RESOLUTION.

HC Deb 30 May 1862 vol 167 cc196-221

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, that although the Motion which he should beg leave to submit was of limited scope, applying only to one rank, it would be admitted to be of no inconsiderable importance. It had, in fact, for its object to adopt the principle of selection in the appointment to the command of regiments, and that those selections should be made upon the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief for the time being. When he last had the honour of alluding to the question of the sale and purchase of military commissions, a declaration was made by the late Lord Herbert to the effect that Her Majesty's Government had already determined on adopting, with as little delay as practicable, the alteration actually proposed in the present Motion. That promise was subsequently frequently repeated—but yet remained without result. He had now by his Motion to invite the noble Viscount at the head of the Government to fulfil those promises. The illustrious Prince in command of the army, though the great supporter of the purchase system, had admitted in his evidence that the efficiency of a regiment depended "entirely" on the "efficiency and ability" of its commanding officer, and that the post of regimental commander was therefore one of great importance. Her Majesty's Book of Regulations for the Army, of which every officer was bound to possess a copy, contained no less than 138 paragraphs emphatically specifying the preeminently important duties of that appointment. The report of the Royal Commission appointed by Her Majesty to inquire into the subject dwelt in like manner on the very serious duties of that rank, and stated truly that the efficiency or non-efficiency of a regiment might affect decisively the result of a great battle. The first paragraph also of the Regulations alluded to was in the following words:— An officer intrusted with the command of a regiment is invested with authority which renders him responsible to his Sovereign and his country for the maintenance of discipline, order, and a proper system of economy in his corps; he is to exact from officers and men the most implicit obedience to regulations, and he is not only to enforce by commands, but to encourage by example the energetic discharge of duty and the steady endurance of the difficulties and privations which are inseparable from military service. How was that regimental command, admitted on all hands to be of such paramount consequence, at present appointed? By purchase, interest, or seniority. There was no regimental rank in the army from which there was so little guarantee required for competency to perform its duties. In fact, if an officer was next in succession, he was appointed almost as a matter of course to the command of the regiment. But that became still more seriously objectionable in consequence of the late regulation giving to lieutenant colonels, after the short interval of five years, the rank of Colonel, with eligibility to be selected for the command of brigades. These changes rendered the proposed reform, of course, additionally urgent. At page 24 of the Report of the Royal Commission was the following passage: — If the purchase system interferes thus injuriously with the appointments to the command of regiments, it must indirectly affect all the higher ranks of the army. Whenever the responsible advisers of the Crown are obliged to prepare for the contingencies of war, and to recommend Her Majesty to name a commander for her army in the field, they must necessarily select from among those who have obtained high rank in the army. The great majority of these officers, however, will have risen by purchase, obtaining their rank, not from any acknowledged fitness, but from the current of promotion and the opportunities of buying advancement. This country will therefore commence the operations of war under a disadvantage, compared with foreign States, where all the officers in the higher grades will have been subjected to several selections, and may therefore, if the power of selection has been honestly and wisely exercised, be all men of known efficiency and merit. What was the working of the system? A young officer no sooner joined his regiment than a series of inquiries or private bargainings were entered on with him as to the amount beyond the legal prices which he would be prepared to contribute towards the different promotions of the regiment. They had it on the candid and honourable evidence of one of the partners of a most eminent army agency firm that in several corps, but especially in the cavalry, double the legal prices, and often more than double, were usually given; and it appeared in the evidence of the Commander-in-Chief that officers who asked permission to make those purchases invariably concealed from the authorities their intention of violating the law. It was generally, and he thought correctly, assumed that a pure and high sense of honour were peculiarly requisite in the army. But how was a high sense of truth and honour reconcilable with the unseemly proceedings imposed by Government upon the officers. It was true that nations which possessed sufficient power and resources to carry on wars for many years would probably eventually obtain, under any system, officers of high rank competent to high responsibilities. But such tardy and uncertain results would unavoidably be coupled with great and unnecessary hazards, and often the worst of all results—the prolongation of wars. The wars arising out of the French Revolution extended to all parts of the world, continued for not much less than a quarter of a century, and gave varied opportunities of experience to our troops; and yet above a dozen years elapsed before a general appeared in our ranks (Sir A. Wellesley), who was justly recognised as eminently qualified to maintain the interests and glory of his country. But of his victories there was one unlucky consequence, namely, that they tended to an inference that our military institutions required no revision. The despatches, however, of that great commander, written not as the head of a great political party, the position which he subsequently held, proved that he considered his operations very frequently injuriously affected by professional deficiencies on the part of those under his command. But, whatever might have been the case half a century back, a considerable degree of professional acquirement was becoming from year to year additionally necessary, and for which the possession of a large sum of money must prove a very unreliable substitute. Neither would the most exact performance of the mere mechanical parade or field-day movements afford for such qualifications any sufficient security. He thought it would not be difficult to cite historical proofs that the shortcomings of not a few commanders raised to rank by these venal means had, at different epochs, cost our country millions of money, fearful loss of lives, and other most regrettable consequences. Thus also it was that the commencement of almost all our conflicts had been usually marked by discomfiture and loss of prestige. But there were fanatics of promotion by money rather than merit. To these he would say, "If this be an honour- able and beneficial system, the Government ought to introduce it into all other departments." But there was no other public department which would not feel dishonoured by such a mode of advancement. At the present time the corruption of the system was more extensive, rife, and flagrant than at any period during the last 200 years. Formerly it was sometimes alleged by the defenders of the system, that if it involved corruption, it was only in the bargains between officer and officer, and that the Government had no participation in it. But that could no longer be said, for the account of the Reserved Fund, laid on the table of the House only two or three days since, proved that the Government were now carrying on a most extensive system of barter in army commissions. His Motion was limited to the one rank of lieutenant colonels, and he would not therefore further trespass on the attention of the House. It appeared to him to be a self-evident proposition already more than once acquiesced in by the Government. Unless, then, the noble Lord the Prime Minister and the War Department had resolved that the proved scandals of purchase, by which the officers of the army were blamelessly and involuntarily demoralized, should remain unabated, he hoped that his Motion would be acceded to.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "in the opinion of this House, no further postponement ought to take place in giving effect to the promises of Government, that the Command of Regiments should no longer be purchasable, and that the promotions to that rank should henceforth be regulated by selection upon the responsibility of the Commander in Chief, —instead thereof.

LORD STANLEY

seconded the Motion.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

Sir, as my lion, and gallant Friend, owing to the state of his health, which we must all regret, was unable to make his remarks generally audible throughout the House, perhaps it will be convenient if I state the precise nature and grounds of the Motion. I shall, of course, endeavour to do so with perfect fairness. The House is doubtless aware that a Commission was issued some years ago to inquire into the system of purchase and sale of commissions in the army. That Commission was composed of the most eminent and competent Members, including, among others, the Duke of Somerset, the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley), Mr. Sidney Herbert, Sir Harry Jones, and the hon. and gallant Member who has moved the present Resolution. The Report of the Commissioners is very elaborate, and appended to it is evidence which shows that the question was investigated with great care and impartiality. The recommendation at which they ultimately arrived is embodied in the present Resolution, and is to the effect that purchase in the army should continue, but that the rank of lieutenant colonel should be subject no longer to purchase, but should be bestowed by selection—that is to say, that the lieutenant colonel of a regiment should be appointed by the selection of the Commander-in-Chief, without any purchase. The Government, after considering the matter, determined to give effect to the chief recommendation of the Commission with regard to the rank of lieutenant colonel, and that decision was communicated in 1860 to the House by Mr. Sidney Herbert, the then Secretary at War. Soon afterwards it became necessary for him to consider the details of the subject, with a view to carrying into effect the decision which had been formed; but upon approaching the question more closely, he found that it was embarrassed with great difficulties of detail, and that it was necessary to take into account, that owing to the amalgamation of the Indian with the British army, twelve new regiments— three of cavalry and nine of infantry— would be created, in which commissions would be awarded, not by purchase, but as in the Engineers, by selection and seniority up to the rank of field-officer. There is no doubt that this system is to be retained in those twelve regiments. I understand that my predecessor in the office I now hold saw no immediate prospect of being able to act upon the decision which had been come to, and made a communication to that effect to His Royal Highness the Commander in Chief. In answer to a question put by the noble Lord opposite (Lord Stanley), my hon. Friend, who was then Under Secretary, stated in the House that until the Government could have some experience of the working of the system of non-purchase in those twelve regiments, it was not intended to act upon the decision which had previously been announced. That is the state in which I found the question, and I will now give the reasons why, as at present advised, I do not think it expedient to depart from that revised decision of the Government, or to take any immediate steps for acting upon the recommendation of the Commission. I wish the House to understand, not that the question is at all finally concluded, but that, as these twelve regiments have not been formed, in point of experience it remains practically where it stood when my hon. Friend gave the answer to which I have referred, last Session. With the permission of the House, I will state briefly the reasons why I see great difficulty in acceding to the Motion of the lion, and gallant General. The subject to which he has limited his Resolution must be considered as part of the larger question, as to the expediency of entirely abolishing the system of purchase. It must be regarded as the first important step in that direction, and therefore the House would fall into a serious practical error if they thought that they could decide this question without exercising a material influence upon the decision of the larger one. In fact, the hon, and gallant General takes that view of the case, because, in apology for the limited scope of his Motion, he said, that at least it would be the commencement of the reformation of the general system, and he qualified his signature to the Report of the Commission in the following terms:— As a member of the Commission, he has the honour to state that he has deemed it a duty to sign the Report decided on by the Commissioners, because he fully concurs in the recommendations, as far as they go, which it contains. But, as the evidence adduced has strengthened the convictions which he previously held on the subject, and as he believes that some additional measures may with advantage to the public be adopted, having for their object a more early termination of the system of sale and purchase of commissions in the army than is provided for in this Report, he will feel it his duty to transmit, as soon as practicable, to the office of the Commission a representation of his humble opinions to this effect. It is therefore obvious that my hon. and gallant Friend considers the application of the principle of selection to appointment to the rank of lieutenant colonel only an instalment towards a general alteration of the system, and that on that account this more limited question has a very close connection with the more extended one. One difficulty in the way of the abolition of the purchase system which meets us on the threshold, is the large amount which it would be necessary for the House to provide for compensation; because I apprehend that it will not be denied, that officers who under the existing system have legally paid for their commissions would, if that system was suddenly altered, be entitled to compensation. The estimate of the amounts required for compensation which I have had placed in my hand is—for Cavalry, £1,335,290; for the Guards, £610,110; for the Line, £5,180,630; total, £7,126,030.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

was understood to intimate a doubt whether this estimate would meet with the sanction of Dr. Farr.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

I cannot say whether Dr. Farr has been consulted upon this estimate, nor did I know that he was an authority upon military statistics. No doubt there will be many different estimates. I have given to the House that which I have obtained from the War Office, and which is certainly not a fanciful estimate. Confining ourselves, however, to the limited question which the hon, and gallant General has brought before the House, it would require about £494,290 to pay to 384 lieutenant colonels the difference between the value of a majority and that of a lieutenant-colonelcy, if they received it at once. Taking it for granted that each officer would, before selling, become entitled to the full value, £17,900 must be added, which would make the total £512,190. These are the most material parts of the financial view of the question. I merely state the facts, and leave the House to form its own judgment as to the conclusion which is to be drawn from them. Beyond this there are certain practical advantages, the possession of which by the system of purchase cannot be denied, however much it may be denounced in theory. One of the most prominent of these is the youth of the officers. It will be universally admitted that a system of purchase clears away officers in the higher grades, and secures to our army, upon the whole, a younger, more efficient, and more active class of officers than can be obtained in any army in which seniority is the only rule of promotion. As to what the hon. and gallant General said with reference to a system of purchase giving a monopoly to the aristocratic class, it is rather difficult to find out what is meant by the aristocracy in this country; but if by "the aristocratic class" he means the Members of the House of Lords and their relations, I apprehend that any one who turns over the pages of the Army List, and looks at the names of the officers, will see that there cannot be a greater mistake than to sup- pose that the officers of our army are principally, or in any large degree, taken from the aristocratic class, in this sense of the word. I do not at all believe that the purchase system has produced that narrowing effect which the hon. and gallant Officer attributes to it. There is another advantage arising from the purchase system to which military men attach great importance, which perhaps a civilian is not able to appreciate as well as a military man; but which, nevertheless, I believe to be a very solid and substantial benefit—namely, what is called the regimental system, according to which promotion takes place in a regiment, the officers live together in a manner which is not usual in foreign armies where there is no mess, and altogether an esprit de corps and mutual confidence and familiarity are produced, which tend very much to the efficient working of our military system. It is often said how absurd it is to have purchase in the army when you do not have it in the navy. Now, there is this great difference between a regiment and a ship—that a ship is paid off when it comes into port, and its officers fluctuate from time to time. There is a continuous unity in a regiment which a ship cannot possess, and which is undoubtedly promoted by a system of purchase. There is another great practical difficulty in the way of appointing lieutenant colonels by selection, growing out of the manner in which our army is employed abroad. If our army was like that of France or Prussia, the adoption of such a system would be much easier than it now is. A large part of our army is permanently abroad. How would the principle of selection operate in regard to it? Let the House suppose that a lieutenant colonel dies on his station in New Zealand, or at Hongkong, Pekin, or some other distant part of the world? The senior major would, as a matter of course, succeed to the command of the regiment. The vacancy would immediately be reported home, and probably in about six months, or a longer interval from the death of the officer, a successor, appointed by selection, would arrive out to take the command, and to supersede the officer who had commanded the regiment for six months, and who might have greatly distinguished himself in the interval. Hostilities might have broken out, and the officer might have shown that he was eminently qualified for the post of a commander, although, from indolence or some other cause, he might not have been distinguished as a major. The general in command on the station might think that the claims of this officer to the command of the regiment were very good, and might remonstrate against his supersession, or give him strong testimonials which would make him a discontented man for life with an exceedingly good grievance. I must think that the probability of the occurrence of such a case affords a very strong argument against our having recourse to a system of selection. In order to show the House the difference between the English and French armies in this respect, I will read a few lines from the Report of the Commissioners. Speaking of the French army, they say— Selection is governed by the following regulations:—Inspectors general are appointed for every branch of the service; they are specially named for this duty, and are not the officers who command the district. These inspectors receive a printed form of instructions before they commence their annual tour of inspection, When an inspector general has inspected a regiment, the commanding officer of the regiment presents to him his list of officers for promotion; the inspector general examines these officers, and selects those whom he considers most fit; he then prepares a confidential report, and transmits it to the Minister of War. When all the inspections are finished, the inspectors meet in committee, review the names in these several reports, and from among them prepare a list for the Minister. The Minister promotes them in rotation, or not, as he thinks best. That is the system of the French army, of which the Commissioners say very truly— In imitation of the French system, it may be suggested that special inspectors should be appointed to visit and examine the regiments, and that all promotion should be based upon a careful consideration of their reports. Such a scheme could hardly be applied to the British army. Inspectors could not be sent annually from the Horse Guards to visit regiments dispersed from Canada to Australia. I think the House will see at once that any system of inspection of this kind for our army would be altogether inapplicable. In the French army, the chief part of which is confined to the limits of France, such a system is perfectly practicable, and no doubt works satisfactorily; but the peculiar service of our army renders it altogether impossible. Supposing the Commander in Chief deprived of the assistance which he might obtain from the reports of inspectors, and were to decide promotions on what is called merit, how would he be able to select officers for the command of regiments without exposing himself to the charge of favoritism, or without being subjected to perpetual pressure from private or political friends? Either there would constantly be intelligible suggestions conveyed in the newspapers, or perhaps in the form of Questions or Motions in the House; and if in the midst of all these serious difficulties the Commander in Chief found himself not equal to the responsibility of selection, I am rather inclined to think that what is called merit would assume the shape of simple seniority. My hon. and gallant Friend, I think, said that the present officers of the army had great reason to complain, because they had been induced by the Government to evade the law declaring that money shall not be given for their commissions. He seemed to think that, as a matter of fact, the Government were perpetually pressing and urging officers into the system of purchase, which was not one that was at all sanctioned or approved by the feeling of the army, or into which they would be disposed to enter spontaneously, and without the constant application of this supposed pressure by the Government. That was the picture my hon. and gallant Friend drew of the working of the system. I do not mean at all to dispute his greater experience and greater knowledge of military affairs, but my information leads me to think that the state of things is directly opposed to that which he has described. I do not believe that the system of purchase is one that is forced on the army by the Government, or to which the army itself is hostile; and I think that a very strong argument in the other direction may be afforded by the practice of the Indian army, the European regiments of which were non-purchase corps, but into which the system of purchase was nevertheless introduced by the officers themselves. In order that I may not be supposed to misrepresent this question, I shall read a few words from the Report of the Commissioners. They say— The strict adherence to the rule of promotion by seniority has led to the adoption of a practice which is permitted by the authorities, though not sanctioned by law, and which produces, as regards retirement, a result somewhat similar to the sale of commissions. The House will observe that this is entirely a voluntary system introduced by the army itself, and one only tolerated and not dictated or encouraged by the Government. The officers of a regiment subscribe among themselves, and make up a purse to induce a senior officer to retire. Contributing is optional on the part of every officer; but in most cases a young man would sooner incur pecuniary inconvenience than withhold his aid from a scheme so popular in the regiment. The practice of thus making up a purse applies chiefly, it is said, to the rank of major, though it occurs also in lower ranks. From the evidence given as to the effects of this system, and the unwillingness of officers to retire without a contribution, in addition to the pension allowed them, it may be inferred, that if the officers of the Indian army were left with no other inducement to retire except the allowance granted by the Government, the regiments would be filled with old officers and the efficiency of the army would be impaired. These Commissioners, from the nature of their recommendation, cannot be supposed to speak with any prejudice in favour of the system of purchase. Even in the Indian Artillery this system has also been introduced, though it does not exist in our Artillery, and therefore I think it must be seen that there is a spontaneous tendency to introduce a system of this sort, unless it be checked by the Government and prohibited by strict penal regulations. But however strict the regulations may be, I hardly anticipate that means might not be found of evasion; and it is doubtful whether, after all, the entire eradication of the system of purchase, sanctioned as it seems to be by the opinions and practice of the army itself, would be as easy as many hon. Gentlemen seem to think. These are the reasons which induce me to hesitate at the present moment in taking any additional step for giving effect to the decision that has been adverted to. I do not at all say that the question is closed, or that it would not be expedient under other circumstances; and when some few years have shown what is the working of the system of non-purchase in the twelve new regiments, that it would not be possible to introduce a change both in this and other branches of the service. But on the grounds I have stated Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to take any immediate steps. Therefore it is not in my power to assent to the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend, and I must give my vote in favour of passing to the order of the day, which is equivalent to moving the Previous Question.

GENERAL PEEL

Sir, if I agreed, which I do not, with the recommendations of the Commissioners, I should object to this House being called on to give any opinion or to exercise any influence with regard to a matter purely relating to the command and discipline of the army. In that view I am fully borne out by the opinion of the late Secretary for War, Lord Herbert, who, in answer to a question put to him, I think by the hon, and gallant Member for Limerick (Colonel Dickson), said the army was governed not by the votes of the House of Commons but by the Queen's regulations, and that he would not be doing his duty if he produced any regulations for discussion in the House before they had been decided on by the Queen in Council. I hope and trust this House will never interfere with the command and discipline of the army. I am perfectly content to take the Report of the Commission on its own merits. It consisted, I recollect, of ten individuals, five civilians and five military men; but one of those civilians had been Secretary at War, the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Coventry (Mr. Ellice). We find that the Report and recommendations of the Commission were only signed by six out of the ten members. The majority of the military members of the Commission absolutely put in a counter Report, in which they objected altogether to the recommendations which were adopted by the majority; and, of the civilians, the right hon. Gentleman who had been Secretary at War objected just as strongly to those recommendations. Therefore the House, I think, is bound to scrutinize narrowly the grounds on which the Royal Commission came to that decision. They held in their Report that they were borne out by the practice of foreign armies, as well as our own in India; but the right hon. Gentleman has shown very clearly that it is impossible to compare the foreign with any English service. Foreign officers are collected together, and there may be good opportunities for selecting the best officers. With regard to the Indian army, I think what has taken place there lately would hardly induce us to exchange the system of the British army for any which may exist in India. The Commissioners were certainly wise in giving some other grounds for their decision than the mere evidence which came before them, for I venture to think the opinion which they came to was in direct contradiction to the weight of evidence. Five gentlemen gave evidence in favour of the proposed change; two of them were civilians, amateur reformers of the army, who had paid great attention to the subject; and I am perfectly willing to admit that they gave their honest opinion. But they must excuse me if I do not attach the same importance to their testimony which I should do to that of military officers. Sir Duncan M'Dougall thought a system of selection desirable but not practicable. Sir James Scarlett, to whose opinion I should attach the greatest importance, thought a system of selection preferable to purchase in the higher ranks; but, with regard to the army generally, he thought examination would be better than selection. That view, however, I do not think practicable. Lord Clyde, whose opinion must carry great weight with every one, declared that— There may be unfairness in selection, but one has a right to expect that men in a high station would select proper and fitting men. Men who are passed over at any time may not like it, but still I think that the principle of selection would give less pain and less cause for regret and displeasure on the part of the individual than being purchased over. I now come to the other side of the question. First there is the evidence of Sir Charles Yorke. Then the opinion of Lord Raglan was stated by the Chairman of the Commission, the Duke of Somerset. There are no two men whose opinion is of greater weight on this subject, because they had filled the post of Military Secretary, and through the Military Secretary all the confidential reports of the army pass to the Commander in Chief. Well, Lord Raglan says— We consider that the system of selection would be highly prejudicial to the efficiency of the army. I should be sorry to see the system of selection introduced under any circumstances in this country. I think it would lead to great abuse. Then came Major General Neil and Lieutenant Colonel Ringham. I will not, however, weary the House by going through the evidence of every military man of distinction, but I beg to call attention to the statement of Sir H. W. Barnard on the system of selection:— I think that the system of selection would be decidedly not so popular in the army as that of purchase; that it could not be carried out; and that it would be a very onerous duty upon those who would have to select. He quotes the opinion of a French officer of high rank in the Crimea, Who was surprised at a party in England wishing to alter our system, and to do away with purchase. He had never seen any infantry to equal the British. From this the House is put in possession of the opinion of a French officer who had an opportunity of observing the working of our system as well as that which prevails in the French army. I shall not go into the finan- cial arguments, because I think the question which we have to consider is whether it would be for the advantage of the service that appointments to the rank of lieutenant colonel should be by selection. Viewing the matter in this light, I would ask what would be the position of the two majors of a regiment when you had taken an officer from another regiment and placed him over their heads? What would their position he when you had pointed out to the men under them that you did not think these officers fit to command a regiment? There is the circumstance on which my hon. and gallant Friend laid so much stress,—that the command of a regiment in action might decide the fate of the day. Well, if this officer whom you had selected to command the regiment was killed, the senior major, whom you had pointed out as not fit to command the regiment, would be called upon to perform that duty. Indeed, I cannot conceive any man so passed over remaining for one single moment in the position in which he would be placed. If he is not fit to command a regiment, he is not fit to be senior major. Again, let us look to the effect of this system on the regiment itself. If you do not promote the senior major, what is to become of the second major? It would be a very hard case with him, because, as long as the senior major remained in the regiment, there would not be the slightest chance of his being promoted. Suppose the lieutenant colonel is killed in action, and that you bring in an officer from another regiment to fill his place; the promotion takes place in the latter regiment, and not in that in which the vacancy by death has occurred. It would be much better to say to an officer, "We do not think you are exactly the man whom we should wish to see command a regiment," than to allow him to go on expecting his promotion, and then pass him over when the opportunity arose. By adopting the former course, you would afford him an opportutunity of retiring from a service in which he had no chance of advancement. A man may be very gallant in action—he may do acts that entitle him to the Victoria Cross,—and yet he may not be as fit to command a regiment as a man who had not so distinguished himself in action; but, depend on it, that would not be the view taken by the country. My hon. and gallant Friend (Sir De L. Evans) himself was raised in one year, during a time of war, from the rank of lieutenant to that of lieutenant colonel, and yet, distinguished as were the services of my hon, and gallant Friend, I do not say that there were not other officers who would have made a good a lieutenant colonel as he. I think we ought to be very cautious indeed how we interfere with that which before the Crimean war was admitted to be almost perfect—the regimental system. The House will remember, too, that there is now an examination before an officer enters the army, and that there is a professional examination for every grade up to captain; so that it would be almost impossible for an inefficient man to obtain the rank of field officer. But what would be said to an examination by a gallant officer whom you yourselves had declared not fit to command a regiment? For the reasons which I have ventured to state to the House, I think the Government exercise a wise discretion in not agreeing to the proposition of my hon. and gallant Friend.

COLONEL NORTH

observed, that all appointments in the higher grades must necessarily to a certain extent be made at haphazard. Still, from the confidential reports made after the half-yearly inspection, the Horse Guards was thoroughly informed as to the efficiency of majors of regiments. In a former debate on that subject, the practice of exchanges was relied on as an argument to show that under the present system an officer was brought from one regiment and put over the heads of those in another; but it would be impossible, without the destruction of the prospects of many officers, to do away with exchanges. One regiment had to do duty in various climates, and their removal from one climate to another was often very rapid. During the Russian war, troops were sent from the Cape of Good Hope to the Crimea, and at the close of that war they were sent to India to assist in putting down the mutiny. On a former occasion the hon. and gallant General put the case of an officer without money or friends, and asked what chance of promotion he had under the purchase system. But what chance would such an officer have under the system of selection? The noble Lord at the head of the Government had, on a previous occasion, stated that merit was only the opinion which one man formed of another, that any opinion was sure to be disputed, and that it was a utopian idea to suppose that under any system individuals could be selected on account of merit alone. That was an opinion which he thought every one must share.

LORD STANLEY

Sir, as I was a member of the Commission of 1856, and the only member of it, excepting the hon, and gallant Gentleman beside me, who is now present in the House, I think if I were to let this Motion pass in silence, I should lay myself open to misconstruction, and I therefore feel bound to support, and, as far as I can, to defend, the opinions expressed in that Report; opinions which all my subsequent reflection and observation have only tended to confirm. I will begin by vindicating what I think is quite as important a subject as the organization of the army—I mean the rights of this House—against the doctrine put forward by my right hon. and gallant Friend (General Peel). I dare say he did what we are all apt to do—use words conveying a little more than he really meant to convey. My right hon. and gallant Friend said, in effect, that this was a question affecting the command and discipline of the army, and that therefore, on constitutional grounds, he was sorry it should be discussed in this House. Now, I have always been under the impression that this House found the supplies by which the army is supported, and I cannot conceive upon what principle it can he contended that we, who have to vote the number of men, who have a right to discuss the Army Estimates vote by vote, and who are bound to our constituents and the public to see that those estimates are properly and efficiently appropriated—I do not see how it can be contended that we have no right to deal with questions upon which the economy and the efficiency of the army may in a great degree depend. As to the speech of the right hon. Baronet the Minister of War, I heard it with some pleasure and also with some regret. I observed with pleasure, that while he submitted to the House some defence of the purchase system, very much as though he was staling what had been supplied to him by the department which he officially represents, he carefully avoided commiting himself to any general approbation of that system. On the other hand, I noticed with regret that the whole tenour of his speech seemed to be what one not unfrequently hears from the Ministerial Bench, but what one regrets to hear from a Minister of acknowledged capacity—an apology for doing nothing. The right hon. Gentleman spoke of the departmental diffi- culties, the difficulties of detail, attending a settlement of this question. Now, I sat with the late Lord Herbert upon this Commission, and I know how ardently he took up the views which are embodied in the Report, and I can well understand that when he was Secretary of War, he, in health already beginning to fail, should shrink from the inevitable difficulties attending this complicated question; for him there was, unhappily, only too good a defence; but, whatever the difficulties of detail may be, I am well assured that they are only such as every Minister can point to when he wants an excuse for not acting; and as every Minister can very quickly dispose of when the Cabinet of which he is a member thinks it time that action should be taken. The right hon. Gentleman said there had been an amalgamation of a certain portion of the Indian army, and that by that means a certain number of non-purchase regiments had been created, and that therefore it would be as well to wait until we saw how the system of non-purchase worked in these cases. But how long are we to wait? This would be a reason for waiting for the next twenty-five years, and it affords no answer to the statements made by the Commissioners in their Report. The Commissioners think that there are certain appointments of great importance and involving grave responsibilities, which ought not to be disposed of by the hap-hazard system of purchase. The right hon. Gentleman, in reply, says that we ought to take no action at all until we see how the system of non-purchase works in certain regiments, where, by the way, purchase according to the English system never existed, and where, therefore, the results which we are to wait for were as visible when the Commission was appointed as they are now. Well, that is nothing more than an apology for indefinite delay. Again, the right Gentleman said, "You cannot touch a part of the system without touching the whole, and as to touching the whole that is too great a matter, as it would involve a compensation of something like £7,000,000." Now, that point was fully considered by the Commission. I do not for a moment deny that our Report is in substance an attack upon the system of purchase as a whole; but we carefully abstained from advising its entire abolition, partly for the very reason which the right hon. Gentleman has given—namely, that it would involve a large and indefinite expense, although that expense would be lessened by being spread over a considerable number of years; and partly, also, because at present, whatever the opinion of the general public may be, military opinion is not ripe upon the question. I do not want to overstate the case, and I fully admit that a numerical majority of officers would now be opposed to the abolition of the purchase system. But in a matter of this kind opinions should be weighed as well as counted; and when I look at the testimony given by such men as Sir Duncan M'Dougall, Lord West, Sir James Scarlett, General Franks, General Spencer, and, above all, by Lord Clyde, all against purchase, I must be allowed to doubt whether there is such a preponderance even of military opinion as is sometimes claimed in favour of retaining the present system. As I have mentioned Lord Clyde, perhaps I may be allowed to point out that, by a curious accident, he has, in evidence given six years ago, completely answered one of the strongest points made in his speech tonight by the right hon. Baronet the Secretary for War. The right hon. Gentleman, arguing against the system of selection, said—"What a cruel case it would be, when the colonel of a regiment dies, if after the major has taken the command, and months have passed, he is told that he can retain the command no longer, and somebody else is put over his head." But does not that happen under the purchase system? Lord Clyde says— An officer in the 55th had been promoted for service in the field, and had obtained his brevet majority. he led the assault at Chinkiang-foo, and though he became brevet lieutenant colonel, and was in command of the regiment in the field, in the presence of the enemy, a young captain who had just come out purchased over his head, and he was obliged to descend to the command of a company. That shows that the very abuse of which the right hon. Gentleman speaks as likely to arise under the system which he deprecates, does actually arise under the present regulations. As regards military opinion, I do not think that we are to test it by the opinions expressed in this House. It is a popular belief, and in the main it is true, that the system of purchase unduly favours those officers who happen to be men of fortune. Now, that is just the class who are likely to be represented here, and I do not think we ought to take their opinion as being an absolutely accurate representation of that of the army in general. My right hon. and gallant Friend (General Peel) said something about amateur reformers of the army, obviously meaning that this was a subject with which civilians had little business to interfere. Now, I venture to say, that although those who have been brought up in a system are probably the best qualified by experience to administer it, they are, as a rule, not the best qualified to judge whether the system itself is one which ought to exist. I speak of officers of the army with all respect, but I shall be excused if I do not speak of them with higher respect than I should of the judges upon the bench. Now, it is notorious, that thirty years ago, when there was an agitation for a reform of our criminal law, when a man might be hung for stealing above the value of 40s., the great majority of the judges were in favour of maintaining the then existing law, and argued against concessions of which now no rational man doubts the expediency. I only mention this in order to show that persons not previously familiarized with a system are perhaps the best qualified to judge as to the policy of retaining it, because they will be likely to form an unbiassed judgment, one not warped by previous habit or training. The House will remember that the system of purchase is unknown in any other army than ours. In the Indian army it exists, but in a form so modified, and so divested of its objectionable features, that the two systems cannot fairly be compared. It is unknown in the navy, in the civil service, and in a large part of our army—in the-Artillery and Engineers. Perhaps the fairest test you can find of its merits, is to appeal from those who are accustomed to it to those among whom it has not been introduced, and to ask what would be the feeling of all or any of these professions if you were to try to establish it where it has not existed before. But, in fact, I am understating my case. There is nothing new in purchase. The system of purchasing offices has, at some time, existed in every European country; in every European country it has been abandoned; it has existed in the civil service of England, and here, in every profession but one, it has been abandoned as incompatible with the ideas and requirements of modern times. In the seventeenth century civil offices were purchased in England, and that without secrecy or corruption. In the old monarchy of France military, civil, and judicial appointments were purchased. It may have been the same in other countries; but, under the influence of the ideas that have prevailed during the last seventy years, the practice has everywhere died out except in the British army. The origin of the practice itself is easy to explain. When offices were more lucrative than they are now, the Government felt a reluctance to displace the holders of them summarily; and thus, if I may use the term, a sort of tenant-right grew up, and those who succeeded to an office paid a compensation for it. The history of this system of purchase is that of many other abuses. First, a practice is more or less openly connived at; then it grows into a custom; and, lastly, what has been a general custom grows into an institution. Then theories are invented to defend that institution, which would be unintelligible to its earliest authors.

And now let us consider a moment how the system works—first, as to the individual officer, and next as to the State. As to the individual, I do not see how any one can make light of the hardship he must feel it to be purchased over. On that point I will again quote an authority—that of Lord Clyde. In his evidence before the Commission he says— There is always pain felt if one man gets over the head of another by means of mere money. He stated, too, from his own experience, that he was put to great pecuniary inconvenience in order not to be passed over by other purchasers. He mentioned the case which I quoted just now, of the major who was purchased over while commanding his regiment in the field. Another case cited in the Report is that of an officer, who, on the ground of qualification, received from the Duke of Wellington, in the Peninsula, the command of a regiment, which he would have been compelled to decline for want of funds unless other officers had combined to make up a purse for him; and this happened in time of war. Can you have a stronger argument against the necessity of purchase than the fact that an officer whom the Commander in Chief in the field thinks the fittest man to command a regiment cannot hold that command but for the accidental interference of his brother officers to help him, and that without that help the command before the enemy must have gone to some one less fit to hold it? Those who have read the life of Sir Henry Havelock will remember his feelings of mortification at being purchased over three times. Could any one suppose that the army gained by such a system as that? I do not wish to exaggerate the grievance; but it seems to me, that as a general rule the officer purchased over is likely to be the best rather than the worst, and for this reason—that of two men entering the profession with equal talent, one of whom takes up his profession merely as a temporary occupation, having nothing dependent upon it, while the other feels that not only his chances of distinction, but his very independence and fortune, depend on success— the latter, by no merits of his own, but from the circumstances of his position, is almost sure to work harder and to prove the more active and efficient. Then look at the effect of the system on the officer who purchased. He says, with perfect truth, that his pay is only a fair income on capital laid out, or 5 per cent on an average on what he has paid. He may say he gives his services to the State without remuneration. And, though the honourable feeling of officers induces them to take this circumstance very little into consideration, yet it is impossible they should not think it something of a hardship if called to perform arduous duties in time of peace. If the feeling is not stronger, it is a proof that the men are good, not that it is a good system. Again, consider what a speculative transaction is the purchase of a commission to an officer of small means. At the best, he sinks half his fortune in a life annuity. If he dies on service, the whole of the capital is lost to his family. Since the subject was last discussed in the House it is true there has been some improvement in the system; now if an officer is killed in action, or dies within six months of a wound received in action, his family receive the value of his commission. Thus the grievance has been partially removed; but if an officer dies from disease, or the effects of climate, there is nothing for his family. Thus an officer is not only exposed to the risk of losing his life in the performance of his duty, but his family are subjected to a fine because he has been forward to expose his life. And what is the defence made for this system? It is said you get younger officers by it. I believe we have younger officers in the English army than in any service in Europe. But the real reason is, in England a large class of young men enter the army for a few years, not intending to make it the permanent business of their life; but attracted by congenial society, and perhaps by the hope of seeing a little service. This class of officers retire from the army early, but not in consequence of the purchase system. They would equally retire on succeeding to estates, or forming local ties, if they had paid nothing and were to receive nothing back. Then, it is said, selection would be invidious, and that there is no danger of bad appointments, because there is a veto on all appointments in the War Department. But though the official veto may exclude bad characters, it does not exclude incompetence; and I could never understand why a man placed in the high position of the Commander in Chief should be more afraid of exercising a responsibility that is exercised of necessity by every head of a great department continually. But, it is asked, does the Commander in Chief know the state of the many different regiments scattered so widely over the world? If he does not, the army must be in a far worse state than I believe it to be. I have always supposed that the Commander in Chief is informed of the state of every regiment in the service. Then it is said there is the risk of touching a susceptibility of feeling in the men who may be passed over. But I never could understand how, under a system of selection, a man can feel disgraced because he has been passed over, when near the top of the list by seniority, by a man on the whole better fitted to command. That is a degree of susceptibility which is not indulged in any other profession, and which is inconsistent with the course of human affairs. Then, however painful it may be to any man to have another preferred over him, the question ought to be considered, whether that state of things has not its good side as well as bad. The fear of being passed over may act as a stimulus to exertion. At present the deficiency of the service is the absence of any stimulus to officers, especially in time of peace. There are in the army many men who, it is evident, are well-meaning, but who are as evidently incompetent. Such men as these may be passed over by the system of selection. But, if there must be cases of this kind, is it not much better for a man to feel that he has been passed over because somebody else is thought more fit to command than to know that he has not risen because he could not obtain a certain sum of money? It is quite clear that having better men put over their heads when they reach a certain rank would precisely supply a stimulus of emulation which at present is not in existence I have only, in conclusion, to ask the House seriously to recollect what is the power which is put in the hands of a commanding officer. It should never be forgotten that an officer in command of a regiment, by his ignorance and incompetence, may compromise the lives of hundreds of men, and perhaps decide adversely the fate of a battle. I think any man, looking without prejudice or preconceived notions, must see that a position which may, under certain circumstances, be of so much importance, ought not to be given away by hap-hazard; but that it ought to be under that control by the Commander in Chief which can only be obtained by a judicious system of selection. And let me say further, that where there is neither marked incompetence on the one hand, nor marked superiority on the other, the rule of seniority would not often be departed from, and that the painful cases of officers being passed over would occur less frequently in practice than is assumed for the purposes of argument. I will only remind the Government, that however they may regard the question now, they are, as a Cabinet, pledged to the measure which my hon. and gallant Friend recommends. It was formally announced by them to this House that they intended to adopt the recommendation of the Commission; and though that pledge may go the way of other pledges, and that reform share the fate of other reforms, the present is not an age tolerant of abuses, and I venture to say that in less than a quarter of a century not one rag of the system of appointments by purchase will remain in the English army.

COLONEL SYKES

was understood to say, that they had already gained sufficient experience of the working of the non-purchase system in some divisions of the army. What necessity was there, therefore, to decline carrying out the recommendation of the Commissioners? The Indian army was an example of the working of a system of promotion without purchase, as up to 1832 the practice of Indian officers making a purse to induce their seniors to retire was unknown and unrecognised. As to interference of the House in matters connected with the army, which had been deprecated, he should justify it upon the ground that they voted the supplies, and passed the Mutiny Act. It was said that the purchase system brought out young men at the head of the army, but he regarded that as a disadvantage rather than a benefit.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

said: The greater part of the speech of the noble Lord opposite was upon a question which is not now brought before us—namely, upon the general question, whether purchase is or is not expedient in our army? Upon that I will say a few words. I quite admit that the English army, and, notwithstanding what my hon. and gallant Friend behind me (Colonel Sykes) has said, the Indian army, were the only cases in which a system of purchase prevailed; and, with all deference to him, I think the system of purchase in the army of the East India Company was far more objectionable than the system of purchase in the Queen's army. In the British army it is optional with each officer to purchase or not, as his means enable him to decide. In the Indian army it was compulsory upon every officer to contribute, and every officer who declined to contribute to a purse to buy out the superior officers, was looked upon as a black sheep, and received a civil hint that he had better retire from the service. I quite admit, that if the system of purchase did not exist in the British army, no one probably would think of introducing it. But I do not agree with the noble Lord, in saying that a thing, which would not be thought of originally, might not, when established, and when opinions and habits become attached to it, work well, although theoretically objectionable. That, I believe, is the case of the system of purchase. Then the noble Lord says, what an effect it must have on the feelings of an officer to be passed over because he is not able to purchase. I say, in answer, that when a man goes into a career, knowing what the regulations are, he does not feel so much mortification, when the regulations of that career apply in his particular case to his detriment, as he would in any other case when the detriment brought upon him is not the result of established well-known regulations acting impartially on all, but arises from what he would consider a capricious exercise of power. In other services, where purchase does not exist, the rule of seniority or the rule of selection applies. The inconveniences of seniority are met in the French service by a regulation which compels every officer to retire at a certain age, that age being in proportion to the rank which he holds, less for a lieutenant than for a captain, and so on. I hold that it is a regulation which, although it insures a set of young officers for their army, may very possibly deprive, and frequently does deprive, the service of men perfectly competent to command, and who would be most distinguished in their career; and therefore there is a great objection to it in practice. The principle of selection for the army may be very good as a general principle for a despotic Government. I do not mean to say that it is likely to be better administered by a despotic Government, but that the complaints to which it may give rise do not find their way so readily to the public ear. But, in a country with a free constitution such as ours, where a man may say, print, or send for publication to the newspapers whatever he likes; where no man is so friendless that he cannot get some zealous advocate in this House to urge his case, to expose to the world the tyrannical prejudice of some higher authority against him, to institute a comparison between his services and merits and those of the person who has been placed over him —under such circumstances, I am afraid that the general principle of selection would lead to consequences which would not be for the advantage of the public service, and would, indeed, be exceedingly detrimental to the position and usefulness of the men in authority by whom the selection would have to be made. I think what has been stated by the right hon. and gallant General opposite (General Peel), as to the inconvenience which might arise on a vacancy happening in a regiment on a foreign station, where no opportunity had been afforded of acquiring distinction, is quite unanswerable. The Commander-in-Chief would find an officer belonging to another regiment, whose good fortune it had been to be at the seat of hostilities, and to distinguish himself by some brilliant exploit, and would send him out to the guard station to supersede the major in command, who was, in all probability, as brave, as judicious, and in every way as competent to perform the duties of the office, and who would, if on the scene of action, have earned as much distinction as the other who had been lucky enough to attract public notice. One can conceive how an officer in the situation of that major, who finds himself superseded by one whom he does not think his superior In merit, while he may be his junior in the army, must suffer from a sense of great and unmerited injustice; and such cases I believe would very often occur. I am therefore of opinion, that with regard to the Motion of my hon, and gallant Friend the House will do right in adopting the proposal of my right hon. Friend to proceed to the Orders of the Day. The noble Lord opposite charged my right hon. Friend (Sir George Lewis) with departing from a Resolution which had been communicated to the House. It was Lord Herbert who came to the conclusion, on full reflection, that the Resolution was one which it would not be advisable to carry out; and last year that change, or rather postponement of purpose, was announced to the House. My right hon. Friend having succeeded to office, after deliberate consideration, adopted the view of Lord Herbert, and by that view the Government is prepared to stand. The noble Lord complains that my right hon. Friend is in the position of a man who is unwilling to do anything. There may be cases in which disinclination to do what you are satisfied is a good thing may be an objectionable quality; but the disinclination to move forward in order to do that of which you doubt the propriety, and which you apprehend may be attended with inconvenient results, is a different thing. we know the maxim in dubio siste, and I believe the course followed by my right hon. Friend is a matter not of censure, but of praise.

Question put, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

The House divided.—Ayes 247; Noes 62: Majority 185.

Question again proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."