§ MR. H. BAILLIE, in rising to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether he has any objection to lay on the Table of the House the Correspondence with the Governments of Prussia and Denmark relative to the Affairs of the Duchies of Schleswig and of Holstein, said, that he and other hon. Members were gratified by the announcement which, at the commencement of the Session, had been made from the Throne to the effect that the foreign relations of this country were in a satisfactory position. He was well aware, however, that the words of that announcement must not be construed in too literal a sense, because experience proved that at the present day the most peaceful professions were not inconsistent with the most artful devices and the most active preparations. Of artful devices, however, he would say nothing, as he did not wish to give offence in any quarter, while at the same time it was quite clear warlike preparations were being carried on in every country in Europe, our own not excepted. If, under those circumstances, the representatives of the people in the House of Commons were anxious to do their duty, they must bear in mind that the expenditure incurred for naval and military purposes must entirely depend on 511 the manner in which the foreign affairs of the country were conducted. Now he, for one, was not among the number of those who complained of the foreign policy of the noble Lord the Member for London, who, in his opinion, had, on the whole, conducted the business of the nation, so far as it came within his department, with great judgment and discretion. But that circumstance did not, he should contend, render it the less necessary that the House should be funished with adequate information in reference to questions of great importance bearing upon the future welfare of the country. It was true that it had of late happened that the attention of the people of England had been absorbed in Italian affairs, so that other questions which awaited the decision of the statesmen of Europe, and in which it became us to take a deep interest, had not received that degree of attention to which they were entitled. In making that remark he must be understood as alluding more especially to the Eastern question, as well as that which had arisen between the Government of Denmark and the German Powers with respect to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. With regard to the former of those questions he would say nothing on the present occasion, except that it appeared to him, so far from having been settled in a satisfactory manner by the Treaty of Paris, to be now more complicated and more difficult of solution than it had been previous to the late war with Russia. It was, then, to the latter question—that which related to the disputes subsisting between Denmark and the German Powers—that he wished more particularly to advert. That was a question which did not affect those Powers alone which were more immediately concerned in its settlement. It was one in which the interests, not only of England, but of other nations, were involved. To maintain the independence and integrity of Denmark was a policy which it was not only wise and prudent for this country to adopt, but it was a duty which we were called on to perform; for it would be obviously most injurious to the public interest of Europe that a Power so situated should have its independence compromised or its strength impaired. The differences which had arisen between the German Powers and Denmark since the year 1848 in reference to the Duchies bad, he might add, been fostered and encouraged by the ambition of Prussia. There could be no doubt that Prussia was 512 the moving Power. Taking advantage of the German feeling which existed in Holstein, Prussia had lost no opportunity of exciting discontent and dissatisfaction amongst the inhabitants of that Duchy, thus rendering all attempts at conciliation or compromise unavailing. Even now, when the Government of Denmark had accepted the proposals made by the mediating Powers, those proposals had failed to satisfy the inhabitants of Holstein; for what they wanted was not conciliation, but separation; it was not, in short, with them a question of liberal political institutions, but one of nationality—they sought separation from Denmark and annexation to Germany. The case of Schleswig was, however, somewhat different. That Duchy did not form a portion of the Germanic Confederation, and the German Diet had no more right to interfere in the disputes which had arisen between the inhabitants of Schleswig and the Danish Government than it had to interfere between the British Government and the inhabitants of the Ionian Islands. The main object, then, sought to be attained by the German Powers with respect to Schleswig was not that which was ostensibly put forward in the case of Holstein—namely, the necessity of performing a federal act of duty in marching to the assistance of a distressed German nationality—but rather that which rose from the ambition, which lurked behind, of extending their frontiers to the shores of the Baltic. It was doubtless true that the magnificent harbour of Kiel, one of the finest in the world, was deemed to be a prize worth contending for; but the German Powers should bear in mind that there was another Power which might set a high value upon extended frontier, and that a policy which might have been wise and for the interests of Germany in 1848, became an act of madness in 1861, when the face of Europe had been changed and the balance of power completely altered. Under these circumstances he was anxious to know what had been the policy of Her Majesty's Government. We knew, indeed, that the policy of the Government had been to mediate, and that proposals had been made to both parties; but we also knew that those proposals were not likely to be successful. Under these circumstances he wished to be informed whether Her Majesty's Ministers had conveyed in terms—in terms conciliatory, no doubt, but still in terms not to be mistaken—the assurance that England would not look with indif- 513 ference upon an unjust aggression or upon any unnecessary and wanton violation of the peace of Europe. The present was not an occasion on which England could pursue that course which had of late been termed the policy of non-intervention, which meant no policy at all. This was a question upon which England was bound to take a decided course and to announce a decided policy; and he trusted that policy would be to maintain the independence and integrity of Denmark.
§ SIR HARRY VERNEYalso wished to put a question to the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office, on the subject to which the hon. Member for Inverness-shire had called the attention of the House. He wished the noble Lord to inform the House, Whether the war carried on by Holstein and Schleswig against Denmark was terminated in January 1851 by the armed intervention of the German Bund, the Duchies having given way on the understanding that rights equal to those of Denmark Proper should be secured to them and to Lauenburg, that each Duchy should have a Representative Assembly with a deliberative vote, that their common institutions (nun-political) should be maintained, that Schleswig should not be incorporated with Denmark, that the German language and nationality should enjoy perfect equality with the Danish; these rights to be guaranteed by a common Constitution for the general affairs of the monarchy? His object was to obtain for the House information as to the true state of the relations subsisting between the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein and the Danish Government. It was most desirable that if the voice of England were raised at all, it should be on the side of peace, and that our Government should make some friendly remonstrances to both parties which might have the effect of averting what appeared to be an imminent war. It was impossible, however, that the voice of England could be heard with effect if one of the parties in conflict felt that the English people were entirely against them, and would not listen to the statements and arguments advanced on the other side. He had heard with surprise the suggestion of the hon. Member opposite (Mr. Baillie) that the support given by the German Powers to the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein was dictated by a desire to dismember the Danish monarchy, and was, in fact, a mere intrigue, especially on the part of Prussia, to obtain possession of the 514 port of Kiel. Having listened to many debates upon this subject in the German Parliament, and having heard it spoken of again and again in all parts of Germany, and even in Holstein itself, he could safely say that such a proposition was entirely new to him, nor did he believe that any such intention ever animated those who advocated interference on the part of the Germanic Confederation. On the contrary, he knew it to be a fact that the members of the German Parliament who advocated interference in the question of the Duchies were precisely those who would be especially jealous of Prussia, and who would be the last to counsel any measure which would add to the power of that country. In 1850 the German Bund ordered a federal army of 50,000 men, 25,000 of whom were Prussians and 25,000 Austrians, to march into the Duchies, and compel them to lay down their arms; and it was under this threat that the Duchies, after one of the most heroic contests of modern times, ceased their resistance and submitted to Denmark. He believed that a peculiarly irritating kind of oppression had been exercised by the Danish Government over their German subjects in the Duchies; for example, the Danish Government had told the German population that they could not be confirmed until they learned the Danish language—which he could not help thinking was a remarkably stupid sort of oppression, because if anything could strengthen the dislike entertained by the Germans to the Danish language it would be an order compelling them to learn it in order to be confirmed. The actual effect had been that the young people had studied Danish with a view to confirmation, and then had hated it for the rest of their lives. He felt the importance of maintaining the power of Denmark: but the power of a country was not maintained by conduct inconsiderate and unconciliatory towards any portion of its population. The only mode by which Denmark could satisfy the just expectations of Holstein and the German inhabitants of Schleswig would be by giving them those privileges and equal rights which were possessed by the other subjects of the Danish Crown. By so doing they would make Holstein a source of strength rather than of weakness to the Danish monarchy. In 1849 the noble Viscount now at the head of the Government proposed that Schleswig should be divided, and that the southern portion, which was almost entirely German, should 515 be incorporated with Holstein. He sincerely hoped that the great influence of the noble Viscount and of the English Government might be exercised on the side of peace, justice, and humanity, and that Europe might be spared the horrors of war.