OBSERVATIONS.

HC Deb 06 July 1863 vol 172 cc270-330

LORD NAAS

Sir, the somewhat unexpected manner in which the discussion on the Motion of my hon. Friend the Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) terminated on a recent occasion, induces me to think I am taking no unusual course in endeavouring again to direct the attention of the House to the important question of China, and to elicit from the Government some explanation on the subject of our relations with that great empire. I am the more encouraged to do so because I believe that of late years those relations have entered upon a totally novel phase. It is evident that the policy which we have adopted since the peace in our dealings with China has been abandoned, and that we are now rapidly entering on an entirely new state of things. It will be needless to do more than remind the House how the empire of China differs from every other country in the habitable world. For ages that empire has been ruled by what is little short of a pure and absolute despotism. But slavery has never existed in any shape within its bounds, and the authority of the Central Government has never been upheld by a large standing army. The public service in China is also of a peculiar kind. For centuries, almost for ages, competitive examination is the principal mode by which admittance to that service is gained. Education and merit are supposed to be the only means by which a man can rise in China. No aristocracy—scarcely anything in the shape of a middle class exists in the country. It is extraordinary, that in an empire so governed there is to be found among the people a smaller amount of patriotism than is to be found among the natives of any other country in the world. Indeed, among the Chinese there is a singular absence of love of country, or pride of race; and little "religious sentiment," or reverence for sacred things, is to be found amongst them. Forcible resistance to authority has always been the only means by which grievances are redressed and wrongs remedied. The right and practice of rebellion appears to have existed as far back as the earliest days of the Chinese Empire. The right of rebellion has always been recognised by their great writers; and it must be owned that the people have been very consistent in reducing the doctrine to practice from time to time. Dr. Legge, in his remarkable book on Chinese classics, shows clearly the opinions of the great philosophers on this point; and these principles, though enunciated 3,000 years ago, I recommend to the attention of hon. Gentlemen opposite, as they might have well been written by an English Whig of 1688. Dr. Legge says— The government which Confucius taught was a despotism, but of a modified character. He allowed no jus divinum independent of personal virtue and a benevolent rule. He says—'Heaven, protecting the inferior people, has constituted for them rulers and teachers, who should be able to be assisting to God, extending favour and producing tranquillity throughout all parts of the Empire. The moment the ruler ceases to be a minister of God for good, and does not administer a government that is beneficial to the people, he forfeits the title by which he holds the throne, and perseverance in oppression will surely lead to his overthrow.' Mencius inculcates this principle with a frequency and boldness which are remarkable. It was one of the things about which Confucius did not much like to write—still he held it. It is conspicuous in the last chapters of The Great Learning, and its tendency has been to check the violence of oppression, and maintain the self-respect of the people all along the course of Chinese history. It is a curious thing, that though rebellions have been numerous, no particular dynasty in China has ever been overthrown without several years of armed resistance against its authority. Coups d'état are almost unknown in that country. As far back as 1279 the Soung dynasty was overthrown after nineteen years of insurrection. It took sixteen years to overthrow the Mongol dynasty; and the Sing dynasty, which now rules the empire, was not established till after twenty-eight or thirty years of rebellion against that which preceded it. The empire of China is now passing through one of those unfortunate crises; and I do not incorrectly describe the state of the country by saying that civil war rages almost from one end of it to the other. Apart from the Taeping rebellion, which has now existed for thirteen or fourteen years, there are constant disturbances in the districts bordering on the Canton provinces, where the rival factions of the Hakkis and Puntis still maintain their ancient feuds; in the western provinces the armies of the Emperor are vainly endeavouring to make head against disturbances there; until lately they were defending Hang-chow on the Yang-tze-Kiang, which was menaced by a body of rebels entirely distinct from the Taepings; and at Tien-tsin our Consul has, in the spring of this year, been severely wounded in repelling an attack on the town by a body of rebels under the general name of the Nien Fei. It was not impossible that that body of rebels might menace even the capital itself. In the far north, near the new treaty port of New Chiang, the foreign residents as we hear from Mr. Consul Meadows, has lately been in fear of destruction by another distinct body of rebels. Indeed, the whole empire, containing a population of 300,000,000 or 400,000,000, is convulsed from end to end. The movement, however, with which we have more particularly to deal, is the Taeping movement. Without pretending to give anything like a history of it, I will only say that it commenced in 1849 or 1850—that it is one of the most extraordinary movements that have ever taken place in any country—that at first small in its beginning, and commenced by a few insignificant individuals, it soon acquired such importance, and such numbers gathered round the standard of the chief, Hung Su Tsuen, that Nankin, the ancient capital of the Empire fell into his hands, and a sort of Government was established there; that the rebels then moved northward until they, almost menaced the safety of the capital, and that they then, without apparent cause, retired pretty much in the same way as they advanced, their principal object being plunder. It is, however, necessary for a moment to consider what were the causes of the Taeping movement. I am afraid that any person who has devoted attention to the affairs of China during the last twelve or fourteen years, must form the opinion that the constant interference of England, and her hostility to the Imperial authorities, have contributed greatly to the disorganization of the country. Those who have considered the subject thoroughly, agree in assigning the movement to three causes—British hostility towards the Government, the opium question, and the circumstance that for the last three reigns China has been ruled by princes of weak character and little influence. By a series of acts of hostility which I will not now enter upon, but which has lasted for years, we have weakened the Government and made it contemptible in the eyes of the people. In Mr. Meadows's book is, to be found the following curious memorial from a Manchou general, written soon after the outbreak of the rebellion:— The troops do not attend to orders, regard retreat on the eve of battle as an old custom, and the abandonment of places they should hold as an ordinary affair.…… The number of robbers and criminal associations in Kwang-tung and Kwang-si is very great, and they assemble without the least hesitation to create disturbances; all which arises from the circumstances of the army at the time the barbarian affairs were being transacted. Formerly they feared the troops as tigers; of late they look on them as sheep. Again, there is no doubt that our constant attempts to force the opium trade upon the Government of China have had a very serious effect, and have been the ever fruitful source of disquietude and violence. Monsignor Chauveau, a Catholic missionary in Yunnan, relates an instance—one in many—by which opium may be traced as one of the causes of the rebellion in the year 1850 or 1851. Six hundred opium dealers of the province of Kwang-si, travelling from Yunan to Canton, being short of supplies, forcibly borrowed or took money and provisions from two brothers of the name of Ischang. These men had no alternative but to comply with their demands. When the opium traders left, these two brothers, who were men of influence and position, were arrested, flung into prison, and severely punished by the Mandarins. This act of gross injustice so incensed the people that they joined the insurrection in great numbers. I might quote many examples to show how much we have to answer for in being the cause of the present state of anarchy in the empire, but I should not feel justified in troubling the House at any length upon past events in China. I wish rather to deal with the present aspect of affairs. But the House will recollect what has been the attitude of England towards China during the last twenty-five years. Almost ever since the East India Company's monopoly was done away with, and since the Chinese Government had determined forcibly to resist the introduction of opium, till within the last two years, our attitude has been one of continued and almost incessant hostility. We have had two, I may almost say four, great wars. Our position has always been one of antagonism to the Chinese authorities. I might describe it as one of armed commerce. The noble Lord at the head of the Government repeatedly told the House that we were not at war with China, at the very time that we were burning the suburbs of Canton and bombarding the forts; and at last our relations with that country had got into such an anomalous position, that we were actually at one time, in the south and on the east coast, supporting the authority, of the Chinese Viceroy in Canton, collecting a portion of the Imperial revenue at Shanghai and defending it against the rebels, transmitting I suppose a portion of that revenue to Pekin; while in the North we were bombarding the Taku forts, seizing the capital, and burning the Emperor's palace. Now, peace being made, we are bound to find a policy for the new state of things, and that is the question to which I particularly ask the attention of the House. A great rebellion exists in China; two parties are striving for the mastery. I have little sympathy for one or the other; least of all am I an advocate of the Taeping movement. At first considerable sympathy was manifested for it, as there was a belief that their religion was closely allied to Christianity. Further inquiries, however, showed, that though, with the aid of some European books procured in Canton, they might have manufactured a spurious sort of Christianity, yet their religion was a sheer imposture, and the assumption of divine attributes and of direct communications from the Deity, was so disgusting to those. Christians who at first had dealings with them, that it is now allowed that no sympathy can be felt for them on religious grounds. Nor have they shown any capacity for creating either a dynasty or a Government. They have been in possession of a large portion of the country for fifteen years, including Nankin and other great cities, but nowhere have they succeeded in establishing anything like an organized form of Government, But this contemptible position which, after all, the Taeping leaders hold, makes the case as against the Imperialists still stronger; for notwithstanding the weakness, the disorganization, and incapacity of the rebels, the Imperial troops have been continually worsted in the field; and with all the military, financial, and political resources of the empire at their command, they have never been able to make head against the Taepings, or to restore peace and order in a single province. Such being the state of affairs as between the rival parties, at the Treaty of Pekin a policy of neutrality was laid down and acted on for a considerable time. I am anxious that there should be no mistake as to the declaration made at that time. That treaty was Concluded in October 1860, and Sir Frederick Bruce, in making arrangements for the protection of the treaty ports, dis- tinctly laid it down that the British were to be entirely neutral as between the Tae-pings and the Chinese Government. Earl Russell writes to Mr. Bruce on July 24, 1861, as follows:—

"I have caused the Admiralty to be informed, in reply, that I am of opinion that Vice Admiral Hope's measures should be approved, and I have now to instruct you to endeavour to make arrangements to secure the neutrality of all the treaty ports against the rebels.

"The Government of Pekin will, probably, make no difficulty in abstaining from using the treaty ports as bases of operations against the rebels, provided the rebels on their side refrain from attacking those ports; and it may be hoped that the rebels will see that it is not for their interest to run the risk of collisions with foreign nations whose trade is protected by treaties.

"You will understand, however, that Her Majesty's Government do not wish force to be used against the rebels in any case except for the actual protection of the lives and property of British subjects.

"I am, &c.,

(Signed)

"J. RUSSELL."

Again, on August 8, 1861, Earl Russell writes to Mr. Bruce— Her Majesty's Government desire to maintain, as they have done hitherto, neutrality between the two contending parties in China. If British subjects are taken prisoners by either party, you should do your utmost to save them from torture or capital punishment; but otherwise you should abstain from all interference in the civil war.

On February 1, 1862, Mr. Bruce writes to Consul Harvey— The policy to be observed and the language to be used to the insurgent Chiefs is this:—We have no cause of quarrel with the Taepings arising out of their insurrection against the Imperial Government, nor do we pretend to dictate to the Chinese people who is to rule over them; on the other hand, any Power that claims that Empire is bound by all the obligations of the treaties China has entered into with foreign nations.

The noble Lord in his place in this House was equally explicit in the declaration of his wish for the maintenance of neutrality. On the 12th of March 1861, Earl Russell laid down this principle in the following words:— I told Mr. Bruce that Her Majesty's Government entirely approved of his conduct; that we did not wish to interfere between the Imperial Government and the rebels; that we meant to be entirely neutral; but that we would not remain neutral when the towns where the English and foreign merchants were established were attacked by foreign forces…. With regard to our policy, the only course we can take is that of perfect neturality; at the same time not allowing the towns where our merchants are congregated to be destroyed." [3 Hansard, clxi. 1858.]

I shall now proceed to show how little by little, step by step, the policy of neutrality has been abandoned, and that we are now interfering in every possible way in the internal affairs of China. The first step taken in this direction was at Shanghai, the principal of the treaty ports, where an attempt was made to carry out what was called the thirty-mile radius. Admiral Hope early in 1861 went up the country to the Taepings, entered into communication with the chiefs at Nankin, and succeeded in obtaining from them an assurance that they would respect the port and environs of Shanghai for one year. The Taepings kept their word; but towards the close of 1861, when the term of compact was nearly ended, there were evidences that they intended to advance upon Shanghai, and steps were taken in consequence to defend the town. Instead, however, of defending the settlement itself, which was absolutely necessary for the protection of British property, it was very unfortunately determined to seize and hold all the country for thirty miles round. Military operations began at the end of April 1862, when a force comprised of British and French troops, some drilled Chinese, and Imperial "braves" marched out from Shanghai, and took two large towns in the neighbourhood. They then went across the river, with the intention of seizing the right bank of the Woosung river, and occupying the peninsula, and took two more towns almost immediately. Whilst besieging another town, however, General Stavely, in command of these forces, heard that the Imperialists, who had been left in charge of the towns first taken, had been routed and destroyed, and that the rebels were marching upon Shanghai. It therefore became necessary to withdraw his troops; the towns he had taken were re-occupied by the rebels, and there was an end for the time to the thirty-mile radius. The first operation, therefore, was a failure. Towards the end of the year, however, the British Forces recaptured those towns—and no attempt has been made by the rebels to re-take them. But these operations involved the whole district in very serious troubles and misery. The position of the unfortunate inhabitants was anything but enviable. The rebels, when they took the towns near Shanghai, killed a great number of men. They ordered those that were left to let their hair grow to show they were rebels. When the English took the towns, they handed them over to the Imperialists, who beheaded many of these unfortunate creatures because they had long hair, and ordered the residue to shave. A few days afterwards the Imperial troops were withdrawn, the rebels came in again, and killed some more of those who had in the interim shaved their heads. The atrocities and carnage that take place in this civil war are horrible to contemplate. On the score of cruelty one side is as bad as the other; there is nothing to choose between them. It is alleged that the rebels have laid waste the country for thirty miles round Shanghai. Great atrocities are, no doubt, committed on both sides, but I deny that the country has been devastated. The despatches speak of the troops as marching through highly-cultivated cornfields, with men at work in them, and there is reason to believe that the atrocities of the Taepings are very much confined to the towns which they seize. The result of these operations is, that though Shanghai is safe, we are responsible for the defence of a large frontier which may be at any time attacked. I will now advert to what has happened at Ningpo, which illustrates, in an instructive manner, how gradually we are being led into interference in Chinese affairs. Ningpo is a very large city, with upwards of a quarter of a million of inhabitants. At the latter end of 1861 it was in the possession of the Imperialists, but was seriously menaced by the rebels. English officers gave the Chinese authorities every advice and assistance by lending them guns, and instructing them how to fortify the city against the enemy, at the same time assuring the mandarins that they would not interfere personally in the struggle. The rebels, however, attacked the city, and drove out the Imperial troops in a few hours; the English gunboats did not interfere, and the rebels took possession of Ningpo, which they held for five months. Matters went on quietly during that occupation. I cannot say that the rebels were successful in attracting a large portion of the inhabitants back to the city, or to restore trade; but it is quite evident that friendly relations existed between the English authorities and the rebels, communications passed and repassed, and our Consul had no reason to complain of any breach of faith on the part of the Taeping chiefs. Almost immediately after the rebels took possession of the city Consul Harvey thought it a favourable moment to arrange the question of what was called the foreign settlement, and this is a good instance how matters of this kind are settled in China. Ningpo was situated at the confluence of two considerable rivers, and a piece of ground nearly surrounded by the two rivers was much coveted by the Consuls as being admirably adapted for purposes both of trade and defence. Accordingly, they endeavoured to obtain the cession of that piece of ground. The American, French, and English Consuls and the captain of Her Majesty's gunboat Scout met one day and passed a resolution that this large piece of ground, almost as big as that upon which the city itself stood, should form the foreign settlement, and be devoted to the purposes of these foreign nations. The whole transaction is thus described by Consul Harvey in a letter to Mr. Bruce—

"Ningpo, January 14,1862.

"Sir,—I have the honour to inclose herewith, for your Excellency's information and approval, copy of a Minute of a Conference held yesterday, at the United States Consulate at this port, for the purpose of defining the limits within which will in future be comprised the 'Foreign Settlement' at Ningpo.

"Since this port was opened to foreign trade in 1843, no definite 'concession' or 'grant' has ever been obtained from the local authorities, in accordance with treaty stipulations; and as this want had long been felt by the increasing mercantile community here, but more particularly and pressings so since the capture of this city by the insurgents, the present appeared to me a very favourable opportunity for coming to a clear understanding upon the point. The inclosed Minute is a brief declaration and statement of the agreement so determined upon by the three Treaty Consuls in regard to this important clause of our respective treaties.

"I transmit also herein a rough sketch of the site and its boundaries; and I trust the steps taken on this occasion will meet with your Excellency's favourable approval, and that your Excellency will be pleased to obtain for them the sanction and confirmation of His Highness the Prince of Kung."

At that time the city of Ningpo and the country around were in the possession of the Taeping chiefs. They did not make much objection, the Consuls took possession, and some commodious residences were built on the land in question. Things went on in that way for some months, when one day in April, on the firing of a salute in honour of the arrival of one of the Taeping chiefs, some bullets struck the Ringdove gunboat. Some idle persons, also, wandering upon the walls, fired a few shots, which went near the boats. These were the only acts complained of by the British authorities, and they were amply apologised for by the Taeping chiefs. Captain Dew, of the Encounter, was sent down by Sir James Hope to obtain reparation and apology, and any one who reads the instructions of Sir James Hope will find there was nothing in them which authorized Captain Dew to make any attack upon the city. However, he demanded that a certain battery should be destroyed. The answer to the remonstrance made by Captain Dew was so satisfactory that on the 27th of April 1862 he wrote to the Taeping chiefs to inform them that he would not insist upon the demolition of the battery, but only that the guns opposite the settlement and ships should be removed. The battery to which he referred was in a peculiar position. It was erected at the confluence of the two rivers, in order to defend the town from any attack that might be made by the Imperial forces. What Captain Dew therefore required was an ample apology, the removal of the guns from the battery opposite the settlement and ships, and that means should be taken to prevent anybody going on the walls opposite to the ships. With reference to the first point Captain Dew said he was perfectly satisfied; and with respect to the two other points General Hwang wrote to say, that though the guns were for the protection of the fort, yet, under the peculiar circumstances, and to manifest the desire of the Taepings for a lasting amity, the port-holes for the guns bearing on the settlement should be stopped up, and no one should be allowed to go upon the walls except the workmen who might be required to make repairs. In fact, everything demanded by Captain Dew was granted, the port-holes were bricked up and the letter concluded in this way—"We are desirous of remaining on good terms with you, and this is our reason for this distinct statement." After the receipt of that letter Captain Dew paid a visit to a large Imperial force, which was being collected for the purpose of taking Ningpo, and was rather curiously constituted. The Imperial Government, having but a small naval force at their command, made a convention with a notorious pirate of the name of Apak for the employment in the Imperial service of himself and eighty junks, which for a number of years had been engaged in piracy. Well, a few days before the attack on Ningpo was made Captain Dew went down the river and communicated with the Imperial Chiefs and their piratical ally. There was every reason to believe that Captain Dew was cognizant of what they were going to do, and the siege of Ningpo had his perfect approval; but it appeared rather a curious thing that a British captain should enter into communication with one whom, in the pursuit of his well-known calling if he caught outside the bar at Shanghai, he would have felt hound to hang. This allied band of Imperialists and pirates advanced to the attack of Ningpo on the 10th May. Captain Dew and several gunboats were then in the river, moored in a line opposite the town, in such a manner that they were exactly in the line of fire of an attacking force. Shortly before the attack he wrote to the Taeping chiefs thus— We now inform you that we maintain a perfect neutrality; but if you fire the guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite the settlement on the advancing Imperialists, thereby endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign settlement, we shall then feel it our duty to return the fire and bombard the city.

So that having received an ample apology, Captain Dew gave up the three points, and then told the Taepings, that if they defend-ed themselves, he would join in the attack and bombard the town! The junks having advanced between the gunboats and the town, some shots were fired, whether from a Taeping battery or an Imperial junk is very doubtful; and then, without further provocation, at ten o'clock Captain Dew opened fire, the Imperialist fleet taking but little part in the attack. Captain Dew bombarded the town till two o'clock, then went to dinner; at three o'clock he landed his men, drove out the rebels, and in the evening handed over the city of Nankin as a present to the Imperial Toutae and his piratical allies. That story showed how British officers conduct affairs in China. There were friendly communications and professions of neutrality up to the last moment; and when the rebels, who had given them no provocation, attempted to defend themselves, their town was bombarded for four hours, after which they were driven out, and the city handed over to the Imperialists. But the policy of pretended neutrality and real interference culminated in an attack which was made by Captain Dew and the French contingent upon the town of Shou-hing in February of this year. After the taking of Ningpo Captain Dew remained in the city for some time, and a certain portion of Ward's force and the French contingent were occupied in garrisoning the place. No attempt was made to establish the thirty miles radius in this place. But in February last Captain Dew and a large number of boats accompanied a force of about 500 men to the attack of a walled town situated 110 miles from Ningpo. He took with him some howitzers lent by General Stavely, and he was accompanied by Lieutenant Tinling, an officer of the Encounter. The force was called the French contingent, and was a very curious one. It was commanded by a French officer, who was called a General, but I cannot make out whether he was originally a military man; I believe he was a clerk in the French civil service. The first night was spent by the force in plundering an Imperialist village—it must have been Imperialist, because it was only fifteen miles from Ningpo. The next day they advanced up a canal to the attack of Shou-hing. Captain Dew accompanied the expedition, he said, in the character of a spectator, but really to advise the commander. There can be no doubt that he took an active part in the operations. A breach having been made, the French contingent were ordered to the assault, but they were ignominiously driven back, the French commander was killed, and Lieutenant Tinling so badly wounded in the neck that he died the next day. It is impossible for Captain Dew to say that he was not in actual command of this force, for, in a letter in answer to a vote of thanks from some merchants at Ningpo, Captain Dew glorified himself considerably on having performed these exploits with General Stavely's "honoured howitzers," as he calls them. With regard to Lieutenant Tinling, he thought justice had not been done to a gallant officer, It had been over and over again said that he was there only as an amateur, and that be met with his death at a time when he was not within the line of his duty. He was there, however, by the orders of his captain. He had accompanied him in this dangerous expedition; and whilst assisting in working the guns he was shot in the neck. I think that that young officer died as much in the discharge of his duty as if he had been on board of his own ship; and that his friends in this country who deeply deplore his loss have a good right to complain that his death had not been spoken of in a proper manner when the subject was referred to the other night by the Secretary to the Admiralty.

I have now shown how at Shanghai and Ningpo the policy of neutrality has been totally abandoned, and active interference by land and sea has been taken in this wretched civil war. I will now refer to two institutions which have grown up in China, and which are becoming to all intents and purposes thoroughly British. The first of these is the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs, the other the Anglo-Chinese Contingent. I will take the description of the former from Mr. Lay's own words. That gentleman, who is Imperial Inspector General of Customs, in answer to a communication from Earl Russell, states that the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs was introduced into Shanghai in 1854; that the Chinese authorities were then too weak to levy the duties; and that in consequence the American, the British, and the French Consuls met together at the British Consul's house, and there nominated three persons to collect and take charge of the Imperial customs. This was a curious nomination. Ultimately, the Chinese Government placed the entire control of the customs in Mr. Lay's hands, so that in 1856 that gentleman became the head of the Chinese customs board. The personnel of the establishment is somewhat remarkable. The system is established at eight ports. The personnel of the establishment is constituted thus— Shanghai.—Mr. H. Tudor Davies (English), late Chief Magistrate at Hong-Kong, absent on sick leave, whose place is supplied by Mr. G. H. Fitzroy, late Attaché to Lord Elgin. Ningpo.—M. Giguel (French), late Interpreter Canton Commissioners. Foo-chow.—M. Meritens (French), late Interpreter to Baron Gros. Amoy.—Mr. Ward (American), late Secretary to the United States Legation. Swatow.—Mr. Wilzer (German), late Mercantile Assistant. Canton.—Mr. Glover (American), late United States Vice-Consul at Shanghai. Chin-kiang.—Mr. Leonard (English), late Mercantile Assistant in the firm of Dent and Company. Tien-tsin.—M. Klecszkowski (French), Major on half-pay. Mr. Hart, who was an Interpreter in the Consular Service, acts during Mr. Lay's absence as Inspector General.

Therefore, at eight ports there are—one English Inspector General, two English, three French, two American, and one German, chief officers. Those gentlemen levy an enormous amount of revenue. The customs duty at Shanghai alone is supposed to amount to £1,000,000 a year. And taking all the eight ports together it is reasonable to suppose that they collect something like £4,000,000 of revenue every year. Those gentlemen, however, practically speaking, are wholly irresponsible to any person or power whatever. It is true that their nomination was sanctioned by the Chinese Government, but they were not certainly appointed originally by them. In fact, the representatives of Foreign Powers really appointed them, and they continue their services under the direction of Mr. Lay, who still retains his character as a British subject, and has been somewhat recently employed in Her Majesty's service in accompanying Lord Elgin to Pekin in the capacity of Secretary of Legation. Now, the important question arises—Whose subjects are these men? Suppose that Mr. Lay or any of his subordinates got into trouble with the Chinese authorities, and was presented with a silver cord, which is the fashionable mode of disposing of high authorities in that country, should we interfere and treat him as a British subject? I apprehend that Sir Frederick Bruce would immediately interfere in his behalf, and claim to protect him as a British subject. The other foreign representatives would doubtless do the same by their own fellow-countrymen. In truth, the system amounts to this, that a great portion of the Imperial revenue is collected and expended by foreigners under the control of an Englishman lately in the diplomatic service of his own country. In addition to the revenue collected at the ports I have named under this system, the mandarins collect a little revenue of their own. Constant complaints are made by merchants that they have to pay, besides the customs duties levied by the foreign inspectors, other charges which are demanded by local Chinese officials, for the payment of foreign contingents and the maintenance of local establishments. Under those circumstances, it is not surprising that there should be constant collisions between the Chinese authorities and the foreign and consular officers. I do not say a word against Mr. Lay. On the contrary, I believe that no more pure or worthy public servant exists. But I believe that he has undertaken duties which were beyond the power of any individual, and that the greatest difficulty will arise from the anomalous position in which he is placed; indeed, these difficulties have already commenced. The Shanghai Shipping List of April 2, 1863, contains an account of a fatal collision between the Chinese authorities and the foreign officials, arising out of a system of "squeezing," which was generally practised in China on all occasions and by all classes. The article I refer to mentions that such collisions are almost of daily occurrence. There was a considerable force at Ningpo under Imperial autho- rity; the Inspectors of Customs had also a number of armed men under their authority; the French contingent was 1,500, and the Anglo-Chinese Contingent was 1,000 men. So that there were stationed in that single town four different authorities independent of each other, and each having large armed forces at its disposal. The occurrence to which I allude is thus described by a local paper— At Ningpo, we learn, that a few days ago a very serious disturbance occurred between some Europeans (custom-house officers) and Chinese officials. It appears that a system of squeezing had long been carried on by the custom-house boatmen; but meeting with a stout resistance, blows were resorted to, and a general mêlée ensued. The authorities succeeded in capturing the boatmen, and taking them prisoners into the city. The Tide Surveyor, Mr. Newberry, stationed at Chinhai, immediately on gaining information as to the whereabouts of his Chinese boatmen, mustered all the Europeans that he possibly could, proceeded to the prisons where they were incarcerated, and demanded that his men should be instantly liberated. The mandarin in charge, becoming alarmed at the threatening appearance of so many foreign faces who surrounded him, unlocked the door of the prison, and Mr. Newberry rushed forward, where he found the objects of his search in irons. These he speedily released, but on their return to the entrance he discovered that the door was locked upon him. Threats and the firing of his revolver inside the prison brought the other Europeans to the rescue, who succeeded in knocking down the door, and liberated the boatmen. It is supposed that several other prisoners effected their escape. One young man, a son of a Chinese merchant, was shot, and died shortly afterwards. The case has been investigated by the proper authorities, but the result has not yet transpired."—(2nd April 1863.)

Lately, however, the forces at the disposal of the foreign inspectorate have received an important augmentation. Mr. Lay and Captain Sherard Osborn, a most distinguished officer, who knows China well, came to this country last autumn to organize an armed European naval force. These gentlemen undertook this mission with the sanction of Sir Frederick Bruce, but he could not discover that they brought with them a single scrap of paper giving them the authority of the Imperial Government for these proceedings. At first Her Majesty's Government proposed to issue licences enabling a certain number of British officers to take service in the new force; but it was felt, on reflection, that that course would be very inconvenient. At the end of August an Order in Council was issued repealing the provisions of the Foreign Enlistment Act, and authorizing Captain Sherard Osborn and Mr. Lay to enlist troops for the service of the Chinese Empire, and to fit out and arm ships of war. The mode in which the funds for the force were obtained is described in a note in a Chinese newspaper, which, I believe, is authentic. A fleet of armed steamers has been purchased in England, to be placed under the command of Captain Sherard Osborn. The money remitted to England to meet the cost of these vessels has been drawn by the Emperor from his customs revenue under foreign inspection. The total sum so remitted has been 650,000 taels. Of this sum, Canton supplied 250,000 taels, Shanghai 200,000 taels, Amoy 50,000 taels. No more money being ready, the balance of 150,000 taels was raised by loan on the Foo-chow customs revenue; the loan was in the form of scrip receivable in payment of import or export duties a year hence, interest at from 8 to 10 per cent per annum. The scrip was rapidly taken up by foreign merchants; they preferred such a mode of paying their duties, as it would save them trouble and expense. These gentlemen had therefore a considerable sum of money placed at their disposal—I should say about] £200,000. Three gunboats were purchased from the English Government, and three other vessels were ordered to be built in private yards in England. The stores, guns, and other equipments were furnished from our arsenals. A code of laws was drawn up for the regulation of the force, a new scale of pay and rations was fixed, pensions and compensation for wounds were settled, a special book of signals was arranged, and last, not least, a new flag, green with yellow stripes, wholly different from either the British or the Imperial flag, was improvised under which these troops were to fight—in the service, not of the Emperor, but of Mr. Lay and the Anglo-Chinese inspectorate. It is rather difficult to ascertain the precise object of the force, as the Government do not seem to have any very defined notions on the subject. Mr. Lay, in his official application for permission to enlist men in England, himself said it was to be employed in re-establishing the Imperial authority on the Yang-tze-Kiang, and commercial security on the inner waters, and in suppressing piracy on the open sea. The latter undertaking might, however, be dismissed from view, as any ship of war might destroy a pirate at sea if she could catch him. Mr. Hammond, writing to the Secretary of the Admiralty to ask the approval of the First Lord, used a very remarkable phrase. He said that Her Majesty's Government approved of the establishment of a European naval force in order to restore order throughout the Chinese Empire. Now, the House will see that the order to restore-order in the empire of China is rather a large order. As the force number only 400 men, while the population of China number about 400,000,000, each man of the expedition was expected to restore order to a million of men. The Secretary to the Admiralty accepted the statement of the Foreign Office, and replied in the same remarkable phrase, that he saw no objection to the scheme. Now, I wish to point out to the House what will, in all probability, be the first exploit of the new force. In any attempt to-restore order on the banks of the Yang-tze-Kiang, they must begin with the capture of Nankin. As the House knows. Nankin is a city of enormous size—the second in the Empire. Since 1854 it has been in the hands of the Taepings, the Imperialists never having made any serious effort to dislodge them. The prospect of the English taking Nankin, and driving the Taepings out of it and into rich silk and tea districts adjoining, is regarded by a number of eminent authorities with just apprehension as the most unfortunate thing that can happen to our trade. That I am justified in assuming that this is one of the points against which the newly-raised force will be directed, will be seen from the following passage in a despatch written by Earl Russell on the 7th of July 1862, after Captain Osborn's expedition had been decided on:—a despatch in which he throws the old neutrality policy overboard altogether, and adopts in full the principle of interference which has been acted upon, by all the British officials in China.

"The rational course for us to pursue is, to defend our own trade, to protect the treaty ports, and to encourage the Chinese Government to arm a sufficient force of Artillery, Infantry, and Cavalry, to overcome the rebels, and reduce them to subjection.

"You will arrange for the stay of the troops at Shanghai so long as that settlement is menaced by the rebels.

"Ningpo ought to be recovered by the Imperialists, and, when they have force sufficient for the purpose, they should undertake vigorous operations against Nankin.

"I am, &c.,

(Signed)

"RUSSELL.

"Foreign Office, July 7, 1862."

Sir Frederick Bruce, however, a year be- fore, on the 16th of January 1861, said he did not see that the fall of Nankin would dissolve the bands which desolated the country, and gave this warning in these words— Should the capture of Nankin merely drive the rebels from the positions they occupy on the river, and the Imperialists he unable to follow them up with vigour and disperse them, they would Seize other points not assailable by us, and feeling secure from chastisement by our naval force, they would be less amenable to reason. We should be liable at the ports to sudden and unexpected attacks unless we had force sufficient stationed at each for its defence.

Again, on the 11th of July 1861, Admiral Hope wrote— I should consider the capture of Nankin as the most impolitic act which could be committed. There is not the slightest ground for the supposition that the loss of that town would have any material effect in the suppression of the insurrection, or any other, indeed, than that of the removal of the Taeping seat of government to some city in the interior out of our reach, and the creation of a feeling of inveterate hostility against us.

Even Earl Russell himself, in September 1861, concurred with Admiral Hope in condemning the capture of Nankin, which a year later he recommended so strongly-Consul Meadows states that a Yang-tze campaign against the Taepings would require a large fleet and a considerable body of troops. He describes the probable course of such a campaign in the following words:— A few years back the aid of a small British army and naval squadron, operating along a portion of the Great River, could perhaps have enabled the Manchoos to suppress this particular Chinese rising against their rule; but now it would require a large fleet of steamers, operating throughout some 1,500 to 2,000 miles of the Great River and its larger branches, and some 20,000 troops, operating in three or four complete small armies in different parts of the tract of country mentioned above as being more or less in the occupation of Taeping forces, and which extends about 800 to 900 miles from north to south, and 1,000 to 1,100 from east to west. So what was dangerous, impolitic, and unwise last year, is sound and right to-day. Our whole line of conduct is changed, and changed without any good cause or reason. I have now shown that this foreign inspectorate of Customs, having the command of an armed force, and really irresponsible, is one of the most dangerous institutions which has ever been sanctioned by the British Government. Its dangers are well summed up in the following words of an able writer:— In conclusion; the dangers arising from the foreign inspectorate becoming an armed power with an immediately belligerent attitude, and that only now loom darkly in the future, are these:—The creation of a power in China which, though now under the control of an English officer, may pass successfully into the hands of Frenchmen and Americans; the probable use that may be made of such power to the detriment of English interests; the tendency of such a body as the foreign inspectorate of customs, when free from ordinary checks, towards degeneration and corruption, more especially when having a large armed force at their disposal; the complications that may arise from the absence of any clearly-defined understanding as to the position of foreigners in Chinese employ, with regard to extending protection to their persons in certain emergencies.

I will next give a short history of the Anglo-Chinese contingent, a force with which Mr. Lay has nothing to do, and which is quite separate from Captain Sherard Osborn's force. In the year 1860 Colonel Ward, whose origin was rather doubtful, and whose nationality was also somewhat obscure, but who, I believe, was a member of General Walker's filibustering expedition, arrived at Shanghai; and being a man of courage and capacity, proposed to form a foreign legion, consisting of Manilla men, Europeans, negroes, and, indeed, any one whom he could catch, for the service of the Emperor. There was plenty of material for the formation of such a force, for the ports of the eastern seas swarm with adventurers, filibusters, and scoundrels, who being unable to live elsewhere, have collected in that part of the world with no object but rapine and plunder, and whose doings have extended south to some of our own settlements, and are about to be brought under the notice of the House by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Wakefield. Colonel Ward collected his regiment, and proceeded to drill them; but the Taepings formed a similar force, and on one occasion it was found necessary to send a man-of-war to Nankin to recover twenty-six British subjects who were in the rebel service, and among whom were seven seamen of the British navy. The scheme, therefore, was given up, and, greatly to Mr. Bruce's satisfaction, as thus expressed in one of his despatches, the foreign contingent was disbanded—

"I report with satisfaction that the foreign legion has been disbanded. A few days before Captain Dew's visit they advanced to attack Tsing-poo, having been promised the support of 9,000 Chinese troops and twenty gunboats; as usual, the Chinese did not appear, and the foreigners, after losing twenty-three men out of sixty, were forced to retire. Having been unsuccessful, though from no fault of their own, they were discharged; and I trust this example of the value of Chinese co-operation, and of their appreciation of military merit, will deter foreigners from joining them. The condition of those employed by the Taepings seems to have been little better; but as free license was given to plunder, their service may be more attractive to many of the adventurers who infest the coast of China.

I have, &c.

"July 22, 1861." "FREDERICK W. A. BRUCE.

Colonel Ward then turned his attention to drilling Chinese, and in a few months he raised a considerable force, which on different occasions rendered pretty good service, although it was almost as often unsuccessful. His little army took part in all the military operations which were undertaken to clear the thirty mile radius around Shanghai. They worked harmoniously with General Stavely, and in fact were a part of the British force. Unfortunately, on the 20th of September 1862, Colonel Ward was killed in the attack upon a small town, and General Burgovine, whose nationality also was somewhat doubtful, was appointed to the command of the force, which he held till January last, when he lost it in a somewhat peculiar manner. The General was a man of large promises, which, however, he was seldom able to perform, and for some months he succeeded in persuading the Chinese authorities that he was always on the point of moving up the river to attack Nankin. At last a day was appointed for his departure, but, according to an account written by Consul Medhurst to Mr. Bruce, the General delayed the march, the line of transports went on accumulating, and 200,000 taels had been squandered without result. At this juncture the pay of General Burgovine's forces fell into arrear, his men mutinied, and he undertook to go to Shanghai to get the money due to them, amounting to about £40,000. Thither he proceeded with 150 armed men; but on his arrival one Ta-kee, a tea merchant and expectant mandarin, whose business it was to make the payment, told him that he should have the money when he started for Nankin. General Burgovine, who was said to have been drunk at the time, struck him, his followers ransacked the house, and finding in it a large sum of money, helped themselves. Some of this money, it was said, was afterwards paid to the troops. This high-handed proceeding incensed the mandarins, who determined to dismiss General Burgovine and cut off his head. This General took refuge with General Stavely, and afterwards proceeded to Pekin to lay his complaint at the foot of the throne; and Captain Holland, an officer of the Royal Marines, was appointed to command the force. General Burgovine obtained from the Emperor an order that he should be allowed to resume his command; but he could not secure obedience to that order at Shanghai, and he has now returned to Pekin to endeavour to obtain the command of at least a portion of the troops. That terminated the connection of the foreign officers with the force, which then passed under the command of Captain, or, as he was then called, General Holland. He was appointed by the British Commander-in-Chief at Shanghai, and retained the command until the 10th of February, when he marched to attack Tait-shan. Captain Holland had with him a force of 2,500 men with twenty-two pieces of cannon, including some 32-pounders belonging to the British army. He attacked the town; but the rebels fought admirably, and the attack was repulsed. No fewer than 500 men were killed, and the 32-pounders were captured by the rebels. Captain Holland shortly afterwards withdrew from the command; but about the time he retired an extraordinary occurrence took place at the head-quarters of the contingent, showing how impossible it was to carry on such a system in China without coming into constant collision with the native authorities. Four or five men had been punished for the offence of selling their arms and ammunition to the rebels. The men underwent severe punishment, but during the night some mandarins, under pretence that the soldiers had not been dealt with severely enough, dragged them from prison and cut off their heads on the parade-ground. Next day, when the men went on parade, there was a row; the men broke from their ranks and rushed to the residence of the mandarins, with the view of serving them as they had served the prisoners the night before. What added to their excitement and exasperation was, that a boat containing sixteen stand of arms, of precisely the same pattern as that supplied to the contingent, had just been seized on the river, and it was said to belong to one of the mandarins, who was suspected of trading with the rebels. The soldiers believed, indeed, not, I fear, without reason, that the mandarins had put their comrades to death in order that their own treason might not be discovered. Nothing further was needed to show the utter hopelessness of dealing with these people at all. Captain Holland was suc- ceeded by Major Gordon, and the notification of the appointment in the official papers clearly proved that both were appointed by no other person than General Stavely the Commander of Her Majesty's forces in China himself. The appointment was thus notified to the Chinese public—

Head Quarters, Shanghai,

March 24th, 1863.

"The Prince Kung and Sir Frederick Bruce having approved of the appointment of Major Gordon, Royal Engineers, to the command of the Ward Force, Major Gordon will take over charge from Captain Holland from this date.

By order,

"F. JEBB, D. A. A. General."

Major Gordon is one of the most distinguished young officers in the British army, having served in the Crimea and afterwards on the Turco-Russian Boundary Commission, and elsewhere, with great credit; and I Cannot but regret to see such a man's services lost to his country and given to a barbarous and foreign Power. According to a notice in the Gazette of last Tuesday, Major Gordon is placed on the seconded list, and has, therefore, withdrawn from the service of Her Majesty for the present. It is quite evident that the contingent in China is intended to be a permanent force, or the officers accepting appointments in it would not be prepared to sacrifice their prospects in the British army. I do not wish to say a single word against them. The fault lies with the Government at home; British officers will always fight when their doing so is sanctioned by their Government, and it is not part of their duty to inquire as to the justice of the cause in which they are engaged. I cannot think, however, that it is right or proper to hold out inducements to British officers to leave their own flag. Captain Osborn will, I apprehend, be more highly paid than the British Admiral commanding in the China Seas, while Major Gordon will draw nearly as much pay as a General on full pay; and it is currently believed that there are other pecuniary advantages to be gained in this service, which it is not necessary to specify. Nor can it be said that they are engaged in the service of the Emperor of China, and that we have nothing to do with the matter. Captain Osborn and his men, as well as the Anglo-Chinese contingent, will be looked upon both by the Imperialists and the rebels as servants of Her Majesty, obeying the orders of the British Government. Already, indeed, Prince Kung has conveyed to Mr. Bruce a formal expression of thanks for the valuable aid rendered to the Emperor by the British, French, and Russian Governments, in most expressive words. I wonder it never occurred to those who inaugurated this policy, how dangerous was the example which they set the Tae-pings. The latest advices show that European officers and men take part, on the rebel side, in almost all the miserable conflicts between them and the Imperial troops; and although the British Government have endeavoured as far as they can to prevent the importation of arms into the rebel districts, yet all the regulations and proclamations which have been issued on the subject have totally failed in precluding the rebels from supplying themselves with as good arms as are to be found in the hands of the Imperialists; in fact, it is well known that Chinese, American, and European merchants are engaged in that very lucrative trade; pay and plunder is plentiful, and Europeans will soon be found in equal numbers in the ranks of both armies. I have now, I think, proved that this country is interfering in the financial, political, and military affairs of China, and that Sir Frederick Bruce, Envoy at Pekin, has assumed many of the functions of Prime Minister of China. It was quite impossible, owing to the policy pursued by the Government, that he could help placing himself in that position. But as his new policy becomes developed it must weaken, instead of strengthening the Government it is intended to support. Such a system as that which we have now adopted in China, of doing everything we can for the Chinese and receiving pay in return, cannot be continued without compromising the independence of the empire. If, indeed, China is to be governed on European principles, it must be ruled by Europeans; but if it is to be governed on Chinese principles, it must be ruled by Chinese. The further we proceed in the present direction, the greater will be the probability that we shall find ourselves embarked in a Chinese civil war, only to end in an Anglo-Chinese protectorate, or even perhaps in an Anglo-Chinese empire. That policy, I must remind the House, bad as it is, depends on the life of one man. Prince Kung is now Prime Minister, and has obtained his high position in a very curious way; for a conspiracy having been formed for the purpose of placing him in power, three of his leading opponents lost not only their places, but their heads. Inasmuch, however, as those men were then representatives of what is called the popular party, who object to foreign interference, and have left behind them a party which is still very powerful at Pekin, it may happen that he may some day find himself treated in the same way as he has dealt with his political opponents; and should the other party come into power, the position of Sir Frederick Bruce will be somewhat difficult and awkward. But, if any further authority be wanted in support of the view which I entertain as to the policy of the Government in China, I need only refer to Sir Frederick Bruce himself, who, in writing to Earl Russell on the 10th of June 1860, says— There is, indeed, another alternative open to the people—namely, that of placing themselves under the protection of a foreign Power, in whose justice and force they have confidence, to preserve them from pillage and massacre. From the language held by some of the more influential native merchants, I think it not unlikely that sooner or later some such proposal will be made to foreign Powers, at the suggestion of commercial or religious influences, should anarchy increase, and should the decision of such questions be left practically to the people and the authorities of the provinces, in consequence of our being debarred from treating directly at Pekin on matters involving Imperial interest and considerations of general policy of such vast magnitude. I am further inclined to believe that foreign support thus given would render the re-establishment of the Imperial authority very difficult hereafter. In the mean time, however, the task of supplying the place of the foreign force would become every day more difficult. The Imperial authority would be entirely discredited in the eyes of the people. The Chinese officials, pressed for money, and relying on foreign support, would become more than ever cruel, corrupt, and oppressive; and the Chinese, deprived of popular insurrection, their rude but efficacious remedy against local oppressors, would with justice throw on the foreigner the odium of excesses which his presence alone would render possible. The consequence would be popular hostilities, reprisals, and that train of events which would render it necessary to appropriate permanently the province occupied, or to retire from it, leaving behind a bitter ill-will among the people. No course could be so well calculated to lower our national reputation as to lend our material support to a Government the corruption of whose authorities is only checked by its weakness.

The dangers and objections to the policy we have adopted never were more ably stated; and that which Sir Frederick Bruce anticipated is, I think, not unlikely to occur. Foreign protection has been given, foreign interference has been established; and it remains to be seen whether the policy of Mr. Bruce of 1860 was sounder or wiser than the policy of Sir Frederick Bruce of 1862. But I would refer also to another authority—that of Dr. Legge, a most distinguished authority—a man who has mixed little in politics, but who knows China well, who has spent the greater part of his life there, who is one of the first Chinese scholars of the day, and who pursues his literary and missionary labours at Hong-Kong, never engaging in trade, but living on the small stipend allowed him by the London Missionary Society; and I must inform the House that Dr. Legge has every personal reason to be in favour of the present system, inasmuch as he is nearly related to Mr. Lay, the chief of the Anglo-Chinese inspectorate of customs and the armed force placed at their disposal. Dr. Legge says— It behoves the British Parliament—the British people—to look to this new complication of affairs in China, to look it fairly in the face. If we are to pacify the empire, we shall require 50,000 troops, and may then find again that we have undertaken more than we are equal to. But I ask in whose interest we are to put down the rebellion? Hitherto Admiral Hope had been acting in the interest of the Imperial Government. Of course, if we fight its battles, it must pay all expenses. The British people cannot be expected to sacrifice the lives of its sons, and its treasure, to establish the Manchou rule, and all gratuitously. Now, I protest against our putting down the rebellion on behalf of the Imperial Government, however they may pay us for it, on two grounds. The first is the ground of its cruelty. I have read harrowing accounts of the devastations of the rebels—how the country is blasted by their march. The accounts are no doubt true. But I have seen also the ways of the Imperial braves, and kept company with them for hours together. Their march over the country was like the progress of locusts and caterpillars. Their thirst for blood was quenchless; their outrages on the young and old were indescribable. On the score of cruelty the case must be about even, inclining to the Imperialist side, if we may judge on the principle that the more cowardly are the more cruel. But the question is not about the masses, but about the officers of Government. And to know what will be the consequence if we put down the rebels on behalf of the Imperial Government, we have only to think of Yeh and his doings in Canton, when in almost twelve months he beheaded 70,000 people. I have heard Sir John Bowring, when other arguments for the Arrow war were exhausted, enlarge graphically on Yeh's barbarities. If we put down the Taepings, we shall kill our thousands on the battle-field, and the Governors of provinces will kill their tens of thousands in the execution areas. We shall be installing so many Yehs. Our high officers will be the ministers to so many butchers of human beings.

Such is the opinion of a man who knows China better almost than any other Englishman, and who is a perfectly unbiassed witness. The policy which has unfortunately been adopted in China, therefore, is equally open to grave objection whether it succeed or fail. If it fail in restoring order, and in re-establishing the present dynasty, it will inflict a great stain on the British name and on British arms. It will so infuriate the rebels that hostilities will be indefinitely prolonged; the solution of the Chinese difficulty—which seems only to lie in the appearance on the stage of some native of the country with sufficient powers of mind to raise himself to a position of supreme authority—will be indefinitely delayed. If we succeed in our policy, we shall establish in the Chinese empire one of the most intolerable tyrannies which the world ever saw. Every kind of cruelty will be committed in our name, deeds will be done which will cause a blush to rise to the cheek of every Englishman, until at last we shall be forced to put an end to the very power which we have vainly attempted to galvanize into a temporary existence. What we are doing in China has been done in India over and over again—the similarity of proceeding is very striking. In India our course has generally been, first, to make war against some native Prince; then having beaten him, we destroyed his army and weakened his authority in the eyes of his people; next we placed a resident at his Court, then we undertook to protect him from external and internal danger, and also to collect his revenue. Our help has generally been more fatal than our hostility. Thus, we gradually insinuated ourselves into every part of his Government, until he had nothing left but his great fortune, which he spent in riot and debauchery, and at last we often have been obliged, for very shame, to put an entire end to his power. What has happened repeatedly in India is certain to happen in China if we persist in our present course.

Now, what is the ostensible object of all these proceedings? Why, to maintain our trade and increase our commercial supremacy in the China seas. But has it never occurred to those who have recommended and are carrying out this new policy that they are pursuing a course calculated seriously to injure that trade? It is a remarkable fact that almost all the silk, and a great portion of the finest tea, comes from the very provinces which have for years past been in the hands of the rebels. Yet what is the result? In 1848 we imported from China 20,000 bales of silk and 65,000,000 lb. of tea, the total value of both being seven millions sterling. In 1862 the exports to this country from China had risen to 90,000 bales of silk and 110,000,000 lb. of tea, the total value of both amounting to seventeen millions sterling, an increase of 130 per cent in seven years! As the trade has enormously increased, it is idle to say that it will be endangered by the success of the rebellion. Free access is afforded to traders in the districts occupied by the Taepings, and no obstruction is offered to the transit of commodities. On this point there can be no doubt, for General Stavely, writing on the 3rd of July 1862, said— Europeans continue to visit the rebel country for purposes of trade, and are treated with civility; large quantities of silk have been brought into Shanghai during the last fortnight, and trade seems in a thriving state.

But that is not all. Many of the British merchants think that our interference, by driving the rebels from the walled towns into the silk and tea districts, will create further ruin and devastation, and consequently, they look with much alarm on the new policy. They say that there is a probability that the Taepings will become so infuriated by our hostility to them that they will impede trade by shutting up the rivers and preventing our agents from buying or selling. They have never done so yet; but when they see British officers embarked in regular organized campaigns against them, when their cities are bombarded and their fortresses reduced, they are not unlikely to take steps for thwarting our great commercial objects. I have had an opportunity of consulting many London commercial houses engaged in the trade with China, and I find they are almost to a man opposed to Captain Sherard Osborn's expedition, and against an interference, calculated, as they believe, seriously to damage the commercial interests of England.

There is only one other point of view in which I wish to regard the question, namely, its probable effect upon our relations with foreign Powers. Two great European Powers have considerable interest in the far East. They are Russia and France. Russia has an interest in those seas which is increasing every day. Until quite lately the great river A moor formed the boundary between the Russian and Chinese empires, and Castreis Bay, near the mouth of the river, was the southernmost Russian settlement. In May 1858, however, Russia concluded at Pekin a treaty of boundary, as well as of commerce with China, by which it was agreed that the territories situated between the river Ousouri and the sea should be possessed in common between the Emperor of China and the Emperor of Russia. We all know what possession in common between two such Powers as Russia and China means. The new line of demarcation between the two Empires was obtained by taking the river Ousouri from its point of confluence with the Amoor, and up to its head waters, then drawing a line from its head waters to the sea. That gave to Russia a large portion of Manchouria, and a coast 900 miles in extent, possessing numerous valuable harbours, and 1,500 miles of inland navigation. At the most southern portion of this district is situated a fine harbour, called Victoria Bay. There the Russians have already begun to establish themselves, have founded a town called Novgorod, have commenced to build ships, and to create something like a trade. That place is situated within only three days' steaming of Shanghai, and is close to the frontier of China Proper. Schemes are, I believe, under constant consideration at St. Petersburg for uniting the port at Victoria Bay with Europe by telegraph; and it is not at all impossible that before long that new town on the Pacific will be thus connected with Moscow and the European telegraph system. The restoration of tranquillity to the Russian empire will, no doubt, be quickly followed by the execution of that project, for which the surveys have been made. This indicates the great interests and objects which Russia has in these countries. Furthermore, Russia has lately shown a decided inclination to follow our example in assisting the Chinese Government in the suppression of the Taeping rebellion, and Russian agents have lately been in communication with the authorities in various parts of the empire as to the best means of carrying their views into operation.

But France likewise is in a very curious position in relation to those regions. She has expended large sums of money in the attempted settlements of Cochin China, and her efforts have, to a great extent, been a failure. Yet, if France succeeds in restoring confidence to the inhabitants of those districts, a considerable trade will surely spring up at Saigon and on the Cambodia. But France has other objects in view in China besides those of a commercial nature. At the present moment her commercial interests in China are very small—indeed, almost absolutely null. There is hardly a French mercantile house in China. But the French have several naval and military depôts in China, and a large native force at Ningpo, commanded by French officers. The rank and file are drawn from the scum of the Chinese, and many of the officers come from that class of Europeans which have not raised the character of the foreigner in China. This force is thus described by a journalist in The China Overland Trade Report, March 14, 1863— The constitution of this French contingent is as inexplicable as it is indefensible, and it is not doubted, nor Can it be, that territorial aggandisement is the motive power. At the present moment the situation of affairs in Annum has disabled the French from having the force at Ningpo which they otherwise would have, for the maintenance of those peculiar pecuniary claims which they so pertinaciously set up against the local authorities of that place. Consequently they have established this contingent force, which, though under the control of the French authorities and under the command of officers of the French army, does not otherwise consist of Frenchmen. The rank and file are recruited from the very scum of Chinese society, rendered desperate by oppression and destitution—the officers are those European outcasts which for years have made the foreign name so infamous on the China coast, and for whom Ningpo has long been the resort. The inducement to join this service is the absolute licence allowed to plunder. This may appear incredible, but what has occurred in relation to this second Shou-hing expedition proves it.

It is also stated that the Anglo-Chinese contingent are deserting to the French contingent, attracted by the superior advantages of pay and plunder which are offered them. But the objects of the French are principally ecclesiastical. For centuries the French Church has taken an active interest in the Chinese missions. At the end of the 17th century the Jesuit missionaries had spread all over the country. They established schools; they educated those who aspired to the higher offices of state, and for some years, under the name of tutors to the Emperor, they exercised many of the functions of Prime Ministers. In 1726 a great persecution arose. Numbers of the native Christians were killed, and whilst many of the Jesuits gave up their lives in the defence of their faith, others were glad to leave the country. But ever since that me there has always been a number of French ecclesiastics in China. The Lazarists have always had establishments in the country. The Jesuits have now returned; the exertions of Roman Catholic missionaries are increasing, and the French Government are actually laying claim to many sites in different parts, which were occupied by French ecclesiastics centuries ago, and not only laying claim but actually obtaining, possession of them. A French cathedral has risen at Canton, and a larger ecclesiastical institution has been erected close to Pekin. It is for these objects that the French wished to extend their influence. Can we object if, with higher aims and holier objects, they follow our footsteps, and enrol armies and man fleets, not for the purposes of trade and the advancement of commerce, but for the propagation of the true faith and the conversion of the heathen? I may be asked what practical steps should be taken to avoid the dangers I have referred to? I am fully conscious of the enormous difficulty of receding from such a course once entered on, and of turning back to the old line of neutrality, but it is quite possible to say, "We will go no farther." The Order in Council was only issued for two years. Her Majesty's Government might intimate to the Chinese Government that at the end of two years their officers must return to their duties, and there must be an end to their interference and assistance. A period would be named when intervention should end, and when no further help would be given. I am convinced that the further we pursue the course in which we have embarked, the deeper we shall get into the mire, and that public opinion will ultimately force the Government to retrace their steps. Our true policy is simple, straightforward, and easy of adoption. No interference on our part between the contending parties in China should be permitted, except so far as it is indispensable for the defence of British property and settlement. If measured by this rule, our course would be clear and the civil and military servants of Her Majesty would have no difficulty in acting on instructions so framed. I have now shown to the House, as well as my ability serves, what is the present state of affairs in China. A view of subjects so diverse and so important, compressed into the limits of a single speech, could be only a sketch, and I wish that the sketch had been made by some abler hand. Sir, I have asked the attention of the House to the subject, because I am perfectly convinced that our present policy, which is as novel as it is dangerous, is one from which we ought to recede as soon as possible. The old attitude of England to the Chinese Government was hostility. It passed to neutrality, and it is now gradually drifting into active interference with every department of Chinese public affairs. I have now done. I believe I have shown that the course which the Government are taking will, if continued, seriously imperil the character of the British name, injure our commercial interests in the Eastern seas, involve us in responsibilities and liabilities, the end of which it is impossible to foresee, and above all, will probably produce serious embarrassment in our relation with foreign Powers. These important matters I commend to the calm consideration of this House, and I own that I await with some anxiety the explanations which I hope are now about to be given on the part of Her Majesty's Ministers.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

said, he did not at all agree with the noble Lord in the expression of his regret that the subject to which he had called attention had not fallen into abler hands; for a more able and interesting statement he had seldom heard in that House, or one which commended itself more generally to their sympathies. He regretted, however, that the noble Lord had thought it necessary to illustrate his view of their conduct in China by throwing anything like discredit on their conduct in India; because although there might have been occasions to which his observations would apply, still, generally speaking, the conduct pursued by the British authorities in India in circumstances similar to those referred to had been such as to bring great blessings on the country and diminish the evils under which different parts of India laboured. About thirty-three years ago the district of Hyderabad was one of the worst in India. It was utterly disorganized, and altogether in a most disgraceful condition. The Governor General of that day sent an officer with very high powers into that district, and the consequence was that for the last thirty years there had not been a more quiet or well-ordered district in India. The object of Her Majesty's Government in China had from the beginning been to raise the character of the Chinese authorities, and gradually, by good example and the conduct they should urge upon them, to fit them to govern their own country, and to maintain peace there, which was far more important to British interests than any authority they could exercise themselves. As the order in Council was only to last two years, it was manifestly the intention and desire of the Government that the Chinese authorities should within that period be able to conduct their own affairs. Having followed with much attention the proceedings of their authorities in China, he had learnt that they had interfered merely for the purpose of protecting British interests and the lives and property of our fellow-countrymen. The great increase that had taken place within the last six years in the value of property at Shanghai showed how beneficial their action had been, and he could not but think that the thirty-mile radius round that city was a very proper arrangement. He thought that justice was not done to Colonel Ward, who had been remarkably successful in drilling the native troops. As long as they exercised their influence in China only for the improvement and benefit of China, together with the fair interests of our countrymen engaged in commerce there, they had a reasonable hope of being able before long to withdraw their troops from that country, and he had no doubt but that such was the desire of Her Majesty's Government.

MR. LAYARD

said, he could assure the House that he had no misgivings upon the policy of Her Majesty's Government in China. That policy had been pursued by the Government since he had the honour of being a Member of it, not only with regard to China, but to all Eastern nations. It would appear, from some observations which fell from the noble Lord, that when the question had been raised some time ago he (Mr. Layard) had abstained from saying anything upon the subject, because he did not dare to face the question. He thought he had before explained the reasons why he did not rise upon that occasion to reply to the hon. Gentleman opposite. It had been said that the question was one of the gravest interest; but when he looked at the state of the House then, and remembered what it had been upon a former occasion, he did not understand why, if this question was of such vast interest, it was so neglected by the House of Commons. He had said that he had no misgivings as to the policy of the Government, which agreed entirely with the views he had entertained as long as he had sat in that House. He was not surprised that the noble Lord—who had brought forward the question in a speech of great length and of considerable ability—should find fault with the Government. It was the duty of the noble Lord to find fault with the Government, and to censure everything they did. And so nothing that had been done in China had escaped the noble Lord's censure—the policy of the Government in relation to that country was fraught with mischief and danger. If all that the noble Lord had said was true, the Government deserved the strongest censure, and his only wonder was that the noble Lord had not concluded with a condemnatory Resolution; but he was surprised the hon. Member for Rochdale (Mr. Cobden), who cheered the noble Lord, should be of the same opinion, and should unite with him in condemning the Government. He should have thought the hon. Member for Rochdale and his Friends would have supported the Government in a policy, which, when he had the honour of sitting among them below the gangway, was the very policy they had suggested. He had been under the impression that they had thought it the duty of the Government to deal with China and other Eastern nations as with civilized nations, upon a footing of complete justice, and not to ride roughshod over them—not to treat them as barbarians, with whom no obligations were binding, and who had no rights, but to remember that we were under treaties with them which we were bound to respect. Such, he thought he could show, had been the policy of the Government, But the noble Lord, not satisfied with condemning Her Majesty's Government, had made them responsible not only for their own policy in China, but also for that of Russia and France. He thought he could, at least, show that there was nothing in the policy of the British Government analogous to that pursued by Russia. It was said that Russia, by following our example, had acquired possession of 900 miles of coast; but there was no such example set by us, for we had appropriated no territory. Our policy had been consistent with the true interests of China herself. He would remind the House that our relations with China had changed within the last few years—not that the opinions of the Government, or the principles on which they acted, had changed; but circum-stances had altered, necessitating a change of policy. Formerly we had no direct relations with the central Government of China, and the Government at Pekin was a mys- tery to us. We had to deal with small governors—each port being almost treated as a distinct capital. The central Government was as ignorant of us as we were of them, and it was the interest of the local Governments to deceive the central Government, and to delude us. That state of things brought about a serious evil, and the British Government had great difficulty in checking the proceedings of the consuls and naval commanders at the various Chinese ports. It became the habit, if such redress as the merchants deemed themselves entitled to were not accorded at once, and frequently even without inquiry, to adopt very highhanded proceedings. Our merchants and traders encouraged this conduct of our Admirals and Consuls, which was extolled at showing true British spirit and supporting British interests, and addresses of congratulation were voted, and services of plate were presented to them. China was called upon to observe treaties which we ourselves did not always observe, and many of our fellow subjects behaved in China upon the the buccaneer's maxim of no law across the line. But all that had changed within the last few years. After the treaty of Tien-tsin a Minister was appointed to reside at Pekin. When, on former occasions, the Chinese question had been discussed, it had been imputed to the Government that they had gone to war in order to obtain a resident Minister at Pekin. If the charge were a just one, the result had at least proved that the Government had not overrated the importance of having a resident Minister at Pekin. Instead of desultory negotiations with local governors, we now had direct communication with the central Government at Pekin, and, instead of exchanging shot and shell, we simply exchanged diplomatic notes. The central Government now could learn the truth, which before had been concealed from them, and they were beginning to understand that the treaties we had made with them were not one-sided, but were as much for the benefit of China as for the advantage of England. The power of direct communication with the Emperor and the Ministry had completely changed our position with regard to China, and had proved of very great advantage. We had shown the Chinese authorities that the best guarantee for internal peace, and the preservation of friendly relations with foreign Powers was the fulfilment of their treaty engagements. Our policy had in view two objects—to strengthen the Chinese Government as far as we could legitimately do so, as the best means of preserving tranquillity in China; and to secure the observance of treaties, not only with this country, but with all nations, without the necessity of that constant pressure which in former days used to end in war. In order to attain these objects, it was necessary to give such support as we were able to the Liberal party in China—to that party which was not oppposed to intercourse with foreigners; and most fortunately for the success of the British policy, there was at the head of affairs in China a very enlightened man, Prince Kung. The noble Lord said that this Prince was the only man of the class in China, and that if he failed, us we should recur to the old state of anarchy. Now, from the reports of Sir Frederick Bruce, he believed that there were in China many statesmen who shared the views of Prince Kung—men of great ability and determination, who would assist him in carrying out the policy which, fortunately for us, he had adopted. At the same time, we enjoyed the advantage of having at Pekin a very able Minister in the person of Sir Frederick Bruce, whose tact, prudence, impartiality, and high sense of justice tended greatly to the success of a policy of conciliation. But Sir Frederick Bruce had had a most difficult task to perform, and the difficulties arising from the Chinese themselves were small in comparison with those very frequently created by persons who ought to have supported him—namely, British subjects. The Government entirely approved the course which he had pursued in treating with the Chinese upon the principles of justice and of respect for treaties and engagements—dealing, in fact, with the Chinese Government as one capable of understanding and fulfilling obligations, and not as one with which we could only deal by constant appeals to arms.

It would be impossible to follow the noble Lord in all his remarks, though, had time permitted, he thought he could answer almost one by one the objections taken to the policy of the Government. It was very easy to find in the blue-books isolated points for criticism, and the noble Lord appeared to have raked among them with great industry. In carrying out any policy, no doubt there must be some things open to objection. He admitted that such might be the case here; but taking a general view of the question, and looking at the broad principles on which Her Majesty's Government had acted in China, he believed that their policy was a just one, and that it was most consistent with the interests, not only of this country, but of China itself. From the little study which he had given the subject, the Chinese appeared to be a peculiar people, with what might be called innate good qualities; for they were industrious, they loved order, and they were easily governed. The latter quality, however, had led to such a degree of supineness in the Government that its control had gradually relaxed, and the country had fallen into much disorder. It was curious, that in the opinion of persons well acquainted with the country, the main cause of the difficulties in that country, was the reverse of what had been stated by his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes.) Those persons declared that its disordered condition was owing, not to the presence of the Tartar element, but to the predominance of the Chinese element. It was because the Tartar element had declined, that a state of chronic anarchy had existed so long there. When the Tartar dynasty first governed the country, their courage and military qualities had enabled them to maintain order. But those qualities had grown gradually weaker, through the peaceful tendencies of the Chinese themselves, and after the lapse of some centuries, the control of the Tartar military police became so small, and the check upon the population so little, that brigandage arose in many of the provinces, and a state of anarchy existed, which the Government, not possessing an adequate military force, were unable to put down. Hence the present disorganised condition of the country.

One of the principles of Chinese policy adopted by the Tartar conquerors was the exclusion of foreigners, contact with whom they believed would ruin the country. All they knew of us was, that we went to China, as they believed, to cheat them, and to bear them down by our high-handed proceedings; and the Imperial Government never had any communication with us except through local Governors. Now, the first thing Sir Frederick Bruce had to do was to remove this unfavourable impression, and lead Prince Kung to believe that we were ready to discuss points with him, to interchange ideas, and see whether a fair understanding could be come to without quarrelling and without war.

Among the first-fruits of his new policy were two remarkable concessions given to us by the Chinese Government. Those acquainted with the details of the Treaty of Tien-tsin would know that one of the points most strongly resisted by the Chinese Government was the opening to British vessels of the carrying trade of a staple article of food—a kind of bean flour and pulse, which formed a considerable trade between the north and south of China. This trade was prohibited by the treaty. But Sir Frederick Bruce discussed the subject with Prince Kung, and after pointing out the advantages of a free trade system, and showing that a system of protection only increased the price of food to the Chinese themselves, he convinced the Prince of the soundness of these views, and British shipping thus acquired a great advantage. Again, by argument instead of force, our Minister had induced Prince Kung to extend the operation of the treaty, and to open that great river the Yang-tze-Kiang to British shipping, and to allow two ports there for the settlement of European traders. At one time the whole river was thus thrown open; but, unfortunately, a contraband trade sprang up, in consequence of which the restriction of the British to two ports became necessary. Both these important concessions were obtained entirely through talking the matter over with Prince Kung, and leading him to see that the advantages were as great to the Chinese as to the English. Now, formerly, in order to obtain such concessions, we should have had to go to war, and should have had to spend hundreds of thousands, or perhaps millions of money, instead of obtaining what we desired by diplomatic arrangements. In all those communications with Prince Kung and the other Imperial Ministers, they said—"You ask us to open our ports and allow British subjects to go into the country in all directions, in order to develop fresh sources of trade; but how can we do these things when this rebellion is going on? You complain of disorder, you say that protection is not given to your goods, and that extortions are sometimes practised on British subjects, and you make us responsible for them. Help us to procure disciplined troops, and to put our finances in order, and then we will do what you wish." Were these demands unreasonable? To listen to the noble Lord, one would fancy that no Power had ever before employed foreigners, either for the better regulation of its finances, or for the reorganization of its army. Why, Russia not two hundred years ago was in a far more barbarous state than China, and it then called to its aid English admirals, French generals, and German financiers, so that there was scarcely a minister in Russia who was not a foreigner. Through such foreign assistance Russia had become a civilized Empire. In our own time Turkey has followed much the same course, employing foreigners in its army and navy, while even at this time there was an English officer an Admiral in the Turkish service.

An extraordinary fallacy ran through the speech of the noble Lord—namely, that what we had done was war, and that we were at war with a portion of China. Now it seemed to him, on the contrary, that what we had done was a proof not of war, but of peace, and we were never further from war with China than we were at the present moment. Then they were accused of a kind of solidarité with the Chinese Government against the Chinese people; but he was certainly very much surprised that, after making that accusation, the noble Lord should have read two extracts—one from a despatch of Earl Russell to Sir Frederick Bruce, and the other from Sir Frederick Bruce to Mr. Consul Harvey—laying down precisely what our objection was in furnishing the Chinese Government with assistance, and disclaiming altogether any intention to interfere between the Government and their rebel subjects, or to do anything else than to assist in organizing the Chinese troops, and in putting the finances of the country in order. Her Majesty's Government considered it necessary to defend the treaty ports, because in them was an enormous amount of British property. We defended them because we knew, that if they were captured by the Taepings, that property would be destroyed. [Colonel SYKES; No!] His hon. and gallant Friend said "No;" but he would prove to the House that the British merchants were of the same opinion as Her Majesty's Government. His noble Friend asked whether the English officers employed under the Chinese Government were still British subjects. To a certain extent they were; for all English officers remained so even after they took service under another Government in the way those officers had done; but for the time being they were actually under the command of the Chinese Government, and we were not responsible for their actions. The noble Lord seemed to think that in consequence of Her Majesty's Government having allowed the Chinese to employ British officers we should have for several years to keep British troops in China. Indeed, his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes) had more than once stated that the number of our troops in China had increased; but so far from that being the case, the policy of allowing British and other officers to be employed in China—for the Foreign officers employed under the Chinese Government were not exclusively British officers, but were officers of all nations, French officers being among them—had resulted in a diminution in the number of British troops in China. In September 1860, immediately after the war, the number was 21,235; in September 1861, the number was reduced to 9,626; in September 1862, it was 4,679; and on the 1st of February in the present year, 4, 639. On the 7th of the same month the officer commanding was instructed to send back the 31st Regiment, 800 strong, a battery of Royal Artillery, and since then a wing of an Indian Regiment.

With regard to the thirty-mile radius, of which so much had been said, and respecting which some Gentlemen contended the Government had gone a great deal too far, the question was a military one, and the Government had had nothing to do with it but to sanction the report of our own military officers, who thought that a radius of thirty miles was absolutely necessary for the defence of Shanghai.

The noble Lord had made an admission in the beginning of his speech, which he seemed to have forgotten at the latter end of it, though the matter was almost the essence of the question—namely, that the Taepings had no recognised Government with which Her Majesty's Government could communicate. That was a point of the very greatest importance in the consideration of the question, because it was impossible for us to enter into relations with the Taepings if they did not admit the validity of our treaties, or had no Government which could be held responsible for their violation. But he was not disposed to again go over the question of the Taepings. Every one who had visited China, and who had an opportunity of forming an opinion on the subject—whether our own agents, independent merchants, or missionaries, agreed in this, that the Taepings were unable to found any Government; that they were mere plunderers going over the country and devastating right and left—destroying and not building up. As that point might be disputed by his hon. and gallant Friend (Colonel Sykes), he begged to read once for all an extract from a letter of one of the most distinguished English merchants in China, Mr. Michie— I have no hope of any good ever coming of the rebel movement. No decent Chinaman will have anything to do with it. They do nothing but burn, murder, and destroy. They hardly profess anything beyond that. They are detested by all the country people, and even those in the city who are not of the 'brethren,' hate them. They have held Nankin eight years, and there is not a symptom of rebuilding it. Trade and industry are prohibited. Their land taxes are three times heavier than those of the Imperialists. They adopt no measures to soothe and conciliate the people, nor do they act in any way as if they had a permanent interest in the soil. They do not care about the ordinary slow and sure resources of revenue. They look to plunder, and plunder alone, for subsistence, and I must say I cannot see any elements of stability about them, nor anything which can claim our sympathy. It had been alleged that the Taepings would not have attacked our treaty port at Shanghai; but what took place when they threatened that city? If hon. Gentlemen turned to the blue-book, they would find that the English merchants there formed themselves into a hand to defend the city. They held a meeting and passed certain resolutions, among which was the following:— 'That the committee be empowered to request from the Naval Commander-in-Chief increased protection for this settlement during the present emergency.' In conformity with the resolution, we would venture to point out to you the extreme probability that the present movement of the Taepings, or rebels, so different from former ones, both in the force reported to be employed and the avowed object with which it is commenced, may keep the settlement in a state of danger and alarm for many months to come. Should the Taeping forces not be dislodged from the surrounding country, they will probably lay a sort of siege to the city and settlement of Shanghai, and, according to usual Chinese tactics, keep up a constant annoyance. Under these circumstances, the small volunteer corps that exists here, and which is now, as you are aware, performing the duty of guarding nightly the inner lines of defences, will be quite inadequate to the labour; for it must be borne in mind that the gentlemen forming it have still to attend to their usual daily business occupations. We feel strongly, therefore, the advisability that the regular forces of Her Majesty should be so strengthened as at an early period to relieve the volunteer force of constant duty, and to give such a feeling of security to the residents of the settlement as may prevent these recurring panics, so utterly destructive to trade, and at all times imperilling the lives and property of Her Majesty's subjects. It having been understood that the policy of Her Majesty's Government is to defend the city and settlement of Shanghai from the Taepings, or rebels, it has led to a vast accumulation of population and wealth here. This latter is daily a greater temptation to the Taepings to endeavour to plunder, the more especially now as their armies are relieved from the siege of Hang-Chow, and are flushed with the capture of Ningpo. Hence, if the policy of Her Majesty's Government is to be maintained—and that it should be so we most cordially agree—we believe that a considerable permanent addition should be rapidly made to the force of troops stationed here. Now, as to Ningpo, a great misconception had arisen with regard to that place. The city of Ningpo was divided into two parts. The river ran between them. On one side of the river was a part of the city thickly inhabited by Chinese; on the other side the Europeans thought it right to make a settlement. On a former evening, his hon. Friend the Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) made some observations on that settlement. He looked on it as if it was something peculiar and out of the general rule. [Mr. LIDDELL: I said we had no legal status there.] It was, however, one of the ports with which we were authorized to trade; but as to our not having a settlement there, that was a mere matter of detail. When the Europeans had settled themselves in one of these ports, they found it most convenient that they should have a portion of it to themselves, in order to avoid those strifes which so frequently arose from a mixture of European and Eastern populations. There was another reason for that arrangement, arising from Europeans being "extra-territorial"—that was, having rights differing from those of the native population, having different laws, and having those laws administered by their own officers. It was true that the formal settlement of that portion of Ningpo to which allusion had been made, had not been proclaimed, but that did not alter our legal status. At Ningpo, the Taepings came down on that part of the city opposite to the settlement of the Europeans—namely, on the part occupied by the Chinese—and the whole of the Chinese inhabitants fled. He had heard it said, by way of argument against the policy of Her Majesty's Government, that the trade with Ningpo was not interrupted after the Taepings had entered. Why, the fact was, that the Chinese inhabitants fled to that part of the city occupied by the English, and that being a treaty port, we held it. The Chinese took refuge under our laws, and the population became so enormous that the trade did not fall off, but on the contrary increased. But that part of the city which was held by the Taepings was entirely deserted by the traders, and was only occupied by an armed rabble. The noble Lord had somewhat mis-stated the state of things at Ningpo before Captain Dew interfered. If hon. Members would read the further papers which had been presented on this subject, they would see that the real cause of quarrel was that the Taepings insisted that they should have authority over the English settlement, and that that part of the town inhabited by Europeans should be placed under them. In a letter from Consul Harvey it was stated that the interference was just in time, for that the Taepings were meditating a treacherous attack on the European settlement, which was to have been put into execution in the course of a few days.

If we had allowed the Taepings to occupy the treaty ports, the result would have been the entire destruction of our trade. That was the conviction of every merchant in China. Either we must have gone to war with the Taepings to defend our own interests and to support our traders, or we must have gone to war with the Chinese Government to compel them to make the Taepings respect the treaties we had entered into with that Government.

Again, the noble Lord had not stated the case quite fairly as regarded Captain Osborn and the other officers who had taken service under the Chinese Government. Captain Osborn did not come from China to organize volunteers and a flotilla, nor was he, in fact, the agent and representative of the Chinese Government. Mr. Lay was the agent of the Chinese Government, with full powers: acknowledged by Prince Kung and Sir Frederick Bruce, and he was the only person authorized to act for the Chinese Government here. Captain Sherard Osborn had, with the permission of his own Government, entered into the service of that of China, The flotilla was intended to put down piracy, and for that object almost alone. The Chinese Government had pledged themselves to put down piracy; and if they did not do it, we should have to do it. The principal reason why we had to keep so large a force in the Chinese waters was to put down piracy, which was known to be the greatest evil our traders had to encounter; and if the Chinese Government were in a position by their own forces to effect this, we should be relieved of a responsible duty and of a great expense, and a great security would be given to British trade; so that Captain Osborn would remove a source of difficulty and of constant dissension between the British Government and the Chinese authorities.

The same policy prevailed in regard to the custom-houses. The noble Lord spoke as if the customs were entirely under the authority of Englishmen, but the list which he could read contained the names of Germans, French, Americans—in fact, of all countries. Mr. Lay, a gentleman of great experience and ability, had been selected by the Chinese Government to be placed at the head of their customs; and if hon. Members would read the papers on the table, they would see how much the customs revenue had increased under his able management. Sir Frederick Bruce, writing to Earl Russell, said— Before the Treaty of 1842, when Canton was the only port open to foreign trade, the revenue from customs was assessed at 900,000 taels (£300,000.) On the opening of the four new ports stipulated by the treaty, the revenue from the customs diminished, and in 1857–8 it did not reach 400,000 taels (£133,000). On the introduction of the foreign element into its management the revenue rose, and in 1861 the receipts were 1,400,000 taels (£470,000.) Deducting 40 per cent (560,000 taels=£187,000) payable for the indemnities, there remain 840,000 taels (£280,000), being not far short of the sum derived from the whole foreign trade of China, when concentrated at one port. The results of foreign management have been the same at every port where it has been introduced; and looking to the recovery of the indemnities, and to the great importance of the Chinese Government not being deprived of funds at a moment when it is striving to restore tranquillity to the country, I think your Lordship will agree in the policy of upholding the system against the clamour of those who are interested in returning to the former corrupt and unsatisfactory customs administration. I have just heard the result of the first month's collection at Amoy. The estimate of the Chinese authorities was 5,000 taels (£1,666), and the receipts were 30,000 taels (£10,000). It was perfectly true that the introduction of foreigners into the customs had been much attacked by the Europeans in China, and caused a considerable outcry there. But what had been the reason of that? Up to the present time foreign merchants had always been attempting to evade the payment of legal duties. They had recourse to all manner of fraud and deception. Of course, there were many exceptions. There were in China firms of the highest respectability, who would not be guilty of such practices; but there were also a vast number of adventurers, who went out to make fortunes as rapidly as possible, who had no regard for morality, or anything else, and whose only object had been to cheat and defraud the Chinese Government. He wished very much that hon. Gentlemen would read Mr. Lay's letter on that subject, which was to be found in the appendix to the papers presented last Session, and which showed the causes of the opposition to the introduction of foreigners into the management of the customs. Mr. Lay mentioned that several firms of the greatest standing had been concerned in these evasions, and in justice to two of them who had been named—Messrs. Lindsay and Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, and Co.—he wished to read to the House their explanation on the subject. Mr. Lindsay wrote— Two clerks in the employ of Lindsay and Co., in direct violation of their agreements, and without the knowledge of their partners, committed this act of smuggling. On discovery, they were justly punished by the confiscation of property worth £1,000. The firm bearing my name have throughout been consistent supporters of the new system, the object of which was that the legal duties should be fairly levied on all. Such an act of smuggling, discreditable under any circumstances, would, in my opinion, have been absolutely disgraceful and dishonourable had it been committed by a firm avowedly supporting the introduction of a new and better system of collecting duties, tinder these circumstances, I think I may injustice request that Lord Russell will allow this refutation of an unjust and injurious charge to appear in the next batch of Chinese correspondence laid before Parliament. Mr. Jardine wrote in a similar strain. He said— There is nothing which we desire more than an efficient custom-house system established on the coast of China, and we have from the commencement cordially approved the principle of a foreign inspectorate. There, then, was the testimony of two of the largest houses in China that the new system worked well, and that it was favourable to trade. And he (Mr. Layard) believed that no greater boon could be conferred on the respectable British trader than the introduction of a regular, well-defined customhouse system. Moreover he must point out, that as the indemnities owing to this country were to be paid out of the Chinese customs, it was of great importance to us that the duties should be regularly collected. He trusted he had shown to the House that there was nothing extraordinary or against the policy of neutrality either in permitting the Chinese Government to have recourse to the services of British officers who were at the time on half-pay, or in allowing British subjects to undertake the organization of the Chinese custom-houses.

Another difficulty which Sir Frederick Bruce had to contend with, and to which he had directed the attention of the Govern- ment, was that of dealing with our own subjects. No doubt many of them were highly respectable, but a large portion were the very reverse. The Europeans of that class were almost the worst portion of the population of China. They supplied Members of the House with complaints against the British and Chinese authorities, and they did their utmost to thwart the policy of Sir Frederick Bruce. How was it possible for Sir Frederick Bruce to persuade the Chinese authorities that the British Government were acting in good faith, when they too often saw British subjects acting in direct violation of treaties, and in a manner discreditable to the nation to which they belonged? Sometimes they took possession of land, for which they refused to pay. Sometimes they smuggled goods, and, when detected, came to the representative of the Government to support them in such practices. That was one reason why hon. Members were so often getting up and reading letters and extracts from newspapers containing charges against the Chinese authorities and the English Government, which were entirely unfounded. He believed that the policy of Her Majesty's Ministers was just and humane towards China. It was calculated to prevent, instead of encouraging war, and we were never so far from war with China as at that moment. If, indeed, the Government were to revert to the old state of things, and refuse to support their officers in controlling British subjects, it would be better to allow the old East India Company to deal with China, and to confine the trade under severe restrictions to one or two ports.

The noble Lord talked of Sir Frederick Bruce as being the Prime Minister of China; but it was to be remembered that Sir Frederick Bruce had colleagues at Pekin; he was acting cordially with the American and French Ministers, and the assertion that he was Prime Minister of China was therefore without foundation.

The authority of Dr. Legge had been quoted, Dr. Legge said, "Talk about the cruelties of the Taepings, but what cruelties have I not seen committed by the Imperial braves!" But Her Majesty's Government were putting an end to the system of employing these braves by the introduction of disciplined troops, who would not be guilty of these atrocities. He believed, however, that the Imperialist atrocities had been much exaggerated. [Colonel SYKES: No.] Yes, he would take the word of Admiral Hope in preference to that of the informants of his hon. and gallant Friend. Dr. Legge talked of the Government putting down the rebellion, and sending 50,000 troops for that purpose; but Her Majesty's Government were not engaged in putting down the rebellion. They were, on the contrary, withdrawing British troops, of which there was a smaller number that year in China than the last. The more the Chinese disciplined their troops, the less necessity there would be for the British Government to defend the treaty ports, which were so important to the trade of this country. The noble Lord talked of the Government as withdrawing the filibusters, and giving the command into the hands of English officers. Was it not, however, much better that the Chinese troops should be commanded by men who would not permit acts of cruelty to be perpetrated? Then the noble Lord drew an analogy between China and India. But in reality there was no analogy between the two cases. In India a portion of territory had been acquired by British subjects, and from small settlements they had attained to a large empire. But the British Government went to China, not to establish themselves as rulers; on the contrary, they desired the independence of China, and to support the Chinese Government in maintaining it by putting an end to disorder and disorganization. The noble Lord was correct in saying that the tea trade had not fallen off, because tea was for the most part grown in districts still occupied by the Imperialists. The noble Lord added that the silk trade had increased. A considerable portion of the silk district was occupied by the Taepings, but not the whole; and the reason why the supply of silk had not diminished was that the Taepings did not generally interfere with the agricultural population, but only sacked the cities. The noble Lord had fallen into the error of supposing that all the country overrun by the Taepings was occupied by them. If he had read the statement made by Consul Parkes, he would have seen that after they had sacked one city they went to another, and did not attempt to occupy the agricultural districts which they overran. The only place they had occupied for any length of time was Nankin. The latest accounts from that city represented it as deserted, except by the Taepings and the young women they used as slaves, for they did not permit marriage. Nothing had been done to rebuild the city, or to introduce commerce.

The Taeping leaders had stated, that if they had not interfered with the treaty ports, it was only in consequence of the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government at those ports. That admission of the Taeping leaders showed that the policy of Her Majesty's Government, in regard to the treaty ports, was just and right. If, however, the Government had done nothing; if the treaty ports had been allowed to fall into the hands of the Taepings; and if the trade had been stopped, the noble Lord would have been the first to denounce the inaction of the Government. It was his belief that the Taeping rebellion was gradually breaking up. Already some of the more important Taeping leaders had gone over to the Chinese authorities, and when Nankin fell, the whole Taeping rebellion would probably fall with it. The despatches of Earl Russell and Sir Frederick Bruce, which the noble Lord had quoted, were penned under circumstances very different from the present, and when the rebellion was at its height, and the Imperial Government had not organized an army to put it down. In addition, he would state to the House, from the reports which he had heard, that the discipline of the Chinese troops, not only under European, but under Chinese officers, was greatly improved, that fewer cruelties were now committed, that cases of plunder were rare, and that the troops were supported by paying for what they obtained from the population. That was a great step in advance, and would go far to show that Captain Sherard Osborn, who was as well known for his humanity as for his gallantry, would introduce great improvements into the Chinese army, and that Her Majesty's Government were deserving of praise, and not blame, for allowing such men to go to China. He might be over sanguine, but looking at what had gradually taken place in China, he had very great hopes. He saw in the distance tranquilllity restored; that vast population again engaged in agriculture; the fields teeming with that produce which, once a luxury, had now become a necessity to this country; the canals once more covered with boats; new markets opened to our industry;—and if those hopes should be realized, he believed the policy of Her Majesty's Government would have contributed as much to the general interests of humanity as to the particular interests of this country.

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

said, they had listened to two very long and important speeches made that evening, and the House must have derived considerable instruction from what had passed. There was not a Member of the House who had listened to the speech of his noble Friend but must have admired the research and knowledge which it evinced, and the clear and lucid way in which a speech of nearly two hours length presented the whole subject to the House, to their great information and instruction. But they might also obtain some information and instruction from the speech of the hon. Gentleman opposite, because he had shown, that after listening to the long and important speech of his noble Friend, he could get up and meet a difficult case, where defence was impossible, by a speech of an hour's duration, which conveyed no information to the House, and touched on no single point which, as an advocate of the Government, he was bound to have noticed. The hon. Gentleman had accused his noble Friend of having made a speech founded on isolated points taken from the blue-book, but those who heard that speech knew well that that was not a fair representation of it. On the contrary, his noble Friend had taken up and attacked the whole course of policy of Her Majesty's Government, and shown that it was systematically contrary to that which they had professed as the only policy upon which we could deal with the Chinese Government, and that it was likely to bring us into collision with vast forces in that distant empire. But the hon. Gentleman contented himself with getting up and making a speech, one hall of which was devoted to the abuse of those who were engaged in commercial transactions in China. The hon. Gentleman spoke for nearly an hour, and only once, and that by accident, did the word neutrality drop from his lips. It was two years since the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, speaking in that House, said that the only policy which could be followed with advantage by the Government in dealing with China was a policy of strict neutrality. That declaration of the noble Lord met with the universal of acceptation the House and the sancniot of the country. But that policy had been entirely reversed by Her Majesty's Government. The hon. Gentleman had misrepresented in a most wonderful manner the speech of his noble Friend; for he said that it was now proposed that we should abandon the defence of the treaty ports. But nothing which Would give a colour to such a supposition ever fell from his noble Friend. His noble Friend not only admitted that policy, but absolutely insisted on defending the treaty ports. But what his noble Friend pointed out was, that having, with a view to the defence of these ports, adopted the principle of the thirty-mile radius, in concert with the Taeping chiefs, we had engaged in operations beyond that—operations which we were not called upon to undertake, and which seriously compromised our neutrality in China. The effect of that policy upon Ningpo would be best shown by a despatch from Consul Harvey to Sir Frederick Bruce, in which he said— We must all be agreed upon the point that the Taepings are essentially a destroying, as we Englishmen are a constructing Power. Let us, therefore, for ever live apart; we are not made, nor can we afford, to breathe the same air, or to mix in congenial pursuits. For my part, let me state that it Will be a source of great satisfaction, and, I may add, of pride, in after-time, to think that I have been placed in a position to use my feeble pen, and to have exercised my humble powers (always within the limits of my official duties) in weakening and undermining, as perseveringly and indefatigably as I have been able, the most gigantic imposture and the most blasphemous structure that ever disgraced ancient or modern ages. Were these the words of the agent of a Government which professed a strict neutrality between two parties? It was perfectly obvious, that within the last two years the policy of Her Majesty's Government, to use the words of the hon. Gentleman, "had altered with events." The policy now pursued by Her Majesty's Government was not for the interest of this country. The evidence which his noble Friend had produced with respect to Ningpo showed some of the most extraordinary conduct on the part of an officer of Her Majesty's Government that could be imagined. The last letter of Captaint Deow the Taeping chiefs contained a passage so remarkable, that though had been qituoted by his noble Friend, he could not help calling attention to it again— We now inform you that we maintain a perfect neutrality; but if you fire the guns or muskets from the battery or walls opposite the settlement on the advancing Imperialists, thereby endangering the lives of our men and people in the foreign set- tlement, we shall then feel it our duty to return the fire and bombard the city. This neutral officer says, "I profess neutrality; but if you venture to pull a trigger in your own defence, we shall bombard the city." What was the consequence? The British poured shot and shell into Ningpo as evidence of their perfect neutrality. The hon. Gentleman had made representations which would mislead the House as to our position with respect to that settlement. He said, "The city is divided into two parts, one occupied by the Chinese population, the other where the traders have taken up their residence with a view to trade." But that was not what was meant by a settlement. What was meant by a settlement was this—it was land positively ceded, within the limits of which British law and not Chinese law, was to have effect. He should like to know at what time British law had been established at Ningpo. At no time had any concession of that kind been made by the Imperial Government of China, and yet Captain Dew said, that if the Taepings allowed a single musket to be fired on a certain portion of the town, the English would fire on the Taepings. It was perfectly clear that the English had no right or title to hold that language; and the use of it reflected very little credit on the discretion of Captain Dew, whatever might be his character for gallantry. The hon. Gentleman had made use of very extraordinary arguments. When they complained of their prompting the Chinese Government to employ foreign forces, he said that in Russia and Turkey foreign forces had been employed, and no objection had been made. But from the peculiar circumstances of China the employment of British officers on one side would be sure to bring us into collision with the other. That was the ground of complaint. One point which his noble Friend dwelt on the hon. Gentleman had studiously avoided a reference to, and that was that the course of policy being pursued was sure, sooner or later, to bring this country into collision with other European Powers who were struggling to establish great and permanent interests in China. His noble Friend pointed out that the policy pursued by Russia for many years had led to the extension of her territory in the Chinese seas, and that the Russians had obtained as the result of that policy a seaboard of 900 miles, approaching within three days' sail of Shanghai with most valuable ports on it. The efforts making by France in China were well known; and he was convinced that the policy of Her Majesty's Government was such as, sooner or later, would lead to a collision of interests with France and Russia. He begged the House, therefore, to consider in what a position this country might be placed by seeing its trade crippled, by having half the population of China against it, and finding itself led into dangerous complications with European nations having interests in that part of the world. It would be no consolation to be told by the hon. Under Secretary that all that might be true, but that the Imperialists were increasing their revenue and the efficiency of their armies. He was convinced that the old policy of the Government was the true policy—that of neutrality, and he, for one, hoped that it would soon be resumed.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

Sir, I have listened with great attention to the very long and, I must say, able speech of the noble Lord who began this discussion. He showed that with, the greatest industry he had gone through the details of all the events which have happened in China for several years past; but I own that I was at a loss to understand the conclusion that he wished to draw—that of censure on Her Majesty's Government for the course of policy that they have followed. In the first place, it was rather surprising to hear from a Gentleman on that side of the House such an enthusiastic defence of rebels—to be told that rebellion is so sacred an institution that it is quite culpable in the Government to give any help to a friendly Power to suppress it. These are new doctrines. Does that principle apply to Italy? Are hon. Gentlemen prepared to say that they would apply the same protection to those who have cast off their allegiance to former Governments in Italy which they are prepared to show to these Taepings in China? One principle, I presume is applicable to one country, and another to another. But the main question is, has the policy which Her Majesty's Government has pursued in China been attended with good results? Is it founded in good faith, and is it likely to produce advantage to the country? In years now gone by, though not long gone by, we were perpetually in hostility with the Government of China, hostility of squabbles, of complaints, or with arms. What is the case now? We were then attacked and condemned, and were told, "You are en- gaged in hostilities with one-third of the human race, you are needlessly risking all the commercial interests of the country by these quarrels and conflicts with the Government of China." We were told to abstain, and let things take their course. Well, the state of things is now altered; these very hostilities which were found fault with have resulted in this, that we are now on the most friendly terms with the Government of China; that we have access to the supreme Government of China, from which we were hitherto debarred by local and provincial authority; and the noble Lord himself has quoted Returns showing the enormous increase of our trade with China during the last three or four years. Compare the state of our commerce with China some years ago, when we were contented with the limited intercourse of the East India Company with one portion of the Chinese Empire; compare that, I say, with the great development now given to industry and commerce over the whole surface of the Chinese Empire. Look at the extension which that commerce, I trust, is destined to receive when, by our friendly assistance, we shall have been enabled to place the internal arrangements of China on a better and more regular footing. A great portion of the noble Lord's speech seemed to me to be high praise of Her Majesty's Government. If I had been listening to any one moving a vote of approbation, I should have expected him to narrate the very things that the noble Lord, in the simplicity of his mind, brought forward as the gravamen of the complaint against the Government. What does he say? He says you are teaching the Chinese Government the arts of Government practised in Europe. You are enabling them to collect their revenue on a systematic principle and to increase that revenue by the equal way in which the customs duties are levied; you are giving them the means of preserving order in their territory; you are allowing your soldiers and sailors to enter into their service to suppress those disturbances that have laid waste and desolate from time to time the fines portions of that Empire. We admit the charge; and we consider it a great merit in the Government in having done these things and in continuing to do them and I was surprised and gratified to fine that the noble Lord, having bestowed all his industry in the collection of facts to fabricate a grave charge, having come to curse, was obliged to stay to bless, and laving come to lay a charge against the Government, was compelled to state things that I think do infinite credit to them. I hold, that as the Government of China has altered its policy with regard to foreign nations, and with regard to the English nation—as the policy of China is now conducted by Prince Kung and associates equally liberal with himself—as they are prepared to enter into intimate relations with foreigners, instead of, as formerly, keeping them at arm's length and endeavouring to prevent all intercourse with them—as the policy of China is now to encourage commerce, and to endeavour to extend it with the nations of Europe, I say it would be suicidal policy on our part not to endeavour to assist the enlightened Government of China in pursuing that course of policy that they are now prepared to adopt. The noble Lord and the hon. Gentleman say, we admit that you are entitled and indeed bound in duty to defend your treaty ports and to have a radius of thirty miles round them; but one of the great charges made was that we took steps to rescue one of these treaty ports from the hands of the Taepings, who had violently seized and occupied it—I mean Ningpo. If the noble Lord admits that it is our duty to maintain the freedom of those treaty ports, why does he complain that we have employed our officers to rescue the important port of Ningpo from the Taepings? The admission of the noble Lord is an answer to the accusation that he made against us. There is nothing inconsistent with the practice of nations in one friendly Government lending to another officers to drill and instruct their troops, to manage the police of their coasts, and therefore we have done nothing when we authorized the Queen's officers to enter the service of China that has not been done in innumerable instances and in a perfectly justifiable manner. The noble Lord said—and it amused me—that one of the duties of Captain Sherard Osborn would be to destroy pirates; he says that it is not necessary to send a ship of war to do it, for anybody might do it if he meets a pirate on the high seas. Yes, but you must first "bell the cat." It is all very well to say that you are at liberty to destroy any pirate that crosses your path, but the chance is that the pirates destroy you, and that is what is happening on the coast of China. We know that the coast of China is infested by fleets of pirates, some Chinese, some Europeans, who prey on all the ships of commerce they meet with. There is no use in saying these ships of commerce may destroy pirates. One of the great objects which Captain Sherard Osborn has in view is to sweep these pirates from the Water by the squadron under his orders, and to restore security to the commerce of Europe on the coast of China; and I hold that to be a very meritorious occupation. The noble Lord went into a description of the great encroachments that Russia is making upon the coast of China, and he told us that France has also views of ambition in parts of Asia in connection with China, and he says, "I warn you that the course you are pursuing will lead you into conflicts with these two great Powers." But what Was the course that he proposed we should follow in order to avoid this possibility of conflict? One course Was that which we are pursuing—that is, strengthening the Chinese empire, adding to the revenue of China, and enabling her to provide herself with a better navy and army. That is one method of inspiring other countries with caution as to any future encroachments they may think it desirable to make in China. But what is really the natural inference to be drawn from the Warning the noble Lord has given us—that we should retire from China and abandon it to Russia and France. Withdraw your Minister, withdraw your settlements, and withdraw your merchants, because, remember, France and Russia are encroaching in China, and if you are there at the time, you will be in conflict with them; and therefore get Out of the way, and allow Russia and France to proceed, because they will be stronger than you, and the only course to avoid the conflict will be to abandon China, to give up your trade and political interest, and everything that you think of real value, to the mercy of those great Powers, and leave China to the future policy of Russia and France. Well, I do not admit at all the wisdom of that policy. I admit it is quite true that Russia may have of late made serious encroachments in the northern provinces of China. It is quite true that France—a Power which has a great tendency to extend itself, has certainly carried her operations into Asia. But, nevertheless, France, and Russia, and England are perfectly agreed, for the present at least, in their policy in regard to China. They all concur in supporting the Imperial Government, and therefore our policy as at present directed has no tendency to bring us into collision with the other Powers. Our Minister at Pekin is on the best possible terms with the representatives of France and Russia, and so far from there being any fear of collision or of any antagonistic policy between the three Powers, I am happy to say that they all concur in feeling that it is their mutual interest to restore, if possible, tranquillity to the interior of China, and to extend the commercial relations of all the countries of Europe with China. I am, therefore, Sir, at a loss to know in what respect we are blamable. In scanning the future the noble Lord anticipates that European wars will arise out of our commercial relations with China. Now, Sir, on the contrary, I think that the policy we are pursuing will open a still larger and more extensive sphere of industry in that quarter of the world. Depend upon it, a country peopled by one can't tell how many hundred millions of men must afford great resources and means of development for trading enterprise. The Chinese are a commercial population, and there is no hostility to the Europeans amongst them as a people. The hostility is confined to a certain number of mandarins, whose interest it is to keep everything that does not actually belong to them out of the field of commerce. That hostility, however, has been swept away. The Chinese Government has been rendered friendly towards Us, instead of being hostile; and I have no doubt, that if these internal disorders could be suppressed, and if tranquillity could be restored in the interior of China, We should find in our Commercial intercourse with the Chinese an important source of wealth and national prosperity, which could be hardly anticipated even by those who talk so much of the advantages of the suppression of the East India Company, and the enlargement of our commercial relations with China. I trust that by this time next year we shall find the result of that faithful and straightforward and friendly policy which we have adopted towards the Emperor of China; and I am convinced if this House will only agree to await the result of that experience, we shall find, that so far from our deserving the censure of the noble Lord and the hon. Gentlemen opposite, oh the contrary, the course which Her Majesty's Government have pursued is eminently advantageous to the country, and deserving of the thanks of Parliament.

MR. LIDDELL

said, he was glad to find that an exposition of the policy of the Government had been elicited. But the noble Viscount, in supporting his own policy, bad ingeniously evaded the real question at issue—namely, the effect of the English policy in China at that moment. The effect of the policy of the Government had been to destroy authority in China; but at that time they were attempting, by very doubtful and illegal means, to prop up a Power which they had themselves destroyed—he meant the Imperial Power. Their own envoy at Pekin stated that within the last few months the capital was in danger, and that the mandarins were making no effort to defend it, because they relied upon the English troops that were there. Their interference in China was wholly unnecessary, and no Member of the Government had attempted to show that there was any attempt to injure British person or property. That interference was not only unnecessary but most mischievous, inasmuch as it tended to prolong that unhappy struggle, and to teach the Chinese Government to trust to British arms rather than to themselves. The noble Viscount said, that their envoy was acting in concert with the representatives of other foreign Powers at Pekin. He did not know how to reconcile that statement with the previous observations of the hon. Gentleman. The hon. Gentleman said, "Never mind what the policy of France and Russia is—there is no analogy between that policy and ours." He believed, if the policy of the Government were continued, that the time would come when China would become a great theatre of political intrigue. The hon. Under Secretary said that the rebellion was waning; but Mr. Oliphant, who accompanied Lord Elgin to Pekin in 1858, and had consequently better opportunities for observation, used precisely the same phrase. The value of those prophecies might be judged from the fact that the war was raging with greater vigour than ever, and the richest producing districts in China had fallen into the hands of the rebels, who still continued to hold them. The truth was, that the rebels were gaining, instead of losing, from the want of faith of the Government, who violated their pledge of neutrality. The last accounts from China undoubtedly conveyed that impression. The action of the French contingent in Ningpo tended seriously to injure our trade; and in proof of that they learned by the last mail that a British contingent had been formed to keep in check the action of the French contingent, on account of their lawless acts of rapine and violence. The first duty of Captain Sherard Osborn would be to control the lawless operations of our French allies. He could not conceive a more difficult position for an English officer, even though he was in the employ of a foreign, power. These were some of the complications which the policy of our Government was leading to. He thought, however, that he had detected in the language of the Government that evening some glimmerings, at least, of an intention to retire from the untenable position which they had assumed, The observation that his noble Friend, if he had any cause of complaint, ought to have proposed a vote of censure was a very old argument, The country had, it was true, once declared in favour of the noble Lord upon a Chinese question, but the people were in his favour not because they approved of his policy in China, but because he was defending public servants in that country. Had they understood to what difficulty, embarrassment, and danger the policy of the Government was likely to lead they would have acted in a different manner.

COLONEL SYKES

begged to thank the noble Lord opposite for having brought the question forward, and for having in his luminous details testified to the accuracy of almost every statement which he (Colonel Sykes) had made in the House during the last two years in regard to events in China. The noble Viscount was mistaken in supposing that the Tartar Government of China existed in its ancient Imperial power and in that character was entitled to consideration and forbearance. The fact, however, was, that there was no such Government. It was a myth, and had no executive power whatever. There were constantly-recurring proofs that the decrees of Prince Kung were not obeyed a hundred li from Pekin, and in the provinces persons and property were at the mercy of cruel and rapacious mandarins or the rebels, and at the treaty ports and for a radius of thirty miles around them, the people had to look to the protection of the bayonets of British soldiers. In the districts of China which were nominally under Imperial Government, numerous outbreaks against the authorities were taking place. They were told that on the 4th of January 1863 fifty robbers landed and plundered the custom-house at Swatou, and on the 18th December 1862 pirates landed and burnt the docks and village of Whampoa, near Canton, and the Imperial Government could afford no pro- tection nor redress. In the neighbourhood of Canton the Imperial Government attempted to tax pork, and the butchers rose and drove the officers out of the place. At Fatshan taxes on bricks caused a rising of the makers, and they also put the tax-gatherers to flight, and many other instances might be named. The drilled Chinese under European officers have been in a state of mutiny half a dozen times; in short, anarchy reigns in China. Where, then, was the Imperial authority? As to the cruelties of executions in China, he held in his hand a statement from an eyewitness at Canton, the editor of the Friend of China, who saw ten men executed, one of them being tied to a cross and skinned while alive, the process beginning at the brow and proceeding downwards. And that atrocity was sanctioned by the so-called civilized Government which England was supporting at the expense of her blood and her treasure. It had been alleged by the hon. Under Secretary of State that it was impossible for the British Government to communicate with the Taepings, because the Taepings had no regular Government to communicate with. But the Taepings had occupied nearly one-third of China for thirteen years. Could it then by possibility be true that they had no Government to administer this enormous extent of territory, Mr. Griffiths John, who had visited those called the rebels at their capital of Nankin, which they had held for twelve years, and written, an account of what he had observed of their institutions, said there were six administrative boards at Nankin similar to those at Pekin. He added, that as the districts were under martial law at present, the civil law was under subordination to the military; but that, of course, when the Taeping authority was firmly established, this state of things would be reversed. But meanwhile there was a Government of the Taepings with which we could have established diplomatic relations. Why, Sir Harry Parkes and most of the Consuls and our naval and military authorities had been in repeated communication with the Taepings, and Sir George Bonham had assured them that the English Government would recognise any chief they might like to set up. The Taepings had custom-houses throughout the territories which they occupied, and a gentleman was with him the other day who told him he had paid these customs duties, and that the Taepings had a regular tariff, a copy of which he (Colonel Sykes) had sent to Earl Russell. The statement, therefore, was unfounded in fact, that the Taepings had not a Government with which diplomatic relations could be established. So far from it, that in all cases where our subordinate officers exacted pledges from the Taepings, they had been scrupulously fulfilled, without an exception. The Taepings themselves had made repeated overtures to us to establish amicable relations with them; in some instances their letters were returned to them unopened, and in all cases we had rejected their friendship. One of the alleged reasons for our conduct was that British persons and property were endangered by the lawlessness of the Taepings, but he (Colonel Sykes) invited the noble Lord at the head of the Government to lay upon the table of the House a single case of injury done to British persons or property with the knowledge of the Taeping Chiefs. They had certainly been made responsible for the plunder of a vessel off Plover Point by the Cantonese Pirates, who held the towns of Chang-soo and Fooshan, on the Yang-tze-Kiang, and they had to make good the plundered property. To save themselves from a future similar infliction, they immediately laid seize to these two towns and took one of them, but the other threw itself under the protection of the Imperialists, and it was Saved from capture by the drilled Chinese force under British and other European officers; Another apology for treating the Taepings as brigands and land pirates was, that they caused desolation wherever they moved. No doubt, in fighting for the laud they took, there was necessarily desolation; but when once in possession, the ordinary industries of life were encouraged and protected. He (Colonel Sykes) held in his hand the diary of two European agents of the house of Hart & Co., of Ningpo, copy of which he had sent to Earl Russell. They were employed to buy silk in the Taeping provinces, and they made two successful ventures, travelling in the districts for seventy-seven days with entire safety, and meeting with great kindness from the Taeping authorities; and they describe the whole country from Ningpo, until they approached the battle-fields around Shanghai, as in a state of luxuriant cultivation. He would ask, therefore, are these eye-witnesses to be believed, or is the House to pin its faith upon contrary statements in blue-books? The fact is, the British public has not been made acquainted with the whole truth respecting events in China; and he again thanked the noble Lord (Lord Naas) for his vigorous and successful exposure of the facts illustrative of our policy in China for the last two years.

MR. GREGSON

remarked, that the gallant Colonel advocated the cause of the Taepings on all occasions. The fact was, there were faults on both sides in China. No doubt the Imperial Government was imperfect, but it was improving; and he had no doubt that Captain Osborn would soon restore its authority, and put an end to the atrocities hitherto committed. Our merchants were perfectly satisfied with the policy pursued by Her Majesty's Government, and we were never in a better position than at present with respect to China. Compared with former years, our commerce with China had of late years wonderfully increased. China, well governed, would be a source of wealth and prosperity to any country connected with it by the ties of commerce.

MR. WHITESIDE

said, that the policy now being pursued by this country in China would rise up again and again against them. What his noble Friend who brought forward the subject objected to was, that they were assuming all the powers of Government in China. Step by step they were undertaking to do that for China which the empire of China ought to do for itself. If their trade were interfered with, it would, of course, be their duty to protect it; but that was quite a different thing from taking upon themselves the collection of the revenues of a country like China, and sending the most distinguished officers of their army to fight her battles, as well as gunboats. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had relied on the fact that trade with China had vastly increased, but his noble Friend (Lord Naas) had pointed out that the great bulk of their trade with China lay in the provinces occupied by the Taepings, and that point had in no way been answered. The Taepings were in possession of a great part of the empire, they were willing to trade with us, and to respect our rights, and it appeared to be an incomprehensible policy to send gunboats and soldiers to a foreign Power to serve against them. Such must be a mischievous and bad policy. The hon. Gentleman the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs had argued that the policy tended to encourage a liberal party in China; but what, he should like to know, did he mean by a liberal party. Did he mean a Whig party? Did he mean a party of ancient and respectable Whigs? He said that a new idea was being developed at Pekin, and the Government was being conducted in the most happy manner. If that were so, what need was there for the gunboats? He (Mr. Whiteside) had no hesitation in saying that the present policy would end in an unfortunate result; and he had heard nothing in the course of the discussion to convince him that it was right to send out British officers, to double and treble their pay under a foreign Power, and he should not be surprised to hear the Chancellor of the Exchequer make as eloquent a speech in reprobation of the policy of the Government as he had done on a previous occasion when China was concerned.

Question put, and agreed to.