NAVY—WOODEN FRAMES FOR IRON SHIPS.—RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 12 March 1863 vol 169 cc1333-90

MR. LINDSAY

said, he rose, pursuant to notice, to move that it was not expedient at the present time to commence the building of wooden ships which were to be covered with iron-plates. It would be recollected that the question was raised a few nights since when the Navy Estimates were under consideration in Committee, and a very general opinion was expressed that while it was expedient to convert wooden ships already on our hands into iron ones by plating, it was not desirable to build wooden vessels expressly for that purpose. The noble Lord at the head of the Government promised on that occasion that the five wooden ships which it was proposed to construct would not be proceeded with until the House had had an opportunity of expressing its opinion upon the respective merits of iron and wood as materials for the building of ships for Her Majesty's navy. He (Mr. Lindsay) now came forward for the purpose of affording an opportunity for the expression of that opinion by the House. In introducing the question be would confine himself to two points:— First, were those five new ships proposed to be built to be constructed of wood or iron?—secondly, were they to be built in Her Majesty's dockyards or under contract by private builders? Now, it was for the House to decide whether iron or wood was the best material for the construction of ships-of-war. It was well-known that iron was ten times stronger than wood— that was to say, that a one-inch plate of ordinary English iron was equal in strength to a ten-inch plank of English oak. The first operation in constructing a ship was the laying down the keel, and in the case of wooden ships the keel, stem and sternpost were necessarily divided into a great number of different parts, and these, with the ribs, or timbers as they were called, were fastened together by bolts and trenails. But the keel, stem, sternposts and timbers had in themselves very little strength. It was only when they put the planking outside, and the ceiling inside, and fastened these also by means of trenails and bolts that the ship acquired strength. But in an iron ship the various parts were practically welded into one another, so that the whole structure became almost a solid body, and formed a vessel infinitely stronger and more durable for all purposes than a wooden ship. Before going further, he might as well state that he was not a shipbuilder and had no interest in any shipbuilding yard. He was, however, a shipowner, and ships both of wood and iron had been built for him in different parts of the country. But for the last ten years he had not built a wooden ship, having come to the conclusion that iron ships were stronger, more durable, and altogether a better investment than wooden ones. Since the discussion in Committee to which he had referred, the Admiralty had laid on the table a statement relating to the advantages of iron and wood, and the relative cost of these materials. The document was signed by Admiral Robinson; but, of course, the Board was responsible for it. Although the Admiralty admitted that on the whole an iron ship was stronger than a wooden one, they argued, in their statement, that it was advisable for certain reasons to continue the construction of wooden ships to be plated with, iron. Among other reasons for so doing, the Admiralty said they never could depend on the quality of the iron. In his opinion, that was purely a question of price and could therefore be readily solved. A 4½-inch armour-plate of ordinary iron cost about £40 a ton; but there was better metal to be got. Lowmoor iron, for instance, was superior, but more expensive. The Swedish and Norwegian irons, which were made with charcoal, were also, he understood, tougher and more durable; but then, instead of £40 a ton, they cost £48 or £50. On the whole outlay for a ship-of-war, however, the difference of price between the ordinary and the superior qualities of iron was comparatively a small consideration. If therefore the Admiralty did not procure the best description of iron, it was their own fault. Next, it was alleged that in iron ships the compasses were subject to dangerous deviations. But there was a vast number of iron ships afloat, sailing to all parts of the world, and it had not been found that there was any serious difficulty in keeping the compasses correct in those vessels. It was also said that iron ships were peculiarly liable to foul. After a voyage of twelve months or so the bottom of an* iron ship was, no doubt, likely to be foul; but, according to the experience of the merchant service, the Admiralty exaggerated the difficulty of keeping iron ships clean. It was a remarkable fact, that when an iron ship was taken into a fresh-water river, such as the Hooghly, or any of the innumerable streams on the coast of China, the barnacles were, to a great extent, removed from the bottom. Ships could also be easily cleaned in dock. Another objection raised by the Admiralty to iron was the prodigious ravages, as they stated, caused by the splinters of iron when the plates are broken and smashed by shot, and the greater facility by which ships of iron could be pierced below their armour-plating by submarine guns than wooden ships. On those points he would offer no opinion of his own, but would cite two able witnesses—one an extensive builder of iron ships, and the other a post captain in Her Majesty's navy. Mr. Scott Russell, in two able pamphlets, discussed the whole question of "Wood v. Iron," and the effect of shot upon them. The conclusions he arrived at were that iron ships could carry much heavier weights than wooden ones, that they were more durable, and that they were much safer against the sea, against fire, against explosive shells, against red-hot shot, and against molten metal. He maintained, in fact, that for all practical purposes they could be made impregnable, even against solid shot. Such was the opinion of a gentleman who had great experience as a shipbuilder, and who had dealt with the question not only theoretically, but practically, for a long series of years. He had no doubt that the opinions of Mr. Scott Russell would be borne out by the hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird), a Gentleman who, from his vast experience, was much more competent to guide the House upon the question of "Wood v. Iron" than even the Controller of the Navy himself. In the course of 1861–2 Captain Halsted delivered a series of lectures before the Royal United Service Institution, and in the presence of a number of able and competent gentlemen, who would have contradicted him if he had gone wrong in his statements. The conclusions of Captain Halsted were almost the same as those arrived at by Mr. Scott Russell. England, he said, possessed a great advantage in the superiority of iron over wood as a material for the construction of ships. Iron afforded greater facility for procuring any required standard of strength without the process of seasoning, and with a certainty unattainable by wood; for producing any form, however finely modelled; for imparting strength to subordinate parts; for obtaining greater lightness with equal strength, and more room with equal exterior dimensions. Iron was also, according to Captain Halsted, adaptable to vessels of every size, was easy of construction, was attended with less expense, possessed of greater durability, was less liable to repair, and afforded superior security against leaking. Against the opinions of such authorities as Captain Halsted and Mr. Scott Russell, the Admiralty had done nothing more than refer to what they called the "prodigious ravages caused by the splinters of iron when the plates are broken and smashed by shot." Were they prepared to produce evidence in support of that statement? He rather thought that they had no experience in firing at ships built of iron. About sixteen years ago, it was true, some experiments were made with the Ruby; but she was a little vessel of only twenty tons, had been employed as a sort of tender at the dockyards, was entirely worn out, and her plates were not thicker than a half-crown piece. No wonder that the broadside directed against her caused "prodigious ravages." What, however, was the evidence of competent naval officers? One of the witnessess examined before a Committee, presided over by the present first Lord of the Admiralty, was Captain Hall, who commanded the Nemesis, an iron vessel, in China. Captain Hall stated that, from his experience in China, he had formed a favourable opinion of iron. Several wooden steamers were employed on the same service; but while they were invariably obliged to lay by for repairs, he was able to repair the Nemesis in twenty-four hours, and she was always ready for employment. On one occasion she was hit fourteen times, when one man lost an arm, and one shot went right through the vessel, coming in at one side and going out at the other. There were no splinters; the shot went through as a man might put his finger through a piece of brown paper, and the holes might easily have been stopped. Similar evidence was given by Captain Charlwood, who had also commanded an iron ship of war, and who said he had no doubt that iron ships could be made stronger than wooden vessels, and that shot in striking them would cause less damage and produce fewer splinters. The Admiralty themselves admitted, not only that iron ships were stronger than wooden ones, but that additional strength was given to wooden vessels by iron. He believed, however, that armour-plates in themselves did not add anything to the strength of the structure of a ship; on the contrary, he rather thought that the great weight of the plates tended to weaken the structure, especially in the case of a wooden ship, and to increase the strain in a gale of wind. A French witness had been produced by the Admiralty to prove that wooden ships, though not so strong as iron ships, were strong enough for our purpose. He saw no necessity for going to France or any other country for evidence upon any point connected with ship-building. The Admiralty might have learnt from any of their master shipwrights that, independent altogether of the great weight of armour-plates upon a ship, the greatest difficulty was found to make the stern frame of a wooden vessel strong enough to resist the tremendous vibration caused by the movement of the engines and screw. In the Edgar, a 90-gun ship launched at Sheerness, the play upon the stern frame was so great, that the master shipwright exclaimed in alarm, "For God's sake stop those engines, or you will drive the sternpost out of the ship." The next question which he desired to bring under the consideration of the House was this—was it advisable, presuming that these ships were to be built, that they should be built in Her Majesty's dockyards? Charges had, he thought, unnecessarily been made by the Admiralty against private shipbuilders, and it was only fair that the answer to those charges should be heard. In Admiral Robinson's report it was stated—"The first practical fact that comes before us is, that in no one instance have the contractors kept to their agreements with the Government, either as to time or cost." It went on to state—" There is no prospect that more than one out of the four iron ships last ordered will be delivered till many months after the period agreed upon; "that not one contractor only, but all had failed in their agreements, "and this clearly indicates the great uncertainty attending this mode of construction." The paper next stated that—"Two other difficulties present themselves—First, the general slovenliness of the work performed by iron shipbuilders, rendering the presence of an Admiralty inspector necessary on the premises wherever the contract ships are building, and leading to many difficulties between the contractors and the Admiralty;" and secondly, "the great temptation that beset the contractors, owing to the cost and difficulty of procuring good iron, to use inferior and cheaper material;" and moreover, that "after a contract is signed, no alteration or improvement, however great, can be made without submitting to any terms the contractor chooses to enforce." These were very grave imputations; but were they true? Why had the contractors not kept to their time? He had received a letter from Mr. Samuda, an eminent shipbuilder, who, writing to him from the Continent, said he had read with surprise the report of Admiral Robinson as reprinted in The Times. Mr. Samuda continued— As regards Admiral Robinson's paper, it appears to me—1. Wooden hulls can, without doubt, be built by the Admiralty in their dockyards faster than iron hulls can be built in private yards under Admiralty specifications and Admiralty interference. 2. Therefore, if the Admiralty could show that a very pressing necessity existed, and could not be induced to trust the work to responsible builders to build on the builders' own specifications, the wooden fleet would undoubtedly be ready first; but, 3. Nothing short of pressing necessity ought to induce the House to sanction this, because wooden hulls when eased in armour-plates are well known to be a makeshift job only. 4. I believe that with an Admiralty specification, Admiralty inspection and direction, and Admiralty interference, iron hulls cannot be built in less time than they have been built—1, because the specifications are complicated in the extreme; 2, because the Admiralty insist on directing every amount of detail; 3, because they are unsettled in their minds and plans on many large points, and on almost every minor point of detail; 4, they take power in every third line of their specifications to have all the unexplained details executed as 'the overseer directs;' and the overseer is very long, and makes many references to other Departments over him, before he does direct, so that, in fact, contrary to what Admiral Robinson would imply, the period of executing every contract lies practically with the Admiralty, and not with the contractor, he is, by his contract and specification, bound hand and foot, and is unable to use his own skill, or proceed at all without getting every point settled for him by the Admiralty, and of course all combination and system by which, and which only, largo works can be done in a short time—namely, by preparing large quantities of work by one set of men, to enable them to follow up other work arranged to be in a certain state by a certain time, becomes impossible. Lastly, I am sure under Government arrangements iron vessels could not be built cheaper than those already built have been, including all extras paid. I believe in every case the contractors have scarcely covered their cost, in many have been losers; nevertheless, I believe that the Government have had full justice done by thorn as a whole, and that they (the builders) are not liable to the imputation cast on thorn for ' general slovenliness;' but also I should add that I doubt if either the Royal Oak or the Prince Consort have advanced sufficiently to enable even an approximate (certainly not an exact) estimate of their cost to be yet ascertained. Now, Admiral Robinson's report, having been reprinted in The Times, had gone forth to every part of the world; and the Thames Ship-building Company, the contractor for the Warrior and other vessels, sent a reply to that journal, which had not yet appeared in its columns, owing, he presumed, to a pressure upon its space. He therefore desired, with the permission of the House, to read the Thames Shipping Company's answer. Their letter to The Times began by stating that— A paper on the construction of ships for Her Majesty's navy has just been presented to Parliament and printed. It is signed by the Controller of the Navy, and contains charges so grave, and at the same time so unfounded, against the contractors by whom our iron-cased ships have been built, and singles out so especially our firm, the builders of the Warrior, that we cannot pass it over in silence, and must request the favour of your giving our reply a place in your columns. Having mentioned the nature of the charges, the writer proceeded— To all these accusations we give an indignant and complete denial. We challenge the Controller of the Navy and all his officers to produce a single example of slovenliness in workmanship or inferiority in material; we appeal to the thousands who have seen the Warrior, to every practical man who has examined her (and where are those who have not?), to her present condition after more than a twelvemonth's trial through the worst weather, and to the reports of her captain, as our vindication against these charges; and with the great companies for whom we have built some of the finest vessels afloat; with foreign Governments, by whom we are largely employed; and with the private firms for whom we have worked, we hope that we have established a reputation which will withstand even such a blow as one in the high position and armed with the authority of Controller of the Navy has thus sought to deal against it…As to our failure to fulfil our engagements either as to time or cost, we have specific facts to deal with. The Controller states that we 'agreed' to build the Warrior for '£210,225, including extras.' We never made any such agreement, nor anything giving even colourable grounds for such a complete misstatement. Our original contract sum for the Warrior was £190,225. On the 16th of March, 1861, six months before the Warrior left the Thames, we sent in to the Controller an account of extras amounting to £10,808, intimating at the same time that we had other large claims; and when all was finished we claimed, not the sum of £254,728, as stated by the Controller, but £269,600, of which we were paid only £251,640. The changes and additions made in the Warrior beyond her original design were, as these figures will themselves show, enormous; in faot, the ship as built was to a very great extent different from the ship as contracted for; and when she was finished, we took the following course:—We submitted to the Controller that these additions and changes were so extensive, our claim for extras so large and so difficult for the Admiralty officers to deal with, that the fairest course would be for us to show the Admiralty what the ship had really cost, and that they should pay us that cost with a profit of 12½ per cent, which, considering that all our resources had for more than two years been placed at the disposal of the Government, we did not consider unreasonable, nor so much as we might have claimed in an extra bill. The Controller of the Navy himself recommended the adoption of this principle of settlement, only reducing the profit to be allowed to us to 5 per cent, or £12,000. All our books and accounts were submitted to the closest investigation by the Admiralty accountants, who verified their absolute accuracy; and we consented to receive this settlement, although really, as we now desire to state, it gave us no profit as shipbuilders at all; not contemplating during the construction of the vessel the possibility of such a mode of settlement, all the iron and the armour-plates, which we manufactured ourselves, were charged to the ship at little over their prime cost, and at much less than the market prices, or what, had we been shipbuilders only, we must have paid, and the £12,000 given us as profit just about represents this difference. On the charge of dilatoriness the writer continued— We frankly admit, as we have before done to the Admiralty, that had we built the Warrior without any alteration from the original design, our estimate of time would have been two or three months too little; but beyond that, we affirm that all the additional delay is due to the changes made by the Admiralfy, and to the stoppage of our work, and the additional work thereby imposed upon us…With respect to our other engagements with the Admiralty for the completion of the Valiant and the Minotaur, we are prepared to prove that the delay in the former is in no respect due to us as contractors; and as to the latter, we shall launch and finish her within an additional time less than is due to the altera- tions and delays caused by the Admiralty them selves We have always admitted that the Admiralty were right in seeking in every way to improve these vessels, and that in the Warrior the improvements were well worth all the time occupied in planning and carrying them Out; at the same time, in our correspondence with the Controller we have protested, and do protest, against their system of blaming the contractor for the consequences of their own acts. Having dealt with the private question between the Controller and ourselves, we venture to make a few remarks on the public question as to the building of these ships in wood or iron, and by contract or in the dockyards… The paper admits the superior strength and durability of iron over wood, but imputes to iron certain disadvantages… The bulkheads and double bottom, which are most disingenuously stated to be complicated and costly arrangements introduced to remedy local weakness, are, in fact, advantages which cannot be overvalued, which exist only in iron ships, and for which wooden ones possess nothing equivalent. The Great Eastern struck lately on a rock, and was saved by her double bottom. Many vessels have been saved by their bulkheads; and indeed if there was no other recommendation of iron, this alone would be a reason for preferring it to wood… The great fact, however, that all our large steam companies, the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, the Royal Mail, and the Cunard, &c., have long since abandoned wood and adopted iron, proves that at least these drawbacks, be they what they may, are more than counterbalanced by the advantages of iron The Controller gives the cost of an iron ship at £214,000, as compared with a wooden one at £187,000, showing a saving of £27,000 per ship. Without questioning these figures, which cannot, however, be admitted as correct, we would observe that this is only the cost of the hull, and that in each case is to be added—the cost being the same—the machinery, say £50,000; the rigging and outfit, say £20,000: the armament, stores, &c., say £20,000 more. The real difference, therefore, is not between £214,000 and £187,000, but between £304,000 and £277,000. In other words, on the cost of five vessels as proposed, out of a million and a half for iron, the country is to save £135,000, even on the Controller's own showing; and that for the sake of this difference it is 'wiser and more economical to supply the wants of the moment by a cheaper and less durable structure.' We do not believe in the cheapness, but we only point out now how small the economy is to be; that, if these ships are built of wood in the dockyards, ' no more money will be required than what already appears in the Navy Estimates, whereas if built of iron by contract the whole of the money required to do so must be voted separately, in addition to the ordinary Navy Estimates,' is a most extraordinary statement, Build these vessels as we may, the £50,000 for machinery, the £40,000 for rigging, outfit, armament, &c., will alike have to be spent. If built of wood in the dockyards, each ship will require above 1,000 tons of armour-plates, to be purchased of' contractors,' which with the expense of fixing will absorb some £50,000 out of the £187,000 put down by the Controller as the cost of each ship. Of the remaining £137,000, say roughly one-third in wages, or £47,000, will be spent if the ships are built in the dockyards, or saved if not; and of the £90,000 balance, representing the material, there will be timber, Ac., in the dockyards worth the money if remaining there, or capable of being sold for the money to the contractors, or saving the money on the next Estimates by continuing in stock. That letter had been forwarded to him by Captain Forde, managing director of the company, and there were important facts in it which would be useful in enabling the House to arrive at a sound conclusion on the subject. In an accompanying note Captain Forde said there were many other points to which attention might be drawn. First of all, in regard to time, the Achilles, building in Her Majesty's Dockyard at Chatham, he said, had been laid down in I860, and was only half finished now. It had been already as long in hand as the company had taken to complete the Warrior. The statement, he further said, made by the Controller of the Navy was calculated to do great damage to a large and important branch of British enterprise, employing a vast amount of skilled labour; and the impression which was likely to be produced abroad, if that hasty statement was not contradicted, was that for honesty, good work, or good material, foreigners need not come here, and they had better resort to France or America. The Thames Ship-building Company had contracts with foreign Governments amounting to £600,000; Messrs. Napier, of Glasgow, had contracts with foreign Governments amounting to £800,000; the Millwall Company to the amount of £300,000, and Messrs. Laird and Son to the extent of £300,000. Here, then, were five companies having contracts with foreign countries to the amount of £2,000,000, employing 10,000 men, on whom probably 50,000 were dependent one way or another, and that statement was calculated to strike a serious blow at the capital invested in these large and important establishments. Surely there was distress enough already in the manufacturing districts without doing anything to increase its amount, and the Controller of the Navy ought to have considered that. He had spoken of only five firms, but there were hundreds of other ship-building establishments in the country to whom this statement would be most prejudicial. The Report, finally, recommended that the House should agree with the Admiralty that these ships should be built in Her Majesty's dockyards. Now, even if wooden ships were to be built—and he would take the sense of the House on that point— were Her Majesty's dockyards in such a state as to build these vessels economically and efficiently? On that point he would adduce three witnesses. These witnesses were the Committee appointed by the right hon. Gentleman (Sir John Pakington), the Royal Commission, and the present Secretary to the Admiralty himself. The right hon. Gentleman, he believed, would have carried out the changes recommended by the Committee if he had remained in office. The noble Lord might think that hon. Members below the gangway used rather hard words in regard to the Government of which he was a Member, but had the Members of that Government fulfilled the pledges of retrenchment and economy on which they were placed in office? He (Mr. Lindsay) and the rest of the independent Members had not left the two noble Lords and the Government of which they were Members. They adhered to their principles of retrenchment and economy, which the noble Lords had forsaken. But he was not objecting to the building of the five ships. If they were necessary to maintain our position in Europe, by all means let them be built. He would never raise his voice against maintaining the maritime supremacy of England. The only question was where they were to be built? He would take the noble Lord as the first witness. The noble Lord, on the 11th of March, 1859, before he became a Member of the Government, gave a graphic description of the Royal dockyards. He said— There had been a system of extravagant expenditure pursued by the ship-building department of the Admiralty, which, he maintained, ought to be thoroughly looked into. In the statement he was about to make, the figures he should have to quote to the House really appalled him. He did not think the House had the smallest notion of what had been going on in our dockyards, in the way of tinkering vessels, amputating them, performing all sorts of surgical operations upon them. They had their heads cut off, they had their tails cut off, they were sawn asunder, they were maltreated in every possible way… His object was to introduce economy, and without economy there could be no true efficiency." And the noble Lord added that 'they wanted a little reconstruction at the Admiralty.'" [3 Hansard cliii. 40, 46, 48.'] The noble Lord had been five years at the Admiralty, but what had he done to effect a remedy for the evils of which he complained, or to carry out the recommendations either of the Committee or the Royal Commission? His next witness should be the Committee on Dockyard Economy of 1859, of which Admiral Smart was chairman. They reported that— There was an apathy and want of activity and energy pervading many of the supervising officers and many of the men apparent in the dockyards. The Committee consider that too little regard has been paid to the subject of cost, and have found abundant proofs of this fact. The Committee found almost a total want of representation to the superintendent of the men in regard to their idling their time, leaving off work before the time," and so forth, and they added that "the arrangements for the superintendence of the men. while at work were generally objectionable. By this Report it appeared that the average cost of shipwrights' labour on, eight corvettes built in Her Majesty's dockyards was £5 9s. per ton, while similar labour on similar ships in private yards was £2 12s. per ton; and that in Her Majesty's yards the cost of labour varied from £4 8s. per ton, to £6 18s. per ton. The Royal Commission was composed of the hon. Baronet opposite, the hon. Member for Glasgow, and Lord Gifford, whose loss he deeply deplored. It confirmed the Report of the Committee, and called attention to the most unsatisfactory state of the accounts in Her Majesty's dockyards. He would admit that the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty had made strenuous exertions to get accurate accounts, which, at the time he came to the Admiralty, were in a very lamentable state. But what had been done to carry out the other recommendations of the Royal Commission? They reported that— The control and management of the dockyards was inefficient, arising from the constitution of the Board, the defective organization of the subordinate departments, the want of clear and denned responsibility, and of accurate accounts. They pointed out a great many things which were in a most unsound state. They took Pembroke, which was solely a building yard, and calling for a return, found, that without taking into consideration the sum of £323,210 which had been expended upon works, such as buildings, machinery, &c., since 1848, the vessels built at Pembroke dockyard during that period, amounting to 65,435 tons, had cost £33 3s 5d. per ton for the hulls alone, and exclusive of fittings, &c. These were vessels of all sizes, but the great majority were under 1,000 tons. Allowing that the vessels under 1,000 tons cost £15 a ton, the average price of vessels over 4,000 tons might be put down at £45 per ton. The Controller of the Navy went into minute detail in the endeavour to make out that the building of wooden ships in the Royal dockyards cost a great deal less than the building of iron ships of the same size in private yards. The Controller took the case of a wooden ship of 4,200 tons. But that vessel, according to the cost of building in Pembroke yard—£45 a ton—would entail an outlay, if built in a Royal dockyard, not of £187,000, as the Controller estimated, but of £256,000. Even taking the cost at £35 per ton, such a wooden ship would cost £214,000 in a Royal dockyard, as against £172,677, the cost of the Hector. In conclusion, the Royal Co in mission reported that large retrenchments might be made in the expenditure without impairing the efficiency of Her Majesty's dockyards; and in that opinion he (Mr. Lindsay) entirely agreed. The ships of the merchants of this country were to be found in every sea, they carried the products of our industry to every country in the world. We built not merely the finest merchant ships in the world, but supplied most other nations with ships of war. How was it that our shipbuilders could not be trusted to construct ships of war for their own country? He was convinced, that as perfect reliance could be placed in our leading shipbuilders, it was desirable not to increase the work of construction in the Royal dockyards, at least till material changes were made in the management of these establishments, and that it was desirable to build the ships we required of iron and not of wood. He, therefore, with great confidence, begged to move the Amendment of which he had given notice.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "it is not expedient to commence at the present time building Wooden Ships which are to be cased with Iron Armour Plates, —instead thereof.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

Sir, in rising immediately after the speech of my hon. Friend I shall lose the opportunity of answering remarks which may be made by-and-by in the course of this interesting debate; but it is so important that the House should be made acquainted with the bearings of this question that I think it better at once to explain the views entertained by Her Majesty's Government on the subject. I gather from the remarks of my hon. Friend that he, at all events, will be no party to arresting the progress of armour-plated ships, and therefore, as far as he is concerned, I have little necessity for adverting to that point further; but, inasmuch as other hon. Gentlemen may take a different view, and may think that the armour-plated navy of England is so powerful that there is no necessity for making any further progress, unless with those ships which we have in hand, I shall address a few observations to the House by way of explanation. First of all, I am not going to make a detailed comparison between the armour-plated fleets of this and other countries; but I may state generally that, great as our exertions have been and still are, we are not yet in a position to abstain from further efforts. Now, upon this point it is very important that the House should be aware of the opinion of eminent men in Fiance, as to the comparative naval position of the two countries, extracted from an authority which the hon. Member for Rochdale will acknowledge—the Moniteiir de la Flotte. From that journal I have translated portions of a paper read at the Academy of Sciences in Paris about a fortnight ago, by Admiral Paris, a great authority upon ship-building, and himself employed in large works for the French navy. I shall read the concluding part first, because it is very striking. The Admiral says— But, whatever be the future consequences of building iron ships, it must be remarked that we are so much in advance of other nations, that a marked superiority exists at present on our side. Now, I trust these words have been heard by the hon. Member for Rochdale—[Mr. COBDEN: More shame for you!]—because I saw him wince under the statement of my hon. Friend (Mr. Lindsay), when he said that he thought it would be necessary that continual progress should be made in the building of armour-plated ships. Now, I can distinctly assure the House that it is absolutely necessary we should continue to build armour-plated ships over and above those under construction. I need not repeat in detail the ships which are being built, but taking large and small we have now under construction twenty-one vessels which are to bear armour-plates—a smaller number than are being constructed over the water. Assuming that the House will not for a moment agree with my hon. Friend the Member for Rochdale that it is not necessary we should make further progress, I come to the interesting point upon which my hon. Friend's Motion is founded—the respective merits of wooden and iron armour-plated snips. Now, nothing can be more fallacious than what we hear right and left as to iron ships being imperishable because they are made of iron only. Why, Sir, it is well known that in the construction of armour-plated ships there is necessarily a very large quantity of wood used, because we find in practice that no iron plates will stand the shock of heavy guns, unless they have a cushion behind composed of wood. Therefore, you have at once in iron armour-plated ships a very destructible substance which is more liable to decay than any other part. Therefore, whether we build armour-plated ships of wood or iron, we must use a certain quantity in the one case of iron in the other of wood. But iron ships, besides having a large quantity of wood, which is liable to decay, have other great defects. They are extremely liable to foul. My hon. Friends says that merchant ships, which go over the world, are built mostly of iron; that they go their voyage, come home, and again go out, being for months without docking. But we have found that the Resistance had a marked superiority over the other ships with which she was tried, and what is the reason? She had been two months less time out of dock than the Defence, three months less than the Black Prince, and five months less than the Warrior. It was quite incorrect to say that the Warrior had not been, docked for two years. Captain Cochrane had said that when six weeks afloat she lost one knot an hour. That was a very important point. It is idle for my hon. Friend to tell us that because iron merchantmen can go over the world without docking, men-of-war can do so too. Here is an important point which my hon. Friend did not bear in view. A merchant ship goes out for a particular purpose, she takes in her cargo, and comes back upon a return voyage. But what does the navy do? Their normal position, so to speak, is in harbour—they are placed on distant stations for long periods to protect our commerce; and, instead of being kept constantly in motion, they are stationary at various foreign places, where necessarily great aggregations of grass and shells foul their bottoms. Now, hear what Admiral Paris says upon this point— There are differences of opinion as to the materials of which armour-plated ships should be built. The English have adopted iron, we wood. The first is adapted to very large constructions, it lasts longer, but it greatly interferes with speed and steerage, owing to the immediate deposit of grass and shells, necessitating continual docking and painting. Thus, there is not only a question of a loss of speed, but of actual steerage. We have it not officially, but it has been stated in the newspapers, that in American waters a conflict recently took place between two vessels, the Alabama and the Hatteras, and the defeat of the latter was attributed to the foulness of her bottom, she being an iron ship. I do not vouch for the fact, but such is the cause assigned. I have referred to Admiral Paris, and the hon. Member for Sunder-land will admit that he is a high authority. The hon. Gentleman will admit that the French have not been unsuccessful in their efforts to form a splendid navy, and that they have an admirable knowledge of the principles of naval construction. Admiral Paris says, with regard to the iron ship— Its greatest defect is due to its weakness against shot or shell which might strike below the armour-plating when the vessel rolls, causing, probably, the loss of the vessel, in spite of the numerous water-tight compartments. That is the opinion of Admiral Paris, and, I believe—indeed, I know—it is also the opinion of M. Dupuy de l'Ome, for I have the authority of the Controller for saying, that he has just received a letter from that distinguished gentleman in which his preference is stated to be rather for wood than for iron. My hon. Friend has quoted largely from Mr. Scott Russell upon this question of iron ships as compared with wooden ships. Now, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) presided last year at a meeting of the Institute of Naval Architects, when a paper was read by Mr. Scott Russell, in which he recommended strongly that we should got our fleets built by him and of iron. But it happened that there was also at that meeting another eminent shipbuilder, Mr. Ditch-burn, who is well known as having produced some very remarkable vessels, and who is as much an iron shipbuilder, I believe, as Mr. Scott Russell. Mr. Ditch-burn said— In considering the strength of ships, it is right to remember that in ships-of-war the bottom is made exceedingly strong; for in addition to the thick external planking which is fitted near the keel, the spaces between the frame timbers are filled in with timber, the frames and fillings being bolted together. Such ships are therefore superior to any iron vessel I have ever seen with respect to strength of bottom. If any hon. Member will move for the Return, he will find that of vessels built for the navy, and lost, the greater proportion are iron vessels. We know that iron is brittle, and cannot, on striking against a rock, resist the blow like wood. Let us take the case, which happened the other day, of the Defence armour-plated ship, the pea of whose anchor struck against her side, close to the water, and knocked out a large piece. If such an accident had happened at sea, it might have caused I very serious inconvenience. It is the particular characteristic of the ordinary iron! ship, that although rigid, it will not bear a sudden blow. I am an advocate for iron ships; and if we could get over these difficulties, I would prefer to see iron armour-plated ships; but, I believe, in saying so I am in a minority among naval officers. I can assure the House, that having discussed this question with very many naval officers, the majority of them have said to me, that they would prefer to command wooden armour-plated ships rather than iron armour-plated ships. Now, I must refer to the paper that has been laid upon the table of the House—the Report of the Controller of the Navy. In doing so, I wish hon. Members to understand that nothing was further from Admiral Robinson's intention than to commit any injustice towards the eminent shipbuilders who have been referred to. We have every reason to be generally satisfied with the great contractors, but Admiral Robinson felt it to be his duty to point out where their work did fail, and I think in doing so he was only doing his duty as a public servant. Admiral Robinson, however, has written me a letter, of which I will read a portion to the House— There is an expression in the pappy presented to Parliament relative to the materials of which armour-plated ships should he built which may he misunderstood, and, if so, may be annoying to the feelings of iron shipbuilders. By 'the general slovenliness of the work performed' I mean only this—that the general standard of iron ship-building work in the trade is so far below what the Admiralty has considered necessary, and has enforced upon its contractors, that they have complained again and again of our insisting upon work being better done than was habitual in the trade. I may add, that there is no quality of work that we have exacted from our contractors, no degree of excellence in workmanship that we have required from them, that we have not ourselves put in practice in our own dockyard at Chatham while building the Achilles. Upon this point I may quote from a letter which the Admiralty have received from Messrs. Napier, the eminent shipbuilders, dated March 11. Those gentlemen say— The unusual test by which the quality of the iron was ascertained, and which had not previously existed in ship-building, was a source of the greatest delay and loss to us, and this could not have been foreseen when we made our estimate. In attempting to attain the strain of twenty-two tons per square inch, and otherwise satisfy the inspectors, we had to pay a very large amount beyond what could ever have been expected from the previous experience we or any other ship-builders were possessed of, and, moreover, had the greatest difficulty in getting, at any price, iron which would stand the test from the most eminent makers either in England or Scotland. The test required is twenty-two tons to the square inch, but Professor Fairbairn says that the best material ought to bear a strain of twenty-five tons to the square inch, so that we do not exact so much as scientific authority states we ought to require. Well, then, it is said that the Admiralty Inspectors are extremely severe. Sir, it pleases me beyond expression to hear that those gentlemen do watch the interests of the public. In former days, as we have heard, the inspectors used to be so intimate with the contractors that they always approved everything which the contractors did; and it is to their credit that they now do try to protect the public.

Having thus endeavoured to make peace between the Admiralty and the shipbuilders, for whom we have the highest respect, I may now, without troubling the House in detail with the statements of the Controller, say that in my opinion his views as to the comparative merits of wood and iron are extremely fair. He gives to iron the credit of great durability, and of much greater strength in very large structures than wood possesses. In short, he says that after a lapse of years the iron frame would have suffered next to nothing as compared with a wooden ship. I entirely go with him in this, lint against those advantages he sets "the serious local weakness of the comparatively thin plates of which the bottom of an iron ship is necessarily composed" (I have given instances of that in the Defence); "the danger, consequently, of getting on rocks in such ships," and "the necessity which this weakness entails of constructing double bottoms, thwartship bulkheads, water-tight compartments, sluice-doors, &c., and various other complicated arrangements which add both to the weight and cost of an iron ship." My hon. Friend tells us, that these water-tight compartments, even if a hole were made in the bottom of a ship, would keep the water entirely out. Yes, if you can get them; but in no case in the ships supplied to the Admiralty have the water-tight bulkheads been watertight. I trust that they will be more perfect in the new ships; but, as yet, not one of those ships has bulkheads or sluice-doors which are perfectly watertight. The fact is, that the question of wood versus iron is one which may be argued any way. On both sides the greatest possible amount of argument may be adduced. The advocates of iron may show immense advantages over wood. On the other hand, those who are not devoted to iron, but who take a disinterested view of the matter, are bound, in stating the case to the public, to show that iron armour ships are not altogether without very serious defects. There is another matter—the relative cost—which I agree is of small importance compared with the necessity of having the best article. It is, I think, not quite fair to bring into a debate of this kind the Admiralty management for years past in our dockyards. But, since this matter has been alluded to, I cannot quite pass over it. Now, I cannot help saying that my hon. Friend is misleading the House, if, when he alludes to the Reports of the Dockyard Commission and the Committee presided over by Admiral Smart, he gives the House to understand that those Reports have not been very carefully considered by the Admiralty, and that great improvements have not in consequence been introdued. Take the Report of the Committee. The gist of Admiral Smart's criticism was the apathy of the dockyard officers, owing to the system then existing. Well, Sir, we agreed in this criticism, and we did in the dockyards that which has had grave political consequences. We established a rule by which for the future no artificer should be promoted to a higher grade after the age of forty-five, thus giving young men from the time of their entering the service an opportunity of fitting themselves for higher posts; and if they have not so fitted themselves by the time they are forty-five, we hold that they are no longer fitted for promotion. The consequence is, that we are taking young men to superintend the artificers, instead of men of an age when we could not expect from them anything like effective superintendence. Then there is the Report of the Dockyard Commission. My hon. Friend pays me a few compliments for having originated this inquiry. If he will look at some papers which are now on the table, he will see what has really been done in conformity with the Report of that Commission. Here are two papers which will give my hon. Friend some little amusement if he will take them home with him to-morrow. One is the balance-sheet of the cost of manufactured articles in Her Majesty's dockyards for 1860–1; and another is a Return of expenses incurred in building, converting, repairing, and fitting Her Majesty's ships. By referring to these Returns my hon. Friend will see the cost of every article. It is prepared on the double-entry system, and is, I believe, as correct an account as is to be found in any mercantile establishment in the kingdom. We have adopted many other recommendations of the Royal Commission, though some of them we could not adopt. For example, it was recommended that there should be laid on the table the expenses incurred on Her Majesty's ships, and that the Estimates should be accompanied by an annual programme of ship-building works; and I now state to the House exactly what we are doing, and what ships we have got for our money. I mention those things to show that the Report of the Royal Commission has been a text-book for the Admiralty; and I am sure that, if the House has patience, our ship-building accounts, which were very indifferent a few years ago, will be well framed and will represent fairly the cost of the ships at the Royal yards. Moreover, my belief is, that if you come to look at these accounts, you will find that the work is not so expensive in the Royal yards as the House supposes, and as I confess that I used to suppose.

I will turn now to the very important point whether we are to build of wood or of iron, and I beg the House to consider, that if we build of iron by contract, we must be prepared at once to state distinctly and specifically what we want. Now, is any man in this country prepared to state what we want? [A laugh.] Hon. Gentlemen may laugh, but, in the face of daily changes, will they tell me what they want? What is to he the form and size of the ships which are to compose our future navy? In the present state of transition, no one can say. You have got broadside ships, you have got Mr. Heed's form of construction, and the turret ships Who can tell me which of these is the best? We are making experiments, and are watching the performances and peculiarities of each class; but until we have got specimens of all these ships at sea, and can fairly test them, it is impossible to say what we shall want two years hence. For the House must remember, that if we enter into contracts for iron ships, we must be prepared to state what is wanting at this future period. It has been shown that vessels under contract cannot be finished under that time, and I do not think we can expect that builders should complete them in less time; but the reason why the Government have paused before entering into fresh contracts is because we are not prepared now to state precisely what, not the bottoms, but the upper works of these ships should be, which are to be completed two years from this date. I shall, perhaps, be told by some ship-building authority, "Why not put it into our hands, and as we go on you can make such changes as you please?" Well, we did that once, but we burnt our fingers. We had very much this sort of feeling when we ordered the Northumberland, the Agincourt, and the Minotaur. The House will remember that there had been great discussions whether the armour-plates should be 4½ inches thick with an 18-inch backing, or 5½ inches and a 9-inch backing. This has been a moot point, and it was only yesterday that experiments were made which, as far as they go, are satisfactory, as showing that we did right in choosing the 5½-inch plates with a 9-inch backing. When we ordered these ships, we left ourselves a margin. We said, "You shall build these ships, and in the course of a certain number of months we will tell you what is to be the thickness of the armour-plating and of the backing." The time came, but the experiments tried were altogether insufficient, and at the end of three months we were just as unable to come to a decision as when we entered into the contract. The builders then said, "We have arrived at a stage when you must decide one way or the other," and we were obliged to come to a decision in the dark. That was a mere question whether you should have thicker armour-plate and thinner backs. But what is the question before the public now? Nothing less, than the whole form and shape from the water-line upwards. Here are the Americans, who have adopted the turret principle; but they built things which the moment they went to sea went to the bottom. The Monitor, as soon as she was caught in a gale of wind, was shown to he unfit for sea. Now, we do not like ships that go to the bottom. We want to build ships which shall remain on the surface. We are told, that if we have turrets, we cannot carry masts and rigging, as they would interfere with the range of the guns. That and other difficulties we are endeavouring to get over, and I trust they will be got over. I do not wish to speak too confidently of turret ships, because they are still matters of speculation. I have confidence in them, but many officers and other great authorities have not. Then, we have Heed's plan, which is a square tower in the centre of the ship, and Mr. Reed 833–3 that by concentrating your weight in and near the centre you may have thicker armour as a coating to that tower. We are trying his principle, and we are also building ships wholly armour-plated. Mr. Whitworth tells you that he will pierce through any armour-plating you may have, not only with shot but with shell; and if he is right, what is to become of armour-plating? I trust these vessels will resist shell, but I mention these matters, though at the risk of wearying the House with matters of detail, for the purpose of showing that it is impossible for any Government now to undertake to give distinct specifications, such as would be absolutely necessary if they desired to build ships by contract. It is impossible in 1863 to give such specifications as should rule the building of iron ships for the navy of 1865. We have, however, given this subject our careful consideration, and we believe that we can progress gradually, and not by fits and starts, as has hitherto been the case, which only produce alarm in the country. The Government believe that the navy is in a satisfactory state with respect to the present year, and in a satisfactory state of progress for the year to come also; but it is still absolutely necessary that we should progress in building ships. We are of opinion that on the whole it is advisable that we should prepare, in the Royal dockyards and at leisure, a certain number of wooden frames for armour-plated ships, which we can hereafter, as further experience suggests, finish according to the most approved system of the day. But I shall be told by those interested in iron, that if we build the vessels of iron, we may reduce the dockyards. Nothing is more fallacious than that. I have a statement, showing the proportion which ship-building bears to other work in the dockyard, and it appears that the immense part of the business consists of repairs and in providing for the fitments and requirements of the fleets. In 1858 the total amount of wages paid in the dockyards was £941,490. Of this there were expended for wages on building, including conversions, £191,145 only, leaving for wages for all the other services in the yards, and for the great business of repairing and outfitting, £750,355. In 1859–60 the total amount of wages expended in the dockyards was £1,483,511. The wages expended on all the services I have alluded to, with the exception of building, was £1,012,043, leaving £471,468 for wages on buildings and conversions, and that at a time when great exertions were being made in building ships. In 1860–1 the total amount of dockyard wages was £1,364,372, out of which only £324,509 were expended for wages on building and conversions, leaving for wages expended on all the other services £1,039,863. I assure the House that it will be impossible to reduce the dockyard wages by undertaking to build proposed ships of iron in private yards. Therefore, in that respect, I think that my hon. Friend's remarks will entirely mislead the House. Assuming, however, what I do not believe will be the case, that the House will think fit to undertake the great responsibility of taking this matter out of the hands of the executive Government, what will be the saving? It will amount probably to £665 on each frame, which, multiplied by five, will give something over £3,000 as the amount saved, against which I should have to propose a large Supplementary Estimate for commencing contract-built ships. Taking into consideration that we want to progress gradually, and that we are not at the present moment prepared to say what the armament and upper works of our ships should be, I think it a more wise thing to have a certain number of frames laid out; so that if we find exertions are taking place elsewhere, we can in a moment set to work and build the ships. "We could, having the frames ready, finish a ship such as I now allude to in a year, probably, if great exertions were used; whereas to build one iron ship by contract would take two and a half years or two years at least. Thus we might go on gradually progressing; and this, in our opinion, is, on the whole, the most advisable course, and preferable to entering at the present time into contracts for iron ships. If, however, it should be the pleasure of the House that the Government should construct these ships of iron, the House must be prepared, as I said before, for a Supplemental Estimate, but I trust that the Motion of my hon. Friend will not be agreed to.

LORD LOVAINE

said, he did not think, with reference to the difficult question under discussion, that the House was competent at present to come to a correct decision. The subject was surrounded with difficulties; such, for instance, as the galvanic action which caused corrosion to take place rapidly. The issue raised by the Motion which had been proposed was one which ought not to be submitted to the decision of the House, but should be left in the hands of the Executive; for it was impossible that a number of Gentlemen like the Members of that House could be cognizant of all the detailed information which was only to be gained from experiments systematically carried on. He should therefore decline to vote.

MR. DALGLISH

said, he would have been quite content to leave the matter in the hands of the Government, if it had not already been in their hands for the last four years; and daring that time they certainly had not taken that action with regard to reform in the dockyards and other improvements which, in his opinion, the House had a right to expect. No doubt an influential Committee was appointed two years ago, but the objects with which its members were selected had not been carried out. The noble Lord commenced his speech with an admonition to the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden), as if that hon. Gentleman had offered any opposition to the increase of the navy. On the contrary, he had always heard the hon. Member urge that the navy of England should be so efficient as to be able to cope with all the world. The noble Lord had then proceeded to discuss the question, and stated that every six weeks during which iron-plated vessels had been out of dock produced a diminution of one knot in the rate of speed. If that were so, the Warrior, which had been out of dock ten months, ought at least to have lost five knots of her speed; but she came up Channel the other day steaming eleven knots and a quarter an hour, with her boilers at not much more than half power. It might be perfectly true, as contended by the noble Lord, that the bottoms of wooden ships were much more strongly built than armour-plated ships. But did that assertion apply to screw or merely to sailing vessels? He wished to inquire whether the noble Lord was aware of what happened to the Orlando recently? He was told that that vessel—a frigate of 800 horse power—in going out to Halifax opened her seams so much that they had absolutely to put in 3-inch rope before they were able to caulk her. Could any one conceive a more dangerous state for a ship to be in? The Admiralty had decided that a different test should be applied to the iron used for their purposes from that which was generally adopted for iron-plated ships. Those vessels, however, performed all the duties that were required of them, and unless the Government could show some much stronger reasons than they had yet done for the change, he did not see why they should refuse to be satisfied with the test which was held to be ample for the costly fleets of the Royal Mail, the Cunard, and Peninsular and Oriental companies. If the Government established a standard, it should be of a degree suited to the ordinary circumstances of the country. The Admiralty Surveyors no doubt did their duty in looking sharply after the construction of vessels, but it was quite possible that they might go beyond what was necessary in their requirements. So many difficulties might be thrown in the way of a builder out of the dockyards which were never heard of in the dockyards as to render it impossible for private builders to compete with the public establishments. When he heard that none of the bulkheads were ever tight, he doubted whether there might not have been attempts in the dockyards at improving those bulkheads. He believed that these were much better and stronger when not minutely subdivided. It was represented by the noble Lord that the use or conversion of timber in the dockyards would only cost £665 per ship, but they all knew that expenditure only commenced at that point. He trusted the House would take the matter seriously into consideration and not allow itself to be persuaded that the dockyards had any possible superiority over private builders. The dockyards had no previous experience in iron ship-building. Reference had been made to the greater delay which took place in the construction of ships in private yards, but he should like to hear a specification of any such delay that had taken place. He desired to see what was the comparative cost of the Warrior and Black Prince, built in private yards, and that of the Achilles, built in one of the dockyards, and he ventured to say that the last-named vessel would not be found to be the most economically constructed. He trusted his hon. Friend would persevere in his Motion, and would take the sense of the House upon it.

MR. LAIRD

said, the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty had given the very best reasons in favour of building ships of iron when he stated the great bulk of wages in the dockyards was paid for repairs. Surely, if that were so, they ought to look out for some material which would not ruin the country by entailing these excessive and continual repairs. The noble Lord, as a reason for not commencing iron vessels, said they could not yet tell what sort of ships would be required. He wished to know, whether, when the plans were finally settled, vessels could be altered at a cheaper rate if constructed of wood than of iron, and in the public instead of in private dockyards. The noble Lord, in his excessive fondness for wood, spoke as if the teak backing was of primary importance even in an iron ship. Any one at all acquainted with the subject must know that an iron ship like the Warrior was a perfect vessel before the teak backing was introduced; and in the event of any defensive armour of a more effectual kind than the present being dis. covered, the teak could be removed and the new material substituted at very little cost and without damage to the vessel. In the case of a wooden ship, however, the planking would most probably be torn to pieces if such an operation were attempted. The noble Lord supported his allegation that iron ships were very apt to foul by referring to the Warrior; but if that were the worst instance which could be adduced, it rather went against the noble Lord's argument. The Warrior went to sea with a speed of thirteen knots with full power, and on her way home, after being out for eight months, she came up the Channel at the rate of eleven knots and a quarter at half boiler power. Then, again, in the case of the fight between the Alabama and the Hatteras, of which, however, he knew nothing beyond what had appeared in the newspapers, it was the superior force of the former, and not the fouling of the latter, which decided the contest. In Admiral Robinson's report it was stated, that while iron ships were more rigid and durable than wooden ones, they were more open to damage by missiles under water. He disputed that assertion. When the Great Eastern, an iron vessel, with a double bottom, lately struck on a rock at New York, she could have returned at once to this country without being repaired, had it not been for the underwriters. Again, about twenty-three years ago he built an iron vessel called the Nemesis, which, on a voyage from Liverpool to Portsmouth, ran on some rocks. The water got into the fore compartment only; and she steamed on to Portsmouth, where she was docked and fully repaired within a week, and at the cost of only £40. That vessel was built in the usual way, and was not inspected by the Admiralty. Her safety, on the occasion referred to, was due to her bulkhead being perfectly water-tight. A similar event occurred in the East Indies, where a vessel belonging to the India Company, after having struck and suffered considerable damage, steamed to a place of security 1,500 miles from the scene of the accident, where she was repaired at a small expense. He had no hesitation in saying, that had that vessel been built of wood, it would have been lost. It was true, perhaps, that the injury done to an iron ship was usally of a more local character than in the case of a wooden ship, but then the repairs were also more local. When an iron-plate sustained any damage, it could be taken out and replaced at the cost of a few pounds; but a wooden ship could be repaired only at an enormous outlay. He had received a letter that very day from Liverpool, in which the writer stated that 120,000 tons of shipping were being built for Liverpool shipowners at present, but he could not hear of any large wooden ships on the stocks. The shipowners had all made up their minds that iron ships were more serviceable and economical, and would have nothing to say to wooden ones. The Peninsular and Oriental Company some years ago deliberately adopted iron as the material of their ships, and had seen no reason to repent the experiment, but, on the contrary, every reason to adhere to the new system. The Cnnard vessels, lately built, which crossed the Atlantic in all weathers, and braved the most severe and trying storms were also of iron. In the event of a shell exploding below water the chances were that a wooden vessel would go down, whereas an iron one would probably be affected only in one compartment, and would continue to float. It was a great mistake to suppose that armour-plates strengthened a ship; so far from doing so they actually weakened her, because the immense weight added to her sides rendered it necessary to cut off the upper deck to compensate for the extra weight of armour-plates. The noble Lord said the wooden vessels could be got ready in a very short time; but it was well known that when even the smallest craft, such as gunboats, were constructed in great haste, it was not long before their worthlessness was discovered. The Admiralty ought to take care that in their hurry they did not use insufficiently seasoned timber, which before a year or two was over would be seized with dry-rot. It would also be well to find out, before more wooden ships were built, whether those which had already been iron-plated would hold out against a storm at sea. That was still a matter of doubt. When the French began to reconstruct their navy, they could not build iron ships to any extent. They applied to him, and he built a number for them. But the Emperor had given great encouragement to the construction of iron vessels in public and private yards, and the result was that the French were becoming quite expert at the work. As long as wood was used for their fleet, they would have to go to other countries for a supply of timber; but if they used iron, we should be independent of foreign aid. The difference in cost between iron and wooden ships ought not to deter them from adopting the former material. The great point was to get ships which would last a long time without repairs—these were the-cheapest in the end. There could be no doubt that Admiral Robinson's Report had produced much suspicion and distrust in regard to the ironmakers and shipbuilders who held contracts for the navy. If any of them had supplied bad iron or done imperfect work, they ought to be exposed by a public investigation; but, on the other hand, if they had fulfilled their contracts honestly, they ought to be cleared from the imputation which had been cast upon them as a body. There had, no doubt, been some difficulty in getting iron of the exact kind which the Admiralty required, but the manufacturers were becoming every day more capable of producing it. He had that day been told by one manufacturer that he was going to turn out armour-plates 12 inches thick. One great advantage of iron over wood was that it required no seasoning and was easily altered and adapted to the wants of the day. He might mention in reference to this subject, that while in business he had built forty ships for the Admiralty, that there had never been a complaint as to the work or materials. The system of contracting for ships, as at present in practice, was a bad one. In the case of engines the parties contracting were required to send in their own plans, and were judged according to those plans. That system had raised English engine-makers to the head of all engine-makers in the world, and the adoption of a similar system in regard to the building of ships would prevent the recurrence of these complaints about bad workmanship, and would insure that the contracts would be intrusted only to men who knew how to build a ship, and would give their attention to it. The adoption of such a course would do more than anything else to develop the ship-building talent of this country, and would place the navy in a position such as it had never hitherto occupied. If the Admiralty were allowed to cut out these frames, they would in a few months be converted into something else, and in two or three years but little of the original timber would be left. He looked upon this as an attempt to get in the small end of the wedge for an expenditure of £1,300,000 or £1,500,000 on the plea that we are going to spend only £500, or £600. In his opinion it would be better to sell the timber and wait for a few months, until they saw what Captain Coles's ship arid the Royal Oak would do. They had tested the iron ships, lot the Government now transfer their crews into four of the wooden ships and send them into the Atlantic for twelve months, and then decide whether they would build iron or wooden ships.

MR. J. C. EWART

said, that he had been for some time past a director of the Peninsular and Oriental Company to which reference had been made. That Company had forty-one iron vessels, of an aggregate burden of 61,700 tons, and were building six more of a burden of about 12,300. Those vessels had been built by contract on the Tyne, the Thames, the Clyde, and the Mersey, and had given the most complete satisfaction. The troop-ship Himalaya, the best transport on the service, was built for them by Messrs. Mare, and afterwards sold to the Government. Two or three of their old iron steamers, having become antiquated in form, were being converted into sailing vessels, and Lloyds surveyor, in a report dated August, 1862, said of one of them, "The bottom plating externally presents a most satisfactory appearance, being free from corrosion, with scarcely any defective rivets, or any leaking butts or seams." That vessel was built in 1847; and as she had performed a great deal of hard work, he thought that this was a good proof how faithfully she had been built. Another vessel, the Garryowen, constructed by Messrs. Laird, was now in the Shannon in almost as perfect a state as when she was built. As additional proof of the capability of private builders to construct iron ships, he might refer to the magnificent line of steamers employed in the postal service between Holyhead and Dublin. In the case of those vessels a form of tender was sent to a few of the most eminent builders, merely specifying the size of the vessels, the speed desired, and the accommodation required, all the rest being left to the contractors. How satisfactory the result had been was known to every one in the House. As a large proprietor in steam-packet companies, he had the greatest confidence in the building of ships by private contract.

MR. CONINGHAM

said, he had always entertained a very decided opinion that it would be far better, and far more economical, to build our vessels by contract than, in the Government Dockyards, and he was glad to find that his opinions were justified by the authority of some of the ablest and most experienced men in the country. He could not see when the system of contract had been so successfully carried out with reference to engines, why it should not be applied to ships. He had pressed Admiral Robinson on that point when examined before the Select Committee; and while he admitted that the manufacture of engines was perfectly successful, he seemed to think there was some abstract reason making it impossible to have, under a system of contract, that thorough inspection which was absolutely necessary. He would certainly support the Resolution of the hon. Member for Sunderland. The only question was whether the Resolution ought not to have gone beyond the question of iron plates, for he was informed that the system of iron plating might be succeeded by the more effective system of steel plating. He regretted the reactionary and retrograde policy adopted in that as in other matters by the Government.

MR. JACKSON

said, the great difficulty was, not as to whether they should build iron or wooden ships, but as to what they should do with the artisans in the dockyards. The Admiralty were overridden by officialism, and one reason why they could not adopt a proper and economical mode of construction was that they could not send their vast hosts of workmen about their business. The country was paying £1,400,000 per annum in superannuation allowances. He wished to know, whether the Admiralty were taking steps to prevent any further increase in the number of their non-effectives? There was no reason why the workmen in the dockyards should not be engaged from week to week, instead of being permitted to establish a claim for superannuation.

MR. BENTINCK

said, a great deal more was meant by the Motion than met the ear. Ostensibly, the House was discussing the comparative merits of wooden and iron ships; but that was the least important part of the question. Upon that subject very little need be said. The noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty had disposed of it when he told the House that there was a great deal to be said on both sides, and that no living man could say what would be the result of the various experiments now taking place. Two things only could test the matter. One was inevitable—time; the other he trusted was long distant from us—war. His own opinion was that the right system of shipbuilding should embrace the use of both wood and iron—an iron frame with wooden planking; and that he thought would be the most economical, the most durable, and altogether the best mode of building-heavy ships. He would not insinuate that there was anything of self-interest or of improper feeling or object in any views or opinions which had been expressed on the subject in or out of the House. Every allowance must be made for the impressions of men in favour of a particular branch of trade or manufacture in which they had been long engaged. But the most important part of the question raised that night was not so much whether they were to build ships of wood or iron as whether they were to be, to a certain extent, independent of the private building yards, or be solely dependent on them. He, for one, could not think it advisable for this country to be dependent for its navy solely on private yards. It had been said that a great deal of the difficulty which had occurred in building in the private yards was attributable to Admiralty interference; but, on the other hand, it had been shown that without such interference the Admiralty could not have justice done to the country by obtaining the best work. His noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty had proved also that no practical economy would result from the complete substitution of the private yards for the public dockyards as far as building was concerned. To render our dockyards incapable of undertaking the construction of the heavier class of ships, would be to do a very unwise and impolitic thing; but if it could be further shown that no real economy would result, nothing more was needed to discredit the proposal. It had been openly stated that there had been much to find fault with in the mode of construction in the private yards; that it had required constant Admiralty superintendence to prevent the introduction of bad work, and that the iron used in building for the merchant service differed in quality from that used in constructing ships for the navy. Here, then, they had the whole case in a nutshell. Nothing could be more impolitic or dangerous than to denude the Royal dockyards, and leave ourselves entirely dependent upon private enterprise. The rivalry carried on between private shipbuilders and the employés of the Admiralty was, he believed, beneficial to the country, and he hoped the double system would long continue. But, if any circumstances should ever render the two incompatible, he should say unhesitatingly let them dispense with private enterprise and rely on their own dockyards for the construction of their fleets. It would be utter destruction to the position and safety of the country if the dockyards were so placed as not to be able to construct every description of vessel. One more remark. The real effect of the Motion of the hon. Member for Sunderland was this:—He proposed that the House of Commons should take out of the hands of the Government of the day the details of the business of a great department of the Government. [Cries of No, no!] No! He said, "Yes." He contended that the Motion simply amounted to this:—That the House of Commons were dissatisfied with the mode in which the Government of the day were conducting a particular Department; that they expressed their dissatisfaction at the manner in which the Department were carrying out certain details; that they thought those details ought to he differently carried out; and that they intended to take out of the hands of that Department the conduct of those details, and to prescribe a mode in which they should be conducted. That was the substance of the Motion. He ventured to say that such a course was most mischievous, and he would go further and say it was most dangerous. He could imagine nothing more unconstitutional than the adoption of the principle of that Resolution. Whatever his opinion might be with regard to the Board of Admiralty, this was not the way to apply the proper correction; and whatever was done, he trusted that the House would never sanction the principle that the House of Commons was to become the executive in matters of detail.

MR. H. ROBERTSON

said, that he saw no impropriety in the House honestly and distinctly telling the Government what it wished them to do in the matter. In his opinion the very reasons assigned by Admiral Robinson to induce them to build ships of wood ought rather to induce them to build them of iron. The delay and cost complained of as incidental to building ships for the Government by contract were the result of the officials of the Admiralty really not understanding what plans and specifications to adopt and adhere to. The Controller of the Navy sent out plans and designs which could not be executed without material alteration. That naturally led to increased cost, for which the contractor was in no way responsible. Take the case of the Warrior. The price first contracted for was £210,000, and the actual cost was £254,000. The contractors did not, however, get that excess of £44,000 as a simple bonus or gratuity, but for additional work that had to be done in consequence of the acts of the Controller. There was no difficulty in the contractors or the Government getting any description of iron they pleased if they only specified what they wanted, and chose to pay its cost. He was convinced that the country was now paying larger prices than were necessary for iron plates, simply because the Admiralty inspectors, not having a correct knowledge of the qualities and properties of iron, laid down improper rules for the guidance of the manufacturers. The result of the incompetence of the inspectors sent down frequently was, that they sometimes ordered an inch to be cut off the ends of the plates simply because somebody happened to say that ought to be done. The result was, that those whose work they were sent to inspect had to pay dearly for the want of knowledge which those gentlemen displayed. He, for one, should like to see a principle of competition established, by means of which a fair standard of comparison might be obtained between ships built in Government and those constructed in private yards. If the Admiralty, out of every four ships, would have one built at Chatham and three at private yards, they would obtain the necessary standard of comparison. Without competition there could be no comparison; and as he objected to monopoly and a sort of "protection shop" in ship-building, and was satisfied that iron was a better material than wood, he would support the Motion.

MR. BEECROFT

The statement issued the other day by the Admiralty relating to the advantages of iron and wood in the construction of ships for Her Majesty's navy, astonishes me no little. In this statement one of the reasons given against the advantages of iron over wood is— "The extreme uncertainty as to the quality of the material used; in fact, the small quantity of real good iron of the best ship-building qualities that can be found in the market." I venture to say, on behalf of the ironmasters, that this statement is a reflection upon them which they do not deserve. It is a slur upon all the ironmasters in the kingdom. The extra demand for armour-plates came on so suddenly, it was impossible to get ready in a moment the requisite machinery and appliances to meet this extraordinary demand. The ironmasters immediately put their shoulders to the wheel, and did all they possibly could to meet the requirements of the Government; they have spared neither expense nor talent. They have spent hundreds of thousands in enlarging their works. As a proof of this, I may mention Mr. John Brown, of the Atlas Works, Sheffield. The noble Lord at the head of the Government went over these works in the autumn of last year, and he there saw many acres of ground which three years ago was a green field, covered with works employed in the manufacture of armour-plates. Mr. Brown is now increasing his works to such an extent, that in April next he will be prepared to supply 1,200 tons of armour-plates per month, that is, as many armour-plates as are required for a ship of the Warrior class; therefore, he will be able to supply plates for twelve Warriors every year. He expects to be able to roll plates up to twelve inches thick. Mr. Charles Cammell, of Sheffield, is now constructing works on a gigantic scale for the same purpose. I could name many other instances of ironmasters who are already able to supply large quantities of armour-plates. 51 any of these firms supply the best quality of material that can be produced. Indeed, they take a pride in supplying the very best material for our iron-clad ships, the future defence of our country. Therefore, I repeat, it is a slur upon the ironmasters of this country to say that "only a small quantity of real good iron can he found in the market." With respect to the alleged "extreme uncertainty as to the quality of the material used," I may observe there is no difficulty, by paying a fair price, in obtaining iron plates of a uniform good quality; and I am quite sure no respectable contractor or iron shipbuilder would knowingly use an inferior quality of iron, for by so doing his reputation would be irrecoverably damaged. In fact, a contractor cannot make use of inferior plates, because the plates are invariably tested before being used. In common justice to respectable contractors, the Government ought, I think, to name the defaulting parties alluded to. It would, I think, be a mere waste of money to build wooden ships and cover them with armour-plates. The iron casing would most certainly weaken the ship, hanging as a dead weight on her sides; and in rough weather the iron plating and fastenings would be liable to strain and tear the wood to pieces. It is said that the French are constructing their ships of war of wood in preference to iron; but how is it that the French are building some of their frigates entirely of iron? I was at L'Orient a few months ago, and saw a 40-gun frigate, the Heroine, in course of construction, and built entirely of iron, outside casing being 4½-inch ar- mour-plates. Wooden ships, not cased with iron, have been proved to be too weak, as it is an admitted fact that in many of them the guns have had to be taken out fore and aft. There cannot, I think, be a shadow of a doubt of the immense superiority of iron ships over wooden ships.

SIR MORTON PETO

said, he was happy to feel that the House approached this question without any political feeling. It was one in which both sides of the House were equally interested. He had been a Member of the House fourteen years, and the first question he heard debated was the very one they were then discussing, and he recollected perfectly well a naval Lord stating, that the question had been settled for ever by the experiment which had been recently made, whereas now it appeared that the experiment was made on an old ferry boat, whose plates were not thicker than half-a-crown. He also recollected when the Government would not have iron vessels even for the conveyance of the mails, saying, that they would not be fit for the transport of troops if they should be wanted for that service; whereas the best vessels they had then for that purpose were the iron vessels they had purchased of the mail companies, who had built them almost in defiance of the Government. He believed that they owed it to the courage of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Droitwich that they had in the service some of the best iron ships in the world. Had he not been at the head of the Admiralty, they would, no doubt, have gone on merely following the example of other nations, till they were obliged to take action. The hon. Member for Norfolk said, the question ought to be loft in the hands of the Government, and that the House of Commons, in meddling with it, was taking upon itself that which did not belong to it. But that was not the case, for they were debating the question on the invitation of the Government, the construction of the five vessels having been stopped till the matter had been discussed in the House. In his opinion, the House was entitled to lay down the principle on which they should proceed in the matter, and then leave the details to the Government. He had been greatly struck that night with the speech of the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, showing as it did the want of appreciation on the part of the Government of what their future should be. The noble Lord argued, that as the Government did not know what was required, therefore the House ought not to prescribe to them a particular course. Now, what the House wanted was, that the ships which should be built for the service of the country should be those which were best adapted for the service. They believed that iron vessels were best fitted for the service. He came now to Admiral Robin-Bon's paper. Admiral Robinson said— There are two important points involved in this consideration—First, the nature of the material. Iron possesses these advantages over wood: An iron ship can be built of larger dimensions than a wooden ship, with no loss of strength. Secondly, an iron ship has more rigidity and strength of structure as a whole than a wooden ship, though locally weak. Now, he took exception to that statement. If an iron ship were properly constructed, with bulkheads and water-tight compartments, it would be much stronger in all parts than a wooden ship. Admiral Robinson went on to say— An iron ship has much greater durability in certain parts of the structure, indeed, in all parts where no wood is in contact with the iron. Now, in this admission lay practically the whole question. Admiral Robinson added— After a lapse of years the iron frame would have suffered next to nothing as compared with a wooden ship. Why, then, not build iron ships, and get rid of the incubus which had so long lain upon the nation, the immense expenditure on the navy. What he and those who acted with him wanted, was to get rid of the enormous expenditure in repairs of the navy. The dockyards should be made as efficient as possible, but to render them efficient, was it necessary to spend millions on millions in useless repairs? What was wanted was, that the dockyards should be conducted on the best possible commercial principles, to do all that was necessary for the country in the very best possible way, and that not a pound should be wasted that a commercial man could object to. A remarkable proof of the superiority of iron over wood was given by the Great Eastern, which, after having one large and eight smaller holes in her bottom, traversed the Atlantic, and did not make water to the extent of an ordinary vessel. The Great Britain was another instance, for he was sure that no nautical man would say that a wooden ship could have stood such a beating as that vessel did in Dundrum Bay. In order to test the question of the relative value of iron and wooden ships, he wrote to the managers of two of the largest steam packet companies. The manager of the Peninsular and Oriental Company wrote in reply— We now build none but iron ships—a proof that we have found them by long experience superior in all respects to wooden ships. Some of our iron ships have come almost scathless out of difficulties, such as groundings and collisions, which would have destroyed wooden ones. The Manager of the Royal Mail Company gave similar testimony, and among other instances cited the case of the Victoria, which after getting into the cleft of a rock in Balaklava Harbour, and having twenty feet of her keel wrenched away, brought home a full cargo of stores, whereas a wooden ship would have been a total loss. As to fouling, it had come to his knowledge within the last few days, and he was prepared to stake his character and reputation upon the proof of the fact, that the wooden vessels latety made by the French in their navy, which had copper bottoms, became as foul as any iron ships in her Majesty's navy. Sir Humphrey Davy thought that a line of zinc round the top of the copper would prevent the wearing of the copper, and so it did, but it destroyed the cleansing quality of the copper. In a galvanic battery copper and zinc produced galvanic action, and so would copper and iron, but the effect of iron on the top and copper on the bottom, while preventing the wearing of the copper, was to deprive the copper of its cleansing property, because the constant cleansing caused by the copper was nothing more than the wearing away of the substance of the copper itself. The French had found that out with regard to the Gloire, from the bottom of which, only the other day, forty tons of barnacles and accumulations had been removed. As to the greater damage from splintering when the iron plates were broken by shot, he should like to hear the opinion of the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield (Sir John Hay), than whom there was no higher authority in the House. He believed that the effect of splintering was the same, whether from iron or wood, and that if a vessel were armour-plated to a certain depth below the water-line, the observation of Admiral Robinson on that point would apply equally to both descriptions of vessels. As to submarine guns, he was not aware that any were in existence, and he did not think the House would be influenced by any dread of what was now a philosophic toy. As to the possibility of iron-clad ships being superseded inconsequence of improvements in artillery, the argument that they should therefore construct less expensive vessels amounted only to this — that they ought not to have the best thing which they knew of, because something better might be invented. He was as anxious as any man to save the money of the country; but true economy consisted in stopping short of nothing less than perfection if perfection could be obtained. With regard to the example of France, it should be remembered that wood was cheaper and iron much dearer there than in England; and that if France were in the same position as England, commanding natural advantages in the raw material, and the first engineering and mechanical science in the world, she would just do what they were endeavouring to induce the Government to accomplish. He hoped the House would not be led off the trail by the question "where the iron ships were to be constructed." he inclined to think that the dockyards should be made efficient for repairing vessels, and that the hulls should be made by private firms, in the same way as marine engines. But that was not the question. The question in issue was whether these five ships were to be built of wood or iron. With regard to the delays of the contractors, the Government was certainly somewhat to blame; because, if the designs for the vessels had been furnished complete, and in the general form in which they were to be built, with the specifications properly drawn out and all the details, there never would have been that delay. Of course, the Government could not be greatly blamed for that, but it was ungenerous and unjust in Admiral Robinson to throw that reflection on the contractors. The Achiles, of which the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty had often spoken as a proof of what the Government dockyards could do, had practically been as long, if not longer, than some of the other vessels. At the present moment they were better able to build iron vessels in the private yards than any other nation in the world, and the best proof of that was that there were now £3,000,000 worth of iron vessels being built by their private builders for foreign nations. In the latter part of the paper Admiral Robinson referred to the comparative cost, and on that part of the subject the whole question at issue resolved itself into a sum of £135,000, as the extra cost of the five vessels if built of iron. That sum was practically a bagatelle as compared with the enormous issue at stake in the navy of the future, and it would be most unwise economy if the House were to sanction an expedient which, though involving less immediate outlay, would in the end be far the most costly, simply for the sake of saving so small a sum.

SIR JOHN HAY

said, he should have been content to give a silent vote in favour of the Resolution of the hon. Member for Sunderland had he not been appealed to so frequently on matters of fact in the course of the debate. The question at issue, as he understood it, was between iron frames and wooden frames, and the best evidence of the superiority of the former seemed to be given in the paper placed before thorn, by the Admiralty. Admiral Robinson said that iron frames were most durable, most rigid, and had the most lasting qualities. Indeed, it was almost suggested that on that account they were least desirable, because changes would be made, and therefore it was better to have ships of perishing, rather than of durable, material. He could hardly suppose, however, that the House would agree with that. Since the great extension of the railway system, nothing had more clearly shown our engineering skill than the application of the tubular principle to bridges for crossing wide rivers and valleys. There was first the iron-framing to bear the weight, then the wooden sleeper to deaden the blow of the passing train, and then the iron rail to receive the blow. That was exactly the iron-ship— the iron-framing inside of all, the wooden backing, and the armour-plate, and it seemed to him just as reasonable to substitute wooden frames for iron as it would be to take down the tubular bridges and put up wooden scaffolding in their places. He agreed with the Admiralty that at present it was desirable that the ships should be coppered, and, though in the present state of science it was difficult to apply the copper directly to the iron, that was no reason why iron ships should not be coppered. Mr. Grantham, of Liverpool, had two ships at sea, which, by an ingenious arrangement of wooden sheathing, separating the copper from the iron, were very efficiently coppered. With regard to the splintering of shot, with respect to which an hon. Member had ap- pealed to him, there was no doubt that a cast-iron shot passing through an iron plate would splinter into a thousand pieces, which the wooden frames would not arrest, and there was a much less chance of the splinters being carried through into the ship and causing greater destruction if there were an internal skin of iron. Another advantage of an internal skin of iron—which was, in fact, the ship proper—the wooden backing and the armour-plates being placed upon it—was that there would be a much smaller risk of the ship being set on fire by the penetration of shells, as the internal skin would exclude the air. Another point which he must notice was as to the test of iron, which some hon. Members thought was too exacting, as requiring a strain of twenty-two tons per square inch. The fact was that steel would bear a strain of forty tons, and the Committee over which he presided had recommended twenty-two tons as the very minimum which iron should bear. He agreed with the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) that the discussion had disclosed an additional reason for considering the construction of the Board of Admiralty. Whenever a question of difficulty arose, it was referred to the House or to a Committee, and the Admiralty was shown to be incompetent to deal with it. At present no individual was responsible for anything done at the Board. It seemed rather hard upon the Controller of the Navy that a document intended for the consideration of the Board should be thrown broadcast before the House, when he was not present to explain or defend it. The noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty had suggested that he was in a minority of naval officers who approved of iron ships, and that he was merely the mouthpiece of the Admiralty in defending wooden ships. It appeared, that whenever the Admiralty was in a difficulty, they appealed to the example of France; but there the Minister of Marine was responsible for everything. In England no one was responsible for anything, neither the First Lord nor the distinguished naval officers who assisted him, and who each bore an infinitesimal share of responsibility. He thought that the heads of the fourteen great Departments—namely, manning, discipline, construction, public works, pay, stores, victualling, ordnance, medicine, hydrography, marines, coast-guard, naval reserve, and transport, should each come to the front, and be personally responsible for whatever happened in his office. They ought to be non-political public servants, and hold their situations either dum bene gesserint, or for a term of years; but there might of course be over them all a political Minister of Marine, who would go out with each change of Government.

SIR FRANCIS BARING

— Sir, I thought the question before us was that of iron ships or wooden ships, and not that of the construction of the Board of Admiralty. I shall not be tempted to follow the hon. and gallant Member (Sir John Hay) into the latter question; but, lest the House should have any misapprehension as to the opinion of the Committee which sat last year, I may say there was not a single person examined, who had been First Lord of the Admiralty, who did not say that he considered himself responsible for all that was done. As to the question really before us, I must say I do not look upon it in quite the same light as some hon. Gentlemen. If it be a question of scientific knowledge as to the best mode of building ships, I do not think I am competent to decide it. The Secretary of the Admiralty has told us that we have the opinion of the professional adviser of the Board, who is responsible for his advice, and in addition he tells us that a large majority of the officers whom he has consulted prefer wood to iron. He adds, that the professional advisers of the French Government have expressed the same opinion. We may be all wrong; but I am surprised, I confess, to hear a gallant Officer tell us that such opinions are absurd and not worthy of consideration. I admire the confidence with which he and other Gentlemen have stated their opinions; but the little weight they seem inclined to give to that of others does not increase my confidence in. their judgment. Neither am I inclined to enter into the discussion between the contractors and the Controller of the Navy. I admit that there are words in that Report which I wish had not been there, and which may hurt the feelings of men who are as honourable and as intelligent as any other body of men, and as capable of doing the work they undertake. I believe there are good contractors, but I know also there are bad contractors. But at the commencement of our building iron ships it is not surprising that the Admiralty should change their plans, nor that contractors should find a difficulty in car- rying them out. But the question before us seems to me to be, what the House will do with the Resolution. I am not prepared to give an opinion whether or not iron is better than wood at the present moment; much less am I prepared to say which will be the better material three years hence. When iron was first recommended for ship- building, I remember that the vessels constructed of it were supposed to be utter failures, and were so regarded by the French naval authorities as well as by the Admiralty in this country; and if the opinion of the House had then been taken, it would no doubt have been decided that no iron ships should ever be built. I only mention this to show that what may happen to-day may be quite reversed a few years afterwards. As to the statement of the Controller of the Navy, I am not sure that it is so ridiculous as hon. Gentlemen seem to suppose. The hon. Member (Sir Morton Peto) stated that these iron ships would last for fifty years. Now, if all your screw wooden ships and sailing vessels would last fifty years, I am afraid you would not find it a very economical arrangement in these times of change and improvement. But the question now is what are we going to vote. This Resolution does not say that we are to have a certain number of ships and that they are to be built of iron. The wording of it is that we are not to build ships of a particular description. Do those who are going to vote for the Resolution mean that they are prepared to vote for iron ships, or will its words cover those who wish to prevent the construction both of iron and of wooden ships? But suppose you bind yourselves to the employment of iron only. Is that wise? I should have thought that at this time, with the great improvements and changes which are taking place both in artillery and in ship-building, it would be well to leave the executive Government as free as possible, not tying their hands either one way or the other. It is not very prudent to bind yourselves at any time; but when all these changes are taking place—when you are calling upon the Government to follow the improvements of the day—is it wise to say, "There is one thing which you shall not do, and another thing which you shall do, and you shall be bound by this Resolution?" Without, therefore, expressing an opinion on the relative value of these two materials, I object strongly to bind the House of Commons and the Government. One ques- tion raised by the hon. Member (Mr. Bentinck) is worth considering—namely, who is to be responsible for the conduct of the navy—the Executive or the House of Commons? My impression is, that whatever form of Admiralty you have, they should be responsible both for the building of the navy and the whole business of the Department. I do not think it wise, unless for the strongest reasons, nor do I think it constitutional, for the House to take into its own hands the Government of the country, and to interfere with the responsibility of the Executive. At present, the First Lord is responsible. But suppose we should be wrong in the decision we now arrive at, who will be responsible then? Again, the Admiralty think that additional expense will be occasioned by adopting this Resolution. In that case it will of course be their duty to come down for an additional Vote. If they follow the decision of the House, they must ask the House to provide the money. Who becomes responsible for the expenditure? The Queen's Government do not ask for it, and are not responsible for it. They come down in obedience to the Vote of the House, and ask for money which they believe is not wanted for the service of the country. That is an extremely inconvenient course. I thought that one of the duties of the House of Commons was to check the Government in the expenditure, but the House of Commons seem to me to be going beyond their proper functions when they press the Government to increase the expenditure and to tax the country, when the Government is of opinion that no such expenditure is requisite.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

—Sir, the noble Lord has most fairly redeemed the pledge he gave on a former evening, that this subject should be first of all explained by a statement on the part of the Admiralty, which we have all received and read, and then that an evening should be set apart to carry on the discussion, which the importance of the subject demands. And, whatever may be the result at which the House may arrive to-night, I hope that no hon. Member will vote except under a full sense that the decision he is about to give is one of extreme importance, both as regards the future efficiency of the navy, and as regards the finances of this county, so far as they depend upon our prospective naval expenditure. I quite agree with what has been just stated by the right hon. Gentleman—namely, that of the Members of this House a great majority, and I freely confess that I am one of the number, would not venture to pronounce a decided opinion, upon their own part and from their own knowledge, as to the comparative advantages of these two modes of building. But, on the other hand, we are bound to give weight to evidence—we are bound to decide upon the weight of testimony before us; and since I have sat in this House I never heard so one-sided a debate as this. The right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down passed no opinion on the relative merits of wood and iron. The only other hon. Gentleman who has spoken otherwise than in support of the Motion, is the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck), and he, too, carefully avoided the expression of any opinion upon this point. But then I entirely dissent from the notion that we are now called upon to decide any other question than the one fairly involved in the words of the Motion. It has been said, that this is a question whether you will build in Her Majesty's dockyards or in private yards. Again, the right hon. Gentleman has asked, whether the House is prepared to take out of the hands of the executive Government a matter of detail. I do not refuse to attach due importance to either of these considerations. I am not disposed to abandon Her Majesty's dockyards in order to build our ships in private yards, but I believe that he would not be a wise man who laid down for the future either course. I- believe that we shall, in the management of our navy, have abundant work for Her Majesty's dockyards; and that, on the other hand, we should act most unwisely if we were to reject that assistance which we have derived, and may again derive, from the ability and the talent to be found in the private building establishments of this country. With regard to the other objection of taking out of the hands of the executive Government a matter of detail, I am not disposed to underrate its importance, but I submit to the House, that this is an objection which you may push too far. The House of Commons has an important duty to discharge, and I deny that this is a question of detail. I say it is a question of principle. It is a most important question, affecting the future welfare of the navy, and I entirely agree with the hon. Baronet (Sir Morton Peto), who said that we ought to approach the subject solely with reference to its merits, and without considering whether the Resolution comes from one party or the other, or whether it affects one Board of Admiralty or another, but that we are bound to discharge our duty, to the best of our judgment, upon the evidence before us. The right hon. Baronet has just told us that we should give weight to the opinions of the officers of the executive Government, and in particular that the opinion of the Controller of the Navy is in favour of the course taken by the Admiralty. Now, is that true? I have no means of knowing Admiral Robinson's views, except by the paper before me; but I say that this paper does not bear out the intention of the Board of Admiralty. If Admiral Robinson be in favour of the views of the Admiralty, certainly this paper does not inform us of that fact. On the contrary, I think it can readily be shown from it, that the Admiralty have made a serious mistake in the decision which has given rise to this discussion. What was the argument of the noble Lord at the head of the Government the other night? He justified the decision of the Admiralty on two grounds. He said that which has been repeated this evening by my noble Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty—namely, that the Government are desirous of, as soon as possible, completing a number of armed ships. I think that question has been raised unnecessarily. There is no man in this House who has urged the Government more than I have to lose no time in building those ships; and the feeling of the House is in favour of such a course. Then the noble Viscount said, there were two reasons for following the plan laid down by the Admiralty—the one time, the other money. I presume that when we have an official paper before us proceeding from the Controller of the Navy, we are to regard it as the production of the first authority within his own Department. What does he say on the question of time?— To build the wooden ship leisurely and to the best advantage would take about as long; but if as much pressed as the contractors have been for the Hector, and if the workmen were entirely uninterrupted, the period might be shortened to twenty-one months. With this statement before me, I confess it was with no little astonishment I heard my noble Friend the Secretary of the Admiralty say that the wooden ships might be built in twelve months.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

What I said was, that after the ships were cut out, if energy were applied they could be built in twelve months.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

We do not want "ifs" and conditions in this matter. We want a plain and unconditional statement. I beg the House to bear in mind that we have got a plain statement that the building of an iron ship is solely a question of time. The building of a wooden ship is not a question of time. Nothing is so dangerous as hurrying a wooden ship. What danger proceeds from hurrying it? Rapid decay. When my noble Friend committed himself, as I think most incautiously, about the twelve months, if we took him at his word he would find himself very much in the position of the contractors referred to in this paper, who could not finish the work in time, and who, if they could, would do a very foolish tiling if they did finish it, because they would build a ship which would decay. Assuming I am right in my view, that the Controller of the Navy is the first authority on this matter of time, I say the noble Viscount's argument founded on time is gone, and a wooden ship has no advantage in point of time over an iron one. Then what becomes of his next argument, that there is an advantage in money? I hope the House of Commons will agree with me that the weakest and worst view we could take of the question is, that it is one of money. Do not build the cheapest vessel if it is not the best. Whatever money you are going to expend let it be for the best article, and let the country have the advantage of it. In the body of the paper I find a statement of the comparative cost of the Valiant, as compared with that of a wooden ship. The former is stated at £206,000, and the latter at £187,000, which shows a saving of about £19,000 in favour of the wooden ship, in favour of the worst of two things, for the House must remember that. But I must observe, that on looking at the schedule attached to this statement, I find that though the Hector and the Valiant are ships of precisely the same tonnage (4,063 tons), with the same number of guns (32), and the same horse power (800), the cost of the former is £172,677, while that of the latter is £206,000 or rather £207,212. Why is the most costly iron ship selected for comparison with the wooden one in the body of the paper? If the least costly iron ship had been se- lected, the advantage of money as well as that of time would be in favour of the iron vessel. The noble Lord, then, has given us two reasons in favour of iron and both are equally unsound. I now come to the question, what is the authority upon which we are to act? I do not ask hon. Members to act upon their own judgment in matters of this kind, but I must say I have great confidence in the opinion of the Controller of the Navy, and on the question of durability, we have this statement of the Controller— An iron ship has much greater durability in certain parts of the structure, indeed in all parts where no wood is in contact with the iron, than a wooden ship; and after a lapse of years the iron frame would have suffered next to nothing as compared with a wooden ship. I appeal to the common sense of hon. Members whether this paragraph is not conclusive against the wooden ships. As to the splinter argument, I think the hon. and gallant Member for Wakefield has disposed of it. Next comes the objection founded on an iron ship getting upon a rock. My first answer to it is, that Her Majesty's ships had much better keep off rocks; but if she gets on a rock, is there no danger to a wooden ship? I speak in the presence of naval men when I say I believe the danger is much greater to a wooden ship in such a case. I am reminded of the unhappy case of the Conqueror, which is an illustration of what I say. She was a wooden ship. The bottom of a wooden ship is no doubt stronger than that of an iron ship, but then the wooden ship has not the advantage of water-tight compartments, but I think no great weight can be attached to the rock argument. The noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty has reminded us that we are in a transition state, and that we cannot tell what inventions we may have within two years. That is true, but it is equally applicable to one side of the question as well as to the other. You are going to lay down five men-of-war, and before you lay them down you must decide what they are to be. The only remaining argument I think it necessary to touch, is that founded on the alleged success of the French armour-covered wooden ships. I confess I read that portion of the Controller's statement with surprise; because it does not agree with what I have heard generally stated in private conversations. I have heard again and again that the celebrated ship La Gloire, which as yet has only been backwards and forwards between Toulon and Algiers, was so strained while cruising in the Mediterranean, in consequence of the weight of her armour on a wooden structure, as to make it a grave question with the French whether they should not give up wood and take to iron. My impression with regard to the Normandie, the Magenta, and Solfe-rino is that they have not yet had a fair trial. I believe that none of them have had a trial which could be compared with that which the Warrior had a year ago in the Bay of Biscay, where never a ship of war went through a severer test, nor came into harbour in a better condition after such a trial. But wooden ships, in consequence of the enormous weight of their engines, which the House will remember must be irrespective of the weight of armour-plating, are obliged to go into dock to be repaired after they have been exposed to heavy weather. I cannot sit down without referring for a moment to that portion of the Parliamentary paper on this subject which throws a most harsh, and, as I think, a most unjust stigma on the shipbuilders of this country, many of whom have made contracts for building ships for the Royal Navy. I cannot understand how the Board of Admiralty can have allowed themselves to place upon the table of this House a reflection upon men of high character and standing so severe and so utterly unmerited as I believe this to be. No exceptions are made. The hon. Member for Birkenhead (Mr. Laird) has alluded to this subject in most just terms, and what must be the feelings of those able and accomplished men his sons, who are an ornament to their profession, when they find themselves included in the category of shipbuilders who are guilty of slovenly work and of using dishonest materials? What must be the feelings of that venerable and accomplished man, Mr. Napier, of Glasgow, whom I feel proud to call my friend, when he finds himself accused also of slovenly work and dishonest materials? Another house in this town, the Thames Iron Company, constructed the Warrior; Mr. Napier, of Glasgow, built the Black Prince, and what right has any Department to come down to this House, and, in order to bolster up a bad case, to stigmatize in this manner men of the highest possible character and standing? I very deeply regret the course which has been taken in this matter, and I know of nothing to justify it. In deal- ing with private firms you may be liable to treatment to which exception may justly be taken. But to stigmatize a whole class, and that class embracing some of the most accomplished men in the country, is a matter which I think the Board of Admiralty will regret, and which I have read with pain and sorrow. Sir, I will not, detain the House, for this question lies in a narrow compass. I, for one, do not desire to take any course which would involve any undue interference with the Executive; but we have to decide to-night a matter of grave importance to the country; and if the hon. Member for Sunderland presses his Motion to a division, undoubtedly I shall find it my duty to vote with him.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Sir, I concur with the right hon. Gentleman who has just sat down on two points—namely, first, that this is a most important question, and next, that the House ought to confine itself to the words of the Motion of my hon. Friend. Therefore, I abstain from entering into that field which was opened to our view by other Members —namely, an intimation that my hon. Friend ought to have included in his Motion the reconstruction of the Board of Admiralty. Whether that meant that the Board of Admiralty ought, like our ships, in his opinion, to be constructed by contract, and made of iron, I will not inquire. I believe that my hon. Friend, on the other hand, instead of wishing that the Board should be made of more hard and more stern material, would rather wish them made softer and more plastic, and more liable to be moulded according to his opinion. But the right hon. Gentleman said that the debate hitherto has been one-sided. Well, in some degree I concur in that opinion, because I think that many of those who have spoken have taken a very one-sided view of the question. It is very natural that Gentlemen who by their daily experience know the advantages and facilities which the contractors have, and who also are in the habit of moulding iron to their will, should think that everything ought to be made of iron. It is the old story — that everything should be of leather. They say that iron is the only material. Well, but I think the whole of this discussion has turned on a misconception as to what has been and what is intended to be the course of the Admiralty. Any one who had come into this House and had heard this debate without knowing what the Admiralty has done would have imagined, that whereas the Admiralty has pertinaciously persisted in building nothing but wooden ships, and whereas it has been shown in this House by recent experience that iron is the preferable material, this House has a right to interpose and arrest the Admiralty in its vicious course, and to tell it to build no more wooden ships, but to have recourse to iron. But what is the fact? Is it true that the Admiralty have set their faces against building iron ships, that they have set their faces against building ships by contract, and that they have done nothing but build wooden ships, and in Government dockyards? Why, quite the contrary. Out of twenty-one iron-clad ships that are built and building eleven are of iron entirely, of which ten were built by contractors. Therefore, I say there is no ground for assuming that the Admiralty are indisposed either to build iron ships or to build those iron ships by means of private trade and contract. The Achilles is the only one of those iron ships built in a Government dockyard. The question then is, we having eleven iron ships actually afloat, and five more of wood cased with iron that are constructing, making sixteen in all, the French—for it is no use disguising the state of the matter—having built, or being now engaged in building twenty-seven, whether the Admiralty are right or wrong in proposing to add five to the sixteen that are now building, and thus giving us within one, and only one, of the number the French now have [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: The French will have thirty-one.] We do not wish to overstate the question. Now, Sir, a great deal has been said with regard to the relative merits of wooden and iron ships; and I think that whereas some hon. Members take exception to the statement of my noble Friend, that if the Admiralty were to-morrow to issue a contract for an iron ship, they would be at a loss to know what particular thing they desired to have, I agree with my noble Friend, and think, that if this House, according to the debate this evening, were to order these five ships to be made entirely of iron, the person to whom the order would be given would be very much at a loss to know what sort of ship it was intended he should make; for a great variety of opinions have been stated by hon. Members who have spoken as to what is the best kind of ship. My hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury (Sir Morton Peto) says that only yesterday he obtained information tending to show that wooden ships cased with iron and sheathed with copper are not likely to answer the purpose. Another hon. Member thinks that iron is likely to be superseded by steel. Another hon. Gentleman has said that different methods are every day invented for the preparation of iron, So that realty, if you had to order an iron ship, it would be very difficult to determine what sort of a ship would be best for the purpose two years hence. Now, there is one objection that no one denies as applied to iron ships, and that is the fouling of the bottom. My noble Friend has stated, on the authority of Captain Cochrane, that the Warrior loses a knot every six weeks she is afloat by fouling. Now, those Gentlemen who have taken that which the right hon. Baronet calls a one-sided view of the question, and who are all for iron, have founded their argument very much on the analogy between packet and merchant ships and men-of-war, totally forgetting the immense difference between packet ships and mercantile ships, and ships intended for the purposes of war. If a merchantman that goes from London to China, to the West Indies, or to the Cape of Good Hope, gets her bottom fouled, and loses a portion of her speed, and, what is a material thing, some part of the power of steerage, what is the consequence? A delay in her voyage. She may arrive some days or weeks later than she ought to do. The steerage being merely to keep her in a straight course, it does not very much matter, except she is taken in a storm or finds herself in any difficulty, whether she steers less well or perfectly. But in regard to ships of war, speed and steerage, may be of the utmost possible consequence —in an action everything may depend upon them. A battle may be lost from some defect in them, and no man can tell the disastrous results to a country of the loss of a naval engagement. Now, it is perfectly clear that iron ships require repeated cleansing of their bottoms from incrustations and marine growths; and as a great part of the service of the navy is performed in distant places, where your ships are required to remain for two or three years without coming home, an iron ship is not fit, in the present condition of things, for such a service. You could not, in the present condition of things, send the Warrior, or a ship of the same kind, to a distant foreign station, for they would have to go into dock, and when their services were wanted they would be getting their bottoms cleansed from the incrustations. But would your wooden ships be less effective as men-of-war than the ships of the nations which they might have to encounter? All the French iron-clads, except one, the Couronne, are built of wood. It is said that La Gloire has been strained. I believe that is a mistake. As far as we know, La Gloire has not been strained, and is in perfect condition. Hon. Gentlemen seem to imagine that a wooden ship coated with iron is the same as a wooden ship not so coated. A ship coated with iron is strengthened in every possible way. She has an iron deck, iron beams, and she is strengthened internally with iron which renders her stronger and stiffer than a wooden ship usually is. Therefore, when the right hon. Baronet says a wooden ship must be strained by the weight of her armour plates, that is perfectly true, but that does not apply to a wooden ship prepared to receive iron armour, because that ship is strengthened in a different manner. My noble Friend has stated that a great number of naval officers say they should very much prefer having the command of a wooden ship armour-plated rather than of an iron ship plated in the same way. Opinions are very much divided upon the matter. Well, then, that being so, what do the Admiralty intend to do? Why, in the course of this summer there will be a mode of testing by experiment the qualities of the Royal Oak, a ship built of wood, but strengthened with iron, as compared with those of the Hector, a ship of the same size, but built entirely of iron, and the result of that experiment will instruct the Admiralty as to the course to be pursued with respect to the number of ships necessary to be built. But my hon. Friend, instead of leaving to the Admiralty to determine, as is their proper function, what is best for the public service, calls upon the House to rush in by a hasty decision, bind up the hands of the Government, and take from them that responsibility which belongs exclusively to them. This House, by deciding upon a question of ship-building, will assume to itself a function which, with all due deference, I contend it is incompetent to perform; and if the result were to be that by yielding to the wishes of the House the Government were turned away from that course which they are disposed to pursue, and if the time should come when we were without the number and class of ships which we ought to have, in order to be on an equality with other Powers, it would be all very well for the Government to say, "The House of Commons are answerable." The House would reply, "You ought not to have submitted to a wrong decision of the House; you are answerable, and we shall wreak upon you that resentment which the nation ought properly to feel against an Executive that has not done its duty." Well, then, I do entreat the House not to consent to a course which I quite agree with the hon. Member for Norfolk (Mr. Bentinck) would be most unwise. There are certain functions which belong to a deliberative assembly, and others which belong to an Executive; and although a deliberative assembly may usurp the function of an Executive, it acts unwisely in doing so. The responsibility ought, to rest upon the Executive, and the House ought to judge, by the acts of the Government, whether they have properly or improperly performed their duty. All that we want is that our hands should be left untied, in order that we may build the best navy which, from time to time, may be possible. The experience of every month may lead to a considerable modification of preconceived notions, but errors hastily committed cannot be hastily repaired. When an hon. Gentleman remarked that iron ships would last thirty or forty years my hon. Friend behind me said, "Well, Heaven forbid! because long before that we may find them superseded by other inventions better adapted to the service." Even now we have several kinds of iron-clad ships proposed—the broad-sided, the turreted, the square-towered, and what are called sinking ships—that is, ships which are to be filled with water so as to expose very little surface to the fire of an enemy; but the question of the rival merits of all these is to be solved by experiment. Only one thing is well ascertained— namely, that in power of resistance a ship with iron plating and a thick wooden side behind the iron is equal to the Warrior. Therefore, whether wooden ships plated with iron are to be regarded simply as ships for sea-going purposes or for purposes of action, they are capable, on the one hand, of maintaining their position in any part of the world just as much as any other wooden ship is, and, on the other hand, they are as well able to resist shot as an iron ship would be. Therefore, when the right hon. Baronet says that the papers on the table show that we would gain neither in time nor in money by building wooden iron-plated ships, I must beg to differ from him; because if the preparations which may be made in the dockyards with very little expense be carried out, a wooden iron-plated ship can be put together in a twelvemonth, whereas an iron ship would take two years and a half. No doubt the difference of expense is not very material, but it is something, and I did not expect that from that quarter of the House (below the gangway, on the Ministerial side) we should have urged upon us an arrangement which, not only in point of time, but also of money, would involve a greater expenditure. Therefore, I do hope and trust the House will leave to the Government that proper discretion which belongs to them in regard to the defence of the country; that it will not prescribe any one particular course; but that as the Government is responsible to the House for the conduct of its departmental arrangements, it will leave them free to act upon the best information which they can obtain as to which class of vessels may be best suited to the wants of the country.

MR. HENLEY

said, the noble Lord had placed the question in a somewhat different position from what it occupied before. He said, "Leave the Government to do whichever of two things they think best." But that was not the issue before the House. The matter had been suffered to lie over for consideration from the Naval Estimates. Was it fair, then, for the noble Lord to place the House in its present position? The Government made a definite statement at the time the Naval Estimates were before the House, and they agreed that the consideration of that statement was to stand over. They placed printed evidence upon the table to sustain their statement, and now did they take their stand upon that issue? No such thing; for the noble Lord said, "Leave the Government to do whichever of two things they think best." The noble Lord stated that the French were beforehand! with us, that we could not stand still, that we must have five ships, and still we should be behind. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty said, "We must progress." How were they to pro- gress? The noble Lord the Secretary to, the Admiralty said, that it was all matter of experiment whether there should be broadside ships, turret ships, or other I ships, and that it would not be right to keep behind the French while these experiments were being made. The paper presented to the House stated that iron ships and wooden ships took equal time in building; and the noble Lord said, that if wooden ships were put up in frame, it would only take twelve months to finish them. But how long would it take to put them up in frame? and were the frames to be put up so as to answer for this purpose or for that, and then to be pulled to pieces? for the Admiralty had acted in such a way before. He thought that the Government had no right to bring such a question before the House; but as that had been done, and as documentary evidence had been placed on the table, the House could not help considering it. The paper on the table of the House afforded a strong illustration of the wisdom of the saying, attributed to a distinguished Judge, "Give your judgment, but do not give your reasons." The paper from beginning to end was a distinct contradiction of the very conclusion which the person who wrote it had drawn. With regard to the question of expense, he was of opinion that that expense was the least which procured the best and most durable article. It was evident that the noble Lord at the head of the Government was in favour of iron rather than wooden ships, and the reasons in the paper drawn up by the Controller of the Navy led to the same conclusion; but the Controller ended by saying that, as iron ships could not be built in the dockyards, it would be better for the present to have wooden ships, which were worse articles. With great difficulty he had came to the conclusion to vote in favour of the Resolution moved by the hon. Member; and he could not have done be until he had read the paper of the Controller of the Navy and heard the speech of the Secretary to the Admiralty. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty said, that the Controller of the Navy never intended to throw any reflection on the contractors for iron ships; but if the paper signed by the Controller was meant to he a friendly salute, he must say, "God bless the contractors if ever that gallant Admiral fired a broadside upon them." What faith could the House put in any part of that document when the Secretary to the Admiralty came down and explained away a portion of it? If the writer did not intend to say what he had said, the statement was not worth the paper on which it was written. He regretted that such a paper should have been put forth, and agreed with the right hon. Member for Droitwich in thinking that no public man had a right to east those reflections on any set of individuals. He was sorry that the question had come before the House in the shape it had. It was not right for the Government to hold over a question of this sort; then put reasons before the House for what they were doing, and finally tell the House, as the noble Lord had done, not to tie the hands of the Government, but leave them at liberty to do anything else but what they had proposed to do.

MR. E. P. BOUVERIE

said, he thought it would be most unwise for the House to take on itself to decide a scientific question, and say that iron ships for warlike purposes were preferable to wooden, especially when they had been told that a preponderance of naval authority was in favour of armour-clad wooden ships. They were told by the Controller of the Navy, and the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, that at present there existed no available means for building an iron armour-clad navy in the dockyards, and that for such a fleet the country must have recourse to private yards. It was not his intention to question the integrity of the owners of private yards, for he was acquainted with some of them, and he knew that nothing could be higher than the character they bore; but he asked whether the House was prepared to hand over the building of the most important portion of our navy to private yards? Were all the ships, on which the safety of the country must depend, to be built by contract in private yards? Experience taught the m to take the very opposite course. At the time of the Crimean war the country was dependent for small arms on private contractors, but experience soon showed that it was necessary for the Government to create an establishment of their own for the manufacture of those arms, for the purpose of control in dealing with the contractors for a portion of the supply. He conceived that it would be a most unwise and imprudent course to hand over the whole of the ship-building of the most important branch of the navy to contractors, at whose mercy the country would then entirely be, should circumstances of the greatest pressure arise.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The House divided:—Ayes 154; Noes 81: Majority 73.

Main Question put, and agreed to.