SUPPLY.—CHINA.—VOTE OF CREDIT.

HC Deb 16 March 1860 vol 157 cc766-814

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT moved that the Speaker leave the Chair, in order to go into Committee of Supply.

Order for Committee read.

Motion made, and Question proposed,

"That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he rose to move the Amendment of which he had given notice. He had intended to have brought this question forward at the opening of Parliament, as its importance demanded; but from various causes he was sorry to find that two months had elapsed before he could get an opportunity. It was true that a short discussion took place on the subject about a week ago, but it was postponed at the instance of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, who said he expected shortly to receive additional papers from Mr. Bruce. He understood the noble Lord had laid some despatches on the subject before the House in the early part of the evening, but he saw by the newspapers that Mr. Bruce was doing nothing, waiting for instructions from the noble Lord. Mr. Bruce was waiting for the noble Lord, and the noble Lord was waiting for Mr. Bruce. In the meantime a gigantic expedition was prepared, which he ventured to submit would cost far more than the £850,000, the amount of the Vote about to be asked for that purpose. He understood that the Government were not disposed to admit that the force would be so large as was generally supposed. But he had received a statement from a high source, asserting that the Indian Government were sending 18,000 British troops and between 7,000 and 8,000 Native troops from India. Artillery, and, he believed, a battering train, were being sent from this country, and there was besides a considerable force from France. Several thousand marines and seamen would also be employed on shore; so that the total force would approach very nearly to 40,000 men. It was possible that the Government had sent orders to reduce that force; and he hoped they had, for it was of portentous magnitude, and he did not know what 40,000 men could be required for. The Chinese were a most unwarlike people, and the least capable of any set of men of resisting even a small force. The employment, therefore, of an enormous force such as he had mentioned, excited apprehensions that some serious views of conquest were entertained. The question of expense was, then, involved in this matter, and, perhaps, an augmentation of the income tax next year. Upon this question of expense he believed that some entertained hopes that a considerable portion might be recovered from the Chinese in the way of indemnity; but he would read the emphatic language used by Lord Elgin in one of his despatches. The noble Lord stated:— Among the difficult questions which I had to resolve at Tien-tsin no one gave me so much anxiety and annoyance as that of the amount to be exacted from the Chinese Government in name of indemnity. From a very early period in those negotiations both Baron Gros and I satisfied ourselves that it would be idle to attempt to extort money directly from the Imperial Government in the North. Everything we saw around us indicated the penury of the treasury. Nothing could be more miserable than the state of the high officers of the Imperial Government with whom we came in contact. The troops called together to defend the capital were, as we had reason to believe, unpaid. Under these circumstances we came to the conclusion that, on practical grounds, and apart from certain considerations of morality and justice which might, perhaps, have been urged on behalf of the Chinese Government, it would be unwise to drive it to despair, and, perhaps, to extreme measures of resistance, by putting forward pecuniary claims which it could satisfy only by resorting to measures that would increase its unpopularity and extend the area of rebellion in the empire. The power of passive indurance is not wanting to the Chinese character, and it was to be feared that the Emperor might make up his mind to brave the worst at our hands, rather than consent to render himself, as his father did after the last war with England, tax-gatherer, on an extensive scale, for foreigners. We resolved, therefore, that such pecuniary claims as we had to prefer should be regarded as a charge on the province of Canton exclusively; that the city should be held as a pledge for their payment; and that the Emperor should only be required to sanction our taking measures to recover them from the local authorities. Let the House consider how enormous would be the expense of the army now being sent to China. It must be borne in mind that the troops proceeding from the highest point, namely, India, would have to go 5,000 miles, and the stores must be transported 15,000 miles. These were matters which cost enormous sums. Some time ago he put a notice in the business paper with the view of inducing the Government to select some diplomatist of great experience to take charge of these important affairs now pending in China; and within the last few days it had been formally announced that Lord Elgin had been selected to proceed to China. That appointment put an end, to a certain degree, to the public anxiety as to the selection of the functionary to go out to China, because very considerable confidence was no doubt placed in the noble Lord's judgment, and the noble Lord might naturally be deemed the fittest person to obtain the ratification of the treaty he negotiated. He perceived from the despatches laid before the House that Lord Elgin was earnestly requested by Lord Malmesbury not to quit his post until he had completed the work so well begun. He supposed the noble Lord had authority to leave, but he thought it matter of regret that the noble Lord did not remain until the whole matter was finished. As he now wished to vary the terms of the Amendment he had given notice of upon the Motion for going into Committee of Supply, he would read the Amendment he desired to substitute. It was as follows:— That humbly participating in the wish of Her Majesty, expressed in Her most gracious speech on the opening of this Session of Parliament— namely, that she will be gratified if the prompt acquiescence of the Emperor of China in the moderate demands which have been made upon him by the Allies shall obviate the necessity for the employment of force—this House is of opinion that the moderation of policy thus indicated on the part of Her Majesty and that of Her Ally the Emperor of the French will best contribute to diminish expenditure, avert complications, and to promote commerce, the interests of justice, and the establishment of peace. Sometimes trifling incidents gave rise to wars. He recollected one war that began in consequence of a hatchet being stolen from a farmer. In the present case, when there was to be a combination of the troops of the two countries, and when difficult circumstances were to be anticipated, it was desirable that every precaution against an unnecessary extension of operations should be taken. It appeared that this great force will be under the direction of two Plenipo- tentiaries, two Admirals, and two Generals. Now, if all these high functionaries acted harmoniously together, as it was to be hoped they would, such harmony would exceed any "happy family" that had ever been exhibited as yet. As material interests connected with the commerce of England were at stake, it was to be hoped that the Government of this country had arranged with the Government of France certain conditions, beyond which their operations would not extend. There were rumours that this expeditionary army was to be disembarked at the mouth of that river which had been the scene of so much disaster, and was then to march to Pekin. He earnestly hoped that that might not he the case. No doubt this force, and probably one-fourth of it, would overthrow any Chinese force that could be opposed to it; but the consequence of marching a great army into the country might be serious. Hitherto, the two wars carried on against China had been on the seaboard, but this, it was said, was to be conducted by an inland operation. He did not pretend to say that some demonstration might not be necessary to restore the reputation of the British troops to a more satisfactory footing in the eyes of the Chinese Government; but he hoped that the passage in Her Majesty's Speech from the Throne expressing a hope that the employment of force would not be required would not remain a dead letter, but that the moderate demands which the Plenipotentiaries had been instructed to make, would obviate the necessity for the employment of force. They might expect that such would be the case the more confidently, seeing that the noble Lord himself and other distinguished members of the Cabinet had on a former occasion very strongly deprecated operations against China. The condition of the country would certainly place great, almost insuperable, difficulties in the way of the troops, and he did not see how batteries of artillery could be worked upon such roads as lay between Tien-tsin and the capital, unless expenditure were disregarded and no resistance encountered. The reason why the French joined so readily in this expedition was, he supposed, that they had a very large army without a present European war wherein to employ it, and this Chinese conflict was perhaps meant as a temporary amusement or occupation for the French soldiery till something more serious turned up. He would not object to our pending a powerful force if France did the same—to be sure we were 10,000 miles nearer the scene of action—but he did not see why we should send double the force of our Ally. He hoped that the noble Lord would immediately inform the House that an agreement on this subject had been entered into with the French Government, and relieve their minds from the apprehension that it had been left loose and indefinite, at the mercy of this diplomatist or that general. The two Governments ought to lay down a definite basis for this proceeding, which was one of very great moment. If they neglected to do so, it was quite possible the expenses of the expedition might swell beyond all calculations, perhaps to eight or ten millions. The hon. and gallant General concluded by moving— That humbly participating in the wish of Her Majesty, expressed in Her most gracious speech on the opening of this Session of Parliament— namely, that she will be gratified if the prompt acquiescence of the Emperor of China in the moderate demands which have been made upon him by the allies shall obviate the necessity for the employment of force—this House is of opinion that the moderation of policy thus indicated on the part of Her Majesty and that of Her Ally the Emperor of the French will host contribute to diminish expenditure, avert complications, and to promote commerce, the interests of justice, and the establishment of peace.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

In regard to the question last raised by my hon. and gallant Friend—namely, the military operations in China—it would obviously be unwise and impolitic to publish the exact instructions given to the military and naval commanders; and, besides, it would also be exceedingly unwise to make those instructions so strict and positive that the officers commanding, at a distance of 10,000 or 15,000 miles from home, would be tied up to a particular course, in whatever circumstances they might find themselves. I therefore cannot give the military and naval instructions. My hon. and gallant Friend says it is not desirable that the troops should march upon Pekin. Undoubtedly it is not, and we have always expressed our desire that it may not be necessary. But, in the event of all reasonable terms being rejected by the Chinese, it will be the duty of the troops to proceed to Pekin; and it would be not only unwise, but a departure from duty, for us to give particular instructions that there should be no marching upon the capital under any circumstances. The terms of negotiation have not yet been finally settled, on account of circumstances which have lately occurred. Instructions have been drawn up by Lord Elgin in which the French Government generally concur; but there are some points upon which they wish for further explanation. Her Majesty's Government thought that the best way, under these circumstances, would be for Lord Elgin, who was very well acquainted with Baron Gros, and had acted with him in a very cordial manner, to go to Paris and consult with him as to the points on which explanation was required. One point of very great importance was, whether the two negotiators, Lord Elgin and Baron Gros, each of them having the full trust and confidence of their respective Governments, should have supreme authority over the naval and military commanders, and have the power of stopping operations whenever they should think it advisable to do so. It is a very right principle that they should possess that power; but at the same time it requires modification, for the naval or military commanders might be so situated that it would be impossible for them to stop operations at a particular moment with safely to the troops and ships. That and other points are still under discussion; no final conclusion, as far as I have yet heard from Lord Elgin, has been come to in regard to them. I shall say a few words as to the necessity for the display of military force. It is evident that when 400 or 500 men were killed and wounded by an ambuscade, without any sort of notice, the lives and property of Europeans in that country could not be safe unless in one way or another reparation were made for that outrage. ["Hear, hear!"] He observed that some hon. Gentlemen seem to doubt that this was done without notice; but what occurred was simply this:—When Mr. Bruce said he was going to the mouth of the Peiho, he expressed the hope that he should be allowed to go up with a vessel sufficient to carry himself and his retinue to Tien-tsin, and that he might be conveyed in an honourable manner from thence to the capital. That proposal was not met by a positive refusal. On the contrary, the Commissioners at Shanghai said they would communicate it to the Court at Pekin, and get an answer in regard to it; the time, however, which they required for that purpose was unreasonably long. When Mr. Bruce reached the mouth of the Peiho the people said there were no authorities on the spot, that they were acting without orders, that they had merely put up the stakes in the river as a protection against pirates, and that they were not authorized to say anything to the British Ambassador. Whether Mr. Bruce was right or wrong in the course he took, it is quite clear that he and Admiral Hope went up to the barrier without any notice having been given to them that their passage up the river was to be obstructed. That being the case, and the loss inflicted on us being so severe, it was necessary that some reparation should be insisted upon. The demands we made were exceedingly moderate. We required, of course, that the treaty which had been concluded, and waited only for ratification, should be carried out. We demanded also an apology for the outrage which had been committed. That being done, we proposed that our Minister should go up in a peaceable manner to Pekin, and that there the ratification of the treaty should take place. Considering that we are at the expense of a considerable armament, more reasonable proposals than these could not well be made. If they are refused and the armament should arrive there, then Mr. Bruce was instructed to ask for a large indemnity. I do not think we could propose anything less than this; and if these moderate terms are not accepted, then the treaty and the other stipulations will have to be enforced by arms. The strength of the expedition will by no means be so great as my hon. and gallant Friend imagines, but we trust and believe it will prove sufficient for the enforcement of our proposals. No one can lament the whole matter more than I do. We do not go to China to form alliances against other Powers. We have no question of boundaries to settle there, or any disputes of the kind that arise in connection with the affairs of Europe or America. What we have to do there is merely to trade; but for the purposes of trade we must have security for the persons and property of our countrymen. Our trade has enormously increased of late years. The trade of Shanghai, for instance, has sprung up since the Treaty of Nankin, and has already assumed considerable proportions. Being a large trade, a great number of persons are engaged in it, and disputes of various kinds are liable to occur. It is therefore desirable that our Minister in that country should be able to resort to the chief authorities, when necessary, and that he should not be confined to Canton, having to deal with petty officials, and to wait months for the conveyance of messages to and the return of answers from Pekin. It is necessary that our Minister should have the power of going to Pekin, with free access to the authorities there. I do not think we ought to be content with the proposition in the American Treaty that the Minister should go to Pekin only on matters of business, and come away again directly. That is not enough. Our Minister ought to have the option of being at Pekin whenever he thinks necessary. It may be found more for our interest and convenience that the Minister should reside at Shanghai, and only go occasionally to Pekin, still I think that the condition which Lord Elgin inserted in the Treaty is essential and ought to be insisted on. I have only further to say that Lord Elgin will soon return from Paris and proceed upon his mission to Pekin. There is no man more anxious to maintain the most peaceful relations with China than my noble Friend Lord Elgin. He is esteemed by the people of that country, and he has a strong desire for their welfare. Both he and Baron Gros are animated by the most pacific sentiments, and we have thought we could not do better than ask Lord Elgin and Baron Gros to go out again as our Plenipotentiaries to arrange our differences with the Chinese Government.

SIR JAMES ELPHLNSTONE

said, he had listened to the speech of the noble Lord in the hope that he would have laid before the House some plan of a comprehensive policy for regulating our future relations with China, and for bringing to a close the discreditable position we had hitherto occupied in that country. He wished the House to look back to the period when the Government first undertook the responsibility of communicating with the Emperor, and to allow him to retrace what had since occurred. In 1832, when the charter of the East India Company came to an end, a different stale of things was forced upon the Chinese Government. Instead of the monopoly that existed on the part of the East India Company, when a disciplined force acted under treaty engagements, and everything was conducted in an orderly manner, the trade was thrown open to persons who flocked to China as an El Dorado. The Government sent out a nobleman (Lord Napier) as superintendent of trade, who was neither charged with the powers of a Plenipotentiary nor backed by a suitable force, but who landed at Canton in the dead of night, and who was accredited to no one but the head of the police and the Customs authorities of Canton. He was insulted, the trade was stopped, and al- most every one who had anything to lose left the country. He (Sir James Elphinstone) was there at the time, and therefore spoke with a personal knowledge of the facts. Lord Napier's death brought that, state of things to an end, and for three or four years afterwards the trade was carried on under the most irregular circumstances. The seizure of opium, the burning of the factories, and a series of outrages upon British subjects led to the first Chinese war. The Government sent out Sir Henry Pottinger as Plenipotentiary, and he concluded the Treaty of Nankin, after hostilities that brought the Chinese Government into great disrepute with their subjects. That treaty was called a seven years' settlement. It was clearly impossible that the relations of the two countries could long rest upon the basis of that treaty. British subjects were exposed to indignities of every description; they were massacred and murdered; they were confined to the neighbourhood of Canton; the city of Canton, contrary to treaty engagements, was closed against them; and the affair of the Arrow was only the culminating point in the long list of injuries and indignities. He thought that Her Majesty's Government were perfectly in the right in this question of the Arrow, because if they allowed vessels that carried the British licence to be interfered with, the commerce of our settlements in those seas would soon fall to the ground. He should, therefore, have supported the Government of the noble Viscount in this dispute with the Chinese Government if he had had the honour of a seat in Parliament at that time. The second Chinese war resulted in the mission of Lord Elgin. In his belief, the whole of the operations of that war, up to the point when Lord Elgin left China, were conducted with singular ability, not only by our Plenipotentiary, but also by the gallant Admiral who commanded our naval forces (Sir M. Seymour). We then had another treaty, which, although it was an improvement on that of Sir Henry Pottinger, was not framed in that comprehensive spirit and regard to the future which ought to have characterized it. Lord Elgin was now going out again, and he trusted that in any future treaty the noble Lord might conclude provision would be made for placing our trade on such a footing that it could be carried on peaceably in future, humanizing and civilizing the Chinese, and giving us greater influence with the Chinese Court. As regarded military operations he differed with the noble Lord as to the plan of operations he had appeared to shadow out, for, in his opinion, it would be a fatal mistake for the troops to advance upon Pekin. No doubt the insult perpetrated upon us deserved retribution; but, in the first instance, it ought to be put before the Chinese as demanding an ample apology and an indemnity large enough to compensate us for the loss of our vessels and material and compensation to those who were injured or their relatives, That was, he thought, as far as we could well go at the outset, failing such a settlement. He would then reduce the forts of the Pehio, but he would be very chary of going further in that direction. He should fall back, and take up the strategic position we ought to occupy, which was to hold the city of Nankin. He had always held that that city was the strategic point which we ought to occupy in China, and which would enable us completely to command that empire. He who held it would have a complete control over all the great producing districts, by the possession which it would give him of the command of all the commercial arteries of the country, and it would then be impossible for the Emperor to collect his revenue or exercise the powers of Government. He (Sir James Elphinstone) would first, therefore, take possession of the Taku forts, and then fall back upon Nankin, where he would make it known to the inhabitants that we were prepared to maintain order and to receive their produce. But if our forces were to go to Pekin the fleet must start in the month of April; some time would be required to reduce the Taku forts, and the month of August would have arrived before the troops could have got to the Chinese capital. Now, it was the opinion of every person acquainted with China that in that event the Emperor would retire into Mantchouria. He had not himself a doubt upon that point. Our army would then have to maintain order among a vast and turbulent rabble; they would have to spend the winter under a climate in which the thermometer sometimes fell to 20 or 30 degrees below zero, and their communications would be cut off by myriads of Tartars. They had all heard of the disasters of Cabul, and it would be too much in one lifetime to suffer from a similar calamity. Our troops might be able to overthrow any army which could be mustered against them, but the Chinese would probably not collect together that we might butcher them. Asiatics would not fight under our conditions, and of all Asiatics the Chinese were the most subtle and ingenious. They would do everything to prevent our march to Pekin, and, when there, would, no doubt, do everything to make our stay as unpleasant as possible. Now, the policy he recommended was one which would checkmate the Emperor at starting, and to do this we ought to take possession of Nankin with a force of gunboats. This would enable us to keep the internal navigation of the country clear, and silk and tea would come to us down the tributaries; the atrocities alike of the rebels and the Imperialists would be prevented; the prosperity and safety of the producing districts would be insured; and the Emperor would at the same time be cut off from the fairest portion of his dominions and forced into a negotiation which, under proper management, would end in a more permanent settlement of the question. This, in his opinion, was the true solution of the Chinese difficulty. With regard to the rebellion, there seemed to be considerable misapprehension. It was of no recent occurrence, but appeared to have existed, more or less, from time immemorial. In 1820, when he went out to China, the rebels were in force in the province of Quangtung. The Chinese authorities then got Americans to fight for thorn, and one of these, a man named M'Gee, kept a public-house, was made a mandarin of the peacock's feather, and used to wait at dinner with his peacock's feather on. In 1849 a sort of semi-Christian movement took place in this province quite distinct from the normal rebellion with which, however, it became speedily identified, but our policy throughout had been of the most vacillating kind. Sometimes we supported the rebels, sometimes the Government; and all this time much of the Chinese coasting trade was thrown into the hands of foreigners, or the Chinese merchants had to pay black-mail for its convoy and protection from piracy. Unless the Government of Great Britain was in a position to take the Chinese Government into their own hands they were not warranted in weakening the power of the existing Imperial Government. The rebels had never carried on a regular Government of any kind, but had been guilty of rapine and murder wherever they went. The only chance of maintaining order and authority in China was to strengthen the hands of the existing Government; and this was the view taken by Lord Elgin in one of his despatches addressed to Lord Clarendon. The noble Lord the Foreign Secretary, in the statement he had just made to the House, seemed to point to a demand for indemnification from China; but unless we laid hold of the export duties of the country we had no means of obtaining indemnity from that people. In the despatch from Lord Elgin read by the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster the great poverty of the Chinese was clearly pointed out, and he observed that it was unwise to put forward pecuniary claims upon them in such circumstances.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

said, the claim insisted on in the Treaty of Tien-tsin was £1,200,000, as compensation for losses sustained by Her Majesty's subjects.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

Yes, but the noble Lord now asked for an indemnity for the great armaments we were sending out to China. He told the noble Lord that it was impossible to obtain it. We had the Persian expedition to guide us in our calculations as to the probable expense of this expedition to China. The Persian expedition only lasted about five months, the distance from Bombay was 1,500 miles, and the sum the country was called upon to pay in order to meet the expenses of that expedition was£2,225,000. How much more than that amount was laid upon our willing horse, the empire of India, he never could ascertain correctly, but it was said that the whole cost of the Persian expedition amounted to £3,750,000, and it is most probable that it did not greatly, if at all, fall short of that sum. But that amount was expended upon a small force going a distance of 1,500 miles. Now, the distance from Bombay to the mouth of the Peiho was 5,000 miles, from Calcutta 1,700 miles, and from Madras 4,800 miles. The contrast price of coal for the expedition to the Peiho is £3 per ton. The horses, artillery, and attendants upon an army of 10,000 or 12,000 men, going such a distance, must be much larger than the number which was required for the Persian expedition; and the basis of the operations being India, the army must necessarily carry the greater part of its supplies with it. But supposing the whole thing to be done in a few months—though he did not expect it would take less than twelve months before the expedition could be at an end—and supposing it would be necessary to leave a force in the country to enforce the carrying out of the pro- visions of the treaty, in that case his belief was that they would not get out of this Chinese war at a less cost than £10,000,000. And all this was to be incurred at a time when they had a deficiency of £7,000,000 or £8,000,000, of which no account was taken, but which must eventually conic out of the pockets of the people; and with a large deficiency and no adequate amount allowed for the expenses of the Chinese expedition, the result to this country would be disastrous. That was the reason why he had steadily opposed the financial measures of the present Government. As to the French, he could not conceive what brought them into this Chinese matter at all. During the sixteen years when he was in the habit of going backwards and forwards lo China, he found the whole of the French trade to that country represented by one ship, that brought out claret to China and took back some toys and green tea, and silk piece goods. He believed that that trade had lately increased, but he was sorry to say, in a most unfavourable direction; namely, in the carrying Coolies, which was neither more nor less than a system of slavery. This trade had been gradually increasing of late years, and had now reached a very unsupportable pitch. It was spreading throughout China a distrust and hatred of the Europeans, and especially of the English, because the inhabitants of China could not draw the distinction between us and the French nation in regard to this obnoxious trade, believing us to be the great promoters of that trade, because we were the only nation that appeared to have commercial transactions with them to any great extent. Now he was of opinion that this Coolie question was a most serious one, and must be dealt with summarily by us. He had heard nothing said by the Government as to the propriety of putting a question to the French Government upon this subject, and it was one that was eating into the vitals of cur Chinese trade, and would continue to do so until we took up the matter as we ought to do and settled it. Before he sat down he wished to impress upon the Government that they ought by no means to take the control of the army and fleets out of the hands of the military and naval commanders after a definite policy had been decided upon; because if an Ambassador, having the control, proposed to concentrate the forces on a given point, the Admiral in command, when two nations were co operating, would often be embarrassed in the discharge of the service in consequence of having to consult the officers of the other nation with whom he was acting. Their great object in China now was to obtain by a permanent treaty arrangement the commodities which they went there to purchase, and in doing so they ought at all times to act as Christian merchants, to support the Imperial Government, defend the honour of our flag, and abstain from shedding the blood of the inhabitants in unnecessary quarrels, and to carry on all their transactions in the spirit of peace and justice.

MR. BRIGHT

Sir, when the speech in which the Session of Parliament was opened met my eyes, and when I came to the paragraph which referred to these unhappy transactions in China, I confess I was glad to see, or to think, that the tone of that paragraph was moderate, and indicated a disposition on the part of Her Majesty's Government to avoid any re-opening of the war with China. I presume that the Resolution which has been moved by the hon. and gallant Gentleman below me is a Resolution rather calling upon the House to support the Government in the policy which was indicated in Her Majesty's Speech. The words of it are such as I imagine every Member would be quite willing to support with his vote, and such as the Foreign Secretary would be ready to accept. There is another object, as it appears to me, in proposing this Resolution—namely, to afford the noble Lord an opportunity of making the statement which, on some previous evening, he gave the House to understand he would make on Chinese affairs. With that statement I confess I am a good deal disappointed; for he has not told us a single thing, except that the amount of force to be sent to China is only about half as much as that which had been stated by my hon. Friend near me. It appears to me that on occasions of this nature, when the country may possibly be dragged into a bloody and most costly contest, it is the duty of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to be a little more explicit to the House. We have had before us, on another occasion, a case which has been mentioned to-night by the hon. Member for Portsmouth (Sir J. Elphinstone)— that is, the war which was carried on with the kingdom of Persia, which cost more than £2,000,000, about which we heard nothing when it began, and about which nobody has heard anything since it ended, except that we have had an enormous sum to pay for it. We are apparently involved in another transaction, which I think the most robust conscience in this House can never regard in the light of an honourable cause. Let us for a moment —and I shall not take up the time of the House more than a very few minutes— trace the progress of these transactions. I will not go back to the original Chinese war, which was about as bad as anything could be, but to that war which was commenced by the indiscretion — to use no harsher term—of Sir John Bowring, the English Plenipotentiary—which was based on a fraud,—upon that which the House of Commons has condemned as a positive lie; and although when there was a dissolution of Parliament a majority was returned to support the Minister who was then in office, yet no attempt has ever been made—and I think no Minister would ever pretend to attempt—to induce the House of Commons to reverse the judgment to which it came on that occasion; and I believe there is now scarcely a dissentient opinion throughout the country as to the folly and guilt of that transaction. One way or other that war came to an end, and a treaty was made under the auspices of a noble Lord who is at present a Member of the Cabinet. There was, in the negotiation of that treaty, a grave error committed. There seemed to be a constant disposition to introduce something into it which should be a special cause of aggravation to the Chinese, but which could be of no use to the trade or the political interests of this country; and one thing was insisted upon which has hitherto been unheard of in China—namely, that an English Minister should take up his residence at Pekin. It is a question open to discussion whether it is worth while to keep a Minister at any Court in the world—it is a question whether it would not be much better that all your Ambassadors should be withdrawn; and that when any difficulty arose between the Government of this country and any foreign Government you should send out a Minister for the special purpose of dealing with it. But, however, this question may be decided, that man must have a wonderful notion of English policy or English commerce who thinks that anything can be gained by picking up some inexperienced or some needy diplomatist—though I would not apply the term needy to this case—and sending him to reside at Pekin, where he will be the least comfortable, and perhaps the very least wanted. That clause was inserted in the treaty, I believe, with the special object of humiliating the Chinese, and to give a proof of the absolute supremacy and triumph which the arms of England had obtained over the feeble Government of China. Now, to turn from the question of the treaty, to the question of its ratification—I do not understand why, in the midst of a political affair of this nature, a nobleman who had been the Minister who had arranged this treaty should not have stayed until the ratification was complete. There may have been reasons for his return that I do not know of, and it may be that the Minister who succeeded him has been, as compared with other men in the subordinate situations he has filled, fit for the position. He is a gentleman whom I never saw, of whom I know nothing, except for this transaction—indeed, I never heard his name until he went to China, and we found him engaged in a transaction so calamitous to this country and so calamitous also to the Government and people of China. In this second case I maintain that we are just as wrong as we were in the case of Sir John Bowring at Canton. All the arguments which the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs used in 1857 would, to my thinking, be valid against the case which he has undertaken in some sort to apologize for to-night. The noble Lord spoke of treachery that was exhibited towards the forces of England; but we have it on the authority of an English officer who was engaged in this sanguinary and unhappy affair, a gentleman holding the rank of captain, and connected with a high dignitary of the Church, who says there was no treachery whatever. And, more than that, if the Chinese had intended to be treacherous or to lay an ambuscade, he says that not a single vessel could have escaped, nor a single person on board have survived, had the Chinese taken the opportunity that was afforded them for firing on the squadron and inflicting such damage upon it as was open to them to do. The fact is, it is not worth our while, as sensible men, involved in the discredit and guilt of this transaction, to try and cover it up by charges of treachery against the Chinese. The charge is one of utter folly and imbecility on the part of our own Minister, and, nowithstanding all that may be said of the valour of the Admiral, of great indiscretion on his part. I hold that pru- dence and valour are twins and go together. Together they do great things; but separate they end in disasters like this. I have no patience to hear in this House Gentlemen getting up and praising the valour of the commanders of vessels on occasions like this. Every man in the fleet, I suppose, showed equal valour; but the 400 or 500 men who were sacrificed on that occasion were sacrificed to the bad arrangements of the Admiral and the utter folly of the Minister. That is an opinion which I do not offer as my own, but as that of men who served in China, and the opinion, I undertake to say, of 99 out of 100 of all reflecting men in England who have read the narrative of this miserable transaction. Up to that point no one can blame the present Government. The noble Lord had just taken office in the very week in which this business took place in the Peiho; therefore he is not to be blame for what happened 15,000, miles away; but I think neither he nor his colleagues showed afterwards that judgment which might have been expected from men placed in responsible positions when they heard the accounts of this transaction. It appears to me no man could read the despatches and narrative, whether they came direct from the Chinese papers or from the correspondent in China of a London paper, or from Indian papers, or from private letters, or any other source, but that he must come to the conclusion that Mr. Bruce has been guilty of a great want of judgment, the consequence of which has been a most disastrous failure. But what has been done with a man who has shown a great lack of judgment and has failed disastrously? I do not pretend to say that I, or any other man may, not sometimes have failed in judgment; we may fail in many affairs of life:—but surely when a Minister placed in this responsible position 15,000 miles from home commits errors so grievous as to bring about results so startling and alarming to the people of this country, the first thing the Government should do would be not to continue such a man in an office of such responsibility, but to replace him by some one in whom the Government and country could hope to find a sounder judgment and better discretion. Nothing can be so absurd to my mind as negotiating with a people through a Minister who has just failed in the first and only transaction he has had with them, and whose mind must necessarily be irritated by his want of success; because, in- stead of going to them with a mind unbiassed, entertaining generous sentiments and such regard for the people as the case admitted of, together with a sincere wish that both nations might live in amity with each other, his mind must he in a state of irritation at his own defeat. I say it is not possible to pick out from the whole world a man — considering equal competency in other respects—who would be so entirely unfitted to have the conduct of these further negotiations or operations, whatever they may be, as Mr. Bruce, who since these transactions has been continued as our Minister in China. If Gentlemen will read his despatches they will see that he never was fit for the office, because they will find that he commenced his negotiations in a spirit of what I must call most unfair suspicion and distrust. Almost every expression that he uses is one which shows ' how much he was disposed to affront rather than to consult the feelings of those with whom he was about to negotiate, and, in fact, he appears to make a positive claim to the confidence of his employers, the Government at home, because he wishes to do things precisely in that manner most calculated to mortify and humiliate the dignitaries of the Chinese empire. Well, if he was not fit for his office then, can he be fit for it now? If he be so great a man that Kwelliang, the Prime Minister over 300,000,000 of people, was not sufficiently great a man to meet him then, if you trust your future negotiations to him, I should not have the smallest expectation of their coming to a successful result; and I think the estimate of expense which the hon. Member for Portsmouth has laid before the House probably falls short of the bill that will ultimately have to be paid by us. But now the noble Lord, doing tardily that which some months ago ought to have been done, proposes to send Lord Elgin out again, with the hope that he may terminate this unhappy state of affairs. I am not able to say whether Lord Elgin is the most suitable man for the purpose; but from his experience and knowledge of Chinese affairs he would appear to be so. If he can clear his mind of all feeling, exasperation, or anything akin to that which Mr. Bruce has felt, then I do not know why he may not be as good a man for the purpose as any other man. Possibly, the failure of his brother may have this beneficial effect upon him, that he may be anxious by his own conciliatory conduct to close this dismal chapter, and he may be anxious by his own conduct of affairs to veil the misfortune of his relative, and therefore he may prove, in the end, the most suitable man to send out to China. I find no fault with the selection of that noble Lord, for I presume there can hardly be a greater difficulty for a Minister than to select a suitable person to fill a most responsible and difficult position on the other side of the globe. I think the noble Lord should begin his instructions—which instructions, by the by, we are not allowed to know anything about—by not insisting upon that part of the treaty which requires that an English Minister should reside at Pekin. I confess, as I said before, I can see no advantage that could be gained to the trade or policy of this country by our Minister residing at Pekin; but if we are more powerful, and can send fleets and armies without stint to break up a great nation that has existed for centuries before we were heard of—if we can do all this, it is not necessary to use all this vast power in so ungenerous a manner as to annoy and insult the supreme governor of 300 or 400 millions of people. If the noble Lord at the head of the Government should speak to-night, or on any future occasion, I hope he will tell us what is the good to be expected from establishing Mr. Bruce, or Mr. Bruce's successor, at Pekin. If he can show that the good is something greatly overbalancing the evil, then we can consider it; but it seems to me to be—to use a rather favourite expression of the day — going to war for "an idea," and that idea about as stupid a one as ever entered into the head of any statesman. Now, on one point the hon. Member for Portsmouth has referred to I should like to make a few observations. The course being taken before going into this new war,—or this now crime, I do not know any other word for it—is one of an alliance with another nation. I am not one of those who are always expressing distrust of the Emperor of the French; I speak with respect on all occasions of the Emperor of the French, the Emperor of Austria, and all the Powers that rule in all countries, as much as any person with whom I am acquainted. But this may be the case—the objects of another Government may be different from the objects of this Government. The noble Lord has told us there is no convention with France as to this transaction; no specific agreement between the two countries as to what they are going to war for, what are to be the terms of peace, how the cost is to be defrayed, or if either Power intends to retain any territory in China. All these points were arranged before the Russian war; but they have not been arranged before the Chinese war; and we may be dragged into complications in China that will cause immeasurable evil there, and lead afterwards to serious complications and unpleasantness nearer home. I think the Chancellor of the Exchequer cannot feel very happy if he heard the speech of the hon. Member for Portsmouth, and his estimate of the probable expenses of this war. As to expense, it appears to me that the country and Parliament have become absolutely drunk on the question. The "words of truth and soberness," such as I endeavour to speak on this subject, are treated as if I were talking of the affairs of the people of another planet, which we have nothing on earth to do with. Here is a great toiling nation of 30,000,000 of inhabitants, increasing every census, with its exports doubling every few years, its population enjoying itself more and more; this is the vast reservoir from which Parliament and the Chancellor of the Exchequer think they can draw inexhaustible streams of wealth, to pay the cost of a policy so idiotic as this we are pursuing in China. I believe the hon. Member for Portsmouth is right in all his calculations and estimates of the cost of the expedition. The calculations we have heard from the Treasury Bench are the mere fringes of that immense mass of cost that must come down on us, if we live to another year. Hon. Gentlemen opposite charge me with having some special affection for the present tenants of that bench. I have always felt a great interest in everybody who has been powerful on that bench since I have had a seat in this House, when I thought they pursued a course in harmony with the true interests of the country and the opinions I have formed of what is necessary for those true interests. I do not blame the Government for any considerable wrong they have done, because they came into this transaction as a legacy of misfortune from their predecessors. But when I approach this Chinese question I confess I think the Government stands on grounds so slippery that I should not be in the least surprised if in the next Session of Parliament—should they be living as a Government, as I hope they may—they find themselves ingulfed by this very Chinese question, which has once before caused political changes in this House. When that discussion took place three years ago I was spending some weeks in the city of Rome. I there received a letter from the hon. Member for Rochdale, written immediately after that division; speaking of the Chancellor of the Exchequer's speech, I recollect well that he said it was "a marvel of persuasive eloquence." That is true; I have heard the statement confirmed by others who listened to that speech. But the right hon. Gentleman on that occasion was speaking on behalf of great principles of justice, and telling the House that what is called the prestige of England is valueless to the nation if it is not based on an equitable policy to other nations. I am not charging the Government with having been inequitable, nor blaming them for transactions of which they are not guilty. I am only warning them against two things—first, against forming a partnership with another Power in transactions which, in connection with another Power, they cannot control; next, against making demands on the Government of China based only on the disaster caused by the folly of their own Minister, and which they have no right, in the sight of God or man, to make. Looking hack on our transactions with China during the last few years, I believe nothing more vicious can be found in our history; no page of our annals is more full of humiliation, because full of crime, than that on which is recorded our transactions with China; and, because I feel this—because I wish the Government to live and prosper—because I wish this House to stand in honour before the country—because I wish the country to hold a position of repute at morality before the world, therefore it is warn the Government and this House against proceeding with a policy which no man here can say in his conscience is not a policy conducted in defiance of the laws of Heaven, and those principles of justice without which human society itself cannot be held together.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

Sir, the hon. Member for Portsmouth appears to have misconceived what fell from the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), from the emphatic manner in which he has warned the Government against giving instructions for our forces to advance to Pekin. The hon. Member's speech is, however, inconsistent in its main principles. The hon. Member's policy consists of an advance on Nankin, which he admits is at this time in the hands of the rebels, or left an utter desert and waste; and he endeavoured to show that we ought to advance upon that city, not for the purpose of putting a temporary pressure on the Chinese Government, but with a view of permanently retaining it. Now, Nankin is either a waste or in the hands of a body of the Chinese people, with whom we are not at war. Our object has been to localize the war as much as possible—to show that we are engaged in hostilities with the Government only, and wish the people to suffer as little as possible. The hon. Member says Nankin ought to be permanently annexed. [Sir J. ELPHINSTONE: Occupied.] Well, "annex" and "occupy" are nearly convertible terms. But I am certain Her Majesty's Government will not be disposed to adopt his advice. Nothing could be more disastrous than saddling ourselves with a tract of country which must involve us in hostilities, and could be but of little use. Then the hon. Gentleman quarrelled with the moderation of the terms of the Government. He blames it for having only required the ratification of the treaty as it stood, and that it has not demanded any indemnity for the war, though he had before said the country is so impoverished it would be impossible to get any. I think the hon. Member's warning that the English and French troops should not march too far into the interior is superfluous. If there are any two armies in the world that do not require a warning against advancing on Nankin, up a river frozen in winter, through an immense population, relatively to which any army must be small, they are the armies of France and England. The English army has the recollections of Cabul, and we should not be willing to incur any similar disaster. The French army, too, has advanced on foreign capitals, from which it barely returned, and could cite its own experience against the attempt. The hon. Member has referred to the difficulties in some of the Chinese towns caused by the Coolie emigration; a very valuable officer, Mr. Austen, has directed his special attention to this subject; and I hope other European nations are accommodating themselves to our mode of conducting the traffic, and that complications with the Chinese from this cause will be prevented. Now let me come to the speech of the hon. Member for Birmingham. He said, with great truth, that this is not a question which the two sides of the House need discuss with asperity; for both have been engaged in the transactions that led to the mishap of the Peiho. The instructions were originally given by Lord Clarendon, and adopted by Lord Malmesbury. Mr. Bruce was, I believe, appointed by Lord Malmesbury. There can, there-fore, be no party recriminations as to the misfortunes that have occurred. But he also says the treaty bargained for things I not necessary. I have no wish to say a single word in defence of the treaty of Tien-tsin. I have an opinion of my own on Chinese matters. Looking back on all the history of our transactions with China, I think we have there been "in a wrong groove," and it is very difficult to get out of it. But I hope the statesmanship of the noble Earl who is about to go to China may obtain for us a better footing there. It may be true that the treaty imposes upon the Chinese conditions which they did not anticipate, and conferred upon us certain advantages. But, at the same time, two Governments represented on both sides of the House have adopted the treaty, so that it constitutes, as it were, a point of departure. Now, it is possible that there is no necessity that there should be an English Minister resident at Pekin. Lord Elgin appeared to be of that opinion; for, although he stipulated for the right of being able to go to head-quarters in case any difficulty should arise, he at the same time assured the Chinese Government that, except on those occasions upon which some misconduct on the part of its officials gave cause for complaint, the English Minister would not insist upon going to Pekin and residing there. Indeed, he rather held the occurrence of such an event in terrorem over them, in case the Chinese Government should act with injustice towards British subjects. But be that as it may, the Treaty at Tien-tsin is now a fait accompli, and has been accepted by both sides of the House, and its ratification must therefore be insisted on. We have not, even subsequent to the attack at the mouth of the Peiho, attached any onerous conditions to that ratification. All, indeed, that we have demanded is that the ratification should take place. It must be borne in mind that the question is one which was beset with great difficulties. The affair of the Peiho took place on the 25th of June. When the news with respect to it reached us, we had to decide upon the conduct of our officers in a remote part of the world. It is also but just to Mr. Bruce to state that his was a very difficult position; he was perplexed by the vacillation of the Chinese plenipotentiaries at Shanghai; he had to contend during the whole summer with the duplicity of their diplomacy. I do not reproach the Chinese functionaries on this account, because I am not quite sure that duplicity quite as glaring did not characterize the diplomacy of European nations boasting the highest civilization, within a period stretching not quite so far back as the end of the last century, nor am I sure it is quite free from it even now. At all events, Mr. Bruce saw that the object of the Chinese was to frustrate by delay the object which he had in view. He accordingly proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, and he found on his arrival there the entrance barricaded. I may here observe that I think the hon. Member for Birmingham is slightly in error in the expressions on this point to which he gave utterancce, for it does not follow that an ambuscade is not resorted to with a treacherous design because it does not succeed. There is, at all events, no doubt that our officers went up to the barricade in perfect good faith. When they reached it they found no flags flying, and no men of rank came down to receive them. The issue was, as we are all aware, that a battery opened on them and that great slaughter took place. Now, that being so, it is quite clear that, whatever may have been the wisdom of our policy towards China in former years, we have now but one course to pursue with respect to that country. We may hope to obtain the ratification of the Treaty of Tien-tsin without bloodshed, but it is, I contend, absurd to approach the Chinese with that object without making some demonstration of force to show that we are capable of carrying our wishes into effect. It is very easy, I cannot help saying, to be wise after the event, and to criticise the conduct of men with the view of showing that they have displayed a great want of judgment. But that is not exactly a fair way of looking at the matter, and, when we are told that the Americans negotiated successfully with the Chinese, it must be borne in mind that they merely asked to be allowed to come within the scope of the most favoured nation clause, and that their privileges in the matter were greatly facilitated by the negotiations of Lord Elgin and the presence of an English fleet. The truth is that the Chinese look upon all "whites," whether Europeans or Americans, as members almost of the same nation, and what they had granted to one nation they would never think of refusing to another. With regard to those persons who have censured the proceedings in China, I will remind them that it is easy to be wise after the event, and to criticise the conduct of men acting at a great distance from home and surrounded by difficulties; but let me suppose that Admiral Hope had succeeded in silencing the fire of the Chinese batteries, and had accomplished his purpose, nothing would then, I imagine, be said in derogation of the judgment displayed by Mr. Bruce. But, passing from that point, I have the strongest expectation that Lord Elgin on his arrival in China will be able to place this question on a better footing. He possesses, in my opinion, many of the qualities which are necessary to effect that object. He has great local experience. He it is who made the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and he must be in a peculiar manner desirous that peace should be established on a durable and permanent basis. You cannot, moreover, read the blue-books connected with this subject without perceiving that he is inclined to the opinion that we are asking too much from the Chinese. Through the whole of his correspondence, indeed, there is breathed on his part a spirit of conciliation which animates me with the utmost hope that we shall be able, with his assistance and the great demonstration of force which we are about to make—for we could not carry our views into effect without such a demonstration—to place our relations with the Chinese empire upon a satisfactory footing. I shall now say no more on the subject, but when the House goes into Committee I shall be prepared to explain the circumstances and amount of the Vote which we are about to ask you to grant this evening.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

Sir, I quite concur with the right hon. Gentleman that the discussion on this important subject is one which need not assume a party character. The late Government, I am aware, appointed Mr. Bruce, and we should be very much to blame if we endeavoured to escape from any responsibility which attaches to us in this matter. But, while I agree with the right hon. Gentleman to this extent, I am sorry to be obliged to add that he has not in the course of his observations relieved me from that disappointment with which I heard the statement of the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs. In making that state- ment I think the noble Lord has hardly acted up to the promise which he made on a former occasion, when I understood him to say that at no distant date — as soon as the despatches which he then expected should have been received—he would make a full explanation to the House as to the policy of the Government with respect to the position of affairs in China. We are still loft in ignorance upon that point. The subject is one in reference to which I am sure the Government cannot complain that they have been subjected to undue pressure from this side of the House. The contrary, indeed, has been the case; for owing to the great interest which we have felt in the discussions on the Budget, on matters of foreign policy, and the approaching debate on the Reform Bill, the attention of Parliament has been to a great extent diverted from the consideration of this most important question. This matter involves considerations of the first import-once. It involves what are hereafter to be our relations with that great and peculiar people, the Chinese; it involves an immense amount of trade with that quarter of the world,—I am sorry to say, at this moment it involves the question whether or not we are to embark in a most costly and difficult war; and, lastly, it involves the question of what is the becoming conduct for the Government of ibis country to take after that most disastrous reverse Her Majesty's arms sustained at the mouth of the Peiho. I think, too, that that most unfortunate event involves the question in such extreme difficulty as to entitle the Government to the support and assistance of the House. Approaching this difficult and embarrassing question in this spirit, I quite admit that, after that unhappy affair at the mouth of the Peiho, it is the undoubted duty of our Government to see that our power and prestige in the East are not diminished. On that account I am not disposed to find any fault with the Government for having sent out a powerful armament to support any demand they may think proper to make on the Emperor of China. I think it was their duty to do so. They have acted wisely to that extent. But the hon. Gentleman the Member for Birmingham—in a great part of whose speech I entirely concur—alluded to the speech delivered two years ago by the present Chancellor of the Exchequer, a speech which the hon. Member for Birmingham did not himself hear, from a cause which now happily exists no longer, but which was described to him by the hon. Member for Rochdale in terms he quoted to the House, and to the justice of which I entirely subscribe. I am sure the right hon. Gentleman will not suspect me of any intention or spirit of flattery when I say that I think that speech was the finest and most impressive I ever heard in this House. I only hope the right hon. Gentleman has not forgotten the sentiments he then expressed. The noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, also addressed us on that occasion. He was not then, as now, sitting side by side with the noble Viscount. He then stood in very different relations to the noble Lord from those in which he is now placed; and I believe neither the House nor the noble Lord can have forgotten the emphasis with which he, in a spirit of equity and wisdom, in which I heartily concurred, bade this House be just and fear not. That was the maxim the noble Lord laid down; and in the present difficult and anxious state of our relations with China I earnestly hope that the noble Lord will now act on that principle,—be just and fear not. The noble Lord told us tonight that he would not raise any question as to the conduct of Mr. Bruce; and I have no desire to force any discussion on that conduct more than is unavoidable. But I must say that the extent to which the noble Lord to-night abstained from giving us any view of the intended policy of the Government does force us, in my opinion, to enter in some degree on the conduct of Mr. Bruce, because that conduct lies at the very root of the policy which the Government are to adopt. Well, I have stated that I think the Government are right in making a demonstration of force in China; but the noble Lord—and that is one of the respects in which he has told us the policy of the Government—the noble Lord made an announcement to-night, in confirmation of what he told us on a former occasion, to which the hon. Member for Birmingham did not allude,—that one of the demands which the Government do intend to make of the Government of China is an apology for the transactions that took place at the mouth of the Peiho. The hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir J. Elphinstone) adverted to that demand of the Government, and in terms of approbation. I know not how far the views I entertain on this subject will find favour in the general opinion of the House, but this is a matter of so much importance, involving consequences of such moment to this country, that I cannot stop to ask whether my views may find favour in this House, or to what extent they may be shared; but I feel it my duty to state those views, and I wish to put it to the House and the Government whether, looking to the unfortunate origin of that transaction at the mouth of the Peiho, looking to the whole conduct of Mr. Bruce in this matter, we are entitled to demand an apology from the Chinese or not. If this is to be your policy—if you are to demand an apology from the Government of China, that decision involves of necessity two questions—first, do the facts as they occurred, acting in that spirit of justice to which I have adverted, justify the demand for an apology? And the second question which of necessity arises is this— if that apology should be refused, what is the alternative? Let me advert for a moment to a question on which the noble Lord has not touched to-night; nor, indeed, has the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) referred to it, but I have heard it adverted to before—namely, that the instructions of Lord Malmesbury to Mr. Bruce under the late Government were such as to justify the course pursued by Mr. Bruce. Now, I entirely dispute that proposition. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: I did not say so.] I did not impute it to the noble Lord; on the contray, I said he did not say so; but the statement has been made by others, and I cannot help adverting to it. Now, I can see nothing in the instructions of Lord Malmesbury that called on Mr. Bruce to make that attack off Peiho. With the permission of the House I will read the very few words of Lord Malmesbury'a despatch which really bear on this question. [Mr. BRIGHT: What is the date of the despatch?] I quote the first despatch in the printed papers, dated March 1, 1859. The only instructions to Mr. Bruce, which appear to bear on this point, are contained in these words: — The Admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war. I know no other expressions from which it is possible to say that Lord Malmesbury had instructed Mr. Bruce to force his way up the Peiho; and that is the question upon which the matter will ultimately turn. I will not at this late hour detain the House by entering into these despatches more than is necessary to establish this point; but I desire to show that Mr. Bruce was not justified in ordering the attack in the Peiho, therefore I will at once direct the attention of the House to the despatch Mr. Bruce received from the Chinese Commissioners Kweiliang and Hwashana. I think that Mr. Bruce acted with discretion in refusing to negotiate at Shanghai. It is quite clear that, for reasons of their, own they wished to detain him at Shanghai and there reopen negotiations; but Mr. Bruce, I repeat, acted with judgment in refusing to remain at Shanghai to negotiate. But when the Chinese Commissioners found that Mr. Bruce was determined to proceed on his mission to Pekin, and would not re-open the negotiations, that very important despatch was written on the 12th of June by them, on which mainly, if not solely, turns the question as to the propriety of Mr. Bruce's attack on the Peiho forts. That despatch says: — The Commissioners feeling that it would not be correct that the day appointed for that purpose [to exchange the ratifications of the treaty], which was near at hand, should be passed, after due deliberation decided that the only course open to them was to represent the matter fully to his Majesty the Emperor, and to request him to be pleased specially to select some high officer who might proceed to Tien-tsin to make arrangements for Mr. Bruce's reception. Their memorial was sent forward at the rate of 200 miles a day, and would arrive at the latest in some eight or nine days at Pekin, so that it might be assumed that when Mr. Bruce and the Ministers of France and America reached Tien-tsin the Imperial Commissioners could not fail to have arrived as well, and so the exchange of treaties in Pekin would be effected by the time fixed for the purpose.…. It behaves them, therefore, in obedience to His Majesty's commands, to return post haste to the capital. As they have prayed His Majesty to detach a high officer to act as agent in the matter, Mr. Bruce will be certainly enabled to arrive at his destination by the time appointed. With the peaceful relations now established between the two nations, nothing certainly will be done that is not in conformity with the provisions of the treaty, and the Commissioners accordingly pray Mr. Bruce at once to put away all misgiving on that subject. … His mission being a pacific one (or as he comes speaking peace) his treatment by the Government of China will not fail to be in every way courteous; and it is the sincere wish of the Commissioners that relations of friendship may be from this time forth consolidated, and that on each side confidence may be felt in the good faith and justice of the other. Now, I wish to ask the Government what diplomatists in any country could have held language more perfectly fair—more perfectly consistent with the bonâ fide intention to execute the treaty at Tien-tsin than that which I have read? Could Mr. Bruce take the slightest exception to that language? On the contrary, was not Mr. Bruce bound, after receiving this letter from the Commissioners, at any rate to have waited the course of events the Commissioners had indicated in that despatch? I cannot see that he had the least pretence for doubting the proposal they made. But what did Mr. Bruce do on the receipt of this despatch? The despatch was dated the 12th of June. Eight or nine days were necessary, on their own showing, to communicate with Pekin. Mr. Bruce then proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho, and, without waiting to see whether or not these Commissioners were acting in good faith, he gave directions to Admiral Hope to break through the barriers and force the passage of the Peiho. What is the language of Mr. Bruce on this subject? In the despatch in which he describes the failure of the attack on the Peiho, he writes thus to Lord Malmesbury:— After a long and anxious consultation M. de Bourboulon and I decided that we ought to adhere strictly to the course laid down in our letters to Kweiliang at Shanghai, and that we should insist, as much for the sake of our future communications with Pekin as for the successful accomplishment of the mission now confided to us, on the right of using the river as the natural highway to the capital. And a little further on he adds:— I do not think that in any case we ought to have allowed our right to choose the only expeditious and commodious route to the capital to be questioned. I speak with diffidence on this point in the presence of those conversant with such questions when I say I believe that Mr. Bruce is not supported by the law of nations in laying down the proposition that they had the right to choose the route by which they should proceed to the Chinese capital. But, however that may be, I hold that he was wrong in not waiting longer to see how far the promises made by the Chinese Commissioners at Shanghai would be fulfilled. In the same despatch Mr. Bruce speaks of the difficult task that lay before him in carrying the treaties into full operation, and ensuring a reception at Pekin "on terms to the last degree mortifying to Chinese arrogance." I am sorry to find those expressions in Mr. Bruce's despatches. I have no desire to comment with unnecessary harshness on that gentleman's conduct; but the papers show that he has been impressed throughout these transactions with the idea that the Chinese authorities ought to be approached in a very different spirit from that wise caution and moderation which, in my opinion, would have best enabled him to perform the difficult duty assigned to him. Well, what happened immediately afterwards? Not waiting for the answer to the message sent to Pekin, Mr. Bruce directed the unfortunate attack on the 25th of June to be made on the forts of the Peiho. At 9 o'clock on that morning a junk came alongside Her Majesty's ship Magicienne, the vessel in which Mr. Bruce was stationed, and which was anchored about nine miles from the forts, bringing an offer from the Governor General of Pechelee to welcome the British Envoy at Peh-tang-ho, whence he might proceed to Pekin by land. The Secretary of State for War has told us we are apt to be very wise after the event. I admit that we are arguing this' question with that advantage; but surely we must not allow that consideration to deter us from endeavouring to place ourselves, as nearly as we can, in the position in which our Minister stood at the time, and then passing a fair judgment on his conduct. Why, I ask, was the Magicienne at a distance of nine miles from the scene of action? That was not the case with the American Minister. He was on the spot at the critical moment, although far less interested in what was going on than our representative. When the communication reached Mr. Bruce inviting him to Peh-tang-ho, in my opinion he ought, if possible, to have countermanded his orders for the attack. For what was the invitation he received? Here is the translation of the Chinese communication:— Hang, Governor General of Chili, Ac, makes a communication. In obedience to the commands of His Imperial Majesty, the Governor General has come to Peh-tang-ho, a port (or harbour) to the northward of Ta-koo, to be of any service (or to do the honours to) Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy. As the negotiators of the treaty made last year, His Majesty the Emperor has issued a decree commanding the Chief Secretary of State, Kweiliang, and the President of the Board of Civil Office, Hwashana, to return from Shanghai to Pekin and they may arrive any day. If the Envoy of Her Britannic Majesty will have the goodness to wait until the Chief Secretary Kweiliang and his colleagues reach the capital, they will thereupon receive him at once, and he will enter the capital to exchange the treaties (or will exchange the treaties in the capital). I appeal to the House whether this invitation, made directly from the Governor General of the province on the morning of the 25th of June, although it may not have boon the direct result of the previous communications from Shanghai, does not exactly correspond with it in spirit? Was it not a carrying out, as far as the Chinese authorities could do so, of their avowed intention to receive our Minister with all proper honour, and expedite his mission to Pekin? I must express my strong opinion that after what passed at Shanghai—after the despatch of the 12th of June, Mr. Bruce was not warranted in ordering the attack of the 25th. Still less, after the invitation sent to him on the morning of the 25th, was the unhappy attack on the forts to be justified. And if it was not justified, are we entitled to demand an apology? The Chinese only did what they had a perfect right to do in barring the entrance of the river. I admit that their conduct at the mouth of the Peiho was not ingenuous or straightforward. [Lord J. RUSSELL: Hear, hear.] The noble Lord cheers, but he is not able to tell me who was responsible for the deception practised on that occasion. The Chinese pretended that there were only militia there; and when Admiral Hope sent in to make certain demands he was met by people who said that the barrier was placed there only to exclude rebels. Nobody, surely, will contend, considering the character of the nation with whom we have to deal, and after the communications received from high officials and persons in authority, that because of these doubtful proceedings at the mouth of the Peiho, the responsibility for which cannot be traced to any one, we are justified in using force to choose our route to the Chinese capital. For, remember, there was no dispute as to our Minister going to Pekin to exchange the ratifications. The Chinese Commissioners at Shanghai fully conceded that point. The only question was as to the route to be taken; and under those circumstances it cannot be maintained that we were warranted in attempting to break through the barriers, and in declaring that we would go by the Peiho, and in no other way. But supposing we demand an apology, and it is refused, what is to be the alternative? Are Her Majesty's Government going to embark the country in a protracted and sanguinary war with China on so doubtful a plea? I hope not. I think the Government are right in requiring that the treaty shall be ratified, and in making a powerful demonstration to support that demand. But I take exception to their intention to insist on an apology, unless they are prepared—which I hope they are not—to make the refusal of that apology a cause of war. At the same time, if they are not so prepared, it would be most unwise to demand the apology at all. The noble Lord alluded to a very doubtful point—namely, how far the Ambassadors have power over the commanders of the naval and military forces, and the extent to which they could direct the operations. What does the noble Lord mean by "the Ambassadors stopping those operations?" Have instructions gone out to commence hostilities before the arrival of the Ambassadors? That is a point on which the House ought to be informed. I believe by the time the two Ambassadors reach China the season will be very far advanced for military enterprises. With regard to the appointment of Lord Elgin, I am happy to say I make no exception or objection. I believe that, looking to the great knowledge which that noble Lord must have acquired of the habits and usages of the Chinese, the Government could not have made a better selection of their negotiator; I but I confess I am anxious to learn on, what footing Mr. Bruce is to remain. Is he to continue in a diplomatic position, or will Lord Elgin supersede him? Are both of them to receive salaries from the country as Ambassadors to China? In conclusion, I may express a hope that the noble Lord at the head of the Government; will be able to give us some more satisfactory information with regard to the future policy of the country than has yet been afforded by the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs or the right hon. Gentleman who has last addressed us.

MR. G. W. HOPE

said, that no one was more ready than himself to assent to the doctrine of the hon. Member for Birmingham, when speaking of Admiral Hope, that personal gallantry was no excuse for alleged misdirected operations; and he ventured to think that Admiral Hope himself would willingly subscribe to that doctrine. The real question was, whether the hon. Member for Birmingham was justified in asserting that these operations at the Peiho were undertaken without a reasonable prospect of success. He did not allege that there was any cause to suspect an ambuscade, and he had not seen any statement in Admiral Hope's despatches to that effect. He would put the case on broader and more general grounds, and maintain that if we looked to the whole history of our wars in China there was nothing in this case to justify Admiral Hope in refusing to obey the instructions he had received. There was no ground for asserting that the Admiral made no reconnaissance, the fact was that he took all the means in his power to obtain information; and admitting the truth of everything that had been stated, that the forts were in a state of sufficient preparation, better than Chinese forts usually were; that foreign auxiliaries were present, and that Russian caps and Russian faces were seen behind the entrenchments, was there in these circumstances sufficient reason for him to decline the contest? He would put it to any professional man, or even unprofessional man, present whether he would not have been held to have disgraced himself had he done so? But there was also another point of view from which it was fair to look at the question. It has been said that the operations in China had been wholly unsuccessful; but was it true that they were so in every part? Until the hon. Member for Birmingham made his observations to-night, the opinions expressed in the House had been so generally favourable to Admiral Hope that he had not prepared himself with references to despatches; but this, he remembered, that the statement by Admiral Hope was distinct — and, indeed, it was admitted by the Chinese themselves, though, of course, with some attempted explanation—that the firing from his guns silenced those of the forts. Now, if the Admiral was able to conduct the operations so far successfully, was it possible to say that he was not justified in undertaking them? He now came to the disastrous part of the affair—the landing. He knew that Admiral Hope took upon himself the responsibility of that part of the operations; but, he asked, was he morally responsible for it? He stood by his men, and fought his best—when he was completely disabled the command fell into other hands, and though with the feelings of a gentleman he took on himself the responsibility of the whole operations, it was too much to say that because that part that was not conducted by him personally had proved unsuccessful he was responsible for all the disaster. He did not wish further to enter into the question except to protest, with the hon. Member for Birmingham, against the further waste of gallant lives in such operations. He was not one of those who looked for the millennium of peace, when wars were to cease, but he remembered hearing an opinion expressed by Sir Robert Peel, in which he agreed, that no war undertaken for mere pecuniary or commercial purposes was ever worth the cost of blood and treasure expended. He did not object to war when honour, interest, safety, or justice, demanded it, but he did object to wars such as these Chinese wars, in which success brought no honour, and failure could only be atoned for by devoted personal heroism.

MR. CUMMING BRUCE

said, he could not refrain from asking the permission of the House to read an extract from a letter of the representative of Her Majesty in China with regard to the conduct of that gallant admiral, on whom the hon. Member for Birmingham, having wasted all his eulogy and admiration on the Emperor of the French, had thought fit to pour the vials of his indignation. The British Minister wrote of the gallant officer, with whom he was acting, Our Admiral is a hero of the antique stamp; such coolness, pluck, and devotion to his duty; he is a great character, say of him what we will. If he underrated his foe, I should like to know who did not; and, as he had never fought with Chinese, he could only form his opinion from what other people had told him. People in England talk as if he went in for attack; but that is not so. We went in to ascend the river, the only high road, and that up which Lord Macartney had gone. No Chinese authorities had told us we were not to take that route; the forts, they declared, were not put up with any intention against us; and no soldiers or banners had been seen there the week before. The gun-boats lay inside the bar, and we had no reason to doubt that, if they advanced boldly and peaceably, to carry out the instructions we had received, they might ascend the river without any such opposition being offered. These were the remarks of our Minister in China. He also held in his hand a letter from a gallant French officer who served out there, and who said that there was nothing to criticise in the conduct of Admiral Hope; but that great praise was due to him for having covered with high honour the most disastrous check which had ever been undergone in China; The French officer went on to remark that, properly speaking, there was no attack made, but that the object sought was only to open the passage; and that, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge of the moral value of the Chinese resistance, it might well have been presumed that intimidation alone would have sufficed to remove it. With regard to the landing, the same French writer thought that, even if this had been done by Admiral Hope's authority, it was a step which he might have been justified in taking. Our Minister, Mr. Bruce, had been blamed by the hon. Member for Birmingham, inasmuch as he received a message from the Governor General of the province at nine o'clock in the morning, and yet the attack went on; that he took no notice of it, and did not suspend operations against the Chinese. But the facts were these. The booms were blown up on the night of the 24th. On the 25th two junks arrived, with provisions, and a letter from the Governor General of the province. There was some informality in the letter, and Mr. Bruce immediately went on board the French Minister's ship to communicate with him. While he was there, consulting with his French colleague, the firing began. The filing continued till night. It was supposed that he might have stopped the firing; but the fact was, that the Magicienne was anchored outside the bar, ten miles from shore. No news came during the day; the Ambassadors were most anxious, but the state of the tide rendered it impossible to communicate with the Admiral. In fact, all the boats of the Magicienne were employed inside the bar, with the gun-boats; and they had no other boat capable of facing such weather. One member of the Embassy, with the master of the Magicienne, did, in fact, endeavour, in the ship's gig, to communicate with the shore, but found it was utterly impossible, and was obliged to return, re infectâ. The conduct of the Minister, in not communicating with the Admiral, was not, therefore, so unjustifiable and inhuman as some hon. Gentlemen declared. Another thing which Mr. Bruce had been unduly condemned for was, not having adopted the course which the American Minister did, in proceeding by another way to Pekin. It was very easy to criticise after the event. But, on his return from the capital, the American Minister called upon our Ambassador on his way down, and authorized him to state officially that, after his experience at Pekin, he (the American Minister) was perfectly persuaded that Mr. Bruce had followed the only course which could have led to any satisfactory result. Mr. Bruce had been much blamed for simply acting upon his instructions, which were to obtain the ratification of this treaty at Pekin, and at Pekin only; he was not entitled to receive if at Shanghai, but he was to insist on all the tokens of respect due to the Minister of a great and equal power. If he had consented to go to Pekin by any other road than that only known and recognized highway by which Lord Macartney and Lord Amherst had gone before him, this would have been, in the eyes of the Chinese, a confession of inferiority and a submission to insult. If he had done so, he would have violated his instructions, and thrown away all the advantages gained by the Treaty of Tien-tsin. He (Mr. C. Bruce) regretted this evasion, on the part of the Chinese, of their treaty engagements, but he did not yet think what had happened would necessarily lead to a renewal of the war, if the negotiation was conducted in a proper spirit. He hoped a renewal of the war would be avoided, because it would be a war in which our success would itself be a calamity for our own interests, inasmuch as it would lower the prestige of the Chinese Government, the only means of preserving order amongst two or three hundred millions of people; and if it brought about a state of anarchy in China, that would be cutting up our commerce by the roots. But he thought the effect of this defeat— as he was afraid it must be called—at the mouth of the Pehio had been much exaggerated; and that the Chinese Government, perhaps, "frightened at the sound themselves had made," would submit to the terms which our Ambassador would offer; and that nothing would occur to prevent the peaceful ratification of the treaty. A great deal had been said about the worthlessness of the stipulations of this treaty that we should have a Minister resident at Pekin; but he was at a loss to reconcile the description which had been given by the hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth (Sir James Elphinstone) with the miserable and unsatisfactory state of our former relations with China. It must be remembered, however, that three Governments in succession had recognized the necessity of having a British Minister at Pekin. He must also remind the hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. B. Cochrane) that Lord Elgin was expressely precluded by his instructions from making a treaty which did not confer a right to enter Pekin. It must also be remembered that the people of China were not averse to our expedition; the gallant Admiral admitted that the peasants themselves came down to assist him in getting the gun-boats up the river. What we had really to overthrow was the authority of the mandarins. Mr. Bruce had been blamed for going to China with a preconceived notion that everybody was against him. But Mr. Bruce thought that the war party had recovered its influence in China, and that he could obtain the treaty only at the place where he was authorized to do so, namely, at Pekin. But what would have been said if Mr. Bruce, from the fear that his entrance would be opposed, had turned tail towards the coast? Would he not in that case have deserved the censure which had been thrown upon him? In his opinion Mr. Bruce had been most unfairly and unjustifiably attacked, and he trusted the House would excuse him for having felt it his duty to state the subject to the House in the way in which he had.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

I entirely agree with the right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir J. Pakington), that when you are judging the conduct of a man, you ought to imagine yourself to be in the situation in which he was placed when he performed the act upon which you are passing judgment, and I think that that is the way in which the conduct of Mr. Bruce ought to be considered. What were Mr. Bruce's instructions? He was instructed to exchange the ratifications of the Treaty of Tien-tsin; he was told that those ratifications were, in accordance with an Article of the treaty, to be exchanged at Pekin; he was therefore ordered to go to Pekin, and he was told to go by the Peiho. He was told that from the mouth of the Peiho he was to go up the river in a ship of war as far as Tien-tsin, and he was informed that the Admiral was to accompany him with a sufficient force. Now, what is the meaning of "a sufficient force?" The only interpretation which anybody in Mr. Bruce's place could place upon the expression "a sufficient force," must have been a force sufficient to enable him to go from the mouth of the Peiho to Tien-tsin in a ship of war, and thence to proceed by land to Pekin and exchange the ratifications. But it is said that there was a qualifying clause—namely, that he was to pursue that course unless unforeseen circumstances should lead him to adopt a more advisable one. I think that Mr. Bruce was perfectly justified in thinking that there were no such circumstances to induce him to alter his course. The right hon. Baronet has quoted a letter from the Chinese Commissioners, which he stated was very fair and friendly, and indicated peaceable intentions; but what did that letter invite him to do? Why, to go to the mouth of the Peiho, for the purpose of going thence to Pekin to exchange the ratifications. He goes to the Peiho, and what does he find there? Does he find at the mouth of the Peiho an official communication saying, "The Government don't like you to go up this way; you must go in some other direction; your passage here will be obstructed by order of the Government?" Nothing of the kind. He finds an impediment. The right hon. Baronet says that every nation has a right to barricade its own rivers. Against an enemy no doubt it has; but you do not barricade your rivers against a friend who is coming to complete a transaction which is to establish peace and friendship and commercial intercourse between you and the nation which he represents. The Ambassadors inquire, "What does this barricade mean, what is the intention of it?" and the answer is, "It is not put up by the Government, it is simply a little arrangement of self-defence established by the people of the district to protect themselves"—against whom? Against the English and French Ministers? No: "against pirates." But the Ambassadors were not pirates, therefore they had no reason to suppose that these barricades were established to stop their progress. Was there any officer of the Chinese Government there saying, "Here I am, and I tell you that you can't go up this way," or" Have the goodness to go another way?" Not a bit of it. The Ambassadors were told that there was no one there but militia and peasantry; nor was there any one in an official capacity under the Chinese Government to offer any obstruction to their progress. Under these circumstances it really appears to me that Mr. Bruce and Admiral Hope were perfectly justified in taking steps to remove the impediment, to remove the obstacles, which did not bear any semblance whatever to an official refusal, and to do that which they came authorized and invited by the Chinese Commissioners to do. Did they begin the attack? No. They began removing the barrier; it was the Chinese who began the attack. It was not necessary for our forces to commence firing. All they wanted was quietly to remove the obstructions in the river, and to pursue the course which Mr. Bruce and M. de Bourboulon had been instructed to take, and had been invited by the Chinese Commissioners to pursue. But was the Peiho the wrong way? Why, the Peiho was so entirely admitted by the Chinese Government to be the pro- per road by which foreign Ministers should go to Pekin, that in the treaty they have concluded with Russia—a treaty which was concluded in May, a month or six weeks before these transactions—there is a stipulation that the Russian Minister, whenever he comes by sea, shall go to Pekin by the Peiho. That river was, therefore, acknowledged by the Chinese Government to be the proper way for diplomatic agents to come, and they knew, moreover, that by our treaty of Nankin we were entitled to the privileges enjoyed by the most favoured nations, including that granted to the Russian Minister of going to Pekin by the Peiho, the passage thus shut against us. I cannot, therefore, imagine any man placed in the situation of Mr. Bruce, knowing what had been the habitual practice, and with instructions to exchange the ratification of the treaty within a certain time—for, be it observed, the period assigned in the treaty for the exchange of the ratifications was upon the point of expiring—shrinking from the difficulties which he found to impede his course, and going away with the treaty unratified. If Mr. Bruce bad done so he would have been justly chargeable with a neglect of duty. It would have been said, "You were told to go up the Peiho in a ship of war; you were told that the Admiral would accompany you with a sufficient force; there was a sufficient force; why did you run away, and allow the honour of the country to be tarnished and its engagements set at brought when you had the means of discharging the mission entrusted to you?" But the right hon. Baronet says, that on the morning of the day on which the attack took place, at nine o'clock, Mr. Bruce received a letter from the Chinese authorities, inviting him to go to Pekin by another way. The right hon. Baronet read that letter very glibly, and if Mr. Bruce had received it as it appears in the blue-book he would have read it very glibly too; but, unfortunately, the letter was in Chinese, and took a considerable time to be translated and made intelligible. No less than two hours elapsed before the letter could be understood, and then Mr. Bruce had to communicate with the French Minister, who was in another vessel at some distance; and I am told that, owing to the stormy nature of the day, the force of the currents, and the very insufficient boat in which alone Mr. Bruce could go, all the other boats being with the squadron inside the bar, he was a long time in reaching the representative of France. By the time be had explained the state of affairs to the French Minister the firing had begun, and it was too late to make any change in his arrangements. But supposing the Chinese letter to have reached him in time, would it have been wise or proper in him to accept the invitation to go to Pekin by the road pointed out by the writer? We know what that road was. The American Minister did accept the invitation, and we know how he was carried through the country in a wooden box on two wheels, without light or air; how between Tien-tsin and Pekin he was obliged to get out and walk because the jolting was so intolerable, and it was impossible to submit any longer to the torture of remaining in his "carriage of honour;" and how when he at last arrived at Pekin he was kept a close prisoner, was not allowed to communicate with the resident Russian Minister, was not permitted to exchange ratifications at Pekin, but was sent back for that purpose to Tien-tsin. Would this country have been pleased to be told that its representative, who had been instructed not to submit in his passage up to Pekin to any degrading ceremony— because it must be remembered that Mr. Bruce was warned by Lord Malmesbury that what might be done on his first arrival would be made a precedent for all future occasions—had been dragged through the country in a covered cart, and so jolted by the way that, in order to avoid a dislocation of his joints, he had been compelled to walk a considerable part of the road? In China there are three modes of honour or of degradation. Those persons whom the Chinese desire to honour are carried in sedan chairs; those who are next in rank are allowed to ride; and none but the very lowest class of people are put in covered boxes and jolted over the rough roads of that country. I say, then, that if I had been in Mr. Bruce's situation and bad received the Chinese letter in time, nothing could have induced me to accept the invitation which it conveyed. No "unforeseen circumstance" could have justified me in undergoing the unforeseen degradation and personal inconvenience which I have attempted to describe. As to the conduct of the Admiral, enough has been already said upon that subject, but everybody must admit that there never was a greater display of heroism than in the attack at the mouth of the Peiho, not only on the part of the Admiral, but also on the part of ail under his command. The cir- cumstance that success did not attend their efforts does not detract in any degree from their distinguished bravery. I should hardly have risen to make the remarks which I have addressed to the House, but the right hon. Baronet wishes to know what is our policy with respect to China— a question which he is undoubtedly entitled to ask. There can be no doubt as to what our policy is; but, when the right hon. Baronet asks what are the instructions we have given as to the operations about to be commenced in China, I must respectfully beg leave to decline answering this question, because the House will see that to tell beforehand how your naval and military commanders or your diplomatic agents are to act in circumstances which have not yet arisen, would be to defeat the purpose which you have in view. But I am ready to say, at the same time, that our policy is as simple as I think it is just and reasonable. A treaty has been concluded with China. That treaty has been approved by the Emperor. We want the ratifications to be exchanged, we want the treaty to become a formal and acknowledged compact between the two nations. Some people think that it contains more concessions on the part of the Chinese Government than it was handsome on our part to ask. I am not of that opinion. The chief variations between the present treaty and the Treaty of Nankin are that we claim, and we obtain, a right of residence, when we choose to exercise it, at Pekin, and the right at all times of direct communication with the central Government of the empire—a right of the utmost importance, the want of which has been the cause of many of the difficulties and unpleasant events that have arisen between us and the Government of China. We have hitherto had communication only with the Viceroy at Canton, an official whose great duty it seems always to have been to put us off with excuses, to keep back our representations—as in the case of Yeh— from Pekin, and, in short to keep the barbarians off as far and as long as he could. The result has been an accumulation of complaints and grievances which have led at last to unpleasant and disagreeable con-sequences. There is nothing in what we ask new to the practice of China. Russia has had for some time a diplomatic agent resident in Pekin, and we therefore demand no more from the Emperor of China than he has already conceded to the Government of Russia. We have more commer- cial intercourse with China than Russia has, more subjects resident in that country, and therefore greater need for direct communication with the central Government of the empire. It may be, no doubt, a question of discretion whether we should exercise the right of having a permanent mission at Pekin. That is a question which would undoubtedly require much consideration. There are many reasons, I am ready to admit, why the position of a Euoropean resident at Pekin might, at all events during part of the year, not be a fit position in which to place a man. But the right of going to Pekin and the right of communicating with the Government of Pekin are rights essential if we want our subjects and their property to be secure. Another stipulation is that we should be allowed to navigate the great liver Yang-tse-Kiang, and to trade with the towns on the banks of that river. At present, while the rebellion continues, and the great towns are reduced to deserted ruins, it is not a right that can be exercised to any great advantage; but it is very important with a view to the extension of trade with China. It is said that we should take possession of Nankin and govern there. I am afraid that town is not likely to afford good accommodation either to our troops or to our commerce; but the right of going up the river Yang-tse-Kiang and trading with the populous towns in the interior is of great importance in the prosecution of our commerce with China. The third stipulation of importance is, that British subjects should have the right to travel in the interior of China with passports. That also is of great importance to our commercial intercourse, and it is a stipulation not at all repugnant to the habits and feelings of the Chinese. People are apt to imagine that what took place at Canton will take place everywhere else. But that is a great mistake. The bad feeling existing towards us at Canton was, I believe, not only artificially got up, but an exception to the rule. At Shanghai there is a large European community living in perfect amity with the Chinese, visiting and associating with them, and our residents go into the interior a certain distance without any molestation from the people of the country. I say our policy with China is to obtain the ratification of the Treaty, and to obtain for our subjects in China freedom for themselves, and security for their commerce and property. We want no conquest. It forms no part of the intention with which this expedition is sent to conquer any portion of China, or to obtain possesssion of any part of China more than we now possess. But we do think, and I am persuaded the country is of that opinion, that it would be disgraceful to this country — that we should lose our position in the East—if, having sustained that disaster which took place at the mouth of the Peiho, we simply allowed things to remain as they are, if we allowed the Treaty of Tien-tsin to remain unratified, and if we did not require from the Chinese Government the satisfaction which we have demanded. It is said that we are pressing the Emperor of China too hard if we demand an apology. If there is to be any redress I think an apology the least which any individual or any nation could demand for an outrage like that which was committed at the Peiho. But there is no reason to suppose that the Emperor of China is disinclined to give us that apology; because we have reason to understand that the term which he has given to the transaction is that it was an isolated fact, arising chiefly from the impetuosity of the British commander; that it was not to interrupt in any degree the friendly intercourse of the two nations; and that he has actually opened to British commerce one of the ports which, by the treaty, was to be added to the five. The Emperor of China is not in a temper of mind indignantly to refuse to make an apology for an act which he disclaims as the result of any orders which he himself had given. When I am asked what is our policy with regard to China, I say that our policy is to require the fulfilment of the Treaty of Tien-tsin, to have by virtue of that treaty increased commercial intercourse with China, but not to involve the two nations in a war which may not be necessary, and not to acquire by conquest any additional cession of territory. With regard to the importance of trade with China, I only ask hon. Gentlemen to go back in their recollection to the feeling of satisfaction which was excited in this country at the time we received the Treaty of Nankin. Let them recollect the general applause of Sir Henry Pottinger for having concluded a treaty which every one believed was of the utmost advantage to this country, and the expectations that the treaty would do great things. The commerce with China has increased very much; in virtue of that treaty we have made an establishment at Shanghai, which is really becoming now a European settlement. But there were things not provided for by the Treaty of Nankin, which are provided for by the Treaty of Tien-tsin, and I do not anticipate that I go beyond the probability of events when I say that when those two treaties are faithfully executed, opening all the resources of China to Europe and America—for we require no exclusive advantage,—they will confer great benefit on the nations of Europe and America, and tend at the same time to improve and increase the prosperity of the Chinese themselves.

MR. WHITESIDE

said, he remembered hearing the noble Lord the First Minister, three years ago, defend a very much worse cause against the eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War, and against the weight of the intellect and patriotism of the House. It was true that the noble Lord on that occasion sustained a defeat, but he cashiered the House of Commons for it. He admitted that the noble Lord succeeded in that move. He had the country with him, because it was thought-he had shown pluck in having maintained that there was a necessity for thrashing the Chinese and compelling them to enter into commercial treaties at the point of the bayonet. The noble Viscount spoke exactly in the same vein that evening as he had three years ago. He showed no penitence, he exhibited no sign of remorse; he appeared as ready to commence war with the Chinese now as he was then. He (Mr. Whiteside) had no intention of attacking Mr. Bruce; but he could not allow the matter to pass without stating what he thought to have been the error of that gentleman. The Earl of Malmesbury in the despatch conveying his instruction to Mr. Bruce made use of this language,— And unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more desirable, it would be desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war. Could there be in the mind of any man who read that an idea that Lord Malmesbury's intention was that Mr. Bruce should make war on the Chinese. Was it not clear that Lord Malmesbury's intention was that in order to maintain the dignity of Great Britain, Mr. Bruce ought to go up the river in a ship of war? But was that the spirit in which Mr. Bruce did go up the river? Was the language used by that gentleman in his despatch to the Foreign Secretary such as to conciliate the Emperor of China? In a despatch written by him he spoke of the necessity of "inspiring the Emperor and his councillors with the conviction that what was once demanded from them would be exacted," and again,—"I am determined lo assume an attitude and tone best calculated to make the Chinese submit quietly to my very unpalatable proposals, by impressing them with the opinion that these concessions are inevitable unless they are prepared to draw the sword." Why, that gentleman was determined to fight, and went with a resolution of fighting anybody he could find to fight with. The noble Lord was incorrect in saying that Mr. Bruce could not have acted when he got the letter in the morning, because Mr. Bruce himself said,— It was difficult to communicate with the Admiral (who was nine miles distant), but I should not have been deterred by the informality of the letter if the contents had been satisfactory. Mr. Bruce could have reached the Admiral in a steamer if he bad liked the tone of the letter, and so, not liking the tone of the letter, he had a battle. As a humane man, the noble Lord must regret the loss of life on that occasion, but the tone of the noble Lord's speech was calculated to encourage the Ambassador to go there and commit the same offence. But he (Mr. Whiteside) would ask the noble Viscount in what book he found that an Ambassador had in the country to which he was accredited a right to force his way up a river and bombard any forts which might present an obstacle to him? Would an Ambassador from this country to France have a right to so act if he were refused a passage up the Seine? Instead of acting as he had done, Mr. Bruce should have written home and consulted the noble Viscount who would have been sure to recommend a pacific policy. The noble Viscount had explained to the House what his Chinese policy was. As well as he (Mr. Whiteside) could understand, it was this—that no matter how many thousand Chinese lives might be sacrificed thereby, we—in strict alliance with our friend the Emperor of the French—were to force our way to Pekin. We were to blow up their forts and bombard their towns, and then say, Good people, we are a trading community; we have come here to extend your commerce and ours; we commence by violating all the rules of morals and humanity, but we have the authority of the First Minister in England, the First Minister in Europe, that this is a light policy. The noble Viscount was very desirous that our Ambassador should reach Pekin; but if he got there would he sleep calmly? From all accounts it did not seem to be a comfortable place for an Ambassador. He (Mr. Whiteside) wished he had the eloquence of the right hon. Gentleman the Chancellor of the Exchequer to convince the noble Viscount that he was not right— though, by the way, the right hon. Gentleman had not convinced the noble Viscount three years ago about that miserable affair of the lorcha Arrow, and justice had now overtaken him for his failure, as he was obliged to propose Estimates for a Chinese expedition, that he must in principle condemn. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War seemed to be the only Member of the Cabinet who on this occasion spoke for peace. The noble Viscount to whom he (Mr. Whiteside) had listened that evening, as he always listened to him, with great attention—had spoken with great determination. Indeed, it was pleasant to hear the noble Viscount at such times. He always spoke with more than his usual animation, spirit, and eloquence, when he was preparing for a war. He had made the Chinese tremble before, and he was determined to make them tremble again— of course with the laudable object of improving our pacific and commercial relations with them. The noble Viscount asked the Chinese for an indemnity; but as the House had that evening heard, on good authority, the Chinese were too poor to pay it. He (Mr. Whiteside) hoped for peace; but whatever might be the result of this war the responsibility of it would rest on the noble Viscount's head, as did the responsibility of the last, though that, indeed, did not seem to affect him much, and when it was brought to a conclusion the House of Commons would have to discharge the bill.

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

said, his conduct had been severely criticised by the hon. Member for Elgin, who had accused him of making misstatements; but he (Mr. Cochrane) was prepared to give the authority for every statement he made. The noble Viscount at the head of the Government had made a very jocose speech with respect to the miserable and unfortunate engagement in the Peiho. The noble Viscount admitted that the Chinese Commissioner sent a letter to Mr. Bruce, which Mr. Bruce could not read because it was in Chinese. Large estimates were voted for interpreters, and yet the noble Viscount made a joke about Mr. Bruce not being able to read a Chinese letter. He was surprised that the noble Viscount had used the language he uttered with regard to the calamitous event in the Peiho. The noble Viscount had also joked about the American Minister, Mr. Ward; but there existed the American President's as well as that Gentleman's own authority for the statement, that he was treated with the utmost distinction. He again expressed his regret that a Minister of the Crown should have made a joke of the sacrifice of life which had occurred at the action in the Peiho, and had embarked in a new war without a sufficient sense of the responsibility incurred.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

The hon. Member has totally misunderstood and misrepresented what I said. I made a joke about the letter, and not about the action; and no man of common feeling, who respected himself, would unjustly impute to another that he made a joke of a great calamity. The hon. Gentleman imagined me to say that there was no interpreter present. That is not the case. There was an interpreter, but it took about two hours to get the letter interpreted so as to be properly understood.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

thought that nothing was more important than that distant functionaries should be supported when they were in the right. What was said in that House was acutely felt, and great pain was inflicted by unjust observations. Mr. Bruce was distinctly instructed firmly to resist all the attempts of the Chinese to obstruct his progress to the capital; and he did not see, under the circumstances, how he could have acted otherwise than he had done. He was convinced that the most humane and merciful policy was to insist upon direct communication with the central authorities at Pekin; for, as long as English traders were left at the mercy of the weak and corrupt officials in the provinces and on the sea-board, disputes and outrages would never cease.

Motion, by leave, withdrawn.

Question put, and agreed to:

House in Committee: Mr. MASSEY in the Chair.

(In the Committee.)

£850,000, Naval and Military operations in China (Vote of Credit).

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

hoped the Committee would allow him to proceed with the Vote of Credit for the Chinese war.

MR. DISRAELI

objected to going into a Committee of Supply at that late hour. Moreover, the late Minister of War, who had an important statement to make to the Committee, had left the House under the impression that the Vote would not be taken at so advanced an hour of the night.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

assured the Committee that it was absolutely necessary the Vote should be passed that night.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, that the necessities of the public service required that this Vote should be taken at once. Unless that were done the Government could not meet its engagements without violating the law.

MR. DISRAELI

said, if the right hon. Gentleman asserted on his word and authority that this was the last evening on which the Vote could be taken, he had nothing to say — except that the public business was not conducted as it ought to be.

THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER

said, he was informed by those officials who watched minutely from day to day the public expenditure, and compared it with the legal authorities, that this was the last day upon which they could take the Vote with the certainty of being able to meet the regular demands of the public service in the different departments of the Government. The Vote could be criticised or impugned, if need were, when the Report was brought up.

MR. DISRAELI

consented to the Vote being proceeded with, solely on the unequivocal statement of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and on no other consideration whatever.

Vote agreed to.

House resumed.

Resolution to be reported on Monday next.

Committee to sit again on Monday next.

House adjourned at a quarter after One o'clock till Monday next.