§ MR. FREELAND,* rose to call attention to our relations with Austria, and also to the present state of the Venetian Provinces, as a source of danger to the Peace of Europe; and to ask the First Lord of the Treasury whether any Communications have been received from our diplomatic or consular Agents in Austria or Italy, with reference to the present state and proposed increase of taxation in the Venetian Provinces, and with reference to the number of Emigrés from those provinces, and to the sentences of illegal emigration which had been notified in the usual manner by the Austrian Government; and to move for Copies of any such Communications which Her Majesty's Government may have received. He said: 254 Sir, if I thought that any discussion which, may arise on the Motion which I am about to make, and particularly on that portion of it which relates to the Venetian provinces, could do harm to the best interests of the Venetians, or the Italians, or to the cause of order and peace in Europe, I would never have yielded to the urgent solicitations which have induced me to submit this Motion to the consideration of the House. I believe that, on the contrary, good may be done. I believe that, to some extent at all events, by means of frank discussion in this House, and perhaps in other Representative Assemblies, a danger to the cause of peace may be removed from the chapter of passions and of accidents to the domain of reason and of public opinion in Europe. On those higher grounds which influence, or ought to influence, a Christian people—on those lower grounds which specially affect the British taxpayer, it is, I think, our bounden duty to do all that in us lies to promote a peaceful settlement of the Venetian question, and to avert, if possible, the outbreak of another war in Italy. If war broke out in Italy, it would soon, I think, involve Europe. Europe narrowly escaped from it only a few weeks since; and I trust that Europe will take warning from the occurcnces at Sarnico and at Brescia. I will not pretend to penetrate the mystery of those occurrences; but if an attack on the Tyrol was intended, an attack on the Tyrol would have been an attack, not only on Austria, but on the territory of the Germanic Confederation. It would have given to Austria, at all events, a pretext for calling Germany to her aid. If Austria had marched to Milan—if Austria had reconquered Lombardy—France might have been drawn into the field to defend the results which were obtained by the victories of Magenta and Solferino, and Europe might have seen the legions of four Powers contending upon the plains of Lombardy. If the Continent were engaged in war, it might be difficult for England to keep clear of its entanglements; and even if England did keep clear of those entanglements, she would soon feel in the diminution of her exports, involving a large increase of local, and, perhaps, ultimately of imperial taxation, the pressure of the calamity which had occurred. Under these circumstances, the Government, I hope, will be able to tell us that they are seeking earnestly to arrive at a peaceful solution of the Venetian difficulty. I hope, too, that 255 they will have the courage to lay boldly and unreservedly on the table of the House the information which they must have received with regard to the present state of the Venetian provinces—information which will enable Parliament to appreciate the existing danger in its full extent and bearing.
Sir, I will not detain the House with any lengthened remarks with reference to our present relations with Austria. Austria has long been one of the leading European Powers. The wishes and policy of England point, I think, with sufficient distinctness to this, that Austria, if she will but march with the age, ought to continue to be a leading Power, and an element for maintaining the balance of power in Europe. That policy, I think, was well expressed by the noble Lord at the head of the Government, in a speech made so far back as 1849. In that speech he referred to those considerations which ought to render the maintenance of the Austrian empire an object of solicitude to every English statesman. Again, Sir, I cannot forget that Austria is, as regards this country, a friendly Power; and not only is Austria a friendly Power, but Austria is the ancient ally of England. The noble Earl the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs said, so recently as March in last year, that during many contests in Europe for two centuries past, we had often contended in the same cause, and against the preponderance of other Powers, with Austria. Well, but then, Sir, the alliance of Austria with England means, in these days especially, if it means anything, an alliance with the principles of justice—an alliance with the principles of liberty and progress. It means, at home more free institutions for Austria; and I rejoice to think that she is obtaining them. It means abroad, if not absolute free trade, a liberalized commercial policy. Apart from these, the alliance of Austria with England has no great moral or material significance.
Prince Napoleon, in his speech made in March of last year, spoke of the alliance between his country and England as being not an alliance with this or that minister, but with the great liberal English people. By that alliance, he said that France, though she might have to make concessions on secondary points, could defend the great principles of liberty and progress. Monsieur Billault said, in the same debate, that this alliance had already ac- 256 complished great things, and that still more remained to be done. Let us hope that Austrian statesmen will emulate these sentiments. If they do so, they will meet, I am persuaded, with a very cordial and hearty response here. England honours old alliances, but there are some things which England honours even more; and these are the principles of justice, the principles of liberty and progress applied in practice to the government of populations, whether they live beneath a native or an alien sway. I have alluded, and I am glad to have been able to allude, to the political changes which have taken place in Austria. Those changes cannot, I think, but tend to a greater community of political sentiments, and to greater harmony of political and commercial action between the Governments and the people of Austria and England. There cannot be a doubt that, in a commercial point of view, an alliance with a country like Austria, whose natural resources and producing powers are capable of large development, might, under a wise commercial system, be of great and growing importance to a country like England, which is the seat of a vast manufacturing industry. In the pathways of commercial reforms, indeed, Austria, as in the case of other reforms, moves slowly. Still Austria made some modifications in her prohibitive system in 1851. In that year, too—for I wish to be just to Austria even where Venice is concerned—she restored to Venice the privileges of a free port, of which Venice had been deprived on account of the part she had taken in the revolutionary movements of the preceding period. Austria took a further step in the right direction by concluding, in 1853, a commercial treaty with Prussia and the Zollverein. The changes it effected were productive of great benefit to Hungary, to Germany, and to Austria herself. As between the parties to the treaty, the duties, I believe, are generally three-fifths less than those which are levied on the productions of other countries. The more free access which English goods have obtained, and will obtain, to the Continent under the new commercial relations subsisting between England and France, combined with those which France is endeavouring to bring to completion with Prussia and the Zollverein, and the provisions of which will, it is said, be extended to England, will probably soon force Austria to modify still further her commercial system, 257 or to sacrifice an even larger amount of customs revenue on English goods than she at present sacrifices to the smuggler. Every month's delay in the conclusion of the treaty between France and Prussia is, we are told, a source of positive loss to England, yet our old ally Austria is instigating the southern States of the Zollverein to oppose its conclusion. I hope, therefore, that the noble Lord at the head of the Government, will be able to tell us that the Government is directing its earnest attention to the extremely important subject of our commercial relations with Austria.
I pass now, Sir, from Austria in her relations with this country to Austria in her relations with Venetia; and the subject is, I feel, a delicate and painful one. But no regard for old alliances ought, I think, to make us blind to the necessity of examining with care a question which, disguise its real character as you may, is undoubtedly a question full of danger to the peace of Europe. On this ground, and on other and more special grounds, we are, I think, clearly entitled to consider it; and this too, without offence to Austria. Austria has more than once solicited our mediation in the affairs of Italy, and England was a party to the Treaty of Vienna. That treaty reassigned to Austria the Venetian Provinces, upon the implied promise, at all events, that those provinces should be equitably governed. England, therefore, is bound to feel a special interest in everything which affects the material and political welfare of the inhabitants of those provinces. Before I refer to the state of Venetia, I am anxious, if the House will kindly permit me, to say a few words on the difficulties with which Austria, it is said, has to contend in considering what I believe to be the only real and final solution of the Venetian question—I mean the cession of Venetia to the Italian kingdom. Those difficulties have, I think, been overstated. It is said, I know, by some, that Austria cannot give up Venetia; because, if she does, she must give up Trieste also. Now, although my sympathies are with Italy, I could not, if I thought that Trieste must follow the destiny of the Venetian Provinces, honestly stand up in my place and say that Austria ought to listen for a single moment to any proposals for a cession of Venetia to the Italian kingdom. But I cannot, I confess, see that the cession of Venetia involves the cession of Trieste also. It is true that in 258 Trieste—drawn thither by commercial and other considerations—the Italian element preponderates. But in Trieste the Italian element is, at all events, the foreign element; it is the national element in Venetia. Again, Trieste, as a port, has greater natural advantages than the port of Venice, and it is of immense maritime and commercial importance to Austria. The shipping of Trieste, too, I am informed, comprised upwards of two-thirds of the entire shipping of Austria. Trieste, moreover, has been called the Hamburgh of Southern Germany, and it owes everything to Imperial favour. So far back as 1719 it was declared a free port by the Emperor Charles VI. It received important privileges from his daughter, that great Sovereign and virtuous woman the Empress Maria Theresa. Still later, in 1818, it acquired the title of "the most faithful city," and became a member of the Germanic Confederation. Again, thirty years later, in the time of the Italian and Hungarian revolutions, Trieste continued faithful to Austria, and it gave proofs of its Germanic predilections, if I remember rightly, by sending a representative to the German Parliament at Frankfort. For these reasons, Sir, I cannot see in this argument which relates to Trieste the force that some attribute to it. If I were an Austrian, I would not sacrifice a single shilling or a single man in order to maintain possession of Venetia, but I would sacrifice my last shilling and my last man rather than listen to any proposal for the cession of Trieste to the Italian kingdom. Then, again, it is urged by many that in a strategical point of view the possession of the Quadrilateral by Austria is necessary in order to enable her to defend the southern frontier of Germany. This point, with many others, has been ably, but not, I think, conclusively urged by Mr. Bonamy Price in his pamphlet on Venetia, to which Mr. Grenfell has published a pamphlet in reply. Without attempting to follow Mr. Price, I may say that his strategical arguments have, it seems to me, been answered by anticipation, by the Austrian Archduke Charles. The Archduke is a great military authority, and his principal work is published I believe, by the Government of Austria for the use of Austrian officers. A summary of the views of the Archduke has been so clearly and concisely given by Mr. R. Macdonnell, in an article in Macmillan's Magazine on "Venetia and the Peace of 259 Europe," that the House will, I hope, allow me to read the extract concerning it. It is as follows:—
In the introductory chapter of his History of the Campaign of 1799, the Archduke Charles enters into an elaborate consideration of the various possible theatres of war between France and Austria. He describes their geographical characters, and discusses at length the advantages and disadvantages to each of the belligerents presented by each scene of operations; and he comes to the conclusion that the valley of the Danube is the vital point in every war between France and Austria. He lays down distinctly that a march from Milan through Venetia upon Vienna is hopeless, so long as Austria holds the defiles of the Upper Danube; and he advises his countrymen, in every war with France, to devote, without hesitation, the bulk of their forces to the valley of the Danube. He refers to possible diversions on the side of Italy as little to be dreaded, and (what is not least important) he takes for granted that the advance of a French army on the Danube necessitates, as a matter of course, the evacuation by Austria of the Tyrol and of Northern Italy.And, Sir, not only have we the authority of the Archduke Charles as to the true points of defence for Austria, but in February of last year the Prussian Chamber of Deputies decided on the Motion of Von Vincke, in opposition to Baron Schleinitz and the whole power of the Government, that it was not in the interest of Prussia or of Germany to place any obstacles in the way of the consolidation of the unity of Italy. That, at all events, was a strong expression of opinion on the part of a majority in the Prussian Chamber, that the Quadrilateral was not wanted for the defence of Germany. It was equivalent to an abandonment of Venetia. Let us hope, Sir, that it will pave the way for the recognition by Prussia of Victor Emmanuel as King of Italy. I am sure, Sir, that we are all delighted to hear that the Emperor of Russia has recognised Victor Emmanuel, and that such recognition has not been purchased by any unworthy compliances on the part of the Italian Government. Well, but then, Sir, if the Quadrilateral is not wanted for the defence of Germany in the hands of Austria, it will be looked upon as a menace to the new kingdom of Italy. And, Sir, this brings us to the real question, which is, "Can peace be maintained if Austria is to continue to occupy in the Quadrilateral a position menacing to Italy?" I believe, Sir, that it is absolutely impossible. I believe, too, that the character of Austrian rule in the Venetian provinces, and still more the proposed increase in a taxation already crushing, must tend inevitably to 260 precipitate a crisis dangerous to Europe. The cries of suffering in Venetia become more audible; the sympathies of the party of action in Italy grow more impatient from day to day. Let us hope that peaceful means may be devised to avert a crisis, which the organs of opinion both in this and other countries assure us is impending.
§ Notice taken, that 40 Members were not present; House counted; and 40 Members not being present,
§ House adjourned at a quarter after Eight o'clock, till Monday next.