SECOND READING. (Hansard, 13 March 1861)

§ SIR JOHN TRELAWNY,
in moving the second reading of this Bill, said, his object was to remove a difficulty which, after some things which had recently occurred, plainly existed in the way of Her Majesty's subjects obtaining justice in her courts, He had recently brought under the notice of the House the case of Maden v. Catanach, in which a plaintiff was nonsuited at the Rochdale County Court in consequence of her inability to declare her belief in a state of future rewards and punishments. Another and more forcible instance of the same kind lately occurred at Maidstone, in which a woman having stolen a shawl, the owner wanted to get her dismissed with a mere reprimand. Contrary to his wish he was, however, bound over to prosecute. The course he then adopted was this. It was suggested to him that he had better intimate to his counsel that he was not in a situation to take an oath, as his reply to any question put to him on that point would have the effect of allowing the prisoner to escape. This hint was taken, and the prisoner escaped accordingly. Various other cases of a similar nature might be mentioned, and many petitions had been presented during this Session complaining of the injury done to Her Majesty's subjects by the existing state of the law in regard to oaths. If it should be said that it was a matter of principle not to meddle with oaths, his answer was that the principle had already been departed from. Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists had been permitted to make affirmations in lieu of taking oaths, both in civil and criminal trials, and in civil cases affirmations in general might be accepted at the discretion of the Judge. This Act (17 & 18 Vict, c. 125, s. 20) does not apply to jurymen, which has led to embarrassment. If affirmations could be relied on in civil cases, why could they not be relied upon in criminal, the object in both instances being the same—namely, to elicit the truth? What had been done with regard to our colonies? Why, by an Act of Parliament (6 & 7 Vict., c.22,) "barbarians and uncivilized people," destitute of the knowledge of God and of any religious belief, were allowed to make such affirmations, in lieu of taking oaths. And surely if that privilege were extended to barbarians and uncivilized people, it 1937 ought to be extended to those who were not barbarians, and who, although they might not believe certain religious propositions, conducted themselves unexceptionably in all the relations of life. By the present law, felons were allowed to give evidence, when the ends of justice required their evidence to be taken, and surely the House would not refuse to admit the evidence of people who were not felons for the same object. He did not believe that it was consistent with the principles of Christianity to endeavour to coerce the consciences of people by oaths. What was the operation of the law as it stood? Why, that if an honest infidel stated he was an infidel he was credible, but the law disbelieved him; but if another person who was an infidel said he was a Christian, he told a lie, but his evidence was received. This certainly was contrary to justice. For his part he should be glad if oaths were abolished. They were told in Holy Scripture, "Swear not at all," and he thought it would not be very inconsistent with religion to abolish oaths. He thought it was presumptuous to require a person in every trivial matter to call upon the Supreme Being and imprecate vengeance upon himself. For what was a judicial oath? It was defined by Starkie (vol. i. 22) to be "a solemn invocation of the vengeance of the Deity upon the witness if he do not declare the whole truth as far as he knows it." It should be remembered that the disability which he sought to remove operated not so much as a punishment to the witnesses who were rejected as to those persons who required the benefit of their testimony. He very confidently asked the House to agree to the second reading of the Bill.

MR. HARDY
said, the hon. Baronet had rested his Bill on a particular case; but his speech and Bill struck at oaths altogether. Our law in respect to oaths was based on the same principle as that of all civilized countries, and had been very greatly relaxed, so as to allow any person having a belief in rewards and punishments, whether in this world or the next, to be sworn according to his own religion. The man, however, who believed in no sanction whatever, and could not be bound by any oath, being different from all other persons, was rejected as a witness. Now, this Bill was not intended merely to alter that state of things, but would make it lawful for any- 1938 body to make a declaration or affirmation who merely expressed a desire to do so and it threw upon the Judge a task which no human Judge could perform—namely, that of looking into the heart of the witness to see whether his objection to take the oath was sincere or not. Quakers, Moravians, and Separatists were permitted to affirm, not because they disbelieved in a Supreme Being, but because they had conscientious scruples against the form of the oath. This Bill, on the other hand, proposed for the first time to enact that Atheists, disbelieving in what the hon. Baronet called certain "speculative notions" on religious subjects, and apprehending no other consequences if they spoke falsely than those which the law inflicted for perjury, should he competent to give evidence, but the effect of the Bill would he practically, that every man should decide for himself whether he would be sworn or not. If it was meant simply to relieve Atheists, and that was the scope and intent of the Bill, why was it not distinctly recited in the preamble? The real question now raised was whether or not they would maintain oaths as part of the forms employed in our courts of justice with a view to impress on the consciences of men the obligation to speak the truth. Why, only two years ago it was found necessary to correct the laxity of proceedings in Committees of that House by requiring witnesses who gave evidence before them to be sworn; and the experience of every magistrate proved that the sanctity of an oath deterred many persons from making false statements. He called on the House, therefore, to resist at the outset a measure like this, which would abrogate the present liberal system in regard to oaths, which was so essential a safeguard to the right administration of justice in this country. He begged to move that the Bill be read the second time that day six months.

§ MR. MALINS
seconded the Amendment. The principle in this country had always been that in the administration of justice the persons who were to give evidence should do so upon oath. The only exception to that was in the case of Moravians and Quakers. The hon. Baronet 1939 seemed to think it was a great hardship that a person who said she did not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments should not be admitted as a witness. But a person who averred a profession of that kind had no feeling pressing on the mind except mere convenience. There were many persons who would make statements when not upon oath which they would hesitate to make if they had been sworn. He hoped the House would not permit the sacred principles of justice to be trifled with by a proposition of this nature. If such a measure was necessary at all it ought to be brought in on the responsibility of Government.

SIR GEORGE LEWIS
confessed that he had hardly ever known a Bill so extensive in its operation, and yet founded on so narrow a basis as that under discussion. It was, in fact, like a pyramid resting upon its apex. Its effect virtually was to abolish oaths altogether. It was unnecessary to enter into any moral or religious argument about oaths; he could only say that their value in securing the veracity of testimony in courts of justice was very generally recognized by public opinion as well as by Judges, barristers, and other persons having daily experience in the administration of the law. The House, therefore, had nothing before it to warrant it in entirely sweeping oaths away. The Bill was so drawn that if any man expressed a simple desire to be relieved from taking an oath, without even stating any objection or assigning any religious or conscientious scruple against being sworn, he should be entitled to make an affirmation instead. That was going far beyond the ground laid by the hon. Baronet, who had cited the case that lately occurred in the north of England, where a witness was asked whether she believed in the existence of God and in a state of future rewards and punishments. On answering the question in the negative her testimony was objected to, and she was ordered to stand down. According to the existing law she was not a competent witness. If the hon. Baronet thought that persons in her position ought to be examined as witnesses, he should bring in a Bill to prohibit the putting of any question respecting a witness's religious belief before he is examined. The witness in the Rochdale case, it appeared, was at first not unwilling to take the oath; but, on being questioned as to her religious belief, she stated that she had none. If the hon. Baronet wished to relieve that 1940 particular class of persons, it was obvious he had made his plaister much too large for the wound. He would repeal the whole law of oaths, although the grievance he sought to redress was of a very minute and limited description, and, if it required a legislative remedy at all, required one of a totally different nature, fie could not, therefore, vote for the second reading.

§ MR. CRAUFURD
moved the adjournment of the debate, it only wanting a minute to a quarter to six, at which hour all debates or opposed matters must cease on Wednesdays.

§ MR. SPEAKER
said, that the House, by the division just taken, had expressed an opinion that the debate should not be adjourned; but there was a Standing Order more imperative; which directed that at that hour, any business under discussion should stand adjourned.