HC Deb 15 March 1861 vol 161 cc2045-53
MR. T. DUNCOMBE

said, he rose to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, If no Despatches were sent to Sir James Hudson between the 31st August and the 27th of October last; and if so, why those Dispatches are omitted in the further Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Italy; and also what are "the interests which Great Britain has in the Adriatic," which the Despatch of 31st August states "Her Majesty's Government must watch with careful attention." He wished to know why the despatches written during the period to which his question referred had been suppressed. There was a period of two months with respect to which they had no information whatever, and that he thought was a very considerable time indeed when the importance of the subject was considered. The Government took great credit to themselves for what was called non-intervention with the proceedings and acts of the people of other countries; but he was informed, and he was not making the statement without authority, that their boasted non-intervention was all a hoax. They certainly had not interfered in regard to Naples and Rome, because their interference was not asked by the people of those places, who did not seek the permission of the British Government to act as they chose. But where Austria and Hungary were concerned Her Majesty's Government had been ready with their interference. They had assisted the strong against the weak; they had assisted the strong against those who had been too long oppressed and tyrannized over. One despatch in particular had been suppressed, but all that would come out by and by. The very despatch of the 31st August would never have seen the light of day if it had not been published first in Germany. In that despatch the noble Lord said, "England has interests in the Adriatic which must be watched with careful attention." Now there was not a man from the Land's End to John o'Groat's House who could tell where those interests were. Perhaps the noble Lord would be good enough to tell the House what they were? There was another despatch—a very important one—wherein, as he was told, the noble Lord instructed Sir James Hudson to say that the Government of England would not allow any fleet to leave the Italian coast for Dalmatia. With that menace there was the fact that we had a fleet at Corfu of 800 guns. Now if that was not intervention he did not know what the meaning of the word was. He asked why should not a fleet leave the coast of Italy for the coast of Dalmatia, even if it were intended to support Hungary? He was told also that there were despatches in which the noble Lord said that Austria was required as a counterpoise to France, and, therefore, of course, Hungary was not allowed to attack Austria at the same time that an attack might be made by Sardinia upon Venetia. There was another despatch which the noble Lord wrote to Sir James Hudson at a time when Louis Kossuth was in Turin. The noble Lord, as he (Mr. Duncombe) was informed, said in that despatch, "Keep your eye upon the doings of Louis Kossuth." To that despatch Sir James Hudson replied in terms worthy of an Ambassador of this country—namely, that he did not conceive it was the duty of a representative of England at a foreign Court to keep an eye upon the doings of a foreign exile, and he declined to do the noble Lord's bidding. But there was another case of interference on the part of the noble Lord. It appeared that a railway was projected, called the Genoese Railway, of which Louis Kossuth was a director. A despatch was written by the noble Lord, in which Sir James Hudson was instructed to inform the Sardinian Government that it would give great offence to England if the Sardinian Government granted a concession to any railway of which Louis Kossuth was a director, because they considered it a means of putting money into the hands of Kossuth for revolutionary purposes in Hungary. That despatch was sent to Sir James Hudson, and again he (Mr. Duncombe) believed that Sir James Hudson declined to do the dirty work, or to be the instrument of communicating such a message to the Sardinian Government. Sir James Hudson told the noble Lord so, and said— You little know the Sardinian Government or Count Cavour if you suppose that if they wished to enter into negotiations with Kossuth they would not do it openly and before the world; and that they would not ask the permission of England to enter into such negotiations. Sir James Hudson declined to communicate that despatch to the Sardinian Government. There, again, Sir James Hudson had shown himself worthy of the high office of Ambassador of England, and would not condescend to take that underhand way of trying to prevent Hungary rising and shaking off the tyranny of Austria. He (Mr. Duncombe) said that those things wanted clearing up, and they must be cleared up by the noble Lord. If there were a shadow of foundation for them, the honour of England was at stake, and the non-intervention principle was a perfect farce. They would act in a manner discreditable and dishonourable if they did not repudiate such conduct on the part of our Minister. It was, however, all of a piece with the conduct of our Government in regard to the Hungarian notes, in respect to which an injunction would be moved for in the Court of Chancery next week, with the view of preventing Louis Kossuth furnishing to his countrymen the means of rising against the tyranny of Austria. Now, he asked, could England be justified in interfering in that manner, and then talking of nonintervention? Hungary was a great country, with 15,000,000 of inhabitants, and 20,000 square miles larger than the whole of the United Kingdom. She was originally, and was now entitled to be, an independent nation in Europe. She had been defrauded of her rights by Austria, and was now on the point of regaining them. The interference of England in that underhand manner, on the ground that Austria ought to be supported as a counterpoise to France, was a policy that could not but create the greatest distrust in the latter Power. Nothing was so well calculated to strengthen the interests of this country and to secure the peace of Europe as a close alliance with France. Everything had been done by the Emperor of the French to promote that object. The Emperor had no distrust of England. The whole distrust was on the part of this country. He had no jealousy of us and no wish to rival us. On the contrary, when the Emperor saw us strengthening our fortifications, he (Mr. Duncombe) believed that his language was, "the stronger England is, the better ally will she be to France." Look what he had done with regard to passports. Had he not opened his country to Englishmen; and had not his own subjects murmured at the superior advantages enjoyed by Englishmen in France? England then wanted no such counterpoise as Austria, with her tyrannical Government. He rejoiced to believe that the days of Austrian tyranny were numbered, and that we should soon again see Hungary taking her original rank as a continental nation. He trusted that the Hungarians would not be driven into premature outbreak, and such a caution was the more necessary because he had seen letters from Turin stating that Austrian agents were hard at work trying to instigate and excite the Hungarians to rebellion. That was one of their anniversary days of freedom, and, therefore, the greater danger existed of their being provoked into an outbreak. If the Hungarians allowed themselves to be tempted into such a premature movement martial law would be at once proclaimed, and a great effusion of blood would be the result. At the same time he would advise Hungary not to give up one iota of her rights but to bide her time, letting the Government of England do what they liked to conspire with Austria against her. Hungary would still recollect that the people of England were with her in sympathy—with her if she wished to see her nationality restored, and to be free, happy, and independent of the tyranny of Austria. If those despatches to which he had referred wore not forthcoming, they might depend upon it they would be soon dragged to light, and then he thought that the Government of England would not stand in a very enviable position in the eyes of the world.

MR. CAVENDISH BENTINCK

said, he would beg to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, whether information was received from Sir James Hudson, previous to the 31st day of August last, to the effect that the expedition of General Garibaldi was secretly assisted by the Sardinian Government; and whether the Foreign Office did, previous to the 11th day of September last, receive official information that the Sardianian Government contemplated the invasion or seizure of a portion of the Papal States? And, whether any and what Answer was returned by the Austrian Government to the Despatch, No. 96, addressed to Lord A. Loftus, and referring to a despatch from Consul General Perry? No one could peruse the despatches printed in the Italian blue beok without being satisfied that there was a number of events of great importance which had not received any notice whatever. In regard to his first question, the noble Lord, soon after Garibaldi landed in Italy, made a statement in that House to the effect that Sardinia did not in any way contemplate the invasion of Naples, and that he had a positive assurance from that Government to that effect. The noble Lord also stated that the Sardinian Government had in no way inspired the expedition of Garibaldi, but, on the contrary, looked on it as a mad enterprise. He confessed that early in August he (Mr. Bentinck), as well as others, had come to the conclusion that that statement ought to be received with great caution, not only on account of the deceit and duplicity which had unfortunately become the characteristics of the Sardinian Government, as illustrated by their conduct during the events of 1849 and 1859, but also by the manner in which they had misled this country on the occasion of the cession of Savoy and Nice. Therefore, he was not surprised to hear from persons of reliable authority that the Sardinian Government, so far from not encouraging the expedition of Garibaldi had assisted it to the utmost of their power. He had heard it stated over and over again on good authority that the King of Sardinia and his Government had actually furnished money and arms to Garibaldi, and further that they were under an engagement sooner or later to meet him in the South of Italy. He (Mr. Bentinck) visited Italy in the month of August last, and he found the people generally entertained that opinion. He also learned that Admiral Persano had received instructions from the Sardinian Government to protect to the utmost of his power not only the original expedition of Garibaldi, but also any ships conveying supplies and succour to him. It was also rumoured that the arrangement was that Admiral Persano was to protect those ships, and then, in the event of disaster, Persano was to be quietly disavowed, and to receive an ample compensation afterwards for his services. He was greatly surprised at seeing no mention made of those facts in the despatches, because it was impossible that a Minister of Sir James Hudson's vigilance should not have known them. The opinion that Garibaldi had an understanding with the Sardinian Government was universally entertained in Italy. To show this he referred the noble Lord to the memorandum of Mr. Elliot, enclosed in a letter dated the 31st of August, in which Mr. Elliot stated that it was generally believed that the expedition of Garibaldi was secretly encouraged by the Sardinian Government. There was another point, the question of the invasion of the Papal States. It seemed to him (Mr. Bentinck) most surprising that the Government had not been informed of that event earlier than they appeared to have been. He apprehended there was no doubt whatever that during the summer of last year the Sardinian Government had positively determined to invade the Marches and Um- bria. As there was no pretence for war an insurrection was planned, and under the pretence of suppressing it the Sardinian army was to enter the Papal States without declaration of war, and, with the excuse of restoring order, to remain in military occupation of the country. Such was the universal belief in Italy. Whether the success of Garibaldi was more rapid than had been expected, or whether in consequence of the interview which took place between a deputation of the Sardinian Government, General Cialdini, and the Emperor of the French at Chambery, he (Mr. Bentinck) did not know, but the Sardinians intervened before any insurrection took place under the flimsy pretext of a demand upon the Papal Government to disband their foreign mercenaries, and most flimsy was that pretext, because the Sardinian troops entered the Marches and Umbria before an answer was received from Cardinal Antonelli. Moreover, it was certain that Admiral Persano's fleet received orders to leave the west coast of Italy for the east for the purpose of attacking Ancona when the proper time should arrive long before the invasion took place; so that it was perfectly clear that the whole affair was settled from the first. Under these circumstances he could not conceive why the noble Lord was not informed of the matter. The only despatch on this point from Sir James Hudson was dated the 7th of September. It was received by the noble Lord on the 11th. The invasion of the Papal States of Umbria and the Marches took place on the 11th, actually on the very day the noble Lord received the despatch. Sir James Hudson, in that despatch, stated to the noble Lord that information had been received that an outbreak was imminent in Umbria and the Marches. Now there was no outbreak. The proclamation of the Piedmontese general to the army, upon an order being given for an invasion of those States, was found in p. 64 of the blue book, and assigned as an excuse, nothing but the employment by the Pope of foreign mercenaries; not a word was said about insurrection. He must say he thought it most extraordinary that Sir James Hudson did not lay the projects of Sardinia before the noble Lord earlier than the 7th of September. Sir James Hudson, in his next despatch, did not say he had been wrong with regard to the insurrection in Umbria and the Marches. He did not allude to the interview of the deputation from Sardinia with the Emperor of the French at Chambery. He did not allude to the fact that Admiral Persano's fleet had gone from the west coast to the east. All that was extraordinary; for it was impossible that Sir James Hudson should not have known all the facts. He (Mr. Bentinck) was in Milan at the time, and on the 2nd of September he saw a great assemblage of National Guards and military. He inquired what it meant, and was told that it was for the purpose of receiving volunteers who were to be mobilized. He inquired the object of the mobilization; and the answer given without reserve was that the mobilized National Guards were to take the place of the troops which were on the point of being sent to the Papal States; The inference on his mind was that Sir James Hudson was either culpably negligent of these matters, or that he purposely suppressed them. The only other point to which he would advert was a letter of our Consul General at Venice on the subject of Austria He did not wish to get up a debate on Austria. As a conservative power she had always been useful to us, and perhaps the existence of Austria might be considered as an absolute necessity and safeguard to Europe. There was a nice little office at Venice, with very little to do in it, and plenty to get. There was a Consul General with £800 a year, besides a Vice Consul with £200 a year. Last summer the Consul General was Mr. Perry a gentleman who had been transplanted from some obscure part of America to Venice, a gentleman of worth and respectability, but with a very imperfect knowledge of the country and its language; and shortly after his arrival he thought to write a letter to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office. It was dated the 4th of September, and it stated that the authorities considered they had discovered a plot against the Government, and that in consequence many arrests had been made. The writer said he believed that nothing of a compromising nature had been discovered, although it was well known that secret societies existed all over the country. (Well, if there were all over the country secret societies against the Government, it was not very wonderful that there should be a plot!) The writer went to say that many respectable persons had been imprisoned for months without trial. (Well, there was nothing wonderful in that. People were kept in prison even in Eng- land many months without trial;) and that within a few days a painter, named Caffi, had been imprisoned on a trifling charge. He (Mr. Bentinck) knew that individual. He was a revolutionist, and had been such for many years; and, therefore, it was not very surprising that, under the circumstances, he should be imprisoned. He was told that the imprisonment was a very short one. Now he did not wish to defend the Austrian system. All that he (Mr. Bentinck) asked was that fair play should be shown to the Austrian Government, and if our Ministers repeated complaints of the treatment of the Austrian people, they should at the same time state what were the circumstances of vexation under which the Austrian Government acted. If the noble Lord would look to the correspondence of the late Consul General at Venice, Mr. James, he would find some insight into the difficulties under which the Austrians laboured. Then the noble Lord wrote to Count Rechberg, and lectured him pretty severely on the statements contained in Consul General Perry's letter. In that case the noble Lord wrote only two days after his receipt of Consul General Perry's despatch. That formed a striking contrast with the course of the noble Lord with regard to Mr. Elliott's letter relative to the wholesale massacres ordered by General Cialdini, which letter he never answered at all. The noble Lord wrote to Count Bechberg— The real danger of Austria is that she invites foreign interference by her own conduct in arbitrarily imprisoning her subjects. Her best friends deplore the absence of all her attempts to conciliate her Italian and Hungarian subjects. But how was Austria to conciliate them? If she gave a Reform Bill to her subjects there would be no chance of conciliation any more than there was of Russia conciliating the Poles, or the English gaining the affections of the Ionian people. He did not profess to understand diplomatic relations; but he thought our Ministers abroad ought to be loyal to the Courts to which they were accredited, and loyal towards those powers with whom England was at peace. If that was not to be the usual character of our diplomatists, why the sooner what had been called its barbarous pomp was done away with the better.