HC Deb 07 July 1862 vol 167 cc1535-65

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

SIR STAFFORD NORTHCOTE

(who had given notice on going into Committee to move— That it be an Instruction to the Committee, to set forth in detail in the Schedule to the Bill, under the head of each station, the name of the works in each district to which it is proposed to apply the sums to be granted by the Bill; the total estimated cost of each work, and the amount proposed to be applied to it before August 1, 1863,") said, that he forbore from moving his Amendment, because he had been informed by the Speaker that he should not be in order in doing so. At the same time, he was anxious to make an appeal to the Government to make some alteration before hon. Members discussed the Bill in Committee. He wished to know how the sum of £1,200,000, lately granted, was to be expended, and to have a detailed account appended to the schedule. By this means they might discuss the Bill better than in the general form in which it then stood. He thought they ought to be careful as to the appropriation of the money they voted. There was a difference of opinion as to certain of these works, and it was considered more desirable to carry out some of them than others. The question was, whether they had then the means of giving effect to their opinion upon the details of the Bill—whether they could reduce the expenditure upon certain fortifications, whether at Portsdown or at Plymouth. If they did so, according to the ordinary rules of appropriation they would effect nothing by reducing this Vote, because it seemed to him that the Government could use the money promiscuously for any purpose mentioned in the schedule of the Bill. If the House were to express its opinion against any particular part of the Bill, he took it for granted that the Government would take care not to proceed with that portion of the works, but there was nothing in the form of the Bill to prevent their doing so in spite of a decision of the House. They were very much in danger of passing Bills like this year after year; and if the House were to rest merely upon an honourable understanding with the Government, without a very strict appropriation clause, there was no saying to what extent the power might be used by the Government. Of the £2,000,000 granted two years ago certain sums had been set down in the schedule for particular stations, and they had now returns of how the money had been spent upon these stations, and he found that at several of these places there had been considerable excess. He knew that £350,000 of that was to be spent upon works already sanctioned by Parliament, and not set forth in detail in the schedule; but he found that at Portsmouth more than £120,000 would have been spent in excess by the end of this month beyond what was sanctioned by the schedule; while at Plymouth, £68,500; at Portland, £112,000; on the Medway, £40,000; and at Dover, £66,000, more than was sanctioned by the schedule, had been expended; and the expenditure at all the military stations had been £440,000 more than was granted by Parliament. Deducting even the £350,000, there was an excess of expenditure of £90,000. How had that money been obtained? Why, £150,000 had been obtained for a central arsenal, which had not yet been fixed upon, and that money had been spent on works at Portsmouth and elsewhere. What he asked was, that the House should not go into this matter blindfold. He did not wish to express any particular opinion upon the fortifications mentioned in the Bill; but it was important that they should keep the matter in their own hands, so that they might be assured that the money would be applied to the purposes for which it was voted. He proposed, when they came to the appropriation clause in the Bill, to move a proviso, limiting the power of the Government with regard to the application of these monies. If the Government would allow them to go into Committee pro formâ, they might then discuss the matter, and decide which works should be sanctioned and which not. If not, he must at a future time propose the Amendment which stood in his name, which would render necessary the alteration of the schedule; and if there was any, probability of his Motion being carried, the Government would see that time might be saved by adopting his proposal. He felt sure the Government would treat the House with perfect fairness, for in the whole of this business the Government had acted in that spirit: they had always freely shown what they had spent, and what they proposed to spend. The plan had been originally sanctioned by a willing majority of the House, and he thought the Government had no course but to persevere in the plan. All he desired was to put the matter in such a shape that they might deal with it practically. He should content himself, on the present occasion, with earnestly asking the Government to adopt the course which he had suggested.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS

admitted that there was a difference of opinion, as to some of these forts; and the Government had found it their duty to object to many of the opinions that had been expressed. But on one subject he thought they were all agreed—that whatever might be the decision of the House, it should be founded on clear data; that there should be no misunderstanding as to the proposals of the Government; and that when once there was a decision of the House, embodied in an Act of Parliament, it should be strictly observed by the executive Government. He was therefore quite prepared to take any course which should correspond with that principle. The hon. Baronet had Stated with fairness that the information the Government had given was satisfac- tory, and he should be ready to adopt the course he proposed if he saw how it could be reconciled with the ordinary practice of the House with regard to appropriations. He was quite ready to follow the precedent if a Committee of Supply. The course proposed by the hon. Baronet was some what stricter. What the hon. Baronet proposed was to insert every item, whereas the Appropriation Act only adopted the total of a Vote. What the Appropriation Act required was that the money spent should not exceed the total of the Vote; but within that Vote the separate items, although, no doubt, the Department observed each as strictly as it could, were not enforced on it by law. But in the making of contracts—for instance, when an Estimate for a barrack was contained in the Army Estimates, the whole amount being £30,000, and the annual Vote being £20,000—the invariable practice was to make the contract for the entire sum. That practice was followed with reference to these forts. If, for example, the whole amount allotted to Portsmouth was stated in the Bill at a certain sum, and the contractor for one part of the works became bankrupt, or an interruption occurred to the works from some other cause, it might be convenient and economical to the public that the sum intended for that work should be spent on some other work within the same schedule. If he were to adopt the proposition of the hon. Baronet, and make the Return a part of the Bill, it would become an appropriation of every item in that Return, which would be much stricter than the practice ever followed in Committee of Supply. He should be quite ready to enter into an engagement with the House that he would not, in the case of any one fort, exceed the total amount stated in the Return which was upon the table; and if that could be engrafted upon the schedule, he should make no objection; but beyond that he was afraid that it would be difficult to go without unnecessarily tying the hands of the War Department. He should be quite willing to make any arrangement which would carry into effect the general principle that the Government should not take any advantage of the House, or enter beyond their expectations and intentions upon any of the works included in the list.

MR. LINDSAY

said, that when the noble Viscount at the head of the Government brought this subject before the House two years ago, he alleged as the reason for asking a large Vote for fortifications the increasing armaments maintained by neighbouring Powers and especially by France. He referred to her great army, and more especially dwelt upon the fact that she had a navy which could not be required for purposes of defence; and that while she had increased her naval force our fleet had, owing to the change from sailing ships to steam ships, been diminished in number. On the faith of that statement the House readily granted a Vote of £2,000,000. Similar statements had been constantly made; but it was only within the last month that there had been laid upon the table, by command of Her Majesty, authentic reports respecting the naval and the military forces of France. Those reports appeared to him to differ in material particulars from the statements which had been made during the last two years, both by the noble Lord at the head of the Government and by the noble Lord the Secretary for the Admiralty, and he therefore thought that it would be well for the House to postpone the consideration of these fortifications until they had further information upon this subject. He was about to move that the consideration of further expenditure upon the fortifications authorized by this Bill should be postponed until there had been laid before the House the reports of our naval attaché at Paris showing the state of the French navy at various periods during the years 1860 and 1861. The House would not have sanctioned so large an expenditure—it was questionable whether it would have sanctioned any expenditure for fortifications, but for the impression which was created by the statements of Her Majesty's Government that we were fast becoming, in comparison with France, only the second naval Power, and should not be able to maintain the command of the sea. What, however, were the facts? That we possesed more efficient steam vessels mounting twenty guns and upwards than all the rest of the world, France included, and that we had twenty more line-of-battle ships (the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty himself admitted seventeen) than all the other nations of the world together. In 1860 the House voted £12,800,000 for the navy, and the number of men voted was 85,500, or 6,000 more than were voted while we were at war with Russia. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty, in asking for those Votes, stated that France had 244 steam vessels that could be mannned and sent to sea in a few weeks, some in a few days, and asked where we should be if hostilites broke out. The Government were not satisfied with the enormous wooden fleet which we then had, and during the year 1859–60 they built 85,000 tons of wooden ships, consisting of line-of-battle ships, frigates, and so forth. Yet at that time they must have known that France had long ceased to build wooden ships, and that one iron-plated ship could destroy all our wooden ones. In 1861 the House voted for the navy) £12,029,000 besides £250,000, an instalment of £2,500,000, which was voted later in the Session. The number of men was 78,200. The noble Lord, in moving those Estimates, observed that it was impossible that our force, either in men or ships, could be fixed without relation to the forces of other Powers, and stated that France had then two very large and powerful iron-cased ships, which they ranked as line-of-battle ships, mounting fifty-two rifled guns each; four powerful vessels which they called iron-cased frigates, mounting from forty to thirty-six guns; four of a very formidable class, called floating-batteries, mounting fourteen guns each; and, in addition to all these, five gunboats of a very formidable character. He thus made it appear that in March, 1861, France had built or was building fifteen iron-cased ships, while we had only seven under construction; and on the faith of that statement of things the House readily granted the large sum of money which he had mentioned. There was a very long discussion upon those Estimates, and in the course of it the noble Lord stated that the Magenta and Solferino would be ready for launching in a very short period and might be sent to sea in a few months, and that of the four frigates one was then at sea and the others were ready. He was in Paris; and having confidence in the statements of the noble. Lord and the noble Viscount as to the immense preparations of France, he took occasion to speak to the Minister of Marine, and the Minister of Marine said that the iron-cased ships were not in the advanced state which was represented. The Minister of Marine, moreover, placed in his hands the means of contradicting these statements. He (Mr. Lindsay) also mentioned the subject to M. Chevalier, who wrote him a note which he read to the House at the time. He, however, thought it necessary to trouble the House with an extract from that note— You have a full statement of our navy in a blue-book placed in a solemn manner before your House. You hare it from the lips of the Minister of our navy. You were told by our Minister, privately as well as publicly, that of iron-cased vessels France has only one at this moment fit for sea, namely, La Gloire. That in a short time there will be a second one of a similar character ready for sea. I tell you, too, it will be necessary to have two more built; but two years must elapse before we are in a position to complete six iron-cased vessels ready for sea. Now, observe those two years dated from the 19th February, 1861. The noble Viscount, however, who doubted the assertion, said it was no use shutting their eyes to notorious facts, and to go on pretending that the policy of France for a length of time had not been to get a navy equal, if not superior to our own. The Estimates were voted in March or April, and on the 31st of May the right hon. Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington) came down to the House, and stated, on the authority of Admiral Elliot, who had visited all the dockyards of France except Toulon, that La Gloire was completed, that the Magenta and Solferino were to be launched in June; and the hon. Baronet summed up the matter in these words— The practical point we arrive at is, that the French are rapidly preparing 15 powerful armour-plated ships, to be added to 9 of a different description also covered with armour, giving them in the whole a force of 24 armour-covered ships, exclusive of the old batteries which were used during the Russian war…. Admiral Elliot assures me…. that in every one of the yards which he visited the utmost efforts are being made to press all those ships forward to completion. I have no wish to excite alarm by making this statement.… The point to which I invite attention is, that whatever may be the motive of France, the practical result is that we are rapidly becoming the second maritime Power of Europe." [3 Hansard, clxiii., 416–17.] The Return of the strength of the naval and military forces of France, and the state of advancement of the iron-cased ships and batteries building on the 1st of January, 1862, did not confirm the statements made by Admiral Elliot after his flying visit to the Franch dockyards, and endorsed by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich. It was now clear that in May, 1861, no such progress had been made in the French iron vessels to justify the statement which was made to the House on the 31st of May by the right hon. Baronet on the authority of Admiral Elliot; and that the statement he had himself previously made on the authority of the French Minister of Marine, and M. Chevalier was literally correct. The Government, finding the House alarmed at the representations of what was doing in the French yards, asked for a supplemental Vote of £250,000, as an instalment of £2,500,000, to build six iron-cased ships of 6,300 tons each, and attaining a speed of 14 knots an hour; and in the month of July that sum of £250,000 was voted, in addition to the original Estimates of £10,000,000 or £12,000,000. Many Members opposed the proposal of the Government, and he was one of them. He warned the Government against the danger within, should the American war continue, and the people be thrown out of employment, and he advised them to consider that, rather than an imaginary danger from without. The noble Viscount, however, notwithstanding these facts, still adhered to his opinion and reiterated his statement as to the supposed increase of the French navy. "In addition to a fleet of six iron vessels," said the noble Lord, "France has laid down ten other vessels, making together sixteen formidable ships of war, in addition to eleven floating batteries." The Secretary to the Admiralty, moreover, stated that other nations were adding to their iron-cased ships, and we must keep pace with them; and the noble Viscount said that the great preparations of France rendered indispensable corresponding preparations on the part of England. The sole reason for the expenditure which was given to the House was the rapid increase of the French navy, and at the same time discussion was deprecated, because it would give offence to France, and the people of England were convinced that the French Emperor had acted most honourably and fairly towards them. Some had said, "Oh, France won't meddle with us as long as we have our hands free; but only wait till we get into trouble with some other Power, and then see how the Emperor will act." Well, we had recently had a difference with another Power, which assumed a threatening aspect, and the Emperor had behaved in the most friendly spirit. It was the French despatch which, in a large degree, helped to extricate us from the American difficulty. Now, under all these circumstances, he (Mr. Lindsay) thought, that before the House proceeded to consider the further expenditure of money upon fortifications, it was very desirable that full and exact information should be supplied as to the actual naval force of France up to the latest date possible. Now, he believed it was correct as regarded numbers to say that France had built and was building 37 iron-cased ships, and England only 26. As far as France was concerned, there were 6 iron-cased frigates to be completed this year. There were 10 ordered to be laid down in the winter of 1860–1, and the building of which would extend over seven years. Not one of those was to be launched before 1863. Now, those made altogether 16 sea-going vessels. The keel of La Gloire was laid down in 1858. Besides those he had enumerated, there were four floating batteries for the defence of the mouths of rivers and coasts, building at Bordeaux, and they were nearly ready. There were also 7 other floating batteries of only 150-horse power each, which had just been ordered. There were 5 gun boats, which were built for the Italian war, and about which his noble Friend had alarmed the House. They were of 32-horse power each, and besides there were 5 batteries that were built for the Crimean war, and they made the total of 37, with a tonnage of 68,000. Now, compare our 26 vessels with these 37. We had 11 completed this year, the tonnage being 47,887, six in the course of construction, each of which was 6,621 tons, making a total for these six of 39,726; one battery, on Captain Cole's principle, which was 2,529 tons, and those 8 old batteries of about 16,000 tons; so that we had built and building 106,000 tons of iron-cased ships, as against 68,000 built and building by France. [Lord CLARENCE PAGET: How many guns?] As the English vessels were each of about 6,600 tons, and the French of about 3,000, he presumed that the English ones could carry double the weight of metal of which the others were capable, or that, at least, they were stronger and more efficient in some other respect. If that were not the case, then the Admiralty, of course, did not know its duty, or it would build two vessels of the smaller kind for one of the larger sort. Therefore the number of guns did not much matter. Should any emergency arise, we could build iron-cased ships faster than any other nation. It was, therefore, enough if we kept ahead of others in our naval force for the current year. France would this year have ready for sea six iron-cased vessels, of 23,000 tons, while we should have 11 vessels, of 47,887 tons, Two of those vessels, the Magenta and Solferino, would not be ready for trial trips before October. Surely these figures did not justify any alarm on our part. If that was our present position, and an emergency should arise, we could turn out throe iron-cased ships for every one that France could turn out, and twice as many as all Europe put together could produce. During the last three years we had voted £38,000,000 for our navy, while France in the same period had voted for hers only £17,600,000; and even of the latter sum £2,500,000 were on account of the expeditions to Cochin China and Mexico. It was said that France nominally voted £5,000,000 and expended £7,000,000. He had before given the House the sums voted and the sums actually expended in the two countries during ten years, and had shown that the excess of expenditure over the Votes was not so great in France as in England. It was constantly stated, that although we had ships, we had not men. Now, France had this year voted 35,000 men for her navy, and 10,000 more for Cochin and Mexico brought up the total to 46,000. It was said that maritime inscription gave her 156,000 men; but that number included the whole of her merchant seamen, her fishermen, bargemen, boys, and, in many cases, the labourers in her dockyards. On the other hand, we had 76,000 men this year for our navy; our reserves might be taken at 40,000 more, although, to be safe, he was willing to take them at a smaller number; and when to these we added our mercantile marine and the other classes comprised within the French aggregate, we had a "stand-by," if he might use the expression, in round numbers of about 400,000 men as against the 150,000 of France. In all these various elements of comparison, then, we were in advance not of France merely, but of France and any other two naval Powers. We were in as good a position now with regard to our maritime supremacy, whether in respect to our wooden ships or our iron ships, as we ever were at any time. Therefore, if we had the command of the seas, he must look upon these fortifications as unnecessary. The House should therefore pause, especially as severe distress prevailed in the manufacturing districts., before spending millions upon millions thus needlessly. Such a course, if persisted in, might produce greater internal dangers in this country than any troubles with which it could be threatened from abroad. For these reasons he had placed his Motion on the paper, which he now begged to move—

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word "That" to the end of the Question, in order to add the words "it is expedient to postpone the consideration of further expenditure upon the proposed Fortifications authorized by this Bill, until there have been laid before the House Copies or Extracts of Reports from our Naval Attaché at Paris, showing the state of the French Navy from time to time, at intervals not exceeding three months, during the years 1860 and 1861, —instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland has, I am happy to say, rectified a great many of the misstatements which he made, I have no doubt unintentionally, in our recent discussions in regard to the numbers of the French navy. Now, I should be ready to remark on his quotations from previous speeches of mine, but I certainly think it unadvisable that we should have these periodical debates on the relative strength of the French and English navies, entering into all these details. Every word that my noble Friend (Viscount Palmerston) has at various times stated with regard to the strength of the French navy is perfectly correct, and has been corroborated to night by the hon. Member for Sunderland himself. He has given every ship, every frigate, and every floating battery which my noble Friend and I had before enumerated, and he has stated the numbers, the force, and all the other details connected with them. The only point, as I understand it, upon which we are at issue is as to the state of forwardness of those ships. With respect to tonnage, my hon. Friend knows as well as I can tell him that that is not one half as important as the question of guns. It is perfectly well known that the ships of our navy have always had to carry fewer guns in proportion to their tonnage than those of any other navy. And why? Because our business has been, and is, to send our ships all over the world. They have to go wherever they may have to meet an enemy—north, south, cast, or west; whereas other Powers do not require to have their navy in so complete a seagoing state as ours. Undoubtedly, there- fore, our iron-cased ships are of very much heavier tonnage than those of any other nation. Hon. Gentlemen who attend to these subjects will find that there are many opinions as to the advisability of having ships of this very large tonnage. But when we come to guns, and the power of throwing projectiles, I could show the House that the proportion between this country and France is not so favourable to us as my hon. Friend supposes. But, avoiding at present the making of any detailed statement, I can only assure the House of this, that the French iron-cased navy has made very great progress. I never said myself, nor has my noble Friend or any other Member of the Government ever stated, that there was any unusual haste or preparation on the part of France in reference to the increase of her navy. We know perfectly well that the conduct of the French Emperor and the French nation has been loyal and generous towards this country; we know that there has been no desire on their part to molest us; but we also know that by husbanding their resources and by very great care and expenditure the French navy is making very great progress, and is in a state of very great perfection. In regard to the number of men, I could, if I did not think it very inexpedient, go into details which would convince the House that what my hon. Friend said about the comparative force of the two countries is really fallacious in the extreme. And whether the Government of England is composed of Gentlemen on the one side of this House or on the other, it behoves it to take proper steps to ascertain what are the naval forces of other States, and to regulate our doings by that which takes place in other European countries. Having said that, I hope the House will excuse me from entering into any further particulars on the subject.

MR. COBDEN

If the noble Lord who has just spoken, and the noble Viscount at the head of the Government, had held the doctrine in times past that it was unadvisable to introduce into the debates of this House references to the strength of the French navy, I should have agreed with them. But we hear that argument now for the first time. When we have before us official and authentic facts by which we can prove that the statements which have been made by the Government in times past with regard to the strength of the French navy have been entirely fallacious and delusive, and when we seek to remove that most lamentable spirit of animosity which has been created towards the French Government and the French people by the constant appeals to our fears on the ground that France was making undue naval preparations, I think this is not the moment for stifling discussion, but rather for examining the plain facts that are before us. Is there a man in this country accustomed to pay any attention to this subject who has not been led to believe—mainly by the statements of the noble Viscount, repeated for many years past, on all occasions when opportunity offered—that France, during the time the present Emperor has held sway there, has unduly raised the proportion of naval force which in former times it was customary for France to maintain as compared with ourselves? Is there anybody who doubts that France, during the time of the present Emperor, has not had a larger navy in proportion to the English navy than she was accustomed to have in former times? That has been the general impression. That is the ground on which we have been asked to vote these enormous Navy Estimates. It would be affectation in me to pretend that I have not had as good opportunities for access to every official source of information on both sides of the Channel as the noble Viscount himself; and I say, in opposition to everything the noble Viscount has stated in the way of vague assertion, that for the last twelve or fourteen years, during which the present ruler of France has had sway in one capacity or another in that country, the French navy has borne less proportion—far less proportion—to the English navy than it did in the time of Louis Philippe. When I make that assertion, in opposition to the noble Viscount, I wish it to be accepted only for what it is worth. I intend to support it by specific proofs, for I hope we have now got to the end of those vague assertions under which, according to the old legal maxim, fraud lurks. Unwilling as I am to trouble the House with statistics, I feel bound to give them a few figures on this matter; and first of all I will give them the outlay in the French dockyards during the last twelve years of Louis Philippe's reign and the first twelve years of the Republic or Empire down to 1859, which is the last year for which we have the audited and official accounts of France, and contrast it with the same expenditure in the English dockyards. I take the expenditure for labour in the French dockyards, I do not give the total expenditure, because when you attempt to draw a general comparison, there are discrepancies in the mode of keeping accounts which make it totally unreliable; but when you come to the amount expended in labour you get a fair comparison. I will give, then, the amount expended in the English and French dockyards from 1836 to 1847 in Louis Philippe's reign, and the amount expended from 1848 to 1859, during the time of the present Emperor. In England the expenditure for labour in the dockyards from 1836 to 1847 was £7,294,000, and in the French dockyards in the same time £4,540,100; showing an English excess of £2,750,000 during that period. Between 1848 and 1859 the English expenditure was £11,510,800; in the French dockyards for the same time it was £6,989,500; showing an English excess of £4,521,300 in the last period, against an excess of £2,750,000 in the time of Louis Philippe. So that, in fact, we have been spending during the last twelve years nearly double of what we had spent, in comparison with the expenditure of France, in the former period. If these facts be true, and I challenge the disproval of them, how is it that during the last twelve years, down to 1859, which immediately preceded the outburst of this mania for fortifications, with any kind of management which could be tolerated by a business-like people, that France could get ahead of ourselves in naval strength? There is another and still better test of the comparative strength of the two navies than that of the expenditure on dockyard labour—the number of men maintained in the navies in those respective periods. The yearly average of the number of seamen in the English navy between 1839 and 1847 was 38,120 and in the French navy 30,150, giving an English excess of 7,570 men in Louis Philippe's time. The yearly average of the number of seamen in the English navy between 1848 and 1859 was 51,660, and of the French navy 33,150, giving an English excess of 18,510 in the latter period, as against 7,970 in the former period. To be still more specific, let us take the number of seamen in 1847, the last year of Louis Philippe's reign, and compare them with 1859, the last year for which we have officially audited returns, and the year which preceded the outburst of the fortification scheme. The number of seamen in the English navy in 1847, was 44,960, and in the French navy 32,160; giving an English excess of 12,800 in the last year of Louis Philippe's reign. In 1859 the English navy had 70,400 seamen, and the French navy 39,470; giving an excess of 30,930, against an excess of 12,800 in the former period. What appeal can there be from facts like these? I beg the noble Lord will not reply to me with vague general assertions; and if these facts cannot be gainsaid, as I believe they cannot, what foundation can there be for the alarmist statements which have been made on the assumption that France was making extraordinary and successful efforts to change the accustomed proportions between the strength of her navy and ours? But can we not, with the aid of these documents, which have been almost incautiously presented to the House by the Government—can we not by these despatches of Captain Hore, the English naval attaché at the Paris Embassy— which alone brings me to my feet—bring this question to a still more precise and tangible issue? I think we may, I go back to the time when the French Government devised a scheme for its naval establishment. In 1855 the French Government appointed a Commission to inquire into the state of the navy, and to devise a programme for its future establishment. In consequence of that Commission a decree was published in 1857—I beg attention to the dates—in which the Emperor defined and fixed the naval strength of France, and in which he published to the world the amount of naval force which his Government intended to maintain for a long period of years to come. In that decree the French Government decided that the maximum of the strength of the French navy should be forty line-of-battle ships — a moderate establishment if we compare it with what France had been accustomed to maintain in former times, when the standard of naval strength was in sailing line-of-battle ships. From a statement of the number of line-of-battle ships in the French navy in each year, down to 1859, it appears that in 1778 it was 68, in 1794 it was 77, and in 1830 the number was 53. And it will be found by any one who will consult that interesting work, The Memoirs of the First Lord Auckland, that when he was, in 1783, negotiating the commercial treaty with France, he sent over to Mr. Pitt a list of all the ships of the line possessed by France at that time. The number was 68. Now, 40 line-of-battle ships is the maximum in the naval force of Franco fixed: by an Imperial decree in 1857—a decree published openly, known to the whole world, and in the possession of everybody who takes an interest in such matters— and that maximum was fixed for a considerable number of years to come. But I find that the right hon. Baronet the Member for Halifax (Sir C. Wood), in bringing forward the Navy Estimates for 1857, stated the number of English line-of-battle ships then built and building as 40. And in a paper presented to the House of Commons in April, 1859, by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich (Sir John Pakington), the number of line-of-battle ships possessed by the French Government at that time is stated as 40, built and building. Here, then, is a datum line; and if, instead of allowing our minds to be diverted to other subjects, we would concentrate our attention on this point, we should be able to measure the increase and diminution of the French navy by a test laid before us that the Government itself cannot reject. From 1857 down to within the last fortnight the noble Lord at the head of the Government has been constantly reiterating the great efforts made by the French Government to increase its navy, and to give it a disproportion of strength compared with that of the English navy. But we have now laid before us a despatch from the naval attaché of our Embassy in Paris; and I find he states that the number of line-of-battle ships in the French navy, built and building, on the 1st of January of the present year, was just 37. So instead of 40, which was announced by the French Government as its maximum, in 1857, we find, on the authority of our own naval attaché, France has only 37. During these last five years our Naval Estimates have enormously augmented; we have heard constant alarms expressed at the increase of the French navy; and appeals have been made to us in support of an enormous system of fortifications; yet we find that France has fewer line-of-battle ships now than she had five years ago. The fact is a conclusive proof that these statements were illusory. I am willing to believe that the noble Viscount has been himself under some official delusion in respect to this matter. My hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) has proposed there should be an addition to this despatch, showing what was the French naval force in 1860 and 1861; and I think this is due not only to the noble Lord, but to Captain Hore, our naval attaché at Paris, placed there to furnish information for the instruction of the Government. Either he has not given correct information, or the noble Lord cannot have read his despatches, because it is impossible, taking the statement he now sends, compared with what has been stated on official authority during the last five years, that the Government could have been under such an illusion as to the French having made such great naval preparations. I have confined my statement to the number of line-of-battle ships, because that class of ships has been the measure of naval power in past years. But if I extended it to smaller vessels, our case would be infinitely strengthened. The hon. Member for Sunderland has told us that our navy comprises more vessels of twenty guns and upwards than all the other navies in the world. I believe he states that correctly; and it proves what I say, that by extending the comparison from large ships to small we should find the case strengthened against the Government in reference to the exaggerated statements they have laid before us. Now, it is impossible to deal with this question without the facts rising up in accusation against the noble Viscount. Whenever the question of the organization of the navy is raised the noble Lord puts himself prominently forward as the advocate of these large armaments, and always with reference to the state of things in France. In the whole of the past five years I defy any one to show an instance in which the noble Lord has advocated an increase of our naval armament in reference to any other country but France. We have heard the word "invasion" from him a dozen times within the last few years. Now, for a Prime Minister to talk about this country being invaded by a friendly Power without one fact to justify a suspicion of it—on the contrary, when the navy of that Government is less than at any former time—is to commit this country to an attitude towards that neighbouring Power that no Minister ought to give it, with the levity of indiscretion that has marked the noble Lord's course on this subject. The hon. Member who preceded me read an extract from a speech of the noble Lord that shows the manner in which the noble Viscount has dealt with this question. He is aggressive in his defensive policy. He would not allow me to sit quiet, without making an attack on me. The noble Lord is the representative of an idea; he seems to be possessed by it—it is the idea of invasion. It is an idiosyncrasy of the noble Lord. Now, it will be in the recollection of the House that in 1860, when the plan of fortifications was proposed, several hon. Members, among them the Members for Sunderland, Glasgow, and Montrose, took steps, either by writing or sending to France, to inquire for themselves as to the reality of the naval preparations of the French Government. And, surely, if there are three hon. Gentleman in this House who may be supposed likely to give an impartial judgment as to a proposal for an increase of maritime defence, it would be the Members for three of our largest commercial seaports. Those hon. Gentlemen, with my hon. Friend the Member for Finsbury (Sir M. Peto) took great pains with this subject. I happened to be in Paris at the time, and I know the pains they did take. Some of them visited the French dockyards, or employed trustworthy agents to do so. Others saw the French Minister of Marine. And after the groundless allegations that had been made here, almost imputing to the French Government some clandestine design against us, I think it proves a great amiability on the part of the French authorities that these Gentlemen were graciously received, and were given every facility for visiting the French dockyards and arsenals. Those Gentlemen came back, and in the spring of 1861 took the opportunity of stating in the House what they had heard and seen, controverting and opposing the statements of the noble Lord, as to the great preparations, and hostile intentions of France. How did the noble Viscount treat these hon. Gentlemen? One would have thought that, at all events, their sincerity would not have been questioned. But I will read an extract from a speech of the noble Lord on March the 11th, 1861, when the Navy Estimates were brought forward, when some of the Members of his Cabinet shrunk away, and others could say nothing. The hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), among others, had spoken on the occasion. The noble Lord said— I rise to contradict the hon. Gentleman's (Mr. Bright's) own erroneous assertions, as well as those of the hon. Members for Montrose and Sunderland. Those hon. Gentlemen came here propounding opinions based on extracts from some newspaper or other. I really think it was a Scotch newspaper that one hon. Member quoted. They recount to us what they were told by friends whom they met at Paris, and they repeat the denials given there by persons excessively interested in misleading public opinion here, and making us all believe that nothing can be more harmless than all the military and naval preparations of France. Why, these Gentlemen come here like the Trojan horse, in order to deceive us as to the real possibility of danger to which we might be exposed." [3 Hansard, clxi., 1787]. And then the noble Lord knocks them down with a Latin quotation. But he again returns to the charge— When some well-intentioned gentleman asks the French if they really mean to invade this country, if they really have any hostile intentions towards us, of course they say, 'Not the least in the world,' their feeling is one of perfect sympathy and friendship with us, and that all their preparations are only for their own self-advancement."—[3 Hansard, clxi., 1791.] In this speech the noble Lord stated—and it was the only fact in his speech—that the French had 34,000 men in their navy; and just before, the Secretary of the Navy, on the same evening had taken a Vote for 78,200 men for our own naval service. I will defy any one to show any year during the reign of Louis Philippe when there was such a disproportion between the naval forces of the two countries, as there had been during the reign of Louis Napoleon, except in the time of the Crimean war. It should be remembered that in 1859, when we had such a large disproportion of naval power as compared with that of France, France was engaged in a war in Italy, while it was a year of peace with us. But in no year of peace during the reign of Louis Philippe did not the navy of France bear a larger proportion to that of England than it has done during the reign of Louis Napoleon. It is not, therefore, a question of who began first. Franco has never increased the proportion of her navy. There has not been one year in which you can show a tendency to increase, except on the part of this country. But the noble Lord has not confined his statements to the navy. He has also given us some facts and figures respecting the land forces of France; but in his statement there was an inexactness of a very grave kind, for he exceeded the real amount of the French force by 200,000 men, which called down a correction from the Moniteur. I must complain of the habitual inexactness of the noble Lord as to these matters; and if the China debate should come on to-morrow, I shall have to recite another grave inaccuracy. On the 24th of May, the noble Lord, in speaking of the land forces of France, said— On the 1st of January, 1862, the French army consisted "—[these are the corrected figures which the noble Lord afterwards gave]—"of 446,348 men under arms. There was, besides, a reserve of 170,000 men, liable to be called out at a fortnight or three weeks' notice, making altogether 616,318"— Not 816,000, as the noble Lord really said.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

No, I never said anything of the kind.

MR. COBDEN

I beg the noble Lord's pardon, because this was not a mistake of a figure. There was addition and subtraction, and the statement was the same all through. The noble Lord proceeded— In addition to this force actually under arms, or liable to be called out for service, I stated that there were 268,117 National Guards, making a total available force of 884,765. That is the noble Lord's statement of the land forces of France on the 24th of May, 1862. Now, I have here another statement made by the noble Lord on the 30th of July, 1845, when he was urging Sir Robert Peel to increase our expenditure. On that occasion he said— France, as I had occasion to state on a former occasion, has now a standing army of 340,000 men, fully equipped, including a large force of cavalry and artillery, and, in addition to that, 1,000,000 of the National Guard. I know that the National Guard of Paris amounts to 80,000 men, trained, disciplined, reviewed, clothed, equipped, and accustomed to duty and perfectly competent, therefore, to take the internal duty of the country, and to set free the whole of the regular force." [3Hansard, lxxxii., 1223.] Now, let us compare the land forces of France according to the noble Lord's own authority in 1845, just previous to the fall of Louis Philippe, with those which she has at the present moment. In 1845 he states the total of the army and National Guard at 1,340,000 men. In 1862 he states the total force of France at 884,765 men, being less in 1862 than in 1845 by 455,235 men. But there has been since then a great change in the number of our own armed force. We must add to our own land forces at least 200,000 additional men in the shape of Militia, Volunteers, and increase of our regular forces. That is a low estimate. Add these 200,000 to the 455,000 which France has less now than in 1845, and it gives 655,235 fewer armed men in France, as compared with those in England at present. That is not an alarming state of things; and if you remember that the National Guard of Paris is now virtually disbanded—even taking into account the increase in the regular force, which I am not here to defend, for it is the monster evil of the age— considering all these points, the House will see that France has not so large an armed force as in the time of Louis Philippe. I will make one more remark upon the question of the responsibility which rests upon the Government and upon the House in these matters. I have heard a doctrine very much insisted on—namely, that we are not to take the dicta of independent Members upon this question, but are to trust implicitly the statements of a Prime Minister. One would think that the sagacity of the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Henley) would lead him to take a different view of the matter. Yet what is his maxim as to the authority of a Prime Minister? In July last, when an attempt was made to get more money from us on the plea that more iron ships were wanted, that attempt was opposed by my hon. Friend (Mr. Lindsay), who, under the discouragement, the taunts, the imputations, and the little attention he received some years ago, deserves the thanks of the country for the manner in which he opposed increased Estimates. Speaking of the noble Lord at the head of the Government, the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Henley) on that occasion said— Speaking as the noble Lord did from his place as Prime Minister, if 100 persons had been sent by hon. Members to look round them, open and shut their eyes when they liked, perhaps having no eyes to see with at all, he did not think that the reports of such people ought to be allowed by the country to weigh for one moment against the positive declaration of the Prime Minister from his seat in Parliament, that he knew the facts he stated to be facts." [3 Hansard, clxiv., 1676.] ["Hear !"] Hon. Gentlemen cry "Hear, hear!" but I think that is a dangerous doctrine. Are we absolved from our responsibility because a Prime Minister makes certain assertions? We are here as representatives of the people. The Prime Minister is responsible to us, and we are responsible to the country; and if we take implicitly the statement of the noble Lord, neglecting our own duty, do you think that, by-and-by, when we get into that condition in which the country is apt to judge of Parliament, and of Ministers by a very ugly retrospect upon their past policy—do you think that we shall stand acquitted before the country for voting these large sums of money without inquiry into the facts upon which the noble Lord bases his statements and opinions? The facts are all accessible to us. There are no secrets about the French naval armaments. Every information which is possessed by the Government may be had by us; and I think it is the duty of the House, as representing the people and finding the money for these armaments, to see that the grounds upon which we vote such enormous sums are valid grounds, and do not rest merely upon the fanciful and excited imagination of a Prime Minister. Now, is this the proper time—does anybody who reflects upon what is passing among multitudes of men out of doors— does any one think this is the proper time to be discussing in this House from day to day the question of more outlay upon bricks and mortar at Portsmouth or Woolwich for the defence of the country? After the statements we have heard, unless the facts and figures can be disputed and disproved, I say that to spend money now upon gigantic fortifications, backing up our enormous naval power, would be a waste of public money impossible to justify. I think we might more properly be engaged in discussing other questions, as was stated by the hon. Gentleman who preceded me, relating to the internal state of the country. There is no question in this House as to defending the country against a foreign enemy. It would be a piece of supreme impertinence in me or in any other man to lay claim to an exclusive interest or regard for the security of the country against a foreign enemy, and I hold the man to be a charlatan who sets up a claim to popularity because he holds the honour and safety of the country in higher estimation than I do. That is not the question here, where every man has an equal interest in the safety of the country. We may take different views—as we are entitled to do—us to the best modes of fortifying and permanently defending the country. Some think we cannot do better than appeal for armaments and fortifications in addition to our existing resources in time of peace, notwithstanding the weight of taxation under which the country is struggling; while others, like myself, may think, with Sir Robert Peel, that you cannot defend every part of your coast and colonies, and that in attempting to do so you run a greater risk of danger to the country than you would incur by husbanding the resources which you are now expending upon armaments, so as to have them at call in time of emergency. That is my view. Let no one presume nor dare to say that he has more regard for the safety of the country than I have. They may try to create imaginary dangers and to take credit for guarding against them; but give us a real danger, show us that our navy is not equal to our defence, that a neighbour is clandestinely and unduly trying to change the proportion which its force should bear to that of this mercantile people living in an island, and then I would willingly vote £100,000,000 of money to protect our country against attack. But, in saying this, I claim no merit. I do not set myself up as a great patriot, for there is nobody here but would put his hand in his pocket and spend his whole fortune rather than have this island defiled by the foot of an enemy. I have my own views as to what constitutes the strength of the country, but they are not the views of those who have had a hand in promoting this gigantic system of expenditure. The right hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) is the author of this scheme. It is his sober, sagacious leadership of which you are followers. The hon. Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Kinglake) has commended this great plan of expenditure; he is the great champion of the noble Viscount in this matter. I cannot follow those gentlemen, for I do not entertain their views. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud thinks that in proportion as you go on extending your commerce and increasing your wealth you must also be continually increasing your armed force. That might he if we were an enervated people, gaining our wealth from the labour of slaves, or if remittances from gold regions were keeping us in idleness and luxury; but my view is that every step you take towards the increase of wealth and the extension of commerce, by that very commerce you are strengthening yourselves and building up those materials and that kind of population which will best provide means of defence whenever we are attacked. Our wealth, commerce, and manufactures grow out of the skilled labour of men working in metals. There is not one of those men who in case of our being assailed by a foreign Power would not in three weeks or a fortnight be available with their hard hands and thoughtful brains for the manufacture of instruments of war. That is not an industry that requires you at every step to multiply your armed men. What has given us our Armstrongs, our Whitworths, our Fairbaina? The industry of the country, in which they are mainly occupied. It has been sometimes made a reproach against me and my friends the Free-traders, that we would leave the country defenceless. I say, if you have multiplied the moans of defence—if you can build three times as many steamers in the same time as other countries, and if you have that threefold force of mechanics of which my hon. Friend has spoken, to whom do you owe that but to the men who, by contending for the true principles of commerce, have created a demand for the labour of an increased number of artisans in this country. Go to Plymouth or to Woolwich and look at the names of the inventors of the tools for making firearms, and shot find shell. They bear the names of men in Birmingham, in Manchester, and in Leeds, men nearly all connected for the last twenty years with the extension of our commerce, which has thus contributed to the increase of the strength of the country by calling forth its genius and skill. I resist the attempt which has been made to show that I am not a promoter of the strength, the power, and the greatness of this country; or that I, or any of those who act with me are or have been indifferent to or ignorant of what constitutes the real strength and greatness of the country.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

The hon. Member for Rochdale and others have referred so directly to me on the subject of exaggerated statements alleged to have been made in this House with regard to the navy of France, that, in justice to Admiral Elliot, I wish to say a few words. The speech of the hon. Member fur Rochdale has been mainly directed against the noble Viscount, whom be has charged with vague and exaggerated statements as to the navies of France and England. I leave the noble Lord to answer that charge, but I must say that I believe he has made no speech upon the subject which was not only not open to the charge of vagueness or exaggeration, but was not strictly founded upon most accurate data. But I must say further, that the speech of the hon. Member for Rochdale with regard to the naval proportion has really nothing to do with the question now before us, no more than if he had addressed the House upon the relative strength of the navies of Spain and England at the time of the Spanish Armada. His speech was in a large degree taken up by comparison of the outlay of France and England during two periods—one during the reign of Louis Philippe and the other under the present Emperor of France. Lot me remind the House that nothing can be more fallacious than to make a comparison of the navies of England and France founded solely upon statements of the money expended during two periods. The rates of wages, the prices of every element of shipbuilding, are so different. [Mr. COBDEN: Labour.] I said so. But that is not the most important fault I have to find with the hon. Gentleman's statement. He told us of a programme issued by the Emperor Louis Napoleon in 1857. Let mo remind the House that the year 1857 was the year preceding the commencement of the idea of armour-plated ships; therefore you cannot attach much importance to a programme of 1857. I must also remark, that during the whole of the hon. Member's speech he did not say one word about what has been passing in England or France since 1859. In 1859 we commenced building iron-plated ships, and, under correction, I believe all the noble Viscount's speeches, and certainly all my statements which have been made since 1859, have had reference to the efforts of France to rival this country and to surpass us in the construction of armour-plated ships. I appeal to the papers upon which the hon. Members for Rochdale and Sunderland have founded their statements to prove that the noble Viscount and the Secretary for the Admiralty were right, and that at this moment France is ahead of England in this important element of naval strength, and that it behoves the Government not to discontinue the efforts they have made. The hon. Member has repeated that he desires to see the navy of England superior to that of France, and that he would sanction any expenditure necessary for that object. But upon that principle the House is not justified in finding fault with the late nor the present Admiralty for their efforts to make the navy of England superior to that of France. The hon. Member communicated his intention of impugning, I will not say my statements, but those of a gallant officer whose name I used. Now, I am bound to state, in justice to that gallant officer, that the hon. Member has failed to impugn his statement, and that the facts, indeed, completely justify every word that Admiral Elliot advanced. My statement was, that the French had fifteen iron-plated frigates and line-of-battle ships, and nine others of different descriptions. In the official return placed in our hands by the Government I find that the French had, on January 1, 1862, six iron-plated frigates afloat and ten building, making a total of sixteen. Admiral Elliot stated the number of iron-plated vessels of other descriptions at nine; while by the Return it appears the French have twelve afloat and two building, being a total of thirty, instead of twenty-four, which was my statement last year. The hon. Member for Sunderland has referred to the state of progress of those ships; but there is this difference—that he speaks of July, 1862, and I made the statement in question in May, 1861. I have spoken on the authority of this paper of sixteen iron-plated frigates. I do not, however, know whether the Solferino and the Magenta are included in that number of sixteen, for they ought not to be classed as frigates— they are two-decked vessels, carrying more powerful guns than any ships in the French or English navy. Captain Here had fully accounted for the delay to which allusion had been made, the spur with which the bow of the Solferino was to be armed having been reduced from twenty-seven tons to sixteen tons weight, and a similar delay having occurred in regard to the Magenta. I think that Her Majesty's Government are right in the course they have taken on this subject, and I trust they will continue to pursue the same line of policy.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

I should like to ask the House whether we are discussing the Naval Estimates of the year, or whether we are discussing plans for the permanent fortifications of the dockyards? The two speeches of the hon. Member for Sunderland and the hon. Member for Rochdale had no bearing on the question now under discussion, but turned upon a simple comparison between the existing navy of France and the existing navy of England. Now, the hon. Member for Rochdale seems to be excessively angry with me. He accuses me of indiscretion, of levity, and of every possible breach of every possible duty that is incumbent upon a Prime Minister. I receive these accusations from him with the utmost possible quietness. I differ so entirely from the hon. Member that it is quite natural I should feel proud of being the object of the hon. Member's attacks. He said that I am actuated by an idea. Sir, I am actuated by an idea. My idea seems never to have entered the fertile brain of the hon. Member. My idea is that England ought to be defended, that her navy cannot exist without dockyards, and that those dock yards must be placed in a safe position against sudden attacks. That is an idea that has never entered into the mind of the hon. Member. The hon. Member has told us that he is ready to spend £100,000,000 to maintain a good navy. Now, we do not ask him to do any such thing. We ask for no more than the moderate sum recommended by the Defence Commissioners to place our naval arsenals in a state of safety. I say that the hon. Member for Rochdale is in a state of blindness and delusion which renders him utterly unfit to be listened to by the country as an adviser on matters of this sort. When the hon. Member deals in matters that he understands—when he descants on questions of free trade and commerce, we generally listen to the hon. Gentleman with the utmost deference and respect. He understands those subjects; he is imbued with sound principles, and his conclusions command our assent. But he goes beyond his crepidam on such matters as these. When he descants on our naval and military defences, he goes beyond the scope of his knowledge, and beyond the reach to which his understanding has extended, and he becomes a most dangerous adviser for this House and the country, ["Oh !"] Why, Sir, I say it is so, because the hon. Member declares that it is presumption in any one to state that he is not as anxious for the honour, and dignity, and defence of the country as any man living. And the defence he proposes is reducing your army and your navy, and leaving your dockyards unfortified; because, he says, you have increased your manufacturing capital and your workmen in Birmingham, Sheffield, Manchester, and other hives of industry and capital. But the richer you are, if you do not defend your wealth, the more you invite attack. The very accumulation of wealth in the country is the reason why a part of that wealth should be devoted to national defence. And, as to the fact of your having plenty of workmen and artisans in your manufacturing towns, you cannot reckon upon them for the defence of the country against a sudden attack, because there would not be time to bring those labouring men from the centre of England, and organize them as a military or naval body, or set them to work to make fortifications. Why, it is childish, to imagine that the possession of those esources, if you do not avail yourselves of them beforehand, can avail to ward off a sudden attack. It is blindness and infatuation on the part of the hon. Member to entertain these views, and I am astonished that he should not be conscious of that which any man who has thought at all on this subject must comprehend. The hon. Member accuses me of great exaggeration with regard to the French army and navy. Now, I utterly deny that I have been guilty of any exaggeration. The hon. Member for Sunderland has confirmed the statement that I made, and it has been further confirmed by the papers laid before the House. Now, with regard to the French army, I stated on a recent occasion that the French army on the 1st of January consisted of 446,000 men under arms, and 170,000 men of the reserve, making a total of 616,000 men. I was reported to have made that total 816,000. It is very seldom that those gentlemen who report our debates in this House commit an error, and an error in one figure is not unnatural. But my statement was 616,000, and not 816,000. The French Moniteur corrected my statement; and what was that correction? It charged me with having made a little error both in the force under arms and in reserve, and the aggregate was stated by the Moniteur to be 612,000 instead of 616,000. That was the correction of the Moniteur, which completely and substantially affirmed the statement that I had made. My statement with respect to the National Guards was also substantially true. Then, with regard to the French navy, the Returns laid upon the table and the statements of the hon. Member for Sunderland have shown that the number of iron-clad ships in the French navy is greater than that which I represented last year. The hon. Member has stated that they have thirty-seven and we have twenty-seven, and those are very much about the relative numbers. I said that they were thirty-six and twenty-five, and he says they are thirty-seven and twenty-seven respectively. Whether we take one statement or the other, it is admitted that in iron-plated ships, which are to be regarded in future as the real strength of a navy, a neighbouring Power is stronger than ourselves. Well, then, the hon. Member for Rochdale has repeated this evening the statement which he published in his pamphlet, and has endeavoured to show the comparative amount of labour employed in the dockyards of England and France at certain periods, and the amount of the Naval Estimates of the two countries. Now, the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich has very properly stated that that comparison is fundamentally fallacious—fallacious upon the ground of the money expended on workmen. A man in the French dockyards gets 2s. 6d., a man in the English 4s. 6d. a day. It is evident, therefore, that with the same number of men working, the cost of the English dockyards must, from the rate of wages, be greater. Then, with regard to the ships in commission, the general expenditure in wages of a 90-gun ship in the two services is as £19,000 a year for a French ship, to £29,000 for an English, so that the latter cost £10,000 a year more. Well, all that shows, that the forces being equal, the actual expenditure of the one country must be much larger than that of the other. Therefore, it is perfectly fallacious, as a measure of relative strength, to tell us only what is spent, unless you also take into account the disproportion between the wages of labour. Well, Sir, I shall not intrude long upon the attention of the House, because it does really appear to me, as was stated by the right hon. Baronet the Member for Droitwich, that all the eloquence which we have heard from the two hon. Members was utterly beside the question. Granted, if you will, that there is at present no appearance or any likelihood of war between the two countries; that is the reason why you ought to employ the interval of peace in placing yourselves in a condition to meet a different state of things. It is the utmost degree of folly to conclude that because this year, or next year, or the year after, we are not likely to have our relations with a neighbouring Power altered, we are therefore to leave our dockyards in a state which, if anything were to happen, would not find them in a condition of adequate defence. If we were proposing something that could be accomplished in twelve months, or a couple of years, I should deem the argument of the hon. Member of some force and value; but that which we are proposing to you is a measure founded upon deep reflection, and calculated to endure for a length of time. We ask you to place our dockyards in that position in which they will be safe from attack by any foreign Power. And here I must say that I entertain very little apprehension that the feelings of the hon. Member for Rochdale will be shared in by the country, because I have a conviction that these opinions are confined to a few persons; and, so far from my being afraid of any responsibility which I am incurring in proposing that we should defend our dockyards, I should feel myself unworthy to hold the position which I occupy—I would not continue to be responsible if I thought that the Members of this House would not furnish the means of defence which I consider absolutely indispensable for the future security of this country. I therefore have an "idea" which the hon. Member has not, that "idea" been deeply implanted in my mind. So far from believing that the attacks of the hon. Member will do me the least damage in the estimation of my countrymen, I am glad that he has had an opportunity of pointing out distinctly the wide difference of opinion between himself and me. With regard to the defence of the country, my mode is different from his. Whatever he may say with regard to the improbability of war, though his advice may be— Oremus pacem, et dextras tendamus inermes, I, on the contrary, am for preparing ourselves for war in time of peace, and doing it scientifically, and with forethought. I am for preparing ourselves for the storm that may or may not come, and then we may reckon on a continuance of peace; for we may depend upon it there is nothing which will contribute so much to the permanent peace and security of the country as its being known to foreign nations that we are in n, condition to defend ourselves if attacked. As to the expense which these fortifications will involve, I will ask any hon. Member to compare it with the disastrous consequences of the presence of an invading force in this country for a fortnight or a month. Let us see what war is costing that republic beyond the Atlantic, let us see the efforts that nation has been compelled to make because there was no previous preparation. They had all on a sudden to organize what they wanted for the contest they are engaged in. Let not us, in this country, fall into the same error; let us do what we can quietly and economically; let us prepare what is necessary for any contingency that may happen, and when that is done we shall have done more for peace than the commercial treaty of the right hon. Gentleman. We shall have done more than his free trade. We shall have done that which I trust will make us respected by other countries, and will tend to the security and permanence of that peace which I have as much at heart as he has, though I think I go a better way about preserving it.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill considered in Committee.

House resumed.

Committee report Progress; to sit again on Thursday.