HC Deb 27 February 1863 vol 169 cc879-943
MR. HENNESSY

—Mr. Speaker, In the Session of 1861, when I presumed to ask the attention of Parliament to the state of Poland, I was met by the stereotyped reply, that Poland was not a practical question. In the following Session, when I had the satisfaction of co-operating with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Tiverton in again calling attention to the state of Poland, we received the same answer. Sir, I venture to affirm that, whatever tone may now be taken by the Government, the old reply will not be given to-night. Since 1861 Poland has become, in the estimation, I believe, of every Member of this House, not only a practical but a momentous question. In 1861 events were taking place in Poland that wore little understood in other parts of Europe. It was then said that the endurance and passive attitude of the Poles were an indication that under the pressure of three great Powers the heart of Poland could not beat. I thought, on the contrary, and I ventured to express the opinion here, that the great forbearance of the Poles was a proof of implicit trust in their leaders, of confidence in their cause, and of faith in the future. Now, we see that all is changed. Universal forbearance has suddenly been transformed into universal revolt. How has this happened? Not because of domestic conspiracies or foreign influences. No; it is due to the Russian Government that the attitude of the Poles has been changed; it is in the conduct of the Government that we are able to discover the proximate cause of the national outbreak.

Early in the year 1862 an Imperial ukase was issued which promised reforms, and appeared to confer privileges on the Poles. On the 10th of June, 1862, the Emperor appointed the Grand Duke Constantine his Lieutenant in Poland, and the Marquis Wielopolski to assist him. The Grand Duke Constantine solicited the Polish nobles to confer with him on the wants of Poland. The nobles, the great landowners, and the municipal bodies responded to that appeal. It was not alone from the Emperor of the Russias and from his Lieutenant the Grand Duke that words of advice were addressed to the Poles, telling them to petition for a liberal form of government. When I called the attention of the House to the state of Poland, there was seated in the Peers' gallery a Pole of high rank and influence from the province of Podolia, who overheard the words spoken from the Treasury Bench by Lord John Russell. That noble Lord was then making his last speech in this House, and he said to the Poles— I believe your interests point to tranquillity, and to petitions and requests for a more liberal form of government, and for institutions similar to those which were granted from Vienna. What was the consequence of following that advice? The maréchal de noblesse went back to his own country shortly after the noble Lord had made that speech. The ukase to which I have referred was published, and the nobles of Podolia assembled; 300 of them met, the maréchals de noblesse at their head, and an address to the Emperor was drawn up, in which they said— Rejecting all thoughts of the predominance of any particular race or class, the Podolian nobles remain true to the fundamental Polish idea of giving to all classes the same political rights, and they require union with Poland because they see in such union the foundation of free institutions. The situation of the country is very bad—a people without means of education; the laws opposed to the customs, traditions, and interchange of opinions; the execution of the laws rendered nugatory by an administration foreign to the country, and concentrated beyond the pale of the national wants and interests, and, finally, a population without organs selected from its own body for the purpose of directing its affairs. What was the result of that address? I hold in my hand three letters describing the fate of the nobleman who had heard the advice of Lord Russell, and had followed it. One of the letters is dated from a prison at St. Petersburg, and the other two from Warsaw, describing what had happened. The last letter is dated the 16th of February, 1863, and is written by a near relative of the unhappy nobleman in question. It says— The maréchal de noblesse whom you have seen in England is now immured in the prison of Petropaulovski, condemned for fourteen months, with eleven of his companions, to cruel and inhuman treatment. So much for following the advice given to the Poles by Her Majesty's Ministers; so much for accepting the hypocritical counsel of the Russian authorities. I mention this incident mainly for the purpose of illustrating the conduct of the Grand Duke as far as it affected the higher classes in Poland. But every class in Poland felt the pressure of the Russian Government; because during the time of which I am speaking, and since October, 1861, a state of siege prevailed. I have said that the Grand Duke Constantine also invited the municipal authorities and town councils to confer with him upon the condition of the people. The town council of Warsaw, acting upon that invitation, sent to the Grand Duke a report dated July 20, 1862, on one of the prisons of Warsaw. The report began by saying that— The total number of men and women arrested from the beginning of the year 1862 to the 19th of July, was 14,833. The description of the room in which the political prisoners were confined was as follows:— Room No. 18, the same small size as the other two, except that it is but half their width, contains thirty men, arrested for not carrying lanterns at night. This room has no furniture and only one small barred window. There is so little space that the men in it can neither He down nor move about with freedom. There is scarcely a breath of air, and the close packing of these thirty persons is an unprecedented instance of disregard of human life. The report closed with this sentence— Considering, first, that the number of people arrested during the past half-year amounts to nearly one-tenth of the whole population of the town, and to one-fifth of such population, excluding children; second, that among those arrested are persons detained for the most trifling inattention to the decrees of the police, and mothers with little children, even children of four years old and children at the breast are often arrested—the Deputy President and the delegates of the Municipal Council consider it most expedient to take immediate steps to put a stop to this evil. I am not quoting newspaper correspondents, or private letters, or any anonymous authorities—I refrain from relying on such information in a question so grave as the treatment of political prisoners, lest any person should accuse me of exaggerating; I have quoted from the report of the Town Council of Warsaw upon one of the prisons of the town. There were two or three other addresses from provincial councils in reply to the invitation of the Russian Government. The address of the provincial Council of Piotrkow, dated November, 1862, has a peculiar significance now— The Council also feels it its duty to call the attention of the authorities to one of the chief causes of the present position—the want of men qualified for the various kinds of labour. Between the years 1833 and 1856 many thousands have been recruited for the army from this province, constituting the cream of the population, and not leaving enough men for labour. These recruits were sent thousands of miles away, into strange lands, for many years, were attacked by a dreadful mortality in consequence of the climate, and returned, their numbers reduced to 498, not only useless, but a burden to their province. For these reasons the Council has felt it to he its duty to protest against any recruiting for the army which might be carried into effect on similar principles, and, above all, against a system which, by calling to the army the majority of persons belonging to the educated or mechanic class, would deprive the province of every means of self-development or progress. It is of opinion that the retention of recruits in their own country, with due protection for their language and religion, which are the only treasures left to a nation under foreign rule, could alone render a conscription tolerable to the population of this country; any other will always be considered as something worse than the heaviest of misfortunes. I have read these extracts to the House as a statement of the Polish case by the only official element left in Poland. But that is not all. In accordance with the request of the Grand Duke Constantine, Count Andrew Zamayski in open day suggested the policy which he thought best suited for the country. Nothing could be more moderate than the document which was drawn up by that much respected representative of the country gentlemen of Poland. Nevertheless, for that act of petitioning Count Zamayski was summoned to St. Petersburg, he was exiled, and he is now in banishment with his brother Ladislaus. Sir, I have received authentic information of what passed at the remarkable interview between this illustrious Polish exile and the Russian Czar, and I beg to call attention to the extraordinary language addressed by the Emperor himself and by Prince Gortschakoff to Count Zamayski. The Emperor said, "The only way to govern Poland, I see now, is by terror." And, on leaving the presence of the Emperor, Prince Gortschakoff said to the Count, "If you force us to it, we will make Poland a heap of ashes and corpses." And, again, Prince Gortschakoff said, "It has long been the conclusion of the Imperial Government, and remains so, that the only course to be pursued in reference to Poland is a policy of extermination." That policy the Russian Government have endeavoured to carry out, and the means they have adopted for that purpose are boldly described by their own official organs. Of these the most notable was the conscription. That great idea of the Grand Duke may fairly be called a device for converting barrack-rooms and fortresses into political prisons. According to their own admission, they hoped, in this way, to seize and secure every person opposed to their policy. The conscription was directed against the towns alone, against certain classes alone, and its object was defined. And how had it been carried out? I hold in my hand numerous letters describing it. But the House will not need any such documentary proof in the face of the statements made in another place by an eminent authority (the Earl of Ellenborough), and in the face of the fact that those statements had received the sanction of Her Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and had not been contradicted. It appears that the Russians at one o'clock in the night—the order having been made on the previous evening—surrounded the houses of the shopkeepers, middle classes, and professional people in Warsaw, dragged them from their beds and carried them off. The Russian official journal of Warsaw, on the 15th of January, thus described the time of the conscription:— Between the hours of one and eight o'clock this morning the levy of recruits for the army has been accomplished in the town of Warsaw. The official journal, having stated that fact, went on to state what was not fact, but what was intended to produce, and did produce, a great result. It said that — Never in the course of the last thirty years had men so taken shown so much readiness and goodwill, and when lodged in the town hall they actually became joyful at being now freed from the influence of evil men. That official notification concluded by stating that— It is likely that the same measures will meet with the same satisfactory results all over the country. Sir, under these circumstances, I ask, what were the Poles to do? Hero was this conscription, unprecedented in the history of civilization, and hero was the official journal of Warsaw telling the people that it was to be carried out in the other parts of Poland. What were the Poles to do? It has been truly said that by "uncalculating despair" they were driven into insurrection. But, as surely as the conduct of the people was uncalculating, the policy of the Government was premeditated. The civil Governor of Warsaw, the Marquis of Wielopolski, has openly boasted that he drove the people into insurrection, observing that he had done his duty, and that it would now rest with the military authorities to discharge theirs. What do we now see? The whole Polish nation of one mind—a universal insurrection, or rather a universal resurrection of the people; and, though without arms and without the slightest previous preparation, the insurgents day after day extending the area they had opened in Poland. Day after day the Russian troops are defeated, and the heroic struggle is absorbing the admiration and anxiety of Europe. This success arises from two causes—First, because the whole nation co-operates with the insurgents; and, secondly—and this is not an insignificant fact—because among the troops of Russia there exists a spirit of inevitable insubordination. One Russian officer, leading on his men to attack a party of insurgents, when he came in sight of them, called his officers around him and said, "My conscience as a man points in one direction, and my duty as an officer in an opposite," and that unfortunate soldier committed suicide. Accounts also reach us of Russian troops leaving towns in the morning to attack insurgents and coming back in the evening unwounded and disarmed. What does that mean? It moans that even the Russian troops to some extent entertain a friendly feeling for Poland, and are sensible of the disgraceful position which Russia has assumed.

It may be asked, why should a Member of the British Parliament presume to interfere in this matter, and what has the House of Commons to do with it? To such inquiries I answer, that not only is Poland a practical question now, but that it is beyond all doubt an English question. It is an English question, because England is bound by a treaty entered into between this country, Russia, and other Powers of Europe with regard to Poland. If I can show that England is bound by that treaty—that the treaty has never been abrogated with the consent of England, and that it has been violated by Russia—I must leave the House to draw its own conclusions as to what should be the policy of this country.

There has been a great deal of misconception about the precise value to the Poles of the Treaty of Vienna, That the treaty is of some value to Poland might be inferred from many well-known facts. Lord Castlereagh conducted the Vienna Conferences on the part of England, and in February, 1815, he laid down as the basis on which he entered into the negotiations of Vienna the wish constantly manifested by the British Government to see Poland an independent State, more or less of considerable extent, over which there should reign a distinct dynasty, and which should form an intermediate Power between the three great monarchies. From that basis Lord Castlereagh was reluctantly driven, for he was not able to secure an independent Poland under a distinct dynasty; but he secured for Poland that which he deemed of vital importance to the Poles, and to the peace of Europe, a constitutional independence. That the first fourteen articles of the Treaty of Vienna should be devoted to that country, showed the importance the Great Powers attached to these obligations, and confirms the judgment of Talleyrand that Poland was the first, the greatest, and the most eminently European question that could be brought before the Congress of Vienna. I am not going to give my own interpretation of the articles of the Treaty of Vienna concerning Poland; but, for my present purpose, I will only rely on the interpretation of them given by two eminent authorities —the Emperor of Russia himself, and the noble Viscount on the Treasury Bench. After the treaty was negotiated, the Emperor of Russia, addressing the Poles, stated that they had received a constitution preserving in public enactments the Polish language, restricting public appointments to the Poles, and establishing freedom of commerce and a national army. In a yew years the Emperor addressed the Poles again, and told them that their restoration was defined by solemn treaties and sanctioned by a constitutional chart; and that the inviolability of these external engagements, and that constitutional law, insured for Poland henceforth her place among European nations. The first address was delivered by the Emperor of Russia in 1815, and the second in 1818. During the negotiation of the Treaty of Vienna, the noble Viscount now at the bead of the Government was a Minister of the Crown; and he was in the Foreign Office during the various infractions and final destruction of the treaty rights of Poland. I appeal, then, to the noble Viscount to say whether that treaty has not been systematically violated by Russia. In 1861 the noble Lord used remarkable words, to the effect that the course pursued by Russia constituted a complete and decided violation of the Treaty of Vienna; that the stipulations of the treaty were broken almost as soon as they were concluded, and that perhaps the greatest violation of a treaty that had ever taken place in the history of the world was that which had taken place in the case of Poland. Though these words were used when Poland was thought to be only an abstract question, they are of paramount importance now. Yet it is even more important to observe what was the language of the British Government on the occasion of the Polish insurrection in 1831, and to ascertain whether or not they then asserted that Russia had violated her treaty engagements. For thirty years the despatches which determined and defined the policy of this country in 1831 were concealed from the Parliament and the people of England. The distinguished General opposite (Sir De Lacy Evans), who I am informed will do me the great honour of seconding my address, moved three times for those papers. Motion after Motion was made to the same effect by other Members, but the Government persistently refused to produce them. Thanks, however, to Earl Russell, they were laid upon the table in compliance with a Motion which was made the Session before last. The noble Earl, then a Member of this House, in agreeing to my Motion, said that so many years had elapsed that there could no longer be any harm in allowing the despatches to be published. Those documents disclosed some very important facts. It appeared that in 1831 the noble Viscount now at the head of the Government, again and again told the Russian Government that they had not carried out the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, and that they had violated that treaty. Indeed, in one despatch the noble Viscount distinctly protested against that violation. In writing to Lord Heytesbury, on the 22nd of March, 1831, the noble Viscount expressed himself as follows:— By Article 1 of the Treaty of Vienna it is stipulated that the Poles, subjects respectively of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, shall obtain a national representation and institutions regulated according to the kind of political existence which each of the Governments to which they belong shall think it useful and fitting to grant them. It is understood, that although this stipulation has been executed by Austria and Prussia, it has hitherto been entirely unfulfilled by the Russian Government. His Majesty's Government have been informed by the French Ambassador at this Court that instructions have been sent to the Duke de Mortemart to draw the attention of the Russian Government to this matter, and the French Government have expressed a wish that your Lordship might be instructed to support the Duke in his representations on this subject, But the next sentence renders all this nugatory. The noble Viscount, turning to his Russian vocabulary, says— Your Lordship will, of course, be careful not to take any step on this business which could lead to any unfriendly discussions with the Russian Government, with whom His Majesty's Government are, under present circumstances, more than over desirous of keeping up the closest relations of friendship. But if the question should be agitated, your Lordship is instructed to state that, as far as His Majesty's Government are informed of the facts of the case, it does not appear to them that the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna applicable to the Polish provinces of Russia have been hitherto carried into execution. I am, &c., PALMERSTON. That despatch, though tinged with a Russian spirit and meaning nothing but words, and though from its reservations utterly valueless in 1831, is of value now; for it establishes the fact that at a critical moment, when the insurrection was raging, the noble Viscount stated that the treaty had not been carried out by Russia. In the same year another despatch was written by the noble Viscount, of which the people of England had heard but little, a despatch to which it was important their attention should be directed at the present moment. In 1831 the Government of Louis Philippe, a most cautious and peaceful Sovereign, addressed a despatch to the British Government, asking them to co-operate in endeavouring to secure for Poland those institutions which were guaranteed by the Treaty of Vienna. The note of Count Sebastian, which was communicated by Prince Talleyrand to Lord Palmerston, was in the following terms:— Paris, July 7, 1831. Mon Prince,—The King, touched by the evils which the Polish war has already caused to two nations in which he takes so lively an interest, eager to insure the maintenance of peace, compromised daily by so prolonged a contest, and no less engaged in preserving the West of Europe from the fearful sufferings which this war entails, has addressed himself confidentially to the Emperor of Russia, in order to put an end to so many disasters, and to bring to an end blood-shedding over which humanity has only too long groaned. The King's intention was also to preserve the political existence of a people which has showed itself so worthy of it by so great courage and patriotism, and which has the guarantee of the Treaties of Vienna for its nationality. Up to the present time the King's efforts have not achieved the results which he had the right to expect. Notwithstanding their small success, His Majesty does not consider it his duty to renounce the generous and pacific mediation which his personal feelings recommend, and which the condition of Europe prescribes to him. He believes, especially, that were England to act in agreement with France for giving to this salutary interven- tion all the force of which it is susceptible, the effect might be made certain by the combination of these two Powers. The King is sufficiently acquainted with the feelings which animate His Britannic Majesty to entertain the hope that he will not refuse to give his frank and complete ad hesion to our advances, and to join his powerful action to our efforts, at a time when the question of the welfare of humanity and of the general interest of Europe transcends all others. The de sire of His Majesty, men Prince, is that you should make immediate and pressing overtures to the English Government with reference to this subject: we are awaiting their result with much impatience. Accept, &c., HORACE SEBASTIAN. The noble Viscount, in replying on the 2nd of July, 1831, wrote as follows: — The object of the communication which it is now proposed that France and England should jointly address to Russia is an immediate cessation of hostilities, with a view to negotiations for the purpose of re-establishing peace between the contending parties by some lasting arrangement; and it appears from Count Sebastiani's despatch that a proposition to this effect has already been made to Russia by France, but hitherto without success. Can it, then, be expedient to make a proposal which there is no ground to hope would be accepted? The effects and bearing of the contest upon the security of other States have not hitherto been such as to warrant measures of such a description; nor has the conduct of Russia towards England been calculated to excite any unfriendly feeling; she has, on the contrary, performed towards this country all the offices of a good and faithful ally, and, in the late difficult negotiations for the purpose of effecting a settlement between Belgium and Holland, she has acted with perfect fairness in her co-operation with the other four Powers. Under these circumstances, His Majesty, deeply lamenting the calamities of a disastrous and desolating contest, does not think the time has yet arrived when he could be justified in adopting a proceeding which, however conciliatory in form, could not fail to alarm an independent Power, naturally jealous of its rights. For these reasons his Majesty feels himself under the necessity of declining the proposal which the Prince de Talleyrand has been instructed to convey. The noble Viscount spoke of the "rights" of Russia; but the fact was Russia had long before lost any rights she possessed in Poland, by her violation of her engagements. I shall not at present presume to offer any opinion upon this memorable despatch of the noble Viscount in 1831. I simply draw the attention of the House to the possibility of a similar despatch being written in 1863, and of the noble Viscount again becoming the arbiter of the fate of Poland. Seeing what took place in 1831, and remembering that this despatch was concealed for thirty years, I respectfully put it to the House whether we ought not to press the Government to say distinctly what they are going to do? There are many other considerations, besides those springing out of the Treaty of Vienna, which give us a direct interest in the independence of Poland, but I will not go into them now. I do not pretend to deal with the whole of the great Polish cause. I am only, as it were, opening the pleadings. I have no doubt other hon. Members, better able to do so, will state the case in full. I will merely add a word or two on the practical aspect of the question.

It is significant that the various Powers of Europe are no longer indifferent to Poland. In France there is a diversity of opinion among public men on every great question save one, and that is Poland. On that subject Legitimists, Orleanists, Imperialists, Republicans, all are united. I shall not venture to predict what will be the policy of France, but there can be little doubt that it may depend on that of England. For a long time past men have been in the habit of asking, what will the Emperor do? But the question now is, what will England do? If the policy of this Empire is to depend on the spirit of the people, if the Ministers are prepared to carry out the wishes of the people, I can have no misgivings about the diplomacy of 1863; for I believe we can say with truth that the feeling of this country is as unanimous and as friendly to Poland as that of France. And what has been the conduct of Austria in this matter? She has complied with the Treaty of Vienna, as far as Galicia is concerned, and within the last few weeks the attitude she has assumed has received the well-merited commendation of the highest authorities in the other House. It is the traditional policy of Austria to be friendly to Poland. True, she was a party to the great crime of the partition; but when the Empress signed the deed, she added these memorable words to it — Placeat, because so many great and learned men will have it so; but long after I am dead and gone people will see what will happen for breaking through everything holy and just. MARIA THERESA. Again, during the insurrection of 1831 the Emperor Francis, then on his deathbed, sent the following message through Count Kolovratz, to the Envoy of the Polish Provisional Government— The Emperor feels that the time is drawing near when he shall have to appear before the great Judge; the possession of Galicia weighs on his conscience as a crime, and he would be ready to restore that province to Poland, provided it were not annexed to Russia. If my words could reach his ears, I would, therefore, respectfully urge the present Emperor of Austria to maintain the attitude he has assumed, for it is not only in accordance with the public opinion of Europe, but it is interwoven with the best interests of the great Empire that he governs so well, and it is strictly consistent with the traditions of his house. There is another Power in Europe; some speak of it as a weak Power, but it is not so; which can exercise great influence on Russia. I mean the Sublime Porte. The present Sultan is a man of determination and ability, and I can tell the House, what the noble Lord at the head of the Government probably knows, that of all the Powers of Europe none will be more anxious at this great crisis to assist Poland than the Sublime Porte. There are many reasons why the influence of Turkey upon Russia is well worth our consideration. The policy of England would be a policy to vindicate her own public faith and solemn engagements; the policy of the Turks would be a policy to save themselves and preserve the integrity of their empire. Again, in the North of Europe, there are Powers which have ever been, and are at this moment, friendly to Poland. On the other hand stood Russia herself and the Government of Prussia. To a certain extent Prussia has fulfilled the obligations of the Treaty of Vienna, and I am therefore willing to hope that she is not now combining with the arch-violator of that treaty. To do so would be indeed a fatal step. I have beard with pleasure that the Prussian Minister has announced that the Convention concluded with Russia has been misunderstood, and its purport exaggerated. I cannot believe that Prussia has gone so far as the House has been led to suppose on a former occasion. She may have committed a fault—a fault which may, perhaps, be repaired—and I hope we shall hear from the Government to-night, some satisfactory statement as to the actual attitude taken by Prussia. What are the sentiments of the people of Russia? Even in Russia itself I see a ray of hope. Among the people of Russia there is, if I am rightly informed, a profound feeling in favour of Poland. The Russian Government is not a Government which sprang from the people or has any direct communication with the people; on the contrary, it has many of the characteristics of a foreign Government; and though the Czar and the Grand Duke are no doubt resolved, if they can, to crush the Poles, the people of Russia do not sympathize with the Imperial policy of extermination. I will not weary the House by reading passages from the Russian newspapers. It may be enough to mention that a journal printed in St. Petersburg recently published an argument in favour of an independent Poland, and urged the government to act upon that view. That paper has since been suppressed, but the fact that it ventured when in existence to publish such an article is significant. But my chief dependence is on Poland herself. I do not ask for armed intervention; I do not wish that a single foreign soldier should be sent to Poland. One Queen's messenger despatched from the Foreign Office to Paris, Vienna, or Constantinople, would be worth 100,000 foreign bayonets to the Poles. It is not armaments they want; but if the Powers of Europe, parties to the Treaty of Vienna, and the Sublime Porte, choose to act in diplomatic concert, then Poland is secure. Sir, the House to-night presents a very different appearance from that which it exhibited when I called attention to the state of Poland on former occasions. The contrast is, indeed, most striking. Nor is it confined to Parliament. From one end of the country to the other, the public mind has changed. Apathy and indifference have given way to the deepest interest and anxiety. Why is there this change? It is because a long absent visitor has returned. Many years ago, Hope for a season bade the world farewell; a long season and a sad season for Poland; but it is passed. Hope has returned— and I beg leave to welcome her to this House, and to mark her presence here to-night by moving this Address to the Crown.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, humbly to represent to Her Majesty that certain Treaty obligations have been incurred by England and other Powers with Russia in respect to Poland, and that these Treaty obligations have not been fulfilled by Russia, but were (in the words of Her Majesty's present First Minister) broken almost as soon as concluded: That these joint obligations are set forth in the first fourteen Articles of the Treaty of Vienna, and that the Emperor of Russia, on the 13th day of May 1815, thus recapitulated them: 'A Constitution; the preservation in public enactments of the Polish language; the restriction of public appointments to Poles; freedom of Commerce; and a national army; and subsequently the same Sovereign, addressing the Poles, said, 'Your restoration is defined by solemn Treaties. It is sanctioned by the Constitutional Chart. The inviolability of these external engagements and of that fundamental law ensures for Poland henceforth an honourable place among European Nations:' That for many years past not one of these engagements and conditions has been fulfilled: That it appears from the diplomatic documents which from time to time have been laid before Parliament, that these external exgagements of Russia in respect to Poland were avowedly intended by the contradicting parties, on the one hand, as a compensation for the loss of her independence by the dismemberment, and, on the other hand, as guarantees for the peace and security of Europe: That the breach of the solemn engagements thus incurred between England and Russia has recently been described (2nd July 1861) by Her Majesty's First Minister in his place in this House, in the following words:— 'The course which the Government of Russia adopted towards Poland was a complete and decided violation of the Treaties of Vienna. The stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna were broken almost as soon as concluded. Perhaps the greatest violation of a Treaty that has ever taken place in the history of the world was that which occurred in the case of Poland:' That for years past the Poles have borne with exemplary patience this deliberate violation of their national rights: That whilst their endurance has attracted the admiration of Europe, it seems to have aroused the worst passions of the Russian authorities: That the patriotic self-restraint of the unanimous people of Poland has at length given way under an accumulation of outrages unparalleled in these times: That the Kingdom of Poland is now the scene of desolating conflicts between the troops of Russia and the people thus driven to desperation: Humbly to submit to Her Majesty that these facts demand the interposition of England in vindication of her own public faith and solemn engagements, —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

SIR DE LACY EVANS

seconded the Motion.

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, that having from first to last supported the Government of which the noble Lord at the head of the Administration was a Member in one Russian war, a war which had been carried to a successful termination, he was anxious at once to state that he would be no party to urging the noble Lord beyond his discretion in the sense of intervention for the sake of Poland, at the cost of another Russian war. The conduct of the noble Lord, and the expressions used by the noble Lord, which were quoted in the form of the Motion, were a sufficient guarantee to the House and the country that if it were possible by friendly offices to mitigate the present state of affairs in Poland, and the evils to which Poland for so many years had been subjected, the noble Lord would not fail to use the power of England in this sense. But, lamenting as he did the condition of Poland, and deprecating its partition, still he thought the House ought to ask itself—Are the Polish people in a condition to establish their own freedom? ["Yes."] In his opinion, Russian Poland by itself would not be large enough to constitute a free State, under existing circumstances; and if this insurrection succeeded as against Russia, was the condition of that part of Poland which belonged to Prussia such as to justify the active intervention of England to wrest that portion of Poland from her ally? The hon. Member for the King's County admitted that the condition of that part of Poland which belonged to Austria was satisfactory. [Mr. HENNESSY: No.] Then the hon. Member implied that England was to enter into hostilities with the object of depriving Austria also of certain dominions which she now held. That was rather a grave proposal, and he was actuated by this motive, for no one had ever seen him stand aloof from a movement in favour of rational freedom in any part of the world. What he feared was this, whether, if the Poles were now to succeed, they might not find that they had substituted one tyranny for another, because he doubted whether the condition of that country was such as to prove that the people were qualified for freedom. Let them glance for one moment at the history of 1815. The Emperor Alexander then participated in the feelings of England, and set honestly to work in order to carry out the dictates of the treaty that was to establish constitutional freedom in the portion of Poland which fell to Russia. But he was immediately met by a Roman Catholic movement, by a Jesuitical agency, stirring up disunion and strife, and what was the proof? The proof of it was this:—That in anticipation of establishing the state of things which England desired he was forced to expel the Jesuits from that country. This happy state of things, organized by the Emperor Alexander, in 1815, in the sense of England, lasted till 1820, and then the mischief that had been fomented broke out, and Russia had a right to say that she was forced to crush freedom. ["Oh, oh!"] Hon. Members said "No, no!"—[" Oh, oh!"]— but he asserted that the conduct of the Parliament of Poland, in 1820, was totally inconsistent with the understanding upon which the Emperor made the declaration quoted by the hon. Member. Let not the House be deceived. There were agencies at work in Poland that were not in favour of true freedom. With whom had the Emperor of Russia remonstrated against the fomentation of the troubles which had now broken out? With Rome. And Rome had refused to aid in the pacification of Poland, but sanctioned the action of her ultramontane bishops in that country. Let the House not be deceived, but remember that brigandage in Italy was characterized in this House as a struggle for the restoration of freedom. He had only risen to protest against the House being deceived, conceiving that by any hasty action of their own in the case of Poland, they might be hurrying the Government into that which might become a most serious complication, without being likely to advance in Poland the cause of true freedom.

MR. BUXTON

said, that every one who took an interest in Poland must be exceedingly obliged to the hon. and learned Member for the King's County (Mr. Hennessy) for the able speech in which he had introduced this subject to the House. From no part of that speech had he derived greater pleasure than from that passage in which the hon. and learned Member said that he did not advocate intervention by war, but only by diplomatic means. Every man of sense and humanity would deprecate our going to war on behalf of Poland. But while he deprecated any steps being taken by the British Government that could have any semblance of a tendency towards war, he thought there were solid grounds why the Government of England ought to utter on her behalf an earnest protest against the crimes of which Russia had been guilty, and still more against the barbarities which she might be tempted to commit if she prevailed—as he feared she would—in the re-conquest of Poland. Not only, however, ought the British Government to cause the voice of this country to be heard, but it would be well for that Government to do its utmost to persuade every civilized country—at any rate, every country of Europe—to unite with England in the utterance of the same views. The force of any protest would be increased tenfold if it were a unanimous expression of opinion by every people within the same quarter of the globe. It was sometimes laid down as a maxim that a nation should say nothing when it meant to do nothing; and very often, no doubt, well-meant protests had seemed to be utterly without avail. The experience of England and France with regard to Naples was not encouraging. In fact, a Government that knew it was not to be interfered with by force could always affect to treat its neighbours' protests with insolent contempt. The matter, however, might not really end there. The Government, thus remonstrated with, might treat such interference with scorn; but the victims whom she was wronging would look with affection on those who, of their own accord, had stepped forward to aid them; and the feeling would be deepened in the hearts of all men that the country which breaks through the law of justice and humanity isolates itself from mankind, and exposes itself to the indignant aversion of her sister kingdoms. It seemed to him that more and more as mankind went forward, the nations that lived side by side ought to form one organized whole —a commonwealth of nations. It would, in reality, tend towards that result that they should abstain from meddling by force with each other's affairs; but it would be well that they should not stand aloof from each other, as if the deeds of one were not a shame to the whole, but should combine to withhold each other from the crimes and follies of which they might else be guilty. And if ever it could be right for neighbourly Governments to join hand-in-hand in condemnation of the acts of any one Government, surely such a case had now arisen? Poland had been treated by Russia with shameful insult and shameful brutality. The whole aim of Russia had been to crush out the national feeling and patriotism of the Poles. She had set herself with a resolute purpose to grind them down under the heel of her despotism, and to break the spirit of a most gallant people. It seemed, indeed, a short time ago, that the Emperor, whose policy in other parts of his empire had been liberal and humane, had become alive to the folly and wickedness of this tyranny over Poland. He seemed, at length, to be catching sight of the truth, so obvious to every bystander, that unless Poland was to continue to be the weakness and the disgrace of the Russian empire, she must be treated with the reverence due to her rights. It appeared as though the wisdom which of late years had come over the policy of England in her treatment of her dependencies had reached the Czar, and it was dawning on him that by allowing Poland to become once more a people, enjoying her own institutions, though still under his sceptre, he would not only be doing that which was just and noble, but raising the Russian throne to a height of glory in the eyes of mankind which it had never reached before. The path lay straight before him towards rendering his empire stronger, while at the same time winning for himself the purest honour. From his other acts we might have deemed him worthy of such a policy; but, whether it was by his own fault, or that he was misled by wicked counsel, the terrible result of this change of conduct was before them. There was no occasion for him to dwell on that new and iniquitous act of tyranny—the attempt of the authorities to seize on every man whose education and energy of character might render him an efficient representative of his countrymen, and to send him off in all likelihood to perish in Siberia or the Caucasus. He did not hesitate to say that, barring the massacre of the women and children, that attempt was closely parallel to the mode in which the King of Dahomey seized on the young men of a Fellatah village in order to sell them into slavery. But though the cup of Polish wrath was filled to the very brim by this brutality, they still held themselves in check, and it was not till the pride of the whole nation had been trampled upon by the official proclamation, which averred that these young men had gladly offered themselves to the Russian recruiting sergeants, that the nation had burst forth at length into a hurricane of rage, and had filled the land with insurrection. If ever the doings of tyrants ought to call forth the indignant protest of the nations around, our Government ought not to pass over in silence such iniquities as these. Such a protest would not be idle. He was assured by those who knew much of Russian feeling, that they were singularly sensitive to the opinion of Europe. They were, above all things, afraid of being thought barbarians, and would shrink extremely from the solemn rebuke of their more civilized neighbours. It might be said that public opinion had been expressed loudly enough by the press of this country and of Europe. He heartily rejoiced that the press of this and of all civilized countries had spoken forth with such tremendous emphasis in condemnation of these outrages. But, after all, the members of a Government like that of Russia could have little time and little inclination for making themselves acquainted with what the newspapers of other countries might be saying; whereas the combined protest of England, France, Italy, Austria, Spain, Sweden, Norway, Holland, and Belgium—he heartily wished he could add the name of Prussia too— could not but ring in the ears of the Russian Emperor. An additional motive for making such a protest had been afforded by that transcendant meanness of which the King of Prussia had been guilty, in eagerly assuring Russia that he would do his part towards crushing the unfortunate Poles, and that his sympathies were now, as they ever had been, with the oppressor against the oppressed. A baser action than that Europe had not seen for many a long year. The King of Prussia, by the narrowness of his views and the stupidity of his treatment of his own people, had already awakened feelings in which indignation was mingled with contempt. But even the King of Prussia could hardly have been expected to proclaim his zeal in the great cause of consigning to death and slavery those who were simply rising up against brutal cruelties. Since the King had thus come forward to give his countenance to Russia, it would the more become other nations to show what all men but he were feeling in the very depths of their hearts. The position of Austria, again, afforded a further motive for such a course of conduct. Austria had shown herself worthy of the respect of Europe in her treatment of that portion of Poland which had fallen to her share. She had not sought to trample out the nationality of the Poles, nor to crush them under her foot; and the result was, that although Galicia might have some cravings to join the kingdom of Poland, should such a kingdom ever be restored, her people did not complain of the treatment of the Government to which they were consigned. He thought it would encourage Austria, and make her position less difficult, if all her sister nations expressed their abhorrence of the policy of Russia, with which her own stood in such gratifying contrast. Above all, they knew that France was resolved no longer to look on with tacit acquiescence at these deeds. He did not see why our Government should wait for the lead of France; nor, on the other hand, would it be possible for those who represented the British people to stand by in silence while France was taking energetic steps towards impressing on Russia and on Prussia the sentiments by which she is moved. It might be, too, that our joining ourselves with France in remonstrances would tend to hold her back from war. On the whole, looking at the atrocities that had been done, and the dire likelihood of still fouler deeds—seeing the real bent of the Czar's mind towards humanity—seeing what power in these days the voice of Christendom must have, if uttered firmly—seeing the step which Prussia had taken, the position in which Austria stood, and the decision to which France was tending— the motives seemed strong for our Government not to linger, but to call upon every Power, great or small, of Europe to join with England to condemn what was past, and to press upon Russia a wise and gentle policy in days to come.

MR. MONCKTON MILNES

Sir, although on former occasions those persons, Members of this House, who brought the question of Poland under discussion may be accused of having induced this House to go into a matter of theoretical polity rather than one of practical import, I do not think that my hot), and learned Friend opposite (Mr. Hennessy) or any Member on the other side of the House, can be accused of doing so on the present occasion. I do hope the House will fully estimate the value of this discussion tonight; because I apprehend that on the souse in which the Government of this country conceives this House to speak will depend to a very great degree the line of conduct which that Government will take in regard either to following any proposition of the Government of the Emperor of the French, or in initiating any measures of their own. If I be right in this apprehension, I think Her Majesty's Government will do well to follow the opinion of this House. Because the question is one that has long engaged the attention of mankind; it is one on which no Government could be authorized to act entirely on their own impulses, or their own private opinions—it is one in which they can only act with safety and with honour by obtaining the full support of this House and of the country, not only to the mea- sures which they adopt, but to the consequences which may result from them. Although I have no desire to suppose that the word "intervention" in the speech of my hon. and learned Friend opposite meant anything more than diplomatic intervention, and although I have no reason to believe that in the present aspect of Europe there is any immediate reason to suppose that diplomatic interposition would be accompanied by more serious measures; nevertheless I say that it becomes this House to look to the possible consequences of interposition; not to act blindly and one-sided in the matter, but to take a clear and comprehensive view, so as to feel, that if they do their duty in this matter by their country and by Europe, they may be perfectly at ease, whatever the consequences. It is no secret that this question at the present moment deeply agitates the French nation—it is no secret, because, and the fact may be gained from the history of Europe, the question of Poland does excite in the French people an interest so absorbing as to be altogether disproportionate to their interest in any other foreign affair whatever. It is very much as if all the sympathies which my hon. Friend the Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) feels for Italy were combined with all the sentiments entertained on the same subject by my worthy Friend the hon. Baronet the Member for Dundalk (Sir George Bowyer)—all the aspirations for liberty combined with all the ardour of religion. Therefore, I say, there can be no doubt the French people are ready to support the Emperor in any measures he may lake with regard to Poland, even though these measures should ultimately induce an appeal to arms. It becomes us, consequently, clearly to understand, whether it is our duty in this case to support any proposals for peaceable interposition which may be made by the Emperor of the French. The first consideration is, are we bound to do so by the state of the treaties? I own that I cannot read the Treaty of Vienna in any other sense than as determining the common consent at that time of all the Powers that Poland should enjoy, in a certain degree, the advantages of a comparatively free government. The history of that negotiation is curious in itself. Lord Castle-reagh—whose strong common sense comes out more and more as we grow familiar with his suggestions—was fully aware of all the difficulties which would encumber the question the moment free Poland was attached to despotic Russia. Therefore, all the interest of England was brought to bear with a view to constitute a large and independent Poland as an integral part of Europe. So far the conscience of England acquits her. She had taken no share in the partition of Poland, and at the great Congress of Nations she did all she could to rectify that wrong. But the other Powers were too strong for her, and the the arrangement was made by which Austria and Prussia each got a portion, and the Kingdom of Poland was constituted, with all the dignity of an independent people, and attached to the despotic empire of Russia. What Lord Castlereagh had anticipated naturally occurred; the difficulties of the position grew day by day, and were increased by the ill-will shown towards Poland by the Government of Russia. An intelligent and moderate Government might have surmounted the difficulties; but it was not in the power of human wisdom to combine the Government of Poland in an independent and liberal spirit with the increase and fostering of absolute despotism in Russia. I cannot agree with my hon. and learned Friend opposite that the insurrection of 1831 was not justified. It was provoked by a series of great insults, of dire cruelties, and of systematic oppression; and when the spirit of liberty broke out so freely, in some cases so wildly, as it did then in Europe, it was not in human nature that Poland should not have attempted to resist. The Emperor of Russia took advantage of that resistance; and though that view has not been distinctly formalized in any diplomatic document, yet I believe it is understood that the Russian Government consider that the Treaties of Vienna were cancelled, as regards Poland, by the insurrection of 1831, and that any power which Russia now exercises over Poland is no longer restrained by the faith of the Treaty of 1815, but that her dominion is held by the simple right of conquest. I cannot admit this doctrine, for several reasons, and mainly on this ground:—Whatever may be the immediate relations between Poland and Russia at the Treaty of Vienna, Russia nevertheless contracted towards the other Powers of Europe such obligations as would justify them in holding this language towards her:— "You have no right to keep in the centre of Europe a focus of continual discontent, when the wisdom of mankind has taught us that to hold a recalcitrant nation by the mere means of force is not only impolitic in itself, but intolerable in its consequences. You have no right to keep Poland in a state of chronic insurrection; you have no right to impose a condition of perpetual disturbance on your neighbours of Austria and Prussia; yon have no right to threaten the peace of Europe, in which we are all concerned." The circumstances of history are very seldom parallel, but I would call the attention of the House to an instance bearing some resemblance to the mute appeal which is now made by Poland. In 1809 the people of the Tyrol wore attacked by the combined armies of France and Bavaria. They made an appeal to England, at that time under a Tory Government, not supposed to give its countenance to anything favouring revolutionary designs, and with the leave of the House I will read a passage from the answer given to the Deputies of the Tyrol by Lord Bathurst. After expressing his regret at the event he says— When submission is in effect more hazardous than resistance, or when the dangers attending on each are nearly balanced, a brave nation may be encouraged justifiably to prefer the latter alternative; but when by resistance the sufferings of those engaged in it must be grievous, and the hopes of its success cannot possibly be great, it is not for those who are not to participate in the danger to counsel others to incur it. But the despatch did not end here. Lord Bathurst added — If, however, the remembrance of past happiness, the sense of recent, wrongs, the expectation of renewed oppression, the character of the country, the habits and spirit of the people, shall decide them to persist, His Majesty cannot but give some testimony of the interest which he takes in the issue of a contest too unequal, he fears, to be availing, but which he knows to be just. I take that to be the spirit of the counsel which Her Majesty's Government ought to give on the present occasion. We must not delude ourselves by false hopes. The character of the Russian Government is well known, and their stern and cool-headed statesmen will estimate our interference at what it is worth. I think that it is worth something in two ways. It is worth something in itself, and my hon. and learned Friend has justly said, that Russia is not now unamenable to public opinion. The people and Government of Russia are now conscious that they are on the threshold of a new order of things. The emancipa- tion of the serfs and the comparatively enfeebled position of Russia as a military Power in Europe should impress on the Russian people the consciousness that they can no longer combine in their policy the astuteness of the West and the primitive barbarism of the East. The press is beginning to have its influence. Newspapers are no longer confined to her capital, but traverse the uttermost limits of her dominions. She knows, too, that the perpetration of perpetual injustice is not only viewed as a crime in the eyes of Europe, but that it will prove a great impediment to her internal progress as well as to her external policy. Russia also knows that the military strength of England, although physically inferior to that of France, will yet weigh considerably when thrown into the balance with that of France. Add to the enthusiasm of Franco the deep conviction of duty on the part of the people of England, and you will get a stress of public opinion that will not bear upon Russia in vain. Therefore, I believe that I am not inaccurately interpreting the feeling of this House when I say, that if overtures are made to the Government to express to the Emperor of Russia the strong opinion—I will use a stronger word, and say the indignation of this country at his persistence in a line of Government which can only be maintained by atrocities such as have lately occurred, they ought not to be ignored by this House or by Her Majesty's Government. I know that many excuses are made for these acts. There were plenty of good and learned excuses made for the Massacre of St. Bartholomew and for the Sicilian Vespers. There is not a coup d'état that does not find its apologists, nor one that has not, viewed from one side, its excuses. The Russian Government may say that they were compelled to adopt this larcenous oppression of carrying off thousands of men to serve in their distant armies by the fear of a national insurrection. But why did they provoke that insurrection? Why, when they got to a state of things in which the aristocratic element and good sense of the community were enlisted against them— why, when the movement was clearly seen to he one not of excited revolutionists, but was conducted by the most temperate, the richest, and the best men of the country—why did the Government take advantage of that moment to attempt to turn the perfectly constitutional proceedings of the people of Poland into vio- lent and angry revolution? Therefore, do not let the Government of Russia represent that the state of Poland rendered this act one of State necessity. The future of Poland hangs in the balance. I have no hope that the mere military power of Poland will not succumb to the arms of Russia. But it will be well if by our interposition we try to modify materially so awful a state of things. The conduct of Prussia has been visited with deep censure not only in this country but throughout Europe. We have not only a strong dynastic, but almost a personal interest in the welfare of Prussia; but the wishes and sympathies of this House go with the rising liberty, the constitutional and moderate liberty of the Prussian people. I am sure that this is not a case in which we can interfere; but we may exhibit to the Parliament of that country that our interest and sympathies are with them in this hour of trial and danger, and we may assure them, that if by such means as their constitution allows them they show their just reprobation of the Government of Russia, they will acquire the esteem and admiration of this country. To Prussia at the present moment we should address the language of moderate remonstrance. To Russia we should speak in a tone of just and manly indignation; and I trust that Her Majesty's Government will rightly convey and express these sentiments. If they do this, they will not misinterpret the feelings of the House.

MR. WALTER

Sir, I listened with deep interest to the able and eloquent address of the hon. and learned Member for the King's County. But I am bound to say that the enthusiasm which the hon. Member excited in my mind with respect to Poland dropped down at once from boiling point to zero, when, at the close of his speech, he informed the House that the interference he contemplated was not of a military but of purely a diplomatic character. However strong our sympathies may be—and we have proof enough that the sympathies of the people of England are strongly in favour of Poland—we ought not to be misunderstood on so important a question. The Resolutions which the hon. and learned Member has moved consist of sundry recitals of the well-known state of Poland; but they end in a practical conclusion of so serious a character that I trust the House will permit me to read the last paragraph once more. The conclusion which the hon. and learned Member desires the House to adopt is as follows:— "Humbly to submit to Her Majesty that these facts demand the interposition of England in vindication of her own public faith and solemn engagements." Sir, that language, if it means anything, means war. It ought to mean war. England ought not to counsel her Sovereign to use such language, if diplomatic action alone is to be taken. I do not wish to prejudge the question at issue, or to give, at present, an opinion upon it. But I wish the House to understand that when the House of Commons asserts that England is bound to interpose in vindication of her own public faith and solemn engagements, it must be prepared to support the Sovereign in giving effect to that language. I trust that the Government will not be misled into believing that this Address expresses no other meaning than that which may be conveyed by a Queen's messenger. I think I may even say that it would be degrading to the majesty of England to place such language in the mouth of the Sovereign, if nothing more is to be done. I shall not pretend to go into the question which the hon. and learned Member has opened. I leave that for persons better qualified than I am to discuss it. The time may arrive, or, for all I know, the time has arrived, when it may be necessary for England to act. But whether that time has arrived or not, I trust that the House will believe that England is bound to give effect to her language, and not to place in the lips of the Sovereign words that say so much when the hon. Gentleman who proposes them means so little.

MR. DENMAN

said, he also felt very strongly the objections just stated by the hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter). The hon. and learned Member (Mr. Hennessy) stated that he only contemplated diplomatic intervention; but he (Mr. Den-man) agreed in thinking the House could not possibly agree to the last paragraph of the Address unless it were prepared immediately to go to war; and that to put upon the records of the House a Resolution pledging themselves to "interposition," especially to "interposition in vindication," if not followed up by a speedy declaration of war, would expose them to the charge of using idle words without any real intention of acting upon them. While however, he would counsel moderate action on the part of the Government, and while he deprecated the use of such lan- guage as that in which the last Resolution was couched, he differed from the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton) in thinking that under no possible circumstances should any other than diplomatic action be resorted to by the Government. He could not approve of diplomatic negotiations commenced with an understanding that in no eventuality were they to be followed by war. Therefore, he should be anxious to pass such a Resolution only as would strengthen the hands of the Government in the proposed diplomatic negotiations; but he would not tie the hands of the Government by telling the Russian Government, that however atrocious their violation of treaties, however wicked and cruel the conduct of Russia towards Poland might be, the English Government would not be prepared to go to war with Russia. The necessary alteration in the Address might, he thought, be made by omitting the words of the last paragraph after the word "demand," and by substituting words which would make the paragraph read as follows:— "Humbly to submit to Her Majesty that these facts loudly demand the serious and immediate consideration of Her Majesty's Government." The House would then do in its collective capacity what every speaker (unless the hon. Member for North Warwickshire were an exception) had done tonight individually, and express its strong and ardent sympathy for Poland. He had felt, when the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegale) rose, that he would hardly be two minutes on his legs without saying something to show that the want of sympathy with Poland which he showed arose from the fact that she was a Roman Catholic nation. He could not help thinking that the hon. Member allowed his judgment to be I warped by that fact; but it was to be hoped that—ardent sympathizer with liberty as he knew his hon. Friend to be—he would become a convert to more liberal views. It ought to be remembered that a clown-trodden and oppressed country was the very country where plotters, Jesuits, and all the miserable engines of tyranny have a sway such as they never can have where freedom prevails. By an honest expression of opinion in favour of Poland, and by thus helping her to become free, the hon. Gentlemen would find that those things which now so much disquieted him would all disappear. Until she was free they never would disappear.

MR. NEWDEGATE

explained that all he had said was that the speech made on a former occasion by the noble Lord at the head of the Government had convinced him that he required no prompting in favour of Poland, and to urge that the matter might be safely left to the discretion of the Government.

MR. DENMAN

He was glad to hear that that was the opinion of the hon. Gentleman. He imagined that the hon. Gentleman had spoken disparagingly of Poland, and of her right to freedom, because of the great number of Jesuits in that country. As to leaving the cause of Poland in the hands of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, there was no man in whose hands that cause was likely to suffer less than in his; but, at the same time, the influence of the Government would be greatly strengthened by a unanimous expression of the opinion of that House. He therefore hoped that, without cither pledging themselves to go to war in this matter or declaring that under no circumstances whatever would they be prepared to go to war, the House would agree to a decided Resolution in favour of Poland.

LORD FERMOY

said, he felt the full force of the remarks of the hon. and learned Gentleman who had just sat down; but he thought, that if they desired that debate to have any moral effect in Europe, they must not be nervous about putting on record a strong Resolution conveying their opinion of the conduct of Russia towards Poland. It had been said that this country was not responsible for the partition of Poland—that might be so—but England was, he believed, morally responsible for many of the unfortunate results to that country from the non-fulfilment of the Treaty of Vienna. It was not enough to say, as the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. Monckton Milnes) had done, that Lord Castlereagh, our Plenipotentiary in 1815, advocated the independence of Poland at Vienna. To the final decisions of the Congress, England was a party in conjunction with the other Powers who signed the treaty. Poland herself was not responsible, for all through her history she had protested strenuously against her oppressors. Under these circumstances it was his opinion that that House—the oldest, freest, and most distinguished assembly in Europe—should now adopt a unanimous Resolution emphatically con- demning the acts of Russia. When the hon. and learned Member for the Kings County placed on the paper the Motion which he had introduced with so much ability and moderation, he (Lord Fermoy) had thought that there could not be in the British House of Commons any other sentiment than one of unanimous condemnation of the conduct of Russia— how much, therefore, had he been astonished to hear the hon. Member for North Warwickshire vindicating that Power, and saying practically that the Poles were not worthy of liberty. His astonishment, however, was lessened when the hon. Member gave his reason for that, because when that hon. Gentlemen smelt something of the Pope in this matter, it was not so surprising, perhaps, that he should have come to such a conclusion. Still, could any man read in the newspapers the accounts of the atrocities committed by the Russians in Poland—the deeds of rapine, rape, kidnapping, and murder, and not be moved by them? The people of Poland were, indeed, of a different religion from the hon. Member; but was that a reason why the people of England should not Sympathize with them in their sufferings. Our responsibility for the condition of Poland was heavy. She had never been a party to her own dismemberment and degradation. She had suffered three partitions and she had taken every legitimate opportunity to protest against them. Russia had done everything in her power to foment discontent among the Poles, to get up conspiracies among them and exasperate them to violence, in order to find an excuse for massacring and expatriating them. In 1831, when Poland carried out a partially successful revolution and formed a Provisional Government, the Powers who made the arrangements of 1815 should have met and admitted her into the family of nations. The contracting Powers ought, then, to have insisted on her freedom. That opportunity was, however, lost. Another now presented itself. After employing in vain every kind of peaceful remonstrance, and been subjected only to increased outrage, the Poles had taken up arms. It was incumbent, therefore, upon this country, in vindication of its own character and honour, to act, and to act promptly, on this occasion. He did not say that we should rush headlong into war; but the Government must be the best judges of the right mode of interfering, and the onus of doing so judi- ciously and effectually ought to he thrown upon them. If Poland were restored to independence, she would be a friend to this country in any European troubles, and an important trade with her might easily be developed. Looking back to the past history of Poland, it would he found that she had always exhibited a tendency towards free trade, while Russia was one of the most decidedly protectionist Powers of the day. With a free Poland, then, England would be likely to have secured a considerable increased custom for her manufactures, while we should have additional facilities for procuring those raw materials which we required. Setting aside, then, all feeling of sympathy or philanthropy, and looking at the question merely in a practical and commercial point of view, there was every reason why we should lend our aid towards the re-establishment of Polish independence. The line of conduct, he might add, which Prussia was pursuing in the case of the Poles was an eternal disgrace to her Government. She was, to use a vulgar phrase, holding a candle to the Devil, and he thought she would before long find enough to do in settling accounts with her own people. Meantime, however, with France on our side, and with Austria ready, as he believed she was, to assist us in bringing about a satisfactory solution of the Polish question, he had not the slightest doubt that we might in conjunction with those two Powers effect much in that direction. If in concert England, France, and Austria were to come to the resolution to insist that Russia should either take the alternative of adhering honestly to the Treaty of Vienna, or be prepared to see them come to the support of Poland in the endeavour to win her freedom, we might depend upon it that there would be no war—that Russia would either do justice to Poland or she would be set altogether free; and in contributing to the accomplishment of that result we should have acquired for ourselves not only the gratitude of Poland and the thanks of the world, but we should have done more to secure the future peace of Europe than if the House of Commons were to hesitate for ever about the mere drawing up of a Resolution.

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

Sir, I should be sorry that this debate should be closed without my having asked permission of the House to address to it a few observations. My hon. Friend the Member for the King's County, has received a deserved tribute of admiration and gratitude from all those who have addressed the House this evening, for bringing under our consideration to-night, in a speech not more remarkable for its judgment and its discretion than for its information and ability, this important subject. I am sure he also deserves the thanks of every friend of Poland for his exertions in her cause, not only upon this but upon former occasions; and he deserves the thanks of every one who has the peace of Europe at heart—that peace which I believe in my conscience can never be thoroughly secured so long as the ulcer of Polish oppression is allowed to fester in the heart of the Continent. I am sure also that he deserves the thanks of the House for the persistence with which he has, year after year, brought forward this question. He has now so impressed that question on the attention of the House, that instead of addressing a few Members scattered at frequent intervals upon the benches of this House; he is this evening enabled to lay the wrongs of Poland before a full and attentive House. I say emphatically, he deserves most truly the gratitude of every friend of Poland. Sir, this question has certainly assumed a different complexion to-night from that which it has borne in former years. In former years this was a question that was classed among measures advocated by those who were by politicians spoken of as being of a rather enthusiastic turn. Every one who admires the bravery of the Polish nation, their love of country, which nothing has been able and nothing will ever be able to extinguish; their patience under suffering, their enthusiastic resistance to tyranny—and every Englishman admires qualities like these—cannot fail to express his sympathy for the Polish cause whenever an opportunity occurs in this House. But now, as the hon. Member for the King's County, has pointed out, the question has entered into a different phase; and I believe that, instead of its being a question reserved for the consideration only of the generous and the enthusiastic, there is no more practically urgent question at this time demanding the attention of the statesmen of Europe than the position of the Polish people. And this consideration becomes more important to us when we reflect that at this moment, I believe, the solution of this question rests, in a great degree, with Her Majesty's Government. I believe that at no time and upon no question, has there been among us a more solemn sense of responsibility than now presses on England with regard to Poland. Now, Sir, let us look for a moment at what is the position of France in regard to this question, and what is now passing in that country. The hon. Member for the King's County has pointed out — what we all know —the enthusiasm that has always been felt for the Polish cause among every class of the French people, the generous sympathy which has always been expressed at the sufferings of the Polish people. What has of late taken place? Every one whom I have the honour of addressing, knows what, for a length of time, has been the position of the press in France. Upon no question cither of internal or external policy had the expression of an opinion been allowed in the French press: reports had been criticised and curtailed before they were allowed to be published: if the rules and regulations of the Minister of the Interior were broken, a warning was sent to the offending journal, and, sooner or later, the result was its suspension. But those who have remarked what has been lately going on in France, must have observed that the tone and temper of the French journals has altogether changed. In the case of the Polish insurrection, from the first the papers were allowed to publish exact reports of everything that was said; comments next made their appearance; and now, so far from being limited to comment and report, there is scarcely a journal in France that does not express in burning language the enthusiastic sympathy of the French people with Poland, and call on the Government to give expression to that enthusiasm and to that sympathy. In this, I think a significant proof is furnished of what it may be assumed is the latent opinion of the Government of France. But let us consider for one moment what may be the possible effect of this stirring up these enthusiastic feelings in France upon the course of the French Government, and consequently upon the state of the affairs of Europe. It is perfectly possible that this sympathy and this enthusiasm in the cause of Poland, may give such impulse to the French Government, that instead of taking that position which, I think, the French Government is anxious to take, of acting in diplomatic conceit with Her Majesty's Government, and giving the fullest support to the Polish cause, the French Government may find themselves in the position of having a public opinion in France too strong for them to resist; and then consequences may occur to Europe of an importance that cannot be magnified, results that it is fearful to contemplate at this time; and it would be a poor consolation for us to reflect that it was owing to the timidity of an English House of Commons, and the over-caution of a Liberal Administration, that such consequences had resulted. Again, let us look for one moment at the position of Austria. My hon. Friend the Member for the King's County has pointed out with the greatest truth what are the traditions of that empire. But this must always be remembered with reference to Austria and to the politics of that part of Europe-—it can never be expected that on n question of this kind Austria should take the initiative. On the one side she has Russia, and on the other France; and her whole policy has been a consideration how best to promote her own policy by acting in concert with the most powerful party. Therefore, there is nothing more important than that England should take the initiative and join with France; and I am as firmly convinced as I can be of anything not capable of mathematical proof, that if we take such a course, in common with France, Austria will not only be willing, but will be anxious to give her cooperation on behalf of Poland. My hon. and learned Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Denman), the hon. Member for Pontefract (Mr. M. Milnes), and the hon. Member for Berks (Mr. Walter), now find fault with the Resolution of my hon. Friend because it is too strong. It meant war, said the hon. Member for Tiverton, or it meant nothing. I differ from that opinion. More than that—it appears to me impossible for any one to agree to the statement of facts contained in the Resolution and then to be satisfied with the lame and impotent conclusion at which the hon. and learned Member for Tiverton would have the House arrive—that we should conclude by saying that these things "deserve the early attention of Her Majesty's Government." What does the first part of the Resolutions embody? It contains a statement that the great Powers of Europe entered into a solemn compact and agreement intended for the pacification of Europe, and that to it all the great Powers were bound: it goes on to say that this compact has been flagrantly and notoriously violated by the Government of Russia; that this conduct on the part of Russia has been stigmatized by the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government in the most solemn terms; and having said that the treaty was intended to pacify Europe, that all the Powers of Europe were parties, and that its obligations have been violated, we are to come to the weak and impotent conclusion that Her Majesty's Government are to take these circumstances into their early consideration.

MR. DENMAN

The words I wished to introduce were much stronger. The words were—" the serious and immediate consideration of Her Majesty's Government."

MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALD

It does not help the hon. and learned Gentleman much to say that when the law of Europe has been trampled upon for a number of years, the matter deserves the serious and immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government. The objections that are taken to the Resolutions were two-fold. The hon. and learned Member for Tiverton objects that our proceedings should take the shape of a Resolution, and not of an Address to the Crown. I must entirely differ from him on that point. In the first place, an Address to the Crown is a more solemn proceeding than a Resolution of this House; and I wish the House of Commons to proceed in the most emphatic and solemn manner possible. But beyond that, Her Majesty is a party to the treaty which has been violated; and it was against her that the most flagrant breach of public faith has been committed. And therefore I say the right form of proceeding is the Resolution for an Address to Her Majesty. But we are told that intervention necessarily means war. Why? Surely there are solemn cases demanding the interposition of England which can be made without meaning war, or expressing, as an hon. Gentleman opposite said, a determination on the part of this country never to go to war. Here is a treaty to which all the Powers of Europe are parties, and by which they are bound. Would it not he a solemn interposition to call together the parties to that treaty, and in the face of Europe to charge the Russian Government with falsity to their obligations? Would that not be an interposition on the part of this country that could not fail to have an immediate and important effect on the public opinion of Europe and, I believe, of Russia? And is not the course proposed, that we should act in harmony with France, in harmony with Austria, in harmony with the great Powers of Europe—is not that an interposition of England in vindication of her own public faith and solemn engagement? I, for one, return my thanks to the hon. Member for the King's County, who has brought this question before us in the way he has done. I thank him personally for the opportunity which he has afforded me of expressing opinions which I deeply feel. Only this morning I saw one of the most distinguished Poles—whose name is a passport to the confidence of his fellow-countrymen and to the admiration of Europe as a pure and sincere patriot— and he told me that for years he had cherished the certainty in his heart that Po-land would be restored to the family of nations. He said he felt her cause was just, and, being just, sooner or later Providence, in its own good time, would bring about its consummation; and now, be added, that time has arrived. I implore the House of Commons not, by refusing to assent to this Address, to daunt that hope and that expectation,

MR. STANSFELD

said, that if the hon. Gentleman the Member for Horsham (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald) was justified, as he thought he was, in tendering thanks to the hon. Member for the King's County, he might be permitted to make his acknowledgments, not for the ability with which the hon. Member had spoken, but for the opportunity given to the right hon. Gentleman to utter those generous words which deserved all their sympathy. They had to deal with questions of fact, and with the grave question, what course, in this emergency, the House of Commons ought to pursue. There could he hardly any doubt about the facts, and, in spite of the opinions of the hon. Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Nowdegate) he did not think there could be any serious difference of opinion upon the character of the proceedings of the Russian Government. The insurrection was caused—nay, was compelled by the conscription. The Poles had no choice but to rise. An ordinary conscription was levied on the whole male population of a whole country by lot, with protection against chance bearing too hardly upon the members of one family, and with the privilege of providing substitutes. This conscription for the Russian finny was levied upon the population only of the towns of Poland, without any ex- emptions, and every man was, in fact, named by the Russian Police. They all knew how this conscription, if it could be so called, was carried out on the night of the 14th of January. It amounted, neither more nor less, to the wholesale deportation of the élite of the youth of Poland. It was a barefaced scheme—a barefaced device—for sweeping into one huge net all that was patriotic, all that was free-spirited, and all that was progressive in the country; a device for carrying away bodily all who were the promise of their country, and for consigning them to a doom which every Polish mother would feel was worse than death. To such a conscription it was simply an impossibility to submit, and the Poles had no choice but to resist. He would not dwell upon the heroism displayed by the Poles in the unequal struggle. It had been, in the beginning at least, almost an unarmed insurrection; for their cannons were made from the tree which but yesterday flourished in the forest, and their guns had been snatched from the hands of a soldiery very numerous, infinitely better disciplined and armed, against whom they had unhesitatingly marched, some with the national weapon, the scythe, but some—he spoke the literal fact—with only clubs in their hands. He would not stay to dwell on the well-known heroism of the Poles; he preferred to hasten onward to a question which it appeared to him of the highest importance that they should know how to regard in the discussion in which they were engaged that night. He wanted to know what were the motives of the conscription. He desired to ascertain how it was that Russia was tempted to pursue a course which had roused the indignant wonder of the whole civilized world. Was it wanton—was it an unreasoning and capricious act? Was it one of those acts of arbitrary blind cruelty which the possession of despotic power sometimes tempted its possessors to indulge? He thought that was not the real character of the act, and he considered it of the utmost importance that they should inquire as to the origin of such a proceeding. After the failure of the insurrection of 1830, and after the European movement of 1848 and 1849 bad passed over without any overt response on the part of the Polish people, there were perhaps not many who did not begin at least to fear that the life of a nation had been too successfully crushed out. If they did entertain that fear, the movement of the last two years must have convinced them that that fear was unfounded. And let him, in passing, ask the attention of the House to the new character of that movement—to the hopeful and vital character of a movement which included within itself, and which he might say originated with, and was directed by, the middle classes, for the first time coming upon the battle-field in that unhappy country. He said this movement which was now going on must have convinced them that that fear was unfounded. Well, if that were so, was it not clear that there were only two courses open to the Czar? If Russia were not prepared to retrace her steps, and to go back, if not to the constitution of the ancient kingdom of Poland, at least to what the hon. Gentleman (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald) desired that she should do, the observance of the treaty stipulations by which she was bound—if, he said, Russia were not prepared to retrace her steps, it was necessary for her to meet this portentously rising movement by some definitive policy; and if she could not avert it, it must ultimately be quenched in blood. Now, the peculiar misfortune of the Polish people was this— that to execute that purpose a Polish nobleman had been found — a man of undoubted ability, a man of great force of character and will, but a man of arrogant and perverted views. He would now make a statement which he thought no one would be able to contradict; he ventured to say that when Count Wielopolski accepted the position of Civil Governor of Poland, the faculty in reserve of levying this conscription in the very manner in which it had been brought about was one of the terms of his appointment. If there should be any doubt as to the predetermination in this matter of the Russian Government, there was ample evidence to confirm the view which he took. In the mouth of November last a private circular was issued from the Department of Home Affairs in Poland to the civil Governors of that kingdom. With the permission of the House he would read one or two passages from that document— Considering," it said, "that the persons whose business it would be to select persons for the military conscription from the nominal lists drawn up with this object should possess the necessary information, not only respecting the social position and occupation of those included in such lists, but also of their political conduct; and inasmuch as one of the chief principles and objects of this conscription is to get rid of those people who by their conduct have disturbed public order, these functions are to be performed— Then the letter went on to indicate the persons who were to make out those lists. A little further on was the following:— The Council of Administration also brings to notice that it will be the duty of every recruiting district to provide a certain number of recruits, who shall be especially chosen from among people having no permanent occupation, without work, and at the same time unfavourably noted as to their political conduct during the late events. Then the document concluded by impressing the necessity of the closest secrecy in the preparation of the lists— Finally," so ended the despatch, "you will warn the employés concerned that the business relating to the conscription should be carried on with the greatest quickness, energy, and firmness of conduct, and that all instances of neglect or failure in this matter will entail severe responsibility on their authors. If that were not confirmatory evidence enough of the predetermination in this matter of the Russian Government, he might, refer to an article in the official journal of St. Petersburg of the 5th of February, in which the writer admitted that this measure of conscription was abnormal, in which he designated it as a political act, and in which he justified it on this ground:—That it not being possible to reach the heads of the insurrectionary movement, it was necessary to make an example, and to collect and remove their miserable instruments who still remained within reach of the Russian Government. He said, then, that this act of the Russian Government was no wanton and unconsidered act; he said it was not an act which admitted of facile reparation, or of avoidance in the future. On the contrary, it was the consummation of a predetermined and deliberate policy. He had almost said that it was the consummation of an inevitable policy. Three great Powers had combined in the original crime of the partition of Poland, and the rest of Europe looked on. Then, after the long wars of Napoleon, came the peace and the Treaties of 1815, when, if there had been virtue—he would say common sense— enough, in the councils of the great Powers, that great error and that great crime would have been redressed. But that occasion was also passed over. Hence they had the movement of 1830; and after a long and weary interval of apparent, but only apparent, submission, they had this new and still more promising and pregnant movement, this insurrection which now existed on Polish soil. That insurrection, it was too true, might, like former ones, be quenched in blood; but it would without doubt leave behind it some spark of life, some smouldering fire, sooner or later to burst into a flame which might well become a European conflagration. He desired to take no mere enthusiast's view of this question. He did not, in any degree, ignore the difficulty which must be felt by statesmen to surround its solution; but this at least he would venture to say, that it was impossible to state too strongly the claims of the Polish people on the ground of right, on the ground of treaties, on the grounds of their heroism and their sufferings. He would add, that it would be impossible for this House too loudly and too clearly to express its sympathy with the Polish cause; and however great the difficulties of the solution of this question might be, he would say this to the noble Lord who presided over the councils of this country, that the Polish question had proved itself to be one of those great national questions of which it might be said, that until they were solved, they could have no sure and abiding peace. Now, there was another phase of this question upon which he would ask leave to say one or two words. Prussia had begun to play her part. He would not stop to apply to the part which Prussia had begun to play the epithets which would be necessary to define its character. Suffice it to say, that it constituted so flagrant an outrage upon what he would call the very decencies of international law and usage, and that no great Power could venture to overlook those proceedings without sharing in the shame. Prussia had been volunteering the part of spy and gendarme to Russia. She listened for the footfall of those noble Polish youths, who, urged on by an irrepressible instinct, hurried across her soil to seek their fathers' home; she waylaid, she entrapped, she made prisoners of those young men; and, without the slightest evidence even of the crime of a patriotic intent, she handed them over the frontier to the tender mercies of the Czar. Then there was the convention which had been recently concluded between Prussia and Russia. Was there ever such a degradation heaped upon an enlightened nation by those who should be the guardians and protectors of its honour? Their own soil to be made human shambles, upon which a brutal and foreign soldiery were to come to pursue and slaughter defenceless fugitives! If England could brook such acts as those, then, he said, the day of shame in England was come—the time was then come when it would be well that we should at once make confession of our impotence of power or of will, and turning our backs upon Europe, should sit down and count the profits of honour abandoned, and of the most sacred duties of a nation despised and set at naught. It seemed to him that some action on the part of the Government of this country, and some action on the part of that House were imperative in that emergency. Coming now to the Motion of the hon. and learned Gentleman, he must admit that there were in his mind objections to its concluding paragraph. He did not know how they were in a matter of this grave importance to tie the hands of a Government, in which he presumed they all meant in this case to confide; for to no Government in which they could not confide would he intrust the treatment of so difficult a question. But there was another objection, from his own point of view, to the conclusion of the Motion. He did not know how far they would commit themselves by going back upon treaties which had been so often violated, if not without notice, certainly with impunity, by all the Powers of Europe. If he might venture to suggest the course of action for the Government of this country, he would, at least with reference to Prussia, take his stand upon a different, a clearer, and, as he thought, a higher ground. He would appeal to the principle of non-intervention—a principle recognised but only partially observed in the practice of European nations. He had long thought, that if there were a direction in which the course of the future of this country was clear—if there were a function specially fitted for this country to fulfil, one suited to her character, to her position, and to her power—one conducive more than anything else to the freedom and the independence of nations and to lasting peace, it was the practical assertion of that principle, without which the intercourse of nations was but anarchy upon an extended scale. To that principle he would make his appeal, and he ventured to express a confident opinion that that appeal would not be made in vain. Whether the protest of this country were made in conjunction with foreign Powers—and in that case it was needless to say it would have to be made with certain evidently requisite guarantees—or whether it were made, as he confessed to his mind appeared preferable, in the name of this country alone— that protest, endorsed as it would be known to be by the unanimous adhesion of the people—that protest could not, he repeated, be made in vain. It could not fail to be of some real service to a gallant and outraged people—it could not fail to result in one step gained towards that which he believed to be essential to the future peace of Europe—towards the real and practical recognition of the principle and law of non-intervention as binding upon all the nations of the world.

LORD ROBERT CECIL

said, that when he saw the hon. Member for Halifax (Mr. Stansfeld) rise to address the House, he could not look without a feeling approaching to consternation at the prospect of being com polled upon that occasion to vote with the eloquent and accomplished pupil of Mazzini. He had no doubt that he should have to go into the same lobby upon that question with several Gentlemen with whom he did not ordinarily agree; and he was therefore desirous of explaining the grounds on which he should support the Motion. He had never before heard a debate in which so much unanimity prevailed. Every Member who had addressed the House sympathized deeply with the sufferings of the Poles. The debate had been all on one side, with the exception of his hon. Friend the Member for North Warwickshire (Mr. Newdegate).

MR. NEWDEGATE

said, he wished to explain. He had done no more than express a hope that the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), who he thought might be trusted on that question, would use all his influence for the purpose of mitigating the present state of things in Poland.

LORD ROBERT CECIL

said, he was glad to be corrected, and to know that so far not one single voice had been raised to defend the conduct of Russia, or to express anything but the deepest sympathy for the sufferings of the Polish people. It was hardly possible, indeed, to conceive any assembly of free men, enjoying peace in their own homes, not sympathizing with such sufferings. It would seem as if the hordes of Zengis Khan had come to life again, and poured down upon the plains of unhappy Poland. If that were a rebellion of the ordinary kind, or even if it were a case of a Government striving to suppress a righteous insurrection of its subjects, however brutal might be the mode of its suppression, he should say it was not the duty of this country to interfere by word or deed. But this was not a case of ordinary insurrection, or of brutality practised by the governors on the governed. In the present case we had a direct locus standi, inasmuch as we were parties to a treaty by which the Emperor Alexander had so lemnly engaged that Poland should obtain representative institutions. It was true that treaty had been violated as soon as it was made; but, nevertheless, it still existed. It was made under the sanction of England, and England was pledged in honour never to recognise any infraction, or to omit any legitimate opportunity of recording her indignation at the violation of that great act of international law. He had heard it remarked in the course of the discussion that the treaty had been too often broken to be of any value. That was a mode of arguing insulting to the honour and dignity of England. It was not our business to ask what had happened in other cases. We were bound by a covenant. Our honour was concerned in the fulfilment of a certain promise to which we were parties, and on every occasion when it was in our power we were bound to enforce that promise. It was asked what good could be done by a protest; and it was also said that the Resolution could only mean war. He could see no ground for that interpretation. In fact, even if justifiable, the idea of war was absurd. This country could not reach Poland, and a country which could not be reached by a maritime Power was not one for which we could properly make war. But the great point in this matter was that we were bound to record our protest against a great violation of public law. We were evidently on the eve of great events. The revolution in Poland did not seem likely to be soon suppressed. There was even a probability that it might pass into Russia; and there might possibly be a great disturbance of the European equilibrium. The policy which England now pursued would be that by which she would afterwards be bound, and which would ensure to her either the gratitude or the hatred of the populations concerned. No lapse of time could make a treaty nugatory. No neglect of the provisions of a treaty on former occasions could lessen the obligations of those who were parties to it. He would vote for the Motion, not merely because he sympathized deeply with the sufferings of the people of Poland, but because he desired to vindicate the honour, and dignity, and good faith of England.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

said, he must confess that the arguments winch the noble Lord opposite (Lord Robert Cecil) had addressed to the House confirmed him in the belief that England was bound by treaty obligations to interfere; and if we abstained from interference on this occasion, we should make ourselves, to a certain extent, parties to the atrocities that had been inflicted by the Russians upon the Polish nation. Russia had proved, by the efforts of many years, her inability to govern Poland, and this was strongly felt by the Russians themselves. Russia was disorganized by the frequent attempts to crush the spirit of the Poles; the Russian army in Poland was far from being well-affected to the flag under which they served; and the civil service in Poland was so corrupt and unable to discharge the duties devolving upon it as to draw down shame upon the Government of the Emperor. Russia itself was tired of the strife, and this was evidently a time when the state of the country did afford considerable hope that any effort that was now made in the interest of Poland by the various Powers of Europe would be likely to prove successful; and, moreover, he thought it probable that Austria, the Northern States of Europe, and perhaps the whole of Germany, would be ready to combine to assist the Poles in resisting the Russian atrocities; for Poland, reconstituted into an independent kingdom, would form a most important barrier for Germany against Russia, which was at present advanced into the very heart of Germany. He thought that the part which Prussia had taken in this affair had drawn shame and disgrace—not upon the people, for he believed that the Prussian people disapproved of the conduct of the Government—but upon the Monarch and his Government. It should be remembered, with respect to the present strife in Poland, that there had been a fixed purpose on the part of the Russian Government to provoke the Polish nation into an insurrection. The Poles had acquired moral strength by the passive resistance which they had hitherto offered to the Russian rule, and the Russian Government had determined to break it. Domiciliary visits were paid to the inhabitants at the dead of night, in order that the police might satisfy themselves that the conscripts were in their places; and when the Polish noblesse, having been invited by the Russian Government to state their grievances, presented a respectful address, they were arrested and thrown into prison, and Count Zamayski, who presented it, was banished to England; and this must have been done by the Russian Government because they knew that these were the very men whose calmness and good sense would be exerted to prevent their countrymen from rising in insurrection. In fact, they must have desired to stir up the Poles to insurrection. He could not concur that the Polish insurrection was powerless against the Russian troops, but it certainly would be powerless unless it met with the assent and encouragement of Europe. It was his firm belief that that House had the power to induce the Government to unite with other Governments to give that encouragement to the Poles which would make the insurrection successful, or, at all events, enable them to prolong their resistance till the other Cabinets of Europe could intervene in a manner that was likely to be successful. It was our duty, alike from motives of policy and humanity, to try and put a stop to the horrors which were being perpetrated in the centre of Europe, and to demand that the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna should be observed. And if moral interference failed, the Government ought to show that they were ready to interfere in a material way, and to give assistance to those who were in arms to recover their rights. A doubt had been thrown out as to whether the Polish people were worthy of such assistance. He believed that they were; and that if liberty were granted to them, Europe would have no reason to regret it. The marked unanimity with which this subject had been discussed to-night ought to decide the Government to take that course. With them, in a great measure, rested the solution of this important question; and if they acted the part dictated alike by humanity and policy, they would be supported by the public opinion, not only of this country, but of every civilized nation in Europe.

SIR MINTO FARQUHAR

said, he doubted much whether the part England had taken in this matter had been conducive to her character and high position. We had openly proclaimed our interest in the fate of Poland, and by words and the expression of public opinion had encouraged the Poles to look forward to the time when they might regain their liberty, and throw off the yoke of Russia, which had for so long crushed them to the ground; but he had often reflected that all this was only outward display, and that we had never shown ourselves ready to act up to what we said. Poland's cup of bitterness was now full; and this was an occasion on which our Government might well come forward and say that the people of Poland should not drink that cup to the dregs. It would be for the noble Viscount the First Minister to tell them what had been done, and whether the Russian Government had offered any explanation of the course they took on the 14th January. What was the public opinion of Europe, the press had declared: it could no longer be concealed that this was a European question; and it depended on the course of our Government whether there should be an intervention to wrest Poland from her present difficulties and oppression, or whether these should some day be the cause of a general European war. They had been told that day that the alleged convention between Russia and Prussia was a mythical convention, and he hoped that that was so; but let it be remembered that the noble Lord at the head of Foreign Affairs, had said a few days ago in another place that he had understood from the Prussian Ambassador, that the Russians would be permitted by that convention to pursue the insurgent Poles, and take them prisoners if they could, on Prussian territory. From what had passed in the Prussian Chambers he hoped there had been some misunderstanding; but if such a convention had been made, he trusted that the Prussian Government, when it saw what were the opinions, not only of Europe, but also of the Prussian people, would withdraw from that convention before it was too late. In the able speech in which he had introduced the subject to the House, the hon. and learned Member for the King's County had referred to the Polish insurrection in 1831. At that time he (Sir Minto Farqubar) was attached to the Embassy at Vienna; and he remembered the interest with which he traced on the map the movements of the Russian and Polish armies. The Poles then had a large army, and the occasion was one on which European intervention might have led to satisfactory results; but neither England nor France was prepared to take active steps in favour of Poland, and the insurrection was suppressed. He had hoped, from the course that the Emperor of Russia had pursued towards the serfs, that he had made up his mind to adopt a more liberal policy towards Poland; and he could hardly believe it possible, when he heard of the proceedings of the 14th January, that they could have occurred in this civilized age. He was told that the invasion of the homes of Warsaw by the" Russian soldiery took place in spite of the advice of Russians of high position. As this revolution had been well described as a, revolution of despair, he trusted it would lead to the interference of Europe. He for one protested against the course which had been pursued, and he hoped that they would now hear from the Government that they too would protest against such acts of cruel oppression, and that, in conjunction with France, and, he hoped, Austria, a joint diplomatic intervention would take place which would show that Europe was not prepared to see the Poles oppressed any longer, and that thus at last the hopes they had always entertained would be fully realized.

MR. GRANT-DUFF

said, many English and Irish Members have already risen in this debate. I rise as a Scotch Member to say that my countrymen also deeply sympathize in the Polish cause, and to express in their name the same sentiments which have been already repeated in every part of the House. I do not wish to say more upon the general question; but one or two points have incidentally risen in the debate about which I should like to say a few words. And, first, with regard to Prussia. I am extremely glad that every one who has addressed us to-night has drawn a strong distinction between the conduct of the Prussian Government and of the Prussian people. On a former occasion, when the noble Lord opposite (Lord Robert Cecil), drew attention to the misconduct of the Prussian Government, that distinction was unfortunately not so carefully made, and the result was an amount of bad feeling in Germany, which seriously for a time diminished our influence in that country, and did the greatest possible mischief. Sir, it is said that the Polish cause is not so popular in Germany as it is in England, and that is true to a certain extent; but here also a distinction must be taken. The Prussians think of the Poles chiefly as politicians, and as very impracticable, and sometimes very provoking, politicians; but, although disliking them as politicians, they know well, from their own experience, how to sympathize with brave men engaged in a struggle for their independence. Much has been said and written in Western Europe about Poland, but nothing, I think, that has been said or written upon that subject—not even those lines to which the hon. Member for the Queen's County so gracefully alluded at the close of his speech, have ever sunk so deeply into the heart of a nation, as those famous German lines which record the adventures, the achievements, and the fate of the 4th Polish Regiment. The hon. Member for Maidstone observed that, in the matter of this convention, it is the King who is to blame. That, Sir, is perfectly true, but he went on to say what was not equally correct. The King of Prussia has not always been the friend of the oppressor, and the enemy of the oppressed. During the Crimean war, he gained the greatest popularity, and put himself for a time at the head of the Liberal party in Germany, by opposing the Russian party, and protesting against the weak and vacillating conduct of his brother's ministers. It is since he came to the throne that he has fallen into the hands of bad advisers—of that detestable military clique which the people of Berlin so well call the 'Anti-intellect in uniform,' by whom he has been led to disgrace himself as a King, a German, and a man. I have only one other remark to make, and that is with regard to Russia. There is no doubt that this debate will be most carefully read at St. Petersburg, and it will have all the more effect there, from the fact that no expression has been used in it, which could lead any Russian to suppose that any of the irritation caused by the late war still lingers in our minds. In truth, Sir, we cannot too strongly express that we in England desire the prosperity, nay, even the aggrandisement of Russia. We desire to see her develop to the utmost her Greek and Sclavonic civilization and we are well content to see her spread that civilization over the vast regions of Northern Asia; but we do not wish to see her, whilst she is still semibarbarous, attempt to crush down the Latin civilization of Poland, a nation which has always been connected with the West, a nation which saved Central Europe in 1683. It is this which we think monstrous, and it is against this that we protest.

MR. DARBY GRIFFITH

said, that the atrocious barbarities practised by the Russian Government, so revolting as they were to the sense of humanity, were only part of the Russian system, and the moment any country came under Russian rule, these cruelties followed in the natural course of things—the police dogged the steps of every men, and reported his doings in the secret bureau. Everything was ruled by the iron hand of despotism, and the possession of a constitution by an enlightened country under such a despotism was simply and radically incompatible with it. If, therefore, he were to treat this matter logically, he should be obliged to go further than the hon. and learned Member for the King's County, because these facts demonstrated that a civilized country like Poland ought not to be subjected to a barbarous Power like Russia. He was not at all inclined to take that favourable view of the Treaty of Vienna which had been taken by high authorities, and he much doubted whether any of their stipulations were worth much as a security for the liberties of the Poles. The expressions used were so entirely vague, and it was so entirely impossible to bring them down to any defined standard, that be attached very little value to them; and the circumstances under which the treaty was framed entirely confirmed that view. It was well known that it was the great object of Lord Castlereagh to exclude from the possession of Poland Alexander I., whose doctrine was that he was in possession, that he would restore the ancient limits of the kingdom, of which, being Czar of Russia, he would at the same time be King. Lord Castlereagh said it was impossible to have constitutional civilization separated merely by a national boundary from the despotism of Russia; and it was only after a secret treaty had been made in Lord Castlereagh's bedroom, during a ball at Vienna, between France, Austria, and this country, that any impression could be made on the Emperor Alexander. Unfortunately, those who were oppressed were always open to fallacious illusions held out to them by other people, and the Poles had always been open to them. They were the victims of the deception of Napoleon, who made use of their courage at every opportunity and then deserted them. They put faith in the promises of Alexander, welcomed the professions he made, and supported his power; but, by great efforts, Lord Castlereagh prevented the complete consummation of his views, and brought about that ineffective compromise which was to erect the duchy of Warsaw into a kingdom. But it was so inadequate to the aspirations of the Poles that it was a false and fictitious ar- rangement—like other fictions of the day, such as the suzerainty of the Porte over the Danubian Provinces, the British Protectorate over the Ionian Islands, and other similar expedients. Alexander did so far fulfil his promise to the Poles as to give them a nominal constitution, but he soon found himself in a collision with them which became perpetual; a revolution occurred, and it had since been held that that revolution annulled the treaty. At any rate, its arrangements were so insincere that it was impossible the Poles could derive any benefit from the treaty, and their aspirations were for the restoration of the original limits of the country. The whole question between Russia and Poland related to the province of Lithuania, and the offence in the address lately presented by the nobles to the Czar was the suggestion that Lithuania should be added to Poland, which was held to he treason. The Poles would not be content with the Duchy of Warsaw; they always referred to the treaty between Russia and Prussia supplemental to the Treaty of Vienna, in which the condition of the country previous to 1772 was referred to, although that reference only related to internal communication, and was, in fact, a mockery and an illusion; and to talk of anything less than that as likely ever to tranquillize or satisfy the Poles was perfectly futile.

MR. HENRY SEYMOUR

said, that one fact stood out in clear relief in the debate—namely, that if the Government pursued a course consistent with the honour and dignity of England, they would receive the unanimous support and sympathy of the House, which, judging from the tone of the debate, reflected the unanimous feeling of the country. They had heard of conduct on the part of the Russian Government which brought a blush to every cheek, and of conduct on the part of the Prussian Government such as induced him to think that next to the Poles there was no people so much to be pitied as the Prussians. The conduct of the King of Prussia brought dishonour on the nation; and he hoped that the spirit of the Prussians would not be less than that of the Italians and the Greeks, and that they would vindicate in 1863 those principles which made them rise as one man in 1813; and he hoped that the first Protestant State in Europe would not be the last to accept constitutional government. England was, to a certain degree, responsible for the state of Poland. We were parties to the Treaties of 1815, and it should not be forgotten that England, France, and Austria agreed to furnish 150,000 troops each against Russia, in certain contingencies. It was that convention which saved the Grand Duchy of Posen from the grip of Russia, and preserved Saxony. The Emperor of Russia had obtained the large slice of Poland which was then allotted to him under false pretences, for he said he wished to unite all the Polish provinces under one Government and to give them a constitution; but the conditions under which he received it had all been violated. If he had given constitutional institutions to that country, the Czar would have secured not only an attached people, but he would have become the bead of the Sclavonic race, and advanced his own country to civilization. At the period of the revolution of 1831, the indignant protests of England had some influence on the Czar. Such a result should induce the House to support the Government in taking a vigorous stand upon this question; and if they could not procure the restoration of Polish nationality, which would be most difficult, and which must, he feared, be fought out between Russia and Poland, the united protests of England, France, and Austria would surely have an effect upon the councils of Russia and Prussia, and at least obtain for Poland some of those institutions which had been guaranteed by treaty. Every debate in this House ought to have, as far as possible, a practical issue, and the Government ought, in conformity with the feeling of the House, at once to protest indignantly against the conduct of Prussia, which had been quite contrary to the usages of modern international law. As to Russia, the Government should unite with France and Austria—not in demanding the performance of the stipulations of the Treaties of 1815, for they could scarcely expect France, whose cry for the last ten years had been, "A has les Traites de 1815!" —hut in protesting against the treatment of the Poles, and in asking that the nation should receive a constitutional government. If this were done, the revolution might have an auspicious ending, and the free institutions conferred upon Poland might open the way for the grant of the same privileges to Russia herself. With regard to the Resolutions, feeling the utmost confidence in the noble Viscount, he should be unable to vote for the last paragraph, and he hoped, therefore, that the hon. Gentleman would substitute a paragraph expressive of that confidence, thus enabling the whole House to join in a unanimous vote on this subject.

MR. MAGUIRE

said, he entirely adopted the last paragraph of the Resolution of his hon. Friend (Mr. Hennessy), and thought the House would come to a lame conclusion if, after admitting the preamble of the Address, and expressing a unanimous feeling in favour of this oppressed and afflicted nation, they did not come to something like a practical conclusion on the subject. It might be, that if there had been no treaties to which England was a party, it would not be our province to interfere; but there were treaties to which we were party, and which guaranteed certain rights to the oppressed Polish nation. The noble Lord at the head of the Government had formerly declared that there had been an infraction of treaties and a violation of rights, but since he made that declaration there had been a still grosser violation of those rights. It was not right to say that his hon. Friend asked the House to pledge itself to a vote of hostility against Russia, but he did ask the Government to interfere. And, surely, there was no Government which was more accustomed to interfering with other countries than the Government which now occupied the official benches. The noble Lord's Government was frankly invited not to send bayonets but to make representations of the strong and indignant feeling of the country against continued oppression, and to do on behalf of England what the other nations of Europe were doing to express sympathy with the oppressed, and to restrain the hand of the oppressor from further violence. They all knew that the noble Lord had interfered, and sometimes when it was believed by some persons such interference was not warranted; but if ever there was a case where interference was not only justified but commanded, the case of Poland was that one. There had appeared in The Times an important document, a confidential report of the civil Governor of Lublin to the authorities at Warsaw, seeking the protection of the Russian Government for the citizens against the troops sent to suppress the insurrection. That report showed a state of things which called for the interference of every humane Government. It stated— On the 5th, about 5 a.m., a detachment of the Imperial army, consisting of infantry and Cossacks, surrounded the town of Tomaszow on all sides. The insurgents, some of whom were on guard and the rest in the barracks, perceiving this, assembled, and, after pushing through the ranks of the troops, took up a position outside the town. After a few shots on both sides, the army, not attempting to pursue the insurgents, rushed into the town, and fired several strong volleys with their rifles at the houses occupied by employés and citizens, after which the soldiers scattered themselves over all the streets of the town, and began to rob and murder innocent and unarmed people. The document gave a long list of victims, and concluded with a long and detailed description of the miserable condition of the whole neighbourhood, which had been desolated and deprived of its inhabitants, who, taking with them all they could, fled, no one knew whither, before the robbing and murdering soldiery. The Polish nation wanted no armed intervention, because they desired to achieve their own independence; but if the facts stated by his hon. Friend wore true, and they were admitted to be so, then the Parliament of Great Britain ought to do something more than pass a mere vague Resolution. If the Government did not interfere now, they must never speak of sympathy for oppressed nationalities and struggling peoples. The Government would falsify all their past professions, and disappoint the people of this country, if they did not adopt some practical Resolution upon the present occasion.

MR. WALPOLE

Sir, I never listened to a debate in which I have heard more unanimity and more discord. There has been the greatest possible unanimity of sentiment, and the greatest possible diversity of opinion as to the nature of the practical resolution which we should adopt under the circumstances in which Europe is now placed. We are painfully unanimous in the deep sympathy expressed for the much-oppressed, much-suffering people of Poland. We are indignantly unanimous at the terrible oppression which has now been wrought upon that people more violently than ever—crushed as they are under the iron heel of Russia in a manner more cruel even than has been inflicted upon them before. And we are, I think, sadly unanimous in thinking that there is another Power, with whom we are nearly allied, which has been betrayed into what I could almost call a mean and infatuated compact with reference to a people over part of whom she reigns herself, and with the rest of whom she ought to sympathize by every feeling of honour. Thus far we are unanimous. The real question seems to be how we are practically to deal with this subject, and what is the practical test to which we should bring it. Now, here arises an amount of diversity equal to the unanimity which has been expressed by the House upon the former point. My hon. Friend the Member for the King's County, in a speech which does him infinite credit for its ability, for its information, for the knowledge it evinced, and for its extraordinary temper and moderation, concluded his Resolution with a paragraph concerning which two of his supporters can so little agree as to its meaning and purport, that while one of them, my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Tiverton (Mr. Denman), thinks it so weak as to require strengthening, the other, the right hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. S. FitzGerald), thinks it so strong, that if acted upon—and I confess I concur in that opinion— it must, if not necessarily, at least probably, lead to war.

MR. DENMAN

I certainly did not consider the Resolution too weak; on the contrary, I objected to it because I felt that such a Resolution could not be on the records of this House without meaning almost immediate war.

MR. WALPOLE

That observation was confirmed by the proposition of the hon. Member for Berkshire (Mr. Walter); and this should lead us to consider whether at this moment we are prepared to adopt a Resolution which will inevitably lead you step by step into war. Before we arrive at that conclusion we ought to pause. My right hon. Friend the Member for Horsham, in one of those speeches which come home to the heart of every one, for the feeling and ability it displayed, has recommended us to press on the Government the propriety of offering, in conjunction with France and Austria, an immediate remonstrance; and, possibly, that would be the most effective course. But I apprehend that this Resolution would lead to a war— that the concurrence of three Powers remonstrating with such a Power as that remonstrated against would lead to a war which would not end in freeing the Poles, but which might end in a war which we do not intend or contemplate, probably in the Rhenish provinces. The hon. Gentleman opposite says—but I do not think he could have seriously intimated it to the House— he thinks that we should add to the Reso- lution that we will proceed on the principle of non-intervention. My noble Friend the Member for Stamford (Lord R. Cecil) urged an argument which would lead us immediately into action, if it were an argument solely applicable to the present difficulty. He told us there is such a violation of treaties and engagements that we are bound in honour and public faith to take up this question immediately. Well, but I ask you—these treaties and engagements having been violated for forty-five years, why this argument was not as applicable during that time as now, when the matter has assumed a new phase owing to the misconduct of Russia? Well, the two last hon. Gentlemen who have spoken have stated their desire to bring the question to a practical conclusion. I believe the most practical conclusion you can bring this question to is not to destroy the unanimity of this House, which will go out to Europe and the world—do not, I say, destroy that unanimity by anything which shall seem to approach to anything like division among you. The question, therefore, seems to me to resolve itself into this. Is the Government prepared to echo the sentiments which have been expressed in this House? If they are prepared to echo those sentiments, is the House prepared or not to leave to them the responsibility of enforcing those sentiments? I think there is danger in this House assuming a responsibility it cannot exercise for itself; and I think there is no danger in leaving the responsibility to the Government, who have expressed themselves already upon this question in terms as cogent and forcible as any that have been used in this debate; and I, for one, am prepared to support the Government in leaving to them the responsibility, if they will only give an assurance to the House that they will honestly carry it out.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

—Sir, it is natural, on a subject which excites so much feeling, not only in this country but on the Continent, and especially in a neighbouring nation, that this House should re-echo the sentiment which prevails so strongly out of doors; and I must do the hon. Member who moved these Resolutions the justice to say, that in the manner in which he has brought the matter forward there was nothing of which anybody had a right to complain. With regard to myself, who have been quoted by the hon. Member, both as to what I have said and what I have written, I have only to say that I do not stand here to unsay anything which I may formerly have said, nor to retract anything which I may formerly have written. The Governments of which I have been a Member have always entertained the opinion which it was my duty to express, that in this matter of Poland, the engagements of the Treaty of Vienna, especially as regards Russia, have been systematically and long violated. It is impossible not to feel the deepest sympathy for the Polish nation. They have for a century been most singularly unfortunate. They were unfortunate before the Partition in having a constitution which, whatever some of its merits may have been, was tainted with the gravest possible defects. They were unfortunate in the successive Partitions which deprived them of their nationality. They were unfortunate when the First Napoleon entered the Polish territory on his way to Russia, because he did not then think it expedient to take advantage of that occupation for the purpose of restoring Poland either to entire or modified nationality. They were unfortunate at the Congress of Vienna, because at that time, however anxious the British Plenipotentiary was to restore Poland to a considerable degree of nationality, the power of Russia prevented it, and when Lord Londonderry (then Lord Castlereagh) urged certain conditions, the answer of the Emperor of Russia was, "I have 200,000 men in Poland, and I cannot agree to the proposal you make." They wore unfortunate afterwards, inasmuch as the good and liberal intentions which I believe animated the Emperor Alexander at the time when the Treaty of Vienna was signed were not afterwards adhered to and carried into execution. It is well known that at the time the late Prince Czartoryski was the confidential adviser of the Emperor of Russia, and you see in the provisions of the first article of the Treaty of Vienna the hand of a friend to Poland— a person interested, who looked forward to a better futurity for his countrymen—for in that Article it is said that the Emperor of Russia reserves to himself to give such internal extension to the kingdom of Poland as he may think fit; the meaning of which, I believe, was, that the Emperor contemplated at that time adding to the kingdom of Poland some of the ancient provinces which had been incorporated in the Russian Empire. But, Sir, it is the fate of despotic Governments that much depends on personal influence; and when personal advisers change, the policy of the Government changes too, and so it happened these good intentions were laid aside. And although a constitution was given to the kingdom of Poland in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna, yet that constitution soon became a dead letter, and in the administration of the kingdom of Poland under the Grand Duke Constantine, there were grievances that justified the insurrection which took place in 1831. Then, Sir, I say, it is impossible for any man seeing, on the one hand, the great and distinguished qualities that belonged to the Polish nation, and, on the other, the calamities which from time to time have befallen them, not to take a deep and lively interest in their fate.

We have been reproached in some degree by the hon. Member for the King's County, for not having in 1831 and 1832 availed ourselves of a communication made by France for the purpose of inviting some action at that time in favour of the Poles, then in arms against Russia. We had at that time to consider a great many balanced circumstances and motives; and with every disposition to do what we might think useful to Poland, we did not think that particular proposal was one which would have led to any good or useful result. It might have embarrassed us on other questions then pending, and could not, as far as we could foresee, be attended with any good practical result to the Poles themselves. We therefore declined at that time to interfere otherwise than diplomatically, but we have always held that the conduct of Russia towards Poland has been a violation of the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna. Prussia and Austria have not been liable to the same degree of reproach. Literally they have carried into execution, in regard to their respective portions of Poland, the stipulations of the Treaty of Vienna, because in the duchy of Posen and Galicia there is a national representation sitting in the aggregate Parliament; the language is preserved, the religion is respected, and the rights and privileges stipulated have been enjoyed. And, speaking of Prussia, I must here remark, that however we may condemn the spirit and intention of that convention which we understand was signed lately between Prussia and Russia, I am inclined to think, from information we have received, that the apprehensions which we have been led to entertain with regard to that con- vention are not likely to be realized in the result. I believe that convention has not been ratified—no ratifications have been exchanged, and I am inclined to think, not only from what passed in the Prussian Chambers, but also from the information we have received, that it is not likely that convention will, in its objectional parts, be carried practically into execution. I am speaking, however, not officially, but from information we have received; for we have not yet had a copy of the convention itself. I trust that it may be so; because such an interference of Prussia with what is now passing in Poland would excite, as it has already excited, great condemnation everywhere; and if that conventional interference were followed by acts, it would cast discredit on the Government of Prussia. Sir, the present Emperor of Russia has, in regard to Poland, been placed in a very difficult position. It is a great misfortune for anybody to succeed to an inheritance of triumphant wrong; and it is difficult for a person so circumstanced to disentangle himself from the poisonous folds of so fatal a bequest. There is in the mind of man a strong passion — a determination — to maintain and to vindicate his own personal liberties; but there is also a strong passion, and I doubt whether it is not as strong a passion, which makes men cling to the power of exercising oppression on others; and when long-rooted habits have accustomed the authorities of a Government to administer a tyrannical system, it requires great perseverance and activity on the part of the Sovereign to undo the evil and restore things to their proper condition. I do believe that the present Emperor of Russia, a kind-hearted and benevolent man, does mean, and has meant for some time past, to improve the condition of his Polish subjects. That would be in perfect unison with the system on which he is governing his Russian subjects. The Sovereign who has emancipated the serfs—the Sovereign who is establishing a system of jurisprudence founded upon an imitation of the best judicial codes of Europe—a Sovereign who is introducing into his Russian dominions a vast number of modern improvements—cannot surely have it in his heart intentionally and systematically to crush and oppress any portion of his subjects, whether Russian or Polish. Well, Sir, there can be no doubt that this last act, called a conscription, but which has else- where been more properly designated a proscription, was an act wholly foreign to that disposition which, I believe, really animates the breast of the Emperor of I Russia; and it accounts entirely for the; outbreak which has occurred in Poland. It was a most barbarous measure—it was a most cruel piece of political tyranny under the semblance of a merely military arrangement. No wonder that the Poles should have taken up arms to prevent the further execution of a measure of that kind. I believe that, as far as one hears, that has in some degree now been stopped, and has ceased.

But, Sir, the question mooted by the Resolution before us relates to the conduct of Her Majesty's Government, with a view to communications about to be made to Russia. Now, I cannot conceive that a Sovereign gifted with the qualities which I believe are possessed by the Emperor of Russia, should not see that, in the contest in which he is now unfortunately engaged with the Polish nation, military success would be a great and signal calamity. Why, what would be the effect of military success—what would be the result if, by the action of his troops—by the overpowering force of the 100,000 men who had been sent to Poland—he were entirely to suppress and put down this extensive insurrection? Why, he would have a country in which the desert plains would be bathed in blood—in which there would be nothing seen but the smoking ashes of ruined villages and towns. Is that an object which any Sovereign can wish to arrive at, and should be deem it an advantage to him to obtain a success of that kind? Sir, if the Emperor of Russia saw his own interest—and we give him credit for being an enlightened man —he would think the course best calculated for his own advantage—the course best adapted to secure the permanence of his own authority as well as to promote the happiness of his people—would be to put an end to that revolt by an act of generous amnesty, and by, at the same time, re-establishing in Poland those institutions which the Emperor Alexander gave in execution of the Treaty of Vienna. I cannot believe but that, if that were done, peace would be restored in Poland, and might continue to exist there, and that Europe might be saved from those disturbances which the continued misgovernment of Poland, and the discontent thereby engendered among the Poles, cannot fail to reproduce from year to year, as has been the case in years that have gone by.

But, with regard to the particular Motion of the hon. Member for the King's County, I should hope that he would he satisfied with the unanimous expression of opinion which has been the result of this discussion, and not press to a division the Resolution he has placed, Sir, in your hands. The objections to this Motion are really very great. It proceeds upon an erroneous foundation. The hon. Member assumes that by the Treaty of Vienna we are under an obligation to interfere in the affairs of Poland. We have a right to interfere, but we are under no obligation to do so. And although to those who have not turned their minds to diplomatic document sthis may appear to be a nice distinction, yet there is a real, substantial, and most important distinction between treaties which give you the right to interfere and those which impose on you the obligation to interfere. Now, in the Treaty of Vienna—in that treaty of June 15— there is only one obligation by which we should be compelled to interfere in a case that might arise—namely, that article of the treaty which stipulates that the Powers guarantee to Prussia the continued possession of the portion of Saxony which was allotted to Prussia by that arrangement. But there was no guarantee whatever in the engagement which relates to the kingdom of Poland, nor in any other part of the treaty—except, indeed, that which concerns the independence and integrity of Switzerland. Now, the hon. Gentleman throughout his Resolution proceeds on the assumption that we are under an obligation to interfere; and, consistently with that assumption, in the concluding passage he calls upon the Government to interpose, and vindicate the public faith and solemn engagements of the Crown. Why, Sir, if in truth we were under an obligation to interfere, the Resolution would he right and fitting, and would, as has been observed by hon. Gentlemen who have spoken in this debate, amount to this—that unless the remonstrance which might be made in virtue of that obligation were attended with success, the Crown would be compelled to call upon this House to give it the means of enforcing by arms those stipulations, the just fulfilment of which was refused when urged by diplomatic communication. Therefore, there is that grave objection to that particular Motion of the hon. Member. And if, as I think everybody must admit, unanimity is desirable, we already see that there have been two or three Amendments proposed to his Resolution, and that consequently it is not likely either one or other of the three would secure the unanimous assent of this House. There are other less material criticisms to be made. The hon. Member proposes that which I believe to be unusual — namely, to record, in an Address of this House, quotations from Hansard of that which a Member of this House may or may not have spoken on some former occasion. I apprehend he does me the honour — and I am sure I am much obliged to him for it—of proposing to insert in a solemn Address of this House extracts from speeches which I am supposed to have made. But I do not think that a course, which would be altogether consistent either with the usages or the dignity of this House. Then, Sir, in the interest of that cause which the hon. Member has at heart—which the whole House have at heart — which I believe the country has at heart, and which I am sure that he and all who hear me must wish to see promoted in the best manner possible for the advantage of those whom it concerns, I should say that the course best adapted to accomplish the purpose he has in view would be to content himself with that unanimous expression of opinion which has been elicited to-night—to let it go forth to the world, as it will go to-morrow, that of all the hon. Members who have spoken on this occasion there was not one who had a different opinion from the rest in regard to his interest in the fate of Poland or as to his sense of the injuries which the Polish nation have sustained. I submit that, as was well stated by the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Walpole), it is better to leave it to the responsible Government of the country to give to the Sovereign on this matter such advice as they may think best calculated to attain the object which all desire, and not to take upon the House a responsibility of detail which belongs properly to Her Majesty's Ministers; resting assured that the sentiments expressed by the House this evening are equally shared by those who have the honour of holding office under the Crown. I would, therefore, suggest to the hon. Gentleman that he should now allow the House to go into Committee of Supply, and be satisfied with the result—which, I am sure, is honourable to him, and must be satisfactory to all who take an interest in this subject—of the discussion in which so many Members have expressed opinions entirely in accord with each other.

MR. DISRAELI

Sir, we often hear it said, in the course of these discussions, that the Partition of Poland was a great crime. If it were a great crime, it was a crime shared by the Polish people. The political existence of twenty millions is not destroyed without there being some faults on their side. But whether or not it was a great crime, there is no doubt for Europe it was a great misfortune. Since that Partition, let us recollect what has occurred in Europe. The greatest events which have ever happened in Europe have happened since the Partition of Poland. The whole of the French Revolution, and all those immense results which flowed from that great ebullition, have since then occurred. Since then there has appeared a character on the European stage who alone in modern times could be classed with the Alexanders and the Caesars of antiquity. All the boundaries of the kingdoms which existed -when Poland was partitioned have been altered; the laws of almost every country in Europe have been remodelled; new codes have been introduced; and new Governments called into being. In short, greater and more numerous changes have occurred in the eighty years since that event than were probably ever before crowded into any similar period of the history of man. Sir, I think it very much to the honour of an English statesman—and of an English statesman who had not in his time that credit for his sagacity which I believe posterity now accords to him—I think it much to the honour of Lord Castlereagh that after such immense events, being called upon to take a leading part in the settlement of Europe, he should not have been blind to the importance of restoring, if possible, the political integrity of Poland; and that, with all those arduous and onerous duties which devolved upon him at the Congress of Vienna, he felt that the restoration of the political independence of Poland was a result necessary to the future ease and tranquillity of Europe. Let us remember what were the circumstances under which Lord Castlereagh, as the representative of British policy, conceived and counselled the restoration of the political independence of the kingdom of Poland. He was supported in that policy by Austria and France; he was opposed by Russia. Austria and France were then exhausted Powers; England was suffering from immense exertions; but Russia, from a combination of circumstances, was in a position of irresistible and unprecedented strength. It was under those conditions that Lord Castlereagh, though aided by the sympathy of France and Austria, felt that he was obliged to relinquish the plan which he was then of opinion would be of most eminent advantage to the future prosperity and tranquillity of Europe. But what are the circumstances under which we are now considering the question? England is not suffering from the consequences of an unprecedented exertion of its energies continued for twenty years — England was never so powerful, never so united as it is now: France is not an exhausted Power; and I am happy to believe that Austria is daily gaining strength and authority— strength and authority due not merely to the possession of the great resources which have always belonged to that empire, but to the prudence, sagacity, and wisdom which distinguish her counsels. But if the position of England, France, and Austria is so strong and so promising, what is the position of Russia? The position of Russia is not that which dictated the answer that the noble Lord has quoted— the haughty reply that 200,000 Russians were in possession of Poland, and that that was the only answer that would be given to the politic counsels of the English Plenipotentiary. Well, Sir, Lord Castlereagh under those circumstances, representing with great ability and foresight the interests not only of England but of Europe, gave up the restoration of the independence of Poland, and had recourse to another scheme. He secured by treaty to Poland a certain form of independent government. But although England relinquished his policy, still under that treaty she possessed rights, and had the opportunity of standing upon them. I cannot agree with the noble Lord that the hon. Gentleman who introduced this question to-night with so much ability, laid down the position that there are obligations under the Treaty of Vienna which force England into action; but there are moral obligations which the noble Lord cannot deny, resulting from the position that we occupy under that treaty — moral obligations of the duty of fulfilling which we may avail ourselves whenever the opportunity is afforded. The present position of affairs in Poland is that another insurrection has occurred. The hon. Gentleman who has introduced the question has expressed in his speech, and, indeed, in his Motion, what is justly described as the unanimous feeling of Parliament and of the country with respect to that insurrection. The noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston) objects to the mode in which the expression of the opinion of the House is called for. Under the circumstances of the case, the great object is to elicit an expression of opinion on the part of the House; but how far the hon. Member ought to proceed depends upon the conduct of the Government. If the Government, for example, had adopted a line of policy opposite to the course recommended by the hon. Gentleman, he would have been perfectly justified in asking the House to support cither a Resolution or an Address which asserted the policy that he advocated. On the other band, if the policy recommended by the Government was one similar to that which was advocated by the hon. Gentleman himself, such a proceeding would be quite unnecessary. There is, however, a third position which I think has not been sufficiently considered—that of a Government which does not frankly communicate to the House the policy—the general policy—which it intends to pursue. Because I must say, that although I listened to the noble Lord with great attention, I did not at all collect from him what was the general course which Her Majesty's Government intended to pursue with regard to this matter. To expect that we should become acquainted in detail with the measures which the Government may think it desirable to adopt at this moment would he most unreasonable; but I did not hear from the noble Lord any expression of opinion as to what he thought might he desirable or practical, or even as lo the spirit in which Her Majesty would be advised by her Ministers with respect to the present state of affairs in Poland. I think that is much to be regretted. The hon. Gentleman must decide for himself as to the course which he should pursue in the matter. I myself think it would he extremely unadvisable to have any appearance of a difference on this subject. At the same time, I entirely disagree with the critics who have found fault with the language of portions of the Address. If the House is in a position in which an Address is necessary, there is nothing in the Address of the hon. Gentleman which could he cavilled at. It is, of course, in the power of any hon. Gentleman to place his own interpretation upon the words of that Address. One hon. Member smells gunpowder in the last sentence. I should not myself, if I thought an Address requisite under the circumstances, shrink from the adoption of this form of words. Putting upon this Address the natural interpretation of its phraseology, I understand that it means this:—That Her Majesty's Ministers are not to pass the present state of Poland over in silence, that they are to avail themselves of their rights under the treaty, and to take every other proceeding which they think wise and expedient to carry into action a policy favourable to the Poles. In my opinion that does not necessarily mean war, and I think that we must all of us indulge in more than the hope that great and beneficial changes will take place in the condition of Poland without an appeal to the last arbiter of human destiny. I do not presume to give counsel to the hon. Gentleman; but I will venture to give him this advice, either to proceed with his Address, or, yielding to what I think is the general feeling of the House and for the sake of unanimity, to withdraw it, but not on account of false scruples to consent to have the Address which he has proposed in a very spirited manner, and which very effectively represents his sentiments, emasculated in its language or changed in its expressions. I think that the hon. Gentleman must feel that he has obtained his main object in originating a discussion which has been sustained with power, and which has, no doubt, made Her Majesty's Ministers clearly understand that in the House of Commons there are not two opinions respecting the state of affairs in Poland. I always shrink from any expression of political sentimentalism, I do not know any people who have suffered so much from political sentimentalism as the Poles. Year after year there have been people living in Paris and London, some of them in a state of comparative luxury, stimulating their unfortunate countrymen in Poland to fruitless insurrection and to useless revolt; and all this time we have been favoured by them with expressions of feeling, which—if expression of feeling would effect the salvation of nations—have certainly been abundant and profuse. But what makes me hope that in the present state of circum- stances there is a chance of the great English policy which Lord Castlereagh counselled and recommended being carried into effect is, not only that the position of England, of France, and of Austria is very different from what it was in 1814 and 1815, not only that the position of Russia is very different from what it was at that critical period, but that in Poland we have at present a sheer insurrection of the people against oppression. It is a movement not originated and not stimulated by foreign emissaries. It has not been created by conspiracies in other countries; it has not been fostered in order to promote local ambition or the objects of faction. It is a national movement; it possesses all the elements of a sacred cause, the love of country, the memory of a glorious past, and, as I hope and will believe, the inspiration of a triumphant future.

SIR ROBERT CLIFTON

rose, to express a hope that the hon. Member for the King's County would go to a division. The House was entitled to some more definite answer from Her Majesty's Government

MR. WYLD

said, that since they were not going to a division, he could not allow this opportunity to pass without entering his protest, as an individual in a free State, and as a Member of this House, against the atrocities that were now being committed in Poland. The policy of Russia since 1831 had been utterly to ignore the Treaty of Vienna. He wished, on behalf of his constituents, to enter his protest against the conduct of the Prussian Government in this matter.

MR. HENNESSY

said, he thought he should only be acting in accordance with the general wish if, after the debate which had taken place, he withdrew his Motion. He did so, however, with the object of enabling any other Gentleman to bring forward the same or a similar Motion on a future occassion if necessary.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.