HC Deb 24 March 1863 vol 169 cc1848-65
LORD ROBERT MONTAGU,

in moving Resolutions with reference to the Appropriation of Supplies, said, that in 1861 he had moved the same as that which was now contained in his first Resolution. In 1862, when moving the appointment of a Committee of Accounts, he had strongly urged the abolition of the system of transfers which took place under the transfer clause in the Appropriation Act. Both these Motions had been unsuccessful. But now, as the blue-book of the Public Accounts Committee had fully borne out all that he had said upon those occasions, he trusted that the House would not deem it presumptuous in, him to press the same Resolutions again upon them. The Appropriation Act was the result of the grand struggle which had ended with the Revolution of 1688. It ought, therefore, to have been maintained unaltered until the present day; no changes at least should have been made in it recklessly and without due consideration, or through carelessness and neglect. Notwithstanding this, many changes had been made in the Bill, including the insertion of the clause which empowered transfers, and the alteration which had been made in the year 1858. With regard to the latter, the Committee of Public Accounts reported as follows: — The subsequent alteration was made (in 1858) without the attention of the House being called to the point. The Bill was not printed, and, as your Committee are informed, the change was made through inadvertence. By the alteration the intended limitation was entirely removed." [Second Report, Public Accounts, 1862. page v.] This was explained by Mr. Anderson in his evidence. Until the year 1858 the army grants used to appear in two aggregate sums, between the Votes of which no transfers could take place. In that year they were massed together. It was said that this was done by mistake; but the mistake had not been rectified, and therefore the sphere of transfers had remained extended. The Report of the Committee continued thus— Your Committee recommend that the Appropriation Bill, and the Appropriation Clause, should be printed and distributed in time for consideration, before the Bill passes through Committee of the House. Until the year 1854 the insertion of the appropriation clause had been made the subject of an Instruction to the Committee on the Bill, and was therefore necessarily inserted in the Appropriation Bill. In that year, however, this practice was discontinued. The result was, that in the second Session of 1857 the appropriation clause was omitted and the transfer clause was retained. In the first Session of the year 1859, the appropriation clause appeared as the 18th clause, and the transfer clause was omitted. In the second Session of the same year the appropriation clause was omitted, while the transfer clause appeared, as the 23rd clause. Last year the Bill was printed, but was not distributed, while certain alterations were made without the sanction or cognizance of the House. One of those alterations provided that deficiencies should only be "temporarily defrayed" out of surpluses; and another enforced that the representations made to the Treasury for leave to transfer should be "laid before the House within one month after the accounts had been sent to the Audit Board." He trusted that his first Resolution would meet with the approval of the House, seeing that it was in the same terms as the Report of the Committee of Public Accounts, He was not urging a technical matter of detail, but sought to enforce the constitutional principle, that the appropriation of supplies was peculiarly the function of the House; and which, considering that the struggle to establish this principle had lasted half a century, should ever be looked upon as a sacred duty by the Representatives of the People. His second Resolution referred to the power of transferring the surplus of one Vote to provide for a deficiency under another; or, in other words, appropriating balances to meet excesses. The clause which authorized this operation had been first introduced in the Act of 1846. This clause he would speak of as the 29th clause, because this power was contained in the 29th clause of the Act which was laid before the Committee of Public Accounts, and was spoken of, by the witnesses, under that name. With reference to that clause be affirmed these three propositions—that the object with which it had been introduced had never been attained; that it tended to increase the public expenditure, and was otherwise most injurious; and that no inconvenience could result from its omission.

The object of this clause was the same as that which Sir James Graham sought in 1832, in order to secure a strict appropriation—namely, to secure to the Treasury a control over the Departments, so as to prevent them appropriating money contrary to the wishes of Parliament. Mr. Anderson had stated in his evidence, that the origin of Clause 29 was the Report of Sir W. Herries' Committee; the intention of which was that— Treasury Control might be brought in aid of Parliamentary Control, so as to prevent an excess on any Vote. This, moreover, had been recommended by that Committee only on the supposition of there being no Committee of Public Accounts to inquire into any excesses upon the Votes. This object had not been obtained. To this every one of the witnesses had borne testimony. Sir Richard Bromley said (153), "My own opinion is, that it (the check of the Treasury) is a mere matter of form, and that it would be better dispensed with." Mr. Arbuthnot (1104–9) stated that "the authority given to the Treasury has degenerated into a mere matter of form." "The Treasury check has not so worked as to be successful in its object." The Duke of Somerset al- lowed (1327) that "the control of the Treasury to deny the transfer is and must be merely nominal." In fact. Colonel Greene (230) did not know any case in which the Treasury have refused to give their absent. The Duke of Somerset continued (1447)— The Treasury have, for a great many years, been trying (under Clause 29) to control the expenditure, and keep the Naval Estimates in their right position, but have totally and entirely failed. Mr. Arbuthnot stated, that the Admiralty "utterly declined to acknowledge the authority of the Treasury," and tried systematically to set the Treasury at defiance. He might mention two examples. The first was the transfer of £250,000, which had been voted for the building of iron ships, to the purchase of stores. The Treasury were never asked for their sanction to this transfer, and never knew of it for upwards of a year afterwards; and at last it was made a matter of mere verbal communication between the present Secretary to the Admiralty and Mr. Laing, who was then Secretary to the Treasury. In the same year the store Vote was exceeded by £424,651; which was also met by a transfer; and here again the sanction of the Treasury was not once asked. Application for leave to transfer was, in fact, never made until five days before the accounts were sent in to the Audit Board, when there remained no longer sufficient time to make any inquiries. Such instances showed that the clause had entirely failed in the object for which it had been framed. He now passed to the second proposition, and would show that this 29th clause, or rather the power of transfer which it gave, had operated most injuriously for the public service. He would show this in six different ways. The clause had a very injurious effect, because, in the first place, the expenditure had thereby been greatly increased. Sir Richard Bromley had, in fact, affixed a stigma to the clause by calling it a mere "cover to expenditure." The power of transfer had been created in 1846, and the Duke of Somerset stated that "the next year (1847) the expenditure exceeded the Estimates by £454,000, thus showing that the balance had been overthrown." Mr. Anderson had referred to the same cause, the well-known fact that the expenditure in 1862 was three times as great as that of 1832. As an example, he might mention that the gun- boat slips at Haslar were constructed and the expenses met by a transfer, and "Parliament was thereby committed to a vast expense without any previous sanction." So also the £12,000 given to the German settlers at the Cape was met by a transfer, having been given without the sanction of Parliament. This had been stated by the Secretary at War on March 9.

Secondly, the abolition of the power of transfer, or the expunging of Clause 29, would reduce expenditure. This might be deduced as a corollary from the preceding statement; but he preferred to bring forward independent testimony to substantiate it. Mr. Anderson, who was principal clerk at the Treasury, said (1716) that— Whenever you require those great departments to go to Parliament to vote all their deficiencies, you will very much reduce the amount of those deficiencies. The Duke of Somerset allowed (1400) that "having to come before Parliament for a Supplementary Estimate," would tend to "check the expenditure." But Mr. Gladstone asserted (1636) that "at present there is a power of final adjustment without coming to Parliament at all." And he continued to state that there were many transactions which the Departments would not enter into at all, if they knew that the case must come before Parliament. The reason why the expunging of the 29th clause would reduce the expenditure was very plain; and this introduced the third head—namely, that the power of transfer prevented the Departments coming to Parliament for money; which was another very injurious effect of that clause. The Secretary for War said, that "if the clause were repealed, the Departments would have to go to Parliament for every excess," and added, that "the real check undoubtedly was the vote by Parliament." Colonel Greene stated, that the different Departments always took care to "have a surplus in order to prevent having to go to Parliament." Fourthly, the 29th clause was very injurious, because the system of making transfers tended to produce a laxity in the Estimates; and this laxity in the Estimates produced surpluses and then transfers. These evils thus acted and reacted on each other in ever increasing ratio; and caused an ever-widening circle of vicious expenditure. This had been plainly stated in the evidence, of Mr. Arbuthnot; and Mr. Anderson, had said that the Departments were tempted to make surpluses, and were then induced, by the possession of a surplus, to incur expenditure which they would never incur otherwise; but if no power of transfer existed, and the Departments had to go to Parliament for deficiencies, they would "estimate every service at its proper amount." Fifthly, the power of transfer not only enabled the Departments to avoid coming before Parliament, but also operated most injuriously in entirely defeating the knowlege of Parliament. The Duke of Somerset (1464) said, that "under the existing system, Parliament may vote a vast sum of money for the conveyance of troops, and may find that a large portion of it is spent in stores." Colonel Greene (358) mentioned an instance in which money voted for barracks at Plymouth was spent on works at Hong Kong, which Parliament had never sanctioned, nor even heard of; "so that" to use his own words, "the knowledge of Parliament was thus defeated." And Mr. Arbuthnot (842) said, that payment for salaries might go on without even the Treasury knowing of it. This they did by applying it out of the Vote for Works. Thus, "the Surveyor of Coast Guard Buildings" was an office which was never known of until discovered by accident; for his salary had never appeared in the accounts, but was paid by a transfer from some of the Votes. The Duke of Somerset (1279–1286) confessed that, while Parliament was sitting, the money voted for iron ships was spent in buying timber. He allowed that he "did this on his own responsibility," he "thought it the right thing to do." This line of conduct he had determined on while Parliament was sitting, and yet he had never mentioned it to Parliament. It must be remembered that he had already "taken a Vote, of £722,000 for timber, which was all he could get" from Parliament. To wind up this statement, he confessed that he had determined not to let Parliament know anything about it, as long as "Parliament could take any action." There was also another head under which the 29th clause had operated most injuriously. The Government were induced, owing to it, to ask for a larger sum than they required for certain Votes which were known to be popular with the House; while they took less than was necessary for others which were unpopular; so that the House was by that means actually deceived in two ways:—First, they were persuaded that some much-desired object would receive the advantage which they so profusely granted; and, secondly, they were induced to believe that no more would be spent on some undesirable object than they chose to give. It was well the House should know that it was the practice of Governments to obtain money under false pretences (for he could designate the practice by no milder term). Mr. Arbuthnot, for instance, in his evidence (670, &c.) had said— There was a popular Vote obtained for a Naval Reserve, amounting to £100,000; and I apprehend that Parliament would not have placed that £100,000 at the disposal of the Admiralty for any other object.… Not above £12,000 was spent for that purpose;. … and the rest of that Vote was applied to purchasing stores. I do not think it was an honest expenditure. Again (830)— There is one thing to be always guarded against, and that is, taking what I may call popular Votes, and then applying them to services which have not been voted. And Sir George Lewis (2293) said — Occasionally, as one Vote is a little more popular than another, and the House is more likely to agree to some particular Vote than to another, they might make the Estimate a little fuller upon that head, and they might starve it a little upon the unpopular Vote, in the speculation that they would save upon the popular Vote, and turn it over to the unpopular Vote. While Mr. Gladstone (1577) gave this remarkable evidence— The Admiralty, as all those Departments, have a great temptation.…. to allow those surpluses to grow upon certain Votes, in order to form a fund for meeting the deficiencies upon other Votes…. It leads them. … to provide surpluses in the main upon the more popular Votes, and to trust to them for supplying the deficiencies upon the more unpopular Votes. Indeed, it was quite obvious that the practice of thus taking more than was required under one head, while another Vote was starved, was in itself very reprehensible; yet the evidence of all the leading witnesses who appeared before the Committee went to establish the truth of what he stated. To prove this important matter, still more clearly, he would show it by examples taken from the Estimates and accounts; he would give instances of Governments taking too much on Votes which were popular with the House, and starving those that were unpopular.

Vote 1, for Wages of Seamen, was a popular Vote. On such a Vote, surpluses were made by asking more than was required. Now, it appeared from the evidence, that since 1848, with one exception, there had always been large surpluses on this Vote; equal to £2,000,000 in thirty years, of which £1,700,000 had occurred in the last ten years alone, while in the year 1860–1 the surplus had amounted to,£441,411. Vote 3, for the Admiralty Office, was an unpopular Vote. Such a Vote was starved, to delude the House of. Commons; that is to say, less was provided than the Government intended to spend. It appeared in the evidence, that since 1832, with one exception, the Admiralty had always exceeded their Vote; they had exceeded it at an average of £5,000 per annum. And Mr. Arbuthnot stated, that "there is no reason why the Admiralty should not estimate correctly, except the desire to starve an unpopular Vote." And the Duke of Somerset (1229) allowed this to be the true state of the case. Vote 4, for the Naval Reserve, was a popular Vote; that was, more was asked than would be wanted. The surplus on this Vote in 1859–60 was £96,000, and in 1860–1 it was £92,652. Vote 10. for Naval Stores, was an unpopular Vote, and less was asked for it than would be spent. It was proved, that during the last ten years, this Vote had been exceeded by £2,500,000; of which the excesses during the last two years alone had amounted to £1,000,000. Of this, none was attributable to the China war. For the last five years there had been an excess of £100,000 per annum for timber alone; and the excess during the last three years had been at the rate of £500,000 per annum for timber alone, although they were now building only iron ships. Now, Mr. Anderson said, that as all contracts were made at home, this expenditure could easily be correctly estimated. Hence this was a wilful starving of an unpopular Vote, designedly to be met out of other Votes. Vote 11, for Works, was of a mixed character, in part popular, and partly unpopular. With regard to this Vote, it was shown that £77,000 had been, in 1860–1, spent differently from the intentions of Parliament, and £10,000 more had been spent which had never been estimated for. Again, £15,000 had been granted for dredging Portsmouth; but £25,000 had been spent; and £12,000 had been spent for new docks, which had never been granted at all. Similarly, £10,500 had been spent for works at Hong-Kong, which had not been voted by Parliament, nor authorized by the Admiralty, nor sanctioned by the Treasury, nor estimated by any Department, nor even explained by the accounts. On the whole, it appeared in the evidence that, from 1856 to 1861, £5,000,000 had been spent on objects other than sanctioned by Parliament; so that Colonel Greene, the Director of Works, exclaimed, "The whole of the Estimates (for Works) are a series of those sorts of cases of excesses and surpluses." He had, he thought, said enough to justify him in maintaining that the 29th clause was injurious, and that its operation had justified the use of the epithet which he had the other evening applied to it, when he observed that it had "infistulated" our whole financial system. He wished he could make this stigma hang round the neck of the 29th clause, as long as it appeared in the Appropriation Acts. Before passing to the next proposition he would therefore mention some more important evidence on this point. In the second Report, page vi., the Committee stated, that "the witnesses, with scarcely an exception, disapprove of the power as at present existing." The Duke of Somerset (1448) said, that "the Treasury check has totally failed;" and (1489) "everything that has happened since 1846 shows that the course taken has not resulted in what was intended." Mr. Macaulay (2150–3–4) "entirely agreed that the 29th clause should be repealed;" and said (2224, &c.) "the repeal of the 29th clause would effect every object." While Mr. Gladstone (1580), in quoting Mr. Anderson, said— Let the 29th clause of the Appropriation Act, first introduced into the Act in 1846, and which unsettles the appropriation of all the grants of the year for the naval and military services, be expunged from the Appropriation Act, which will then be restored to its former state, He should next pass to the third proposition which he sought to establish; which was, that no possible inconvenience would arise if Clause 29 were expunged. If some alternative (such as the plan of another Treasury Chest Fund) were thought necessary, let it be proposed by an additional Resolution. He did not himself think it necessary in a financial point of view; although in another point of view it might be most beneficial. For the different Departments were at daggers drawn with the Treasury, and tried to slip from under Treasury control. This scheme had therefore been devised in order to tie them down, and force them under the restraint of the Treasury. This, the House would remember, had been the object sought in framing the 29th clause, but which that clause had failed to attain. To apply to the Treasury for an allowance out of a particular fund, in order to meet deficiencies, was far preferable to the mode of transfer under clause 29. For, when the accounts were made square by means of transfers, there was nothing to attract the notice of Parliament; there was no definite issue placed before the House. While, to apply for the use of a fund, and to give the reasons in writing for that application, and then to come to Parliament for a credit in order to repay that fund, brought a distinct question for discussion before the House. It was, nevertheless unnecessary to resort to this alternative; for, as matters stood, the accounts of the navy were got in eight months after the close of the financial year; then it was discovered that there were deficiencies on some of the Votes, caused partly by imprests at home, and partly by repayments to the Treasury chests abroad. It then became necessary to square the accounts fur Parliament. According to the present system that was done by means of transfers. Now, a transfer did not mean a carrying about of money-bags; it was a mere matter of account, a credit transposed; it made no noise; it was done by a clerk taking the pen from behind his ear and writing a few figures. But, if the 29th clause were expunged, if the power of transfer were abolished, then all the balances (or surpluses) would have to be surrendered, and new credits would have to be voted, to meet the deficiencies and square the accounts. To surrender a balance, it must be remembered, meant merely to surrender a credit, to give up an authority to draw. How, then, it might be asked, could the current expenditure be carried on? The accounts at the pay office were mere current accounts, or cash accounts. Now before the navy accounts were squared they would have procured a new credit at the Bank. The expenditure could therefore be met out of these new credits; all payments could be made out of the navy cash. The only difference would be, that the accounts could not be squared without coming to Parliament for "Votes in excess;" that was, for new credits to clear off those deficiencies. To remove any doubt upon this point, he would refer to the evidence: — Colonel Greene (414) was asked "if he sees any objection in taking away that power of transferring surpluses?" and answered, "No, certainly not." Mr. Vine, the Inspector of the Audit Office, said (473), "I am not aware of any inconvenience to the public service that would arise from it." Mr. Arbuthnot (1117–1120) said, "The transfer is merely effected in the Admiralty books, and is a simple matter of account." The Duke of Somerset argued (1320) that the public payments would not be stopped even if every Vote were exceeded; so that, consequently, if the power of transfer were taken away, there would also be no inconvenience resulting. Mr. Whiffin, Deputy Accountant General, said (1979), "they can meet the expenditure out of the current army cash;" while Mr. Macaulay (2151) said, that "paying the surpluses into the Exchequer will not in the least degree embarrass the different Departments for money." He would compare the services in order to make this evident — namely, the army, the navy, and the civil services. In the case of the Civil Service, each Vote had its own special account in the books of the paymaster; each Vote had its own credit, and its balance was struck every week. When an issue was applied for, it was always specified for which Votes the issue was demanded. The consequence was, that a Civil Service Vote could never be exceeded, the balances at the end of the year were surrendered, and there were no transfers. In the case of the army or navy, money was issued on the aggregate credit; the paymaster knew not for what particular Votes it was issued, nor how the money was appropriated. Yet many of the Votes were for charges at home, and the payments were final payments, as in the Civil Service. The paymaster, in short, was, in the case of the Civil Service, a banker for each separate Vote; while in the case of the army and navy, he was a banker for the whole service; he must honour their draughts as long as they had a credit at his bank (so to speak) sufficient to meet their demands ills accounts were a mere banker's account—a current account—not an appropriation account. But when the navy made up their appropriation accounts, then deficiencies were discovered on some Votes, and surpluses on others. It then became a question how the accounts were to be squared. If it were by transfers, then no definite issue was brought before Parliament; but if the transfer clause were done away with, then the Departments could not square their accounts without coming to Parliament for credits to the amount by which they had exceeded, in their expenditure under particular heads; and there was voluminous evidence to show that no inconvenience could result from such a mode of proceeding. He thanked the House for their indulgence in hearing him on so dry a subject, and hoped that they would bear in mind the propositions which he had proved. 1. That the 29th clause had failed in attaining the proposed object. 2. That it was most injurious to the public service, by increasing the expenditure; by preventing the Departments coming before Parliament; by promoting laxity in estimating; by defeating the knowledge of Parliament; and by causing the Government to take too much on the popular Votes, and starve the unpopular. 3. That, in the nature of things, no inconvenience could result from expunging the obnoxious clause altogether. The noble Lord concluded by moving— 1. That every Bill hereafter introduced for the appropriation of supplies be printed and distributed in time for consideration before it passes through Committee of the House. 2. That it is inexpedient that any Bill for the appropriation of supplies shall contain the power of transfer which was first introduced into the Appropriation Act of 1846, and which unsettles the appropriation of all the grants of the year for the naval and military services.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That every Bill hereafter introduced for the appropriation of Supplies be printed and distributed in time for consideration before it passes through Committee of the House.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, he could not concur in several important points with the opinions expressed by the noble Lord He thought the noble Lord had very much exaggerated the effect produced in the augmentation of expenditure by arrangements—certainly in themselves defective — with regard to the fiscal laws of transfer. No doubt the tendency of lax and defective arrangements was to increased expenditure; but he could not agree, as the noble Lord seemed to assume, that the aggregate amount of expenditure had been very largely increased. He differed, too, from the noble Lord on another point, which though not expressly asserted by him, was assumed and taken for granted all through his speech. He gathered from the noble Lord's speech that he was of opinion that in all cases where the Vote on a particular item was exceeded by the expenditure, whether that deficiency was capable or not of being supplied from the aggregate fund voted for the service of the year, it ought to be made the subject of a supplementary Estimate. [Lord ROBERT MONTAGU: Of a Vote of excess.] That, of course, was a very different matter; but still it was a popular and plausible delusion, that if, on any emergency arising, there was an excess of expenditure on the sum actually voted for a particular service, it ought at once to be brought before Parliament in the shape of a supplementary Estimate. From his experience in the office he had the honour to hold, he was persuaded that there was no practice which would be more destructive of Parliamentary control over the expenditure. It had been a matter of regret to him that on several occasions, from very grave and sufficient reasons, supplementary Estimates had been presented during his term of office, but he was firmly convinced that the whole effectiveness of Parliamentary control depended upon the state of the finances— the balance of income and expenditure— being once a year gathered together and submitted as a whole to Parliament— and in a plan being submitted to Parliament which should substantially, and in the main, govern the whole expenditure and income of the year. But, if from any idea of the supreme control of Parliament, the Government were to be called on every week or every fortnight to bring down supplementary Estimates, the control of Parliament over the expenditure of the year would be entirely nullified under the semblance of consulting its dignity. It was impossible for Parliament to give its whole attention to these points, and he held it to be a canon of all sound finance that supplementary Estimates should be few and as limited in extent as possible. Coming next to matters of fact, he was afraid that the noble Lord had not taken into view what had been recommended by the Committee on Public Accounts, and what had actually been done by the Government. To adopt the noble Lord's second Resolution, which was the most important, would be like taking precautions against dangers which had ceased to exist. When the question was examined before the Committee of the previous year, all that the noble Lord had stated to the House was taken fully into consideration. It was felt that the system was defective. The Act of 1846 sanctioned practices which had previously prevailed without any sanction at all; and though the provisions of that Act might be defective, the noble Lord would find that, substantially, the whole of what he had proposed had been adopted under that Act. The power of transfer, in fact, which he described and denounced, no longer existed. A plan had been submitted in the previous year by which certain separate funds would have been established, out of which these excesses might have been temporarily supplied. That plan was not adopted by the Committee, but in lieu of it another plan was adopted. New securities were taken to insure the submission of these excesses to the Treasury, so that the Treasury had greater certainty than it ever possessed before that these excesses would be submitted to it. The matter being thus brought under the notice of the Treasury, it was likewise provided, that although the Treasury, out of unappropriated surpluses, was Authorized to advance sums to meet the deficiencies on particular Votes, yet that such appropriations should be of a purely provisional character, that they should only hold good until the final closing of the account, and that after that closing of the account the expenditure in excess should be definitively met by a Vote in excess. That Vote would not correspond precisely in its technical character with Votes in excess as we now understood them. They referred to excesses properly so called, which entered into the Exchequer account of the year in which they were passed, and materially disturbed the relative balance of expenditure and income. The essence of the noble Lord's Motion, as he understood it, was to bring each transaction on its merits to the judgment of Parliament; so that by the arrangements of the different Departments they might not be prevented coming under the attention of House. That was precisely the object of the clause which had been incorporated into the Appropriation Act. The 26th clause of that Act provided, that where there was an excess of expenditure, on application being made to the Treasury, the Treasury might thereupon be authorized, temporarily, to defray the excess out of any surplus which might have accrued; and it was then provided, that within a given time after the assembling of Parliament, the proceedings should be laid before it for its sanction, and provision be made to meet the several excesses on the several Votes in such manner as Parliament might determine. The criticism, therefore, of the noble Lord was directed to a state of things which no longer existed, and he was endeavouring to provide a remedy for that which had already been cured by Parliamentary proceedings. Unfortunately, it was impossible, in the varied expenses of a great country like this, for every Department to know exactly the precise amount of its expenditure, and it was necessary that some slight margin should be left. It would be most undesirable to say to each Department, "You must take into account, in framing each particular Vote the extremest amount which you can possibly require, and call on the Chancellor of the Exchequer to provide for it out of the income of the year on a scale which will cover all emergencies." With regard to the noble Lord's first Resolution, of course it was very proper that the Appropriation Bill should be accessible to Members, but he scarcely thought it desirable to go to the expense of from £50 to £100 for printing 658 Bills, of which, perhaps, not a dozen would be used. The principle of the noble Lord's first Resolution was sound; and if he would take it in the following terms, he should have no objection to its being adopted: — That a sufficient number of Copies of every Bill hereafter introduced for the appropriation of Supplies be printed and delivered to Members applying for them in time for consideration before it passes through Committee of the Whole House. With regard to the second Resolution, he had endeavoured to point out that the object at which it aimed had already been obtained.

SIR FRANCIS BARING

said, he was Chairman of the Committee on Public Accounts which sat during the last year, and the House ought to be made acquainted with what had taken place. No doubt changes in the Appropriation Acts had been made without the knowledge of the House, and it was proper that hon. Members who paid attention to these subjects should have the opportunity of seeing the Bill in print before it was passed. There had been great looseness in the matter, and it was necessary to put a stop to that looseness. The Committee over which he presided considered several plans, and at length came to a decision to make recommendations, which the Government had adopted, and which he believed carried into effect all that could be reasonably wished. In future the sanction of the House was to be obtained for the appropriation of any excess in any one Vote to another Vote, in whatever Department the excess arose. He could not see the use of passing a Resolution to do that which had been done already, and he warned the House against interfering with the transfer clause. Under the old practice the Admiralty of itself, transferred the excess of one Vote to another Vote, but a change was made by which the sanction of the Treasury was required. If they repealed the transfer clause, the Admiralty would get rid of the check of the Treasury. What the noble Lord wished was to increase the check, and the Committee recommended them to strengthen it by adding the necessity for the sanction of the House. Under these circumstances, he hoped the House would not come to a Resolution which would entirely upset the plan of the Committee, and would abolish a valuable means of keeping the different Departments in order.

MR. SPEAKER

asked whether the noble Lord accepted the Amendment of the Chancellor of the Exchequer?

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU

said, that he did.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Motion made, and Question proposed, That a sufficient number of Copies of every Bill hereafter introduced for the appropriation of Supplies be printed and delivered to Members applying for them in time for consideration before it passes through Committee of the Whole House.

MR. HADFIELD

said, he was friendly to the publication of all the Acts of the House, and therefore he should support the principle of the first Resolution. But it did not go far enough. He wished the Indemnity Bill as well as the Appropriation Bill to be printed. The Indemnity Bill ought not only to be printed in the folio edition of the statutes, but that, as the greatest part of the expense of setting the types must be incurred, copies should be supplied to any Members who required them. It was a reflection on the House to be passing a Bill every year indemnifying persons from penalties for not taking an oath against the Pretender.

MR. SPEAKER

said, he must call the hon. Member to order, as he was not addressing himself to the question before the House.

MR. HADFIELD

said, he would move as an Amendment that the Indemnity Bill be included in the first Resolution, and then he should be in order in referring to that Bill. He protested against the House being made ridiculous by passing Bills which excused even those who passed them—including the Law Officers of the Crown—from the penalties incurred by a neglect to make unnecessary and ridicu- lous declarations, the ground of such excuse being that they did not know the law.

Amendment proposed, after the word "Supplies," to insert the words "and every annual Indemnity Bill."

LORD ROBERT MONTAGU

said, that the chief argument which had been brought against him was that a change had been made last year in the transfer clause, which clause the Chancellor of the Exchequer had denominated "an evil," and which this change had "cured." The change which had been referred to might be an improvement, but they had no experience flow it would work, and no security even for its continuance. At any time they might return to the old system without the cognizance of the House. But as it was agreed on all sides that the clause had failed in its object, and was an evil, he must express his astonishment at the desire which was evinced to bolster up a bad cause. He would, however, consent to withdraw his second Resolution. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had assumed that he (Lord Robert Montagu) wished him to comedown to the House "every fortnight" to adjust the accounts. He meant that this should be done once for all, when the accounts were closed. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had objected also that "a Vote in excess entered into the account of the year in which it is voted." This was true of a cash account, but it would not be thus in the case of service accounts, such as those of the army and navy. He should withdraw the second Resolution.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he wished to remind the House of the offer of the Secretary of State for War to furnish the detailed accounts of the army expenditure, if they were moved for. He wished also to appeal to those hon. Members of the Committee who had said that there was no objection to their being presented, to say whether further examination confirmed them in that conclusion, because if they were to check the power of transfer, which had been abused, they must have before them the detailed accounts of the expenditure of the army for the past year when they were dealing with the Estimates.

Question, "That those words be there inserted," put, and agreed to.

Main Question, as amended, put, and agreed to.

Ordered, That a sufficient number of Copies of every Bill hereafter introduced for the appropriation of Supplies, and every annual Indemnity Bill, be printed and delivered to Members applying for them in time for consideration before it passes through Committee of the Whole House.