ARMY (SALE AND PURCHASE OF COMMISSIONS.)—ADDRESS MOVED.

HC Deb 06 March 1860 vol 157 cc17-68

SIR DE LACY EVANS

(who was very imperfectly heard) said, he rose to move, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that she will be graciously pleased to order the gradual abolition, as soon as practicable, of the sale and purchase of commissions in the army (having due regard to existing rights)—with the view of substituting for the purchase system, promotion partly by seniority and partly by selection, grounded on war services of merit, length of colonial and home services, and attested professional fitness—under such regulations as Her Majesty shall be pleased to direct. The system of purchase was, he believed, as it at present stood, productive of the greatest abuses which existed in the army of any civilized country in the world. It imposed, as far as he could ascertain, a tax on the officers of our army amounting to £4,742,000, which was the actual sum of the commissions calculated at the price which might be legally expended. Now, in order to get rid of a system such as that, desirable as its abolition might be, he did not propose that any very great sacrifice on the part of the country should be incurred, because he felt convinced that if the authorities were in earnest in the matter they might allow the system to die away without rendering any great pecuniary loss necessary. Instead, however, of pursuing a course by which a result so desirable would be secured, different rules and regulations had of late been introduced into the service, by which the present state of things, instead of being remedied, was likely to be aggravated. He did not, however, seek by his Motion to effect any sudden change in the system, but was simply desirous of carrying out in the main the views which had been advocated by the Royal Commission which had been appointed to inquire into the subject, merely going a little further in what might be considered the reform of our military system. Indeed, it was well known that many Members of the Commission, including, he believed he might say, the right hon. Gentleman the present Secretary for War, were desirous of going a little farther, and of including majors and lieutenant colonels in the non-purchasing ranks. Therefore he would propose that, as regarded the ranks of major and lieutenant colonel, the system of purchase should cease. At the date of the commission there were 222 lieutenant colonels and 258 majors in the army, including the West India regiments; and it appeared that between the years 1851 and 1855, 40 lieutenant colonels and 46 majors retired from the service. They might therefore assume from that the ratio of the retirement of those officers. Taking this basis he calculated that the sum that would be required in the present year to effect his proposal would be about £67,000 for the second year, £62,000; for the third year, £58,000; and so on. The present system allowed the incompetent officer to take the place of the competent. As an instance, he referred to a letter he had received from an officer of the highest capacity who had been passed over fourteen times. He mentioned the case of another officer who had been passed over eighteen times; and yet, strange to say, that officer was still an advocate for the system of purchase. Another officer, a man of great merit, had been passed over twenty times. After the Crimean war, in which the officers and soldiers were not less distinguished by gallantry and endurance than those in any former war, it was felt that a deficiency existed somewhere, and a Royal Commission was appointed, consisting of five civil and five military members. This Commission, which, however, was not constituted in a manner to secure perfect impartiality between the two branches of the service, heard evidence; and the result of their investigation was a Report, showing, in fact, the inexpediency of the system of promotion by purchase. One of the recommendations of this Commission was, that officers should be professionally educated, and he (Sir De Lacy Evans) wondered that this had not been attended to before now, as the education of non-commissioned officers and privates was for some time in operation most successfully. He was, however, sorry to say that this recommendation had not been followed up. Again, he wished to ask why the competitive system, which had been introduced into most of our civil departments, and obtained in the military departments of France, should not be introduced into our army. It appeared on the authority of the Report of the Commissioners, that at present commisions in the Guards cost 100 per cent more than the regulation price, while commissions in the Line and Cavalry cost 50 per cent over the regulation price. With regard to the comparative merits of the purchase with the non-purchase system, he thought that the experience of two services which were employed in the Crimea gave them a lesson that was most useful—he alluded to the Cavalry and Artillery. In the first of these the system of purchase was not in operation, whilst in the latter it was more rife than in any other arm of the military service. How, then, had the system of non-purchase in the Artillery and the system of purchase in the Cavalry worked in the Crima? Why, the Cavalry lost all their horses the very first winter, and were scarcely able to exist; but when the campaign had ended, the Artillery were even in a more efficient state than when the siege of Sebastopol commenced. The time had come when it behoved the authorities at the Horse Guards to adopt any and every improvement in the organization of the army that could be suggested. Undoubtedly those who thought that the Treaty of Commerce with France would eventuate in the establishment of peace all over the world might regard the matter as of little import; but he could anticipate no such result from the Treaty of Commerce. He was not opposed to that Treaty—far from it; but he put no faith in it as a conservator of the peace of Europe. In his opinion the political sky was lowering; wars and rumours of wars prevailed throughout the Continent, and the Emperor of the French in his recent speech to the Legislative Chamber had openly declared his resumption of the policy of conquest. Under these circumstances, it was the duty of the Government to maintain the army in the highest possible state of efficiency, and he ventured to submit that that could never be accomplished under the present impolitic system of promotion by purchase. He hoped, therefore, that the House generally would concur in the Resolution which he begged leave to move.

Motion made, and Question proposed,— That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty, praying that She will be graciously pleased to order the gradual abolition, as soon as practicable, of the Sale and Purchase of Commissions in the Army (having due regard to existing rights),—with the view of substituting for the Purchase System, promotion, partly by seniority and partly by selection, grounded on War services of merit, length of Colonial and Home services, and attested professional fitness,—under such regulations as Her Majesty shall be pleased to direct.

MR. RICH

said, he felt much pleasure in seconding a Motion which nobody could have introduced with greater propriety than the hon. and gallant General who had won his way to honours and promotion by valiant exploits spread over half a century of service. His observations on the subject were so important that he trusted they would be placed in extenso before the public. The substantial question which was raised by the Motion was whether money or merit should prevail. Now, although he was perfectly aware that many who had risen to the command of regiments by virtue of the system of purchase had afterwards proved themselves to be admirably well fitted for the advancement which they had thus obtained, thus accidentally joining merit to money; yet, until hon. Gentlemen could show some necessary connection between money and merit he must hold that this practice, so contrary to all our principles and practice in every other Department of the State, of buying promotion and command, was neither consistent with the safety nor the honour of the country. The system was one which almost everybody was prepared to admit could not be defended on abstract grounds, and among those who maintained that opinion he might reckon the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War as well as the noble Lord at the head of the Government. He well recollected his right hon. Friend's condemnation of the principle, and stating his determination to alter it whenever an opportunity offered. It was, however, asserted that by means of the system as it stood the efficiency of the army, that is to say the supply of officers of appropriate age and qualifications, was satisfactorily upheld. Now, upon that point he was prepared to join issue with its advocates, leaving out of account the last eight or ten years, during which period, owing to the wars in China, India, Persia, and the Crimea, far more than the ordinary number of officers had been appointed, and too many of them swept away. Previous to that period, however, he found that the average age of ensigns and cornets in the army was 21; that of lieutenants between 28 and 29; that of captains 38; that of majors between 43 and 44; that of lieutenant colonels, 49½; of major generals nearly 60; of lieutenant generals, 65 and upwards; and of full generals, above 70. Now no one would contend that these were appropriate ages for the respective ranks which he had just enumerated, and yet this was the undeniable result of the purchase system, bolstered up as it had been by very frequent brevets, by a vast increase of general officers and by so profuse a sale of unattached commissions as to elicit even the condemnation of a high authority at the Horse Guards. It left us in 1850 with our youngest grey-headed major general older by many years than the Duke of Wellington when he had laid down his sword after some fifteen years, not of a major general's but of supreme command, and thirty years older than Napoleon when he commenced his career of victory. There were, indeed, men so peculiarly constituted by nature—for instance, Sir C. Campbell—as to be able at a very advanced age to perform efficiently the duties which attached to their position, but such hardy veterans were only marvellous exceptions to the general rule to the unbending laws of human decay. The same objections applied to all the other ranks of which he had shown the inappropriate, and therefore detrimental ages. Thus the system of purchase had broken down, yet the Resolution of the gallant Officer opposite (Captain Leicester Vernon) recommended that it should be persevered in; and why? because promotion by seniority had failed in the Artillery, Engineers, and Marines. He granted that the promotion in these corps had not been rapid; but then it should be remembered that the Engineers and Artillery had not the advantage of exchanges, and moreover had fewer facilities with regard to the half-pay list, while in these corps and in the Marines there were fewer field officers than in the purchasing corps. It did not, however, follow that because a system of narrow seniority did not succeed the system of purchase must be upheld. He saw no connection between the failure of one system and the falsely assumed success of the other. One might have failed more than the other; but he contended both had failed, and what was now required was a system of combined seniority and selection to be carefully and honestly applied to the army, and the first step should be to put an end to the purchase of the rank of field officer. The purchase system too had broken down by the constant and flagrant transgression by the army of all the rules and regulations laid down by authority for keeping its prices within appointed limits. The Duke of Wellington felt this abuse so strongly that he issued a stringent order to the effect that any officer giving or receiving beyond the regulation price should be subject to be cashiered. The Duke had a strong hand and a resolute will, yet here he was not strong enough to contend with mere degrees of corruption. His orders were utterly fruitless. So, too, the Duke of York when he thought to curb this corruption by requiring that every officer who bought or sold a commission should declare on his word of honour that he had neither given nor would give, directly or indirectly, more than the regulation price—yet it was in palpable evidence that commissions brought 50 or 100 per cent beyond the regulation price. Was there not something inherently false and wrong in a system which no orders, no laws could bend. It was said that, by means of purchase, retirement was provided for old officers; but there could be no question that the grant of a moderate pension was much preferable. There were two classes of purchasers—one, men of large fortune and high station, who went into the army with all the gallant spirit of youth ready to put themselves in the very front of danger, but who after a time, wearying of the service, retired to their estates or filled seats in this or the other House of Parliament. It was good for these young men to go into such a school as the army; but it might have been still better for them to have learnt more of duty and obedience in its subordinate ranks, than to have rushed on by extravagant purchases to premature commands, and most undoubtedly it would have been better for the army. For instance, when in command of regiments they induced a system of expense—not extravagant in them, but mischievously so for their associates, and that was, in fact, the secret of the present check which Cavalry regiments had experienced; sober people being afraid to trust their sons in them far more because of their extravagant habits than the mere price of the commission. The other class of purchasers consisted of young men of high aspirations, proud hearts, and cool heads, who took the army as a profession, were ready to make any sacrifice to rise in it, purchasing each successive step and straining every nerve to raise the means. These were valuable and brave officers, the very men to command our regiments. But we too frequently lost their services just when they were becoming most valuable. It is well known that when officers become generals they forfeit the privilege of selling their commissions. Too many of these officers, therefore, pressed by the pecuniary sacrifices they had made to purchase their commissions, sell them when they approach the rank of general, and so they are lost to the service, while to induce others to remain, the pay of a general officer having a regiment is made double that of an Admiral so as to enable them to recoup some of the money they have squandered on their commissions. It is thus that in this item alone the country expends little less than an £100,000 a year in indirect support of the purchase system, which we are told is so economical, but which is, in fact, extravagant in a mere money point of view, but infinitely more costly in all that regards a nation's and an army's weal by its open disregard for all merit that has not money in its pocket. In the navy the system of combined-selection and seniority has answered well; up to 1850 there was a less slow promotion in the navy than in the army; and our naval officers were on a much younger scale than the army. It is not impracticable to adopt the same system in the army. For these reasons he hoped the House would entertain the Motion of the gallant General. His hon. and gallant Friend was quite right not to press it to the full extent of putting an immediate end to the purchase system; but it was to be hoped that the Government would give that encouragement to a gradual abolition which was embodied in the proposal that no purchase should be allowed above the rank of captain, and that the command of regiments should be by selection. If that were adopted it would be received by the public as a great boon and a step in the right direction, while it would relieve a great number of deserving officers from the pain of seeing themselves passed over, and leave the army open to those enterprising, gallant, and high-spirited young men of all classes whose services we could little afford to dispense with.

CAPTAIN LEICESTER VERNON

said, he rose to move an Amendment to the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster of which he had given notice, and which was to this effect:— That whereas the promotion in the seniority corps already existing—namely, the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Royal Marines, being of an unsatisfactory character, this House is of opinion that it is not desirable to extend the seniority system to the whole of the army. He had not the least doubt that the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De Lacy Evans had exhausted in argument all that could be found in support of his proposition. If he answered those arguments rather inferentially than in detail, he hoped it would not be supposed that he was wanting in courtesy, but the fact was, he must confess, he had heard very little of them indeed. He gathered that the hon. and gallant Member said something about professional education, but that applied equally whether promotion was by purchase or seniority. The hon. and gallant Member also urged that the service was weakened; he did not hear whether by a system of purchase or a system of seniority, but he concluded by seniority, because they found that a system of seniority did weaken the service, not only morally but physically. The hon. and gallant Member afterwards said something about the Admiralty, but he could not follow him there, because he confessed he was entirely at sea as to what the hon. and gallant Gentleman said. The Motion had been seconded by the hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich), and he thought they ought to take that occasion to give their warmest thanks to the hon. Member for being ready on all occasions to advocate what he believed to be the interests of the army. If the hon. Member did not happen to be quite in the right groove, it might be owing to his not being in the profession. The hon. Member had taken a bold course, and said he would narrow the question to one of merit and money. There he should join issue with him. The hon. Member gave a certain ABC illustration of various positions, but he seemed scarcely to understand the alphabet of what he was talking about. The hon. Member spoke of the age of officers, and, if this Amendment had been moved at the time the hon. Gentleman addressed the House, he should have thought he was seconding the proposition. It was upon the objection of age that the hon. Member relied, and he might fairly say that when the hon. Member had uttered one word in favour of his own views, he had uttered two in favour of those which he advocated. The hon. Member had also said that the Ordnance did not allow officers to go on half-pay. That was a mistake, for he (Captain L. Vernon) happened himself to be on the half-pay of the Royal Engineers. He felt diffidence in taking the step he had done in moving the Amendment, as it placed him in opposition on a military subject to the high rank and experience of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, which entitled his opinions to considerable respect. It did more, it placed him in opposition to a popular feeling which he thought was a popular mistake, and if it were not for certain facts, and the deductions from those facts, he should hesitate to stand forward to arrest the progress of popular opinion, headed as it was by the hon. and gallant Member. He hoped the House would extend to him some indulgence, while he endeavoured to show that the seniority system was not entirely one of unmixed good for the army. It must be conceded that if purchase were done away with, the main condition of promotion must arise from death vacancies. But senior officers could not be persuaded to die for the purpose of promoting junior officers; therefore, it stood to reason that promotion must he very slow, and then arose the unsatisfactory position partly assumed by the hon. Member for Richmond—that the officers were too old for the rank. This was no haphazard assertion, but based on broad facts. What occurred in the seniority corps—the Engineers, Artillery, and Marines, which represented an army of 45,000 men? They mu9t recollect that peace was the rule, and war the exception. That being so, in peace the subaltern officers of those corps served no less than 24 years before they reached the rank of captain. Now, 24 years was nearly a quarter of a century, and, according to the average duration of life, the prime of manhood did not exist for more than 20 years. What, then, must be the position of that service where the subaltern officers passed the whole of the prime of life in that rank—where they followed the beat of the drum from colony to colony, in the east and west, in the north and south, in Asia, in Africa, and in America, with but very rare glances at Europe? That was the condition of those officers, who passed the whole of the prime of life, without comfort, and what was more, without hope, for "hope which came to all ne'er came to them." The necessary consequence was, that when war came the senior officers were worn out. In the Peninsular war the Duke of Wellington's best officers of Artillery and Engineers bore the rank of second captains and lieutenants. In the Crimean war the colonels of Engineers one after another broke down and failed physically. The whole work was left to second captains and lieutenants, and he asked was that the condition to which they would reduce the whole of the British Army? There was an opinion abroad that the purchase system threw the commissions of high rank in the army into the hands of those who, in the slang of the day, were called the "upper ten thousand." Nothing was more unfounded. Any man who looked at the Army List would find that such was not the case. If they looked down the list they would find that for one Plantagenet there were fifty of the great clans of Smith, Brown, Jones, and Robinson; for one aristocrat there were fifty taken from the small gentry, from commerce, and from trade. The fastest Lancer he ever saw was the son of a Scotch upholsterer. The wildest Dragoon and the most tearing Hussar sprang respectively from a provincial banker and a country attorney. The son of the silversmith of his mess was a major of heavy Dragoons, and only the other day he admired the nodding helm and shining cuirass which encompassed the offspring of a London solicitor. The father of Havelock, the hero of Lucknow, was a Baptist minister. That showed that it was not the aristocracy to whom commissions were confined by a system of purchase. They were told that it did not admit of promotion from the ranks. He knew some instances to the contrary. Sir John Elley, who rose to the rank of a Lieutenant General and Colonel of the 17th Lancers, was a private in the Blues. General Cureton, who led the charge of the 14th Light Dragoons and turned the fortune of the day at Chillianwallah, enlisted as a trooper; and, no doubt, the Secretary for War could put his hand on many officers who fought as rank and file at Alma, Inkerman, and Balaklava. They had been told that the seniority system acted well in the East India Company's service. Was that really the case? Did they not find that promotion was such a drag that officers were obliged to invent a sort of purchase system of their own? Every man was compelled to subscribe a certain sum to purchase officers out. It was not voluntary. They were compelled, and the price which they gave was very nearly the price of the regulation in the Queen's service. The French system was cited as a model. They were told that they should look at the French system—how good that was. The French system was one third by seniority, one-third by merit, and one-third by favour. If that were introduced into this country how long would it be before merit and favour under our representative system became one? How did it act in France at this moment? During the Crimean war some officers of French and English regiments were coming over together in the same transport, being wounded. The conversation turned, as was always the case with officers, upon promotion. One of our officers said, "Your service gives you fellows something like a chance." A French officer replied, "Erreur! mon ami, erreur! pour avancer chez nous faut avoir parent au Ministère de la Guerre." But did the system work well in France? There, if an officer had not attained a certain rank by a certain time, he was forced out of the service. He was fit for no other profession, and for the rest of his existence he hung on to the outskirts of society. All who had been abroad must have seen hanging about estaminets men whose upright carriage, close cropped, grizzled hair, and heavy moustache showed what they had been, and whose haggard faces and threadbare clothes showed painfully what they were. Was that the condition to which they would reduce the British officer? He thought that one of the reasons why France was so aggressive was her military system. They preferred a despotism, provided it was military. They perferred war to peace because the one was bread, the other starvation. It had been said that under our present system merit was not the thing, but money was, and that no person could be advanced by merit alone. Now, he could give them a most remarkable instance to the contrary; and if in doing so he had to speak of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster's merits to his face, he did it not to give that gallant General any annoyance, but because it was necessary for the argument. A friend connected with the service had procured him the following particulars respecting the career of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster:— In the summer of 1814, Lieutenant Evans of the 3rd Light Dragoons, then a very young man, was appointed to the Quartermaster-General's Department, and attached to the expedition under General Ross which sailed from the south of France, at the conclusion of the war with Napoleon, to operate on the coast of America. He was mentioned with great praise and recommended for promotion by General Ross in the despatches announcing the action at Bladensburg and the capture of Washington; again by General Brook, who succeeded to the command when Ross was killed at Baltimore; and again, a third and fourth time, by Generals Kean and Lambert in connection with the proceedings at New Orleans. For these meritorious services he was Gazetted to a company in the 5th West India Regiment, without purchase, on the 12th of January, 1815. He became a Major by brevet a month or two later, and in the promotion consequent on Waterloo he became a Lieutenant Colonel, on the 18th of June of the same year, he having returned from America in time to be at that battle. Thus stepping in six months from the rank of Lieutenant to that of Lieutenant Colonel without the expenditure of a single shilling. It would have been impossible for the hon. and gallant General to have accomplished such a rise as that in a seniority corps. With all the merit in the world—even with all his own merit—the gallant General would have stopped at the rank of captain, and never got beyond it. It was no disadvantage to an officer without money to be in a regiment where purchase went on. Put the case of a young man without money in a regiment where he was at the bottom of the lieutenants' list, and suppose every other officer in the regiment had money, and was to purchase; the whole of those above him would buy themselves out of his way, until he arrived at the top of the tree, where he would wait for that death vacancy or other casualty to give him promotion, which he would have had to have waited for otherwise in every step from the bottom. In a book which had been sent to him he found this passage:— What does not seem to have been sufficiently considered is the advantage derived from purchase by those whose poverty subjects them to the mor- tification of being passed over by juniors. The practical effect of the system is to bring those men rapidly to the top of their respective ranks, where they benefit by any vacanies occasioned by death, by brevet or by augmentation. For instance (said the writer), I myself, when a lieutenant and captain in the Guards, did not purchase; three juniors whent over my head; but within a year of reaching the top of the list (having served on full pay for nineteen years) I obtained my promotion by a death vacancy; whereas, had the system of purchase not existed, there would have been no inducement to the senior officers of my regiment to retire, and ten or fifteen additional years would probably have elapsed before I could have attained a position where promotion would have been possible. He could not give a stronger proof of the difference between regiments where seniority existed, and those where purchase prevailed than the fact stated in Her Majesty's regulations, that in the one case a man who had served six years in the army might have the rank of lieutenant colonel, whereas, in a seniority corps he had himself been for twenty-four years a subaltern, and nine years an ensign, thus remaining absolutely longer in the lowest rank than the period within which the regulations allowed an officer to attain the position of a lieutenant colonel. The same work from which he had already quoted said:— The routine of unremitted colonial service must produce considerable inefficiency among the officers of the army, and the result would inevitably be either to maintain an enormous retired establishment at the public charge to furnish a provision for the worn-out officers, or to leave the commissions of the army in the hands of those incompetent to discharge the duties attaching to them if it were not for one of those very anomalies to which we have alluded at the commencement of this division of our report—namely, the system of sale and purchase of commissions as authorized by the regulations of the service. The same report went on to say:— It is manifested in these returns that by far the larger portion of officers are perfectly qualified for their duties, and it is equally apparent that this efficiency is maintained by the system of purchase. The weight which ought to be attached to these extracts might be inferred from the fact that— The report from which these extracts are taken is signed by fourteen of the most distinguished men that ever met together in any country for any stated purpose—namely, the Duke of Wellington, the Duke of Richmond, Lords Melville, Howick, and Hill, Henry Labouchere, Admirals Sir Charles Adam, Sir Thomas Hardy, and Sir George Cockburn; Generals Sir James Kemp, Sir Hussey Vivian, Sir Alexander Dickson, Sir Henry Hardinge, and Colonel Sir Richard Williams. The hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich) had put the question as one of money versus merit. There was a sort of morbid feeling abroad that the effect of purchase was to admit rich blockheads to promotion, and to keep back the poor but efficient officer. Those who said that carried the argument a step further, maintaining that those who purchased were of necessity blockheads, and those who did not were the reverse. Was that really so? Put it to the test. Look at the successes of our armies, where purchase was the rule, and compare them with those of the French army, where such a system of advancement was unknown. He was not there either to dispute or depreciate the glory of the French. That nation had raised a triumphal arch to that glory which terminated the dusty road which the Parisians were pleased to designate the Elysian Fields, and on that monument were inscribed the victories of their arms. He knew not with what feeling other foreigners might look upon that record of their defeats; but he owned that, as an Englishman, he was able to look upon that triumphal arch with complacency. From Cressy to Waterloo, of none of our battles with the French had we any reason to be ashamed. He had heard that the name of Corunna appeared on the record to which he had referred; but that he fancied must be a mistake either of his informant or of the chisel of the artist. He had always thought that we won the day at Corunna, and that Sir John Moore died in the arms of victory. The war in the Peninsula was for six years one continued success. The heroes of Jena, Wagram, Marengo, and Austerlitz—Marmont, Massena—so often victorious where the English were not that he was called "L'enfant cheri de la victoire"—Jourdain—so often beaten where the English were that he was called "the anvil"—Victor, Suchet, and Soult, were all out-marched, out-generalled, out-fought, and driven back from the lines of Lisbon to the gates of Paris by our own Picton, Graham, Crawford, Beresford, Pakenham, and Hill. Then came the crowning field of glorious Waterloo, and there the star of Napoleon, the so-called soldier of merit, sank for ever before the genius of Wellington, the so-called soldier of purchase. All the Generals who had thus honourably vindicated the fame of England in the Peninsula were of the purchase school; all save Graham and Picton were under forty years of age—the age of subalterns in the seniority corps. With these glorious antecedents before us—with the brilliant example of the gallant General who had made the Motion on the one hand, and on the other the discouraging instance of the mover of the Amendment—both types of different systems—while it was not for him to devise what was the best system for promotion in the army, he trusted the House would not think him out of place in denouncing ns the worst that under which he himself and many others had groaned for years—the seniority system.

Amendment proposed,— To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'whereas the Promotion in the Seniority Corps already existing, namely, the Royal Artillery, Royal Engineers, and Royal Marines, being of an unsatisfactory character, this House is of opinion that it is not desirable to extend the Seniority System to the whole of the Army,' instead thereof.

Question proposed, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question."

COLONEL DICKSON

said, he could not but think that the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, in the course he had taken, was acting rather in unison with his own private opinion than from any particular zeal for the interests of the service of which he was so distinguished an ornament, and which certainly had assisted him in gaining the honours he enjoyed. He regretted the invidious distinctions which had been raised between the two services and between two branches of the same service. The gallant General had not been just to the Cavalry in the Crimea, whose services in the field at Balaklava must ever remain graven in the hearts of the nation. It was true that the Cavalry suffered much in the war; but it must be remembered that they had to undergo the brunt of a series of actions which the Artillery escaped; and that they were, moreover, in the main, inexperienced recruits, while the Artillery were experienced soldiers and seasoned to their duties in every quarter of the globe. It was hardly fair, therefore, to draw the comparison which he had drawn, and use it as an argument for the abolition of the system of purchase. Another element introduced into the discussion of this question was the influence of the press. An article appeared in the leading journal of that very morning, the direct object of which seemed to be to put some pressure on the Secretary of State for War, and to guide the Government in their decision upon this vitally important question. He was one of the last men to complain of the liberty of the press. He believed all classes and conditions of the people were greatly indebted to the press, and that it was to its influence we owed the saving of our army during the Crimean war. But letters were occasionally published in certain journals which displayed such ignorance of the subjects on which they treated, that all who wished to form an unprejudiced opinion would do well not to rely upon the statements they contained, but calmly and dispassionately consider the matter for themselves. When he saw letters, all bearing the stamp of one writer, and animated by the same spirit, setting forth that British officers were nothing but fashionable idlers and extravagant scapegraces, and that colonels of regiments introduced a system of expenditure utterly regardless of the condition of the younger officers, whom they led into extravagant habits in order that they might pamper their own luxurious tastes—when he saw charges so utterly unfounded as these brought forward—he felt they ought to be treated with contempt, but also that they might mislead inexperienced persons. As to the purchase system, he did not wish to stand up as a patron of abuse. He was quite aware that from unavoidable circumstances, and from the long continuance of peace, great abuses had crept in, and that a system which he believed conduced, on the whole, to the welfare of the army, had, on that account, arrived at a pitch of extravagance that required alteration; but he thought there was a wide difference between improvement and total destruction. The purchase system, he contended, was a direct advantage to the poor man whom it raised to rank along with his richer comrades. Suppose a man rose from the ranks, and became an officer, with small means, he struggled on, and for some years performed the duties of his new sphere, and lived a mere annuitant on his pay. If the purchase system did not exist, there he remained till old age overtook him, when he must retire on the wretched pittance of half-pay. But under the purchase system, he could (after serving his country as long as he was fit), realize a handsome competency, which enabled him to fix his family in the position of life to which his gallantry and his good conduct had conducted him. This he regarded as an unanswerable argument in favour of the purchase system. If the system were abolished, it would cost, not £4,500,000, but £8,000,000, as, in his opinion, every officer was entitled in justice to recover back the whole of the money which he had paid for his commission, not only the regulation amount, but the extra sum which, although not openly recognized, was paid under the connivance of the authorities, and was as notorious as the regulation price itself. He entirely approved of the arrangement of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War for assimilating the prices of the commissions of the Cavalry and Infantry. This was most satisfactory. He thought it was matter of regret that he did not go further, and, by refunding the sums they had paid beyond the regulation price, allow the Cavalry officers at once to reap the advantage he proposed to afford them at a future period. But if it were supposed that this reduction in the price of commissions would enable the poor man to enter a cavalry regiment, it was an utter mistake. The very nature of the service rendered it impossible, unless the country was prepared, which he did not think was the case, to make an enormous increase in the pay of the whole army. It was true that a cornet would get his commission for £450; but his outfit, dress, and accoutrements, would cost him at least £100 more, and his horses another £100. Well, then, this made a total of £650. But what was his position in the regiment? His cornet's pay was £146 a year. Now for his actual expenses; not, mind, his extravagance. He must have two horses, and he would be charged for keeping them £25 17s. a year; the expense of shoeing them at 2s. a week per horse would be £10; the wear and tear of saddlery another £10; some allowance must be made for wear and tear of horseflesh, and this could not be put down at less than £20 a year; and in addition to that there was the subscription to the mess and band—the extravagant establishment talked of by the gallant General, but which were not the establishment of the cornet's choice—fixed by Her Majesty's regulation at £8. These items with other miscellaneous charges would cost him about £87 5s. a year. Then as to eating and drinking, taking the club standard, the cheapest way in which a man could live, or taking the standard of the wages given to the valet, this would come to 5s. or 6s. a day. Putting that down, then, at £100 a year, there was an actual deficiency of £50 a year at the very first, without reference to clothes or any article of comfort or luxury. Unless, then, they were prepared to increase the pay of the army they could not induce poor men to enter into the cavalry regiments. He would admit that the new regulations made the service more economical than Before, and that the officers could live cheaper, nevertheless it required something beyond their pay to support them. He had heard a great deal of army extravagance, but he could truly say, from his own experience, having served in cavalry and infantry for a long time, and having been a member of what were termed a crack corps, that he never knew a single case of an officer ruined by extravagance at the mess, though there were no doubt many cases of officers being ruined by expenses incurred, extravagance and vice indulged in without the barrack walls. When such instances occurred the parents of the young men blamed the regiment for all these evil results. But, after all, how very few were those cases of misconduct on the part of individual officers! Such misconduct could not be long concealed, and it was obvious to everybody that the cases before the tribunals of the country where officers were accused were few indeed. The honour of the British Army stood far too high to admit for a moment such attacks. What he would ask would be the effect of the abolition of purchase? Why, one of the very first effects would be, that that which could not be done directly would be done indirectly the moment the purchase system was abolished. The truth was, that so long as men had money they would offer money for what they wanted, and when men had anything which others coveted they would accept of money. Nor could they, for instance, prevent the officers of a regiment privately subscribing for the purpose of purchasing a man out. The system prevailed in the Indian army, and it notoriously prevailed in the Militia, for Militia commissions were every day hawked about as they were in the Line. He had heard recently of an adjutant of Militia who had repeatedly refused £2,500 for his commission. It would be absurd to throw away so large a sum of money by the abolition of this system when a much smaller amount of money, if properly dis- tributed, would contribute considerably to the welfare and comfort of the service. Abolish this system as they might, it would creep in again. A remark has been made as to the scarcity of cornets at the present time. One of the reasons for that scarcity undoubtedly was, that the examinations were what he should term absurdly severe. The very feelings which induced young gentlemen to enter the army, the very characteristics which stamped them as best fitted for the profession, were those least compatible with the present system of examination, which exacted close study and a knowledge of the most intricate questions. He knew one case of a young man who had gone to Oxford to take his degree rather than pass that examination, knowing that in the one case the knowledge which he would acquire would be useful to him throughout the rest of his life, while in the other it would not. He did not see why a certificate of having attained a certain position at a public school should not be received as a complete qualification for the army. He wished to read one or two opinions that had been given before the Commission. And here he would express his surprise at hearing the hon. and gallant General complain of the style of evidence which had been given before that Commission. He (Colonel Dickson) thought that the officers who had been examined there had given their evidence in the most straightforward way. Surely, the evidence of the Commander-in-Chief was as candid and as unexceptionable as any evidence could be. Earl Grey had expressed strong doubts as to the policy of competitive examinations, and said he did not think that those examinations were proper teats of qualities the most important in a soldier. Sir B. Brodie, in an interesting work, said he feared that the forcing of the youthful mind would prove most injurious in after life, and this was demonstrated in the French service, where diseases of the brain were often the consequence. He was almost afraid to refer to the French army, whose example was always crammed down their throats. But what was the fact? What was the experience of the two systems in the Crimea? He was aware that owing to peculiar circumstances our military system had at first broken down; but when we found out our deficiencies, day by day and week by week the system improved, until we became entirely superior to that of Franco, which, as we succeeded, decayed in the same proportion; so much so that he believed they could not continue the war any longer, and this country was obliged to conclude a premature peace because France was unable to continue the struggle. That which had carried us through the Crimean war and had gained for us so many of our most glorious victories was the so-much decried regimental organization—the only portion of our military system which the principle of purchase affected. Now, what was the remedy proposed? It was a remedy of selection. Whatever might be the fate of this Motion that was a principle against which he must utterly protest. It was a system which, if adopted, would ruin the British army. It was a system which no officer could carry out. It was quite impossible for any commanding officer to decide who ought to be promoted and who ought not. The Duke of Cambridge said he should be sorry to see any partial change. A change should be complete or should not take place at all; for a partial change would lead to doubt and insecurity. He thought that if they did away with the purchase system the next day they would have an indirect purchase and sale going on, which would lead to great mischief. It would be impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to make selections without exciting great discontent and heartburnings in the army. Then how was a Commander-in-Chief to act as regarded officers on foreign stations? Even at home there might be two regiments in garrison, the colonel of one of which wished to retire. The major of the other might happen to be a relative. How was the Commander-in-Chief to act in such a case without exciting the suspicion of jobbing? Of course he would put into the hands of the Commander-in-Chief the power of a veto, in order to prevent the promotion of undeserving men. But to suppose that a Commander-in-Chief could act upon the principle of selection was perfectly ridiculous. The great body of the English army was characterized by an esprit de corps. If we ever destroyed that feeling we should ruin the efficiency of the whole army. The regiments which had performed the most brilliant actions were noted for their esprit de corps. That it was which sustained them at Inkerman, when every individual felt that he was not only fighting for his country but that the whole reputation of his regiment depended upon his efforts. In conclusion he wished to thank the House for the attention with which they had heard him, and to assure them that he was actuated solely by a wish to promote the interests of the service in the observations he had made.

MR. P. O'BRIEN

said, he had no wish to disparage the heroic exploits of the British army, but he thought the invidious references which had been made to the victories it had gained over the French might have been omitted at a time when we were entering into a treaty of commerce and peace with France. He could not believe the assertion which had so often been made, that the purchase system was absolutely necessary to the efficiency of our army, seeing that no such system existed in France and other countries, which, nevertheless, possessed excellent armies. Military men, however, were so bound up by their own transactions that they could not express an unbiassed opinion on the subject. He complained that, with the view of conferring some advantage upon certain places of education in England, admission to the Artillery and Engineers, which he had always regarded as scientific corps, were now regulated by the classical acquirements of candidates rather than by their knowledge of the theory of projectiles. He was no enemy of classical learning, but it seemed that in future the man who could repeat arma virumque cano with the best grace, was to be preferred to the candidate who was the most deeply versed in mathematics and mechanics. That was a matter which demanded, and he hoped would receive, some explanation.

SIR FREDERICK SMITH

said, it was with great pain that he differed from the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster upon any subject, but especially upon one that so closely concerned the army. They were both old soldiers, though belonging to different brandies of the service, and he could truly say that he had watched the career of the hon. and gallant Gentleman with great admiration. The question he had mooted went to the very root of the British army, and he felt sure that in the hands of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War it would receive the attention which it deserved. He regretted that, in consequence of the low tone in which his hon. and gallant Friend had addressed the House, he had been unable to gather the purport of many of his observations; but he did not think, so far as he had heard him, that the hon. and gallant General had proved the existence of an abuse of any kind. The object of the Motion was to abolish promotion by purchase, and to substitute promotion by selection combined with seniority. He confessed he could not see how selection was to be combined with seniority. Promotion must be either by purchase, or seniority, or selection. As a member of the scientific branch of the service, he knew that promotion by seniority gave to the State men of advanced life when it wanted young active officers, and he believed that if the purchase system were introduced into the Ordnance, it would produce men equal in talent and superior in physical power. With respect to selection, the Duke of Cambridge, Earl Grey, and Lord Panmure—all high authorities—were of opinion that it would be utterly impossible to carry on promotion in the British army upon that principle. Take the case of selection in a regiment. Suppose a captaincy was vacant, and there were ten lieutenants. What was to be the test of fitness? In time of peace a man might possess latent qualities for war which the Secretary of State, or the Commander-in-Chief, or whoever had the appointment, could not discover. Who, then, was to be selected—the man of science or the man of drill? If neither science nor drill were to be the test what was it to be? Well, then, say the fourth or fifth on the list should be selected for promotion. What in that case would be the heartburnings and discontent of the first, second, and third, who were passed over? Instead of having a harmonious regiment, we should have one in which discord prevailed, and the mess would be a hell upon earth. He should regret, therefore, to see the system of selection introduced into regiments. But give the principle a wider range and suppose the power of selection to extend over the whole army. A captaincy might be vacant in a regiment stationed at home. The general commanding in Canada recommended Mr. A, belonging to the 10th Regiment. Mr. B, of the 20th, was highly spoken of by his senior officer in India; and a report came from Gibraltar in favour of Mr. C, a deserving officer of the 50th. Who was to decide as to the respective merits of these candidates for promotion? He believed that unless the men were brought together and tested in a variety of ways no Secretary for War or Commander-in-Chief could give fair play. But the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster was for seniority combined with selection; the latter based upon war services of merit, length of colonial and home service, and professional fitness. How was professional fitness to be tested in time of peace, and who was to say how many marks were to be given to war services, how many to colonial, and how many to home service? The hon. and gallant General was mixing up things which had no natural connection, and he might as well try to add pounds, shillings, and pence to pounds avoirdupois. He had heard that the late Sir William Reed, when a lieutenant of Engineers, was senior officer of Crawford's division in the Peninsula, and had under him a lieutenant of the line as an assistant engineer. By the recommendation of Lieutenant Reed, before the campaign was over his assistant became lieutenant colonel, while Sir W. Reed came home still a lieutenant. That was an instance of the disadvantage of promotion by seniority, and the benefit of a system of merit and purchase. He hoped that Her Majesty would never be advised to adopt the Resolution of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster. What he would say was, "leave things as they are." They were producing and had produced for the country the finest troops in the world, and if our regiments were good, surely the staff could not be bad. He believed that with practice and with such opportunities as the Government were now giving to staff officers, we should not only have the finest regiments but the best staff officers in existence. The Government were going in the right direction, and he hoped they would persevere and continue to encourage officers who were doing their duty. With the expression of these sentiments he was quite satisfied to leave the matter in the hands of his right hon. Friend the Secretary for War.

CAPTAIN JERVIS

wished, as a member of a non-purchasing corps (the Royal Artillery), to say a few words. The intention of the hon. and gallant Member (Sir De L. Evans) appeared to be to open the army to the middle classes more than at present. It was, however, first necessary to ascertain whether the country was inclined to pay the cost necessary for that experiment or not. The purchase system, which had existed in this country for 200 years, had been so controlled during the last forty or fifty years that it had relieved the country of a great burden in pensions, and the Duke of Wellington had borne his high testimony to its value as a means of bringing young, active, healthy, energetic, and better qualified men into the army, at the same time that it threw none for a provision upon the funds of the State. But it would be impossible, without a great deal of inquiry, to state the amount of the dead-weight of pensions under the proposed system of abolition of purchase. For himself, he should not object to open the upper ranks of the army to the whole body of the people, as he believed that the more closely the people were connected with the army the more attached did they become to the institutions of the country. But when a person in the middle classes put his son to a profession, after giving him a solid education and starting him in life, he expected that the young man would maintain himself by his own exertions. How far would the pay to officers in the British army go to realize that expectation? He would not take the case of the cavalry, or other expensive branches of the service, but instance that of the infantry, and ask whether a man could subsist upon it or not? The pay of an ensign was £95 14s. a year, or 5s. 4d. a day. In the Artillery it wad a little more than £100, but, as that brought the officer under the income tax, his pay was a little less than that of the officer of the Line. The average duration of service as an ensign was three years. He then became a lieutenant, in which rank he remained, on an average, from seven to eight years, when his pay was £118 2s. 6d., without deducting income tax. There were few who attained the rank of captain before the age of 35 or 36, when the pay was £211. The next step was that of a field officer, when his pay would increase to £292. At 45 a man might become a lietenant colonel at £310 a year. Now, would a man with any affection for his son place him in a profession where at 45 he would be in the receipt of no more than £310 per annum, with all the expenses attending his position? If the hon. and gallant General really meant to do away with the system of purchase, he must be prepared to increase the pay of the army to such an extent would induce persons of the middle class to put their sons into it. Any man, of whatever profession he might be, ought to be able to support himself upon his pay without running into debt. The very principle of a profession was that it should produce sufficient to live upon. He had served in many parts of the world, and could state that England was of all countries that iii which an officer lived at the least expense. At home he was nobody— a mere subaltern; but abroad he was the representative of the English people; he incurred mess expenses in entertaining fleets, &c., and he could not do this on his pay. Often on colonial stations had he expended £17 a month in mess expenses in entertaining persons of whom he knew nothing, when his pay for the same period was not more than £7 or £8. Compare with this the salaries paid to the civil servants of the Crown, who were not over paid. The third-class clerks were paid from £100 to £300; the second-class, from £350 to £500; the first-class, from £500 to £800. So that entering a public office at 18 or 20 years of age upon £100, a clerk might reasonably hope, with intelligence and assiduity, to be in the receipt of from £600 to £800 at an age when in the army he would be receiving £310 per annum. Considerable expense was also incurred by officers in moving about from one station and one garrison to another. If an officer was foolish enough to get married upon his pay, he was doomed to sell out, and must go to the diggings. The late Lieutenant General, Sir C. Napier, was a lieutenant colonel, certainly a field-officer, at Corunna. He afterwards went to America. He made a name in Cephalonia, and afterwards in Bermuda. He was appointed to the command of the northern district in England during the Chartist riots, and at 60 he was offered as a reward for his long and distinguished services, the command of the Bombay army. Did Sir C. Napier, with these advantages, accumulate large means? On the contrary, when he arrived in India he looked back with desperation to the fact that if he had died on the voyage he could not have left his girls a single farthing, for he had expended all he had on the journey. Sir Charles had landed in India, after paying the passage of himself and family, with only £2 in his pocket. Without entering into particulars, he might state that the purchase system was no bar to the mercantile class going into the army; but as a general rule they carefully abstained from doing so, because it did not pay; and unless the House were prepared for a large pension list and increased pay, the resolution of the gallant General would mean nothing at all. With regard to promotion by seniority, the hon. and gallant Member for Berks (Captain L. Vernon) told the House he had been for twenty-four years a subaltern in the Engineers. The term of service had been shorter of late years, but the reason why promotion was better now was that in the coure of twelve years the Artillery had been exactly doubled. When he entered the service there were eight battalions; this year there were sixteen. He had, there fore, received the promotion due to twenty; years' additional service. But you could not go on doubling this force. A return had been moved for by the right hon. Gentleman (Mr. Monsell) which showed that out of sixty general officers on the staff there were only two Artillery officers and one Engineer, the reason being that they were too old to serve on the staff. As far as opening the army to the middle classes was concerned, the question was one of money. Unless the hon. and gallant General was prepared to amend his Motion in this sense he must vote against him.

COLONEL LINDSAY

said, he wished to explain to the House what a gallant officer examined before the Commission in 1857 said with respect to himself. That gallant officer, Captain Macpherson, stated in his evidence that he had been purchased over no less than eighteen times, and yet, when asked by the Chairman of the Commission what his opinion was of the purchasing system, he replied that he thought it highly beneficial to the service by accelerating promotion to officers who did not purchase as well as to those who purchased. The gallant officer added, that though he had been passed over eighteen times, and though it took him eighteen years to get his company, he considered that he should have had many years longer to wait for it if there had been no system of purchase. The officers examined before that Commission seemed to be pretty nearly divided in opinion, and the balance was turned over in favour of the purchase system very much by the civilians who gave evidence. He was willing to admit that if it could be fully proved that the system of purchase was vicious in principle, inefficient for the army, and inconsistent with the public benefit, it would be the duty of the House to make good to the officers who had sunk their money in commissions the amount so expended; but he did not think that the House would be called on for that sum, because he believed the system to be good, both as regarded the army and the public, and he had heard nothing that night to alter his views. The hon. Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich) had asserted that the system of purchase had not produced any greater rapidity of promotion than the system of seniority in the Ordnance, but such was not the case, for he was in possession of a return for a series of years before the Crimean war, showing the periods of service after which officers attained the rank of lieutenant colonel; and the return proved that, although the system of purchase was the system of the army, a system of non-purchase also existed to a considerable extent. In 21½ years—and he took the period before the Crimean war, that its influence might not be taken into the calculation—from 1833 to June, 1854, 428 officers arrived at the rank of lieutenant colonel, and these officers averaged about 25 years' service before attaining that position. Those who rose by purchase were 22 years and eight months attaining that rank, and those who did not purchase were 27 years and nine months. Now that was sufficient to show that the system of purchase was useful to give youth and vigour to the ranks of the army. If they abolished this system, they must come to compulsory retirement; and in France the allowances on compulsory retirement were, for a lieutenant general £300 to £350, for a lieutenant colonel £120, and for a captain from £90 to £120; the retirement taking place with a lieutenant general at sixty-five, with a lieutenant colonel at sixty-two, and with a captain at fifty-three, and a lieutenant at fifty-two years of age. It would be absurd to think of having lieutenants of that age in the British army, considering all the duties they had to perform, and all the different parts of the world they were sent to. He asserted that the country would not have lieutenants and captains of proper age, and youth, and vigour, in the several ranks of the army it the system of purchase were abolished. Again, the total number of officers on full pay of the army was 8,167, and the amount of retired full pay was £56,714. On the other hand, the number of officers in the Royal Artillery was 1,072, and the amount of retired full pay for that corps was £32,232, being only about £24,000 less than the other. The retiring pay would, therefore, be enormous if they desired to have that exodus out of the various ranks of the army which would maintain the present amount of promotion. Moreover, the system of purchase was compatible with every principle of examination. Examinations of a military character were regularly made under the authority of general officers, and controlled and watched by the Commander-in-Chief, who was extremely desirous that they should be effectively carried out. These examinations could be as effectively conducted for the benefit of the service and the good of the country as well with the purchase system as without it. They were all agreed that merit should be rewarded; and in the higher ranks of the army it was done whenever the opportunity presented itself. Lieutenant colonels were promoted to the rank of generals in consequence of merit; but what constituted merit it was difficult to arrive at in peace time. He had conversed with general officers on the subject, and always found that they considered it exceedingly difficult to ascertain degrees of merit. Men's capacities varied. Some men might be able tacticians, but they were not found out till they were engaged on active service. Others had talents of a different kind; but there was no means of deciding the superiority of one over another till they were taken into the field. It might seem a curious argument, but there was to some extent a control which upheld the discipline of the service, in the system of purchase. There was a species of control in the knowledge that they had embarked capital in the service; that that capital was their own, and that at any time they could get it back again. He prayed the House to reject the Motion, for he believed the system of purchase had been found most efficient in the army. Imputations were cast upon the regimental system, but the regimental system had never failed. It was not the regimental system in the Crimea that failed. It had ever stood the test of peace and the test of war, and he believed it was equally for the benefit of the array and for the public good.

COLONEL P. HERBERT

said, holding in very high respect the gallant General who had brought this Motion forward, he regretted to find himself compelled to oppose him on a military question. But as that question excited considerable attention in large constituencies, where perhaps it was but imperfectly understood, he could the better rely on the military opinions of the gallant General the further he was removed from Westminster. He had understood the gallant General to say that in the Crimea the horses of the Artillery suffered in much greater proportion than the horses of the Cavalry, and to attribute that in some way to the system of purchase in the one case and the absence of it in the other. [Sir DE L. EVANS intimated that he said quite the reverse.] So far as his (Colonel Herbert's) experience went, he thought the Artillery branch of the service lost just as many horses there from starvation and suffering as the Cavalry did; and in proof of that he might cite the case of the two batteries attached to the division under the command of the gallant General, which, from having far on to 300 horses at tire beginning of the war, had only 40 or 50 between them at the end of the first six months. He hoped the House would not be carried away by statements of opinion of the officers of foreign armies in reference to this question. He had had repeated opportunities of conversing with foreign officers on this subject, and he almost uniformly found them under the misapprehension that the system of purchase, as it existed in our service, was one under which a rich man was able to buy commissions at his will, over the head of any officer who did not happen to be so rich as he, and that, in fact, commissions were put up to the highest bidder. He had also found that when the system was explained to them as a system of seniority, provided that an officer was able to provide a certain sum of money, the foreign officers had allowed its advantages. He did not oppose this Motion from any consideration of the manner in which the system of purchase affected individuals. He rested his defence of that system on the broad public ground of its tending to promote the efficiency of the service as well as public economy. No one would deny that in general it was desirable that officers of all grades should be in the vigour of life, and that not only senior officers should gain their rank while still in the prime of life, but that officers in the lower grades should attain their rank young. Again, the House must recollect that officers retiring from the service after 10, 20, and sometimes 30 years' connection with it do not cost the country a single penny for pensions. He asked the House to consider the cost of retirement which would be requisite to keep up the necessary stream of promotion. In the service of the East India Company the retirement on full pay as a captain was allowed after 18 years' service, and as a major after 22 years; and yet there promotion in every case—at least it was so before the Mutiny—was lamentably slow amongst all ranks of officers. But did any one wish to reduce the promotion in the Queen's service to the same level? He would also remind the House that in the East India Company's service there was a system of purchase. That was a remarkably oppressive system, and many a young officer had been forced into debt by a system which was not virtually optional, as in our service. Again what was the case of the Artillery and Engineers? Between 1830 and 1840 there had been instances of subalterns promoted to the rank of captain after 20 and 22 years' service, and of captains promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel after 20 and even 29 years as captain alone. It might be said that things were better now, but if so, that was entirely owing to the large additions that had been made of late years to the Artillery. At present the full pay retirement in our service amounted in the infantry and cavalry to £60,000, and in the Artillery and Engineers to £48,000. The number of officers in the Artillery and Engineers was 1,465, and in the infantry and cavalry upwards of I 8,000, making the proportion as 1 to 5½, The present rate of retirement in the Artillery and Engineers, to keep up the stream of promotion, would be manifestly insufficient when the augmentations ceased; and in the infantry and cavalry we should have to increase the full pay on retirement from £60,000 to £264,000, which would make a difference of £204,000. Certainly, the feelings of poor and meritorious officers ought to be much respected. He thought they were very often respected, and that great consideration was shown at the Horse Guards to officers who from want of means had been unfortunate in promotion, and although when they had entered the service they knew the system under which they were to serve. The question of military education was so irrelevant, that he did not think it necessary to say anything about that. Allusion had been made to the French army. What was the system of promotion carried on there? It was one partly of selection and partly of seniority. But he was not aware that the French Army was without heartburnings, and he had heard many accounts of duels that had taken place in the French army among the officers on account of promotions that had taken place. There was one very important point which should be borne in mind, and that was, that in France when people had complaints to make about promotions there was no House of Commons to discuss those complaints, and there was no free press which could take up their gievances, or in which some correspondent, signing himself "Justitia," could advocate the claims of an officer who might happen perhaps to be his own brother. A gallant officer, a friend of his, a man of high military rank and of still higher military reputation, had summed up in these terse and graphic words the opinion of British officers on a system of promotion by selection:—"Every officer of the army is ready to recognize the principle of selection, provided he is himself the person selected." He, however, defended the present system upon higher grounds than mere personal advantages, believing that it tended to the efficiency of the public service and economy in the public purse.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

Sir, the subject which the House is called upon to consider is one of the most difficult and complicated that can be submitted to it. In the first place, it is well that we should be certain that we are using clear and definite terms and describing as we intend to do the subject we are discussing. I agree, as an abstract proposition, with the opinion advanced by the gallant Officer who moved the Amendment, that seniority by itself is a bad method of promotion; but when you use that expression it seems to imply that seniority promotion was something unknown to our present system. The fact is, as has been stated in debate, we have several distinct corps, which may be said to be governed upon different principles in respect to promotion. We have the Infantry and Cavalry of the Line and the Household Troops, the two scientific corps, and the Indian army. These are all seniority corps, with this distinction between them, that in the Queen's service, and in the Indian army there is a seniority system accelerated by purchase, and in the scientific corps in the Queen's army it is seniority pure. The man who stands first for a death vacancy in the Line gets it, or, if he does not take it, the man who stands first for purchase, having the money, gets it, and so on. Having said so much, I must add that there is no subject which has been so overlaid on both sides with arguments that are not tenable, and by statements which are gross exaggerations, as this question of purchase. I must also say that the gallant General (Sir Do L. Evans) in my opinion, made some very extravagant assertions respecting that system. The gallant Gentleman opposite (Colonel Herbert) has truly said that the argument of the gallant General leads to this, that the greater loss of Cavalry horses in the Crimea was attributable to the purchase system, while the greater vitality of the Artillery horses was traceable to the absence of that system. On the other hand, the supporters of the present system declare that the whole spirit and value of the army depends upon what is certainly an artificial system after all. They have passed upon it the most extravagant encomiums, amongst other things attributing to it the victory of Waterloo. Again, the gallant General argued that purchase was not only incompatible with education, but that money and education are positively antagonistic. That is a great social and moral discovery, in the truth of which, however, I do not believe, but, on the contrary, I am of opinion that it is so ordained by Providence that you may truly say poverty and ignorance go together, because education costs money, and is therefore more within the reach of those who have money. There is nothing more erroneous than the notion, into which those who advocate the abolition of the purchase system have fallen, that the non-purchasing officer is necessarily a hard-working, meritorious man, devoted to his profession, while the man who purchases is therefore to be regarded as a man not devoted to his profession or deserving of his promotion. That is an unfounded assertion, and any argument based on it is therefore fallacious. There is another argument which on both sides is extremely doubtful. I have heard most sanguine expectations held out by the advocates of entire abolition of purchase that a change of system would procure for us a different class of officers, and would bring into the ranks the sterling ambitious characters of the middle class who would give immense force and strength to the army. It is said, on the other hand, that if you abolished purchase, you would lose the means of officering your army with gentlemen, and I am one of those old-fashioned persons who believe that gentlemen officers are a great advantage. In this country, which is not a military nation, and which possesses but little of the spirit of military subordination, I am not ready to give up anything which tends to secure to our officers a ready and willing obedience. But I believe that both those assumptions are incorrect. If purchase were abolished tomorrow, I do not think you would find the slightest difference perceptible in the class of men who would come forward to officer regiments. It is said, and truly, that the army is an ill-paid profession; but it carries with it honour, and station, and reputation. The very fact of its being an ill-paid pro- fession will cause its officers to consist in a great degree of men who have something else besides. But then, if you think the abolition of purchase will deprive the army of that class of gentlemen and all the professional and middle classes comprised within that term, I ask why should the army be worse off than the navy, where no purchase exists, and whose officers I am sure the army will admit will compare in any way with military officers? Then it is said by some that the Queen's army is completely and especially aristocratic, and that the Indian army, on the other hand, is a purely middle class army. But what is the English army but a middle class army? The presence of a few sons of noblemen docs not alter the character of the great bulk of the officers who are drawn from the middle, by which I mean the professional, classes. Having premised so much upon the general subject, I will pass to another point. I was a Member of the Duke of Somerset's Commission. The Report of the Commission was drawn up with great ability, and gave a true and impartial account of the advantages and disadvantages of the system of promotion by purchase. The greatest stickler, either for or against purchase, would admit that the case on either hand is fairly put. When I came into office, among the various topics which presented themselves to my attention was the effect which the purchase system had upon the army and on the public service. I do not know why the gallant General says I inveighed against purchase, but certainly I have listened to and adopted, and am ready to act upon, any scheme by which I can see a way to get rid of the abuses and scandals that overlay the practice of purchase. I find, looking at purchase fairly, and admitting that it quickens promotion, that to a great degree it is valuable. Some one has said that purchase does not procure physical vigour and is incompatible with intellectual vigour. I do not admit that. It is true that as President of the Commission of 1854, I found that purchase alone would not insure vigour among officers, and that it was necessary to supplement it by additional measures of retirement; but with those supplemental measures it is quite possible and easy to keep the army on a safe and healthy footing as regards age. My gallant Friend (Sir De L. Evans) quarrels with me for what I did, and read extracts from my letters, and if I was at all thankful for his inaudible tones, it was when he quoted from my letters. The casa is this:—I found when I entered office that an old controversy existed between the War office and the Treasury respecting the cause of the difficulty in filling up the cornetcies in cavalry regiments. The matter was a very serious one. There were more than sixty vacancies for cornets, a number equivalent to all the cornetcies in seven regiments, which could not be filled up. It had been said that this was entirely owing to your making men pay subscriptions to the baud and to the deductions made from their forage allowance. I asked what was the cost of the outfit of a cavalry officer. Several estimates were given me, none of which were under £1,500, and some reached £2,000. Now, will a charge of 1s. 5d. a day for those objects drive away from the cavalry men who are willing to pay £2,000 to begin with, and who afterwards pay large sums for their steps—as high as £17,000, I believe, for a Lieutenant Colonelcy? It was absurd to suppose that such a small amount would deter men from entering this branch of the service. Then I had to find some other cause, and I think the true cause has been correctly stated by the hon. and gallant Member for Limerick (Colonel Dickson). He said that the difficulty was not occasioned by the price of the cavalry commissions, the cost of the forage, the subscriptions to the band, nor even the expenses of messing. The chief expenses of a cavalry regiment, he added, lie outside the barrack-yard—that is to say, in the expensive amusements of wealthy men. Now, of all the recipes you can supply for repressing these none are so inefficacious as attempts by authority to impose sumptuary laws. Why, the very fact of attempting it would drive the officers into further expenses. There is another way of accomplishing your object. What is it that gives a tone to a regiment? There is a passage in Carlyle's Life of Stirling which I recollect made a profound impression on me. It is that where, talking of the English public schools, he says, the schoolmasters are always exclaiming, "See how we administer these schools; what men we produce; what a tone there is!" This is all nonsense, says Mr. Carlyle; it is not the masters but the boys who produce this tone—who produce it, moreover, not in obedience to the masters, but half the time in spite of them. It is through the boys that the spirit of combination, of resistance, and of honour which prevails in our public schools is maintained, and Mr. Carlyle laughs to scorn the claims of pedagogues to be considered the creators of this English tone and feeling. So it is in our army. It is the officers themselves who give the tone to a regiment. The best plan is to try and introduce fresh elements of a sounder public opinion into these regiments—to bring in men who cannot afford to lead this kind of life—to set their public opinion against that of the wealthy and extravagant; and as soon as there are enough of those who have not the means of indulging in these expenses you will restore a healthy tone to these regiments. I am sorry that the gallant Officer objected to my course in this particular, when he ought, on the contrary, to have approved of it as a step in his own direction. I had to deal with the price of the commission. He says I aggravated the evil. On the contrary, I diminished it by one-third, and two more moves of the same nature would produce a total abolition. He says the plan will fail. Now, I do not like to prophesy, but I think I shall prove right when I say that it will succeed, I know that already the applications to the Horse Guards for cornetcies have increased; and I myself have had letters from friends who have sons in the army, and who say, "We have kept our sons in the infantry because we could not afford the price of the cavalry commissions; but we had now much rather that they were in the cavalry." The feeling is that the reduction in the price of commissions will diminish the extravagance, which two things together have always hitherto made an inconvenient hole in the parental pocket. The Duke of Somerset's Commission took evidence upon these points at great length and from very able men. It is unnecessary for me to attempt to decry the character of the officers who were examined on either side. They were all excellent men, and there was a variety of opinion. Some spoke in favour of purchase without the slightest qualification whatever. Some, again, only deprecated the abuses of the purchase system, and thought that efforts ought to be made to check them. Well, what are the abuses which mark the purchase system? At the outset, I would say that nothing is more true than that both in England and abroad the system is very much misunderstood. A French newspaper, giving a resumé of the life of Lord Raglan, said that such was his enthusiasm for the profession of a soldier that, though the son of a Duke, he scorned to enter the army by purchasing a colonelcy, but came in as a simple ensign. That is very much the measure of the foreign view of the purchase system. In England I know it is commonly thought that when a rich man goes into a regiment he can get what rank he chooses by holding up his finger; he is certainly obliged to follow in the natural order of the military hierarchy, but though he cannot pass over ranks, he can pass over men's heads as he likes. That is not the case, and in the lower ranks it may happen that a poor man may gain by the system. Suppose, for instance, that a man has risen from the ranks, and that, as somebody expresses it, all the officers' superior to him in his grade "get out of his way" by purchase. He finds himself thus at the top of his rank; the first time a death vacancy occurs he is there ready for it to fall into his mouth; and after having served for a certain number of years he may retire with a small fortune gained in the service by these means. No doubt, this purchase system is indefensible in theory, but in practice it is extremely useful, and I think you should pause for a proper substitute before adopting any sweeping measure of abolition. Where is it that the great scandals of purchase arise? Not in the lower ranks of the service. The great prices are given in the superior grades by very wealthy men who want a position which gives them power, responsibility and reputation. It is this which leads to these high prices at which public feeling is justly shocked. We hear, too, of exchanges made for the purpose of trafficking in this way, and sometimes a regiment is thus deprived of its step. A striking case has been mentioned by Lord West, and is to be found in the blue-book. An officer in a certain regiment wished to sell, but his juniors were poor; he had no prospect of getting a high price for his step, and he therefore exchanged with a lieutenant colonel into another regiment, where there was a rich man who was ready to pay any price for promotion, and his own regiment therefore lost the advantage of the step. Such cases are always attributed to the Duke of Cambridge and the Horse Guards, and it may not be unnatural to suppose that the officer who is at the head of the whole system has it in his power to stop such an abuse; but the Duke of Cambridge does not know, and cannot know, of such an intention. How is he to trace the motives for the different exchanges which come before him? A few months after they are effected he may find out that he has authorized an exchange for unfair purposes, but he is perfectly powerless to apply a remedy. The system of exchange is much complained of, and sometimes with justice; but in all professions, and especially in so severe a one as our army, it is often a great advantage to enable men who have served perfectly well in other parts to avoid serving in India, or in climates which they are, perhaps, unable to endure. I do not see much inconvenience or evil in such a system. The Duke of Somerset's Commission recommended that, in order to check the great prices which are given in the upper ranks of the army, purchase should be confined to the rank of major and the grades below it. The importance of a lieutenant colonelcy was so great, it was argued, that succession to it should not be allowed by seniority—that is, by seniority either with or without purchase. The Commission objected very much to the system of seniority. So do I. I have always been opposed to it. I was responsible for the introduction of a system which I freely admit has been much complained of in the army, but which I am sure has added very much to its efficiency, by which officers selected from among the colonels, are made either brigadiers or temporary major generals, and ultimately attain the rank of major general. That, therefore, is not promotion by seniority, but by selection. Of course, these changes are very disagreeable to a body like the army. Of course men who are not selected feel great disappointment and discontent. But, after all, the public service is the first thing to be considered. You may regret to wound the feelings of officers; but you must keep in view something higher and more important still—namely, the efficiency of the army of which they are individual members, and certainly the army has very much benefited by the change. The Duke of Cambridge in this respect is very much opposed to the system of selection, as casting upon the person who has to select a burden which in this country it is almost impossible for him to bear. He says that the duties of the commander of a regiment are of the most important kind. But if you contrast the seniority system with the system of selection, you find the former open to the gravest objection; because under it, with your eyes open, seeing the incapacity of an officer, you are forced deliberately to put him into an office of responsibility and trust. As to the effect of this system what is said by General Simpson? He is a most excellent officer, has had great experience in inspecting troops, and has been in command of a district; in reply to Sir H. Jones he stated that he had known several officers who were not equal to the command of the regiments which they held. He was unable to say what proportion had obtained their commissions by purchase, but the effect was the same where the promotions had been by seniority. He was asked if this could not be remedied by a system of selection, and he replied that it could, but to pass over a man would be a very serious and difficult matter. Some gallant Members appear to think it would be very easy for the Commander-in-Chief to exercise a veto in any case where the officer succeeded by seniority is deemed unfit for the post. [Mr. ELLICE: Hear, hear!] The right hon. Gentleman cheers; there are two ways in which this veto may be exercised, and I shall be glad to learn which method he considers least invidious. Either you must tell a man, "You are a good officer, I have no fault to find with you, but there is another still more able and with higher professional qualifications whom I must prefer;" or you must say, "You are utterly unfit and incompetent for the situation, and I therefore must appoint another man over your head." [Mr. ELLICE: Not so invidious as to allow juniors to purchase over old officers.] At all events it is so invidious that General Simpson said that in the course of his life he knew only two instances in which it was done. The Commander-in-Chief expressed his willingness, if supported by public opinion, to exercise the power which he possessed, but he found the thing was in itself so invidious as to render it impossible to do so. General Scarlett gave his opinion that selection in the upper ranks would operate as a check on those enormous sums which are given for commissions over and above the regulation price. You come then to this point, you have officers in command of regiments who having arrived at them by seniority are not equal to the commands they hold; you have the opinion of General Scarlett that selection in the higher ranks would remedy that evil; but you have also the practice and evidence of the authorities to show that it is impossible, as being too invidious, to pass over a man because he is incompetent when there are no fixed principles on which selection is to be made. We, who signed this Report in 1854, con- ceived that if a stop were put to the purchase of the rank of lieutenant colonel, by which an indefeasible right is acquired to the successive steps of major general, and lieutenant general, with the command of a regiment, and all the perquisites and emoluments attaching to that important position, the same inducement would no longer exist to give extravagant prices in the junior ranks of the service. There have been very important changes in the system of promotion during the last six years; formerly every officer rose to be a captain, and then obtained a brevet, becoming, in course of time, lieutenant colonel, major general and so on; he might never have served a day in command of a regiment, or acquired any experience of that character, but he was eligible for command, and could retire on half-pay. It is impossible to imagine any worse system than this; not only was he promoted, though he had no service, but he had better chances than a man with service, because he did not go to unhealthy climates. This mode of promotion has been swept away, and in its stead has been substituted that of promotion for service. At the present moment the rule is that no man can rise above the rank of lieutenant colonel unless he has held a regimental command for a certain period, or served for a certain time upon the Staff. The Staff will be very soon closed to everybody who has not passed through the Staff College. The mass of regimental officers of course will not go there—in fact, it would be very inconvenient if they were to do so—and you will consequently have a number of excellent officers whose only chance of rising to the higher grades of their profession will be by having five years' service in command of a regiment. How are they to obtain this qualification? I will suppose the case of officers who have not the money sufficient to purchase their promotion. I hear it said by the gallant Colonel (Colonel Herbert) that they may acquire the necessary qualification by their senior going on retired full pay or by death vacancies. But again I ask, with the long list which precedes his own name, and the few opportunities which can thus occur, how is it possible for the necessary qualifications to be obtained by poor but deserving officers? As a broad and general rule I believe it will be very difficult for a man who cannot purchase his lieutenant colonelcy to rise to the higher ranks; and, when the practice becomes established, the injustice will be felt to be intolerable, and will lower the army as a profession in the eyes of the British people. It is therefore necessary to devise some means by which the rule may be broken through in favour of those who have not money, and who may not succeed in getting the death vacancies. The view of the Commission was that the cessation of purchase of the rank of lieutenant colonel would open an avenue to those who could only rely on meritorious services for their claims to improve position, and would also diminish what I believe is the unanimous disposition of the lower ranks—to give illegitimate prices. You found it impossible by the "declaration upon honour" to check this tendency; the only way, therefore, to do so, will be by diminishing this temptation. I come now to some other points which have been raised in the discussion. It is said in answer to the proposals of the Commission that the danger of selection will be very great, on account of the likelihood of favouritism and political pressure. Hon. and gallant Gentleman say that under a despotic government you may select the best officers for particular services, but that in a free country it is impossible to do so. I believe that is a libel on free institutions. Those selections are even now made in other professions, and in the army they would be made under the influence of public opinion brought to bear on them by this House. I believe the statement of the impossibility of selections under free institutions, when examined, really means this—that by the criticism to which the selections are liable you give the selector a very uneasy life. That is quite true; but in proportion as it is true, it is a guarantee against favouritism and jobbing. The apprehension of public criticism of a job prevents a job being done; the whole system of publicity rests on that criticism. Look at the Admiralty; for many years the Admiralty was in the habit of making political promotions; it was notorious. Public opinion has revolted against it, and the House of Commons took the chief part in putting it down. Now, no Minister to influence a division, or for any political motive, would dare to give a ship to an officer incapable of commanding her. Such is the susceptibility of the House of Commons on this subject that I recollect a strong and I think unreasonable attack was made within a very recent period on a right hon. Baronet opposite, because he wished to get a naval officer into the House to assist him with his professional experience in conducting the public business. I think it was a very proper course for him to take, and I only mention the case to show how jealous the House is of all such influence. But it is said the person making the selection of officers in the army should not be the Commander-in-Chief only, it should be somebody else. How the Secretary of State can make the selection I do not know. He would have no personal knowledge of the merits of any of the officers. He must go to some military man to make any selection for military reasons. It is argued that the selection by the Commander-in-Chief is not only liable to be influenced, but that it cannot be made with proper regard to efficiency. I doubt that very much. Sir G. Brown said, in his evidence before the Commission, that he was quite sure that the Commander-in-Chief has the means of knowing the character, capacity, and intelligence of every officer in the army, if he goes to the proper quarter to ascertain them—the Adjutant-General's office, and that he himself, when in that department, had been repeatedly sent for by Lord Raglan to discuss the fitness and ability of officers required for a particular service. Sir G. Simpson and Lord Pasnmure both state that the Commander-in-Chief has full means of knowing the character of every officer. It is said that this power of selection may be exercised during a war, but not in time of peace, and that in peace promotion by selection would degenerate into a system of promotion by seniority. But what is the present system but a system of seniority accelerated by purchase? Then it is said there is a difficulty of selecting in the case of officers serving abroad. The Duke of Cambridge says he can select officers at home, but not so well abroad. I admit there is a difficulty in doing so. Though in India, or wherever large bodies of troops are collected, the means exist of comparing officers together, yet where the force is less there are less means of comparison. I have gone through the objections raised to the question of selection for the rank of lieutenant colonel. I have in this blue-book evidence on evidence, from men whose opinion is entitled to great weight, that the command of a regiment should not be held for a very long period by one officer. This is the opinion of Sir C. Yorke and Lord Panmure. The distinction drawn by the Commission of which I was a mem- ber is, that it is in the upper ranks of the army the sale of commissions gives rise to scandal and injustice, but that in the lower ranks it gives that acceleration to promotion necessary to keep the army in proper physical youth and vigour without being attended by the evils it causes in the upper grades. When I signed the Report of the Commission, I did so with the conviction that on a very difficult question this was the best course to take. I view with apprehension and alarm any proposal for the entire abolition of purchase; I do not see what is to replace it. I have looked carefully at the plan of Sir Charles Trevelyan; but I think his proposals would weigh hard on the officers of the army, and throw a very heavy burden on the Government. His plan, on paper, shows a great saving, but, practically, I do not think it would prove so. The principle we follow is not open to many of the objections urged against the system of purchase, while it removes it from the ranks, in which the greatest evils and scandals arise from it. I signed the report, believing it laid down the best course to pursue, and I have seen nothing since to shake my opinion. Holding, as I do, that purchase in some shape, to some extent, in some ranks, is necessary, I believe it better to preserve that system and make it more useful by making it less open to objection. Without pledging myself to details, because many points will require very careful consideration, I may state that the principle laid down by the Commission is the principle the Government acknowledges in dealing with this question. It will be my duty to prepare a scheme founded on that principle with the greatest care, thought, and caution, and lay it before the military authorities for consideration. On one side it may be said by the hon. and gallant General (Sir De Lacy Evans), this is a miserable course of proceeding, and a very small measure of improvement; that it does not meet all his conceptions, and, therefore, he will have none of it. On the other, my right hon. Friend behind me (Mr. Ellice) will say the change is too hasty, too sweeping, and too rash. I have been accustomed to live between two fires; and, between two extremes, I am not sure but we are nearer the truth. As far as I see my way, I am prepared to act. It must depend, of course, on the Government how the measure can best be shaped. There are great difficulties to encounter, strong prejudices to be met; but beyond the point to which I see my way I will not move an inch. This great machine, the English army, is not a thing to play with. The value and reputation of an army does not depend merely on its numerical force, but on the spirit by which it is animated, and we must not deal lightly with anything that concerns it. I have, for a civilian, had much experience of military matters; and every day I am disposed to think more highly of the English Army, its working, and administration. I have told you the principle on which the Government are prepared to act. I will lay before the military authorities a scheme based on that principle, and which will carry our views honestly into effect. I trust the House and the country will support us in bringing this scheme to a successful issue. I listened with the greatest attention to the evidence which was given before the Commission by Lord Clyde, General Spencer, Lord West, and other officers who were in favour of the total abolition of the system of purchase. They saw all the abuses and scandals by which the working of the system was attended; but they did not appear to have thought of the substitute for it which was to be provided, or how a remedy was to be applied to the evils of which they complained. The simple remedy of plunging our hands into the public purse will not do. Then what course, let me ask, is open to us? For my own part, I think that purchase ought to be limited to the ranks of the service below that of lieutenant colonel, in which position I think due care ought to be taken that an incompetent man, to whose charge the lives of 1,000 men are committed, should not be placed. While, however, I deem it right to act upon the principle which I have just laid down, I will not be driven to go one inch beyond the point to which I distinctly see my way. Our army is a machine too delicate to be lightly handled, and while I shall seize the earliest opportunity consistent with due deliberation to submit to the Government the scheme to which I have referred, I feel bound to dissent from the Resolution of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, as well as from the Amendment of the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Berks.

MR. ELLICE (Coventry)

said, his right hon. Friend who had just spoken was quite justified in regarding the question under discussion ns being one of the most difficult and important which could be submitted to the notice of Parliament. He must, how- ever, confess that he did not think the mode in which his right hon. Friend had announced it to be his intention to deal with the subject was calculated to diminish the difficulties by which it was beset. To the system of purchase taken in the abstract he was perfectly aware strong objections existed. He was, moreover, ready to admit that if any scheme could be devised by which those objections could be put an end to, without impairing the efficiency of the army, he should be prepared to give such a proposal his cordial support. He was at the same time, however, unwilling to take a course by which the abuses which at present existed would, instead of being removed, be to a great extent aggravated, and he should, therefore, advise hon. Members to be careful how they gave their assent to the proposition which his right hon. Friend had shadowed out. It was quite true that that proposal had emanated from the majority of a Commission of which his right hon. Friend was a Member; but then it should be borne in mind that there was also a minority which had objected to the recommendations which the Commission had made. In that minority were two general officers of great experience, who were of opinion that those recommendations would, if carried into effect, tend to increase the evils with respect to the system of purchase of which complaint was made. One of those officers had, he might add, arrived at the highest rank in the army without ever having purchased a step, and had seen officers who possessed larger means frequently placed over his head. Now, the scheme which had obtained the approval of his right hon. Friend was accompanied by so many difficulties that he was unwilling to pronounce any very decided opinion upon it until the measure in which it was embodied had been laid before the House. He must, however, observe that if the right hon. Gentleman deemed the scheme so good a one as he seemed to think, it was somewhat strange he should not have placed it on the table in a tangible shape some time within the last two years. It would seem, indeed, as if the proposal of his right hon. Friend had been brought forward simply to meet the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, but he could not help thinking it would have been laid before the House with a better grace if it had been introduced when the Army Estimates were being moved, in conjunction with those great improvements which he was prepared to admit his right hon. Friend had during his military administration effected. The right hon. Gentleman founded his proposal on the grievous abuse which was said to exist with respect to the system of exchange, and also with respect to the means by which officers arrived at the rank of lieutenant colonel. The right hon. Gentleman in doing so, however, appeared to forget that the abuse on which he relied was one which had reference to other times, for he (Mr. Ellice) must do his Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief the justice to say that since he had become Commander-in-Chief it had ceased to exist. Those instances in which officers of large fortune had exchanged with poorer officers from one regiment to another, even when they did exist, could have been very easily dealt with, if the authorities were so disposed. They were perfectly well known at the Horse Guards, which, in fact, had encouraged them, so that the authorities were to blame for the abuse which had taken place. The practice, moreover, had not been one of common occurrence, and yet the right hon. Gentleman was disposed to regard it as one of the great evils of the existing system! Now, he should like to know what effect the proposal of his right hon. Friend was calculated to exercise on the lower ranks of officers in the army? Was it probable that many gentlemen would be desirous of entering the service by means of purchase when they were aware that, having arrived at the rank of major, they might be able to proceed no further, and might have a favourite of the Horse Guards placed over their heads? A great deal had in the course of the discussion been said about foreign armies, but the question which the House had to consider related to the English army, which could only exist in a country like our own. We had no conscription, no enforced military service. Our officers were independent, and not the slaves of absolute power. They were under the protection of that House. They were, as his right hon. Friend had truly said, derived for the most part from the middle classes. Well, then, how did the matter stand? A clergyman, a lawyer, or a manufacturer placed his son in the military service of the country. He happened, perhaps, to have some £3,000 or £4,000 to give him with a view of promoting his interest in life. He knew that as things at present stood so long as the young man conducted himself well nobody could be raised over his head by means of patronage or jobbery. Thus far the system worked well, and one security for the independence of the army was afforded. But there was also another point worthy of consideration. At present it appeared to him that whether a man was promoted by seniority or by purchase, it came to the same thing. One abuse—the great abuse of the system of purchase—had been done away with; no man could now enter the army without satisfying the country of his efficiency by passing an examination. There were now, owing to an agitation of the question for thirty years, and through the willing assistance of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for War, two examinations which a man must pass for the army as there were for the navy. Formerly there was no examination at all. A man could purchase his steps and arrive at the command of a battalion, and no man knew whether he was able to take the command of 1,000 men or not. But it was hard to say what influence the proposed change, if adopted, would produce in the independence of our officers, whose promotion might be interfered with by an undue exercise of patronage. There were also considerations of another kind. It must be recollected that ours was an army which was scattered throughout India, Canada, the West Indies, the Mediterranean—in short, over all parts of the globe, in small detachments, and that it was of the utmost importance that the officers by which it was commanded should maintain unimpaired their esprit de corps. That feeling would not admit, however, that it should be in the power of the authorities to select some gentleman, a relation perhaps of some Member of that or the other House, and put him over men who had been quartered in a pestiferous climate, where their services were forgotten—merely because it was thought he had done better service at St. James's than in foreign fields? His right hon. Friend was not a member of the Commission on which he (Mr. Ellice) had the honour to serve. Both Earl Grey and he had tried very much to improve the scientific corps of the army. The hon. and gallant Member for Harwich (Captain Jervis) had stated their case with great truth. Nothing could be worse than the state of the scientific corps. Six or seven years ago it was very difficult to find a captain who had not arrived at the age of 60. During the Duke of Wellington's campaign in the Peninsula they sent out to him various superior officers of the Artillery, and along with them Captain Dickson. He found them all unfit for the position intended for them, and he took Captain Dickson, who being a general in the Portuguese service, and the two armies acting together, became a general in the united army, and commanded 12,000 men during the campaign. Such was the state at that time of the Artillery and Engineers. In the Commission, Earl Grey and he proposed that some measures should be taken at least to accelerate promotion, if for no other reason than this—that our troops served sometimes with other troops in the field, and a young foreign officer of 30 or 35 having been advanced for some particular service, was found commanding some of 60 or 70 years of age. They proposed to the two distinguished officers who served on that Commission, Sir John Burgoyne and Sir Hew Ross, that in the Artillery and Engineers, in order that something might be done, they should adopt the course taken, he believed, in the French army, and have one-third promotion by merit and two-thirds by seniority. Those two officers said they knew what were the feelings of these corps. The officers lived together as brothers. There was no mode of distinguishing during peace who were the superior officers, and they asked how they could select one man and place him above his seniors? If that system were attempted it must fail. The right hon. Gentleman (Mr. S. Herbert) had quoted such parts of the evidence of General Brown and General Yorke as appeared to be in favour of his proposition; but, so far as he (Mr. Ellice) knew their opinions, he must say there were no two officers in the British army more averse to this scheme. The proposition was that purchase should stop at the majority, and that officers should be selected for lieutenant colonels. His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief on being asked his opinion on the subject, said he hoped that if that plan were carried out they would find some other person to undertake that selection. In this country during peace it was impossible. It might not be impossible in time of war, but it would be unjust: for, suppose a regiment serving in Jamaica, the officers sacrificing their lives in that pestilential country, was some young man for distinguishing himself in the Crimea to be placed over the beads of men of long and laborious service? The men who suffered most and deserved most from the country were those who served and suffered in those remote and isolated stations. Well, but was there no remedy for the evils of which his right hon. Friend complained, and preventing incompetent officers arriving at the head of regiments? They had some discussion on that subject in the Commission, and he asked the Duke of Cambridge whether he thought it would be his duty, supposing he knew a man incompetent to command, I to appoint him even by purchase in his own regiment? His Royal Highness said, certainly not; but still it would be a very difficult and invidious duty to place on him. This, however, was very unlikely to occur, since examinations were instituted in the army by which the competence of officers was, to a certain extent, secured. There was another remedy suggested by his right hon. Friend, in which he entirely concurred. He thought there was nothing so bad as placing officers in command of regiments, and keeping them there till they became general officers. First of all they became too old for their duty, and then it stopped all kinds of promotion in the service. Unless they intended to alter the system of purchase altogether—and he would give his willing consideration to any scheme the Government might propose with that view—his belief was the only improvement they could now safely introduce was to use their authority directly to see that no incompetent officer was appointed to command a regiment; that officers shall only remain six years in command, and that the public should be prepared to provide liberally for them. They had no right to tell a man who had embarked his money as well as his existence in their service, that they would deprive him of that reward he had looked forward to until he became major general. He did not think the difference between his retiring allowances on full pay when he became a major general would be a very serious addition to the expense of the army. And he believed the best step between the existing system and that new system, which some more able man than himself must suggest for the abolition of purchase altogether, would be what he had just indicated. The hon. and gallant officer (Sir De Lacy Evans) had stated that he had produced certain papers before the Committee with respect to the relative condition of the navy and army. To show how serious a question this was, they had 150 retired officers who had from £1,000 to £3,000 a year from the public. Those pensions for their past services in command of regiments were partly a remuneration for the money they had invested in the service. An admiral in the navy had from £400 to £600 a year and no more, yet no man could say that a general's service was either more difficult or arduous than that of an admiral in the navy. Then there was our Indian army. Was that to be placed on the same footing? Their Indian officers were in a state of great uncertainty; they knew not who were their masters, and what was to be their destiny. It was full time that question was settled. Before they attempted to patch up the affairs of their own army and entertained novelties in their system of promotion, for God's sake let them have, at all events, before them some scheme as to how they were to deal with the Indian Army. That army, he supposed, would be added to that of the Queen. In the Indian Army the system of promotion was very different; the scale of pay, allowances, and pensions was very different; but these things were all in the air. They unsettled things very fast, and settled them very slowly. Let them, then, have some general scheme, not of mere patchwork, but by which they seriously intended to settle the affairs of the whole army, and then the House would decide on the entire question. Having said thus much, he might add, that he knew of no Administration that had done so much for the British Army as that of his right hon. Friend. Go where they might, look to what branch or department of the army they pleased, they would find that his head and hand had been at work in the right direction. This made him regret all the more that he felt himself now compelled to differ from his right hon. Friend on this occasion; but he must beg and entreat him to consider that each British regiment of Infantry was the best pawn to be found on the military chess-board of the world. It always stood its ground; it always did its duty well whenever and wherever called upon. Let them be just to the army—err rather on the side of generosity and liberality to their officers than show a disposition to curtail their privileges and advantages. The moment was one in which it was necessary to give encouragement to do everything that was great and generous on the part of the country towards the army. And, being afraid that the proposition of his right hon. Friend would be very badly received by the army in general, he was sorry to differ from him.

COLONEL NORTH

said, he had heard with regret the observations of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary at War. His proposition was but an endeavour to get in the small end of the wedge which would eventually lead to the destruction of a system most advantageous to the army and the country. The plan of the right hon. Gentleman was not yet before them, but it would appear that the only prospect which an officer had in future before him was to attain the rank of major. However bad it might be on principle to look merely to money as a means of promotion, it would be still worse to have to look to the patronage of men in power. He could not clearly understand from the statement of the right hon. Gentleman how the officers were to be selected, and whether lieutenant colonels were to be chosen from the majors of other regiments. If that were so, they would be obliged to proceed a great deal in the dark, for it was well known that many men who showed no particular abilities as majors when promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel made very good commanding officers. The chief reason why he objected to doing away the system of purchase in the army was the way in which it would operate to the injury of as good and brave a body of men as was to be found in any army in the world—the noncommissioned officers. He could not suppose that for the mere 1s. or 1s. 6d. a day, which the sergeant major would get when raised to a subaltern's position, he would be willing to sacrifice all his associations and remove into a totally different sphere to that in which he had formerly moved, and a sphere for which he was quite unfitted. In his opinion, the non-commissioned officers themselves would much prefer the continuance of the present system, as they generally looked forward to obtaining a commission as a reward of bravery and good conduct, in order that they might sell it and maintain themselves and their families in comfort. He did not think the statements of the hon. and gallant General, with respect to the manner in which the promotions were made, were quite in accordance with the facts, nor did he concur in the remarks he had made with respect to the youth of the officers. He believed that no class of men showed themselves better or more efficient in the Crimea than those youthful officers, and contended that their early entrance into the army was essential for the formation of thorough soldiers and officers.

LORD STANLEY

said, he did not rise for the purpose of continuing the de- bate, but to express his hope that the hon. and gallant General would not think it necessary to divide upon a question with respect to which no distinct expression of opinion would be conveyed by the votes they gave. He had been a member of the Commission which sat on this subject four years ago, and he could assure the House that though no man had gone into that Commission with a stronger conviction of the anomalies and inconveniences of the purchase system, yet after he had heard the evidence there given he could not but see, as he believed all the members saw, that to abolish totally that system throughout all grades of the army was an undertaking of great difficulty, one which would be attended with enormous expense, and for the carrying out of which no sufficiently matured plan had then or to this day been submitted to the House and the country. As a member of that Commission he had at the time readily concurred in the compromise to which it had come, and which was embodied in the plan now proposed by the Secretary of State for War. To that course he was still prepared to adhere, and if the House went to a division, he should be compelled to vote against the proposal of the gallant General, which went to abolish the purchase system without substituting any plan for it, while he should be equally prepared to vote against any Resolution which might assert that the system was one which could be defended in all its parts. It appeared to him that the hon. and gallant General would, by pressing his Motion to a division, only injure the cause he had taken up, since many Members would be compelled to vote against him, who on general grounds would be in favour of some amelioration of the system. He hoped the House would be prepared to receive the compromise recommended by the Government without a division.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he would accept the suggestion of the noble Lord, and withdraw his Motion.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

observed, that he hoped the hon. and gallant Gentleman who had moved the Amendment would be disposed to withdraw it; as, of course, it was inapplicable now that the hon. and gallant General did not mean to take the sense of the House upon the Motion.

CAPTAIN LEICESTER VERNON

said, that of course, as the Motion was withdrawn, he could have no objection to the withdrawal of the Amendment.

Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Main Question put, the House divided:—Ayes 59; Noes 213: Majority 154.