HC Deb 14 June 1860 vol 159 cc424-40

Order for Committee read; Motion made, and Question proposed, "That Mr. Speaker do now leave the Chair."

MR. LINDSAY

said, he rose to move the Resolution of which he had given notice:— That with a view to greater efficiency in war, and less expenditure in peace, it is the opinion of this House that more prompt and effective measures should be adopted to complete the reserves of Marines and Seamen for Her Majesty's Navy. The number of the Naval Reserve, it had been generally agreed, should not be less than 70,000; but this proposal was very far from having been carried out. First, the Report of the Royal Commission recommended that there should be at all times a reserve of 5,000 Marines in addition to those that were enrolled at that time. Out of that number only 2,000 had been enrolled, and it was therefore 3,000 short. It was also recommended that there should be in the home ports a reserve of 4,000 seamen. Of these not a single man had been enrolled. It was recommended that the Coastguard should be increased to 12,000; only 6,800 had been entered, including officers, boys, and landsmen. Of short-service pensioners only 169 had been entered of the 3,000 recommended. Of the Naval Volunteers from the Merchant Service only 1,100 had been enrolled. The Commission recommended that the numbers of the Naval Volunteers should be 20,000; and he (Mr. Lindsay) thought there ought to be no less than 30,000; but there was only, by the last Return, 1,100 enrolled. The whole number enrolled of every kind was very far short, indeed, of the lowest estimate of what the Royal Commission considered necessary for the protection of the country. Every hon. Member in the House would agree that it was necessary to maintain the fleet in an efficient state, and at as small an expense as possible. At the present moment they were spending on the navy in the time of peace about £13,000,000 annually. They were doing so for two reasons; first, because there was no reserve; and, as the country must be prepared for war, they were compelled to keep a large fleet in commission always cruising about, as they could not otherwise obtain sailors at a short notice. This large fleet induced France to suppose this country had some intention of attacking it. It was a preposterous idea, but it had an effect on the Government of France and compelled it also to increase its naval force; which again reacted on this country. England spent more money because France did the same; and because France was spending money England spent more money also. But what this country was compelled to do arose to a great extent from the want of a Naval Reserve. The question then arose, had the Admiralty done all in its power to bring this reserve up to the proper number? It ought to be brought up to it on the ground of economy. With such a reserve it would not be necessary to keep a large fleet always cruising about. The bounties and retaining fees offered by the Admiralty had not drawn a sufficient number of men from the merchant service. The country was spending £1,000,000 a year to officers on the reserved and retired list of the Royal Navy; and yet if they were to raise reserves to the full extent re commended, they had not got officers sufficient to command them. They were still scarce of active young efficient officers. If, however, they were to look to the merchant service, where quite as strict an examination was undergone as in the Royal Navy, and perhaps stricter, they would have no difficulty in obtaining the number of officers required, from that service, to command the reserve, and for a very small retaining fee indeed. Money was not so much an object with them as the position they would gain at home and abroad by being recognized as officers of the reserve; and they would all be recruiting officers for the Royal Navy. The consequence would be that we should, instead of having obtained only 1,100 men, have in all probability secured by this time the services of 20,000. As it was, the state of the retired list was such, the amount of money which it cost the country so serious, and the dissatisfaction among the officers so great, that Her Majesty's Government had been obliged to stop the supply; that is to say, instead of having eight or ten midshipmen as formerly in a line-of-battle ship, we now had only from two to four. The effect was, that the supply of young officers in ships of war was short, and that being so, they were obliged to fill the places of those junior officers by other men competent to perform the duties. Under these circumstances, he would recommend that a higher grade of petty officers in the Royal Navy should be established to perform the duty of midshipmen. That would also act as a further inducement to seamen in the merchant service to join the navy. He wished to say one word in regard to the Articles of War in the navy. It was, in his opinion, most expedient that the Articles of War should he revised, so that men might not be precluded from entering the navy by a dread of the punishment to which they might under the operation of those Articles be subjected, and the ends of justice be defeated by the fact that owing to their severity, the officers durst not, in many instances, carry them into execution. As to the question of flogging, he should only say that while he was not prepared to advocate its complete abolition, inasmuch as it was, perhaps, necessary in order to uphold discipline, he should wish to see it maintained with some symbol of justice; the seamen, instead of being subjected to summary chastisement, being afforded the privilege of a trial as was the case with the soldier. Having made these observations with no intention of stopping the Supplies, but simply with the view of bringing the important matter to which he had referred under the serious consideration of the House, he should beg to leave to move the Resolution of which he had given notice.

Amendment proposed, To leave out from the word 'That' to the end of the Question, in order to add the words 'with a view to greater efficiency in war and less expenditure in peace, it is the opinion of this House that more prompt and effective measures should be adopted to complete the reserves of Marines and Seamen for Her Majesty's Navy.'

MR. LIDDELL

said, he wished, before the noble Lord the Secretary for the Admiralty rose to reply to the speech of the hon. Member for Sunderland, to call his attention for a moment to a subject which was quite germane to the question before the House. He referred to the subject of school ships, with regard to the non-establishment of which considerable disappointment was felt throughout the country. Now, he should remind the noble Lord that the raising of a Naval Reserve had been recommended as only a temporary measure, and had been resorted to simply for the purpose of creating a supply of men for the Navy until the period had arrived when a permanent supply might be secured through the medium of school ships. It was, nevertheless, he believed, the fact that there was only one of those ships in existence, and that vessel had been stationed, or was about to be stationed, at Southampton. He should like, under those circumstances, to know why a larger number of school ships had not been put into requisition and why it was that the application of Liverpool to have one of them placed there had been overlooked? He was also anxious to ascertain from the noble Lord whether any communication had passed between the Admiralty and the Board of Trade in which the co-operation of the former was solicited in the working of the scheme to which he was alluding? He believed that the fault lay in the lowness of the Exchequer, and that there might be some difficulty in getting the money; but he (Mr. Liddell) could not too strongly urge upon the House the necessity and importance of making a beginning of that great scheme which had been recommended by the Commissioners for Manning the Navy. They were spending millions of money in building and altering their ships, but they had not men to man them, and money could not obtain them. He had it upon indisputable authority that the supply of seamen every year was becoming more and more scarce, and neither by money nor money's worth could they obtain them. The establishment of the system of school ships, however, would do much to break clown the barrier which now existed between the naval and the merchant service, and speaking from his own experience he felt assured that the Government would meet with the co-operation of the inhabitants of our seaport towns in carrying it into effect.

LORD CLARENCE PAGET

In reply to my hon. Friend who has just addressed the House, I have to state that several communications have passed between the Admiralty and the Board of Trade on the subject of school ships. There are two classes of those ships—the ships exclusively for the Royal Navy, and what may be termed mixed school ships for the navy and merchant service combined. I am now speaking of mixed school ships, and my hon. Friend is, I may add, misinformed, if he supposes we have established any of those vessels at Southampton. The Commission having recommended that there should be 2,000 boys trained in school ships for the navy, the steamship Eagle will be, I believe, located at Southampton in furtherance of that object. I can, however, assure my hon. Friend that her Majesty's Government are extremely anxious not to stand still in this matter, but we think it the wisest course to wait and see how the school ships for the Royal Navy will succeed, before we commence the mixed system. It is a question of time. I am not at all surprised that those connected with the shipping interest, and, indeed, all who are concerned for the welfare of the navy, should be most anxious to have this scheme of school ships fully carried out. We are just as anxious as they can be; but surely the Government must be allowed some sort of discretion as to the rate at which we must proceed, always having regard to the economy of the public money, for as yet the cost of these school ships cannot be ascertained with precision. My hon. Friend may depend upon it this subject is not at all lost sight of by the Admiralty or the Board of Trade. It is only part, and a great deal must depend on the amount expended on other parts of the scheme of the Royal Commission. With regard to the Naval Reserve, for instance, a very large expense has been incurred in fitting out ships and batteries; and, although the numbers enrolled do not come up to anything like 20,000, yet we are making very fair progress. I can inform the House—if we only chose to lower the qualification—if we chose to enter into the Naval Reserve force, men who were not first-rate seamen, we could make great show in a short time. But it has been the policy of the Government, and I think it a very wise and sound policy, that we should not enter in it any but first-rate seamen. To prove that they are first-rate seamen who are entered in the reserve it is sufficient to state how anxious shipowners are in entering men to get what are called reserve men into their ships. The officers of the Great Eastern, for instance, in preparing for the Transatlantic voyage, have shown the greatest anxiety to get as many men as possible belonging to the Naval Reserve, knowing that they are first-rate seamen. My hon. Friend (Mr. Lindsay) made a very fair statement, and I am very much disposed to agree with a good deal that he said. There is but a shade of difference between us, and that is in regard to the merchant service officers. Nobody is more aware than I am, that, in the event of war, we must count on the young officers of the merchant service. That I think nobody will doubt for one moment; but my hon. Friend wishes that they should be entered at once into the reserve force, with an honorary rank. That is no doubt a very taking view of the matter. I should certainly be very much disposed to concur with my hon. Friend when be says we should have already enrolled 20,000—he mentioned 20,000, but the number recommended was 30,000—had we allowed the officers to join. But much as I should desire to see the merchant service officers employed if an emergency should arise, I cannot say they should be appealed to join the reserve merely with the view of influencing the men to enter. I think my hon. Friend hardly does the officers of the merchant service justice in this respect. I believe they are all exerting themselves very much to induce their men to enter this service. But I am bound to say, if the merchant service officers were to be entered with the title of officers of the navy, we should probably very soon have them coming for pay as well as honorary rank. That becomes a question of pounds, shillings, and pence —a mere question of expenditure. But as such it is a very serious question. So much for the first recommendation of my hon. Friend. His second recommendation was in regard to petty officers. He said if our petty officers were placed on a respectable footing, it would be a great inducement for merchant men to join the navy; but he must be aware that we have what are called chief petty officers, who are a superior class of men, receive very good pay, and form a link between warrant officers and the petty officers and the ship's company. Then my hon. Friend referred to what he considered the cruelty of our Articles of War, which he said alarmed merchant seamen from entering the navy. I was in hopes I should before this have been enabled to propose a Bill with a view to amend our naval code; but I can now inform my hon. Friend and the House that the Duke of Somerset is about to lay on the table in "another place" a Bill for the improvement of the Articles of War in the Royal Navy. I think my hon. Friend's observations were very much confined to these points. With regard to the present state of the navy, I may state that we are entering able seamen wherever we can get them. We might take second class ordinary seamen on board our ships from the merchant service, but I believe the Admiralty are perfectly right in not taking all-comers indiscriminately into the navy. I believe one cause of the late unfortunate occurrences which took place in some of our ships was the great admixture of the lower class of merchant seamen, being utterly unused to anything like discipline, not having been brought up in the navy, and having no interest in common with it. In many instances the disturbances were, in fact, traced to the action of these seamen. For the same reasons the desertions have increased. I do not wish to say a word against the merchant seamen as a body. I believe good merchant seamen are as good men as we could get; but the Admiralty, I repeat, are, I think, quite right in not lowering the qualification prescribed, and entering any but first-rate seamen into the Naval Reserve, or into the navy itself. Although we might swell the numerical force, and greatly increase the expenditure, I do not think it would tend to render the navy more efficient. We might fill our ships up quicker, but I believe it would be bad policy, for we should be introducing into the navy a class of men who really are not likely to do credit to the service. We have at the present moment nearly 9,000 boys in the navy. Only conceive of what value these boys—who will, no doubt, mostly turn out first-rate seamen—must in a short time prove in the navy. You will have so many young men brought up in the service and attached to it; and, if the public will only wait patiently, they will see the navy in a short time on the most satisfactory footing in that respect. I may state to the House, indeed, I have done so before, but I will repeat, as the Member for Southwark will probably allude to the subject, what is the state of our home or reserve force at the present period. In the Coastguard, including Coastguard ships, we have 6,642 men and officers. The Naval Reserve, or volunteer force, now amounts to 1,105 men. The Royal Naval Coast Volunteers are 7,070, and the Marines on shore amount to 6,084. These different bodies of men I have enumerated amount altogether to 23,831. We are enlisting Marines as fast as we can, recruiting parties being out in all directions. We are as anxious to enlist Marines as my hon. Friend or any one can possibly be. In addition to the large force at sea, we have got fitting out a line-of-battle ship, the St. George, and it is satisfactory to state, that although that ship has been in commission only for a very few days, she is already more than half-manned. We have also fitting out the Bacchante, the Hecate, the Barracouta, the Geyser, the Torch, and the Bloodhound. There are a great number of seamen in the Royal harbours, including the men in the flag ships and harbour ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth, who will be perfectly available in the event of any unfortunate emergency. I must say, in conclusion, that I think it would be much more convenient to the House that I should reserve myself to answer the observations which hon. Gentlemen deem it their duty to make instead of having to speak early in these debates. The hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Southwark (Sir Charles Napier) usually prefers to wait till after I have addressed the House, when I have no opportunity of replying to his remarks. I am obliged to rise, and when I have spoken the hon. and gallant Member gets up and takes me to task for what I have said. I will only add that no exertions shall be spared on the part of the Admiralty to ensure an efficient navy and Naval Reserve.

ADMIRAL WALCOTT

To the question at issue, what will secure the seamen whom we already possess, and what will win others to the naval service? I would answer, four conditions;—the encouragement to continuous service, the incentive to emulation, the advance of wages commensurate with the seaman's increase in science, and a liberal pension at the expiration of a given period of faithful duty. Our present languid supply is the consequence of our past undiscriminating and irrational treatment of the indifferent and deserving seaman alike. At present, after a service of ten years, all seamen are entitled to a retirement on 6d. a day. I would induce them then to enter the reserve to an addition of £6 or upwards to this existing pension of £9; and the boon would bind these men to remain faithful to their own country instead of transferring their energy, vigour, and proficiency to another land. Let me repeat and press the suggestion upon the Admiralty, speaking as I do from long experience, from considerations matured by intimate acquaintance with a sailor's habits and ways of thought, that to recruit our navy efficiently we must invite the lad of 14 to 16 years of age, then docile and open to strong impressions, when the excitement, change, and novelty of a life at sea would present the most persuasive attractions, and he would easily adapt himself to the routine of order, regularity, cleanliness, and drill in gunnery and seamanship. The hardy youth, born and bred in our seaports, was the class from which the seaman sprang. Let training ships be stationed at Portsmouth, Plymouth, Chatham, Woolwich, and Deptford, under the command of officers of skill, judgment, and prudence, who would render the naval service attractive, and enter boys to the number of 3,000 to 4,000 a year, and I will pledge my professional character to the result—the formation of an efficient navy within a few years. It is of no avail to equip the most imposing array of our floating bulwarks, unless they are alive from stem to stern with first-rate practical officers and efficient crews, adepts in seamanship and gunnery. To secure this paramount object—to answer the country's just expectations, it is indispensable to hold out certain reward to the meritorious officers and seamen who exhibited zeal and proficiency in the discharge of their duties. Infuse this spirit into the navy, and the supremacy of England will be disputed only to secure for her an era of new triumphs.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

said, the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty complained that he always waited, until he had spoken, to bring him to account. The fact was, he had been in the habit of speaking early in the debates until experience taught him that it was necessary to wait for the noble Lord, because the noble Lord had a very clever way of parrying what fell from other hon. Members with respect to his department, and leading the House away from the questions that were addressed to him. He did not think the noble Lord had given a satisfactory reply to the very able speech of his hon. Friend the Member for Sunderland. His hon. Friend complained with great justice that the recommendations of the Manning Commission had not been carried into execution. He had shown that the Manning Commission recommended a reserve of 30,000, not counting the 5,000 additional Marines which they suggested should be raised, or the 5,000 men for other stations. Now, they had it on the authority of the noble Lord himself, that after scraping together all he could get from different resources, the whole number of the reserve amounted only to 23,000 men, and if he would read the Report of the Commissioners he would find that he had included certain classes who ought not to be comprised in his estimate. We had not made the addition to the Marines which was recommended by the Commission, but had only increased that body by 2,000. The Commissioners gave their opinion that the reliefs at the home ports and the Coastguard ought to be speedily raised, but the Admiralty had not speedily raised either the one or the other. The restrictions upon the Coastguard were a great deal too high, too great a length of service being required. The Commissioners recommended that this force should consist of 12,000, and although a year had elapsed since they made this suggestion, we had now no more than 6,800. The state of affairs on the Continent was not very promising, and if matters grew worse, how were we to obtain the men necessary for manning the fleet? The Commissioners also recommended that there should be 4,000 seamen in the different ports, in addition to those in the guard-ships and flag-ships, and the men scattered in various places; but not a single one of those 4,000 men had been raised. There was no use trifling or practising concealment in this matter. Of the total number of 6,800 Coastguard men only 3,181 belonged to the class called "fleet men." He supposed that we should obtain the 20,000 Naval Volunteers some time or other; but as his hon. Friend had asked with great propriety, Suppose you had obtained and had occasion to call out your Royal Naval Volunteers, where would you get officers to command them? You will then find it absolutely necessary to come to the mercantile service. Well, why not come to that service now, assign Volunteers their rank, and give some slight decoration—say, an "arrow," embroidered on their collar. When they went to sea in the splendid fleets of our merchant seamen, that decoration would proclaim to all on board, "I am a Royal Volunteer Officer—why have you not Royal Volunteer Seamen?" But the Admiralty would do nothing of the kind out of the absurd jealousy they entertained of the merchant service. The noble Lord said these officers would ask for pay. He did not see how they could do so unless they were employed; and he insisted that the plan of his hon. Friend was a plain and sensible one, showing a thorough knowledge of the merchant service, while the noble Lord as plainly showed he did not know how to deal with them. Then they were told that it was the influx of men from the merchant service that had caused the late disturbances on board the fleet. Why, ever since he had been in the service there had been a constant influx of men from the merchant esrvice, and very glad were they to get them. They used to get them from all kinds of craft during the last war—aye, and worse than that—convicts, "Lord Mayor's men" as they were called. It was because he wished to save the navy from being flooded, in periods of emergency, with such worthless, disreputable characters, with the sweepings of the streets and gaols, that he urged the maintenance of a disciplined reserve force, which they could call to the aid of the regular navy in time of war. If that were once properly done, there would be no need for those fortifications that were now so much talked of. But what was their condition? If war were to break out the next day they would require 120,000 seamen; and he would ask, where were they to be got? The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty had expressed his disapproval of the bounty system adopted by the late Board of Admiralty, but he would ask what else was to have been done? Ships were lying three and four, and even five, months in harbour after they were commissioned for want of men; the bounty was offered, and the late Board was able to man ten sail of the line. Of course, a proportion of these deserted; that had always been the case; but if the Government instituted an efficient system of police and punishment, desertion would soon cease in the British navy. The noble Lord said the Admiralty were now engaged preparing new laws. But how long were they to take in the preparation? The task was not a difficult one if the Board would only set about it in earnest; two or three officers would in a very few days make all the corrections that were needed. Now, he had made the matter more plain. He told them that the navy was at this moment between 7,000 and 8,000 seamen below the Vote of the House of Commons. He insisted that the Government ought to follow the example of their predecessors, and offer bounty to recruits until they had made up the proper complement of men, and then, if they thought proper, they might discontinue it. His hon. Friend recommended a higher grade of petty officers. He had over and over again stated that there was not a sufficient distinction made between the petty officers and the seamen. The only way to raise their position was to raise their pay, and the Admiralty ought to insist on the Chancellor of the Exchequer giving them money for that purpose. At present all that the best men on board a ship had to look forward to was the rank of boatswain, gunner, and carpenter. As to rising beyond these there was not the smallest chance. If a warrant officer did a gallant action in the war, he had a chance to get a commission; but since the peace that had been a rare event. Various things had been done for the benefit of seamen. The Royal Commission had recommended the establishment of a Seamen's Fund; but was there any prospect of that recommendation being carried out? Then, why were savings banks not established? It had been promised that savings banks should be established in the different ports, though nothing had been done: but he contended there ought to be a savings bank on board every ship. There was another thing of which he had often spoken privately. There was no ore to take care of the seamen's money on board ship. The seamen had no safe place to put their money; some stowed it in their bags, and some in their hammocks, where there was great danger of being robbed. How easy would it be for the paymaster to take charge of the money and keep a running account with the men. He might be told the paymaster had too much to do; then give him an assistant. That, it would be said, was expensive but if it was necessary to the efficiency of the navy, expense ought not to stand in the way. The noble Lord apologised for the short supply of school ships by saying the batteries were not ready. What did they want with batteries? They wanted ships. Then the noble Lord said there was a difficulty in the merchant service of getting men. But he was informed by a gallant friend, the Great Eastern had no difficulty in getting petty officers with twelve years' service from the Royal Navy; and the great steam companies—the Peninsular and Oriental Company, for instance—could get their choice of men while the British navy was in want of them. All the great steam companies readily got the men they required; and there was no reason why the navy should not obtain them also, if they took the right course. The reason was that the service was unpopular. It was a disgrace to the country that it should be so, and the Admiralty ought to devise some means to correct the evil. As to entering boys of sixteen or eighteen years of age, he was aware that they would cost a great deal before they would be efficient seamen, but, as they had been cobbling, God knew how long, without succeeding in obtaining a sufficient number of men, they ought to take boys, however expensive it might be. The effect would not be felt immediately, and besides that, they ought at once, seeing the state of affairs in Sicily, and the confusion throughout the world, to take steps to obtain a proper reserve. He believed that the expenditure of large sums of money in fortifications would be entirely and totally useless. A man like Napoleon Buonaparte, with an army of 600,000 men, would not be such a blockhead as to attempt to land men where the fortifications were placed. He would go a little to the east or a little to the west, and he would find plenty of places where there were no fortifications. When England commanded the seas she defied the whole world, and the British way—the only way—to defend this country was to maintain a well-manned and a well-disciplined navy.

MR. BENTINCK

said, it appeared to him that the whole purport of the Motion of his hon. Friend was to imply, or rather to assert, that the Board of Admiralty had not done the utmost in their power to carry out the recommendations of the Manning Commission; and he was bound to add that if that was the object of the Motion it was one in which he entirely concurred. He did not think that the Board of Admiralty had exerted themselves to the utmost to give effect to those recommendations; and he further believed that they had consequently neglected an important duty. But the question then arose, upon whom was the principal blame in that matter to rest? Now he was not prepared to throw all the blame upon the Board of Admiralty. He admitted that they were the body directly responsible, but it should be remembered that they had great difficulties to contend with. He believed that the real blame laid with that House. The indifference of the House of Commons to the importance of the question was the cause of the absence of the necessary exertions on the part of the Board of Admiralty. That Board had, like all other public departments, to deal with that most inconvenient personage a Chancellor of the Exchequer, who seldom allowed his mind to wander beyond figures, was indifferent to the requirements of the country, and was ready to starve every branch of the Government in order that he might reduce his Estimates to the lowest possible amount. He did not deny that the Board of Admiralty ought to insist on obtaining the sums required for the efficiency of the service over which they presided; but it was rather too much to expect from any particular set of gentlemen that they should break up the Government with which they were connected by coming to a quarrel with the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Under these circumstances the blame must be charged upon the House of Commons. Let some paltry discussion be raised involving the advent to office of one party or another, when it was of little consequence what the decision might be, they saw 500 or 600 Members coming down to the House, and taking the most eager interest in the result of the division, whereas during a discussion on the state of the navy the benches were almost deserted. The inference was that the House of Commons were perfectly indifferent upon the subject. He felt persuaded, however, that until the House should put a pressure upon the Admiralty, the present wretched system of conducting the naval service would continue. That system was based upon the principle of a penny-wise and pound-foolish economy, and the benefit of £13,000,000 expenditure was lost, when £1,000,000 more would make the defence of the country complete. It was a question purely of pounds, shillings, and pence, and all discussion of details was a mere waste of time. The great steam-packet companies obtained as many men as they wanted, as his hon. and gallant Friend had stated, because they chose to pay for them, and it was a disgrace to this country that it should experience the slightest difficulty or delay in procuring the men it required for its navy. Let the Government pursue one or other of two courses. Let them either say, "we disagree with the recommendations of the Manning Commission, and we are not prepared to carry them into effect," or let them resolve on carrying them out by incurring the necessary expenditure. There was one other point to which he wished to advert. He entirely agreed with his hon. and gallant Friend in his condemnation of the proposal to defend this country by fortifications. He regarded it as utter insanity. He believed that for all practical purposes the money to be so expended might as well be thrown into the middle of the sea. It was impossible, in his opinion, to doubt that one-half of that money employed in raising and maintaining an efficient Channel fleet would do more good than all the brick and mortar or all the stone work that could ever be erected.

MR. WHITBREAD

said, that he wished to correct a misapprehension as to what had fallen from the noble Lord at the head of the Admiralty. The noble Lord had stated nothing about the difficulty experienced by the merchant service in obtaining men for their ships, but that they were anxious to get the men who had joined the Royal Naval Reserve, and adduced the fact to show that they were first-rate seamen. He might also add with regard to savings banks on board ships, if the gallant Admiral meant the reception of the seamen's money and the payment of interest, there was no such institution; but if he meant that, instead of placing their money in their chests and hammocks, sailors ought to have a place of safe deposit, there was what was called the second chest, into which savings were received by the paymaster, and the men were pressed by their officers to place their money there for safety. As to raising the number of Coastguard it might be done at once, but it must not be forgotten that it would take away the best men and half ruin the fleet. By lowering the qualification for the Coastguard and for the Reserve numbers might be added, but they would not have men to be depended upon, and they would not have first-rate sailors.

ADMIRAL DUNCOMBE

said, he believed that the immediate subject then under consideration was the manning of the fleet. The Admiralty were accused of not having made sufficient exertions to ensure the due accomplishment of that object. It should, however, be borne in mind that able seamen, of whom alone a reserve ought to be composed, were very difficult to get. Only that day week he was on board the Great Eastern, and one of the officers told him that, although they expected to have to go to sea in forty-eight hours, they were seventy-eight able-seamen short; that they did not know where to get them, and they thought of endeavouring to obtain them ultimately in America. It was true that men had been readily obtained for the St. George and the Bacchante, but as one of those vessels was to convey his Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to Canada, and the other was to be the ship of Prince Alfred, the facility with which they were manned could not be considered a fair example of the ease with which men could be obtained for the navy. He was delighted to hear that the articles of war were to be revised, as he believed that such a revision would tend more than any other step which could be taken to make the naval service popular. The maintenance of discipline on board ships was of the greatest importance, but punishment should be commensurate with offences; it should also be certain, and it was impossible to carry out the extreme penalties provided in the present articles of war. He entirely approved of the recommendation of the Commissioners that a large number of boys should be trained for the Royal Navy. He wished they had 15,000 or 20,000 of those boys, for he believed that their services would hereafter be productive of the greatest advantages. It was on the education and training of boys that in future years they must rely for a supply of sailors.

MR. AUGUSTUS SMITH

said, that the House was about to be asked for Votes upon account of the Civil Service Estimates; a practice to which he entertained the strongest objection, because when the money was obtained nothing more was heard of the Estimates until so late a period of the Session, that there was no opportunity of fairly discussing and considering them. It was quite true, as was stated by the noble Lord the Member for the City of London the other night, that in the years 1851, 1853, 1854, 1855, and 1858, money was voted upon account of these Estimates, the consideration of which was not commenced until the months of July or August. But what had been the result of the adoption of that course? Why, these Estimates had increased from year to year to a very considerable extent. In 1851 they amounted to £3,900,000, in 1853 to £4,800,000, in 1854 to £6,600,000, and in 1858 to £7,235,000, and he thought it was full time for the House to look into that expenditure. The proper course would be for the Government, instead of asking for Votes on account, to take those Votes upon which the balances were running short, and let them be fairly discussed and their amounts voted. The first item for which money was wanted on account was the salaries of the First Lord, the Lords and the Secretary of the Treasury, who were the persons responsible for the delay of these Estimates, and who ought, in his opinion, not to receive their money until they had fulfilled their duties to that House. The most important, perhaps, of all the Votes was, however, that for public education, which had run up in amount in a greater degree than any of the others; and if they agreed to these Votes on account, they would hear nothing more with regard to the subject of them until a late period of the Session, when it would be impossible to bring them under discussion. There were also Votes for the Commissioners of Works, for the convict establishments at home, and for the consular service; all of which ought to be fully discussed, but for the consideration of which the House would obtain no sufficient opportunity if it now consented to give Votes upon account. It had been said that the Estimates could not be submitted to the House earlier because there was before it a great and urgent constitutional question, and those who agreed with him had been accused of wishing to impede the progress of business. Such an accusation was unjust, because the Reform Bill was pressed upon the House in opposition to the wishes of all but a small section of its Members. He should not oppose the Motion that the Speaker should leave the chair, but he should take the sense of the Committee upon the first Vote on account that was asked for.

Question, "That the words proposed to be left out stand part of the Question," put, and agreed to.