EUROPEAN FORCES—INDIA—LEAVE. (Hansard, 12 June 1860)

§ SIR CHARLES WOOD

I rise, pursuant to the notice I have given, to move for leave to introduce a Bill repealing the powers possessed by the Secretary of State for India to raise men in this country for the local service of Her Majesty in India. 369 The Bill I propose to introduce contains only one simple clause for this purpose; and I have adopted this mode of bringing the question before the House, in order to test its opinion on the principle of the measure, without encumbering it with any details that might distract attention from the main question. In the execution of the measure a great number of details will have to be carefully considered. Indeed, if the House refers to papers now on the table, it will find among them a letter addressed to me from one of the ablest officers now serving in the Indian army, suggesting the necessity of appointing a Commission or Committee of experienced officers, to go into the numerous and minute details that will arise when the measure is brought into practical operation. I will therefore state generally the principle of the plan that I think must be adopted, and avoid entering into a statement of the details. I adopt this course also for another reason:—I stated earlier in the evening that the Council of India did not concur with the plan. But they have stated fairly and frankly, that if the decision of the House confirmed that of Her Majesty's Government, they would faithfully endeavour to carry that determination into effect. I did not think it fair to ask the Council of India to prepare any plan, or consider any plan, till that decision had been come to; but I shall be most anxious to have the benefit of their advice on the details of any plan for carrying out the determination of Government and of Parliament. I think there can be no great difficulty in carrying a plan with this object into execution. Even among the papers on the table of the House there are no less than three detailed plans of the kind. Two of them are drawn up by officers of the Indian army, and one by an officer of the Queen's forces, now serving in India, Sir William Mansfield. I have received a fourth detailed plan, also drawn up by an officer of the Indian army; and in principle all these four plans are much the same; if they differ it is on points of detail. They, therefore, show a general concurrence of independent authorities, all intimately acquainted with the subject with which they deal.

Before going farther, I will state what the military forces in India have hitherto been. It is generally known that the India Company had in India three large armies —those of the three Presidencies, Bengal, Madras, and Bombay. Each of these consisted of Native regiments, comprising artil- 370 lery, infantry, and cavalry. The Company have had besides these, from the earliest times, a number of European troops—the Company's troops, they were called—raised in Europe. They consisted of artillery and infantry. There have been also in India, for many years back, a considerable number of Queen's troops, which comprised only infantry and cavalry. The European infantry was therefore common to the Line and the local forces; the European cavalry was exclusively that of the Queen's army; the artillery was exclusively the Company's. Before the breaking out of the mutiny the Native armies amounted to near 250,000; but I need not refer further to them, I will confine myself to the Europeans. Without going very far back, I may state that in 1830, the Company's European forces consisted of artillery, and one regiment of infantry, in each Presidency. About 1840 a second, and in 1854 a third, European regiment was added in each Presidency. During the mutiny three regiments of infantry and five of cavalry were added in Bengal, but the infantry was not trained, and the cavalry regiments hardly formed. After the Sepoy mutiny, discontent arose in the local army, and a large proportion of it obtained their discharge. The Queen's troops in India have for many years been in the proportion of about two to one of the Company's European troops. In 1820 the Queen's troops were 20,000, those of the Company 10,000; in 1839 Queen's 17,000, Company's 8,500; and in 1852 the Queen's troops were 28,000 to 14,000 of the Company; but during the mutiny the number of the Queen's troops was about 90,000, to 24,000 of the Company's European force. This number was the maximum which the Company's force ever reached; but they were not all fit for service. After the discontent manifested by the Company's local troops, about 11,000 of them took their discharge; and this force was reduced to about 12,000 men. Now, the only question on which I wish to take the opinion of the House is this,—whether we shall continue to maintain a separate European force for local service in India, or whether all the European troops in India shall form part of the Queen's general army. I must say that this question is one on which I long entertained the most serious doubts. I stated last Session that we were prepared to maintain to a certain extent a local army in India; and it is only in consequence of events that have taken place since, and 371 longer and more careful consideration, that my Colleagues and myself have arrived at the conclusion that it is not expedient to continue that separate local force. I wish to state, before I go further, what the chain of circumstances and arguments were by which we arrived at this conclusion,— not only to relieve ourselves from the appearance of inconsistency, but because the same arguments may weigh with others, and tend to induce the same conclusions.

When India was governed by the Company this question was not brought to my notice. The only military question connected with India which I had to decide was the addition of one regiment to the local force, which I assented to with the concurrence of Lord Hardinge; and the substitution of irregular for regular cavalry, which was under discussion with Lord Dalhousie, when I quitted the Board of Control. When my noble Friend (Lord Palmerston) introduced his Bill for transferring the government of India to the Crown, I was asked whether the disposal of the Indian army would not be an insuperable obstacle to the change. I answered him that, though it would be a difficulty, it formed no insuperable obstacle, as I thought the Native regiments might be officered by officers from the Queen's troops, placing them on an unattached list for Staff appointments. Before this question could be brought to a decision the matter was taken out of our bands by a change of Government. When in last June I was appointed to the office which I now have the honour to hold, I found that my noble Friend who preceded me had decided on maintaining a local army in India to the extent of two-fifths of the minimum European force in that country, and I am not ashamed to confess that I was extremely unwilling to disturb the decision in this respect at which my noble Friend had arrived. I well knew the single-mindedness with which he formed his conclusions on all subjects connected with India which came under his notice, and that he had carefully considered this particular question. I felt, therefore, the strongest anxiety to carry his views into effect. I may, however, remind the House that at that time the mutiny of the European troops in India had been only recently reported in this country, and that its more grave features had not been brought to our knowledge. It was under these circumstances that I made the announcement in August last to which I have referred, and I was not a little stir- 372 prised to bear on that occasion the strong opinion expressed by the gallant Officer opposite (General Peel) against this course as I had understood that Lord Derby's Government had concurred in it. I then, as appears from the papers which have been laid before the House, submitted to a member of the Council of India, who came over to this country charged with the views of Lord Canning on the subject, and who certainly is one of the ablest advocates of the maintenance of a local army, the determination at which my noble friend who preceded me in office had arrived on the subject. I stated to Colonel Durand that that determination was to keep up the local army to the extent of two-fifths of the minimum European force in India. Now, it is desirable, as the House will not fail to perceive, that the amount of the local army should not be a varying, but a fixed amount, because any variation in the amount of force would be more easily made in the Queen's troops serving in India, who may be moved to any part of the world according as their services might be required. The force in India was then upwards of 90,000. I was, however, in hopes— though my hopes were not perhaps quite so sanguine on the point as those which others entertained—that the European force in India might be diminished to an, extent which I do not at present deem expedient. I took the numbers which General Hancock in his Report suggested should be 60,000 men, and I asked Colonel Durand, assuming that to be the minimum number required for India, how he would dispose of 24,000, two-fifths of that number. As will be seen by his letter, which is amongst the papers on the table of the House, he said that it must be a mistake to take that number as two-fifths of all the force, and that any such arrangement should have excluded the artillery and engineers, and concluded by observing that there was no alternative between the adoption of Lord Canning's proposal, supported in the main by the Report of the Military Committee of the Indian Council, and a new Act, leaving it to the wisdom of Parliament, which would then assume the responsibility to devise whatever it might deem expedient. Now, Lord Canning's proposal was that there should be an army of 80,000 Europeans, two-thirds of which should be a local force. The Military Committee of the Council of India concurred substantially in that view, fixing the total at 78,000 instead of 80,000, so that I 373 looked upon Lord Canning's proposal as being supported by the Report of the Military Committee. The local force, therefore, in accordance with the opinions of its principal advocates, ought not to amount to less than two-thirds of whatever number of European troops we maintained in India, whether that number were 40,000, the two-thirds of 60,000, or 53,000 some odd hundreds, the two-thirds of 80,000. It was also contended that a small local force would not occupy that equality of position as compared with troops of the Line which everybody seemed to regard as indispensable. The amount of local force to be maintained on the determination of my noble predecessor satisfied nobody. These views, I confess, took me somewhat by surprise, and tended very much to shake my confidence in the propriety of the determination which I had announced to the House. While the question was pending a succession of letters, extracts from which are on the table of the House, arrived from India, pointing out how much more grave and serious the conduct of the European troops who had mutinied was than had been supposed in the first instance. The mutiny began to assume the appearance not of being the work of young men who had just gone out to India, but of an organized combination among their older comrades, and this new aspect of affairs as represented by Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield, furnished ground for serious consideration.

In dealing with this subject, moreover, the question of expense had always presented one of the greatest difficulties. I myself was under the impression that the additional expense of Queen's troops would be very much greater than that of a local force. This, however, was a point with respect to which it was not easy to procure any impartial opinion, those who took opposite sides with respect to it being disposed to regard their own facts and figures as the only accurate data. I referred to the Registrar General under these circumstances, and he suggested a civilian not likely to be biassed by military views in order fairly to investigate the question. The Report of this gentleman has been laid upon the table, and the result is that the additional expense of maintaining Queen's troops is found to be much less than the Indian authorities supposed. Later in the course of the autumn, we received accounts of the number of men who took their discharge from the Indian army, and that in 374 consequence that army was reduced from upwards of 24,000 to 12,000. The question, therefore, which we then had to consider was not whether we should maintain the Indian army, such as it was, but whether we should raise a new army—not to the extent of 24,000 men, for that number would not be satisfactory to the advocates of a local army—but to the extent of at least 40,000. It seems to me that after what has been reiterated by the advocates for maintaining a local army, we may dismiss altogether from our notice the proposal for maintaining a small local army in India, which is a course which everybody who pays regard to the efficiency of such a force seems to condemn. That was the question which we had to consider last June or July, but such is not the case at the present moment. Circumstances have altered within the ten or eleven months, and we are not therefore open to the charge of inconsistency, if we have now apparently come to a different decision from that at which we some time ago arrived. A small local army would be inefficient, a large one seemed to us to be dangerous, and we therefore came to the only possible conclusion, that a local army ought not to be maintained.

I have made this brief statement in order that the House may see the reasons by which our policy has been guided, and I shall now proceed to state more fully the grounds on which our decision is based. In doing so I think I may avail myself at the outset of an admission which was made in the discussion on the Motion of my hon. and gallant Friend behind me to the effect that à priori the argument is now in favour of our having only one army in India. During the period of the existence of the Company's government, there were many reasons which might be advanced in support of the maintenance of a Company's army. It was many years ago contended that it was necessary the army should belong to the governing power of the country, although even then many high authorities differed on the subject. Since, however, the transfer of power from the Company to the Queen has taken place, I think the force of argument lies entirely the other way. I dismiss altogether, for the reasons I have stated, the idea of a small local force. No person of authority advocates that there should be only one army in India, and that a local army. The question is between a large local army 375 as well as troops of the Line, or only troops of the Line maintained in India. I would ask, in the first place, whether it is desirable to raise in the same country, and from the same class, two bodies of men for the same purpose, but ruled by different authorities and guided by different forms of military discipline. That is the first question which I call upon the advocates of the maintenance of a local army to answer in the affirmative, and if they cannot do so upon any reasonable grounds, then I contend the à priori argument is against the view which they take. If, then, they are not able to substantiate their view in this respect, they must either show that the local reasons are so strongly in favour of a double army as to overbalance the general disadvantages connected with such a system, or that it is impossible with justice to put an end to the existing army as it stands.

Now, I am prepared to admit that much ought to be conceded to the wishes of the Indian army, and that its interests ought to be carefully protected in dealing with this question. I should feel very differently if it were proposed simply to put an end to the Indian army; but the proposal is that they should be united to and form part of the Imperial army. I admit fully that nothing can be prouder than the recollections of the old Indian regiments of the three Presidencies; but we propose that they should form part of an army not less glorious than themselves, and on whose standards are emblazoned many of the battles from which they derive their own renown. Seringapatam and Delhi are not only on the standards of the Indian army, but on many of the standards of the English army. The victors of Arcot and Plassey would be associated with those of the Peninsula and Waterloo. What are the wishes and feelings of many of the Indian officers on this subject? I admit that the older officers are generally for the maintenance of the Indian army, but the greater part of the younger officers are in favour of amalgamation. Among the papers you will see statements to that effect. I would beg to call attention to the letters on the subject of Lord Elphinstone contained in these papers, because they contain the most reasonable and well-considered views on the whole question, without any prejudice of any kind. What does Lord Elphinstone say? I was constantly in communication with him on this subject, and in a letter to me Lord Elphinstone says:— 376 With regard to the local army, I think that people in this country, with the exception of a few of the senior officers, are fast coming round to the view which I have always taken of the subject. If the local army has no exclusive privileges and advantages, it must of necessity sink into a secondary and inferior force. This conviction is now forcing itself upon the more intelligent of the local officers. They see that in amalgamation with the British army lies their only chance of continuing upon a footing of equality, or, perhaps, I should rather say, of maintaining the superior status which they have hitherto enjoyed. The same observations are made by a very able and well known Indian officer in this country. I asked him "What do the officers in the Indian army think of amalgamation?" He said, "Every officer above the rank of a major is for the continuance of the local army; of those under that rank nine-tenths are for amalgamation." It is not unnatural that the older officers should he attached to the proud recollections of the service with which they were connected and, on the other hand, it is also natural that the younger and more active officers should be glad to have the chance of service in connection with their brothers in arms elsewhere than in India; and why should we damp that spirit from which the efficiency of our future army in India is to be derived?

I must now, Sir, perform what is certainly the most painful part of my duty to-night, which is to call the attention of the House to some of the extracts of the letters on the table, which I must say appear to me to furnish the strongest grounds for the course we are about to take. It would be exceedingly unbecoming in me, a civilian, to venture to give an opinion on the efficiency, or discipline, or conduct of a regiment or of an army; but those most competent to form such opinions have given them. Their opinions have influenced us, and I think they ought to influence this House. I shall give no opinion of my own; I shall simply read extracts from the letters which are before the House, containing the views of persons well acquainted with the circumstances, well acquainted with the facts, well able to form an opinion, and which will, I have no doubt, have great weight with this House. Of the gallantry, bravery, and endurance of the Indian army no one has ever expressed a doubt; but there does seem to be, I confess, a most unanimous concurrent testimony of all officers of the Queen's troops that the discipline of the Indian army is not what it ought to be. To a considerable extent this has been admitted by their own officers. 377 I do not mean by discipline being well set up, or smartness on parade; but I mean what has been so well expressed by Sir John Lawrence when be said:— While I admit that the tone and interior economy of a Royal regiment may on the average be somewhat superior to that of a local regiment, the difference is not so marked as may be supposed. [Opposition cries of "Hear, hear!"] All I seek to establish by that extract is that the interior economy of a Royal regiment is superior to that of a local regiment. But I was anxious to quote the words which so well express what I mean by the short expression of discipline. It may be said that the Queen's officers are partial witnesses; but when I find them saying that the discipline of a Queen's regiment remaining long in India deteriorates to a considerable extent, they may be admitted to be just to both services. What does that prove? It proves that there is some cause acting upon both local and English regiments to deteriorate the discipline of troops remaining long in in India, and it is not difficult to assign a reason. I use the word discipline as the shortest. I mean by it the interior economy of a regiment and the relation subsisting between its officers and men. I believe it has been generally observed that a local colonial corps which cannot come under the general supervision of the higher military authorities is apt to degenerate, more especially if they serve in a climate where exertion and energy are not likely to carry them on for a very long time, unless under the stimulus of war. Officers, after tea or fifteen years in India, are not so active and energetic as they might have been in a cool climate, or had they been in India for a shorter period. Sir James Outram, an experienced Indian officer, speaks of a Queen's regiment, after ten or fifteen years in India, being in the same state as a Company's regiment; and he speaks of the system of the Indian army being such that it is a wonder there is any discipline at all. That discipline in that army is sadly deficient, we have the direct testimony of Lord Elphinstone again. He speaks both of the system of Native and European forces. He says:— The same system, resulting in the total want of all influence over their men in the regimental officers, has led to both. The organization of the late Bengal army was as faulty as its discipline was lax. There can not be a more impartial witness 378 on this subject than Lord Clyde. He has served in India for a great part of his career, as well as in all parts of the world, and is a most competent authority on military matters. What does Lord Clyde say?— It is clear from what we have now seen that it is absolutely necessary not to trust to local corps, and that we can alone put faith in a discipline which is constantly renovated by return to England, and the presence of officers with their regiments who look on them as their homes. In a letter to the Duke of Cambridge, Lord Clyde says:— As your Royal Highness knows, I have always been strongly of the opinion that it is impossible, as shown by practice and experience, to maintain discipline in a local corps, such as we expect in one of Her Majesty's regiments, but it did not occur to me that the loyalty of local corps might suffer. Sir Hugh Rose, not a martinet soldier, goes at great length into the question, I will only read one paragraph; but the whole letter turns on the same point:— Nobody has mixed more with Indian officers than I have. I have never had a shadow of a difference with them because I was a Queen's officer and they were Company's or Indian officers. I know the state of their feeling. They admit to me that the disorganization and undiscipline of the Bengal army, and in a lesser degree of the Indian army in general, were the causes of the mutinies. They admit, especially since the mutinous conduct of the European Indian army in the discharge question, that amalgamation is necessary for the bettor discipline of the Indian army. Such is the opinion of these high authorities. I am quite aware that there is much to palliate the conduct of the younger soldiers. But it is not true that the mutiny was confined to the younger soldiers. We thought at first that this had been so, but what says Lord Clyde upon the point? I beg leave again to draw your Royal High ness's attention to the fact of the passive participation of the non-commissioned officers and so called good men of the Bengal Artillery in the evil intentions of the younger and bolder men who were so near the commission of the worst crime. Again he says:— Even in the old regiments the men have not confidence in their officers. And further in my mind I must accuse the old soldiers of the Bengal Artillery of having been the prime movers and ringleaders in all this bad business. It is perfectly obvious from his letters that, while Lord Clyde did not attach much importance to the outbreak of the recently enlisted soldiers, the deepest possible impression was produced on his mind by the disaffection of the veterans of the Bengal 379 army. He thought, in fact, that a just appreciation of the state of that army as it was disclosed during the summer, particularly in its older soldiers, was perfectly fatal to the maintenance of a local European corps. A much more serious subject of reflection, however, presents itself in connection with what then took place —namely, the power of combination possessed by an army permanently located in India with a separate interest from the rest of the Queen's troops. All history tells us of the danger that may result from a large body of men with arms in their hands having such a separate interest and a power of combining together; for that the combination which took place on the occasion to which I have referred was extensive and perfect is abundantly clear. I do not insist upon this with the view of dilating on the faults of the men who took part in the movement; but I do wish strongly to impress it upon the House as a warning for the future. And here I will read only one paragraph from Sir William Mansfield's letter:— I have observed in The Times and some Parliamentary speeches which arrived by the last mail a disposition to slur over and make little of the misconduct in the local European army in this country. I venture to impress on you the gravity and danger of the crisis which we have tided over, and that it was impossible to exceed in completeness and wickedness the combination which threatened us in May last. Such was the feeling throughout the Bengal Artillerymen that, though the old soldiers and non-commissioned officers were too wary to commit themselves to overt crime, not one of them in any part of the country came forward to warn their officers of what was impending; their combination and conspiracy in this respect being more thorough than that of the Sepoys themselves in 1857. That suggests matter for very serious consideration, and the view which may be taken of it is forcibly expressed in a further extract from Lord Clyde's letter, which says:— Whatever may now be done, the recollection of this strike or mutiny will never die out in the Indian local army. It will very possibly affect Her Majesty's army also in a minor degree; but in the former—namely, the Indian local army—it will live for ever, and be a precedent to which the minds of the men will always revert when they are dissatisfied whith their work or the regulations affecting them. I am, therefore, irresistibly led to the conclusion that henceforth it will be dangerous to the State to maintain a European local army. …. I feel I should be wanting in my duty were I to remain silent, now that the strongest conviction has arisen in my mind that from henceforth we should have no local Europeans whatever. 380 Now, be it remembered that Sir William Mansfield was originally in favour of the maintenance of a local European army. He had stated that opinion very decidedly, but the result of what occurred on this unhappy occasion entirely converted him to the opposite view. This is explained at length in the correspondence, but, as I do not want to trouble the House with more quotations than are fairly due to the importance of the subject, I will read only one more extract penned by him. He says:— I reiterate that the experience of the last six months forbids us to entertain the idea of a local European army of any size, if we value the existence of the empire, Sir Charles Trevelyan, who has taken the greatest possible interest in all military matters, says:— The Royal army is one which, under all the various contingencies to which an empire like ours in India is subject, is more to be depended upon for loyalty to the mother country. As I said before, I do not wish to dwell on these circumstances with a view to exaggerate the misconduct of the men, but I think we should be wanting to ourselves if we did not take warning by what has happened, and did not adopt such measures as human foresight can suggest to prevent the recurrence of such combinations among our troops to demand from the State whatever they might claim as their right. What took place on that occasion ought, as General Mansfield expresses it, to be to us like "the handwriting on the wall," and ought to induce us to use all the precautions in our power against the possibility of its repetition. Now, Sir, I take it to be as clearly demonstrable as anything can be, that the danger of combination is far less in a moveable force which is constantly changing its situation, which is stationed in India at one time, in some other part of our dominions at another time, and which at regular intervals renovates itself by a return to its native country, than in a force permanently located in India. In the Queen's army, if discontent appears in a regiment it may be moved away almost in the ordinary course of duty, but if it appears in part of a force permanently stationed in the country, it may soon spread, may leaven the whole mass and imperil the stability of your empire. The conclusion, therefore, at which we have arrived from the correspondence is that, for the sake both of military efficiency and political 381 safety, the army of India ought to be one and the same with the Queen's.

I certainly was a little struck at finding that in the Military Committee of the Indian Council it was urged that the misconduct of the local troops was a powerful reason for maintaining a mixed European force. I was not only astonished, but sorry to see such an argument used. One more dangerous and fatal could hardly have been advanced. That there are, and would continue to be, jealousies between the two I corps I think no man can doubt who reads this correspondence. I have heard that the Queen's officers complain that, having to servo in India, and to go through the same hardships as the local army, they were excluded from the rewards which it enjoys while, on the other hand, the Indian officers complain, and perhaps not unnaturally either, that they should be shouldered out of the monopoly of good things which they have hitherto possessed, Those jealousies are strongly stated both in Sir James Outram's Minute, and by Lord Clyde. Lord Elphinstone also mentions these jealousies, the differences which exist between the two forces being, in his opinion, one of the strongest grounds for their amalgamation. Out of these differences arises the double Staff. It is also impossible to select on all occasions the fittest man for a particular post, because he must be taken from the one corps, and not from the other. Lord Elphinstone points out, as clearly and conclusively as words can do, that nothing but making the two forces one can put an end to these feelings, which at present prejudice the interests of Her Majesty's service. He says:— There is but one way of setting the question at rest for ever, and that is, amalgamation. If it is not done at once, in the meantime mutual jealousies will go on increasing, and the difficulty of the inevitable final step will be increased. Let us consider for a moment what is the real value of this argument for maintaining the distinction between the two services. It is that the safety of our Indian Empire depends on our being able to use one half of our European troops against the other! Heaven help us if we are driven to rely upon such a resource of safety as that! The argument seems to me utterly untenable, and if we are to trust to it it would be far better that we should quit India to-morrow. We have had that argument used on a former occasion in connection with a previous state of discontent that existed in the Madras army. Sir John 382 Malcolm, from whom I take the liberty of quoting a very short extract, thus deals with it. Speaking of the Indian army, he says:— They should be put upon a footing which would make them have an honourable pride in the service to which they belong. This they never can have (such is the nature of military feeling) while they consider themselves one shade even below another army with which they are constantly associated. There is, perhaps, no other efficient remedy for this great evil than the adoption of a measure by which the whole of that army which Great Britain employs in India should be consolidated into one. The distinctions which now exist are pregnant with every mischief to our rule. They are the source of constant irritation, and are calculated to produce an opposition of feeling among those whose complete union is the pillar of strength on which Great Britain must depend for the safety of her possessions in India. It has been suggested that such divisions might be useful, as they maintained a salutary check; but this limited and unwise suggestion can never merit a moment's attention. It is founded on a distrust of ourselves, which is quite incompatible with the permanent preservation of our Eastern possessions. I think I could not in words express more clearly my own feelings and opinions on this subject.

These are the grounds on which we have come to the conclusion, that both our military efficiency and political safety in India, require the amalgamation of the European forces in India. I should not, however, fully discharge my task if I did not advert to the main arguments of those who advocate separate armies for India. The first argument, which has been put forward in two or three papers which are before the House, refers to the danger which must ensue to India if there should be any power in the Home Government of withdrawing troops from India to England. I think that argument is without foundation. It must be for the Central Government to decide where the wants of the empire are greatest, and where the strength of the empire ought to be concentrated. During the Crimean war it might be necessary that the forces of the country should be concentrated in Europe. During the China war they were properly diverted from that country for the defence of our Indian Empire. If the Home Government are not to be trusted with the decision and the discretion of saying where the forces of the empire ought to be stationed, they are not fit to hold the position of rulers. The risk is said to be in withdrawing such a force as will endanger the safety of India, and we are told that the safety of India was endangered by 383 the troops that were kept from India in consequence of the Crimean war. Now I have ascertained that the force in India in 1857 was less than the force in 1854 by 1,600 men only. But what remedy against this danger is provided by the advocates of a local force? Their proposal is that one-third of the force should be Queen's troops, as to whom the Government are to have absolute power of withdrawal. Take the proportion of 40,000 and 20,000 which has been proposed. The Government at home are to have the power of withdrawing 20,000 men, and we are told that the withdrawal a force of 1,600 will endanger the safety of our Indian Empire. The argument is perfectly absurd, even if the Government are not to be trusted with the power of looking to the general safety of the empire.

The next argument is that the power of the Governor General will be destroyed by the removal of the local European army. I am at a loss to see how this position is proved. There is in one of the papers a long enumeration of duties in reference to the army said to be discharged by the Governor General, but which it seems to me to be impossible for the Governor General to perform, and which would be far better discharged by the Adjutant General or the Quartermaster General. The Governor General ought to have, locally and temporally, the whole power that the Government at home possess, and surely with this power it cannot be said that his authority or position are impaired.

The next argument is the greater expense of the Queen's service. I confess that on the first consideration of the matter, I thought the excess of expense of the Queen's troops much greater than, upon investigation, it appears to be. Depend upon it, also, the most efficient force will be the cheapest in the end; and I do not think we ought to be deterred by the greater expense of the plan proposed, if, on other accounts, we think it good. From the calculations which he made, Mr. Hammack states that if the whole of the existing local force were converted into Queen's troops, the increased cost would be about £114,000 a year. If we assume the whole European force at 80,000, the substitution of local troops, to the extent of two-fifths, as proposed by Lord Stanley, would make a saving of about £184,000. A saving of under £200,000 would, however, as I think, be a very trifling consideration, in an expenditure of at least £14,000,000, if it 384 is to be weighed against considerations of safety or efficiency. I believe that the expenditure may be very much reduced by changes in the system of depôts, reliefs, and the double staff; and I confess I think there is no proof that the change proposed would ultimately entail an increased expense of £200,000.

It is further objected that the whole expenditure for India would depend upon the will of the authorities at home. No expense, however, can be incurred for India, except by the consent of the Secretary of State and the Council for India; and that is as complete a check as can be devised for the control of the expenditure. The question of expense turns mainly on the comparative health and efficiency of troops permanently stationed in India, and of troops frequently relieved. The returns certainly at first sight seem to show that the health of the Indian troops is the best. Mr. Hammack, however, considers the returns very imperfect; and the conclusion is certainly at variance with well known facts and opinions. Returns contained in Mr. Hammack's Report show that the health of civilians deteriorates according to length of residence in India. Mr. Martin, the highest medical authority in the Indian service, says that length of residence in India, so far from conferring any advantage on the English constitution in the way of acclimatization, surely and gradually leads to physical degradation. The general assumption is that English regiments, on landing, have so much sickness that they rapidly lose their men. This is not, however, borne out by the facts. Lord Elphinstone says: Last year there was a considerable excess in the average both of sickness and mortality in the Company's army, though the great majority of the Queen's troops had only just arrived. Mr. Hammack, in summing up the arguments, comes to the conclusion that the most beneficial results will follow from the practice of more frequent reliefs. It is perfectly well known that men come home invalided from India, who are quite competent to serve in a temperate climate. Men who are young and able-bodied, because they can no longer serve in India, are placed upon the pension list; so that the dead weight of the Indian army is greater than that of any army in the world. Men come home invalided after a short service in India, who, under a system of reliefs, might serve many years in this country, whereby the Indian exchequer might be relieved from the payment of their pen- 385 sions for many years before they now come upon it. I do not think, therefore, that the arguments against abolishing the local force, drawn from even the possibility of a slight increase of cost, ought to have such weight as to induce us to pause.

I come now, however, to a consideration which led me to doubt for a considerable time as to the course which was best to be taken. I mean the argument that, if the local European force is amalgamated with the Queen's troops, we shall not be able to obtain that supply of officers for service in India, which the wants of that country imperatively require. If I thought it impossible to provide a suitable supply of officers I should hesitate in the course I am now taking. Before entering particularly into this subject, however, I wish to make one or two observations. The House must remember that the union of the local with the European army, does not necessarily imply any change in the mode of officering the Native array. I think it ought, but it does not necessarily follow that it should. It has been the custom never to remove an officer from a Native regiment till he has reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel; and it is quite possible, therefore, that the Native army should continue to be officered as it now is. I do not think that is the way it should be officered. I only wish to point out to the House, that if there were no other means of providing officers for the Indian service, there would be no difficulty in continuing the present system of officering the Native army, and selecting from those corps officers for Staff employment. Indeed, for some time to come the regular regiments in Bengal, and the armies of Bombay and Madras, must probably be maintained very much on their present footing.

Another observation I wish to make is one suggested by an old Indian of great experience—that of late years there has taken place a great change in the character of Indian officers. They are not so entirely devoted to India as their scene of service as they formerly were, when they used to go on leave only to the Cape of Good Hope and return to India again; a practice which led the officer to regard India very much as his home. The more rapid and easy communication with England now enables officers to come home instead of going, as heretofore, only to the Cape; and this circumstance has tended very much to diminish the difference between the officers of the local army and 386 those of the Line. The former are not so exclusively Indian as they once were.

But what are the services for which these officers are required? They are principally on what is called Staff employment, and that in India has a very large significance. It includes diplomatic service, employment as collectors, magistrates, and judges, service in the Commissariat and Ordnance departments, in the Pay Office and in public works and, indeed, in every conceivable mode of employment. So far as the civil service is concerned, I think the supply from the army is a very valuable one; but the efficiency of the army is impaired by the removal of officers from their regiments. So far as the civil service is concerned it would be better to provide for it in some other way than to ruin the army. But even as applicable to all Staff employment the present system is by universal admission the worst that could be adopted for the army. The officers are taken from their regiments and employed in the discharge of civil duties, perhaps for many years, and then return to the command of their regiments when they have ceased to have any practical knowledge of military matters. I will only trouble the House with one quotation from the opinions of both Queen's and Indian officers on this subject, though they all concur in condemning it. Sir Patrick Grant says:— The efficiency of regiments, in my opinion, is most injuriously affected by the number of officers taken from corps for Staff employment. Either regiments are drained of their best and most deserving officers, or patronage is not dispensed with reference to superior merit. … European officers now fix their whole thoughts on devising means of getting away to Staff and other detached employment; anything rather than regimental duty is the universal feeling. The consequences of this craving are utter indifference, not to say positive dislike, towards their men, and the engendering of a reckless, discontented disposition, which is, I doubt not, communicated to the soldiers. I need read no more to prove the vice of the present practice. Whether the local army be maintained or not it is indispensably necessary to put an end to this system, and provide officers for the civil service in some way which would not impair the efficiency of the regiments, This may, I think, be most conveniently effected by the formation of a staff corps, from which officers could be chosen for such employment.

There is another point on which I wish to state my opinion. I have arrived at the conviction that the whole of the Native army should be under what is called the 387 irregular system—a term which Joes not, however, mean what the words seem to imply, for the regiment would be under the most careful superintendence and exact military regulations. Lord Elphinstone, Sir John Lawrence, and other distinguished Indian authorities are of opinion that the Native army, cavalry, and infantry, should be placed on the irregular system. The Commission on the organization and the Military Committee of the Indian Council have recommended that all the Native cavalry, and part of the infantry should be so formed. In point of fact this is now the case as to the greater part of the army in Bengal, and the whole of the forces going to China are organized on the irregular system. Lord Elphinstone says:— The best regiments in Bengal were the irregular cavalry, and the same holds good throughout India. I would apply this system to the whole Native army, infantry as well as cavalry. Sir Henry Frere, after recommending it strongly, proceeds as follows:— The essential difference between the two bodies is not the being subject to—or exempt from rule generally. Both are subject to rules of their own, and the difference is in the nature of the rule, which is often stricter and more imperative in the irregular than in the regular corps; but the unwritten rules of common sense applied according to the judgment of a single selected officer, to which the so-called irregular is subject, appears to me much better adapted for the government of Native troops than written rules intended to ensure uniformity of system and conformity to the English army, which have lately governed the regular Indian army; therefore, I would advocate the general adoption of the former system. Under this system I believe that the discipline is more effective than it otherwise would be, and it affords the opportunity of employing Natives of a higher description in your army than can be found in any other mode of service. There is another advantage to be especially looked at in the present state of Indian finance, and that is, that it is cheaper. Then comes the question, how is the unattached Staff Corps to which I have referred to he formed? Sir John Lawrence, Brigadier Chamberlain, and Colonel Edwardes in their Paper on the Indian Army, suggest a mode of doing so by the formation of colleges in India, and a certain amount of training. I will only quote the concluding paragraph relating to the subject. "By such a system a well selected, highly trained, and efficient Staff would be secured for the irregular regiments." Other modes have been suggested, but in whatever way this 388 may be done the selection should be made from young men in regiments in India. Whatever Indian appointments there are they should be eligible for them, and the Native troops should be officered from that corps. It is obviously a matter of indifference whether they are taken from a local force and also Line, or from the Line only, the selection in either case resting with the Indian Government. Then comes the next question—is it likely that the Line will furnish an adequate supply of those officers? Lord Canning, in a Minute which I have laid upon the table to-night, expresses a strong opinion that they will not. His opinion, however, is contrary to that of many others well able to judge on such a point. The arguments against our expectations of getting a sufficient supply of officers from the Line are founded on a state of things in which those officers have not been in a position to obtain those appointments. It is only recently that Staff appointments have been thrown open to officers in the Queen's service, and therefore it is not fair to argue that young men will not in future be found to do that which hitherto they have not had any opportunity of doing. Upon this point Sir Charles Trevelyan says— But if, instead of this, an Indian career were opened to Line officers, and it were arranged that a certain period of regimental service in India, with a certain proficiency in military science and the Native languages, would qualify for transfer to the local Staff corps, young men would crowd into the Line regiments serving in India in order to push their fortunes in that country. Sir Patrick Grant says the same— Under this system the European officers would look upon their regiments as their homes; to be attached to a Native corps would be considered one of the prizes of the service; and the permanent association between officers and men that must ensue would, more than anything, tend to restore the old feeling of mutual respect and attachment which, in the early days of British power in India, united the Native soldier and his European officers. Lord Elphinstone takes a similar view. He says— I am convinced that it would be a wholesome stimulus to exertion; and that, in the room of one young officer of merit withdrawn from his regiment for the Indian Staff list you would have two or three qualifying themselves, not only for selection to this list, but for the active duties of their profession. He goes on to say— If the question of local or Line troops turns upon whether the Line can supply a sufficient 389 number of officers, qualified for the various duties now taken by the officers of the Indian army, I have no doubt that the decision will be in favour of the Line. Wherever an opening has been made for officers of the Line, they have eagerly prepared themselves, by studying the Native languages, to compete with the Company's officers. He further says— I have just received an answer to an inquiry I made as to the number of officers in the Queen's Regiment here (the 31st), who are studying Hindostani. I find that, besides one officer who is in England, and who is said to be a very good Hindostani scholar, three of those present with the regiment have passed the examination in the vernacular, and two more have lately begun to study. This in a regiment which has hardly been a year in the country, and with hardly any inducements to officers to take the trouble of acquiring a new language. Sir William Mansfield says— We should have one homogeneous service, which would present a much wider field of selection for the instruments of Indian civil and military administration than we had under the old system, and I believe that the fear that we should lose our means of preserving to India a class of gentlemen properly educated for it, would be found to be a vain and futile one. Colonel Norman in the same sense says— It would be found, I am persuaded, that a list of this description would be composed of good, hard-working officers; and that the evil anticipated by some, that we should not have a body of officers who had made up their minds to serve in India, would never be felt. On the contrary, I believe the Staff would be better supplied than at present. What I contemplate then is that we should have a body of officers so raised, so trained, and so employed by the Indian Government rising in rank after a certain number of years' service, and devoted to an Indian career. That is the ultimate state of things which I hope to arrive at, but which cannot be attained for some years, as the existing Indian officers have prior claim to service on the Staff. The officers of the late Bengal army are to a great extent at present so employed, and it is only as vacancies occur that openings for officers of the Line will present themselves. This interval will afford ample time to ascertain whether or not the officers of the Line will furnish a sufficient number of candidates. If the supply from that source should not be adequate, there will be ample time for us to take other means for procuring the requisite supply of officers. This employment on the Staff is the answer to the fears which have been expressed, that there is any intention to break faith with the Indian officers. Those 390 fears are unfounded, as such an idea has never been entertained. It would be most unjust, most ungenerous, and most unwise to break faith with those officers. Let me show how our measures would affect different classes of officers. Take the case of an European regiment in the Company's service. All the existing officers of that regiment will rise by regimental seniority until they arrive at the usual period of rising by general seniority. All the new officers in that regiment will come in as Queen's officers, available for general service. Every soldier in that regiment has entered for ten years, and at the end of that time will be entered for general service, as will all men who are raised for them henceforward. If the regiment remains in India for ten years, the probability is that few officers and none of the men will have any claim to be continued on Indian allowances. After about that time the regiment will be available for general service. With regard to these regiments, we propose to try whether a system which is much advocated by many Gentlemen in this House will be successful or not. We do not propose to introduce the system of purchase there. An officer entering will rise by seniority to the rank of captain, and thence to the grades of major and lieutenant-colonel, partly by selection and partly by seniority. I do not myself entertain that objection to the purchase system which is felt by some, but I will not enter into the subject now. The real difficulty, however, as regards Indian officers does not occur in European regiments or in the amalgamation of the European troops. The difficulty arises from the number of officers of the Native army whose regiments have been disbanded. There were seventy-four regiments of regular Native infantry in the Bengal army, but only fifteen now remain. No one will propose to create anew the Bengal army as it existed before the mutiny. These officers can not claim it as a right that the Indian army should be maintained on its former footing and to its former extent in order that their pay and privileges should be preserved to them unchanged. Nor can they claim that an European army should be formed with a sole view to their employment. The arrangement which we propose, as it seems to me, violates no right to which they can lay legitimate claim, and it is just the course proposed by Sir Patrick Grant in reference to the Madras army, when he suggested the reduction of twelve regiments. There will 391 be no difficulty in forming a Staff corps and officering the irregular regiments from this corps. A check has been given to retirements from the uncertainty which has prevailed. I think measures should be taken to encourage it in the elder officers, and if some facility be offered to that end, I believe it will lead to the retirement of many, and that ultimately we are more likely to want officers than to have more than we need. Then I have heard that a great many officers would be glad to change their positions for a similar rank in the Line. Every officer of the Indian army will, if he chooses, have the power of exchanging into the Line, and will be eligible for command in any part of the world. Thus the general plan will be, that the European regiments will form part of the Queen's army, the existing officers retaining their positions, rising by seniority, as they do now; that officers will enter them for general service, rising by seniority to the rank of captain, and afterwards by selection to the rank of major and lieutenant-colonel; that the existing officers of the Indian army will be employed either as they are now in the regular regiments, or in various situations on the Staff; and that ultimately vacancies in the Staff corps will be filled up by candidates selected from the Queen's general army. That is an outline of the scheme for the organization of the Indian army. But I wish to place before the House the alternative, which is a matter for serious consideration. We are called upon to maintain a local army of at least 40,000 men. The number of local troops at this moment I will assume to be about 15,000. The question, therefore, is not one of maintaining an existing establishment, but of raising at least 25,000 men in addition, and of training them in this country for service in India. Now, how is that to be done? Lord Canning's last Minute proposes twenty-four additional regiments for Bengal alone. It is admitted that new regiments cannot and ought not to be formed in India. That experiment has been tried, and failed. We must then form, drill, and train in this country for the service of Bengal alone twenty-four European regiments. What will the advocates of economy say to this? In the meantime we are to maintain the same number of Queen's troops in India. And then, when these new and raw troops are trained and drilled, I suppose the old experienced soldiers of the Line regiments, which we have kept in India for the time, are to be 392 disbanded. I ask the House seriously to consider this question. If we adopt the views I have stated we shall he put to the expense, trouble, and delay of raising these men, and of training them in England for a certain number of years, paying out of the Indian revenue for the double force of Queen's troops now forming part of the garrison of India, and the force trained in this country which is to form the future garrison. I do not think that anybody will entertain such a project on the score either of economy or efficiency. If we are to calculate on two-thirds of 80,000 men, I should have to add some 15,000 men more. The Indian officers of Native regiments, avowedly incapable of forming European troops, would have to be brought home to officer them, and Queen's officers be borrowed to train both officers and men. I entreat hon. Gentlemen to consider what such a proceeding would entail upon this country and upon India. I must say that I do not think that when this proposal is seriously considered, it can be entertained by the House. Hitherto I have said nothing as to the authorities on one side or the other, but I must beg the House not to be led away by the notion that this is a mere question between Indian and English authorities. The highest Indian authorities are extraordinarily divided on the point. Lord Ellenborough, who has paid great attention to it, is strongly in favour of an Indian army. Lord Elphinstone, who has had more experience in India than almost anybody, who has been Governor of two Presidencies, whose conduct throughout the whole of the Indian mutiny has met with universal approbation, and who has shown himself most competent to deal with Indian questions, is in favour of the amalgamation. Lord Canning has sent home a strong Minute against amalgamation. Sir Charles Trevelyan, who, with all his faults, knows a great deal about India, and has paid great attention to all military questions there, expresses an equally strong opinion the other way. There are no two men who are better acquainted with India than Sir George Clerk and Sir John Lawrence, and they express directly opposite opinions. Sir Archdale Wilson, the conqueror of Delhi, goes one way; Sir James Outram, the conqueror of Lucknow, goes the other way. Sir Robert Vivian is strongly in favour of a local army; Sir Patrick Grant, the Commander in Chief at Madras, is in favour of amalgamation. Going back to the past, we find that Sir 393 Thomas Munro was favourable to a local army, while Sir John Malcolm was against it. Mountstuart Elphinstone was in favour of a local army; Sir Charles Metcalfe thought there ought to be one army only. I have quoted half-a-dozen authorities on each side, and of the most eminent modern statesmen and soldiers, differing completely on this subject. I must maintain, therefore, that the arguments I have endeavoured to lay before the House are not overborne by the overpowering weight of Indian officers. Lord Cornwallis was strongly in favour of one army, and that in the time of the Company's rule. He could not carry out his views, the India Company being too strong for him, and overpowering the opinion of one of the most experienced of our statesmen and soldiers. I was surprised the other day to hear the Duke of Wellington quoted as an authority for a Native army. Now, in 1812, Lord Melville wrote to the Duke of Wellington, then in Spain, and asked his opinion on this subject. I need not state how great was his experience of Indian matters, and how entirely he was influenced by the sole consideration of the good of his country. The Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Melville, in answer, to this effect:— I will not miss this opportunity of stating to you my opinion,—first, that the European army in the East Indies ought to be the King's; secondly, that the three armies (that is, the armies of the three Presidencies) ought to continue separate and distinct; thirdly, that the Native army ought to be the Company's, if the Company should continue to be the Sovereign of the territory; .…. fifthly, it is my opinion that all authority, civil and military, must be vested by the law in the Governor in Council. The law must recognize no other authority in the State. The Company may, and ought to, instruct the Governor in Council—first, to leave all matters of discipline solely and exclusively to the Commander-in-Chief, and to interfere in them in no manner, excepting when the safety of the State should require it; secondly, that all recommendations to military appointments, such as the Staff officers of the army to commissions, promotions in the army of persons—civil or military—to fill the departments of the army, and the inferior commands, should be made by the Commander-in-chief to the Governor in Council. The Governor in Council should be obliged to record his reasons for dissent. Thirdly, the recommendations to superior commands, such as divisions of the army, should be with the Commander-in-chief when the holders of these commands exercise no civil authority or political function; and that, in the case of a nomination to a higher command being vested exclusively in the Governor in Council, without the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief, the Governor should be directed to consult with the Commander-in-chief in making the selection. It would be 394 very desirable to leave a latitude by law to the Governor in Council to promote officers for meritorious services, at the recommendation of the Commander-in-chief, out of the usual regular routine, as well as to pass over officers guilty of misconduct. This might be done by giving the Governor in Council the power to promote such officers, by brevet in the first instance, who should succeed to the first vacancies in the rank to which they should have been promoted in the regiment to which they should belong. I have read the whole of that opinion, and it will be observed that the three main conditions which, in the Duke of Wellington's opinion, should be carried into effect are, that the European army in India should be the Queen's, that the armies of the three Presidencies should be distinct, and that the supreme authority of the Governor General should be recognized.

These are the essential parts of the scheme which I propose. I must deny also that this is exclusively an Indian question, and I maintain that both on Indian and on Imperial grounds the course which ought to be pursued is that upon which the Government has resolved. It is quite true that the mutiny of the Sepoys is over, and that tranquillity is restored; but I confess that there are still many grounds for solicitude. The confidence of all classes which once prevailed is shaken, and, what is still more alarming, I am afraid that there is considerable estrangement between the races. Therefore it is essential, in the first place, to put on a footing which cannot be shaken our military superiority. The rebellion was put down by the unparalleled constancy and bravery of our fellow countrymen, both in the Civil and Military Service, and of the European forces, and we have vindicated and established our superiority; but I bold that it must be maintained so complete and so evident that none shall question the efficiency of our arms. I am far from meaning that we should not endeavour to make use of every means of conciliation. We are bound to show the Natives that we are their friends and benefactors, and that they would lose by a change. I believe that such a course of proceeding is essential to the maintenance of our power in India. I am anxious not to place everything upon mere force, or upon the authority of the Government, but to depend mainly upon measures of improvement and upon the influence of reason. Still, to be able to act in this way the Natives of India must feel, and we must feel, that we are not to be shaken in our military 395 supremacy. The Englishman must feel that he is so safe that he has nothing to fear, for fear and jealousy are always cruel. The Natives must feel that it is useless to plot and conspire against us. Thus and thus alone, after what has happened, can we place ourselves in such a position that we may be enabled to extend those blessings to India which I believe it is our destiny to confer. But I believe also that we must pursue this course not only for Indian, but also for Imperial reasons; for any evil which falls on India must he felt severely in this country. In the last mutiny how much English blood was shed, and what a great strain India became upon the resources of England! It is upon England in case of emergency that the pressure must come; therefore, it is only fair, right, and just that we should put our army in India in a state of the greatest possible discipline and efficiency, and constitute it in such a manner as to prevent, as far as human foresight can do so, the possibility of the occurrence of a calamity far more alarming than a Sepoy mutiny. I hope the House will concur in the plan which is now proposed by the Government, and I beg to move for leave to bring in a Bill to repeal so much of the Act of the 22 and 23 Vict., c. 27, as enables the Secretary of State for India to raise men for Her Majesty's local European forces in India.