes his despatch— Thus having accomplished every act of retribution and punishment, and having received the expression of your (that is, of Colonel Neale's) satisfaction with the extent of this operation," &c. Supposing this town of 180,000 people had been accidentally burnt, was it conceivable that such a dreadful incident could have been spoken of by Colonel Neale, and likewise by Admiral Kuper, without the faintest shadow of a word to imply that it was an accident, and without the faintest expression of regret? But if any doubt could still remain, it was utterly dispelled by this plain fact—that six private accounts of the operations had been published, each of which, except the first, described the shelling of the town as a distinct part of the operations. He would now proceed to read extracts from letters from officers and men engaged, which had been published. One of them, addressed to the Japan Herald, from one who had been himself engaged, said— About dusk the town was fired in several parts by our shells;" and added, "About nine o'clock the whole of one side of the town was blazing. An officer on board the Euryalus kept a log from hour to hour, which had appeared in the Japan Commercial News. One entry in this was— 3.30 p.m.—Cleared for action, engaged batteries on both sides, firing shells at Satsuma's house and town. 5 p.m.—Ceased firing; observed the town to be on fire to the south of Satsuma's house. Another writer, who had also been engaged, mentions that the Argus and Coquette went to the assistance of the Race-horse, and "continued firing on the town and the battery to the left of it." The account went on— The Racehorse floated about half-past five, the Coquette and Havoc continued shelling the town till dark," adding, "The destruction of property must have been enormous. On the same day— 12.30 p.m.—The fleet weighed again, and proceeding under slow speed, commenced shelling the batteries and town as we passed them at long ranges. No more than twenty shots were fired by the batteries, all of which fell harmless. The town again took fire to westward. Another gentleman, who gathered his account from the officers and men, wrote— The Euryalus soon got her guns in order, and the 110lb. Armstrongs did dreadful mischief to the town, the factories, and foundries; and on Sunday afternoon the fleet steamed out, engaging the batteries and shelling the town the whole time. The artist employed by The Illustrated London News also said, on the first day— Half the town was burnt. At night the fleet anchored, the batteries ceased firing, and the Perseus sent in a rocket now and then to keep up the fire. The next day the fighting was continued, the batteries were silenced, the remainder of the town was burnt, and Satsuma's castle battered with shot and shell. The fleet then steamed out, and left what was Kagosima a mass of ruins and flames. A letter from a sailor said:—" On the second day we attacked the town and shelled every house we could see." To sum up the proofs that the town had been burnt on purpose. It was quite clear that there was no weight in the argument that a British Admiral could not do such things, because in the last ten years three British Admirals, besides other Admirals, had bombarded towns. Then the destruction of the town was predicted, it took place, and was spoken of not only without regret but with satisfaction; not as an accident, but as an achievement. Six accounts were sent to different papers, and each account expressly mentioned the shelling of the town itself as having been a part of the operations; while, on the other hand, the vehement discussion in the newspapers upon this topic during last autumn had not elicited one single line written by anybody that could indicate that this feature of the operations was accidental. He said then, that all this amounted to a demonstration that the town was purposely shelled.

He ventured to assert with little fear of contradiction, that the burning of this town was a direct transgression of those usages of war which prevail among civilized nations, and to which it was right and wise above all for England to adhere. In saying that, he was perfectly aware that there was no abstract principle of international law which forbade a belligerent to destroy private property; no one could claim compensation in a court of law for injury done to his private property by an enemy. But he did maintain without fear of contradiction, that it was the usage of civilized nations in conducting war to spare private property on land, except in cases of absolute necessity wholly different from the one he now alluded to. He had carefully examined all the dicta on this point of the leading modern writers upon international law—and let him, in passing, say how much in doing so he had been indebted to the guidance of his friend, Mr. Godfrey Lushington—and he could assure the House that so far as he could discover, there was an universal consent among writers on international law on this point. He would only quote three or four sentences. Kent, in his Commentaries, said— That a conqueror who destroys private dwellings, or public edifices devoted to civil purposes only, violates the usages of modern war. In Marten's Law of Nations it was stated that— Even in taking a fortress, except in cases of necessity, it is now admitted that the besiegers are to direct their artillery against the fortifications only, and not intentionally against the public edifices or any other building. He would not trouble the House with passages which he held in his hand, taken from Twiss, Heffter, Wheaton, Klüber, Phillimore and Grotius; but he could not refrain from quoting the words of Vattel, who said that— The destruction of towns was a measure odious and detestable, unless absolute necessity, or at leant cogent reasons, demand it. And he added these remarkable words— But as the perpetrators of such outrageous deeds might attempt to palliate them under pretext of deservedly punishing the enemy, be it here observed, that the natural and voluntary law of nations does not allow us to inflict such punishments except for enormous offences against the law of nations, and even then it is glorious to listen to the voice of humanity and clemency when rigour is not absolutely necessary. He did not think that the House would be impatient if he concluded these extracts with a sentence from Lord Bacon— The wars are no massacres and confusions, but they are the highest trials of right; and in the proceedings of the wars nothing ought to be done against the law of nations and the law of honour. He could not pass from this part of his subject without reminding the House of the profound indignation which was excited all over Europe, and which was so loudly expressed by the whole press of England, headed by The Times, at the throwing of Greek fire into Charleston by General Gil-more last autumn: and so too, again, at the bombardment of Palermo by that miserable King whose nickname ever after reminded the world of the atrocity. Yet in each of these cases the bombarded town was fortified, and was standing out in arms against him who deemed himself its lawful sovereign. He hardly needed to remind the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Attorney General, the Home Secretary, and others, of the splendid eloquence with which they denounced the bombardment of Canton by Admiral Seymour. But then it might be suggested that there were peculiar circumstances in the present case which justified a departure from the ordinary usages of war. There were peculiar circumstances in the present case, and he thought that he should be able to show that, in so far as these circumstances were unusual, they counselled, with singular force, to forbearance. It must be remembered that from the outset they had placed themselves in a perfectly false position with regard to Japan. For more than 300 years the Japanese had been a most peaceful, prosperous, well-governed, and contented people. All they asked was to be let alone—to be allowed to be happy in their own way. In former days they had received foreigners, not only willingly, but with cordial hospitality; but the result had been that they found their religion and their institutions, in jeopardy, and they were forced for their safety's sake to drive foreigners from their shores. Nor could it be denied that a singular de- gree of well-being had followed upon that policy. The English, by forcing themselves upon them by the terror of arms, as Sir Rutherford Alcock shows we did, were invading the natural rights of the Japanese to manage their own affairs, and to do what might seem best to themselves for their own security and welfare. Here again the British were acting in defiance of the rules of international law. "China and Japan," says Halleck— For a long time declined all commercial intercourse with other nations, and even now permit only a very restricted trade. The question was at one time discussed, whether this people could not be compelled to open their ports to foreigners; but, as a question of international jurisprudence, it scarcely merits consideration. Now, he was not complaining of our having gone to Japan. He thought that as other nations had thrust themselves upon the Japanese, and had apparently been well received, the English could hardly have stood aloof; but he thought it was both rash and harsh to force ourselves upon the metropolis. He had no doubt that the wise policy would have been to have kept to a few commercial ports, and that even now it would be wise to retire from Jeddo if that could be done with dignity. But the British certainly had no abstract right to be there. Neither did he excuse the chicanery and violence by which the Japanese nobles sought to extricate themselves from a treaty which they abhorred. That treaty, too, appeared not to have been legally executed according to Japanese law, as it was not signed by the Mikado or the Japanese nobles. No doubt the murder of Mr. Richardson was a very shameful crime. At the same time, as Mr. Fortune informed us, the Tycoon's Government had not yet been able to abolish that ancient law of 300 years' standing, in virtue of which licence was given to slay foreigners wherever they might be found. The Bishop of Victoria also, in his book written before the murder of Mr. Richardson, warned us of the probable consequences if Englishmen should so far transgress the usages of the country as to stand upright in the road—much more to remain on horseback in the road—while all the native population was on its knees, during the passage of the great Prince of the Empire. That might be a shameful custom, but if it were the custom and the law, we should not blaze out with furious indignation, should any of our countrymen fall victims to their own temerity in trampling on the usages and insulting the feelings of the native princes of the land. He understood, too, that the Japanese authorities had earnestly begged that no Englishman should go out upon the road during the passage of this great Sovereign Prince. He hoped he should not be misunderstood; he regarded that murder as a wicked crime; he allowed that it was not only just and politic, but essential, to obtain reparation for the murder of an Englishman; but he maintained that there was nothing in the peculiar features of this case to justify us in resorting to an extraordinary excess beyond what the usages of war allowed in vindicating that outrage. It must be remembered that we had already obtained from the Tycoon the payment down in hard cash of the vast sum of £100,000. Not only that, but the Tycoon had amply apologized and had made some important concessions. And, again, one of our demands upon the Prince of Satsuma was a demand which it was absolutely impossible for him to grant. It was stated by Colonel Neale himself, that the chief agent of the outrage was the father of the Prince himself. "His retainers," says Colonel Neale, "but obeyed his instructions;" and Colonel Neale goes on to observe, "No power that has yet been brought to bear is calculated to coerce the Prince of Satsuma to deliver his father up to condign punishment." He should think not, and he was not ashamed to say he should hope not. He might be wrong, but it seemed to him, that however much it comported with the wisdom and dignity of England it might have been to ask a Sovereign Prince to deliver up his own father to be hanged, however wise it might have been to make such a demand, and however right it might have been to enforce such a demand by the destruction of his men-of-war, his foundries, his fortifications, his factories, the shops of his subjects, and his own palaces—he was inclined to doubt whether the occasion required the last finishing touch of laying his capital in ashes. He feared, however, that what influenced many in defending these proceedings was the feeling that the Japanese were beyond the pale of civilization, and that in dealing with nations in that condition it is justifiable to use measures from which we should, of course, refrain in dealing with our equals. That feeling appeared to have existed in Admiral Kuper's mind, to judge from his conversation with the Japanese Envoys. He told them, with what seemed a grievous want of delicacy of feeling, to remember, "That we are one of the first nations in the world, who, instead of meeting civilized people as they thought themselves, were in reality encountering barbarians." The Japanese Envoys had too much self-respect to vouchsafe a reply to this sally, but simply rose to leave. He must be allowed to say that from his heart and soul he repudiated and abhorred the idea that in our dealings with less civilized nations we were to be ruled by a more lax code of morals than that to which we should own allegiance when we came in contact with the nations of Christendom. It seemed to him that it was one of the first and foremost axioms which an English statesman ought to obey, that we should treat those who were weaker than ourselves, or who stood on a lower footing than ourselves in point of civilization, with forbearance as generous and with justice as rigid as that which we exercised towards any of the great Powers. However, in this case it was a mere illusion, showing nothing but the ignorance of those who held it, to suppose that the Japanese are, to use Admiral Kuper's phrase, barbarians, who could only be amenable to rough usage. No one who had studied thoroughly what we know about Japan but must allow that they have attained a rare height of civilization. No doubt in some respects they were far from being what they ought to be; but even as regards that laxity of morals, which is their worst trait, he could help being reminded of Burke's saying, that "Vice itself loses half its evil in losing all its grossness." All writers swelled the chorus of admiration for the Japanese. The Bishop of Victoria told them that his own intercourse with the people led him to regard them as a friendly race, accessible, frank, manly, energetic, and polite. Mr. Fortune, who saw more behind the scenes than perhaps any other traveller, spoke with enthusiasm of the Japanese. Even close to Yeddo, which contained 2,000,000 human beings, he said— The scenery was always changing and always beautiful, hill and vale, broad roads and shady lanes, houses and gardens, with a people industrious, but unoppressed with toil, and apparently happy and contented. Mr. Oliphant said— Each day gave us fresh proofs of the amiable and generous character of the people. We were filled with astonishment and delight at the exquisite taste displayed in the gardens and cottages by the roadside. He dilates upon the universal taste for reading—even the common soldiers, when on duty, were continually engaged in reading. It is impossible, he says, to compare the general social well being of Japan with that of any other nation, and not admit that Japan will gain by the contrast. Surely such a people ought to have been treated by us, in the early days of the intercourse we had thrust upon them, with the utmost possible tenderness, instead of with an extreme of violence and rigour.

So much for the peculiar circumstances of the case. Nor could sound policy be alleged to justify this violence. If the feeling of the people was with us, and it was the Princes who wanted to keep us away, surely our true policy would have been to do all that we could to foster that good feeling of the people themselves, whatever we might do with the Princes. But, of course, if we went and destroyed one of the chief cities, we aroused all the sympathies and patriotism of every class against us. The Japanese, if we were to believe Admiral Kuper, were barbarians. But there was a deal of human nature even in barbarians; and it was not in human nature to be friendly to those who knocked their neighbour's house about his ears, and might very likely do the same thing to them. He expected that a great deal would be made of the news in to-day's paper, that the Prince Satsuma had paid the indemnity and made certain concessions. In fact, some hon. Gentlemen had been good enough to condole with him, that his friend Satsuma had taken all the wind out of his sails. He was not prepared to admit that even the payment of £25,000, garnished though it might he with certain other unknown concessions, was enough to give a country like England perfect satisfaction for having—he would not say committed a great crime—but, he would say, having inflicted a great calamity. He wanted to know what were those other concessions? Was the Prince of Satsuma's father to be hanged? Or were those retainers to be hanged who, as Colonel Neale told us, only did his bidding? The Japanese warned us that if they executed anybody at our command, as a matter of course they would execute the wrong men. Had his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs got wrong men executed for a crime they did not commit? A rumour had come lately from China, and a highly probable rumour too, that the Prince of Satsuma had ordered from America rifled guns to the value of £200,000. Worse than that, other rumours reached us, which were confirmed by Colonel Neale's despatches, of probable civil war between the Daimios and the Tycoon. Is that success? Is it true policy for us to plunge that country, lately 30 peaceful, so prosperous, into anarchy and intestine war? Sir Rutherford Alcock also warned us emphatically of the tremendous undertaking it would be should we go to war with the Daimios. Unless we chose to land troops and follow them into their mountains, the only thing we should be able to do would be to make a holocaust of the towns and villages on the coast. He lamented to see that in one of Colonel Neale's most recent despatches, written a month after the destruction of Kagosima, he said, "It might be imperatively necessary to fall back on the powerful aid of Her Majesty's squadron, and urge on Admiral Kuper the necessity of entering on a systematic and serious series of hostilities." A systematic series of hostilities! He asked again, was that success that we should be plunging into a systematic series of hostilities with the unhappy Japanese? A great responsibility rested that night upon this House, that it did not shrink from letting our Admirals know that, at least, we will not permit massacre and conflagration. It was mournful to think that the flag of Christian England should be the herald, not as it should be, of peace and goodwill toward men, but of anarchy, of tumult, of fire, and sword.

He had now, he hoped, shown that this act was condemned by the usages of war, that it was condemned by all that was peculiar in the circumstances of the case, that it was condemned by sound policy. He was sorry for the length to which he had been carried, but he should not be satisfied to sit down without reminding the House in a few words of the intense misery which this act must have wrought among the innocent people of Kagosima. No doubt, those who ignorantly spoke of the Japanese as barbarians may, with equal ignorance, tell me that Kagosima was a mere collection of flimsy hovels, which could be burnt down and built up again, and no one be much the worse. The fact, however, was that Kagosima was one of the chief cities of the Japanese Empire, and its factories, its foundries, its palaces, its fortifications indicated that it abounded, like the other chief cities of the Empire, with evidences of the high refine- ment, civilization, and intelligence of that extraordinary people. No Englishmen had ever set foot in Kagosima, but Mr. Oliphant visited one of the small towns near it belonging to the Prince of Satsuma, a town of only 3,000 or 4,000 inhabitants, and he describes how in the bazaars there was so much displayed, and it was all so beautiful and new, that as he walked through the brilliant avenues his mind was quite stupified with admiration. He wished those who intended to talk in that way would glance over the pictures in those works on Japan which he had with him, and they would then see that though on account of earthquakes the houses were built of timber, with bamboo poles and paper partitions, and did not as a general rule rise above one story, the woodwork was of a solid kind, and they were full of picturesque and graceful ornaments. Remembering all this, and also what travellers told us of the amiable and generous character of the men, of the gentle demeanour of the women, and the bright charm of the children, he confessed he could not think without a pang of seven British men-of-war throwing shells broadcast into a city of 180,000 of these people, and that with effect so rapid and so terrible that before nightfall half the town, we were told, was in a blaze; and the flames, said an eye-witness, "leapt from street to street, leaving ashes and desolation behind them." "By ten o'clock on the first night," said another, "the extent of the conflagration was over a mile in length. The destruction of property must have been tremendous "In short, within 24 hours of the firing of the first gun, "we steamed away," said one, and a more pathetic sentence I have not heard for some time, "we steamed away, leaving what had been Kagosima a mass of ruins and flames." "The destruction of property must have been tremendous!" Destruction of property! Can we soothe ourselves with the hope that it was property alone that perished? Why, in such a population as that there cannot have been less than 30,000 little children; there must have been thousands upon thousands of sick, of aged, of infirm, of women labouring with "child. It was appalling to think what must have past in those first awful hours, when the shells were rushing overhead and exploding among the dwellings, and the flames, bursting at once from a hundred centres, roared in the hurricane and leapt from roof to roof. We could but too easily imagine the volumes of blinding smoke, the shrieks of those whose escape was cut off, the anguish of those whom no effort could save, the terror and despair of that vast multitude as it surged through the blazing streets. But was that all? To find an army of 30,000 men in shelter and food has before now, as we know too well, overtasked the energies of a great nation. We know too well what sufferings, horrible and heartrending, its failure may cause. Who was there under that sky so noted for its winds and rains and winter's storms to find shelter for those outcasts? Who was there to stay the hunger of that mighty host, with its tens of thousands of gentle women and tender little ones—who had escaped indeed with their lives from that gulf of fire, but who stood there on the hillside as our fleet steamed away from that mass of ruins and flames that had been Kagosima—stood there in mute despair, employment gone, trade at an end, their all swept from them, themselves starving, houseless, desolate? He claimed from the Government, as an Englishman,—he claimed it as a right, that they should that night do all that in them lay to clear the fame of the country from the blot that stained it, and to ward from us, in the days that are to come, the doing of such deeds. The hon. Member concluded by moving the following Resolution— That this House, while only imputing to Admiral Kuper a misconception of the duty imposed on him, deeply regrets the burning of the town of Kagosima, as being contrary to those usages of War which prevail among civilized nations, and to which it is the duty and policy of this country to adhere."—(Mr. Buxton.)

MR. AYTOUN

said, he rose to second the Motion. He would not follow the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton) into the traditionary history of Japan, and the aversion which the inhabitants undoubtedly had to the presence of foreigners; but it was plain that they knew enough of the history of our proceedings to convince them that a general permission to us to trade and settle there would involve them in anarchy and misfortune. The Japanese were not ignorant of our proceedings in India. They knew well enough that we first settled there as humble traders, and then under the pretence of punishing injuries inflicted upon us, we acquired the territory of the people. They knew also that under the specious pretence of relieving the people from oppression and tyranny we had extended our conquests, deprived princes of their territories, and advancing step by step we had never ceased until we had become masters of the largest portion of the country, and of an empire which had no parallel in its extent since the dissolution of the Roman Empire. Could any one doubt that such considerations had operated powerfully upon the Japanese mind? Could any one doubt that the treaty which gave us permission to trade with them had been extorted by fear? Could there be any doubt that the Japanese had yielded to it from dread of the consequences which might have resulted from resistance to the power of England? Hitherto the representatives of the Foreign Office had declined to discuss this question, simply because the Tycoon's Government, with which the treaty was made, was a de facto Government. In his opinion, they had only avoided the discussion of the Japanese question because they were satisfied in their minds that the conduct which our Government had pursued towards Japan could not be justified. But whatever might be the cause, it was clear that the treaty had produced a powerful feeling of discontent in the minds, not only of the nobles, as Earl Russell seemed to suppose, but of the people of Japan. There was another most important question—what had been the conduct of our own merchants in that country? He was afraid they had not conducted themselves with that moderation and with that respect for the feelings of the natives which they ought to have shown: on the contrary, it had been eminently calculated to aggravate that discontent. They had also evinced a great disregard for the interests of their own country. It seemed to be a matter of indifference to them how heavily the tax-paying people of this country were burdened to support them in the arrogant course which they had adopted. They had abundance of evidence of it. For instance, there was the conduct of the merchants who, under fictitious names, demanded at the Japanese custom-house large quantities of the gold coin of the country in exchange for dollars. Then there was the affair of Mr. Moss, who was no doubt guilty of the crime imputed to him. Instead of being punished, after he had escaped through a mere legal technicality, the deep feeling of the British community in that country was shown in his favour in a most unmistakable manner. It was said that any pecuniary fine imposed upon him would have been paid at once, because subscribed by his friends. The arrogant spirit prevailing among the British population had been shown on another occasion lately. In one of the despatches it was stated that there was an intention on the part of the Japanese Government to construct a new road along which the Daimios might pass, in order that no collision might occur between them and foreigners. The British representative, upon the request of the Japanese Government, recommended that British subjects should not travel along that road for three days; whereupon a a number of the English residents wrote a letter complaining in very decided and arrogant language of the course the British representative had thought proper to pursue. There was another point which ought not to be forgotten—namely, that the evidence of what was passing in Japan was ex parte, coming as it did from persons who were interested in making out a good case for themselves. Our representative himself had not always treated the Japanese Government with the moderation and consideration to which it was entitled. On one occasion there was a scarcity of silk in one of the ports, and a despatch was written by our representative calling the attention of the Japanese Government to the subject, and suggesting that the scarcity had been occasioned by a systematic arrangement of certain monopolisers at Yeddo, and stating that it was currently reported—reported only—that the Japanese Government had arrested several merchants, and that one had lost his life because he pleaded to be allowed to sell silk. When such a spirit was manifested as that existing among the foreign residents, and when our representatives were encouraged by the Foreign Office in the adoption of such high-handed courses as had been pursued in Japan even before the late deplorable events, it was impossible that friendly relations could be permanently continued. The unfortunate murder of Mr. Richardson having occurred, the Foreign Secretary took steps for obtaining redress, but the method he adopted was of a very extraordinary character. In the debate in the other House towards the close of last Session, Earl Russell said it was his intention to impose a heavy pecuniary penalty on the Tycoon, and at the same time was, through the Admiral, going to compel Prince Satsuma to give redress for the wrong which had been done. He (Mr. Aytoun) could not imagine how Earl Russell could consider it his duty to punish both the Tycoon and the Prince Satsuma, If the Tycoon was de facto ruler of Japan, why did he not ask him to enforce punishment? and if he was not able to execute justice in his own country, then he was not de facto ruler, and ought not to be punished at all. His hon. Friend who moved the Resolution said that he did not blame Earl Russell. He (Mr. Aytoun) did not wish to express censure of any one in particular of those who had been guilty of the horrible outrage which had plunged the people of Kagosima into misery, and brought disgrace upon the British name, but he would refer to some of the despatches. The first despatch in the "blue book" was from Earl Russell, and was dated from the Foreign Office, Dec. 24, 1862. It contained the following passage:— If Daimio Satsuma should not immediately agree to, and carry into effect, the terms demanded of him, the Admiral should go with his own ship and with such others he may think fit to take with him, or he should send a sufficient force to the territory of the Prince, which I have been informed is a peninsula on the most southernly point of the island. He has a fort, I am told, at the south-west end of the Island of Kiusiu. The Admiral or senior naval officer will be better able to judge than Her Majesty's Government can be, whether it will be most expedient to blockade this port, or whether it will be possible or advisable to shell the residence of the Prince. He would compare that with a despatch of Earl Russell addressed to Colonel Neale, in which he announced to him that he had been made a Companion of the Bath. Earl Russell said:— Her Majesty has been pleased, in testimony of the patience, good temper, and firmness with which you have conducted this negotiation (referring to the recovery of the £100,000 from the Tycoon as an indemnity), to confer upon you the Companionship of the Order of the Bath. The accomplishment of the remainder of your instructions has been found more difficult. Earl Russell then went on to refer to the answers which had been received from the Ministers of the Prince Satsuma. He said:— These answers in reference to a murder committed by the retainers of the Prince in full daylight, ten months before, upon a person who had not in any way impeded the passage of a public road, showed a fixed determination to afford no redress. Vice-Admiral Kuper then directed that three steamers belonging to the Prince should be taken and retained by way of reprisals. But before any further communication could take place, hostilities were commenced by the Japanese, and Her Majesty's ships were fired upon from the batteries with shot and shell—an act which it became necessary immediately to resent. The steamers taken were burnt. The batteries were fired upon from point blank range; many guns were dis- mounted, and various magazines exploded. It is much to be lamented that as the batteries were apparently situated in and about the town, the consequence of firing with shot and shell upon the batteries and magazines should have been to set fire to the town, which Admiral Kuper says has been burnt. Many innocent persons have thus unfortunately been injured. At the same time, it is obvious that if Admiral Kuper had not returned the fire of the batteries, Her Majesty's squadron would have suffered a defeat, and fresh murders of British subjects by the cruel and insolent Daimios would have been perpetrated."—Correspondence, p. 100. The effect of this despatch was to defend what had been done on grounds which it was utterly impossible to maintain. Earl Russell said that the taking away of these steamers as reprisals led to the conflict which took place. He (Mr. Aytoun) admitted that if the proceedings had been confined to the first day, deplorable as was the result, that was a ground of defence; but Earl Russell entirely ignored the fact that the town was assailed on a second occasion. How it could be a defence for the operations on the afternoon of the succeeding day, when the fire was kept up by Her Majesty's ships, passed his comprehension. The fact was, that the conduct of the British was entirely indefensible, and he hoped the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs would be able to throw some light on the subject. There was one other quotation he would make from the blue-book, which showed that the probability of such an event as the destruction of the town was present to the minds both of Colonel Neale and Admiral Kuper before the attack commenced. It was to be found in the memorandnm of a conversation which took place between them and the agents of Prince Satsuma, on board the Euryalus. Admiral Kuper said—" The settlement of this matter can no longer be delayed. Kagosima is at my mercy, and if hostilities are once commenced the town will be destroyed." Colonel Neale added—" Such is not our wish, but if you compel us to do it, it will be your own fault." It might be said it was easy to find fault, but difficult to suggest a remedy. He would reply, that if the Government, in sending out representatives, instead of enforcing the single idea that we had a treaty, would impress upon them the necessity of not sacrificing every consideration of policy and humanity, and of the interests of our trade as regarded the ultimate result, he believed we should avoid the bloodshed which was impending if we were to drive the Tycoon's Government to desperation by demanding the rigid fulfilment of a treaty in all its provisions.

Motion made, and Question proposed.

MR. LONGFIELD

rose to move the Amendment of which he had given notice, the distinct object of which he said was to free a most meritorious and worthy officer, with whom he had not personally the slightest acquaintance, from a very grave imputation sought to be cast upon him by the Resolution of the hon. Member for Maidstone. He thought the House would agree to the Amendment, and would not accept any of the three courses or alternatives submitted to them by the hon. Member, and would not admit that he had been "cold-blooded and cruel," or that he had made "a grave misconception of his orders," or "a terrible mistake." All admitted that this was a most unfortunate affair; but why was the whole of the blame to be cast on Admiral Kuper? Admiral Kuper, he believed, was not a native of England; he was not highly connected; he had not been decorated with the Order of the Bath; he had no friends save what the justice of his case he hoped would now rally to his side. That being so, the hon. Member perhaps supposed that the gallant Admiral might be hit as hard as he pleased; but he (Mr. Long-field) would show the House that from first to last not the slightest blame attached to Admiral Kuper, that he laboured under no misconception of orders, that he understood them well, that he obeyed them, and concerted measures according to the letter and spirit of the instructions he received. The papers narrating this tragedy, in which a town of 200,000 inhabitants had been reduced to ashes, many lives lost, and u vast amount of property destroyed, opened with a despatch by Earl Russell. It appeared that a gentleman named Richardson was killed—" murdered "it was called; but when all the circumstances were taken into consideration, it appeared to him that manslaughter would be the more correct term. Premeditated murder it certainly was not. A gentleman rudely disregarding the custom of the country in the respect paid to Princes travelling in the road, was cut down by the attendants of the Prince whom he had offended. He gave the hon. Member (Mr. Buxton) all the advantage of the strong epithets which Earl Russell crowded into one little sentence, such as "barbarous murder," "barbarous as- sault," an event "which filled Her Majesty's Government with great and just indignation." To the demands for reparation the Tycoon from time to time replied, in language which certainly showed as much civility as that with which he had been addressed by the British Minister, that the assault was one of those sudden affrays in which there were great facilities for the escape of the actual offenders, that he was taking every means to apprehend them, and that he would make all the reparation in his power. In the papers Colonel Neale stated that the tone of the Ministers of Japan with whom he came in contact on this question was most conciliatory. Earl Russell, in his despatch of the 24th, laid down his ultimatum—namely, that the head of the Japanese Government should expiate the offence which had been committed by what some would think nothing more than an exaction—namely, the payment of a sum of £100,000, while the Daimio was to be mulcted in the sum of £25,000. The object of making such a demand seemed to be not so much the execution of summary justice upon those who committed the crime in question, as the provoking of hostilities which would give Colonel Neale, Her Majesty's Consul at the place, an opportunity of making a moral demonstration of power, which he several times expressed a desire to do. The instructions given to Colonel Neale were, that if the Prince of Satsuma refused to agree to these terms, he was immediately to proceed to such measures of coercion as he might deem best fitted to carry out the object in view; and the despatch stated that the Admiral or Senior Naval Officer, on proceeding to Kagosima, would be a better judge than Her Majesty's Government could be of the steps it was most desirable to take; and "whether it will be most expedient to blockade the Prince's port, or whether it would be possible or advisable to shell the residence of the Prince." The Correspondence showed plainly the interpretation that was put upon the despatch by the person whose duty it was to communicate it to Admiral Kuper, and would prove that the Admiral carried out not only the letter, but the spirit of the instructions which he received. Colonel Neale was of opinion that the Daimio was one of the principal persons who objected to the residence of Englishmen in Japan, and he thought that an admirable opportunity offered of obtaining reparation for the murder, and also of " pushing a trade," to use the words of a commentator upon the occurrence. A blockade, it seems, was not possible, so that the second was the only alternative left him. Colonel Neale seemed also to have been impressed with the idea, that to humble this independent Prince would be acceptable to the Japanese Government; for in a letter to Earl Russell, Colonel Neale expressed his Conviction and opinion that the hardest blows we may be forced to strike should be directed against this Daimio, so thwarting to the Tycoon's Government in its relations with foreigners, and so directly connected with the perpetrators of the outrage for which redress is sought. The scene of hostilities would thus also be removed to a distance from the Tycoon's court and capital, while the news which would percolate throughout the empire that Satsuma had been humbled in his independent career would afford, I have reason to believe, actual satisfaction to the Jeddo Government."—Correspondence, No. 25. The correspondence showed that it was Colonel Neale, acting for the Foreign Office, who gave orders to the Admiral. In writing to the Japanese Ministers he distinctly informed them, In the event of the refusal, delay, or evasion of the Prince of Satsuma to carry these demands into immediate effect, such measures of coercion will immediately be adopted against him as the Admiral may judge best calculated to obtain the reparation demanded. He gave orders to the Admiral, he knew the consequences of those orders, and the burning of the town was effected with his knowledge, in his presence, and with his sanction; and yet the hon. Member for Maidstone wished the House to pass a resolution accusing the Admiral of a total misconception of his orders. There was no misconception whatever in the matter. The orders were clear and precise. Colonel Neale, no doubt, believed that the steps he resorted to were warranted by the letter of Earl Russell; he advised everything which the Admiral did, he sanctioned all that occurred by his presence, and expressed his unlimited satisfaction with the result. The Japanese Ministers themselves had previously warned him of what was likely to follow his demand. In the letter of the Japanese Ministers for Foreign Affairs to Lieutenant-Colonel Neale, dated 8th April, 1863, they say, As regards your man-of-war going to the domains of (the Prince of) Satsuma, and there entering into discussion, it is such that, you understanding the state of affairs in this empire, it needs no further communication; therefore it is to be feared whether the said undertaking may not originate an unexpected calamity."—Correspondence, No. 28, Inc. 3. These fears were only too well founded. Colonel Neale did not act without having been duly forewarned. The negotiations went on, and at length Admiral Kuper received orders from Colonel Neale to adopt such prompt coercive measures of reprisal, and such other measures as he might deem expedient to punish the Government of the Tycoon for breach of faith. On the 14th of August the Consul and the Admiral had an interview with the Japanese Ministers. Admiral Kuper informed them that, hostilities once commenced, the town would be destroyed. "Such," said Colonel Neale, "is not our wish; but if you compel us to do so, it will be your own fault;"—thus adopting and sanctioning the threat made by Admiral Kuper. The next day hostilities commenced by the seizing of the Prince's steamers. The batteries on shore thereupon fired upon the squadron, and then the fire was returned by the directions and in the presence of Colonel Neale, who represented Her Majesty, and was superior to the Admiral, who was bound to carry out his orders. Was it to be tolerated then that Admiral Kuper was to be made the scapegoat of others, whether of Earl Russell, who should bear some of the blame, or of Colonel Neale, who should bear the rest of it. His (Mr. Lougfield's) object in rising was to vindicate a gallant officer from the grievous imputation cast upon him—an officer who was doubly unfortunate in having had to perform a duty which was no doubt repugnant to his feelings, unfortunate in being the instrument of such savagery, and in the attempt now made to sacrifice him in consequence. He hoped that the Amendment would have the support of all who could realize what it was to be placed in a position of responsibility under such circumstances, and who were not willing that an officer should be degraded in order that the Government might escape. The hon. Gentleman concluded by moving the Amendment.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he had great pleasure in seconding the Amendment. He considered the grave imputations sought to be thrown upon Admiral Kuper by the course taken by Her Majesty's Government, and by the speeches made by some hon. Members during the debate, reflected no credit upon the Government or upon those hon. Members who endeavoured to cast discredit upon an officer placed in a difficult position, and who had carried out the most unpleasant duty imposed upon him by the barbarous orders of the Foreign Office in a manner which had done violence to his feelings, but reflected credit on his judgment and skill. The attack upon the town of Kagosima was the culminating point of the course of policy Her Majesty's Government had chosen to adopt in the East. Not long ago he called attention to an attack made upon the town of Tringanu in the kingdom of Siam, and the policy pursued in that case was identical with that which had been acted upon in the present instance. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India said, no one could be more anxious than himself to prevent transactions of a questionable character, such as he admitted the attack upon Tringanu to be. But on Christmas eve, Lord Russell sent out a message of good will to mankind in the shape of a distinct order to separate the subject from the Government, to demand from the Government of the country a certain amount of compensation for injuries inflicted on a British subject, and at the same time to exact reparation from one of the subjects of that foreign country which they had a right only to claim from the Government itself. The first despatch in the book showed with what rashness and ignorance this barbarous policy was undertaken by the Foreign Office. "He has a fort, I am told, at the south-west end of the island of Kiusiu;" the geographical position of the place to be bombarded was not even known; and yet further on, instructions were given to the Admiral, if possible, to shell the residence of the Prince. He contended that after the arrival of the British squadron in the harbour of Kagosima, after the negotiations by Colonel Neale had taken place, and after it had been decided it was necessary to carry out the instructions of the Foreign Office by seizing the steamers by way of reprisals, Lord Russell was distinctly responsible for the burning of the town. Colonel Neale decided that the ships should anchor in a position where he could communicate with the authorities on shore—those authorities, by the way, alleging that in the absence of the Prince they were not empowered to agree to terms—and when asked for time he decided that they should be coerced. The steamers being seized as the first measure of reprisal, the batteries at once opened fire on the British ships. The British Admiral would have been disgraced if he had not imme- diately returned that fire; and as the batteries were more formidable than the ships and carried more guns, it was all that the force under his command could do to silence the forts, and in the weather then prevailing it was impossible to make a distinction between them and the lightly-constructed town immediately in the rear. The opening of the fire upon his vessels was the direct consequence of the reprisals ordered by the Foreign Office. It was said that on the following day the Admiral committed another barbarous act in opening fire on another portion of the town; but this was consequent upon the demand of Colonel Neale, that the Palace of the Prince should be fired upon in accordance with the distinct intimation conveyed in the despatch of Lord Russell. So that from the time reprisals were first undertaken until the squadron left the bay, the barbarity of the proceedings—if such a term was applicable to the burning of the town—was in strict obedience to the orders of the Foreign Office, which could only end in the destruction of the town. He had felt it right to make these observations in defence of an absent officer, whom he did not know, whom he had hardly ever seen, but who, he thought, had been most unjustly treated; and while Colonel Neale had been recommended to his Sovereign for decoration, the name of Admiral Kuper had never once been mentioned, nor had the Government even defended him from the ignominy heaped upon his name in every part of the country.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the words "while only imputing to Admiral Kuper a misconception of the duty imposed on him."—(Mr. Longfield.)

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

Sir, I can assure the House that I have read the Correspondence laid upon the table relating to the attack on Kagosima, in the island of Japan, with the earnest desire to arrive at a just and impartial decision; and I am happy to be able to acquit Admiral Kuper of blame connected therewith. But I deplore, as keenly as any one can do, the pitiable circumstances which have led to such a sacrifice of life amongst a population at once innocent and unoffending; and I am quite certain that Admiral Kuper suffered the most poignant feeling of regret while firing upon the city, uncertain whether the women, children, aged, and sick had been removed therefrom. But with regard to this, he had not the power of exercising any precautionary foresight; for, entrusted with the honour of the National Flag, it could not admit of an instant's hesitation as to his returning the fire of the batteries opened on his squadron. And what had been the conduct of the authorities on the preceding day? The despatches state that, During the interval occupied by these communications the batteries on shore were constantly manned, and the guns diligently trained and pointed on the ships of the squadron, especially on the Flag ship, the whole of them being within range. From this it was evident that the authorities were determined not only to reject the demands made by the British Government, but were resolved to oppose them by force. Upon the ministers of the Prince of Satsuma, therefore, the blame of this damnable outrage to humanity must be laid, for they were the real culprits.

Sir, I must apologise for the use of this strong expression, but it seems to me to merit even that word. The hon. Member who seconded the debate has stated, as his opinion, that "this destruction of Kagosima would tarnish the reputation of England in all civilized countries;" whilst I maintain that it was wholly attributable to the ministers and advisers of the Prince of Satsuma in opening the fire of their batteries on our squadron. Still, I confess, I cannot but think that some of the instructions given by Earl Russell were in some measure unworthy of a British Minister at the head of Foreign Affairs.

The spirit of impartiality which I profess obliges me to express my regret, that on the seizure of Prince Satsuma's steamers by our vessels, as reprisals, instead of lashing them alongside to take them down to the Admiral, they did not—supposing the state of their engines permitted it—simply compel them to accompany them, which would have prevented any misconception on the part of the Japanese as to the assumption of triumph, and that on coming in sight of the Admiral's ship a flag of truce had not been hoisted as token of a desire to hold further communications with the authorities.

In conclusion, I must express my opinion that, under circumstances of great difficulty and discouragement, the squadron was handled in a perfectly seamanlike manner, and that great credit was due to Admiral Kuper and the officers and men under his command for their courage and their skill.

LORD STANLEY

I quite understand the reluctance of my hon. and gallant Friend to pass any censure on persons who, whether in a civil or a military capacity, are performing a very responsible and arduous duty at a great distance from home, and compelled by the fact of that distance to act without instructions. I share in that feeling, and I shall be glad if I hear from the hon. Gentleman the Member for Southwark (Mr. Layard) a better defence for these proceedings than appears in the papers which have been laid before us. I do not intend to go again over the ground covered by the speech of the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton); but I will call the attention of the House to one or two points, and I do so now in order that an answer may be given by the hon. Under Secretary. I do not understand what justification can be alleged for the double claim made by her Majesty's Government—first, the claim made on the central government of the Tycoon; and next, that made on the Prince of Satsuma. I could understand either if the other were not put forward. I could understand your treating the Prince as entirely independent, and then your course would be obvious. You might have applied to the Tycoon in the first instance, and if he replied, "I cannot punish the Prince of Satsuma," you might have said, "Then we give you fair notice that we shall take the affair out of your hands and punish him ourselves." But if the Prince of Satsuma is responsible for the murder, then this demand of £100,000 from the Tycoon, who is not responsible, who did not order the murder, and could not have prevented it, is simply an act of extortion. On the other hand, if the Prince of Satsuma is to be treated as a subject, no doubt we have a right to come on the Government of Japan for compensation; but then we ought to leave it to the Government to settle matters with the Daimio. But the responsibility of the one, from the nature of the case, excludes the responsibility of the other, and therefore those who have conducted the negotiations on the part of this country have by making the double demand put us in the wrong. It also appears to me that the amount of the demand is altogether exorbitant and excessive. No doubt, it is very painful and difficult to have to value human life; but one can only judge of what would be done if such a case occurred in Europe. If the murder of a British subject took place under anything like similar circumstances in a European country, you would insist on the punishment of the offender and demand compensation; but you would not demand a sum amounting altogether to about £150,000, and proceed in satisfaction of the claim to seize property of much greater value. One-tenth of the amount probably would be thought sufficient. There is another point, to which I think the House ought to look. The hon. Member for Maid-stone spoke of the inhumanity of those proceedings. I look at the matter in another way, and say that their impolicy is greater than their inhumanity. The Government of the Tycoon is in great difficulty between the Daimios on one side and the foreign merchants and diplomatists on the other. You have, then, to deal first with a Government which may be taken to be neutral between the two parties; next with the great chiefs, who undoubtedly are hostile to foreigners; and, lastly, with the people, of whom we do not know whether or not they share the prejudice of the chiefs against foreigners, but who, at all events, have nothing to lose by the country being open to trade, and may have a great deal to gain. I think it clear, then, that the policy which common sense would have suggested would be to deal fairly and moderately with the Tycoon's ministers; to undermine, as far as you could, the influence of the Daimios on the people, and with that view to conciliate the latter by all means in your power. I am afraid your proceedings in reference to this murder will have a contrary effect. All they will know about the affair is that the foreigners have had a quarrel with their chiefs and destroyed a town. That will place the Daimios in the position of being the natural protectors of the people, whereas your object ought to be to separate those two classes, and to show the natives, that though you may take a part against the chiefs, you do so in the interest of the people. I am afraid it will be a very long time before the bad impression created in the minds of the people by those proceedings will be obliterated. I also think it is very questionable whether what you have done will have much effect on the chiefs. I do not say anything as to the destruction of batteries, because, since it was determined to treat the Prince of Satsuma as independent, no objection could be taken to your destroying his forts; but when your doing that involved the destruction of a town, it is another matter. I do not expect that much moral effect will be pro- duced on the Daimios by such an operation as that. It reminds one of the story of an Irish absentee landlord whose agent in great trepidation sent him over a threatening letter which he had received. The landlord, in reply, said, "Tell those fellows they are great fools if they think that by shooting you they will intimidate me." I very much fear that the same is the case with the Daimios. They are not likely to be intimidated by punishments which fall on the people. You will not frighten the class on whom you wish to produce an effect, but you will make enemies of the class whom you want to have for your friends. In these same papers I see a transaction, of the same date, which, though not strictly connected with this case, yet hears on it as showing what the general character of British policy towards Japan has been. It seems that in October of last year there was a good deal of anxiety felt among the traders because the trade in silk was falling off. What was the reason of that falling off? Colonel Neale, writing to the Japanese Minister, says— The matter respecting the restricted arrivals of silk being now well known to be caused by no accident or want of the material, but by a systematic arrangement of a few of the principal silk dealers, or monopolizers at Teddo, great uneasiness and alarm prevail among the mercantile community of Yokohama. Upon that assumption, because those dealers in silk at Yeddo are doing that which dealers in Manchester and Liverpool do every day—because they are holding back produce in the hopes of getting higher prices—our representative writes a very peremptory letter, and the Japanese Government is called upon to explain. That is not the way you would act towards any European Government. I refer to that letter because it throws light upon whatever may be doubtful in other transactions, and shows what our feelings and bearing have been in dealing with the Government of Japan.

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU

said, it appeared to him that one half of the speech of the hon. Member for Maidstone had been disposed of by the remarks of his hon. and gallant Friend behind him (Sir John Hay), and the other half demolished by the hon. Member himself. The former had cleared Admiral Kuper of all blame and misconception of orders; while the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Buxton) had said that our proceedings in Japan were contrary to the usages of civilized war, although he had admitted that within the last few years we had three times done the same thing, and that other nations had continually acted in a similar manner. From this admission it appeared that our proceedings were not contrary to those usages of civilized war, which had prevailed during the last ten years. The hon. Member had also enlarged on the effects, but he had carefully kept the cause in the background, and only touched upon it in a light and casual manner towards the close of his speech. He had spoken of the horrors of the attack on the town of Kagosima, but he had not explained why that attack had been made. The fact was that Mr. Richardson, accompanied by two gentlemen and a lady, was riding along a road which was open to us by treaty. It was the custom of the Japanese when one of the Daimios approached with his retinue to get out of sight, or else to fall humbly and imploringly on their knees while the Daimios passed by. As the road was open by treaty, it could not be said that Mr. Richardson and his friends ought to have gone down on their knees before a haughty barbarian noble. However, to avoid all dispute, they got to the side of the road, and took up as little room as possible while the procession went by. One of the Daimio's followers, however, drew his sword, cut Mr. Richardson's throat, lopped off his hands, and hacked his body in the most heinous and revolting manner. This would have been bad enough had it been a solitary instance of crime; but this was not the first case of the kind. Numerous murders had been committed; this was only an aggravation of a series of outrages. What were the Government to do? What would have been said if the noble Viscount at the head of the Government had allowed such an act to pass unchallenged? He would thereby have acknowledged that the slaughter of this Englishman was justifiable; he would have exonerated the barbarians from all their guilt. If the noble Viscount had taken such a craven and dastardly course he (Lord Robert Montagu) would himself have moved a vote against him. He contended that the Government were bound to ask for reparation. They did so. The Government of the Tycoon made an apology; they admitted that a gross and serious crime had been committed; and they agreed to pay £100,000. There was only one thing wanting, and that was the punishment of the offender. The Government of the Tycoon said it was not in their power to punish the murderer, because the Daimios were like vassal princes. They were too powerful to be punished. They set the Tycoon's Government at defiance. But the Government of the Tycoon said in effect, "You may go with your superior force, and you are perfectly at liberty to punish the Daimio yourselves, if you can." Several of our ships accordingly sailed off to Kagosima and demanded reparation. There they got a shuffling answer, and no reparation appeared likely to be obtained. Admiral Kuper demanded that reparation should be made within forty-eight hours, or he would shell the forts. [An hon. MEMBER: The town.] Well, the Admiral had been defended by his hon. and gallant Friend (Sir John Hay) on that point, and therefore he would not detain the House by disputing it and repeating the arguments which had already prevailed with the House. He fired on the forts; or rather returned the fire like a true British sailor; for the forts were the aggressors. But a typhoon was coming on. The gunners, if they had been on board the Excellent, would no doubt have made good practice and hit the forts alone. But a heavy sea set in, which prevented them from taking proper aim with their shells. A Japanese town was built of bamboo, brown paper, and varnish, and our shells falling among such houses naturally set fire to them. It was true that the next day another bombardment took place. Admiral Kuper saw that many houses had been burnt, but that the palace of the Prince, who had caused the offence, stood uninjured in all its proud magnificence. Would it have been just to shell the poor, and let the haughty feudal noble escape? As he steamed past he shelled this palace also, and he was perfectly right in so doing. What had been the result? Prince Satsuma has acknowledged the crime, paid £25,000, and promised to bring the offender to justice. And what is the object of the Motion and of the Amendment? To signify to this noble that he has done wrong in acknowledging the crime; to proclaim to him that he is free to murder Englishmen; to tell him that our Government have done him a great and fearful injury. The hon. Member for Maidstone said that we acted in Japan in a manner contrary to the usages of civilized nations. But did not the hon. Gentleman know that the Dutch, the French, the Americans, and the Russians had all in turn been outraged by the Japanese, and had all demanded repa- ration in the same way? A Russian had been struck in the face, and the Russian officers insisted that the officer who committed the act should be degraded and punished. Every other civilized nation trading with the Japanese had been insulted as we had been, and had exacted reparation by the same means. The hon. Member had talked of the narrow lanes of the town and the shrieks of women who could not escape. This was the fiction of a fertile imagination; it was a fancy which would have embellished a poem; but it was not business; for it was not supported by the statements of fact in the blue-book. All that the hon. Member proved by this was, that when they had war they must have with it the horrors of war. War must be made in Hotspur fashion. There must be "saltpetre," "dead bodies," and "unmannerly knaves;" it could not be carried on by people with "pouncet boxes and white gloves." Again, the hon. Member asked us why the people of Kagosima should suffer, when they had nothing to say to the outrage? Wars must be made against nations. They cannot be directed against individual offenders. When the English Government learned that the King of Denmark had made a secret treaty with the Emperor Napoleon, and that the Danish navy was to be employed in making a descent on the English coast, they sent Nelson to bombard Copenhagen. It might have been said that the people of Copenhagen did not know of the secret treaty; but yet we destroyed that fleet and bombarded that city. When the British fleet attacked Boulogne on account, if he remembered aright, of the Berlin and Milan decrees, it was not considered that the inhabitants of Boulogne had nothing to do with those decrees. So, again, with regard to the bombardment of Genoa. The French were going to descend upon that town, and use that port as a point of departure in their assaults upon the shores of the Mediterranean. The people of Genoa had not invited the French; yet we took the town in order to ward off the danger. Then, the hon. Member said that the treaty with Japan ought to have been signed with the Mikado, and not with the Tycoon. Both this country and the Japanese had, however, accepted the treaty with the Tycoon, and it was too late to go back and declare the nullity of the treaty. The hon. Member should have brought this before the House at the time; it is now beside the question to seek for arguments on that ground. Our trade with Japan was increasing, and was most valuable; what would be the result? Foreigners and Englishmen would flock to Japan; and more unoffending Europeans would be murdered on the roads unless these assassinations were put a stop to. He remembered meeting the Japanese Ambassadors in 1862, at the residence of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and he asked one of them what had struck him most of all the wonders he had seen. The Japanese replied, "The things at Woolwich." He had especially admired the Armstrong guns, because they would throw shells with such wonderful force and precision. That let us a little into the secret. That showed that what these Japanese worshipped was not honesty, justice, or friendly feeling, but power. If they found they had to do with a weak or drivelling nation, they would disregard the dictates of justice and equity. The feudal nobles of the country were most haughty and proud, and if we wished them to be just in their dealings with us we must show that we had the power to exact reparation for injuries. When they had felt that power, they would then learn to treat us with justice.

SIR FRANCIS CROSSLEY

said, he was not willing to content himself with giving a silent vote on this question. The eyes of all England were at the present moment directed to the war in Denmark, and the invasion of that country by the Austrians and Prussians, when all their just demands might have been satisfied without resorting to that extremity. But it seemed to him that they could see sins in other nations much more readily than they could in themselves. He thought that the burning of Kagosima was a horrible proceeding. His hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale had made a very correct comparison when he said, "It was as though an enemy had laid Bristol in ashes because an individual had been murdered on the highroad between London and Brentford." When Englishmen thought proper to take up their abode in a foreign country for purposes connected with their own interest or pleasure, he thought the least they could do was to pay some regard to the manners and customs of the people among whom they chose to cast in their lot. It appeared to him that Mr. Richardson and his friends did not show sufficient respect to the Daimio. That did not justify the minder, and he did not blame the Government for demanding reparation; but there was some fault in their Foreign Office sending out lax instructions to their commanders. Earl Russel had named in his despatch that he understood that the Prince Satsuma had been importing some valuable steamers from Europe, and that it might be well for Admiral Kuper to seize them: if the despatch had staid there, or gone on to point out that, failing that, he might take possession of an island, it would have been more humane and equally effectual; but, in lieu of that, Earl Russell spoke of shelling the palace of the Prince. Admiral Kuper seized three steamers seven or eight miles, from Kagosima, and, instead of towing them away as reprisals, he drew them under the guns, and then said, "Fire, if you dare! but remember we are one of the first nations of the earth; and although you think yourselves civilized, you are only barbarians." He did not think that that was the most conciliatory manner in which to carry on negotiations. It was said that this town was built of wood and paper; but he thought that was one special reason why it should not have been bombarded. When the honour and interests of the country could be upheld without the sacrifice of human life, it ought to be avoided; and he trusted their agents abroad would feel that the Government and this House would not reward them for such acts as the burning of Kagosima, but only when they did their duty.

MR. LIDDELL

said, that the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down had very properly raised his voice against the loose instructions given by the Foreign Office to officers who were entrusted with delicate and difficult duties abroad; but the Foreign Office ought to be a little more careful also how they made treaties. Whenever this country made a treaty, whether in Europe or the East, she got into a mess. He differed from the hon. Gentleman who had opened the debate with so much ability and knowledge of the subject, when he said it was no business of theirs to enter into the treaty question. Now, the whole of these matters hung upon the treaty question. There was no man in that House who had attended to the affairs of Japan who would get up and say that the treaty with that country was not a most hasty and inconsiderate piece of diplomacy, and entered into without any knowledge whatever of the manners, the customs, or the laws of the Japanese. And how, then, could such 9 treaty be expected to bn faithfully observed? They had been in- formed by a legal authority that no Court in this country would have found the persons who murdered Mr. Richardson guilty of anything more than homicide. The laws of Japan, they were also told, forbade the interruption of processions, which often partook of a religious character, and the retainers of the great nobles were, he believed, even enjoined to punish and possibly to kill anybody who might venture to interfere with their progress. So that, if we looked at the question from a Japanese point of view—and he trusted that in discussions in that House they would never forget the great legal maxim, audi alteram partem—there would be a great deal to excuse the crime of which the Japanese had been guilty. The poor ignorant Japanese might have thought himself justified in killing Mr. Richardson on the high road. Well, we demanded reparation from that people, and we destroyed one of their towns and killed 1,500 persons. Naturally hostile to foreigners, were the Japanese likely to be conciliated by such conduct? He had risen mainly with a view to ask the Government what was their policy in Japan? Perhaps he would receive a similar answer to that given recently by the noble Lord to the leader on that side of the House—that their policy was peace. But it was a remarkable inauguration of a peace policy to bombard a capital, destroy property, and kill 1,500 persons. The noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office in his last letter to Colonel Neale said, he must wait for further accounts before complete instructions as to our policy in Japan could be given. It therefore appeared that Colonel Neale was to shape out the policy for the Government at home. But Colonel Neale's policy was trade, and a favourite article in the market was Japanese silk. But, in order to encourage the silk trade, was it necessary to commit acts which excited the indignation and horror of England? Were we who always said that our mission was to spread Christianity in the East now about to worship what the Americans called "the almighty dollar?" and accompany that worship with acts of violence and war. It was time that we reconsidered our policy in Oriental countries; for in the East Indies, in China, and in Japan, it was found that that policy was sustained by acts that were neither justifiable nor creditable. It might have been necessary to have demanded reparation at Kagosima—he did not argue that now; but surely, if necessary, they should have exhausted all means in their power to obtain that reparation before proceeding to the last extremity. Japan had for 100 years been happy and prosperous in itself; but now, owing to the presence of foreigners, it was on the verge of a social revolution, of which the Gorogio, the council having charge of foreign affairs, were unable to predict the results. The native authorities were at their wits' end to know what to do in consequence of the arbitrary and unjustifiable manner in which the British Government were enforcing the stipulations of a treaty originally very hastily entered into. At present we had not ascertained exactly who the Mikado was, and in whose hands the supreme authority in Japan was lodged. They had talked of the authority exercised by the Tycoon; but supreme authority seemed to have been exercised over the Tycoon himself on a recent occasion, for he had been summoned to answer to the Mikado, who had only lately been informed that a treaty had been signed with foreigners. Surely the Government should acquaint themselves with the state of affairs in Japan before they attempted to frame a policy to guide them; and, in his opinion, our hasty treaty ought to be revised, in conjunction with those who were acquainted with the usages and laws of Japan; certainly the treaty could not work as it at present stood. The Gorogio said— If a continuance of trade at Yokohama be persisted in, this state of affairs (revolution) -will grow worse; trade will suffer, and no doubt disappear in consequence, and then the friendship will be destroyed. If Her Majesty's Government wanted trade to thrive, they should reconsider the treaty; and he hoped they would tell the House to-night that they would adopt some policy less violent and less arbitrary than that lately practised in Japan. The House had heard of the sufferings of the Japanese at Kagosima, but nobody had spoken of the anxiety and suspense suffered by our countrymen, the members of the Legation, who were compelled to live in Japan. Night after night there had been attacks on the Legations, houses had been burnt and murders committed. [Mr. LAYARD: Hear, hear!] The hon. Member cheered that statement, and no doubt such outrages were much to be regretted; but then they were not to be stopped by increasing still further the animosity of the Japanese. He conten- ded that the House of Commons were bound to interfere; and if it was found impracticable to carry out the treaty with a people who wanted nothing from us, and who were happy and prosperous until we forced ourselves upon them, then Parliament should say le jeu ne vaut pas la chandelle, and should consider whether it was wise to continue our relations with a country so shut up in its own extraordinary traditions and inscrutable laws and customs—a country which did not care for or want our trade, though in pursuing this trade we were hazarding the lives of valuable public servants,and involving ourselves in costly quarrels.

MR. A. W. KINGLAKE

said, he agreed with much that had been said by the hon. Member who had just sat down, but he could not entirely respond to the appeal with which the hon. Member commenced his speech, because he had not sufficient vividness of imagination to take a "completely Japanese" view of this question. They were Englishmen, but he trusted that as the result of that night's debate it would appear, that they were Englishmen capable of moderation and capable of justice. The hon. Member (Sir Francis Crossley) had unintentionally done an injustice to Earl Russell by saying that from first to last he had never expressed any regret for this disastrous occurrence. From the papers it appeared that Earl Russell did not lose a moment in expressing the horror with which his mind must have been filled:— It is much to be lamented," he wrote, "that, as the batteries were apparently situated in and about the town, the consequence of firing with shot and shell upon the batteries and magazines should have been to Bet fire to the town, which Admiral Kuper says has been burnt. Many innocent persons have thus unfortunately been injured. The noble Lord (Lord Robert Montagu) had, in his opinion, been a little hard upon his hon. Friend (Mr. Buxton) when he accused him of having indulged in declamatory language in adverting to the persons who must have suffered, when this town was burnt. But his hon. Friend's statement was grounded on strict statistical reasoning, because if a town of that vast size was destroyed, numbers of people must have perished in the flames; and if 1,500 persons were killed, there must have been among them a large proportion of those utterly helpless beings, to whose sufferings his hon. Friend had referred. On the other hand he could not help expressing his concurrence in every word which had fallen from the noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley). The sum demanded as compensation was of such magnitude as to give the idea of something very like oppression; and from some misunderstanding of the instructions, or some fault in them, the demands made appeared to be cumulative. If it were right to go against the Tycoon, it could hardly be right to go against Prince Satsuma, and therefore he could not. but think that the demands were intended to have been alternative. There was another unfortunate circumstance which aggravated the impression of injustice. Certainly, if a sovereign were unable to exercise perfect control over a distant province, there was good ground for the action taken by a foreign Power against the pro-consul. But so far from disclaiming the sovereignty, the Tycoon repeatedly claimed it, entreated the British authorities not to proceed against Prince Satsuma, and offered to pay the sum demanded. Moreover, he promised to do all that he possibly could do to get at the murderers of Mr. Richardson, and deliver them up for execution in the presence of British officers. True, he left it doubtful whether the murderers could be found, but they were hardly better off with Prince Satsuma. He thought the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn had established that part of his argument in which he showed that the accumulative mode of proceeding against that unfortunate people was oppressive. The hon. Gentlemen who had moved and seconded the Amendment had been eager to resist any blame which they thought might be imputed to Admiral Kuper for the part which he had had the misfortune to take in this transaction. He agreed with them that in the present state of their information as to the details of the transaction it would be unjust to impose anything like blame, or seeming blame, upon Admiral Kuper. It was true there was a report of the language in which, under the excitement of the event, Admiral Kuper, so to speak, had celebrated the deplorable act which was the subject of the debate, but they had not yet before them the statements which he might think fit to make when he should hear of the light in which the sad event was regarded in this country. It therefore was premature to express any opinion; but he could not agree with the gallant Gentleman opposite (Sir John Hay) that he had established the case which he had attempted to make. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had at tempted to show that Earl Russell's instructions were a cogent order for the destruction of the palace of Prince Satsuma, and that no Admiral could have done otherwise than he did. He (Mr. Kinglake) ventured to say that position could not stand. Earl Russell, not in imperative words, but in what might be called suggestive terms, put it whether it might not he possible to shell the palace of the Prince. But no one would contend that there was an imperative mandate rendering it compulsory upon the Admiral to destroy the residence of the Prince wherever he found it, whether on a bare hill-side or in the midst of a populous town. That was a course of argument which could not be sustained for one moment.

Coming to the instructions sent from home, he would ask the House to consider the policy which had culminated in the destruction of the city of Kagosima. Let the House not suppose that our conduct towards the Japanese Government was anything like the accustomed struggles between a civilized and a barbarous nation. He would undertake to show that what had been going on in Japan, in which England was concerned, was a policy of the newest and most extraordinary character. The usual custom of England in respect to opening commercial intercourse with a strange or barbarous nation was, that traders first settled there, and having found the people willing to trade, a commerce was eventually established. In the course of time the English trader had a grievance, and then appealed to the Foreign Office for support, which he obtained, not simply as a trader, but as an Englishman, entitled to the protection of the British Government. In Japan that mode of proceeding had been reversed. It was not the trader who went first, and the political engine followed, but the political engine had gone first and the trader followed, who conducted himself in so arrogant a manner under the protection of the political engine as to have brought upon the people of Japan a great amount of what he must call political oppression. He would take the statement of their own representative, whose terse and expressive description could not be doubted. Colonel Neale wrote:— Indifference to the cold reserve and obstructive acts of the authorities in this country would meanwhile doubtless encourage their continuance; but it is impossible by arguments or reasoning alone to influence the councils of this Government. The great difficulty with which our diplomatic agency has had to contend has been the lack of means to induce moral pressure; no lever has presented itself whereby to arouse conviction of a reciprocity of interests tending to render our goodwill and amity a political necessity to the Tycoon's Government, or to in3uce on their part even a conciliatory policy. In a word, it has not hitherto been apparent to the ruling powers in this country what they had to gain by their relations with foreigners; while, on the contrary, the jealousy of powerful feudal chiefs, the chances of civil commotion (the elements of which already existed), are alarmingly increased by our presence and by our requirements."—Correspondence, No. 16. Thus we were showing that people with arms in our hands what it was they had to gain from contact with European Powers. No one could read the papers without being convinced that the treaty had broken up the political system of Japan. It appeared that before the treaty the Tycoon had become the substantial sovereign. No one heard of the Mikado, but there were Daimios under the Tycoon. The result of the treaty was that the Tycoon incurred so much disgrace and contempt for entering into it that the power of the Mikado was at once revived for the very purpose of neutralizing as it were the treaty into which the Tycoon had been so ill-advised as to enter. All who read the papers could not fail to be struck with the wisdom, moderation, and good sense of the nobles of Japan. They said they would gladly have intercourse with foreigners if they could be strong enough to be sure that the foreigners would act only as guests. What had happened was that, far from acting as guests, the foreigners had overturned their customs, altered their system of government, and defied the nobles in the face of the people. In order to give an idea of the tremendous sacrifices which this unfortunate people had been compelled to make to keep on terms of amity with European Powers, he would refer the House to the extraordinary statement that they consented to abandon forty miles of the high road, the road leading to the capital, in order to avoid collision with foreigners. The noble Lord the Member for Lynn had effectively shown that when we had exerted all that political pressure that matters did not end there. It appeared there was a good deal of silk which the natives had prepared, and probably intended to sell, but which, for some reason known to themselves, probably to obtain a higher price, they did not at once sell. The capital of the European traders was lying idle, and therefore Colonel Neale addressed to the Tycoon's Government a strong remon- strance, barely mentioning a report that intimidation was exercised to prevent the sale of the silk. Colonel Neale said— The matter respecting the restricted arrivals of silk being now well known to be occasioned by DO accident or want of that material, but by a systematic arrangement of a few principal silk dealers or monopolizers at Jeddo, great uneasiness and alarm prevails among the mercantile community at Yokohama. Two millions of dollars have been brought here for the purchase of silk, and are lying idle. Steamers arrive from China to ship the silk expected to have been ready for exportation, and return comparatively empty, thus occasioning great loss. The native merchants are suffering extremely, and some have shut up their establishments at Yokohama, and have left the place; and finally, it is currently reported that three or four other merchants of Yokohama have been arrested, or are about to be arrested, at Kioto, and that one has lost his life because he pleaded to be allowed to sell silk. I lose no time, therefore, in requesting your Excellencies to communicate with me, at your earliest convenience, the real situation of this matter, and the actual intentions of the Tycoon's Government. So serious a matter cannot remain in suspense, and if no communication is made very shortly reassuring to the commercial community, I must adopt other measures, and proceed to Jeddo more effectually to seek explanations from your Excellencies."—Correspondence, No. 68. In reply to that menacing demand, the Tycoon wrote, expressive of regret at hearing of this matter, and saying he thought that the silk would be forthcoming in a few days. Now, though that despatch was of an extraordinary and unjustifiable character, it had not been blamed or commented upon by our Foreign Department, but it seemed to be looked upon in the light of a semi-trading and semi-political transaction. But the gravest matter of all remained yet to be told. The British Government, acting by the hands of Admiral Kuper, had distinctly interfered with the Sovereignty of Japan. It was the undoubted right of an independent Power to erect batteries wherever and whenever it pleased within its territory; but how did Admiral Kuper deal with that right? The Admiral wrote in these terms to the Governor of Kanagawa:— I beg leave to acquaint you that it will be my duty to prevent the construction of any battery at the point named in your Excellency's despatch, as well as in any other position which would command the anchorage or town of Yokohama. The port of Yokohama having been appropriated solely to commercial purposes for those Western nations having treaties with Japan, there can be no necessity that it should be defended against them, while nothing but an aggressive act or repudiation of treaty rights on the part of the Japanese need render it necessary for them to defend themselves from external enemies for many years to come."Correspondence, No. 73. [Mr. LAYARD: Hear, hear.] He presumed from that cheer that the hon. Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs was of opinion that the Japanese were no longer at liberty to defend the port which had been given up for commercial purposes. He did not believe, however, that such an oppressive policy had been deliberately invented in Downing-street, but he conceived that it resulted from the impossibility of the Minister at home sending out stringent instructions to the English Minister in Japan, who, unfortunately, was surrounded by merchants determined to take the fullest advantage of the treaty, and by a public opinion which made it difficult for him to act with that temper and moderation which all Englishmen would desire. It was therefore incumbent on the Home Government to refresh, from time to time, the memory of the British Minister in Japan with respect to the duty he had to perform, and the necessity of observing something like moderation and justice. In the midst of what was disagreeable in the papers before the House, there was one agreeable feature in the apparent union existing between the Powers having treaties with Japan. He was glad to perceive that the instructions given to the French Minister appeared to be entirely loyal, and all the foreign representatives seemed to have acted cordially one with another; and he would suggest that it would, perhaps, be well to take advantage of this union, so that by its means something like a rational system might be adopted of dealing with the Japanese, leaving to them the sovereignty of their land, the enjoyment of their ancient customs, and, above all, the liberty to trade or not to trade exactly as they chose.

MR. LAYARD

said, that the well-known sympathy of the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton) for suffering humanity in all parts of the world, the lead he had taken in so many philanthropic questions—his very name even—fully justified him in submitting his opinion on the question before them. He was not disinclined to agree with much that had fallen from the hon. Gentleman, and if he did not agree with all he had said it was because he disputed, not the genera! principles which he had laid down, but the manner in which he had applied them to particular instances, and the deductions he had drawn from certain facts. He owned that it was a most deplorable thing to bombard a great city, and to destroy by fire the habitations of a great number of people, and he entirely sympathised with the hon. Member's eloquent description of the sufferings entailed on the inhabitants by a conflagration such as that which raged at Kagosima. War never ought to be undertaken except on the strongest grounds, and when the party waging war was justified in so doing. When a war was commenced without a just and definite object, or when it was prolonged after the elements of peace had been obtained, every life which was forfeited under such a state of things was a murder weighing on those who brought about the strife. So far there could not be any difference of opinion between himself and his hon. Friend, or, indeed, between any Member of the House. Moreover, his hon. Friend was not entitled to charge him with any want of sympathy for Eastern races. On the contrary, in the House and elsewhere, he had maintained, with all the energy at his command—perhaps, as some might think, with too great energy — the cause of Eastern nations, and had expressed his profound regret and indignation at the manner in which they were too often treated by those who had subdued or were otherwise brought into contact with them. Let them, however, see how far those principles applied to the circumstances of the case before them; but before doing so, he mast reply to the observations which had come from the other side of the House. He was the last man in the world to cast improper imputations upon such a man as Admiral Kuper, or to detract from his merits in any way. He thought that there had recently sprung up in this country too strong a tendency to condemn without sufficient information and inquiry, the conduct of officers abroad. He repudiated with indignation the idea that an English Admiral or General would wantonly destroy human life or property. He had seen as much of war as most civilians, and had had a good deal of experience of military men, and had always found them singularly humane, tender-hearted, and averse to the shedding of blood. It was necessary before going into the facts connected with the destruction of Kagosima, that he should briefly sketch the course of our relations with Japan, as observations very hostile to Her Majesty's Government had been made concerning them. His hon. Friend the Member for Bridgewater (Mr. Kinglake) and others seemed to think that we had forced ourselves on the Japanese. We were not the first nation to enter into treaty arrangements with them. About the time of the war in China, when English arms had met with some success, the American commodore, with a considerable fleet, visited Japan, and without threatening the Japanese he so managed affairs as to lead that people, who knew, to use a common expression, how to put two and two together, to come to the conclusion that they had better have a treaty of commerce with the United States. Up to that time there had been no treaties with Japan, except a convention for the protection of shipwrecked mariners. Russia next stepped in and demanded a treaty similar to that with the United States, which was granted. Two such Powers having obtained treaties, he would put it to the House what would have been said if the English Government had neglected to seek privileges of the same kind? They would have heard the hon. Gentlemen below the gangway denouncing the Government in burning and fiery language, and declaring that when there was a question of balance of power in Europe, or of some waste paper treaties, the Government were quite ready to go to war, but whenever commerce and trade were concerned, the Government would do nothing. There would have been complaints that while there were in the markets of Japan cottons from America and knives and scissors from Russia, the products of Manchester and Sheffield were excluded. On these grounds alone Her Majesty's Government were bound to enter into treaty relations with Japan. He would not ask whether Japan could or could not have remained in the state of isolation at which she aimed. In his opinion, however, islands which had been called the England of the Eastern seas, abounding in products of great use to the civilized world, and lying in what would before long be the great line of intercourse between America, and China, and other parts of the Eastern hemisphere, could not have remained cut off from the rest of the world. At the same time he admitted that we had no right to force ourselves upon them; I but he denied that we had done so. Then, the Government were blamed for having made a treaty with an authority in Japan who had no power to negotiate it; and the hon. Member for Bridgewater said that the whole of our misfortunes arose from that fact. Well, we made the treaty first of all with the same authority to whom the United States and Russia had gone—with the Ty- coon, whom we found at the head of the Government. He had not much faith in a good many of the facts adduced in the course of the debate. True, he had not read, perhaps, every book of travels, such as Holborn to Hakododi or London Bridge to Jeddo, and such like; but he had perused a great many accounts by reliable persons, and had conversed with our agents and others who had resided among the Japanese, and had had great facilities for studying the state of the people. If the information he had received was correct, the country was by no means in such a state of happy tranquillity before we arrived as had been represented in such eloquent language. Mr. Pruyn, the American Minister at Japan, in an interesting despatch laid before Congress, stated that previous to our entrance the people were not at all in a good condition; on the contrary, he described them as most miserable. A certain number of Daimios held sway, who were feudal chiefs with bands of retainers; and the rest of the population were only slaves. In the papers which had been laid before the House, hon. Members would see how the privileged classes and their retainers used their power. Now it was customary for one of the Yakonins to try their swords upon the first unarmed man they might meet in the streets. There were three political parties in Japan, and those who liked to draw historical parallels would, perhaps, find a curious resemblance to the state of parties existing elsewhere. There was first a party called in the papers Torees, who might be said to be the protectionists of that country. These were opposed to all intercourse with foreigners. They were for the protection of native industry. They would have no treaties or communications with foreigners. Then there was a party who were a kind of Liberal Tories, who did not object to communications with foreigners, to trade, and treaties of commerce, on condition that they shared a little of the power, and some of the places in the gift of the Tycoon, And there was the Tycoon party, who wished to keep their places to themselves. They were favourable to foreigners, to trade and treaties with them, on the understanding, however, that they monopolized all the advantages. The Tycoon party thus insisting on everything for their benefit, the Torees and Liberal Torees united and determined to take advantage of the Mikado, the ecclesiastical head. They put forth the cry of "Church and State." They declared that nothing could be done without the consent of the Mikado, whom they put forward as the kind of puppet of their party. The Tycoon boldly went to the Mikado, and he found himself in a position in which it was necessary to give way. The Tycoon proposed a compromise. He pretended he was inclined to drive out the foreigners; and, having satisfied the Mikado on that score, he returned in triumph. Then began a system of deception on all sides. Meanwhile, constant outrages were being committed, not only on the subjects of Her Majesty, but on those of Russia, the United States of America, and other countries. The Tycoon expressed regret, but no redress was obtained. He was afraid of strengthening the hands of his rivals on the one hand, and unwilling, on the other, to lose the profitable connection with foreigners. Still our commerce increased, that fact proving beyond a doubt, notwithstanding the statement of the hon. Member for Bridge-water, that the people themselves, whatever might be the feelings of the Daimios, were our true friends and anxious to trade with us. A great deal had been said about our unwillingness to conciliate the Japanese, and our harsh treatment of them. That charge was wholly without foundation. On the contrary, the British Government had shown throughout every desire to conciliate them, and had made every reasonable concession. The Japanese Government had sent ambassadors to this country to obtain a revision of the treaty, and to ask that two of the most important treaty ports should not be open to trade. Her Majesty's Government, taking into consideration the difficulties by which the Japanese Ministers were surrounded, allowed them to plead their case, and consented to let these two ports remain some time longer closed against our trade. He remembered his hon. Friend the Member for Brighton complaining of this concession and the injustice thus operated to trade. Not only did they make that concession to the Japanese, but they communicated with other Powers, and induced them to make the same concession. The House had so often heard of the outrages which had been committed on British subjects that he would not go into detail. He had done so last year. But at the very moment when they were making these concessions, and showing every disposition to conciliate the Japanese, the horrible murder of Mr. Richardson took place. He regretted to find that some hon. Gentlemen who had spoken in the course of the evening, had tried to cast blame on Mr. Richardson and his party. He knew how often his countrymen in the East had been blamed for their own conduct when any outrage had been committed upon them; but in this case he ventured to say that Mr. Richardson and his friends were not at all to blame—not a single word could be said against them. They were riding in a road which had been opened by treaty. No notice had been given at the time that there was a procession of a Daimio expected, although it was given on the night of the murder, in the hope of deceiving the British authorities. Three gentlemen and a lady were riding on this road; they met a procession; they withdrew off the road and did everything they possibly could to avoid it; but, notwithstanding this, the retainers of the chief, whoever he was, fell upon them and tried to murder them all. The lady escaped by a miracle. Two of the gentlemen were badly wounded, and the fourth was murdered. The hon. and learned Gentleman who moved the Amendment, who had been called a high legal authority, said this was a case of manslaughter. He afterwards characterized it by an expression which he had heard for the first time—he called it a casual murder. Why it should be called a casual murder he could not explain. The evidence went to prove this. One of the party after being cut down fell from his horse, upon which some of these retainers rushed on him; and when afterwards entreating for water knelt on him and cut his throat. That was what an hon. Gentleman, speaking, he supposed, the language of his part of the country, called a casual murder. He thought it about the moat horrible and determined murder he had ever heard of. An attempt had been made to show that we had infringed the customs of the Japanese, and a parallel had been drawn between that case and that of a foreigner meeting the procession of the Lord Mayor in one of the narrow streets of London. But the parallel did not hold, because the road where Mr. Richardson was murdered was an open road, solemnly kept open by treaty. So anxious had they been to meet the wishes of the Japanese, that they had by treaty settled where foreigners should go and where they should not. Without any warning, Mr. Richardson was murdered. What then occurred? The Admiral was urged by the merchants to land the marines, and make an attack on those who had committed the murder, and to obtain possession of the person of the chief. Who prevented those energetic measures which would have certainly led to bloodshed and probably to war? Who, but Colonel Neale and Admiral Kuper, who had now been so much condemned? Had they not a right to demand redress for what had occurred? What would have been said if they had left this barbarous murder unavenged? His hon. Friend who had brought forward the question said he would have voted against a Government which had failed to demand redress. But then it was said they had made a double demand. The noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), in the short and pointed address he made to the House, said he could not satisfy himself as to the justice and propriety of making a double demand. Well, he thought the reason for that was perfectly plain. In the first place, it was not stated that the Japanese Government admitted they could enforce the demands made on Satsuma. They constantly denied that they had the power to do so. They said that the men guilty of the murder had escaped; that they were with Satsuma, and that the Tycoon had no power to arrest them. The Government had made two distinct demands of the Tycoon and Satsuma. They were not for the same thing. These demands were stated distinctly in a despatch from Earl Russell to Colonel Neale, and the grounds on which they were made were twofold; in the first place they demanded £100,000 from the Tycoon, not for the murder, but for the offence of permitting a murderous attack upon a British subject on a public road opened by treaty. That was a fine on him for permitting such outrages on a road he was bound to protect. Then, a demand was made upon the Prince whose retainers had committed the murder, for a sum to be divided among the relatives of the murdered man and amongst those who had suffered. The amount was £25,000. Some might think that was too much, others that it was too little. On that point opinions might differ, but his opinion was that it was reasonable. Mr. Richardson, the murdered man, was a wealthy merchant who was coming home to England, having amassed a fair fortune, and his death was a serious blow to his family, for which they were entitled to some compensation. The lady and the other persons injured were of good position in life. Besides the claim for compensation, the execution of those who were guilty of the outrage was demanded. It had been stated over and over again that they had asked for the execution of Satsuma's father. That was quite contrary to the fact. In the first place, it was not known that the chief in question was Satsuma's father. The first impression was that it was his uncle. The American Minister said that it was his secretary. However, they had not asked either for his uncle or his secretary, but for the trial and punishment of those members of his suite who committed the act. The demand, as the blue-book would show, was for the speedy arrest and bringing to capital punishment, not of the Prince Saboola himself, but of those among his retinue who perpetrated the outrage. It should be remembered that the Prince himself stated that no orders had been given for the attack. If that were so, surely it was right to ask for the punishment of those who committed the offence without orders. Under the circumstances, the demands made were perfectly just. But, supposing they had accepted the excuse of the Tycoon's Government, that Satsuma was beyond its control, and that it could not enforce the punishment of the murderers, then every Daimio would have been encouraged to follow the same course; fresh outrages would have been committed on British subjects; and the Tycoon, when applied to for redress, would have said, "Oh, I have no control over the Daimios." Again, if they had exacted retribution from Satsuma alone, and not from the Tycoon, on any new outrages occurring, the Government would have said, "You must do as you have done before; you must deal with the Daimio; we are not responsible." Therefore, it had been thought best to make both the Government and the Daimio responsible. That, he believed, was the right course. Nor were we the only persons who had punished one of these semi-independent chiefs for acts committed against foreigners. By a reference to the blue-book it would be seen that a joint representation had been made to the Japanese Government by the English, French, Dutch, and American Ministers, stating that they held the Prince of Negato, who had fired on the ships of those nations, responsible for those acts, and they would proceed to punish the wrong-doer; and accordingly the Dutch, French, and American men-of-war went and punished that Prince by destroying his batteries and part of his town. But did the Japanese themselves deny our right to proceed against and punish Satsuma? On the contrary, they recognized it, and offered to send a Japanese man-of-war with a high officer of state to join our force. That vessel not being forthcoming at the last moment, our fleet went without it. That, however, was not a matter of blame to Colonel Neale or Admiral Kuper, but rather to the Government, which having made a distinct promise failed to keep it. Admiral Kuper sailed for Kagosima. It had been stated that the instructions of Earl Russell were not sufficiently distinct; that owing to that circumstance the Admiral acted as he had done, and that the blame consequently must fall entirely on Her Majesty's Government. Now, anybody at all aware how communications were carried on between the Government and its naval officers would know, that a great deal must in these cases be left to circumstances and the discretion of the commander of a fleet. But in this instance there was more than ordinary necessity for giving this direction. When these instructions were sent, the Government had not the slightest idea of the position of Satsuma's residence. All they had heard was that he had a palace or castle near the sea-shore, that he was a very powerful chief who had a considerable trade, for the purposes of which he had purchased certain vessels, that his castle was so situated that our fleet might easily get to it, and that there would be no difficulty in seizing these vessels. That was all they had learnt, and consequently their instructions to the Admiral were founded on very imperfect knowledge. The instructions were necessarily very guarded. Earl Russell said— I have been informed that the territory of the Prince is a peninsula on the most southerly point of the island. He has a port, I am told, at the south-west end of the island of Kiu-siu. The Admiral, or senior naval officer, will be better able to judge than Her Majesty's Government can be, whether it will be most expedient to blockade this port, or whether it will be possible or advisable to shell the residence of the Prince. The despatch went on— I have also been informed that the Prince of Satsuma has steamships brought from Europe of considerable value; these might be seized or detained till redress is obtained. These instructions were framed with a very imperfect knowledge of the position of Satsuma's residence; they did not even know that there was a large town there. [Laughter.] He was at a loss to know why hon. Gentlemen should laugh; but they would seem to have had more knowledge of the geography of Japan than anyone else in England. All the Government knew was that the residence of this Daimio was near the water, and could be reached by shells from the bay. Colonel Neale and Admiral Kuper arrived at Kogosima on the 11th of August. Late in the evening they cast anchor at the entrance of the bay. They afterwards went further up and anchored before the town. What was the very first thing that the Japanese did? They attempted an act of treachery. They invited the envoy and the Admiral to go on shore and negotiate with them. No doubt, many hon. Gentlemen in that House who had such confidence in the Japanese thought those officers were very wrong in not accepting that invitation. However, Colonel Neale and Admiral Kuper, knowing the people with whom they had to deal better, did not deem it prudent to venture into the trap. On the following day a Japanese, calling himself a chief, approached the fleet and asked to come on board the Admiral's vessel, attended by a very large number of followers. In their ignorance about English men-of-war they thought they might capture the vessel by a coup de main. ["Oh!"] There could be no moral doubt of it. He preferred to judge of that by the opinion of those out there than by the notion of hon. Gentlemen in that House. When the Japanese official saw that he was outwitted, he was so overcome that he was speechless, and hurried away as soon as he could. During all that time the batteries were being manned, and Admiral Kuper saw arrangements being made to attack his fleet. It had been most incorrectly stated that he remained under the batteries for the purpose of provoking their fire. The papers distinctly contradicted that. The Admiral said he withdrew from the batteries as far as possible—in fact, he could not anchor further off on account of the extreme depth of water. Well, Satsuma's officers having given a most unsatisfactory answer, beginning by admitting that those who committed the murder ought to be punished, and ending by saying that the murder was due to the breach of an old Japanese law with regard to processions on the road, Colonel Neale, finding further negotiation useless, requested Admiral Kuper to take the matter into his own hands. On the following morning the Admiral directed one of his officers (Captain Borlase) to take posses- sion of Satsuma's steamers, doing at the same time all he possibly could to prevent any act of hostility or bloodshed. Having seized the vessels, it had been asserted that the Admiral "flaunted them" in the face of the Japanese. Now if hon. Gentlemen would look to the map they would see how utterly unfounded were the statements that had got abroad on the subject—statements which he was very sorry to see repeated by the hon. Member for Rochdale. Satsuma's vessels were not in that part of the bay nearest the sea, but at the bottom of the bay, and a glance at the map would show that they could not have been taken out of the bay without passing a point where they would be exposed to the fire of the batteries. And so far from the Admiral placing the captured vessels purposely under the eyes of the Japanese, in order to draw down their fire, he took them to the opposite part of the bay to avoid it. These vessels were no sooner taken than the Japanese opened a tremendous fire of shot and shell upon our fleet. [An hon. Member: Quite right.] An hon. Gentleman exclaimed "Quite right." He did not condemn the Japanese for doing so, but he should condemn any British Admiral who allowed himself to be fired upon without replying to the fire. What would the opinion, not only of that House, but of the whole country, have been if Admiral Kuper, instead of returning that fire, had slipped his anchors and sailed away? It was his bounden duty to return the fire; he could do nothing else. Even supposing he had been justified in not returning the fire from any cause—supposing he had left without retaliating—what would have been the inevitable result? There would have been a cry throughout the whole of Japan that our fleet had been defeated and had run away? There would have been murders without number; the life of not a single foreigner would have been safe. It was clearly the duty of Admiral Kuper, not only as a sailor, but as the representative of the British Government, to return the fire immediately. It was not necessary that he should defend the conduct of Admiral Kuper as regards the destruction of the town. The hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay) had relieved him from that duty. The hon. and gallant Gentleman had stated that it would have been impossible to return the fire of the batteries without setting fire to the town; and as the hon. and gallant Member was a high naval authority he would take his admissions as a complete justification of Admiral Kuper. An hon. Member had stated that Admiral Kuper threw shells into the town; but throughout the despatches there was not a single statement to that effect. It had also been said that the Admiral bombarded the town, but the truth was, that bombardment was not once mentioned in the despatches. Neither Admiral Kuper nor Colonel Neale said a word which could lead to the belief that a single shell was thrown purposely into the town. ["Oh!"] On the second day, no doubt, shells were thrown into the castle of Prince Satsuma, but on the first day, according to the best evidence they had, no shells were thrown into Kagosima. It was the return of the fire of the batteries which inevitably set fire to the town. Now, what was a Japanese town? It was built simply of very thin lathes of bamboo and paper, and nothing else. Very little timber was used. Fires constantly occurred in Japan, and five or six years seldom elapsed without a town being entirely destroyed. The people were so completely prepared for fires that they were always ready to remove themselves at the shortest notice, and in every town a large number of men were maintained for the express purpose of extinguishing fires. Everywhere the people were prepared to withdraw at once from their homes in case of fire. If they had not done so in the present instance, the fault must have lain, not with the British fleet, but with the Japanese authorities themselves. Those authorities had four days' warning, for the fleet arrived on the 11th, and the firing took place on the 15th; it had been their intention from the first to fire upon the fleet, and they must have known that the batteries could not fire upon the fleet without having their fire returned. It was their duty, under these circumstances, to command the people to withdraw. He believed, indeed, that a large portion of the people did withdraw from Kagosima, for in all such cases the first step taken by the Japanese authorities was to advise, and even compel, the inhabitants to remove. Still it was possible that there was some loss of life. No one could deplore it more than he did, but it was some consolation to know that the loss of life must have been very small. It had been his fortune to reside for some time in a city more notorious for fires than, perhaps, any other in the world—Constantinople. Almost every month there was a great fire, consuming the houses of more inhabitants than perhaps were contained in the whole of Kagosima. The houses of Constantinople were built of wood, which became almost like tinder in a short time, and the consequence was that a fire spread with extraordinary rapidity. Within a few hours almost a large portion of the town was gone, and yet during the whole of his residence in Constantinople he never heard of a single case of loss of life from fire. The people were so accustomed to fires that at the first announcement of one they packed up their property in cases made for the purpose, everything was carried away in an incredibly short space of time, and loss of life was scarcely known. These considerations led him to hope that very few lives of innocent persons were lost at Kagosima. No doubt some loss of life occurred among the retainers of the Daimio. We could not reproach ourselves for it, for the retainers of the Daimio fought against us, manned the batteries, and ran all the risks of war. They fought, doubtless, in what they believed to be a good cause, but still they were killed in fair and open warfare. He doubted, however, whether many met their death in consequence of the conflagration. On the second day it was necessary, according to the Admiral's view, and in accordance with his instructions, to destroy the palace of Prince Satsuma. What the noble Lord opposite had stated was perfectly true—that the Admiral could not have left Kagosima, after the dwellings of the poor had been destroyed, with the palace of the chief malefactor remaining untouched. Admiral Kuper, therefore, did quite right in throwing his shells into the palace, and there was no proof that the fire extended to any other part of the town. ["Oh!"] Hon. Gentlemen might, if they pleased, assume that the fire did extend to other parts of the town, but there was no proof of it. ["Oh!"] "Oh!" was not an argument, and if hon. Gentlemen objected to his statement let them get up and refute it if they could. The hon. Member for Maidstone began by saying that he was going to call a number of independent witnesses. Every one must have expected that those witnesses would be persons of a certain standing, whose evidence was of such weight as to warrant the House in listening to them; but what were they? One was a picture in the Illustrated London News. He did not want to say anything against that admirable and useful publication, but those who were in the secret knew how drawings were made of places at the other end of the world, and he doubted whether any person connected with the News was at Kagosima when the engagement took place. It was not impossible, indeed, that a picture of a town in South America had been furbished up to represent a town in Japan. Then the next witness of the hon. Member for Maidstone was a statement in an Aylesbury paper. Now, he had a great respect for an Aylesbury paper, but he could not accept its authority at second hand from his hon. Friend.

MR. BUXTON

The statement was made by a sailor.

MR. LAYARD

said, he should like to know who the sailor was. Seeing, however, that they had got neither his name nor his statement, the hon. Member must allow him to accept in preference the statements of an English Admiral. Such was briefly the history of what took place at Kagosima. He wished now to call attention to the Motion of his hon. Friend. With respect to Admiral Kuper, as he had already stated, the Government had no desire to impute any blame to that gallant and distinguished officer; on the contrary, it was their duty—it was the duty of the country—to support him. It had been asked why they had not given him the same reward as was given to Colonel Neale. Colonel Neale had been rewarded, not for what had taken place at Kagosima, but—and the distinction was clearly marked—for the tact, judgment, and discretion which he had shown in bringing to an end a most difficult and complicated negotiation. Why the Government had not acted towards Admiral Kuper in the same way was simply this—there was a strong feeling in the country with respect to Admiral Kuper; the Government viewed the occurrences at Kagosima with regret, and they thought it only just to Admiral Kuper that he should be allowed an opportunity of giving the fullest explanations. For his own part, he had no doubt that those explanations would be satisfactory, and, in the meantime, he thought it would be most unwise, unjust, and ungenerous for the House to pass such a resolution as that before it, which, after all, was neither more nor less than a vote of censure. He felt confident that Admiral Kuper had not wilfully or wantonly injured Kagosima, but the fact was that he could not have responded to the fire of the batteries without setting fire to the town. It had been intimated that Her Majesty's Government felt no regret for the damage done to the town. Now, the first thing they did after receiving an account of what had taken place, was to write a despatch expressing regret that the town had been unfortunately injured. That regret had been embodied in the Speech of the Royal Commissioners; it had been re-echoed in that House; it had been felt by the country; and, therefore, there was no more to be said on that point. But the Government went even further, for if hon. Gentlemen would turn to the instructions subsequently sent to Japan, they would find that not only had the Government expressed their regret, but had also done all they possibly could to prevent the recurrence of the same misfortune in future. In a despatch dated November 14 would he found the following passage:— Her Majesty's Government are especially desirous that while British persons and property are effectually protected, no injury should be inflicted upon the Japanese population. With this view it will be incumbent upon the Admiral or senior officer in command on the Japanese waters to endeavour to confine hostilities undertaken by him, as far as possible, consistently with due protection to British subjects, their property, and their commerce, to forts and batteries not surrounded by the dwellings and places of the non-combatant inhabitants. It is, of course, part of the duty of the officers in command of ships to return the fire of hostile batteries wherever they may be situated, but, in planning expeditions to stations on the coast, the difference between forts placed to disturb commerce and batteries erected for the defence of populous towns should always be borne in mind, and the first-mentioned of these two classes of forts should be the object of attack, in all cases where there is no absolute necessity to attack batteries of the second class. Therefore not only did Her Majesty's Government and the House express regret, but every precaution against the recurrence of such an event, unless, as in the case before them, it became unavoidable, had been taken. The main part of the resolution was that which affirmed the Act to be contrary to the usages of war prevailing among civilized nations. Was that so? Certainly not. The distinction was very clear. If a city or town was provided with batteries or other means of offence, and ships, brought in collision with those batteries and returning their fire, burnt down the place, it was a very different case from that of burning down a defenceless town. The distinction was maintained during the Crimean war, and it was well known that, although there were magazines and materials most valuable to the Russians in Odessa, as Odessa was not a fortified place it was spared. Without going back too far, let the House look at bombardments which had occurred since 1816. In that year Algiers was bombarded by the British fleet because our Consul had been insulted, and the Algerine Government refused redress. In 1830 Antwerp was bombarded. The bombardment of Beyrout, and the bombardment of Acre were in 1840. Barcelona was bombarded by the Spanish Government in 1843. The legitimacy of the proceeding in neither case was called in question. Then came two very strong instances, quite as strong as that which they were discussing. In 1844 certain robber tribes committed depredations on the French territory adjoining that of Morocco. The French Government demanded redress, and on its being refused they bombarded Tangier and Mogador. They bombarded Tangier first, and afterwards Mogador, which was a peaceful town, and the private property of the Emperor of Morocco; and not only did they destroy the greater part of it, but they allowed the barbarians to come down from the hills, kill many of the inhabitants, and sack the place. Then there was the bombardment of Rome in 1849, which was continued for more than a month. He would next call attention to an instance which he was quite certain his hon. Friends below the gangway would not censure, because that bombardment was the act of a Power which the hon. Member for Birmingham usually held up to them as a model—namely, the United States. It was the bombardment of Greytown in 1854. In consequence of differences about a canal, the American Government sent vessels to Greytown. A few hours' notice was given to the inhabitants, and the place was bombarded. The buildings, being of stone and wood, were not sufficiently injured, and the crews were landed, who pillaged and sacked the town and burnt it to the ground. What did the President of the United States say in his Message about a bombardment of a town which had no batteries, and where ships had not been fired upon—a peaceful town without defences?— The arrogant contumacy of the offenders rendered it impossible to avoid the alternative, either to break up their establishment, or to leave them impressed with the idea that they might persevere with impunity in a career of insolence and plunder. He was sure his hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, would not call in question that authority. But was that all? What was taking place at that moment? Charles- ton was being bombarded, but not as an act of defence against any batteries, or as a necessity of war. Greek fire and missiles of the most terrible description were constantly being thrown into the town, merely as an act of aggression. They heard of women and children being killed, and yet a large number of persons in this country, and even some in that House, justified that bombardment. But the most heartrending and deplorable account of a bombardment which he ever read was not a bombardment by sea. It was that of Jacksonville. There was a town which had risen up in a few years, and which possessed churches, theatres, public buildings, public walks, and everything to render it beautiful. The town was razed to the ground; everything was destroyed, and all was justified as a legitimate act of warfare. [MR. ROEBUCK: A wrongful act by another nation does not justify us in committing similar acts.] He did not justify such acts, he condemned them as much as any man, but he quoted these cases to show that bombardment was regarded by civilized nations as one of the proper usages of war. The Resolution stated what was not the case in saying that the bombardment of Kagosima was contrary to the usages of war among civilized nations, and therefore the House could not agree to it. Even in Japan we had not been alone. The American ship Wyoming was sent to punish one of the Daimios, and what did her commander state in his report? "A number of shells exploded in the batteries, and considerable damage was done to the town." The French, too, in order to punish a Daimio, landed and destroyed one of his villages. The papers which had been presented to Parliament showed that in our proceedings and our policy we had received the cordial assistance of the French and Dutch Governments. But his hon. Friend found fault with our policy, and said it was not sufficiently conciliatory. He thought we should have given way, and not noticed the outrages which had been committed. At the outset, however, the United States pursued in Japan the opposite policy to ours, and such as was recommended that night. An American Secretary of Legation was murdered, and the house of the Legation was burnt. It was declared that these were accidents, and no apology was tendered. Every excuse, however, was made, and pursuing their system of conciliation no reparation was demanded by the American Government. Other out- rages on American subjects followed, and still no redress was demanded. The American Minister contrasted the favourable position in which he stood towards the Japanese with that of other Governments. But on the 16th of June, Mr. Pruyn, writing to Mr. Seward, said— I have not been anxious till recently for the presence of any of our naval force here. But my opinions have undergone a great change, and I now content myself with the simple proposition. It must be obvious to the President that the presence of Commodore Perry's powerful fleet first opened Japan, and it is both natural and undeniable that the same means must be relied on, for some time at least, to preserve to the world what was thus gained. It was the presence of the British fleet and of other vessels of war in these waters which has brought about a peaceful solution of the late complications. My advice and that of every representative of all the treaty Powers, and of all Powers combined, would have been powerless without such force. There was a complete answer to the recommendation of the hon. Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell), that the British Government ought to have adopted a more conciliatory course than they had done towards the Japanese. Mr. Pruyn had not only recommended the President of the United States to reverse the policy which that country had pursued towards Japan, but to make a great demonstration upon Osaca, and march his troops up to Kioto, one of the principal cities, and insist upon reparation for the wrongs done to American subjects. The Americans -were so conciliatory, so long-suffering, that they allowed a Secretary of Legation to be murdered and the Legation house to be burnt, without taking any notice of such acts; and now they were compelled to admit that the only policy to preserve peaceful relations with Japan was the policy which Her Majesty's Government were blamed for pursuing. Mr. Pruyn might be right, or he might be wrong; but after a long experience he admitted the opposite policy had failed, and that, in his opinion, our policy was wise and just. It was very easy to criticize, but what policy was proposed? Were we to do as the Dutch did when they were confined to Desima—grovel on our bellies and submit to every kind of insult? Then let us remember that the position of the Dutch became so intolerable that they were obliged to give up the trade. He was inclined to think it better to trust to the judgment of our agents on the spot than to the judgment of persons who had had no opportunity of personal observation; and it must not be forgotten that, after all the hostilities, our trade with Japan was rapidly increasing from year to year. Out of the £7,000,000 invested in the trade with Japan more than one-half belonged to this country, the fruits of British industry. Amongst other accusations against Colonel Neale it had been asserted, that in his demands upon the Japanese authorities with regard to the sale of silk he had violated the principles of free trade; but the question involved was not one of free trade at all. One of the principal objects of the mission of the Japanese Ambassadors to this country was to obtain from the British Government a promise to allow the Tycoon and his adherents to enjoy a monopoly of the silk trade, but such a concession was refused. All that was conceded to their representations was that the trade in silk should be carried on under certain restrictions. Difficulties had from time to time arisen on the subject; every kind of artifice was had recourse to to prevent the free sale of silk; and Colonel Neale had received information that one merchant had been killed because he wished to sell his silks to foreign traders, the fact being that the small traders were prevented from bringing down their silks with that object. The consequence was that Colonel Neale had demanded that those restrictions, being contrary to treaty, should be removed. The answer of the Japanese Government was that it was a question of free trade, with which they had nothing to do; but the best proof that that answer was simply an excuse was that, upon the matter being duly taken up, the Tycoon took alarm and the silk was sent to market. Our only relations, he might further observe, with Japan were relations of commerce; we had no political views with regard to that country. The Government were simply carrying out in its case the views advocated by those gentlemen below the gangway who were for ever telling the Government that it was their duty to open fresh markets all over the world. It was the pressure which they put on which led to such cases as the present; and if hon. Gentlemen, instead of making exciting speeches in the country and leading the people to imagine that the Government were always forcing the Chinese and Japanese into a war, would endeavour to impress upon our merchants the expediency of being less eager to extend their trade—of being more moderate, and of giving the Government credit for doing all that lay in their power to effect that object, there would, he believed, be considerably fewer difficulties than at present. In making these observations, he did not wish to say a single word against the British merchants in the East. Many of them were very honest and very industrious as well as enlightened men; but he was nevertheless of opinion, from what he knew of the East, that all our difficulties were created by British traders in that part of the world. He did not, in making that statement, refer to the great commercial houses, but rather to the host of little traders who rushed in and seemed to think that the Government had nothing to do but to support them in all their preposterous pretensions. With respect to the Motion under discussion, he had simply to say, in conclusion, that he was quite willing that the opening words, which cast an undeserved reflection on Admiral Kuper, should, as proposed by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, be withdrawn, while he could not even then give his assent to the remaining portion, inasmuch as to do so would be to admit that the bombardment of a town was inconsistent with the usages of war. If, therefore, his hon. Friend should press his Motion, he should meet it by moving the Previous Question.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

said, that in a paragraph in Lord Russsell's Despatch. Colonel Neale was informed that Her Majesty had been pleased to confer upon him the Companionship of the Bath because of the firmness and good temper which he had displayed in his negotiations with the Japanese authorities. He could not therefore but express his regret that while that Gentleman, who was chiefly known to the world as the comrade in the East of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had had his services thus acknowledged, the gallant and meritorious officer, who faithfully and with the utmost patience and perseverance carried out the instructions of the Secretary of State, was left wholly unrewarded. Now, he had known the career of that gallant seaman for a period of forty years, and he believed that he had uniformly discharged his duties with great zeal and ability; and he had to add that the Government would be improperly deserting their officer if they did not distinctly acknowledge his services. The orders issued by the Secretary of State as to the bombardment of Kagosima exhibited the greatest possible ignorance in respect to Eastern cities. From China to Egypt the yaman, or principal residences, was surrounded by outer buildings, and it was, he contended, impossible in these cases to engage the forts and at the same time to prevent the town from being burnt. Admiral Kuper, moreover, fought under the greatest disadvantages; indeed, he was convinced that had not that gallant officer been trammeled by the action of another, he would never have fought under the circumstances nor in the position in which he did. There was no spot at which he could anchor with any reasonable chance of holding on, so that he was obliged to fight under way, and as it happened in a breeze, which ended in a gale, and with such an oscillation of his ships that he could not possibly avoid, in attacking the forts, setting fire to the town. The Admiral had been directed to destroy the castle of Prince Satsuma; and he had done absolutely nothing which did not necessarily accompany his obedience of that order. He should further say that he believed the destruction of the town did not lead to anything like the same scene of misery which would follow such an operation in a European country. The people of the East easily escaped from their lightly constructed dwellings, and soon repaired the losses which they thus sustained. As an illustration he might observe, that he had seen on the 30th of November, 1822, 14,000 houses destroyed in Canton by a conflagration which lasted only ten or twelve hours. Being engaged at the time in the East India Company's service in that quarter, he was employed in trying to save the inhabitants, but not a single soul was to be found to be saved, except a few women with very small feet who could not get away. Not a single man could be discovered in the place, but many were to be seen sailing down the river with chests before them, in which they had been able to pack up all their effects at a moment's notice. On returning to the town two years after he saw the streets exactly in the same state as they were before the fire took place, and the same signs over the doorways; so that he could bear testimony to the fact, that when an Eastern city was burnt, there was not anything like the misery occasioned which the hon. Gentleman who opened the discussion that evening had so graphically depicted.

MR. W. E. FORSTER

said, that he had listened to the speech of his hon. Friend the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs with great pain: with great pain for two reasons—first, because he had hoped that the Government would have been willing to accept the very moderate Resolution of the hon. Member for Maidstone; and, secondly, because he was sorry to hear his hon. Friend defending an act when committed by our own countrymen, which, had it been done by others, he would have most loudly condemned. He did not intend to enter at all into the question of the treaty, because the House could hardly judge the general policy of the Government in Japan until they had received information as to what was then and was likely to be in future their real position with reference to Prince Satsuma, the Tycoon, and the Japanese people. What they were called upon to do that evening was to express an opinion upon the bombardment of Kagosima. Before addressing himself to the general question, lie would refer to a matter of detail which was of some importance. On page 100 of the blue-book there was a memorandum of a conversation which took place between Admiral Kuper and Colonel Neale and the Japanese envoys on the night of the 14th, the day before the bombardment. At the end of that memorandum there was this curious paragraph— Admiral Kuper: Colonel Neale wishes to settle the question with you amicably; and if by to-morrow at ten o'clock a.m. you do not do so, the matter will be handed over into my hands, when I shall commence by not allowing a single boat to pass. (The Japanese officials rose to leave.) Colonel Neale: Your reply, which may be a refusal, having been delivered, do you propose further to communicate with us? Admiral Kuper: We wish you to communicate with us again to-morrow before ten a.m., your boat flying a white flag. Japanese: Perhaps we will send before ten to-morrow morning. Admiral Kuper: That would be better. Colonel Neale: Your envoys and boats will not be molested whatever may be the nature of your despatch. Yet it appeared from Admiral Kuper's despatches both to the Admiralty and to Colonel Neale, that, notwithstanding that there had been an understanding that the envoys of Satsuma were to be allowed that interval before the matter was placed in the hands of the Admiral, at daylight the next morning, he sent vessels to seize the steamers and thereby in effect commence hostilities. He did not advance that as a charge against either the Admiral or Colonel Neale, but it was a matter which needed explanation, more especially after the gra- tuitous assertion of the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, that the invitation to Admiral Kuper and Colonel Neale to go ashore was given with a perfidious intention of entrapping them into an ambush. Such might have been the case, but there was no proof that it was so, and therefore such an assertion ought not to have been introduced into the debate. Approaching the general question, there were two points upon which they were all agreed. They all felt how deplorable and lamentable was this terrible tragedy, and they all shared in the regret which had been felt throughout the country that it should have happened. The only question was whether it was matter merely for regret or also for blame; and, if so, upon whom did the blame rest? The question whether there was any blame depended upon whether or not the destruction of the houses of unoffending inhabitants was intentional. The hon. Under Secretary had not exactly denied that it was intentional. He had rather followed the curious expression in the Royal Speech, in which the word "incidental" appeared to have been used with the view of giving the idea that the occurrence was accidental, without exactly saying so. He had attempted to throw doubt on the reasons given by the hon. Member for Maidstone, for believing that the bombardment was intentional, but when the public had read the two speeches they would, he believed, remain of opinion that such was the case. There was really abundant proof that it was intentional. There were the private letters, two or three of them written by officers, and one probably by the master of the Euryalus. Those letters were written without any inducement to misrepresent the truth, the writers apparently having no idea that the shelling of the town would be considered in England a wrong or disgraceful act. They were, therefore, impartial and truthful, and they contained over and over again such expressions as "We shelled the town," or "The town was shelled." The statements in those letters would carry conviction to the minds of the British public. Then go to the official despatches. What did they establish? They began with the statement that Admiral Kuper and Colonel Neale, a few hours before the contest commenced, threatened the Japanese envoys with the destruction of their town, and ended with a statement from Colonel Neale that they had carried out their instructions in letter and in spirit, and among other things had reduced the capital of Satsuma to ashes, Some hon. Members might have been surprised that the Motion had not been met with the usual answer, "Wait for explanations from Japan." He, however, was not at all surprised, because he ventured to prophesy that when the explanations were received they would be full of wonder that we should have expected anything else than exactly what had happened. He said, therefore, that inasmuch as the act was undoubtedly intentional, it was blameworthy. His hon. Friend had mentioned several cases in which he said that similar acts had been committed by other Governments. He did not know the particular circumstances of those cases, but the cheers of abhorrence with which the mention of some of those acts was received, convinced him that the Government would find it necessary to accede to this Resolution; for he felt sure that the House would think that this was a matter in regard to which it was their duty to call the Government to account, and that if they were eloquent in denunciation of the atrocities of other countries, they ought to be still more careful to express their opinion upon those of their own. He dared say that the hon. and learned Attorney General would take part in the debate, and he hoped that he would state whether it was in accordance with the laws of war intentionally to destroy the houses of unoffending people and non-combatants in a large town.

Then came the question, If the destruction of the town was blameworthy, upon whom ought the blame to fall? It could only fall among three people. It might fall upon all three, upon two, or upon only one of them. It might fall upon the Admiral who conducted the bombardment, upon the Minister who instigated it, or upon the Minister at home who gave the instructions which led to it. He must say that he did not acquit any of them. He did not acquit Admiral Kuper altogether, but he acknowledged as much as any Member of the House that great allowances must be made for him. He was placed in most difficult circumstances. It was evidently a difficult battle to conduct; there were all the naval difficulties which had already been described, and great allowances must be made for the Admiral. He did not wish to press upon him too severely, but he was sure that even his own friends must regret the tone of his despatch and the absence of any expression of sorrow for what he had done. However, they must not judge a sailor too hardly on such a matter. Colonel Neale he considered more deeply responsible than Admiral Kuper, because it was his business, having the Admiral under his orders, and being constantly by his side, to consider what would be the result of the operations as regarded humanity and as regarded our policy. But Colonel Neale was in a most difficult position, and great allowances must also be made for him. Colonel Neale for a whole year had been living in constant danger of assassination, and he must say that, after most carefully reading his despatches, he could not but admire the general courage and forbearance with which he met the difficulties of his position. They must also remember that he had behind him an alarmed and indignant body of Englishmen, who were pressing him to violent action, which pressure—and he ought to have credit for that—he had most commendably resisted. Both the Admiral and the Minister were in a most difficult position, and all depended upon the tone of the instructions which they received from home. He must honestly confess that he exceedingly deplored the manner in which those instructions were conveyed to them. Earl Russell, writing to Colonel Neale on the 24th of December, 1862, said— If the Daimio Satsuma should not immediately agree to and carry into effect the terma demanded of him, the Admiral should go with his own ship, and with such others as he may think fit to take with him, or he should send a sufficient force to the territory of the Prince, which I have been informed is a peninsula on the most southerly point of the island. He has a port, I am told, at the south-west end of the Island of Kiu-siu. The Admiral or senior naval officer will be better able to judge than Her Majesty's Government can be, whether it will be most expedient to blockade this port, or whether it will be possible or advisable to shell the residence of the Prince. It was quite clear that the idea of shelling the residence of the Prince was suggested by the Foreign Minister, who must or ought to have known that it would be impossible to shell that residence without shelling the town. It was indeed quite clear that the idea of shelling the town was suggested in that despatch; and so it seemed to have been understood by both Admiral Kuper and Colonel Neale, for on the second day—when there was no excuse of the hot blood of conflict—when the first conflagration was over—he fired at some batteries which were being raised on the hill above him, and in doing this he said he took the opportunity of shelling the residence of the Prince on the other side of the harbour, in the course of which the remaining half of the town was destroyed. Taken by themselves, the proceedings of the first day might have left it doubtful whether the destruction of the houses was intentional, but what took place on the second day could leave no doubt on the matter. At page 97 would be found Admiral Kuper's description of his doings on the second day, and his own words showed that he went in to carry out Lord Russell's suggestion, and in doing that destroyed the other half of the town. The Admiral said— On the following afternoon, the gale having moderated, and as I deemed it necessary to remove the squadron to a safer anchorage than the great depth of water opposite Kagosima afforded, and having also observed the Japanese at work erecting batteries on the hill immediately above the little bay where the small vessels were at anchor close to the shore, we weighed, and passing in line between the batteries of Kagosima, steamed out, and anchored to the southward of the island. The opportunity was taken to shell the batteries on the Sakeira side, which had not been previously engaged, and also the palace of the Prince in Kagosima. These operations were attended with complete success: there is every reason to suppose that the palace has been destroyed, as many shells were seen to burst in it, and the fire, which is still raging, affords reasonable ground for believing the entire town of Kagosima is now a mass of ruins. [Mr. LAYARD: We had an imperfect knowledge of the place.] That might be, but it was no excuse. There were shops in London in which books might have been bought which would have informed the Foreign Office that Kagosima was a large and thickly populated place. The hon. and gallant officer opposite (Sir James Elphinstone) would have told them that the Prince's residence was likely to be in the very middle of the city, and certainly they ought to have been acquainted with all such facts before they sent out such instructions. They might say that they were too much occupied, but what occupation could be more useful than preventing such events as these? Certainly, what with giving lessons in humanity to Russia, and lecturing Austria and Prussia on international law, the Foreign Office had been very busy lately; but, after all, that giving uncalled for advice was a mere luxury. Their proper business was, when they took the direction of important operations such as that under consideration, to obtain all the information in their power. It was no excuse for the Foreign Office to say that they sent out the despatch with imperfect knowledge. Probably there was no one in the kingdom who would more regret the sending of his despatch than. Lord Russell. He had declaimed eloquently against such transactions on a former occasion, and any one who had watched his career would know how deeply he would regret that such lamentable results had flown from the carelessness with which he had written his despatch. Still, it would have been fairer to Admiral Kuper, and to our Minister out there, it would have been more honourable to this country and to himself, if he had candidly expressed that regret, and if he had said he was sorry for the carelessness of his despatch. There was no sign of any feeling of that sort in the despatches which ho had written since the news of this bombardment came to England. But what the noble Lord had failed to do it was the duty of the House of Commons to do. Since he had been in Parliament much time had been taken up in discussing the conduct of foreign Princes and people. He was not one of those who believed that these expressions of moral disapprobation did much good. It was impossible for foreign countries to believe that we were merely talking; they thought that there were acts behind our words, and, being perplexed as to whether our moral reprobation was to be enforced or not, they became provoked and irritated. Our expression of opinion misled the oppressed and irritated the oppressors, seldom convinced, and much less seldom persuaded. But there could be no doubt that it was the duty of the House of Commons to express its opinion on such acts as these committed by the authorized agents of the Crown. He hoped that his hon. Friend would consent to the Amendment which had been moved by the hon. and learned Gentleman opposite, for it was no part of the business of the House to apportion the blame; and that then the Resolution would be accepted by the Government. It was impossible for the House to repair the harm which had been done. They could not compensate those who had been turned out of their houses, nor call to life again the women and children who had been killed; nor could they erase from the memory of the Japanese the lesson Admiral Kuper had taught them as to the value of commercial intercourse, and the superiority of Christianity and civilization. They would long remember how, only a few hours after Admiral Kuper told them we were the first nation in the world, and that they were barbarians, he showed them the difference between English civilization and Japanese barbarism. The House should express its disapproval of the act which had been committed, and therefore clear themselves of all responsibility for it. It could, by the vote proposed, tell our Admirals and Ministers abroad, and also our Ministers at home, that they were responsible for such outrages—for the destruction of a town containing 180,000 inhabitants, without warning or notice—and that, if such atrocities were repeated, they would be visited with more severe condemnation than that contained in this moderate Resolution, which, he believed, would receive the assent of the country, and which he trusted the Government would accept.

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Sir, the debate has gone very fully into the whole policy which of late years has been pursued in Japan. Into that wide field I do not intend to enter, but I think it most important that the House should remember what is the Motion on which it is proposed to vote. Assuming, in accordance with what appears to be the general agreement of the House, that the words proposed to be omitted are left out, the Motion will run thus— That this House deeply regrets the burning of the town of Kagosima, as being contrary to those usages of war which prevail among civilized nations, to which it is the duty and policy of this country to adhere. We shall, therefore, not be voting on any particular question connected otherwise than most remotely with the general policy of this country towards Japan; but we shall be affirming three propositions, as to two of which no doubt can be entertained in this House or the country, the third being one which, on consideration, I think they will find it impossible to adopt. What are these three propositions? The first is that the House deeply regrets the burning of the town of Kagosima. In its address to the Grown the House has already echoed the expression of Her Majesty's deep regret, shared by the whole country, that this calamity should have occurred; and neither the hon. Gentleman who moved this Motion, nor any other hon. Member, I venture to say, can with more fervent sincerity express his regret than I and all those who sit around me are prepared to do. As to the second proposition, that it is the policy and duty of this country to adhere to the usages of war which prevail among civilized nations, there can be no possible difference of opinion; and I am happy to say that I can take no exception whatever to the statement of the usages of war prevailing among civilized nations which was made by my hon. Friend the Member for Maidstone. It will be a sad day when any of those usages are questioned; for nothing can be more certain than that the wanton destruction of the dwellings or property of innocent non-combatants, the wilful ravaging of a country, or the burning of a town or city, without any necessity arising out of the legitimate exigencies of war, is clearly condemned by the usages of all civilized nations. And it must not be supposed that my hon. Friend the Member for Southwark, in referring to those usages as having in practice admitted the bombardment of towns, intended for one moment to let it be understood that he or any Member of Her Majesty's Government could for a moment contemplate such an event as the bombardment of a large town with many inhabitants without the utmost horror and regret. Nevertheless, it is undoubtedly true that the usages of war prevalent among civilized nations, do not proscribe with any absolute prohibition military operations which may involve even that deplorable consequence: and therefore it would not be true to say that the burning of the town is of itself contrary to the usages of war prevailing among civilized nations, unless you could show that it was a wilful and wanton and unnecessary act, in no degree consequent on or required by the exigencies of military service. On that subject the very authorities to which the hon. Member for Maid-stone referred are those to which I should wish to appeal. He read a passage from Martens, in which it was said:— All the means necessary to the reduction of a fortress are justified by the laws of war; consequently, there are cases which may authorize the demolition or burning of the suburbs. But, except in cases of necessity, it is now admitted that the besiegers ought to direct their artillery against the fortificatious only, and not intentionally against the public edifices or any other buildings either within or without the ramparts. If the House affirms that the usages of war have been violated in the present instance, it must come judicially to the conclusion that Admiral Kuper did intentionally direct his artillery, not against the fortifications, but against the dwellings of the peaceful inhabitants surrounding the city. I beg to put this point before hon. and gallant Gentlemen, who always stand up with becoming zeal for the gallant services to which they belong. It is impossible to affirm the words in this resolution without attributing that deliberate intention to Admiral Kuper; for the moment it is admitted that the conflagration was the inevitable consequence of operations necessary to the military service in which he was engaged, it is plain that the case is outside the rule laid down, the terms of which I have just read. My hon. Friend quoted a passage from Vattel in which that writer speaks with horror of unnecessary bombardments and burnings of towns, which he says are to be regarded as odious and abominable. But that same writer says that though— The law of nations, while it condemns all hostility which in its own nature and independent of circumstances does not contribute to the success of our array, does not increase our strength, or weaken our enemy; on the contrary, permits or tolerates every act which in itself and in its own nature is proper for the purposes of the war, without stopping to consider the degree of necessity in the particular case—at all events, unless the exception from the general rule rests upon the clearest evidence. It is obvious that if we throw upon every Admiral or General employed in naval or military service the burden of justifying in each particular case the precise degree of severity which he used, where any misfortune results from operations undertaken to give effect to his instructions, we are placing him in a position in which no officer ought ever to be placed, and rendering it impossible for any one to be employed without incurring the risk of perpetual odium and disgrace. Had Earl Russell written a despatch to Admiral Kuper or to Colonel Neale, saying, "Her Majesty's Government order you to proceed to Kagosima and bombard the town," it would have been the duty of the officer to execute that dreadful command, throwing the whole responsibility upon Her Majesty's Government. But what were the instructions issued by Earl Russell? "The Admiral, or senior naval officer, will be better able to judge than Her Majesty's Government can be, whether it will be most expedient to blockade this port, or whether it will be possible or advisable to shell the residence of the Prince." It is impossible to say that these instructions relieved the Admiral from the duty of adhering to the usages of civilized nations. There is no instruction to set those usages at defiance; no direction to bombard without necessity a peaceful town and destroy the inhabitants. There is an express reference to the discretion and judgment of the naval officer, and no command whatever to commit unnecessary and wanton acts of destruction upon private dwellings or residents. Admiral Kuper did not intentionally fire on private buildings; lie executed an operation of war. And there is not one of those writers who says you cannot reduce castles, or fortresses, or batteries, because by the operations necessary for that purpose it may happen that suburbs or peaceful dwellings surrounding these fortifications will be destroyed. Let the House consider what the consequences would be if such a rule were laid down. From this very case it appears, that in Japan there are a number of great feudal lords or petty sovereigns, who, having their own castles and fortifications—nay, apparently having taken measures to provide themselves with fleets and men-of-war without regard to the Tycoon, or any other authority in the country, are carrying on war with anybody who may sail a vessel through the straits—French, Dutch, or American, all alike. In that state of circumstances some persons, no doubt, will hold that the best course would be to retire from Japan altogether, and to withdraw from future intercourse with that part of the world. As I said before, I will not enter into that larger question. But suppose you do not withdraw? Will any one undertake to say that this nest of feudal lords, or robbers, or whatever you please to call them, may carry on war on their own account directed against the commerce of all civilized nations, and upon land may murder any Europeans who happen to meet their bodies of retainers, and yet are to be entirely exempt from the operations of war in return, because, forsooth, these castles, or ships of war, or fortifications, are so situated, that it is difficult to reduce or take them without the risk of damaging some unoffending habitations? All I can say is, that in this case we have an instance of those horrors of war which should make us wish to see war as seldom as possible; but if we are to deal with the usages of civilized nations, it is quite certain that no usage ever accepted by civilized nations exempts from the operations of war military castles, batteries, and fortifications, such as those of the Prince of Satsuma. And because calamities of this kind may follow naval and military operations, are you, therefore, to abstain from the latter altogether? Operations involving such consequences may be good policy or they may be bad policy, but they are not contrary to the usages of civilized nations. The authorities referred to in this debate all say that if those deplorable casualties follow from the legitimate operations of war, the usages of civilized nations do not proscribe them, however much humanity may deplore them. Therefore I say it is impossible to vote for the motion unless the House think that Lord Russell, Colonel Neale, or Admiral Kuper did wantonly, willingly, and in a manner not necessary for the legitimate purposes of warlike operations, cause the destruction of this large town. Well then, I ask, Is there any foundation for this accusation against any one of those three persons? As to Earl Russell, I have heard some gentlemen say that he ought not to have authorized—for he did not direct—that he ought not to have indicated, or suggested operations against the residence of the Prince Satsuma—not a private residence, the House will observe, but the castle of a great military lord, without knowing more than he did know about it—namely, without knowing its situation in reference to the buildings which, it now appears, surrounded it. My hon. Friend the Member for Bradford (Mr. Forster) has expressed an opinion, for which no doubt he has reason, that Lord Russell might have discovered that the residence of this Daimio was near the buildings of the town of Kagosima. From any inquiries which I have been able to make, as to the means of acquiring information on the subject, it appears to me that we were not within reach of that information. It is therefore that Earl Russell states he has not that information, and leaves it to the naval officer to exercise his discretion. But, whether you blame Earl Russell or not for doing that which, I suppose, has been done in every warlike operation—namely, indicating the general character of the operations which it may be advisable to take, and leaving it to those on the spot to form a better judgment than could possibly be formed at home—one thing is clear, that Earl Russell did not order wantonly, willingly, and unnecessarily the destruction of the private residences of the peaceful inhabitants. If Earl Russell had known the exact situation of affaire, I say without fear of contradiction from any one acquainted with the writings of the authorities on these subjects, he would have been justified in giving instructions to our agents to reduce those fortifications and silence those batteries, even though the accomplishment of these objects might involve the destruction of the town. But Earl Russell did not act in that way; for when he was aware of what might follow from such operations, he writes "Avoid all operations that may lead to such consequences." It may be said that it is a pity he did not know that, and give these instructions sooner. No doubt Earl Russell may regret that he was not aware of those circumstances sooner; but will any one blame him for not having anticipated the consequences that followed from the first attack? Still more will any one seriously say that in writing that despatch Earl Russell ordered the destruction of these buildings wantonly, willingly, and unnecessarily? As to Colonel Neale, it is not fair that because he was onboard the Admiral's ship he is to be considered as having stimulated that officer to destroy and shell the town, and that the responsibility of what was done by the Admiral should be thrown upon him. Colonel Neale did what I believe is always done under similar circumstances. He handed over the responsibility to the Admiral, leaving him to exercise his discretion as to the measures which ought to be taken. In page 82 of the papers hon. Members will find that, writing on the 15th of July to Admiral Kuper, Colonel Neale says:— I have, therefore, the honour to request you to direct such portion of the squadron under your command as you may deem expedient to proceed, as early as practicable, to the territory of the Prince of Satsuma, with the view that I may be enabled to prefer the demands I have been instructed to make, and, in the event of a refusal on the part of the Prince to accede to those demands, that I may be in a position to call upon you to adopt such coercive measures as you may consider best calculated to enforce their acceptance. There is not the least reason to believe that any other course than that was taken by Colonel Neale. Then, will it be said that Admiral Kuper was guilty of wantonly, willingly, and unnecessarily shelling the town? If so, I must say I think that is an accusation entirely unsupported by the facts of the case. One observation made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bradford is entirely erroneous, and contains a very serious imputation on the Admiral—namely, that having on the previous evening told the messengers of the Prince of Satsuma he would give him till ten o'clock the next morning to make his submission, he acted in a manner inconsistent with that promise, and commenced operations at an earlier hour. I say there is no foundation for that. On the contrary, as I read the account as given by the Admiral, I say that be faithfully kept his word. The passage referred to by my hon. Friend is on page 97 of the papers, but in it the Admiral does not say he commenced operations at an earlier hour. What he says is— I immediately directed Captain Borlase, of the Pearl, to proceed at daylight on the following morning with a portion of the squadron to a bay to the northward of Kagosima, for the purpose of seizing and bringing to our anchorage three steamers, the property of the Prince, which had been previously ascertained to be lying there; Captain Borlase was also desired to avoid, as much as possible, all unnecessary bloodshed or active hostility. It was perfectly justifiable for him to direct a portion of the squadron to go into a position for service at an earlier hour than ten o'clock, 'because he had no reason to believe the evening before that there would be a message of peace, although he had promised not to commence operations till ten o'clock in the morning. He does not in the despatch say that he commenced operations before that hour. On the contrary, he observes that the steamers arrived at the anchorage during the forenoon. I think it was not generous of hon. Members to refer in the tone they have done to the passage in p. 99, where Admiral Kuper says, Kagosima is at my mercy; hostilities once commenced, your town would be destroyed, and I shall stop your trade both here and at the Loo-Choo Islands. Admiral Kuper saw that the destruction of the town was likely to result from his operations, and he gave them notice of it; and will the House believe that he was not sincere when he gave instructions, the next day, to avoid all unnecessary bloodshed? And if he did give notice of the danger, will the House believe that they were not prepared for that danger? What brought the danger on? Was it aggressive action on the part of Admiral Kuper? No, but it was aggressive action on the part of the batteries, that opened a hot and destructive fire on the ships; and, after the notice of the previous day, I say that either the party of the Prince had taken measures to inform the inhabitants of the danger, or they were the persons culpable for not having done so. Admiral Kuper gives an account in the despatch of his engaging the batteries; but there is not a word in that despatch, from first to last, of his throwing shells on purpose into the town. I think it must be conceded that the burning of the town resulted from the operations of the first day, and that it was destroyed owing to the inevitable circumstance that the batteries were to be silenced. Referring to the operations of the first day, the Admiral says— One-half of the town was in names and entirely destroyed, as well as a very extensive arsenal or factory, and gun-foundry, and five large Loo- Choo junks, the property of the Prince, in addition to the three steamers already described. A heavy typhoon blew during the night, and the conflagration, increasing in proportion to the height of the storm, illuminated the entire bay.', That, I think, gets rid of the inference that one-half the town was destroyed on the first day, and the other half on the second. What does he say of the operations of the second day? That he shelled the castle and the batteries, but not that he shelled the town. This is the passage— On the following afternoon, the gale having moderated, and as I deemed it necessary to remove the squadron to a safer anchorage than the great depth of water opposite Kagosima afforded, and having also observed the Japanese at work, erecting batteries on the hill immediately above the little bay, where the small vessels were at anchor, close to the shore, we weighed, and passing in line between the batteries of Kagosima, steamed out and anchored to the southward of the island. This opportunity was taken advantage of to shell the batteries on the Sakura Sima side, which had not been previously engaged, and also the palace of the Prince in Kagosima. These operations were attended with complete success; there is every reason to suppose that the palace has been destroyed, as many shells were seen to burst in it; and the fire, which is still raging, affords reasonable ground for believing that the entire town of Kagosima is now a mass of ruins. From these passages it would clearly appear that the burning of the town is to be attributed to the operations of the first day, and not to those of the second. What we have to decide is, whether the gallant officer wilfully and wantonly burnt the town. No one will pretend to say that Admiral Kuper had instructions needlessly to burn the town; so that, if the House adopts this Resolution, the whole responsibility will rest upon Admiral Kuper. Such an inference, however, cannot be justly drawn, and the House will, I am sure, do what is always done,—namely, place the fairest and best construction on the acts of public servants. I was, I own, a little surprised to hear the hon. Member for Maidstone in that very admirably-toned speech—marked, as it was, by great ability and conceived in the best spirit—lay so much stress on certain letters and accounts from private but anonymous sources, which have appeared in the newspapers. All our experience is, that common sailors and people engaged in such operations are not so much alive as ourselves to the distinction between shelling a town and shelling fortifications. As a matter of fact the town suffered from the fire, but many of these people seem to think the more harm that is done the better. Thus, ignorant peo- ple writing from the spot would be tempted to magnify the horrors of the scene as so many points of congratulation. No doubt persons of small reflection, and writing in hot blood, would not anticipate the manner in which these events would strike persons in cold blood and sitting at home. But because they might think the burning of the town a good thing, are we to say that Admiral Kuper did intentionally and unnecessarily shell the town? If, on the contrary, the House should be of opinion that he confined his fire to the batteries, how can we affirm that he has done an act "contrary to those usages of war which prevail among civilized nations?" If that were really true I am far from saying we ought not to acknowledge it. But if, as I contend, it is not true, are we to send forth to foreign countries, and to the Japanese themselves, accusations against ourselves, and declare that we did this act wantonly, unnecessarily, and for the purpose of destruction? What has happened has been a legitimate consequence of military operations, and shall we then accuse ourselves falsely of having done wantonly that which we regret? I am sure that Admiral Kuper regretted the burning of the town at the time as much as we do now; for although it is true that he does not express on the face of the dispatch the sentiment of regret with which the news was received by Earl Russell and by the country, yet it must be remembered that a despatch of this kind is a detail of what has occurred, and is very seldom made the vehicle of the sentiments and feelings of those who write it. I believe it would be an act of the greatest injustice to Admiral Kuper to suppose that he did not regret the burning of the town. If we could see the private letters he wrote from the scene of action, I have no doubt it would be found that he regretted and deplored it as deeply as any one. Were his operations then directed against the peaceful inhabitants, or the castles and forts of a person whom we had a right to treat as an enemy? I assert that the Admiral did not wilfully and wantonly destroy all these dwellings, and I do not believe the House will do so great an act of injustice as to affirm this Resolution, although I believe it agrees with the general principle enunciated by my hon. Friend. I felt most deeply the picture of the calamity which he drew. I am sure that every single individual would join in the expression of regret at this calamity, but we are not therefore to malign ourselves and calumniate our officers by saying that what has been done has been contrary to the usages of war which prevail among civilized nations.

MR. WHITESIDE

I have listened, as I always do, with great pleasure and profit to the hon. and learned Gentleman. He is sure to express himself with perspicuity and ability, but he has found it hopeless to convince the House that an event which has been the subject of general regret in the country should not meet with the expression of similar sentiments on the part of the House of Commons. In the biography of Gibbon it is stated, that that accomplished Minister Lord North used to slumber between his Law Officers of the Crown, and, it is added, that he might safely slumber between the pillars of the Law and State when supported on the one side by the skilful eloquence of Wedderburn, and on the other by the majestic sense of Thurlow. We are familiar with the "majestic sense," and we may expect soon to hear the "skilful eloquence." The Attorney General commenced his speech in rather a professional manner, by dividing a simple proposition into three parts. The first part of the Resolution meets his approbation. We may deeply regret the burning of the town of Kagosima. Why, said the hon. and learned Gentleman, Her Majesty in her Speech regretted the fact. The expression of that regret, however, is no argument against the Resolution, but rather a strong support of the Resolution. The hon. and learned Gentleman next expounded the law of nations, and he did it with the candour which might have been expected from his eminent ability. If my hon. and learned Friend had made out that there was an absolute necessity for the burning of the town, he might have established his case. I was surprised to hear my hon. and learned Friend begin a subtle disquisition on the words of the instructions given to Admiral Kuper. I understood him to attempt to prove that Earl Russell did not mean what he had expressed. This House always views with disfavour an attempt to explain away that which has been clearly expressed by a Minister of the Crown, and which has led to serious consequences. There are two hon. and gallant Gentlemen on this side the House who have said, that if they had been in Admiral Kuper's place, and had received the instructions given by Earl Russell, they would have gone in and done the same thing. If you interpret instruc- tions by the consequences that flow from them, and if Admiral Kuper did the thing he thought he was warranted by his instructions in doing, is it a manly thing in Earl Russell to gay that he never meant that thing at all, and that the responsibility is to be shifted to the officer who did the act? I say that the thing was intended to be done. The instructions are clear. Who pointed out the destruction of the palace of Prince Satsuma as one of the measures that might be necessary? Who defined the two things that were to be demanded from the Tycoon and the Prince Satsuma? Earl Russell; and the Admiral and the Ambassador pursued their instructions literally. Colonel Neale is a man of ability and tact. He managed matters to this point that—he was dealing with the Government of Japan—he had obtained an apology and an indemnity from that Government. What did Earl Russell say in a short despatch of three lines? He said that Her Majesty's Government accepted as satisfactory the apology of the Japanese Government. He dealt with the Government of the Tycoon as the Japanese Government. This touches the argument of my noble Friend, the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), to which no answer has been given by the Attorney General. The day that this indemnity was agreed to the question was settled, for Earl Russell admits that the Japanese Government had done all that they could do. Colonel Neale, however, in pursuance of the second branch of his instructions, announced that he had now to deal with the refractory Prince. What was the answer of the Japanese Government? They warned Colonel Neale not to undertake this matter, and not to invade the Prince of Satsuma. They said, "Owing to the present unsettled state of affairs in our empire, which you witness and hear of, we are in great trouble, and intend to carry out several plans. Supposing, now, something untoward were to happen, then all the trouble and care both you and we have taken would have been in vain and fruitless." But they did proceed to deal with the refractory Prince. The Attorney General says that they had not the least design upon the town of Kagosima. There is one line in this book which my hon. and learned Friend has forgotten. In a conversation between the Admiral, Colonel Neale, and the Japanese officials before the bombardment, Admiral Kuper says, "The settlement of this matter can be no longer delayed, Kagosima is at my mercy. Hostilities once commenced your town will be destroyed." Now, can any man argue after that declaration that the Admiral did not understand his business was to destroy the town in destroying the forts that protected it? Observe, too, the singularly complacent manner in which Colonel Neale communicates to Earl Russell how his orders were carried out, because the Attorney General puts the question upon this footing, that it was not intended in carrying out the instructions that such deplorable mischief should be done. He says— I have the satisfaction to report to your Lordship that the instructions with which I have been charged, onerous as they were palpably and in fact, and having reference to the outrage of last September, have been carried out in letter and in spirit. It might have been thought that Colonel Neale would have expressed something like regret at the extremities to which he had been forced to have recourse. No! Mark the words in which he points out how the instructions which the Attorney General finds it so difficult to understand have been carried out in letter and in spirit. The indemnities demanded of the Tycoon's Government are afloat on board Her Majesty's ships. I have had the honour to transmit to your Lordship the written apology of the Government of Jeddo; and, in respect to the Prince of Satsuma having ill-advisedly sought to evade the specific demands which Her Majesty's Government deemed it advisable to direct me to make upon him after due consideration of all the circumstances, and, after long forbearance, his capital is in ashes, his foundries destroyed, and his steamers burnt. It remains for me to trust that Her Majesty's Government may deem that my instructions have been thus fulfilled. Fulfilled!—how? In bombarding the forts, and in returning next day and destroying the town, which had been partially destroyed the day before. Therefore, adopting the views of the hon. and learned Attorney General, when Admiral Kuper and Colonel Neale complied with the instructions of Earl Russell, and destroyed the town, we are to declare that it was necessary from the particular circumstances of the case and according to the usages of war. But what answer has been given to my noble Friend (Lord Stanley)? I do not know that we ever made war upon the Doge of Venice, but what would you think of this—to demand satisfaction from the Doge first, and, having got it, then to say, "We must next proceed against a particular noble, and get satisfaction from him also?" By acting in that way every one of those Daimios might be made the objects of a separate war; and yet, while we hold ourselves at liberty to pursue each individual noble, at the same time by dealing with the Government of the Tycoon we admit it to be really the Government of Japan. The hon. and learned Gentleman gave no answer to the argument that when once Earl Russell got from the Government an apology and an indemnity to the amount of £100,000, he then demanded £25,000 from the Prince of Satsuma, and in addition that some persons should be capitally punished. The Admiral said, "I am ordered to get you to execute some people;" but the Japanese replied, "We are in the habit of punishing only the guilty in this country, and would it not be much more satisfactory that we should discover the real offenders?" But it is said in one of these despatches that the chief agent in the commission of the outrage is generally understood to have been the father of the Prince himself; and 'tis no wonder in that case that no power you have yet been able to bring to bear upon him is calculated to coerce the Prince to deliver up his own father to condign punishment. I confess if you went to war because the Prince had not handed out his father to be executed, you would appear to me to be a most unreasonable body of persons. But whether you look at the principle involved, or the manner in which it has been worked out, the question now seems to be, as was shown by the hon. Member for Bradford (Mr. W. E. Forster), whether you intend to practise in your own persons, and in your own country, those principles of humanity which you are so ready to advise all other nations in the world to adopt. It is said that you rule only to bless, and conquer only to spare; but if you uphold the wrong that has been done in Japan, your laurels will be tarnished, and in vain will you represent yourselves as the most humane nation upon the earth. It has been urged that these proceedings were undertaken to propitiate the commercial interest in the country. Commerce may be good, the pursuit of wealth may be right—I speak in a House where many commercial gentlemen sit; but it is to their honour that they have been the loudest in condemning that which the Under Secretary seemed to intimate had been done for their especial advantage, and that they still hold more dear than wealth or commerce the honour of their country and the interests of humanity.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

The right hon. and learned Gentleman who has just sat down said, that there was one point which had not been adverted to by my hon. and learned Friend—namely, the double demand which has been made in Japan. That point I will explain immediately. Now, Sir, it is unnecessary to travel over ground which was so ably gone over by my hon. Friend the Under Secretary, and my hon. and learned Friend the Attorney General. But I must say, in the first place, that the treaty with Japan was in my opinion a wise and a useful arrangement. I believe I may appeal to Gentlemen on the other side to bear me out in that. It was concluded with the treaty-making power of that country. Although there is a division of authority in Japan, there being a spiritual chief, the Mikado, as well as the Tycoon, yet there is no doubt whatever that the Tycoon is the treaty-making and governing power, and that was admitted by the Prince of Satsuma in a conversation with Colonel Neale, in which he said— The Tycoon was to blame when he made that treaty for not having inserted in it a clause giving to Daimios exclusive possession of the roads in which they might make their processions. That I say is a distinct admission that the Tycoon is the treaty-making authority binding on the country. Well, that treaty has been in force now for several years; we have appealed to it in cases in which we considered its provisions not duly carried out, and it has never been urged in reply, that it was not binding because it had not received the sanction of the Mikado. Therefore, I dismiss altogether the doubts as to the binding nature of the treaty as having been made only by the Tycoon. I think no man can doubt that British subjects, both officials and private merchants, having been subjected to repeated acts of outrage, attempted and perpetrated in Japan, it would have been unbecoming, unfitting, and criminal in the British Government to allow those outrages to pass unpunished without demanding reparation or redress. We should have been exposing our fellow-subjects in Japan, resorting thither under the stipulations of the treaty, to the murderous caprice of these Daimios and their retainers, who, as my hon. Friend stated, exercise such undisputed sway in the country, that when they purchase anew sword and want to try the edge, they sally forth into the streets and cut down the first person they meet there. It was necessary, therefore, for the security of our fellow-subjects and the honour of the country that satisfaction should be demanded for these outrages.

But then I am asked, "Why have you demanded satisfaction both from the Tycoon's Government and from the Daimio, by whose retainers these particular outrages were committed?" The fact is this:—There was a double default. The Tycoon's Government were bound to give security to British subjects within the range of their authority. This outrage was commenced within the range of their authority. It was committed upon the road called the Tokaido, which had been expressly assigned for the use of British subjects, in order that they might take their exercise there with security and without molestation. It was the duty of the Tycoon's Government, if they knew as they did that a body of the Daimio's retainers were going in procession along the road on a given day, and if they knew and expected that any meeting between the procession and British subjects might lead to violence, I say it was their duty in such a case to have stationed guards upon the road in order to protect Europeans. We were, therefore, justly entitled to require from the Tycoon's Government a sum sufficient to operate as a fine upon them for not affording proper protection to British subjects in a place in which our countrymen were entitled to be.

We were also entitled to demand the punishment of the retainers who had committed the outrages. But the Tycoon's Government said, "We are unable to afford this redress. These Daimios are so powerful, that they defy our authority. We cannot get you satisfaction; if you want it you must go to the Daimio and get it yourselves." Then we demanded, in the first place, satisfaction from the Government for their default in not taking those precautions which they might have taken, and which it was their duty to take; and we demanded satisfaction from the Daimio whose retainers committed the outrage by which a British subject had so grievously suffered. And really, when we are told by the hon. Member who moved the Amendment that this was a sort of chance medley, a casual encounter, which was below notice on the part of the British Government, I do not think we should have been justified, and I am sure the nation would not have thought us justified, in holding the lives and limbs of British subjects so cheap. Sir, I cannot compliment the hon. Member upon the good taste he showed in that part of his speech. Well, then, satisfaction was demanded and satisfaction was granted by the Tycoon's Government, who consented to pay the sum we required. But Prince Satsuma refused. Were we to submit to his refusal, or compel him to give us that redress to which we were so justly entitled? I say that we should have failed in our duty if we had not resorted to the means which were at our disposal for the purpose of compelling this brutal Daimio to give us satisfaction for the outrage. It was not simply for the purpose of punishing him; it was also for the purpose of deterring others from these murders, which were so frequently attempted, and which had in some cases unfortunately been actually committed. Why, the attack upon our Legation, the murder of two sentries at the door of the Legation on another occasion—both of those atrocities were committed by the retainers of Daimios who were specially employed by the Tycoon's Government to protect the very people whom they so barbarously attacked and, in some cases, murdered. It was necessary, I say, for the protection of British subjects, that these Daimios should be taught that although they might set at defiance the authority of the Tycoon, they could not with impunity commit outrages upon British subjects. Admiral Kuper was therefore ordered, in case redress was refused, to use force in order to obtain it. My noble Friend at the head of the Foreign Office gave instructions, not simply on his own authority, but instructions sanctioned by the Government, and for which I take as full a responsibility as any that can attach to him. I entirely approved at the time, I entirely approve now, of the course which my noble Friend took; and I say that it was the only course which was consistent with his duty as a Minister of the Crown, and as representing the interests of this country abroad. Did my noble Friend say, "Go and bum a defenceless town?" No such thing. He left it to the discretion of the Admiral, either to blockade the town and port belonging to Prince Satsuma, or to destroy his forts and his castle if that could easily be done. Admiral Kuper performed his duty as a British officer ought to perform it. He did not begin an attack upon the forts. He demanded satisfaction and parleyed for two days with the envoys of Prince Satsuma. As my hon. Friend (Mr. Layard) said, they tried by acts of treachery first to inveigle him and Colonel Neale ashore, and we know pretty well what would have happened to them if they had fallen into the trap; and next to surprise the vessel and take it by asking permission, to bring forty armed retainers on board. This leave was given, but a party of marines of equal force was ranged opposite to them, and they, then thought it better to re-embark in their boat, without carrying out the object for which they had come prepared. After two days spent in negotiation, Admiral Kuper sent to take possession of the steamers by way of reprisal, and if Prince Satsuma had yielded to our demands those steamers would have been released, and no harm would have been done to his forts, his palace, or to the town. But while these steamers were in the possession of our ships the forts opened fire upon the British squadron. I trust there is no man in this House who will maintain that, when a British admiral commanding a squadron is fired at by a foreign battery, it is not his duty to return the fire and to teach the enemy that British ships are not to be insulted and attacked with impunity. Well, then, Admiral Kuper was compelled to burn the steamers, in order that his ships might be free for action. In the course of that action the town was set on fire, and we deeply regret this incident. But the House must recollect the circumstances under which the action took place. There was a violent gale. The ships were firing in a troubled sea. It is one thing to fire at an object when you have your gun upon a fixed platform, as on shore; it is a very different thing to fire at an object when your gun is in a ship rolling in the waves, when at every moment it shifts its position, and when the aim you take is not the point at which the shot strikes. When in addition to a violent storm they here had the smoke and heat of action, I think the House will see it was impossible to be sure that the shot would not go over the batteries and fall into the town. As my hon. Friend has stated, in all human probability the population of that town had received notice to quit their habitations, and very few of them were in the houses which were burnt. We know that when questions arose at Jeddo and other places, it was recognized as a sign of hostile intentions on the part of the Government that the Japanese population quietly disappeared from the town, and there is every reason to hope that similar warning was given to the people of Kagosi- ma, and that very few were in their houses when the conflagration took place. Towns in Japan are built of the frailest possible materials. It is well known that these islands are subject to frequent and severe earthquakes. The people cannot, dare not build their houses of solid materials, lest the shock of the earthquake should bring them down. They are built of wood, of bamboos, and of paper, which yield to the oscillations of an earthquake. That temple in which our Legation was housed at the time when that murderous attack was made upon them had only paper partitions, and when the members of the Legation were drawn up in one room they thought themselves lucky that their assailants did not come to them through the partitions, instead of winding along the tortuous passages from which they were ultimately expelled. I say then that the burning of the town was not the result of any intention on the part of Admiral Kuper, but was merely incidental to an action which was not brought on by us, but was begun by the Japanese, and upon which the Admiral could not, in point of honour and of duty, refrain from entering and returning the fire of the batteries.

It is said that on the next day he shelled the castle; it was his duty to do so. The object was to teach the Daimio by personal loss that he and his retainers were not with impunity to sacrifice the lives of British subjects. It was proper and right for Admiral Kuper to direct his shells against the castle of the Daimio, but that does not show that he directed his fire against what remained of the town; but the violent wind which still prevailed naturally spread the conflagration which had begun, and probably extended it over the greater part of the town. We are called upon to say that we regret that result. Well, Sir, we entirely concur with that sentiment; but it has been already expressed in the most formal manner in the Speech of Her Majesty's Commissioner at the opening of the Session, and has been adopted and repeated in the most formal manner by this House in the Address voted in reply to that Speech. It is not usual for this House to go on repeating in a less formal manner that which has been more formally expressed before. Therefore, I say, reading the Motion by the Amendment which has been moved, and which, no doubt, will be agreed to, it is reduced to two points—regret at the conflagration of the town, and an opinion that the bombardment of towns is inconsistent with the usual practice of war among civilized nations.

Having disposed of the regret by saying that we entirely partake of it, and that this House has already in a formal manner expressed that feeling, I will notice the other point—the assertion that the bombardment of towns is inconsistent with the practice of civilized nations in time of war. That assertion is not correct—it is not consistent with truth. There are innumerable instances of towns having been bombarded. Some have been already mentioned, and I have a list of many others. History and records of passing events show that the practice of bombarding towns in time of war is unfortunately not unusual. Therefore, to assert that such practice is inconsistent with the usual practice of war among civilized nations would be directly contrary to the facts described as historical records. I lament that the practice of civilized nations has been such; I think it is desirable we should not imitate it, and it is not our practice. We abstained from it in the Russian war, as in the case of Odessa, which we knew contained great magazines of various kinds essential to the supply of the Russian army; but we abstained from attacking Odessa, which was not a fortified town, as we thought it would not be in accordance with the feelings of this country to attack an undefended town, even to deprive the enemy of stores which would be useful to him for hostile operations against us. Denying entirely the truth of the position that the bombardment of towns is at variance with the practice of civilized nations in time of war, I am perfectly ready to agree that it is a practice which we disapprove, lament, and certainly are not disposed to follow. Therefore, although I cannot accept the truth of the statement itself, I do accept the meaning and spirit upon which that statement is made. I should hope that my hon. Friend will be satisfied with the tone which has prevailed in this debate. No one, I think, has maintained that it is a practice that ought to be. followed to bombard towns for the purpose of destroying the houses and property of non-combatants and innocent persons; but nobody can deny that if that be the result of a conflict between attacking forces outside and defending forces inside, it is one of those incidental casualties of war which are among the calamities attaching to hostile operations. Therefore, I hope my hon. Friend will be satisfied with having obtained an admission of the principle for which he contends, and not be disposed to press his Motion to a division, as it would be mere surplusage to express regret, and it would be contrary to historical fact to say that the bombardment of towns is not practised among civilized nations. When the Amendment is disposed of, I should propose to meet the Motion with the previous question; but if my hon. Friend would withdraw it, I think it would be the most fitting termination of a discussion the tone and temper of which must have been satisfactory to him.

Question put, and negatived.

Amendment made.

Main Question, as amended, proposed.

MR. BUXTON

said, his main object had been to test the opinion of the House as to the burning of towns in order that the case in question might not form a precedent for future imitation. He did not think the expression in the Queen's Speech was sufficient for that purpose, but combining that with the clear and vivid expression of opinion by the Attorney General and the noble Lord, he thought his object was sufficiently attained, and therefore he should ask leave to withdraw his Motion.

Previous Question put, "That that Question be now put:"—(Viscount Palmerston.)

The House divided;—Ayes 85; Noes 164: Majority 79.

AYES.
Adderley, rt. hon. C. B. Elphinstone, Sir J. D.
Aytoun, R. S Ewing, H. E. Crum-
Baines, E Farquhar, Sir M.
Bathurst, A. A. Ferrand, W.
Bazley, T. FitzGerald, W. R. S.
Bright, J. George, J.
Brooks, R, Grenhall, G.
Cave, S. Greene, J.
Cole, hon. H. Gurney, S.
Collins, T. Hadfield, G.
Corry, rt. hon. H. L. Hamilton, Lord C.
Cox, W. Hamilton, I. T.
Crossley, Sir F. Hay, Sir J. C. P.
Cubitt, G. Hennessy, J. P.
Dalglish, R. Hibbert, J. T.
Dawson, R. P. Hubbard, J. G.
Denman, hon. G. Humphrey, W. H.
Disraeli, rt. hon. B. Hunt, G.W.
Duncombe, hon. W. E. Ingestre, Viscount
Dunne, Colonel Kelly, Sir F.
Du Pre, C. G. Kinglake, A. W.
Edwards, Colonel Lawson, W.
Leatham, E. A. Roebuck, J. A.
Lennox, Lord G. G. Sclater-Booth, G.
Lennox, Lord H. G. Seely, C.
Leslie, C. P. Selwyn, C. J.
Liddell, hon. H. G. Smith, J. B.
Lindsay, W. S. Smith, S. G.
Longfield, R. Somes, J.
Lygon, hon. F. Stanley, Lord
Macaulay, K. Stracey, Sir H.
Macdonogh, F. Sykes, Colonel W. H.
Manners, right hon. Lord J. Taylor, Colonel
Tottenham, Lieut.-Col. C. G.
Morgan, hon. major
Naas, Lord Walcott, Admiral
Noel, hon. G.J. Westhead, J. P. Brown-
O'Neill, E. White, J.
Packe, C. W. Whiteside, rt. hon. J,
Pakington, right hon. Sir J. Whitmore, H.
Wyndham, hon. H.
Parker, Major W. Wyndham, hon. P.
Peacocke, G. M. W.
Peto, Sir S. M. TELLERS,
Pilkington, J. Lord R. Cecil
Powell, F. S. Mr. W. E. Forster
NOES.
Acton, Sir J. D. Dundas, F.
Adeane, H. J. Dundas, rt. hon. Sir D.
Angerstein, W. Dunkellin, Lord
Archdall, Captain W. Dutton, hon. R. H.
Astell, J. H. Enfield, Viscount
Baring, H. B. Evans, T. W.
Baring, T. G. Ewart, W.
Barttelot, Colonel Ewart, J. C.
Bass, M. T. Fane, Colonel J. W.
Beach, W. W. B. Fenwick, H.
Beale, S. Fermoy, Lord
Beaumont, S. A. Fitzwilliam, hon. C. W. W.
Beecroft, G. S.
Bellew, R. M. Foljambe, F. J. S.
Bentinck, G. W. P. Fortescue, C. S.
Berkeley, hon. C. P. F. French, Colonel
Brady, Dr. Gard, R. S.
Bramston, T. W. Gavin, Major
Bridges, Sir B. W. Gibson, rt. hon. T. M.
Briscoe, J. I. Gladstone, rt. hon. W.
Bruce, H. A. Glyn, G. G.
Buller, Sir A. W. Goddard, A. L.
Bury, Viscount Goldsmid, Sir F. H.
Butler-Johnstone, H.A Gore, J. R. O.
Butt, I. Gore, W. R. O.
Calthorpe, hon. F. H. W. G. Goschen, G. J.
Gower, hon. F. L.
Cardwell, rt. hon. E. Gregory, W. H.
Castlerosse, Viscount Gregson, S.
Chapman, J. Grenfell, H. R.
Clay, J. Grey, rt. hon. Sir G.
Clifford, C. C. Grosvenor, Lord R.
Clive, Capt. hon. G.W. Haliburton, T. C.
Codrington, Sir W. Hanbury, R.
Coke, hon. Colonel Handley, J.
Collier, Sir R. P. Hankey, T.
Cowper, rt hon. W. F. Hardcastle, J. A.
Craufurd, E. H. J. Hardy, J.
Crawford, R. W. Hartington, Marquess of
Damer, S. D. Headlam, rt. hon. T. E.
Davey, R. Henley, Lord
Dering, Sir E. C. Hervey, Lord A.
Dodson, J. G. Hodgkinson, G.
Duff, M. E. G. Horsfall, T. B.
Duff, R. W. Hutt. rt. hon. W.
Duke, Sir J. Kinglake, J. A.
Kinnaird, hon. A. F. Repton, G. W. J.
Knatchbull-Hugessen, E. Robartes, T. J.A.
Rothschild, Brn. M. de
Laird, J. Russell, H.
Layard, A. H. Russell, A.
Lefevre, G. J. S. Russell, F. W.
Levinge, Sir R. Salomons, Mr. Aid.
Lewis, H. Scott, Sir W.
Locke, J. Scourfield, J. H.
Long, R. P. Seymour, A.
Lowe, rt. hon. R. Shafto, R. D.
Mackinnon, W. A. Sheridan, H. B.
Manners, Lord G. J. Smith, A.
Martin, P. W. Smith, Sir F.
Massey, W. N. Smyth, Colonel
Miller, W. Stansfeld, J.
Mitchell, T. A. Steel, J.
Montagu, Lord R. Sturt, H. G.
Morris, D. Sturt, Lieut.-Col. N.
Morrison, W. Talbot, hon. W. C.
Mowbray, rt. hon. J.R. Tempest, Lord A. V.
Neate, C. Thompson, H. S.
Newdegate, C. N. Tollemache, hon. F. J.
North, Colonel Tracy, hn. C. R. D. H.
North, F. Turner, J. A.
O'Hagan, rt. hon. T. Turner, C.
O'Loghlen, Sir C. M. Villiers, rt. hon. C. P.
Paget, Lord C. Walter, J.
Palmer, Sir R. Weguelin, T. M.
Palmerston, Viscount Whitbread, S.
Paxton, Sir J. White, L.
Peel, rt. hon. Sir R. Wickham, H. W.
Peel, rt. hon. F. Wood, rt. hon. Sir C.
Peel, J. Woods, H.
Pender, J. Wynn, C. W. W.
Pennant, hon. Colonel
Pinney, Colonel TELLERS.
Ponsonby, hon. A. Mr. Brand
Potter, E. sir W. Dunbar
Powell, J. J.