§ MR. HENNESSYsaid, he rose to ask a Question of the First Lord of the Treasury as to the nature of the obligations with respect to Poland involved in the Treaty of 1746 Vienna. It was now rather more than three weeks since the House had, in the course of debate, pronounced its opinion on the state of affairs in Poland. On that occasion certain general pledges were given, by the noble Lord, as to the policy which the Government intended to pursue; and the House exercised considerable forebearance in not pressing the Government for immediate explanations on the subject. The time had now, however, come when they were entitled to ask the Government what they were doing. Since the debate on this question, events in Poland had made great progress. The intelligence of the recent defeat of General Langiewicz had been construed by the English press into a serious blow to the Polish cause; but he thought he could show that the event by no means deserved the importance which had been attributed to it. The area of the insurrection in Poland was now three times as extensive as it was when he had the honour of directing attention to the subject; and in estimating the defeat of General Laugiewicz it was neccessary to bear in mind the nature of his position. General Langiewicz had just crossed the Austrian frontier, and held command in, the south-west corner of Poland, and at no time did his operations extend beyond an irregular circle of from forty to fifty miles radius, or a total area of some 1,600 square miles. From General Langiewicz's head-quarters, as straight as a bird could fly, to Bar, in the east of Poland, where the largest number of insurgents was assembled, was a distance of 500 miles. Kiew was 200 miles further to the east. Again, from Skala to Konin was 200 miles. From Bar to Pinsk, in the north, was 250 miles, and to Vilno 500 miles. Polotsk, on the frontier of Lithuania, was 600 miles to the east of Konin. The meaning of those figures was, that while the Polish general, commanding an area of less than 1,600 square miles, had suffered defeat, the insurrection itself, which reigned over about 50,000 square miles, had been extending its area day by day. If the gravity of the rising were to be estimated by the numbers that took part in it, the result would be no less striking. And with regard to Polish affairs generally, he would take the liberty of cautioning the House against placing too implicit reliance upon the details daily furnished by the telegrams of the numbers of Poles disarmed, captured, or slain. There was a remarkable coincidence in two telegraphic despatches which 1747 were published in the leading journal of that day. One was dated Warsaw, March 20, and stated that Sokol, the Polish general in the north, was attacked by the Russians and defeated, with the loss of 400 killed and fifty-four taken prisoners. The other was from the Russian Embassy, and set forth that General Langiewicz, in the south had been defeated with exactly the same loss of 400 killed and fifty-four taken prisoners. Such a coincidence was certainly to be accepted as a warning against accepting too readily the statements which came—as he presumed this had done—through the Russian Embassy at Paris. So far from thinking that the defeat of the nominal commander-in-chief—and Langiewicz was no more, for there were fifty independent commanders in different parts of Poland, as perhaps under the circumstances was best for the cause—so far from thinking that the defeat of the nominal commander-in-chief involved the loss of the struggle, he believed that there was no ground whatever for discouragement. He had received information that a landed proprietor who had property worth £80,000 or £100,000 a year, which would be confiscated if the attempt failed, had joined the insurgents. So had a nobleman whose name was well known in England—Count Zamoyski; and so, in fact, was every one doing of character and position that cared for his country. So far from being disheartened by the news just received, he regarded it simply as an indication of the desire of the Russians to get hold of the nominal commander-in-chief—a desire, of course, which was easily gratified, owing to the small number of men under Langiewicz; but he could not believe that the loss of a single feather from the wing of the Polish eagle would seriously affect its flight. Neither did he see that there was any reason, in the actual state of things, for the hope which had been expressed in a leading journal that the Czar would make those benevolent concessions to a defeated people which the editor seemed to think the present was a fitting occasion to offer. With reference to the details of the recent debate, he (Mr. Hennessy) might remind the House that the question he desired to bring before the House was, whether under existing circumstances England had not a moral obligation resting upon her to interfere in the cause of Poland. It was admitted by the noble Viscount at the head of the Government that England had a right, under the Treaty of 1748 Vienna, to interfere; but if Russia violated that treaty to the injury of the Poles and to the danger of the peace of Europe, he asked the noble Lord whether to the bare legal treaty right there was not super-added a moral obligation arising from Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington having signed the treaty avowedly for the purpose of protecting the Poles and preserving the peace and security of Europe? What was the language used by diplomatists in dealing with this question? He knew of no diplomatist who was more worthy of attention than the noble Viscount himself; for though speaking in this House he had done what he did not think was often the case with the noble Lord—made use of expressions which were not perfectly accurate; yet in the despatches relating to the affairs of Poland, which were written in 1831 and 1832, but which were not published until 1861, he found that the word "obligations" was used very often, not only by the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg and by Count Nesselrode, the Russian Minister, but by the noble Lord himself. Writing on the 13th of April, 1831, to the noble Lord, who was then at the head of the Foreign Office, Lord Heytesbury said—
Upon the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 22d March, I thought it advisable not to lose any time in informing Count Nesselrode of the nature of the instructions I had received, and in touching upon the several points to which my attention was directed. This I did in the order in which they stood in your Lordship's despatch, beginning with the obligations imposed upon us by the Treaty of Vienna, and the necessity in which England, as well as France, was placed, to watch over the progress of the war in Poland, and to remonstrate in the event of any measures being adopted on its conclusion at variance with existing engagements.A despatch addressed by the noble Viscount to Lord Heytesbury, dated November 3, contained the following passage:—The war being now over, and the authority of the Emperor as King being completely re-established in Poland, the time is come when His Majesty feels himself justified, both by his friendship for the Emperor of Russia and by the duty resulting from the obligations which he has contracted under the Treaty of Vienna, in addressing to His Imperial Majesty, in the most amicable tone, and with the deference which is due to his rights as an independent Sovereign, some observations as to the best mode of re-settling the kingdom of Poland under the dominion of the Emperor, on principles accordant with those on which its union with the Imperial Crown of Russia was originally formed, and in such a manner as may be most conducive to its future good government and tranquillity.1749 Here, then, we found the noble Lord repeating the phrase formerly used by Lord Heytesbury—the "obligations" imposed upon England by the Treaty of Vienna. Count Nesselrode answered this despatch at great length, and seemed to think that the several parties to the Treaty of Vienna did not incur the same obligations—for instance, that though Russia might have incurred obligations under the treaty, England had not done so; to this the noble Lord very fairly replied as follows:—It is hoped that upon reflection the Russian Government cannot fail to see all the inconvenient and dangerous consequences which would flow from thus establishing different degrees of obligation among the Powers who have equally signed a general treaty.When the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans) in 1831 called attention to the affairs of Poland, the noble Lord said the Government were prepared to fulfil the "obligations" which England had contracted under the Treaty of Vienna, but he refused to tell what they were doing or to publish the papers. There could be no doubt, therefore, according to the noble Lord himself, that a moral obligation was contracted under that treaty, and that it was the duty of England to interfere, of course by diplomatic action and in concert with the other Powers, on behalf of Poland. It was an important fact that throughout the whole history of English diplomacy in regard to Poland the noble Lord had always refused to act in concert with the other Powers. He refused in 1831, when solicited by France to address a joint note to Russia—and here it might be remarked, in passing, that in his despatch asking for the co-operation of England the French Minister spoke of the Poles having the "guarantee" of the Treaty of Vienna. We now knew that at the time of the Crimean war the same overture for joint action in regard to Poland was made to England by France, and was again rejected by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Now, for a third time the noble Lord had the case of Poland in his hands; and the House would probably like to know whether the French Government had solicited the co-operation of England in diplomacy; and, if so, whether its request had been refused. In a recent remarkable speech delivered in the French Senate, M. Billault reviewed the policy of the noble Lord in 1831, 1750 and denounced "many words and little actions" as a mode of treatment which should no longer be applied to Poland. That was in fact exactly what the noble Lord's policy in regard to Poland had actually been, and he was glad that M. Billault had publicly condemned it. The speech of the Imperial Minister was said, on the highest authority, to be an accurate interpretation of the policy of the Emperor. M. Billault had, moreover, thrown out a hint which was of great importance — he had hinted that a Congress might be necessary to settle the question of Poland. Were they to believe that the word "Congress" would have been used in M. Billault's speech if it were not considered a matter of serious importance? He would certainly not have ventured to do so if the Emperor was not prepared to recommend such a measure. He should like to know from the noble Lord whether an application had been made to him to address a joint note to Russia with regard to Poland, and whether, if that had been refused, the noble Lord was prepared to reiterate the old exploded argument which he used in 1831, when he declined a similar proposal—namely, that he relied on the benevolent intentions of the Czar? He (Mr. Hennessy) had no faith in the "benevolent intentions" of the Czar. The Czar himself told Count Zamoyski that his future policy in Poland would be one of terror and extermination; and certainly he had kept his word as far as he was able. If the noble Lord praised the Czar and the Grand Duke Constantine in the language held in that House not long ago, the impression would be created that our Government had attempted in 1863 to repeat the course it took in 1831. But he (Mr. Hennessy) ventured to say that the people of this country would be sorry to hear that the Prime Minister was about to follow his old policy—a policy which in his opinion was a mean policy, unsuited to the position of England, and most dangerous also to Europe. If France were left to take up this question by herself, the balance of power and the peace of Europe might be jeopardized. These evils would be averted only by a joint action between the two Powers. If France went alone into this matter, there might possibly be "a rectification of frontiers." On that, which was the lowest ground, the noble Lord ought to be cautious how he refused to co-operate with the French 1751 Government. He begged, therefore, to ask the noble Lord whether it was his opinion that no moral obligation existed on the part of England with regard to the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna affecting Poland?
§ VISCOUNT PALMERSTONSir, the hon. and learned Gentleman gave notice of a very short and simple Question, but he did not give notice of his intention to go into a dissertation as to the relative prospects of the Russian army, and of the Poles who are acting in resistance to that army. I shall not follow him through that dissertation, nor say anything that will imply any opinion as to the probable results and termination of that contest. Everybody has equal means of judging for himself. When, on a former occasion, the hon. and learned Gentleman mooted the question of the obligations resulting from the Treaty of Vienna, I understood him, as I think the House roust have done, to imply that there was in that treaty an obligation upon Great Britain to make war—to interfere forcibly in the affairs of Poland. My answer was, that there is no such obligation. There is a right if she thinks fit to exercise it; but there is no engagement entered into by Great Britain in that treaty which imposes on her the obligation of interfering, by force of arms, to give effect to her interpretation of the articles of that instrument. To that interpretation I entirely and completely adhere. I maintain that it is a just exposition of the effect of the treaty. I said, that where a treaty between different Powers does not contain an express stipulation guaranteeing, on the part of any or all of the Powers, any particular arrangement established by the treaty, there is a right on the part of each contracting party to enforce the arrangement if it thinks the object within its means of doing so; but there is no obligation, unless there is a specific stipulation such as I have named. But the hon. and learned Member now entirely shifts his ground and talks of a moral obligation. But instead of it being a moral obligation to interfere by force of arms, by the quotation he has made from a despatch of mine to Lord Heytesbury he shows that the interposition, which I then contended we were under an obligation to make, was one of a totally different kind from that which he urged on a former evening. What is the despatch which the hon. and learned Member quotes? It is a despatch in which I said that the insur- 1752 rection being over, and the Russian Government having re-established its authority in Poland, Her Majesty's Government, in fulfilment of the engagement contracted by them under the Treaty of Vienna, proceeded to represent in friendly terms to the Emperor of Russia considerations as to the arrangements he should make on the restoration of tranquillity in Poland. Well, that is a very different obligation from that which I understood him to argue for on a previous occasion. That obligation was fulfilled in the sense in which it was quoted; because the British Government did at that time make a friendly representation to the Emperor of Russia, urging what they thought it fitting for the Emperor to do with regard both to the obligations he had contracted by treaty, and to what was right and just with respect to the Poles themselves. In that sense I accept the interpretation of the hon. and learned Member; and when the proper time comes to lay before the House the papers showing what has been done and is doing, I am persuaded the House will perceive, that as far as any obligation upon the British Government to make friendly representations to the Emperor of Russia on behalf of the Poles goes, that obligation has been completely fufilled. With regard to the question which the hon. and learned Member has put, as to the communications going on between the French and English Governments in reference to the manner in which any representation should be made, I am sure the House will feel that it would not be useful, even if it were fitting, for me to enter into details as to that which is now passing on this subject. But when the hon. and learned Gentleman reproaches us, and me especially, with not having during the Crimean war consented to a proposal—if such proposal had been made—to transfer the seat of operations from the Crimea to Poland, I think the decision of Her Majesty's Government was the only rational and sensible decision that could have been come to. The war began in a Turkish question; it began for the purpose of protecting Turkey from invasion and attack by Russia. We were occupied, in conjunction with France, in obtaining the security of Turkey from Russian aggression. And be it remembered that that war commenced by a quarrel between France and Russia on a Turkish matter—that, in truth, it was France which began the war, or, at least, the dispute out of which the war originated. France, there- 1753 fore, was not a party entitled to ask us—before we had obtained in the Black Sea that security which we thought necessary—to relinquish our half-accomplished enterprise, and embark in another operation totally unconnected with the origin and cause of the war. I contend, therefore, that we acted properly in saying, "Let us finish what we have begun—namely, the protection of Turkey—and when that is ended, we may then see whether there is any ground for engaging in a new dispute with Russia on a question wholly distinct from that which gave rise to the first." We were perfectly justified, then, in not agreeing to suspend those operations in order to embark in a totally different matter. With regard to the still earlier period of 1831, there were at that time considerations which induced us to decline entering into what promised to be likely to lead to serious differences between England and Russia. We did make the representations which the hon. and learned Gentleman has quoted, and although, unfortunately, they were not attended with the success we could have wished, still we did as much as diplomatically we could do. And I beg the House to bear in mind—because it is well to recollect it in the course of these discussions—that the hon. and learned Gentleman now confines his interpretation of the Treaty of Vienna to this:—that we have an obligation, in cases in which the interests of Poland are concerned, to interfere diplomatically on behalf of that country. I believe, Sir, we shall convince the House that we have done our duty in this case, and that our efforts have at all events done some good to those on whose behalf they were made.