§ MR. SLANEYsaid, he would venture to say a word on one topic to which Her Majesty had addressed herself in Her most gracious Speech from the Throne, and which was adverted to in the Address. Her Majesty stated that She viewed with deep regret the unfortunate differences which had arisen between various States in the American Union, and expressed Her hope that those differences might be adjusted. She also added that Her desire in that direction was much increased by the friendly and kind reception which was given to the Prince of Wales during the period of his late visit. Her Majesty also expressed Herself most graciously to Her Canadian subjects for the reception which they had given the Prince. Perhaps he (Mr. Slaney) might be permitted, as the only Member of the House who was present on that occasion, to bear his humble testimony to the handsome and enthusiastic reception which was given to the Prince, both in the Canadas and in the United States, where he had the pleasure of witnessing the enthusiastic reception that was given to His Royal Highness at Washington, Philadelphia, New York, and 111 other places. The enthusiasm which had been manifested arose from the high respect which our Transatlantic cousins entertained for the Queen herself, and for the many virtues which adorned Her character. He would also say that the reception given to visitors from England at that time in consequence of that feeling was most agreeable. It was, perhaps, not inopportune for a Member who was there to bear witness to the kind reception given to the Prince, the enthusiastic expression of attachment to this country, and that they were proud to belong to the same race as ourselves; and he thought that Englishmen might return the compliment and say they were proud of such descendants. He hoped and trusted that the unhappy differences which now divided the States would be amicably adjusted, and he cordially echoed the iteration in the Address of those sentiments of goodwill which were expressed by Her Majesty in Her gracious Speech from the Throne.
§ ADMIRAL WALCOTTsaid, he rose solely for the purpose of giving expression to the liveliest feelings of satisfaction with which he had listened to the flattering terms in which Her Majesty was graciously pleased to express Her approbation with the manner in which the navy and army had rendered, in conjunction with Her Allies, their services in the campaign in China, and he could only regret that the Navy had not been afforded more enlarged means of retrieving their former most heroic but unsuccessful efforts against the Taku Forts. He was firmly convinced that the nation would accept no false economy in the administration of the Navy. A more vigilant supervision of expenses and a more responsible execution of the duties attached to the Board of Admiralty it undoubtedly required, but it would view with suspicion and indignation any measure which in effect would lower the efficiency of the Navy, or endanger the loss of that strength and name which had ever been regarded as the palladium of the Empire. While on that subject he would ask the indulgence of the House in the expression of his sincere sorrow in the withdrawal from among them of that gallant old seaman Sir Charles Napier, who, on every occasion, raised his voice with; energy and earnestness, in behalf of those; measures in which, in his judgment, the interests of the naval profession could be advanced—a profession which he, in his own person, so largely adorned.
§ MR. CRAWFORDsaid, that as reference was made in the Address to India, he might be allowed to ask a question of the Secretary of State for India as to the proposed loan. The question which he wished to put was, whether the necessity for raising a loan of £3,000,000 in London, for the service of the Government of India, was owing to circumstances connected only with railway receipts and expenditure; or whether it arose from the falling off of the available sources of income or increase of expenditure in India?
§ SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, he was very happy to be able to give to the question an answer which he thought would be considered satisfactory, not only by his hon. Friend, but by the House generally. As, however, the subject was one not of public interest only, but affected private interests also, he hoped that he might be permitted fully to explain the circumstances in which the loan was made. The House was aware that, as far as the public expenditure of the Indian Government was concerned, a considerable amount of money was disbursed in this country on account of India. The only source from which that money could be provided was the revenue of India, and under ordinary circumstances a considerable amount had to be remitted from India to this country for the purpose of defraying that expenditure. On the other hand, since the construction of large lines of railway in India had been undertaken, the money for which was subscribed principally in this country, large remittances to India would have been necessary, looking to railway interests alone. Of late years the remittances from India on account of the expenditure of the Government, and to India on account of the railways, had nearly balanced each other, and there was no remittance either way. The mode of effecting a balance was this. The railways paid into the Home Treasury of the Indian Government the whole amount of their subscriptions. The portion necessarily required in this country for the purchase of materials and similar purposes was withdrawn from the Home Treasury. The expenditure incurred in India for railroad purposes was defrayed from the Indian Treasury. The Government of India, instead of remitting that which was required for Home Government purposes to England, paid the money for railway expenditure in India; and the money paid in England on account of the railway expenditure in India was applied to the pay- 113 ment of the expenditure of Government at home, thus avoiding the whole expense of remittance. Of course, while the expenditure in Doth countries was about equal, there was no necessity for any remittance either to or from India. Hon. Gentlemen who took an interest in the finances of India would remember that towards the close of last Session he stated that probably the payment of the railway companies to the Home Treasury in the course of the year 1860–1, would amount in round numbers to £7,000,000. Of that amount, he estimated that £2,500,000 would be required for home expenditure, leaving £4,500,000 available for railroad expenditure in India. He added to that £250,000, the amount by which he thought he could reduce the balance in the Home Treasury, and that gave a total of £4,750,000 to be expended in India in the year. The home expenditure of the Indian Government in this country was more than that, and he expected that the Indian Government would remit about £1,250,000. If the expenditure in India on railway account, and if the payment by the railway companies into the Home Treasury had been what he had anticipated, he should have had no occasion to use the power of borrowing, which he obtained from Parliament last year. But at that time even there were symptoms that the expenditure would be greater and the receipts less, and he thought it necessary to arm himself with that power. The expenditure had been greater in India because, amongst other reasons, the Government had been anxious to afford as much employment as possible to the people in the North-Western Provinces, who had been suffering from famine. According to the best estimate the Indian Government could form, the expenditure in India for the year ending the 30th of April next would be £6,000,000 instead of £4,750,000. Therefore, in the first place, the Government, who would otherwise have been in a condition to remit £1,250,000 for the home disbursements, was unable to remit that amount in consequence of that increased expenditure on the railways in India. The excess of expenditure beyond what was anticipated was £1,250,000 in round numbers. On the other hand, the railway companies here, owing probably to the state of the money market, had, up to the present time, paid into the Home Treasury only £4,500,000, and giving them credit for paying in, up to the 30th of 114 April next, £1,000,000 more, which he was afraid was as much as they could do, only £5,500,000 would be received in this country instead of £7,000,000. That would leave the Government here short of money to the extent of £1,500,000, and adding the excess of expenditure in India to the deficiency of payments here, there would be a total deficiency of £2,750,000, entirely on railway account. In point of fact some of the railways, and among them the company with which his hon. Friend was connected, had paid in the full amount anticipated, but others had paid considerably short of the amounts estimated, and the deficiency of payments added to the excess of expenditure gave, as he had stated, a total of £2,750,000. He, therefore, found it necessary to exercise the power which Parliament was good enough to give him in the last Session, and apply for a loan of £3,000,000—little more, probably, than would cover the deficiency in the railway accounts in the course of the year. The answer, then, to the first part of the question was, that the necessity of raising the loan was entirely owing to circumstances connected only with railway receipts and expenditure. With regard to the public receipts and expenditure in India, he was happy to say there was no need whatever for borrowing a single sixpence. There might be a little falling off of revenue, owing to famine and drought in the North-Western Provinces; but, on the other hand, he was happy to say the expenditure had been considerably reduced since he had last had the honour of making a statement on the subject to the House. When Mr. Wilson spoke, about that time last year, in proposing his Budget to the Indian Council, he estimated the probable reduction in military expenditure at £1,700,000 for the year. He stated later that the reduction would be about £2,500,000, and it had actually been about £800,000 more. Therefore the reduction for military expenditure for the year had been £3,300,000 following a reduction of £3,500,000 in the year before, and showed a total reduction of £6,800,000 in the course of two years. He hoped it would be seen that the Government had fairly set their shoulders to the wheel, and that they were bringing down the expenditure much more rapidly than he had reason to anticipate when he last addressed the House. He could not speak confidently as to what the produce of new taxes might be, but if the produce 115 of the new taxes came up to the estimate of the Indian Government, and if the reduction next year was equal to the reduction of this year, there was every reason to believe that the expenditure and income next year would be balanced. Mr. Wilson had been confident that such would be the case, and he, too, felt the same confidence, although no one could correctly estimate the income and expenditure for two years. Therefore, in answer to the second part of the question, he could say that the loan was not owing to any falling off of income or increase of expenditure in India; and if, by the blessing of Providence, peace was preserved and no other unforeseen circumstances arose, he entertained the sanguine hope that they would be relieved from the necessity of any further loan for the purposes of the State.
§ MR. VANSITTARTsaid, he understood the right hon. Gentleman to say that £1,250,000 had been spent on railways in India. In the month of November the Governor General published a financial minute, in which it was stated that all public works would be suspended, including works calculated to produce an increase of revenue, to which the Government was pledged. He wished to know whether these works had been prosecuted to the extent of £1,250,000, or whether they had been entirely deferred.
§ SIR CHARLES WOODsaid, he thought he had stated that the expenditure this year would be £6,000,000. They expected that it would have been only £4,750,000. Therefore there had been no postponement whatever of railway works.
§ MR. NEWDEGATEsaid, he wished to know when the right hon. Gentleman the President of the Board of Trade would be prepared to lay on the table the returns relating to trade and navigation.
§ MR. ROEBUCKsaid, that before that question was answered, he wished to observe that there was a Bill in the right hon. Gentleman's office with regard to trade marks. The right hon. Gentleman was aware that the manufacturers of this country lost credit by the forgery of persons who put the trade marks of English manufacturers upon foreign goods. The predecessor of the present Attorney General, as he (Mr. Roebuck) had been informed, had framed a Bill to prevent that practice, and he wished to know whether the Government were prepared to 116 bring in a Bill during the present Session for the purpose of preventing the forgery of trade marks upon goods.
§ MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, the trade and navigation returns for the month of December had been delayed for the purpose of affording time to make up the landing accounts of all the cargoes properly appertaining to the trade of the year 1860, but they would be laid on the table in the course of a week. A Bill had been prepared on the subject of trade marks, and would shortly be brought either into that or the other House of Parliament. He believed it was thought better to commence in the other House of Parliament. The Bill was intended to amend the law relating to fraudulent remarks upon merchandise, and would impose penalties for using trade marks in order to commit frauds in the sale of goods.
§ MR. HADFIELDWill the Bill give powers to the Government to negotiate with foreign States to obtain a reciprocity of protection on this subject?
§ MR. MILNER GIBSONsaid, the object of the Bill was to alter the English law. Of course, it must be left to Foreign States to say what protection they would give to English manufacturers. The Government would undoubtedly be very glad if Englishmen could obtain protection in all foreign countries against a fraudulent use of their trade marks. This country gave foreigners national treatment with reference to trade marks; and, as the Bill would render our law more efficient, it might induce other Powers to give national treatment to Englishmen in foreign countries.
§ MR. SEYMOUR FITZGERALDSir, I am deeply sensible of the inconvenience of making observations on what passed last night in the absence of the noble Lord who presides over Foreign Affairs, but I learn from the Secretary to the Treasury, that the noble Lord is on his way to the House, and as this is the only opportunity, and as probably the noble Lord will arrive before I am very far advanced in the observations which I have to make, I trust the House will grant me its indulgence. I am also sensible of the inconvenience of reviving a discussion to-day, which might have more fitly been taken last night; but the fact is, that the hon. Member for Birmingham (Mr. Bright), by his speech, devoted to a subject of paramount domestic interest, so entirely changed the tenour of the discussion, that I abstained from reverting to the subject of foreign policy. 117 The tone of the hon. Member for Birmingham was so earnest, and so fairly indignant at the course of the Government, that I felt it a very difficult matter for me to recall the attention of the House to the less exciting topics of a diplomatic correspondence. I may briefly say in passing, that I can well understand the curt and indignant feeling with which the hon. Member for Birmingham spoke, because the noble Lord the Member for the City not only buried Reform, but had not the delicacy to apply his handkerchief to his face to conceal the smile which was upon it as he stood in the position of chief mourner. Sir, I wish to recall the attention of the House to the answer which the noble Lord gave my right hon. Friend the Member for Bucks with reference to two despatches addressed to the British Minister at Turin on the 31st of August and the 27th of October. With reference to the Speech which Her Majesty has been counselled to address to the House, I was inclined, until I heard the speech of the noble Lord, to complain of a grave omission. I believe that if there is any one subject upon which the heart of the people is set, it is the maintenance of general peace—not merely from economic and prudential motives, not only from a sense of the burdens which a state of war imposes upon all who are included in it, or have to prepare against it, but I believe from higher motives, springing from a conviction that war, not rendered necessary by the honour and interests of the country, is not only a grave political error, but a high moral crime. What I thought the Speech ought to have contained—and what it does not contain—was an assurance on the part of the Government that they were alive to the dangers which menaced the peace of Europe, that no efforts would be spared, and that no stone would be left unturned to secure the maintenance of general peace. The Speech says that Her Majesty trusts that the moderation of the Powers of Europe will contribute to the maintenance of the public peace; but whether Her Majesty's advisers mean that they trust the Powers of Europe will be moderate, or that if they are moderate, general peace will be secured, seems on the face of the Speech left as a matter of conjecture. In reply to my right hon. Friend, the Member for Buckinghamshire, the noble Lord, so far as the Government are concerned, made a very satisfactory statement—namely, that at the present mo- 118 ment, in concert with our Allies, they are using every exertion in their power, and directing the whole energy, and the whole weight and influence of this country to the maintenance of the general peace of Europe. I believe that if the Government sincerely work for that object, peace may possibly be maintained, but at the same time I am sure that it is impossible those efforts can be successful if the noble Lord and his colleagues publish to the world such documents as those of the 31st of August and the 27th of October. It is with regard to those papers that I more particularly wish to address the House. The noble Lord, in reply to my right hon. Friend, was certainly more adroit than candid, and his reply in reference to the second of those papers—if I may use the word, not in an offensive sense—was almost evasive. The great claim which the present Government has on the confidence of the House in the guidance of foreign politics is, that they hold fast by the principle of non-intervention. Certainly, hon. Members on the Opposition side, are not the persons who by any possibility can complain of the adoption of such a policy, because I always remember with satisfaction that the Government to which I had the honour to belong in a subordinate capacity, was the first Government which proclaimed and adhered to the principle that we ought not to pursue—as for years we have pursued—a meddling policy in every petty as in every great affair in which nations with whom we have communications become involved. Gentlemen on the Opposition side are not likely, therefore, to complain of the present Government adopting and firmly adhering to the policy of non-intervention. The contrary is the fact. The complaint against the present Government is that, proclaiming themselves firm adherents to the doctrine of non-intervention, in the first place they do not practise it, and in the next that they publish documents totally inconsistent with it. The noble Lord, who is now the champion of non-intervention, wrote a letter upon the 31st of August in not very courteous terms. I am not going to criticise that despatch, but I think it was unnecessarily offensive in its tone, and that it mixed up subjects in a manner far more likely to irritate than to conciliate, to estrange than to influence, the persons to whom it was addressed. At the same time I think the noble Lord was perfectly justified in writing that despatch, 119 because it is clear there was a great ferment and crisis in Italy at the time, and therefore, although the language was unnecessarily strong, the object was good— namely, to throw the whole weight of the Government into the scale for the maintenance of peace. The letter sent to the King of Sardinia was to the effect that if Sardinia stirred in a certain direction she would have England against her, and that the noble Lord had reason to think that the great Powers of Europe would also interfere. The words menaced intervention on the part of this country, and all the remark I will make on that despatch is that it was not one on which the Government could rest its claim of acting on the principle of non-intervention. But with regard to the second despatch the noble Lord did not deal frankly with my right hon. Friend. My right hon. Friend spoke of both despatches. The noble Lord detailed the circumstances under which the first despatch was written. He referred to its terms, and he justified its principles. He adhered to all it contained, and he so far dealt candidly with my right hon. Friend. But when the noble Lord came to deal with the second despatch his answer was not satisfactory. He adverted to its terms, to the circumstances under which it was written, and to the course taken by the King of Sardinia, but he did not justify that course on the ground stated in the despatch, but on another ground totally different and absolutely inconsistent with it; and, then, carrying war into the enemy's country he called on my right hon. Friend the Member for Bucks to say whether he objected to the statement which the noble Lord had made of the grounds on which the Government justified the course of the King of Sardinia. It was not the grounds now taken by the Government, but the grounds taken in the despatch of October 27, that the noble Lord was called upon to vindicate, and yet about them he said not one single word. Now, what is the despatch on which the Government claim the character of a non-intervention Government? I regret extremely that the noble Lord is not yet in his place, but as the despatch in question is one for which the Cabinet must have been collectively responsible, I have, at least, the satisfaction of addressing the noble Viscount at the head of the Government and two other Members of the Cabinet. My right hon. Friend the member for Bucks seems to 120 have been not the only person who has been bewildered as to the policy of the Government, for the Government of one of our Allies was thrown into a state of even greater confusion and perplexity on the subject. Nor is this to be wondered at; for I defy the ingenuity of man to reconcile two such contradictory documents as the two despatches of the noble Lord, or to discover how they could have been written by the same hand. The noble Lord, as we know, attended Her Majesty upon her visit to Germany. He there had an interview with Baron Schleinitz, the Foreign Minister of Prussia, immediately after which the Prussian Government, desirous of reassuring their own people, published the following statement in their official Gazette:—
The cordial relations which have ever existed between England and Prussia will continue to exist if the two countries do not mutually misunderstand their true interests. These relations have become more deeply rooted, and have acquired increased firmness and extension by the conference at Coblentz, and by the ready exchange of views which then took place between the leading statesmen of the two countries. In view of the present great complications in the European political system, the more satisfactory it is to be enabled to state that there was a coincidence between the views and opinions of England and Prussia on the great and important questions of the day.I can readily conceive the surprise and bewilderment of the Prussian Minister when, after having come to the above conclusion, and discovered as he thought a perfect coincidence and accord between himself and the noble Lord on all the important subjects of the day, he read, only five days after, in the journals, of the letter of the noble Lord, the special object of which was to find fault with the important step which the Government of Prussia had taken in regard to the affairs of Italy, and to express, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, not accord of opinion with that of our Ally, but utter and entire disapproval of everything that had been done. But passing that by, I wish to call the attention of the House to the real danger of that despatch, for a document of more dangerous tendencies than that despatch of the noble Lord has never issued from the pen of any statesman in any country of Europe. The doctrine of non-intervention is popular in this country, not merely because it tends to keep us out of war, but from our moral conviction that the adoption of that principle is a great gain to in- 121 ternational law and international morality. It proceeds on the principle that neither on one side or the other is it right that a State which has no concern with the particular circumstances should interfere with the domestic relations of another state. It is not merely from the idea of self-security, or to avoid dangers to ourselves, but it is absolutely necessary in the cause of international law and morality to establish that general principle. Now what is the principle the noble Lord lays down in his second despatch—the noble Lord, as a Minister of non-intervention, and claiming credit as a Minister of non-intervention, what does he there lay down with all the authority of his name and position? [Here Lord John RUSSELL entered the House.] I pass by the reference of the noble Lord, whom I am glad now to see in his place, to Vattel, because in the present day the opinion of a British Minister is of a great deal more weight than the dictum of a writer who has been dead more than a century. The position of the noble Lord, as I understand it, is that a Foreign State has the right to interfere in support of a people against their ruler, when the people have good cause of complaint. But, as he holds that the people are not only the best, but the sole judges of the justice of their complaint, and as no insurrection ever takes place without the insurgents believing they are very ill-used, I do not think I overstate the doctrine of the noble Lord when I say that it amounts to this —that, in every insurrection that occurs, it is the part of a country wishing to pursue a liberal and generous course to lend the rebels the support of their arms. Is that doctrine consistent with the principle of non-intervention? It is exactly the reverse. There is no State in Europe, there is no conceivable circumstances in which, according to the noble Lord, it would not be the duty of a liberal and generous Government directly to interfere by force of arms. I ask the noble Lord to consider what must be the result of such a principle? The noble Lord is surely of too logical a mind not to perceive that it cuts two ways, and that it may be adopted equally in favour of a people struggling for liberty and a dispossessed Sovereign struggling to regain his throne. It is impossible for the noble Lord to say that this country, which loves liberty and hates tyranny, can interfere in behalf of a people struggling for freedom, and that a despot shall not say, "I think 122 my brother despot is very badly used by his rebellious subjects, and in a spirit of liberality and generosity I will assist my brother sovereign to put down all attempts at insurrection." It is perfectly clear that if the noble Lord's principle holds good, it not only justifies but almost obliges a country, in a spirit of liberality and generosity, not to adopt that principle of nonintervention for which the Government claim credit, but directly to interfere, and if they are to do so it is quite clear that the example would be followed in a totally different sense. Again, look at the danger of the doctrine. The noble Lord, who with his means of information at command, knows what is passing all over Europe, cannot fail to be aware that nothing is more easy at the present time than for a Sovereign, with aggressive designs, to stir up insurrection in the dominions of their neighbours. The noble Lord, I believe, is perfectly well aware that at this moment, throughout many countries in Europe, there are scattered emissaries of foreign powers who are there certainly not with the object of maintaining or contributing to the public peace. He is perfectly well aware that what I will call machinations are going on in many countries of Europe, by means of which, if war occurs, it is possible that an aggressive Sovereign may find his arms assisted—his attack from without assisted by disorders within. It is easy as I have said for a Sovereign, with an aggressive object, to stir up insurrection in the territories and dominions of his neighbours? We have had examples of that in Italy; and when that takes place the aggressive Sovereign will find a pretext ready shaped for him in the words of the noble Lord. "See," he will say, "there is an insurrection in the dominions of my neighbour; the people are the best judges—the only judges—whether they have a right to complain of their government or not; and, therefore, in no spirit of aggression—for I have no ambitious feeling—but in a spirit of liberality and generosity I feel myself called upon to assist those who are in arms against their Sovereign." But there is another and more serious danger to be apprehended from the doctrine of the noble Lord. Nothing, I am satisfied, is so calculated to interfere with the cause of constitutional reform, and with that tendency to constitutional reform which was steadily and happily spreading over the whole face of Europe—as these unfortunate declara- 123 tions on the part of a Liberal Government, which gives strength and force, not to the cause of constitutional reform—not to the advancement of constitutional liberty— but to the cause of insurrection and revolution, by encouraging the leaders of such movements to expect assistance from abroad. I can give the House a curious illustration of this. I had the pleasure of spending a considerable time in Hungary, and there became acquainted with all those illustrious men who are, at the present time, struggling to establish constitutional freedom in that land. Shortly after the appearance of the noble Lord's despatch, I received a letter from one of the most distinguished of that party. The noble Lord will see, from the sentiments contained in the passage I am going to read, that it is impossible to make public the name of the writer. I will only say that he is one who is now engaged heart and soul in the struggle for constitutional liberty in his country. He writes as follows:—You, who have been among us and know the difficulties of our position, can well understand how they are increased by this wonderful letter of your incomprehensible Lord Russell. It has already in effect given such courage to the Separatists that we, who hate the Austrians as much as they do, must either side with the Government or see our country the prey to anarchy and insurrection. Alas, indeed! that it is an English Minister who thus makes elsewhere constitutional action impossible, revolution almost inevitable.I cannot add any additional force to these words. Their force lies in their truth. The doctrine of the noble Lord is the most dangerous which has ever proceeded from the pen of a public man, and its first fruits will be felt in the country for which it was addressed. It is remarkable that the doctrine of the noble Lord has not the mark of originality. It is dangerous, but it is not new. Not much more than half a century ago the same language was held by the National Convention of France. They, too, declared, just before the establishment of the Republic, that France, as a liberal and generous nation, offered the assistance of her arms to any people who were struggling against a tyrant. There was this difference, however, between the Convention and the noble Lord, that they were ready to back their words by deeds, and the noble Lord is not. That is an essential difference, I grant, but the principle is the same. And, now, after the lapse of somewhat less than seventy years, we have the Minister of an English Sove- 124 reign, a Member of a Constitutional Government, adopting the sentiments, and almost the very language of the National Assembly of 1793. I have felt it my duty thus to call attention to the despatch, not only on the ground that it is perilous and dangerous, but, I repeat, because the noble Lord last night adroitly evaded any allusion to its contents. He spoke of the circumstances under which it was written, and justified the course of the King of Sardinia. But did he place that justification on the ground that the King had only done that which was liberal and generous— on the ground that in a spirit of liberality and generosity he had assisted those who were struggling for freedom? No; not at all. He justified the King's conduct on the ground that it was an exceptional case, and that the continuance of anarchy and disorder in the South of Italy menaced the peace and security of Sardinia. He referred not to the authority of Vattel, but to the authority of Lord Castlereagh. He never attempted to justify the dangerous doctrine contained in his despatch. By the way, I may refer to the charge of the noble Lord that my right hon. Friend the Member for Bucks was an Austrian in sympathy, and had spoken in high eulogium of the King of Naples. My right hon. Friend did not think it worth while to contradict the noble Lord, but he might have said that, at a distant period of time, he may have spoken as the noble Lord and others have spoken, of the importance of maintaining Austria as one of the Powers of Europe, but that the idea that he ever praised the King of Naples is a mere hallucination on the part of the noble Lord, and he might have defied him to adduce a single speech which contained such an allegation. I am not now saying a single word that can have a bearing on the right or wrong of what is called the Italian question. I believe it possible that events may not turn out as happily, or if as happily, certainly not until after a great lapse of time, as the noble Lord anticipates; but that is in the bosom of time. It is, however, not worth while now to discuss the character or conduct of the persons engaged in those important affairs. I will only say that I can well understand the cordial sympathy entertained in this country towards the illustrious man who has shown commendable moderation, singular purity of conduct and character, and the most distinguished bravery, even although the course he has pursued in 125 Italy may have been somewhat irregular. I can well understand, also, the feeling of disgust which prevails at the falsehood and treachery which have characterized the other party. I do not yield to the noble Lord in my sympathy for those who are struggling for freedom, nor in my attachment to the cause of constitutional liberty. I hope and trust the time will come when it will be enjoyed by all nations of Europe as freely and fully as by ourselves; but there is a wide difference between such feelings and the doctrine of the noble Lord. That doctrine tends not to spread the flood of constitutional liberty or a love for constitutional institutions, but rather to engender a suspicion of constitutional States, and a belief that their institutions will not prevent them from becoming as dangerous to the peace of their neighbours as States of a despotic character. I do not propose to go further into the matter. I believe the doctrine of the noble Lord is a dangerous one, and I am glad to have an opportunity of expressing my dissent from it, and I hope that if other Members do not express a similar dissent, they do not the less cordially disagree from that doctrine than I do. At present it has the sanction of a great Minister, and is regarded in Europe as the principle of the English Government. It is not, however, a principle of non-intervention. It is a principle sanctioning, and not only sanctioning but encouraging throughout Europe, the position that in a spirit of humanity and generosity it is right to give support and assistance to rebellion. My right hon. Friend last night endeavoured in vain to elicit from the noble Lord a clear explanation of our relations with France. I have always held that a cordial understanding between France and England was essential to the peace and happiness, not only of the two countries themselves, but of Europe at large That is an axiom in European politics, but I want to know what the present Government mean by a "cordial understanding," If the noble Lord can assure us that Her Majesty's Government had the cordial assistance of France in their laudable efforts to preserve peace, he will make a most satisfactory announcement. That is an alliance which will be thrice blessed. But if the noble Lord means by a cordial understanding such relations as we had an. example of last Session, when at the first the noble Lord assured us of the most friendly intimacy between the 126 two States, and afterwards informed us that we must look for an alliance elsewhere—we are to be called upon, as then, to stand by and watch the progress of events, to see the development of a policy we believe to be injurious to our interests and dangerous to the peace of Europe, and at the same time he told that we can only maintain our understanding with France by fresh concessions, then, I say, that such an understanding is not a ground of security, but a cause of disquiet and alarm. We shall have the noble Lord coming down again as he did last year, and telling the House that he has renounced the understanding, and must look for alliances elsewhere, in language and manner more calculated to irritate the French Government and the French people than any language I have ever heard used since I have been in this House. Sir, I want to have more ample explanation than the noble Lord gave last night. The noble Lord refers in one of the despatches to a cession of territory—meaning of course Liguria—by Piedmont to France. The noble Lord refers to it, and he assumes that he has received an engagement from the King of Sardinia that such a cession should not take place. I think it is clear that the noble Lord would not have made that inquiry, and would not have snatched at that assurance if he had not had reason to think that such a cession was likely to be made. I wish to ask the noble Lord whether he is now satisfied that there exists no ground for apprehending a cession of Liguria to France in the event of the King of Sardinia receiving assistance from the French arms. I should also be glad to receive some explanation from the noble Lord with respect to the state of affairs in Syria. The noble Lord said last night that that question would come under the consideration of the great Powers of Europe. The time has already passed when the French troops in Syria ought to have been recalled under the terms of the convention by which they entered that country; and I believe that their further continuance there will not only be dangerous to the existence of the Turkish empire, but will also form a great obstacle, if not one of the greatest perils, to the continuance of peace in Europe. I fear that if concession is made on this subject, and that if that occupation is prolonged, the youngest man among us may not live to see the French troops withdrawn, and I think, therefore, it is incumbent upon the noble Lord not only to tell 127 us that this matter is to come under the consideration of the European Powers, but to declare what is the opinion of the British Government in reference to that occupation. I have now concluded the few observations I desired to make; and I must only apologize to the noble Lord for having availed myself of this opportunity of addressing them to the House, and for having at the same time found it necessary to commence them in his absence. I certainly should not have taken such a course if I thought I should have been enabled to deal with the subject upon any other occasion.
§ LORD JOHN RUSSELLSir, I do not rise at all for the purpose of complaining of the course the hon. Gentleman has followed. I could have wished, perhaps, that he had given me some notice of his intention to make the observations he has done to-day; but as to the substance of his remarks I think it is an advantage to the Government, as well as due to this House, that if a despatch has been totally misconstrued—if an interpretation has been put on it which is totally foreign to its purport and to its words—full explanations on the subject should be given by the Government. The hon. Gentleman condemns the despatch of the 27th of October as affording a general countenance to a people who are in insurrection, and as entitling them to expect the support of Foreign Powers who are imbued with liberality and generosity. Now, I think, the hon. Gentleman must choose one of two courses—either he must deny that there should be any power of interference by a Foreign Power, — that intervention should never take place, or he must show that in this particular case of Italy and the invasion of the State of Naples the intervention of Sardinia was unjustifiable. As far as the general question is concerned, it would be the greatest absurdity to lay down a rule that those who rise against a Government are in all cases to be placed in the same category, that they are all guilty or all meritorious, all deserving of the scaffold, or the cross of honour, or the diadem. To tell me that because I admire Washington I must therefore admire Wat Tyler, that because I approve the brave deeds of William the Silent I must therefore approve of Massaniello, would be utterly absurd. All I contend for is that each case must be judged by its own merits. You cannot say that there should never be any intervention by a Foreign 128 Power at any time without condemning our own conduct in various instances, and without sapping the very foundation of the Constitution we now enjoy. Take the cases that have happened since the peace of 1815. There was an insurrection in the States of the Sultan which lasted for four or five years. The Sultan was the legitimate Suzerain of Greece; acknowledged by many — probably by all the Powers of Europe. His power was assailed by insurrection, and three of the Powers of Europe interfered to put an end to the struggle. Were those Powers of a revolutionary democratic character akin to the Jacobin Convention of France? The first of them was the Emperor of Russia, who interfered to protect the rebels from the vengeance of the Sultan. The other two were the Constitutional Powers of France and England. They agreed that a force which the Sultan had despatched under Ibrahim Pasha, one of his Generals, to suppress the insurrection should not be allowed to continue its operations, and, though the instructions given were not very precise, they were pretty sure to end as they did end, in the forces of the three Powers under Admiral Codrington totally destroying the Turkish fleet and preventing the Sovereign of the country from reducing his subjects to obedience. Does the hon. Gentleman mean to say that intervention was there unjustifiable; and that the people of Greece should not have been supported in their insurrection? Another instance occurred not very long after, in which my noble friend (Viscount Palmerston) took a very conspicuous and distinguished part—I mean the insurrection which took place in Belgium. The people of that country were discontented with the rule of the Dutch Sovereign under whom the Congress of Vienna had placed them. Their grievances in regard to the distribution of patronage were, no doubt, very considerable; but they enjoyed freedom of representation, and were allowed to make what representations of those grievances they chose, and if I were to compare their wrongs with those which the people of Naples and Sicily have suffered, they would appear as nothing. The whole people of Belgium rose. A gentleman with whom we are all acquainted, and who, by his conciliatory manners, great acquirements, and experience in diplomacy, is generally respected in English society,—I mean M. Van de Weyer, the present Belgian representative, 129 signed a document on the subject, commencing with the words "To arms, to arms, to arms "—a document which must be called of a revolutionary character; but the gentleman whose name was attached to it believed he was justified in publishing it. On that occasion France and England interfered not only by counsel, but by arms and by action. The Prince of Orange was sent by his father, the King of the Netherlands, to quell the rebellion. I believe he would have taken Brussels, and for the time, at least, quenched the insurrection in blood, had he not been checked by the information that a French army was on its way to occupy Brussels, and to encounter the Dutch troops. An English fleet went nearly at the same time to establish a blockade of the Texel, so as to prevent the King of the Netherlands from making any further effort to recover that sway over his revolted subjects, which was his by the sacred right of treaties. Does the hon. Gentleman say that that was a wrong interference? He can hardly do so. But there are other instances of intervention. There is that upon which, as I have said, all our constitutional liberties rest, namely, the interference—and that without an insurrection, but merely upon the suggestion that the people of this country were discontented—of the Dutch Stadtholder, at the head of Dutch forces, to invade the kingdom of England, and dethrone the Sovereign who then ruled it. That, I suppose, the hon. Gentleman can hardly say is an event which we ought to repudiate; because, although I have heard a noble Lord in this House call King "William III., our glorious deliverer, by no other name than that of the Dutch Stadtholder, I suppose that we all now acknowledge that to him we owe it that that real liberty and that Constitution, which had been matter of doubt and of contest for 50 or 100 years, was at last established. Take also an instance further back, which has lately been recalled to our recollection. Those who have read the interesting volumes of Mr. Motley, in which with great research and with great ability he has explained the causes which led to the rise and the establishment of the Republic of the Netherlands, will recollect how he shows that, notwithstanding the great power of Spain, and notwithstanding the formidable nature of the war in which the adoption of such a course would involve her, the lion-hearted Queen who then ruled over England did not 130 scruple to give her assistance to the Dutch, but that, in order to enable them to establish their independence of their legitimate Sovereign, she encountered all the perils of a great war and all the dangers which were threatened by the formidable armada prepared by Philip II. Perhaps, after hearing of these instances, the hon. Gentleman will allow that there may be cases in which intervention is legitimate, and may be justified by the interests of the country or the importance of the object. The hon. Gentleman, however, may take issue upon the case itself which is stated in the despatch. He, like the right hon. Gentleman who spoke last night (Mr. Disraeli), who also wished to fix my attention to that despatch, has evidently paid no attention to it himself. Both he and the right hon. Gentleman evade and avoid all its arguments. They evade the statement of facts which it contains, and they say, "Here is a general declaration in favour of insurrection, and an assertion that it is an act of liberality and generosity to assist it." I am almost ashamed to read any part of the despatch; but it begins with stating these questions: — "Were the people of Italy justified in asking the assistance of the King of Sardinia to relieve them from Governments with which they were discontented?" and, "Was the King of Sardinia justified in furnishing the assistance of his arms to the people of the Roman and Neapolitan States?" These questions are argued in the despatch. Shortly, indeed, but as completely as I could within the limits of such a document, I state in it all the principal reasons which in this instance justified the people of the kingdom of Naples in asking for the assistance of the King of Sardinia, and the circumstances which justified that Sovereign in complying with their request. Am I to go over that ground and those reasons again? I have no objection to do so, and I will state again that in the year 1821 Austria, in compliance with a decree of the principal Powers of Europe—happily England excepted—sent a very considerable army into the kingdom of Naples, where the people, under their legitimate Sovereign, under a Bourbon King, had established a regular representative Constitution, and where we know by the undisputed testimony of Lord Colchester, who was there at the time, and who, Sir, was one of your predecessors in that chair, the Parliamentary discussions were then conducted in a most orderly and most decorous 131 manner. The wish of the people was to establish under their legitimate Sovereign a Government somewhat resembling that of this country, under which people might speak freely of their own affairs, and under which any one who was arrested should have a right to an immediate trial, and should either be proved guilty of some crime or be at once declared to be innocent. Such were the desires of the people of Naples, and it was to suppress such a system, it was upon the declaration that it was impossible that Lombardy should continue to be governed as it then was if there was anything like freedom or constitutionalism in Naples, that a large army was sent into that country, and that 40,000 men were left for, I think, three years in Naples and Sicily, and re-established a system of unjust imprisonment, of the suppression of all freedom of opinion, and of the application of torture to political offenders. Another attempt to obtain free institutions was made by the people under apparently favourable circumstances in the year 1848. The King solemnly swore to the Constitution, and it was apparently established on a safe basis. I have seen some of the men who took part in the establishment of that Constitution, and one who was a Minister under it. At that time the King made one reservation. It was that the National Guard should have no artillery, and the Minister, thinking that this was only a Royal whim, agreed that none but the regular troops should have that arm. There came a fatal day, however, when this reservation made by the King had its effect, when his oath was set aside, when all its obligations were scorned, when the artillery of the regular troops was used to destroy those who were struggling for the Constitution, and when the men who had endeavoured to carry it out, and who as Members of Parliament had been among the most conservative, were arrested and imprisoned for having relied upon the good faith of the Sovereign whom they served. One of them told me that he, at the personal desire of the King, accepted a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. He wished not to sit there, but he had been elected as one of the members, and the King prevailed upon him to accept the seat. A Committee of Public Safety was appointed. He said that he could not approve it; but he was asked by the immediate friends of the Sovereign to take the chair of that committee. He took the chair, and he told the members that a 132 Committee of Public Safety could have no good effect; and that operations would be dangerous; and he begged them to dissolve, and to report to the Chamber that they could not act with advantage to the country. They took his advice, they dissolved, and he received the thanks of the King for what he had done. As he retired from the closet, after having an audience of His Majesty, one of the King's chamberlains said to him, "Did the King receive you very graciously?" "Yes, he did." "Did he praise you very much?" "Yes," replied the Minister, "I never before received such gracious words, and such assurances of favour as I have received this day from the King." The chamberlain said, "Well, take care; I was in the closet this morning when the Minister of Justice was present, and I saw the King sign an order for your arrest." The Minister knew the man with whom he had to deal. He had before been twelve or thirteen years in prison in consequence of a breach of faith on the part of the King. He immediately went to the English mission, and thence on board an English ship, and thus avoided the dungeon which had, no doubt, been prepared for him by his Sovereign. It came to be a question the other day whether or not the son of that King was to be entirely believed when he declared that he was in favour of a Constitution, and that he would observe it, and it was said that he had sworn to it. "To be sure," said one of these Ministers, Poerio, in the Sardinian Chamber of Deputies—"To be sure he swears, for how else could he be forsworn? He must swear first, in order that he may be forsworn afterwards." These were bitter words, but they were not without justification, because all those who in 1848 trusted the promises or believed in the oaths of the Sovereign were condemned by him by virtue of his superior force to expiate their credulity by ten years' imprisonment. Well, Sir, I ask, are not these circumstances which may induce a people to rise against a Sovereign, and to declare that they would rather be under the sway of a King who, whatever may be his faults—and that he has many faults I am ready to admit—has, at all events, been true to his people, who has never made a declaration in favour of their constitutional liberties which he has not observed, and who has taken no oath that he has not kept? What reason I ask is there for wonder or surprise that the 133 millions of people who were under the sway of the Neapolitan Bourbons should declare that they could bear the burden no longer, and should ask the assistance of the King of Sardinia in order that they might enjoy the benefits of constitutional government, without suffering from a constant fear of Royal perjury? The hon. Gentleman has put me upon the defence of this despatch. I have not gone into details, but I have suggested certain topics, and I think that the reasons which I have adduced were such as completely justified the Neapolitan people in the course which they took. Had not the hon. Gentleman forced me to do so, I should not have recurred to these subjects, because I cannot forget that the successor of the late King has expiated these faults and crimes of his predecessor. These, however, were the causes to which I attributed the insurrection of the Neapolitans aiding the invasion of Garibaldi, and I will say that they having so risen, and having called upon the King of Sardinia for aid, he was, for the reasons which I gave last night, justified in going to their assistance and placing himself at their head. Because, as I said, had he not done so, there would have been no restoration of the King of Naples, but there would have been in that kingdom such a state of total anarchy and confusion that it is very likely there would have been other intervention — an intervention hostile to the objects and the cause which the people of Italy had in view. I likewise stated in the despatch which has been referred to, that besides the wants which had taken place in the Papal States and in the kingdom of Naples, there had during the last five or six years been growing in the minds of Italian patriots a conviction—I know not whether Mazzini or who may have been its author—that there was no chance of defending Italy against those who wished to prevent its being independent except by its being an united State; and how was it to become a united State, except by the King of Sardinia taking up arms to make it so? It was not a republic they sought to set up; it was a constitutional monarchy. And let me here observe that there are now in Europe, as there have been at various periods, three parties. There are those who are for despotism, there are those who are for disorder, and there are those who are for constitutional monarchy; and I say that it is not unbefitting the English Government to declare 134 that when there is a contest among these principles they cannot favour despotism, they cannot show any countenance to disorder; but that with the cause of constitutional monarchy and of representative institutions, under the aegis of a king who can keep his word, they do feel sympathy, and that they are glad to see such a cause flourishing in a country which is so glorious for its ancient recollections, and so distinguished for the existing ability, industry, and activity of its sons as is Italy. Therefore it was that when Russia and Prussia, and impliedly Austria and France, expressed their disapprobation of any attempt to establish an independent Italy, I thought that the voice of this country might be heard on the other side, and that it might be shown that one constitutional monarchy at least would be glad to see the Italians free themselves by their own exertions. Not that we meant to interfere to promote that cause, but that we were ready to favour with our approbation the meritorious and glorious efforts which were then being made in its favour. Does it follow that because we approve these efforts in Italy we are therefore, like the French Convention, to declare that where-ever a people rise, wherever they are discontented with their rulers, we are in their favour? On the contrary, as I have said before, if such an instance is a case of real disorder, if it is a case of causeless discontent, breaking out in riot, we are not the least bound to favour or to express admiration of such an event. Every case must be tried by its own merits. That is the purport of what I said, and the whole of my despatch was confined to the elucidation of that principle, and the quotation from Vattel was introduced, as I have said, as an answer to the continual repetition of the statement that the conduct of the King of Sardinia was against the law of nations, and that such a thing had never been heard of before. "The law of nations," it was said, "has been violated by the King of Sardinia, and we, Austria, Russia, and Prussia"—a little forgetting the old story of Poland and the more recent story of Cracow—"are the sole interpreters of international law. We are the only doctors who know what is right and just, and we declare from our supreme tribunal, from our high court of appeal, that he has offended, and is therefore condemned." In my despatch, therefore, I stated the case of the King of Sardinia and that of the Italian people; and, at the 135 same time, I stated, that the severance of the ties which bind together a Sovereign and his subjects is in itself an insurrection. I have to-day said that if Belgium was justified in severing the ties which bound her to her Sovereign because undue partiality was shown to the subjects of the King of the Netherlands—if she was justified in setting at nought the Treaty of Paris and the Treaty of Vienna, by which Belgium was given to the Netherlands, ten times more, I might say 100 times more, were the people of Naples and those of the Two Sicilies justified in severing the ties which bound them to a Sovereign from whom they got no justice, and from whom they received none of the protection which a Government owes to its subjects. Towards the end of his speech the hon. Gentleman said he would say nothing about the rights or wrongs of the Italian question; but the rights or wrongs of the Italian question form the whole matter in dispute. If the Italians have been right in their revolution, in their insurrection, they and the King of Sardinia must be absolved together. If they have been in the wrong then they must be condemned for destroying Governments so excellent and so worthy of support as those which they have lately overthrown.
I have sometimes had in this House to find fault with a Government which I have not mentioned to-day—namely, the temporal government of the Pope. Now, while I do not think that that Government provided for the temporal good of his subjects, I cannot but see in the Pope himself a Prince animated by the most benevolent designs, warm-hearted and kind, and with an Italian heart in his breast, feeling for the Italian people. It remains for him now—and more for him even than for the Emperor of the French, or the King of Sardinia—to solve this Italian question. At the commencement of his reign he showed—and showed most amply—his desire to govern his States in unison with the wishes and in unison with the wants and interests of his subjects. I trust that the feelings which then inspired him will recur to his mind, and I do not at all despair of seeing him again show his sympathies for Italy, and make some agreement with the King of Sardinia, who has been chosen by the almost unanimous voice of the Italians to be their temporal Sovereign, by which, while resigning his secular power, he shall retain the homage which is due to him even from those who 136 are not members of the Roman Catholic Church, and the spiritual authority which, must belong to one who is the head of a faith which is professed by so many millions of Christians. It appears to me that the exercise of the spiritual authority of the Pope is perfectly compatible with Italian independence; and I believe that now, at the close of his reign, if the Pope should make such an arrangement by which his spiritual authority shall be entirely preserved, and his dignity as a sovereign prince shall be acknowledged, he will earn, as first of Italian patriots—even preceding those who have done so much for Italy— such a meed of gratitude from his country as none of his predecessors have ever been able to command. We all know that it is constantly said by Roman Catholics who are in favour of the maintenance of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, that it was assumed in days of difficulty and trial; that it was not sought for as an object of ambition, but that it was undertaken by a Pope who was respected by the people of Rome in order to preserve that city and a great part; of Italy from the evils of the anarchy which would otherwise have resulted from the desertion of the Emperors of the East and the incursions of the barbarians of the North. If such was the case, and if it is true, as it is also alleged, that that temporal sovereignty was for centuries useful, not only to the people of Rome, but to the rest of Europe, and if a time has now come when it can no longer usefully be exercised, let it be laid aside, and I am convinced that all Europe will admire such a noble and disinterested relinquishment of authority.
The hon. Gentleman likewise asked me some questions with regard to our relations with Prance; but I must, I confess, decline to enter into the particulars of relations which are going on from day to day. He asks me with regard to Syria, and upon that subject I have to tell him that the French Government have said—and have said, I think, not unreasonably—that it was at the request of Europe that they sent their troops to occupy a part of Syria, that alarms have reached them that the massacres may be renewed, and that, as the occupation was begun at the instance and with the consent of Europe, it ought to finish at the same instance and with the same consent. They have made that declaration at Constantinople, and the Sultan has said that, although a Conference is not in his opinion necessary, and although 137 he has no doubt that the occupation may cease without any danger to the people of Syria or the Lebanon, whom he is willing to protect, yet that he has no unwillingness to send a representative to a Conference at Paris. Our consent was dependent upon that of the Sultan. We have said that we would go into no Conference at which a representative of the Sultan should not be present, and we say now that the Sultan having given his consent we shall be ready to go into a Conference. The practical thing to be considered in that Conference will, in my mind, be what is the disposition of the Sultan with respect to his own territory. Syria belongs to no Power of Europe but the Sultan; it belongs to no Conference, it is a dominion of the Sultan. Therefore, though it is perfectly reasonable that the Powers in Conference should ask the representative of Turkey, "Has the Sultan provided means for preserving tranquillity in Syria?" still, if the Sultan said, "I am willing to undertake the responsibility of governing Syria without the occupation of foreign troops, and I can answer for the means which I have taken to secure its tranquillity," I believe that not one of them would wish to press the continuance of foreign occupation. That, however, is a matter into which we cannot enter, because it is to be the subject of a Conference, and our Ambassador must, of course, hear what is said by the representatives of other Powers in that Conference. When anything is decided I shall be ready to inform the House of the determination which has been come to.
With regard to our general relations with France, with reference to which a question was put by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Disraeli) last night, that right hon. Gentleman made, as I have heard him do upon former occasions, allusions which were hardly appropriate to his argument. He has more than once alluded to the close connection and alliance which we maintained with France in the time of Elizabeth, in the time of Cromwell, and in the time of Sir Robert Walpole. In the time of Elizabeth and in the time of Cromwell, but more especially in the time of Elizabeth, there was another danger to the independence of the States of Europe, and in the opinion of those great and wise Sovereigns a more formidable danger than that which arose from the preponderance of France—it was the danger naturally arising from the immense possessions and the ambition of Spain, and those great 138 and wise Sovereigns sought to counteract that ambition, and to meet the schemes of supreme dominion over Europe, and above all, the danger of the extinction of the Reformation, by looking to France, many of whose subjects were then Protestants, as a counterpoise to the ambition and the preponderance of Spain. That reason for an alliance with France has, at all events disappeared. Sir Robert Walpole likewise most wisely maintained a close alliance and connection with France; but with whom did he maintain that alliance and that connection? He maintained it with Louis XV., the most unambitious of Sovereigns, and Cardinal Fleury, the most peaceable of Ministers. I say give me again the days of Louis XV. and Cardinal Fleury, and my noble Friend will be ready to act the part of Sir Robert Walpole, to write the most amiable letters to the Court of France, and to be in most intimate correspondence with it. But the days are not similar, the Sovereigns are not similar. We must do all we can to keep on the best terms with France, and we have this satisfaction, that our objects can always be avowed; they are perfectly legitimate; they are to maintain the peace of Europe, and to secure that every Power should be allowed its independence as at present enjoyed. We ask nothing more than that. This House, this country, asks nothing more than that. We have no projects of ambition. We wish not to annex any country or any part of any country in Europe, and, therefore, we can boldly avow our meaning, and can constantly maintain it. That is all that I can say with regard to our own position. The Emperor of the French also knows the value of peace, and I trust that he will despise the counsels of those who tell him that the greatness of France must be promoted by any projects of war or of ambition. It was the opinion of the Powers who entered France in 1814 that for the security of Europe France ought to be great—France ought to be strong. Since that time she has increased in greatness and in force. Her territory is large, her population intelligent. The works of her industry and those of her intellect are appreciated in Europe, and I may say in all the countries of the world. It appears to me that a Sovereign of France cannot better consult her interests than by following the paths of peace, and by maintaining that great and glorious country in the position which she holds—a position which we 139 need not envy, but which we must all admire, as that of a country containing a population as brave and as intelligent as any that has ever existed on the face of the globe. With all these advantages, I see no reason why we and all the other Powers of Europe may not act together in peace with France. I certainly do not share the apprehensions which have been expressed by a Sovereign who has lately come to the throne, that we are immediately on the eve of great convulsions. I trust that such evils may be averted; I trust that peace may be maintained; but, under any circumstances, I hope that this country will always be prepared to maintain its own dignity and independence.
§ Address agreed to:—To be presented by the whole House.
§ Privy Councillors humbly to know Her Majesty's pleasure when She will be attended.