§ MR. BUXTONrose, pursuant to notice, to call attention to the amount of European Forces maintained in India. He believed, that the more any one studied Indian affairs, the more profoundly convinced he would become of the truth of a remark made by Mr. Kaye, the celebrated advocate of the East India Company, that "it would be well that it should be clearly understood how, at the bottom of all our misdoings, and all our shortcomings, is the miserable want of money;" and that it was absolutely impossible for us to have an overflowing exchequer, and avoid the disas- 1153 trous evils that had arisen from the want of means of the Indian Government, in any other way except by reducing the army to the lowest possible point consistent with the entire security of the Empire. Being deeply impressed with the dire necessity (if India was to attain the prosperity to which she was entitled) of reducing the military force far below its present amount, he brought forward the subject in 1859, and again last year. He had the happiness now, which lie had not on those occasions, of acknowledging that so far as the Sepoy force went the Indian Government had been making very considerable exertions in that direction. Within the last two years the Native army had been reduced from 350,000 to 130,000 men, and he was sure he was only expressing the feeling of all who took an interest in Indian affairs in saying how deeply thankful they were to the Government of India, and especially to Colonel Balfour and his colleagues of the Military Finance Department, for that immense reduction. But in the amount of European force the reduction had hitherto been comparatively small. Mr. Laing, indeed, in his budget, spoke of a reduction in two years from 90,000 to 70,000 men; but he regretted to say that that statement would be extremely illusory if taken literally. The actual amount of European force maintained on the 1st of last March at the cost of the Indian Government, was 84,327 men. Of these 72,796 were in India, and 11,531 were in the depôts at home. This, then, was the fact with which they had to deal, that the amount of European force maintained by the Indian Government amounted to just 85,000 men, and apparently there was no intention of bringing it below that amount. At any rate troops to the amount of 2,423 had just received orders to embark for Calcutta, 870 for Bombay, 772 for Madras, and 224 for Kurrachee, amounting in all to 4,300 men. This did not look like a reduction of the 85,000. Now, this amount exceeded by no less than 5,000 men the amount proposed to be maintained in India by the Commission which inquired into the subject of the Indian army soon after the mutiny. That Commission recommended a force of 80,000, and possibly, he thought, the Secretary of State might meet him by saying that he proposed in due time to reduce the force to that amount. He earnestly trusted that this might be done, and done soon. That, however, would not by any means content him. The more care- 1154 fully he examined into the subject the more cordially did he join in the opinion of those Indian statesmen who looked with consternation at that proposal of the Commission, and who entirely denied the necessity for the maintenance of so vast a force. In fact, no Commission ever made a recommendation seemingly with less care and thought, or one less borne out by the evidence before them. The truth was, that that Commission was entirely absorbed by what they deemed to be the important question as to the amalgamation of the two armies; and although, unhappily, they made this recommendation, they did not take the trouble to assign any reason of any sort or kind for putting the amount at that point. They put a question to some of the witnesses as to what amount of force they would suggest; but in no single instance did they require the witness to give any ground for his suggestion. More than this, not only did they supply no reasons whatever, either of their own or of the witnesses examined by them on the subject, but the conclusion they came to was condemned by the greater number and the greater authority of the. witnesses whom they examined. For instance, the Commissioners recommended 50,000 Europeans for Bengal. Now, two-thirds of the witnesses examined before them, and men of the highest position, recommended an amount considerably below that point. Still more remarkably was it that the Commission recommended a force of 15,000 Europeans for Bombay. Now, not a single witness suggested such an amount, and General Griffiths, the most important witness on the point, only demanded a force of 7,000. Again, as to Madras, they recommended a force of 15,000 Europeans, though Earl Canning placed the amount at 10,000; and no single witness went beyond that except a civilian of the name of Thomas. He (Mr. Buxton) said, then, particularly that the recommendation made by the Commissioners was neither justified by any reasonings of their own, nor by the evidence placed before them. Why then, it might be asked, should they have recommended so vast an amount of force? Never was any phenomenon more easy of explanation. The Commission consisted of ten Generals and only one civilian; and he remembered, on a former occasion, quoting Napoleon's observation to his brother Joseph, that "there never was a General who did not cry out for a large army." The noble 1155 Lord the Member for Lynn (Lord Stanley) was the only civilian on the commission; and if the noble Lord would get up in his place and say that he believed a force of 80,000 Europeans was necessary for the safety of the Indian Empire, why he (Mr. Buxton) acknowledged that that must have great weight with the House. But his conviction was, that the reason why the Commissioners recommended that force was simply that ten Generals were allowed to decide for the country what amount of army it should maintain, and that accordingly, without any reference to the general statesmanship of the question —without any regard to the broad and far reaching interests of India and of England, they naturally made a professional recommendation of an army far beyond what really was needed. Was there any human being who would doubt that under such circumstances an army would he maintained far beyond the real requirements of the country? Well, then, this having been the composition of the Commission, he maintained that the fact of their suggesting 80,000 men was almost in itself a demonstration that 80,000 men was far more than was really necessary But what should they say when they found that an estimate which there was so much reason, à priori, to regard as extravagant, was itself actually now exceeded, and largely exceeded, by the force which the right hon. Gentleman now maintained in India? The Secretary of State for India was not content with raising the European force to that immense amount—he was maintaining 5,000 men beyond it, and was in the very act of sending out 4,000 men as a relief to the regiments now there, instead of bringing them home without supplying their place till that point was reached. Well, then, finding that neither the witnesses examined by the Commissioners, nor the Commissioners themselves, afforded any ground whatever for a judgment on this question, and entirely denying the wisdom of allowing ten Generals to decide for a country what amount of army it ought to maintain, they were driven to examine for themselves into the point; and he could truly say that he had spared no pains and research and thought to arrive at an answer to this question, whether so great a force was really necessary for the security and maintenance of our Indian empire. And here he would put to the Secretary of State, in the most definite way he could, a ques- 1156 tion, which he ventured to address to him three years ago in making a Motion with reference to the reduction of the Native force, but to which he could not at that time elicit any reply. He trusted that on this occasion he would do him the honour to give as definite an answer as the case admitted of. What he wanted to know was, against what enemy this force was provided? In the answer to that lay the gist of the whole matter. Happily India was one of those countries which need not at present entertain the smallest apprehension of invasion from without. The miserable fear that Russia would have the madness to march across Asia, and would seriously endanger our Indian possessions —that cowardly fear had passed away. He believed it never was entertained by more than a very few individuals, and even they, after the incidents of the Crimean war, must come to perceive that a wilder enterprise, or one whose failure could be more inevitable, could not be conceived; besides which, if Russia did make such an attempt, we could send troops to oppose her with infinitely more rapidity than she could march them thither over land. No one dreamt that Persia, or any of our other neighbours, would attempt to assail us, or at any rate would attempt it in such strength as to require us to be for ever keeping up so vast a force to guard against such a contingency. Again, should war unhappily arise between England and any other country, we could then, if necessary, send troops to India in time to protect that country against any assaults from them. In short, they might entirely dismiss the idea that this army of 85,000 Europeans and 130,000 Natives, in all 215,000, was intended for the protection of India against a foreign foe. The only object of it was to preserve order, to prevent any uprising against our own rule. Now, let the House seriously examine whether so great a force was necessary for that purpose. They must remember that for 100 years our empire in India was not only maintained, but was constantly pushed further and further by an army the European portion of which never, he believed, numbered 50,000 men, and was often much below that mark. We had infinitely less cause now than we had formerly to apprehend war with the particular rulers within the boundaries of India, who formerly were our dangerous neighbours, but who had since either become our peaceable subjects, or who 1157 had disappeared altogether. Yet we had now nearly twice the number of European soldiers that we used to keep in those days No doubt some apprehension might be felt as to some of the warlike nations on our north-west frontier. In that part a large European force—25,000 or 30,000 men, must always be maintained. But as to all the rest of India, and above all the experience since the mutiny demonstrated that nothing more serious than a local riot need be feared from the unarmed Native population. In short, the only enemy whom we need really fear, the only enemy who could seriously threaten the Indian empire, was the Sepoy force, armed and trained by ourselves. But now it was a most important fact that this Sepoy force had in the last two years been reduced by no less than 220,000 men. It now stood at only 130,000, including a large body of military police, from whom no danger could arise, owing to the absence of regimental organization among them. It was considered, he might add, by most Indian statesmen that it would be quite safe to have three or four Sepoys to one European soldier. The Commission, however, had placed the proportion at five Natives to two Europeans; but at that rate 130,000 Native troops would only require about 52,000 European troops to keep them in check. The result, then, of a minute examination of the subject showed that we had far less need than formerly to apprehend attack. And not only was the strength of our only possible enemy so greatly reduced, but we should also remember that in other respects our power of suppressing insurrection had been greatly increased since the mutiny of 1857. Taught by that lesson, we no longer intrusted to Native hands our forts and our arsenals, without the possession of which no mutiny or rebellion could stand for a week. The artillery force had been greatly augmented, and amounted last March to 11,760 Europeans, a portion of the army which he, for one, had no wish to reduce. The troops throughout were supplied with the Enfield rifle, with which no weapon that any rebels could obtain could compete for a moment. At the same time, the immense extension of railways and telegraphs would enable the Government to concentrate our troops upon any point where alarm arose, with a rapidity unknown before; so that nothing but the most scandalous folly and neglect on the part of the authorities could prevent us, 1158 even with a force of one-third of that now maintained, from instantly bringing to bear, at any threatened point, an overwhelming force of Europeans that could drive any rebel force to the winds. And let them remember the experience given by the mutiny, and indeed by the whole history of our Indian Empire with regard to the impossibility of any of the Natives of that country resisting our arms in whatever numbers they might contend with us. When they remembered the prodigious exploits performed during that mutiny, when they remembered how in many eases the rebels, though armed by ourselves, though equipped by ourselves, though trained to warfare by ourselves, yet were invariably overthrown by a force, in many cases not one-tenth, in some cases not one-twentieth of their own amount— remembering all that, he thought it was not prudence but timidity to keep up an army so largely in excess of any Native force that could possibly take arms against us. Now, were he asked how much he would suggest that the European force might be reduced, he should reply that he only presumed to call the attention of the Government to the facts he had referred to, but could not venture to express an opinion upon that point. He would only say that he confidently expected some day to see an expenditure of only £10,000,000 instead of £13,000,000 per annum on the army of India. He would now show how disastrous was the maintenance of so vast a force, both to India and ultimately also to England. The cost of our army, both European and Native, amounted, according to Mr. Laing last year, to no less than £12,800,000—a much larger amount than was, not many years ago, thought necessary for the defence of England herself, with all her colonies, notwithstanding the proximity of her mighty rival across the Channel, and notwithstanding the enormous claims upon her strength arising in every quarter of the globe. The effect of this extravagant outlay upon the finances of India was most disastrous. There might, perhaps, be some justification for it, if the treasury of India were overflowing; but they had to remember that in the last twenty years the national debt of India had increased by fifty millions; that in scarcely one of those years had they escaped a deficit; that in the three years ending with I860 the deficit amounted to £36,000,000 (taking the three years together); while, to use Mr. Laing's words, 1159 "all the efforts of the Government, aided by the imposition of new taxes which convulsed Indian society, had still left them in 1861 with an apparently hopeless deficit estimated at six millions." It was true that, according to Mr. Laing's budget, it had been expected that this year at any rate we should at length have arrived at a surplus; but they were now informed by the Secretary of State for India, the surplus proved to be a deficit, estimated at no less than a million. Now, he was sure that no one worthy of the name of statesman could look upon such a state of things, in which the income of the country was regularly and to a very great extent exceeded by its expenditure, without alarm; and the result was that we were in every possible way pressing upon the impoverished inhabitants of India to endeavour to squeeze from them more money; and no less than £5,000,000, according to Mr. Laing himself, was raised now by taxes recently imposed. This was a most important point to observe, that in the last few years they had added taxes that drew no less than £5,000,000 out of the pockets of the Indian people. These new taxes mainly consisted of the income tax, which had been found to be doing an incredible amount of harm in the country; and again of the enhanced duties on salt, on stamps, and on customs. Now, every one who was acquainted with Indian matters was aware of the immense evil it was to the people of India to have any salt tax at all, insomuch as one could hardly conceive how, under British rule—professedly and intentionally a benevolent one—a tax that cut so deeply into the daily comfort of the people could be maintained; much less could one have expected that it would in the last year or two have been largely enhanced. They all knew that to a people living, as the Natives of India mainly did, upon rice, salt was one of the very first essentials to health, and strength, and happiness; the want of it inevitably created serious indigestion, and all the multitude of diseases which indigestion was liable to cause; and the consequence was that the people of India had a sort of craving for salt, of which people in England were almost unable to form any conception. There could be no question whatever that if the people of India could obtain salt at a much lower price than they now did, the health and strength of the people would be largely augmented; and yet upon this vital necessary of life, vital as bread itself to them, 1160 we raised last year three-and-a-half millions sterling, the tax being no less in Bengal than eight guineas per ton; and Colonel Cotton had shown that the result was, that whereas the people required at the very least about 20lbs. weight per head, they in reality only obtained, upon an average, 7lbs. weight per head. In fact, he gave reason for believing that a large proportion of the population did not get a tenth part of the salt really necessary not for their comfort alone, but for their health; and that while in England it was not anything like so great a necessary of life as it was in India, the lowest price in India for salt was thirty-five times what it was in England, and the people, of course, would be far less able even to pay the same price as that which people paid here. But again he saw that Mr. Laing proposed, and he believed that the Secretary of State for India had agreed to lower the customs duties from 10 to 5 per cent. This would be an immense boon, not only to India, but to England. Even 5 per cent, however, upon her cotton goods placed England at a serious disadvantage, because this was a customs duty upon an article manufactured in the country without any excise to correspond with it in the interior of the land; and it was obvious at once that a duty, even a duty of 5 per cent, must operate in such a case as a direct protective duty to the Native manufacturer, and must have all the injurious effects which a protective tax could never fail to engender. In this case they had this strongest possible reason for a still further reduction if possible, that now the people in the manufacturing districts were in such deep distress—to which he feared there was no reason to hope a speedy termination—and that if they could extend the market for their cotton goods in India, it would be an invaluable boon to those suffering people and to the whole of this country, while of course it would create a reciprocal traffic in the productions of India itself with England. He would not detain the House by dwelling upon the great evils that followed from the other taxes, all of which might be diminished, some of which might be repealed, if they could but make a considerable reduction in our military expenditure. But it was not merely in the pernicious influence of the taxes which it involved that this military expenditure did such infinite harm. It stayed the hand of the Government in conducting those improvements in the country 1161 from which such mighty results might be expected. It not only wasted so great an amount of our present wealth, but its most serious effect was in hindering us from opening up those vast sources of wealth by which one might else believe that our Indian revenue would, in the course of a few years, he doubled or possibly trebled. There was one other of the many evils arising from the maintenance of so great a force, to which he could not forbear calling the attention of the House, and that was the frightful amount of loss of life and of health which was inevitable in such a body of European troops quartered in that country. He did not believe it was at all generally known in England how fearful the mortality was amongst the English soldiers stationed in India. As one of the witnesses stated to the Commission, "The sacrifices in men and money caused by the climate are astounding;" and again, "The medical statements would almost stagger belief." In fact, the statistics laid before the Commission showed that out of a force of 80,000 Europeans, nearly 6,000 would perish every year; while the permanent loss of health to thousands upon thousands more was not less painful to reflect upon. He would not, however, go so fully as he was tempted to do into the unbounded mischiefs inevitably engendered by the maintenance of so vast a European army. To sum up briefly, he thought the Government ought not to submit their judgment to the ipse dixit— based neither on evidence nor on reason— of the Commission to which he referred. If they examined for themselves what enemy they had to provide against, they would perceive that there was but one enemy from whom peril could really arise —namely, the Sepoy force—and that had been immensely reduced, at the same time that our military position had been greatly improved. Consequently the time had come when we might effect a reduction of our European force, which, besides causing a fearful waste of life amongst those European troops themselves, cut deep, by its expense, into the prosperity of India, without in the slightest degree endangering our Indian empire. If that course were adopted, the prosperity of India would, he believed, be greatly enhanced, and the 130,000,000 of people under the rule of England would find their daily comfort greatly increased.
§ MR. VANSITTARTsaid, that as he had taken no part in the discussions which 1162 had occurred this Session regarding the precise number of European troops to be maintained in India, he hoped the House would allow him to offer a few observations on this occasion. In doing so he could not help expressing the feeling of alarm with which he regarded the course which was being pursued by the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton) and his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes) to effect a reduction of the European force in India. For his own part, he frankly confessed that he was not one of those who were carried away by the wild and Utopian notion that India could be governed and held without a strong European force. On the contrary, it appeared to him that those who entertained that opinion were not sufficiently mindful of the circumstances of India and its past history, and that their amiable but mistaken views were calculated to provoke another rebellion similar to that which occurred in 1857. Looking to the enormous extent of our Indian territories, over which were scattered so many unprotected stations, occupied by mere handfuls of our countrymen, their wives and their children, and to the warlike character of the inhabitants of Oude and the Punjab; looking to the fact that the Artillery in future was to be composed wholly of Europeans, and the arsenals to be manned by them; looking, again, to the, comparatively speaking, large Sepoy army we were obliged to keep in our pay, and to the vast levies of Native police, which required to be controlled more or less by Europeans; and, lastly, to the unfinished state of the railways, it seemed to him, he confessed, a somewhat hazardous proceeding to reduce the European force at the present moment. It should not be forgotten that the mutiny which occurred in 1857 was in no small degree attributable to the Government of that day diminishing the number of European troops, contrary to the earnest entreaties and remonstrances of those distinguished and deeply-lamented noblemen, the late Marquess of Dalhousie and Earl Canning. It appeared to him that the opinion of an individual Member of that House as to the proper amount of force to be maintained must necessarily be wholly speculative; he could not possess the same accurate information as the Secretary for India and his Council, who were responsible for the safety of that country, and who probably arrived at their decision after a conference with the local Govern- 1163 ment. The House knew, upon the authority of the right hon. Baronet, that in the summer of 1861 the Indian Government sent in an estimate for 92,000 men; that the military Members of the Home Council reported that a less number than 80,000 would not be sufficient; and that the right hon. Baronet, on his own responsibility, had cut down these two Estimates to 70,000 men. It seemed that the Native army was to be gradually reduced to 124,000 men. Assuming, therefore, 80,000, as proposed by the Council, to be the correct number, the proportion of two Europeans as against three Natives would be still unbalanced by 2,666 Europeans. Knowing full well the hate and the fanaticism of the Mohammedan population, and the impossibility of calculating for any length of time on the preservation of peace in a country so full of combustible materials as India, fringed by such savage and fiery tribes, as was now exemplified by the war raging on the north-eastern boundary, he had always maintained that the European force for nil India should consist of not less than 80,000 men; and if we allowed the English army to be reduced as it was before the mutiny of 1857, and neglected the sacred duty of affording the same protection to our brethren out there as we did to those in England and in our colonies, we were unworthy to be intrusted any longer with the possession of India. Under these circumstances, without entering into the financial part of the question, which might be more conveniently reserved for the debate on Mr. Laing's budget, he would conclude by protesting against the dangerous policy of the hon. Members for Maidstone and Aberdeen— a policy which, if carried out, would, he believed, have the effect of not only imperilling the lives of those who were so earnestly and devotedly engaged in the discharge of their public duties, but compromising most unjustly the honour of Her Most Gracious Majesty, in whose name our magnificent Indian territories were now governed.
§ MR. KINNAIRDagreed with every word that had fallen from the hon. Gentleman who had just sat down; and with regard to the views of the hon. Member who introduced the subject, although he believed that his intention was good, and that his only wish was to economize the resources of India, he was inclined to think that the time had not arrived when they could with safety act contrary to 1164 the experience of those who had studied the question, who had themselves lived in the country, who knew the Native character, and who were better acquainted than the hon. Gentleman could possibly be with the arguments and necessities for the employment of so large a force. The hon. Gentleman had drawn a beautiful picture of happy and peaceful India, but he appeared to have forgotten what had occurred within the last few months; and though he (Mr. Kinnaird) trusted that by an adherence to a conciliatory policy towards the Natives, to that policy which Lord Canning during the last years of his administration had I carried out, they might look forward to a reduction in the European army, he thought that to force such a course upon the Government now would neither be wise nor economical in the end. Great and sudden reductions entailed, in moments of necessity, a very great cost in order to recover that which a wise expenditure would have maintained. It was true that in past years there had been great loss of life in the Indian army; hut he believed that through the sanitary measures taken by the Government, with the assistance of the railroads, by which they were enabled to keep the troops in healthy districts, there would not in future be that fearful mortality of which his hon. Friend spoke. Looking, moreover, to the circumstances of our colonial possessions, and particularly to our relations with China, he did not think that it was any disadvantage to this country to have in India a body of acclimatized troops ready to perform any service that might be required of them. He believed that at present 80,000 men were necessary for the maintenance of our Indian Empire; and he trusted that the Secretary of State would not be induced by the temptation of adopting the more popular course of reduction, to abandon the line of conduct which had been recommended by the experience of so many great and able men.
LORD STANLEYsaid, that as a member of the Commission which sat four years ago to consider whether, and in what manner, the Royal and Company's armies in India should be amalgamated, he then expressed the opinion, which he did not now hesitate to repeat, that no great importance could be attached to vague general estimates of the number of troops which might he required some years hence, pier-haps in totally different circumstances, for the defence of India, If there was one time at which it was especially difficult to 1165 make such an estimate, it was during the height of the Indian insurrection, when almost every one was more or less excited, and when, more than at any other moment, it was difficult to obtain a dispassionate judgment. At the same time, be did not entirely agree with the statement of the bon. Member (Mr. Buxton), that India was now exposed to no serious danger either from within or from without. It was true that there was no power on the frontier of India at all equal to cope with the force which we could bring to bear; but semi-barbarous tribes did not always calculate the consequences of their actions, and we might at any moment have disturbances in Affghnn-istan, in Nepaul, or in the territories of the Nizam, which, although they might not permanently endanger the security of our empire, might, if they were not immediately suppressed, occasion much mischief before they were put an end to. Then again, although all agreed as to the necessity of governing India, as far as possible, upon a conciliatory system, it was impossible to speak of a country containing 180,000,000 of population — a country which we had acquired by the sword, and which we governed, as Asiatic nations were governed in the main, by the sword—as if it were perfectly free from all danger of internal disturbance. We really knew very little of what was passing in the Native mind. If he gave an opinion, he should be inclined to say that for the present, after the exhibition of British power, and after the measures which had been taken to conciliate the Native chiefs, we were in a position of greater security than we had occupied for a long time past. At the same time, however, he knew that for years before the insurrection of 1857 the same feeling of security existed, and experience had shown how unfounded were the opinions then entertained. Allusion had been made to the pacific character of the people; that was undoubtedly true of Bengal, and might be true, perhaps, of the greater part of India but there were particular districts which from time immemorial had been inhabited by races whose chief occupation and pleasure consisted in war. And therefore he protested against any general conclusion that because the country was now peaceable there was no longer any danger of serious disturbance. At the same time, a reduction of expenditure might fairly be looked forward to, when, by the completion of the telegraph between England and India, the military 1166 reserve at home would be nearer by one half to the seat of operations, while the railways would enable a smaller force to act with greater efficiency. Something had been said about financial dangers; but although this was not a financial debate, he must observe that in the worst times of difficulty he had never desponded, and he certainly did not now despond of the future of Indian finance. Bearing in mind the extent of the population, and the very slight degree to which, comparatively speaking, the enormous natural resources of that country had hitherto been developed, it appeared to him that in future years India would not only be able to bear her present liabilities, but, twenty or twenty-five years hence, if no great wars intervened, she would be able to hear a much heavier burden than that which, he admitted, now taxed all her energies. The population directly subject to British sway, was more than four times that of the British islands; while if the native States, who contributed to the customs duties, were added, the number would amount up to 180,000,000 —nearly six times the amount of the British population. The whole debt of India, excluding the advances to railroads, which were reproductive in their character, was about £100,000,000, or one-eighth of the British national debt, and the pressure which it inflicted upon the people per head was about l–30th or l–40th of that which was felt at home. It should be remembered that for the last fifty years India had been engaged in almost continual warfare; it was impossible to point to a period when a sufficient interval of peace was given for the full development of the resources of any one district. Even with the present amount of revenue the Indian debt did not amount to more than three year's income, while that of England amounted to twelve years' income. These figures showed, that whatever the present pressure of Indian finance, there was reasonable ground for supposing that a few years of prosperity would enable that country to bear much heavier burdens. Though he believed it might be possible in time to come to diminish the number of European troops in that empire, he should be sorry, either in that House or anywhere else, to lay down prospectively any fixed number as that which should be maintained. And against the saving by this probable diminution he was afraid the House must set the cost of various sanitary reforms which 1167 had been strongly urged upon the attention of the Government. A return would, doubtless, be obtained for expenditure under these heads in a diminution of mortality, and in the increased efficiency of the force kept up; but these were consequences which could only follow after the lapse of a certain time, and after the expenditure had all been incurred. Although on the score of humanity there might be a considerable gain, he did not think that for a considerable time to come the House could safely calculate on much reduction of expenditure, consequent on decreased mortality. He had for the last two years been sitting upon the Sanitary Commission of which Lord Herbert had been Chairman. He hoped that they would produce the result of their labours in a very short time: when they did so, the House would see that by proper means great reduction could be caused in the death-rate of Europeans employed in India; but, as he had already said, this could only be done at an increased expense.
§ MR. TORRENSthought the question of army reduction in India might safely be left in the hands of the Executive. But he wished to obtain from the right lion. Gentleman the Secretary for India some explanation of the circumstances under which, during the years 1858 and 1861 inclusive, upwards of 400 young officers were sent to join the army in Bengal, though the greater number of the regiments they were to have commanded had mutinied; the officers, moreover, who had remained after the defection of those troops being more than sufficient to command the remnant of the Native force. To Madras 88 young officers were sent during the same period, though a reduction of the Native force was contemplated; and 120 others were despatched to Bombay. He could imagine nothing more miserable than the position of a European officer in India without any regular employment, and in his opinion it almost amounted to cruelty to send out young officers without there being duties on which to employ them. The Government had stated that 190,000 Minie rifles had been set apart for the army of India, which was a number far in excess of the European force there; but he hoped to hear that none of these arms had been put into the hands of the Native soldiers.
§ MAJOR PARKERdesired to call atten- 1168 tion to the fact that a great many invalids were sent home from our army in India, very imperfectly provided for, after having served their country well in India. Many might be seen about the country asking assistance, and some showing evidence of good and faithful service. In some instances they had received one or two years' pay; and they asked with good reason why they were turned adrift after ten or twelve years' service? He referred to the case of John Orris, of the 75th, whose certificates of discharge stated that he had served in India five years, had been engaged in putting down the rebellion, and was discharged in consequence of being wounded at Delhi; and yet he would receive only 8d. a day for a few months longer, though his character was certified to have been very good. Certainly, when India was increasing in wealth, something could be spared for those who had rendered such good service there.
§ SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, the cases referred to by the hon. Member for Windsor had no connection with the subject before the House, nor, in point of fact, had they anything to do with the Indian army. Whatever these men, who were both in regiments of the line, might be entitled to was adjudicated to them by the Commissioners at Chelsea under the pension and gratuity regulations of the British army. The Indian finances contributed a certain gross sum in respect of these soldiers, but with the distribution of it the Indian Government had nothing to do. Consequently, these cases could not be brought forward as cases of grievance against the Indian Government. The hon. Member for Carrickfergus (Mr. Torrens) had asked him to state the number of young officers who had been sent out to India of late years. He could not at once give the numbers. It would be remembered that it was the practice of the Court of Directors and the Secretary of State to give nominations to young men who educated themselves for the purpose of going into the Indian service, and who took up their commissions after a certain interval. When he assumed office three years ago, he immediately put a stop to that system, and neither he nor any Member of his Council had since given a single appointment. At the same time, while putting an end to the practice altogether, he felt that he could not, without a breach of faith towards those young men to whom promises 1169 of commissions had been previously given, take the extreme step of stopping their nominations. In any army there must be a constant succession of young officers, and he did not believe there would be any want of employment for the young men who had been sent out to India. He must further observe that he and the Members of the Council had voluntarily given up their right of appointing to commissions by nomination. He had to state, in reply to another question, that Enfield rifles had not been placed in the hands of the Native troops. With respect to the Indian revenue, it would be his duty before long to call attention to the financial state of India, and he thought it would be better to defer till that occasion any observations which he might have to make upon the financial part of the question introduced by the hon. Member for Maidstone (Mr. Buxton). Whatever might be the state of Indian finance, it would always be our duty not to maintain in India one single soldier more than was necessary. He would not repeat what had already been so well said on both sides of the House as to the absolute necessity of maintaining an adequate force in India. It was nonsense to suppose, that because everything now appeared to be quiet and smooth in India, no danger could possibly occur again. One week before the recent mutiny broke out there was no English resident in India who would not have said that such an event was impossible; and therefore to contend that there was no danger in India now, because there was no outward and visible sign of it, was arguing against all experience. We must always be on our guard. The real question, however, was, what might fairly be called an adequate force to be maintained in India with a view to the safety of our dominions and the preservation of peace? It had been said that there were no arguments to support their estimate of 80,000 men used in the Report of the Commission which sat on the Indian army. He could not understand by what arguments a matter of this kind was to be settled one way or the other. It was a question of opinion, and could be decided only by authority. He had a great respect for the hon. Member for Maidstone, and on many points would be glad to be guided by him; but he did not think the hon. Gentleman was more competent than others to say what was the precise force which ought to be maintained in India. 1170 Upon such a subject he must defer to those persons who, with the best means of knowledge, had also the responsibility of governing the country. He never proposed to proceed upon the Report of the Commissioners, who were appointed for a different purpose, though he submitted that the opinion of eight or ten general officers, most of whom were acquainted with India, was one entitled to considerable weight. Recently published despatches contained the estimates which at different times within the last few years had been made by the best authorities in India. So recently as 1860 combined estimates of the Governments of India, of Madras and of Bombay made the gross aggregate of troops to be maintained in India 92,000. He thought this number excessive, and after communicating with the military Members of his Council, with Lord Clyde, and other officers whose opinions on such subjects were valuable, he wrote to India stating that he thought a smaller number would be sufficient, but, of course, leaving it to the authorities in that country to decide ultimately on the point. He was of opinion that the ultimate decision ought to lie with them, because they were on the spot, they knew the danger, and were responsible for the Government of India. He should be taking upon himself a responsibility from which he ventured to say the boldest man in that House would shrink if he discarded the opinion of the Indian Government on the important question of the number of troops to be maintained in India. Well, so late as last May the opinion of the Indian Government was that 73,000 was the number that ought to be maintained in India. His hon. Friend had spoken of the number of recruits that had been sent out. Every one acquainted with military arrangements in India knew that recruits were sent out at one period of the year only—in June and July. They arrived in September and October; and when they arrived, the number of troops in India must, in order to maintain the requisite number on the average of the year, be a certain percentage above that required for the year. The different authorities had now arrived at the conclusion that at least 71,000 troops must be maintained in India as the average number throughout the year. After the arrival of the recruits the total number ought to be about 5 per cent above the average. In December last year the total was only 74,419, which was not quite 5 per cent above the ave- 1171 rage, which would have been 74,550. It was therefore an error to suppose that any extravagant number had been sent out. His hon. Friend said that the Government were going to send out 4,000 recruits this year. Certainly they were, and why was that? Because the Artillery was 2,000 below the minimum of that force which the Government of India had stated to be necessary. It was necessary to supply 2,000 men to the Artillery, besides making up the losses by casualties. Two years ago the Indian Government recommended that the Artillery should number 20,000. They had since reduced their demand to 13,000. He doubted whether they had not fixed it at too low a figure: for every one knew that it was important to have a large artillery force in India, hut no more would be sent than were required to make up about 13,000. He quite agreed with his hon. Friend that it was desirable to keep the total military force in India down as low as possible; but he thought it would be a culpable neglect of duty if they kept the number a single man below the strength adequate to afford protection for the lives and properties of our European fellow-subjects in that country. He believed some of his hon. Friend's views were founded on a misapprehension, but he could assure him that the Government would not maintain in India more troops than were considered to be absolutely necessary to afford that protection to which he had just referred.