§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, he rose to move,
That, in the opinion of this House, the recommendations of the Commissioners on Manning the Navy ought to be taken into consideration by Her Majesty's Government, with a view to carry out the principles of such recommendations.The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty had publicly declared that France had the same number of ships that we had, and had extra means of manning them by having recourse to her reserves; but the English fleet could not be manned in that way. Such a declaration by a member of the Government was one of the most extraordinary declarations he had ever heard, and a great responsibility rested on the Government and on Parliament if they allowed things to remain as they were. He had often called the attention of the House to this subject, and he was glad to find that he had at last been so far listened to that we had a respectable and well-manned fleet at the present moment; but we lived in very odd times. France appeared to him, more particularly after what had passed that night, to occupy a very uncertain position with regard to Great Britain and other nations. All this might end peaceably; but as we were not sure that it would, the Government ought to take steps, let it cost what it would, to secure that we should be able to bring forward as great a naval force as France. Every man in the House, soldier, sailor, or civilian, knew perfectly well that things had taken a very different turn of late years from what they had done in former ones. No man could tell what would be the effect of the first naval action fought between France and England. We 1138 had great reliance on our sailors and officers, but the changes in other respects were so perfectly extraordinary, and had never yet been tried, that it was impossible for any one to tell what would be the effect of the first collision. In former days, when a British man-of-war fell in with a French man-of-war, the doom of the latter was fixed; and the same when a British fleet fell upon a French fleet. In the late war the action fought on the 1st of June by Lord Howe was a very severe action; it was fought well both by the French and ourselves. "We were conquerors; but that action was fought after the French Revolution, when the most distinguished officers had left the service, and the French ships were not manned so well as ours. That battle was gained; but no human being could tell what would be the result of the next naval action. At the first broadside a hole as large as a wheelbarrow would be made in a ship's side, and everybody knew that to prolong a contest under such circumstances would be utterly impossible. It had been repeatedly proved that nothing could resist molten iron, and that the ship so struck would be burnt. It was probable that in the first naval action which was fought, both fleets would be almost annihilated; and if, in that case, the French were able to bring forward another fleet, what would be the position of this country? It would be almost annihilated. Now the Government had stated by the mouth of one of their own officers that in the event of a reverse we were not in a position to send a second fleet to sea. It was plain from this that England did not put forward all the strength which she ought to do. A certain reserve, it was true, existed in the different ports of England; there were the Coastguard, which they had been recommended to increase to 12,000, but which had only been raised to 8,100, and the Coast Volunteers, the amount to be voted for which, but not the number of men, appeared in the Estimates. But he had heard that since 1857 or 1858 the same attention had not been paid to the drill of these volunteers as previously. Over and over again he had implored the Government to replace the block-ships by newly constructed men-of-war, and to take pains to increase the efficiency of this branch of the national defences. Last year he had brought the matter to a vote, and his Resolution was supported by the noble Lord at the head of the Government. Some allowance 1139 was to be made at that time, for the Admiralty were then directing all their energies to the establishment of an efficient Channel fleet. Now, however, we had actually forty-eight sail of the line in the water, of which only twenty-seven were actually in commission. What was to hinder the Government from sending out a sufficient number of these, on board of which the Coast Volunteers could be draughted and in a short time trained into a high state of efficiency? No expense would be entailed by the step, for the ships were all ready in the different ports; and why the Admiralty should refuse to carry out the suggestion—unless they were actuated by the stubbornness which generally manifested itself when proposals were made by anybody else—he was at a loss to understand. Whatever was the cause, they were just in the same position as they were last year when he brought forward his Motion. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty admitted that seamen entertained great suspicion of the Board. He quite agreed with the seamen in their view. How could sailors place any confidence in that Board, when they saw the way in which affairs were administered? Some time ago the Admiralty found it necessary to call out what were called the long-pension men for temporary service; and those who had been petty officers were promised that they were to have the same ratings which they formerly held. But they were greatly disappointed to find that such was not the case, and they accordingly addressed an humble petition to the Admiralty. Sailors had exactly the same feelings as officers, and he would like to ask the Secretary to the Admiralty, if he had retired from active service as a captain, how he would like to be sent back to do duty as a lieutenant. This was only one of many causes of dissatisfaction which he had known to exist. Another constant source of discontent was the regulations with regard to leave. Would it be believed that persons of sound sense could have issued an order, directing that whenever ships belonging to the Channel or any other squadrons came into port, and leave was given to the men, they were not to quit the port on pain of having their pay stopped as stragglers, and being otherwise punished? What were the men to do if their wives and families happened to live outside the port. This only came to his knowledge yesterday, and when he heard 1140 it he scarce believed it possible, after the dissatisfaction which had been manifested on board various ships, that such an order could have been issued by any Board. But he now came to the recommendations of the Manning Commission. It suggested that the number of seamen gunners should be increased; he had not heard that any such increase had taken place. The recommendation as to the improvement of; the food, clothes, and bedding, had been | carried out, and the reserve ships were in such a state that they were ready for the men to go into the moment they were commissioned. The allotments of pay, too, had been carried into effect; but what had the Admiralty been about that it had not been done sooner? He came now to the question of bounty, which was most important. He believed he had as much to do in getting the bounty for the seamen as any other man, and it was most successful in manning the fleet. The fleet was now manned; but was it prudent to reduce the bounty to £4? £10 might be too high a bounty after the fleet was manned, but certainly much more than £4 ought to be given. He now came to the important point of the reserves, and in regard to it he did not think that the Government had taken the proper steps to obtain success. They were now obliged to keep up a very large fleet. He did not mean to say that ten sail of the line was too large a force on the home station, but such a large fleet would not be necessary if they had a proper reserve. If they had a reserve of 5,000 men, giving £10 a piece to men who had served ten years, which was called the short pension, they would always have a body of men who would be as ready to be called on as if they were on board the fleet. But if they were obliged to raise 5,000 additional men on the moment for service on board the fleet, they would cost at a low estimate £250,000; whereas the reserve force of 5,000 men would not cost above £50,000. If £10 was not sufficient to get the men, they ought to increase it to £12, or to a still higher sum, so important was the object to be gained. The Commissioners recommend an increase of 5,000 marines, but that had only been carried out to the extent of 1,000. But he wished to ask of what use was it appointing a Commission if they did not carry out its recommendations? They also propose a body of 5,000 marines on short pensions; but where were they? With regard to the Royal Volunteers, the Commission put 1141 them down at 30,000; but it would be difficult to find out where they were, or the 10,000 Naval Coast Volunteers. That was the reserve force pointed out by the Commission, but that reserve force they had not got, and never would, He had pointed out before that it was not necessary to press men into the service, but it was necessary to get them out of the service as fast as they could. If men who had served their country ten years, or even five years, got a pension of £10 or £5, according to the length of their service, and were encouraged to go into the lie-serve, allowing three years' time there to count for two of effective service, it would contribute to the formation of an effective reserve. The Commission had decided that the Coast Volunteers should be entitled to all the advantages of Greenwich Hospital; but when the House read the Report of the Greenwich Hospital Commissioners, they would be astonished to see what "advantages" that hospital held out to seamen, and when they had seen the manner in which, from year to year, sailors' wives and children had been treated at Greenwich Hospital, they would be induced to come to the conclusion that that institution, instead of being a blessing, was almost a curse. He had laboured for years to have that Commission appointed, and he never read such horrible details as the evidence given before it exhibited in the whole course of his existence. He trusted, therefore, that the Government had some better regulation of that establishment in view, and now that he had succeeded in getting its management overhauled, it was his intention to do everything in his power to procure that reform of the Board of Admiralty itself which appeared to him to be so necessary. As an instance of the expediency of such reform, he might mention that in 1857 it had been decided by the Government of the day that seven ships of the line should be paid off—a decision which the First Lord of the Admiralty had carried into effect. The House, however, would scarcely believe that in 1859 another Board of Admiralty had found it to be its duty to entail on the country a large expenditure for the purpose of restoring to a state of efficiency those very ships in 1857 which had been paid off, and paid off too, he believed, in opposition to the opinions of—with the exception of the First Lord—nearly all the Lords of the Admiralty, who, he regretted to say, had not 1142 in consequence resigned their offices; but, on the contrary, had stuck to them like leeches. He had also to complain of the position in which Sir Baldwin Walker, as Surveyor of the Navy, had been placed, the fact being that he could not have given a single order in the dockyards the execution of which he could enforce. He was happy to find, however, that the Admiralty, after fifteen years' consideration, had at length effected a change in that respect, and that Sir Baldwin Walker, as Controller of the Navy, would be enabled to exercise an authority which had hitherto been denied him. He should simply say, in conclusion, that, after all that the House had heard from the noble Lord the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in reference to the Cession of Savoy, it was impossible to tell what consequences to the peace of Europe might six months hence ensue. We should, therefore, take care that we had a sufficient reserve of seamen to man our fleet in case any emergency should arise, and the noble Lord and the Government would, in his opinion, deserve—he would not say to be brought to the block—but, at all events, the general censure in case they neglected to render our navy as efficient as it could possibly be made.
§ SIR MICHAEL SEYMOURseconded the Motion.
MR. HENLEYsaid, he should not follow the gallant Admiral who had just addressed the House through the various topics on which he had dwelt in the course of his speech. There was, however, one point to which he had alluded with respect to which he wished to make a few remarks. It was impossible to read the valuable evidence which had been given before the Commission on manning the Navy, without coming to the conclusion that great difficulty would be found in obtaining, on the breaking out of war, the number of seamen which would be required. He thought, indeed, it was manifest from that evidence, that the service of the Queen was not popular among our merchant-seamen. It had, moreover, been remarked, by more than one naval officer, that they entertained a distrust of the Admiralty. How far that opinion was warranted by the fact, it was not for him to say; but it had been so distinctly stated that it in all probability was based upon some good foundation; although he must confess he was not very strongly impressed by the idea that many of those who had given 1143 evidence before the Commission had themselves any very great knowledge of the feelings by which our merchant-seamen were animated in the matter. But, however that might be, some measures had been taken of late which bore not a little upon the point. The right hon. Baronet opposite (Sir J. Graham) had some years ago set up what he termed a great crimping machine, with the view of procuring men for the navy; but it had turned out that sailors did not like to be ticketed any more than did the Nonconformists. The system had gone on for a long time, to the unmitigated disgust, he believed, of every seaman connected with the merchant service, and it had ultimately fallen into abeyance. It had since, however, been employed for the purpose of getting up a naval reserve; and he should, under the circumstances, and looking to the legislation of last year, and the existing state of feeling in the merchant service, have supposed that if one thing more than another were insisted upon in connection with the subject, it would have been that the terms held out to our seamen under the system, and the conditions upon which they were to serve, should be so plainly, and in so simple a manner set forth, that any one might understand them at a glance, and that every apprehension as to a desire existing on the part of the Admiralty to entrap men into the service should be removed. He himself had in private, during the course of last Session, urged upon the noble Lord opposite (Lord Clarence Paget) the expediency of taking that course. The noble Lord, however, appeared to have fallen into the error of attempting to cook before catching the hare, he had not got the men to come forward. So indefinite were the terms offered, that if a seaman were to ask the precise nature of the engagement he was expected to enter into, no one would venture to give him an answer. They were to be called out by proclamation on an emergency; but what was the exact interpretation of an emergency? The Act of Parliament said when Her Majesty saw fit; that made them liable to be called out at any time. That could be understood. But such was not the condition stated. What was the emergency contemplated? Was it war, invasion, or the imminent danger of it? Seamen did not know what was the meaning of the term used; how, then, could they be expected to enter into the engagement? A great deal of their legislation about sea- 1144 men appeared to go on the idea that these men were fools. They were no such thing; they were a most suspicious class, for they generally found on shore those who tried to impose on them. But how could they expect men to bind themselves to their service, if they did not understand the nature of the contract? Then, as to time, the engagement was to be for five years, "unless otherwise provided." That "otherwise provided" might carry it on within a few days of ten years. The men naturally wanted to know whether they were going to bind themselves for five or ten years. A plain man would say at once, "I will make a bargain with you for five years." "Undoubtedly it was a much greater advantage to get men for ten years than for five years. They must recollect, however, that they wanted A.B. seamen. There was not a very great number of them. The returns produced before the Manning Commission, showed that the whole number was only 67,000; and when they took those over age they would strike off one-fifth or sixth. They must, therefore, hold out great advantages to the men, and, first of all, they must make the terms more definite. The men must know on what terms they were engaging, and for what length of time. Take the case of married men, engaged, perhaps, in the coasting trade. They held out to them that they should be drilled at home, and that was a great inducement to such that during their month's drill they should be enabled to return at night to their wives and families. But that was not promised; it was only said if the service permitted; and seamen would, therefore, be inclined to conclude that the service would not admit of it, and they would not get home of nights. There was another question on which he could not pretend to give an opinion. When a man entered he was to have a certificate that he was A.B., and that he had served as such for so long. The shipping-office people had no authority to enter him, but they were to do all the talking. Who could tell what a recruiting sergeant said? When the seaman had been talked up to a certain point he was to be handed over to another party, who did not know what had been said before, or what bargain had been made, and then he was entered. Under such a system the seaman naturally felt there was no security that he would have the same rating as in the merchant service. It was unwise, he thought, not to take all the men 1145 they could get to enter. They might easily have framed their resolutions so as to got rid of much of their cumbrous machinery. Seamen, above all things, hated to be confined. The whole of the rules, the noble Lord would excuse him for saying, had been framed in a spirit of mistrust of the seamen. He believed the more they trusted these men the more trustworthy they would be found to be. This not only applied to seamen but to every class. While the measure was passing through Parliament he had felt great interest in it. If it had succeeded it would have been of great importance to the country by breaking down the sort of feeling which was said to exist between the two services. With that view everything ought to be done to make the terms so clear and simple that he who runs might read, and then he hoped the men would more generally come into them. They must remember that the Queen's service held out no hope of promotion, or scarcely any hope of promotion, to men before the mast. The number of warrant officers was extremely small; that was their only hope of promotion. On the other hand, if they looked to the number of able seamen in the merchant service and the number of certificated masters and mates, they must see that the chance of promotion there for good men was not only large but certain. The apprentices and boys in the merchant service were about 23,000; the uncertificated petty officers and able seamen were not 100,000; so that there being 40,000 certified masters and mates, it was perfectly clear that every A. B. of good conduct was not only certain of promotion but sought for. They could not, therefore, expect such men to enter the Queen's service unless they not only held out sufficient inducements of a pecuniary nature, but made the terms of service short, and at all events as clear and definite as possible. The Secretary for Ireland had great merit due to him for what he had done in this matter, and if the scheme had not succeeded it was owing to the want of a proper conciliatory spirit in the terms which had been promulgated.
§ MR. LIDDELLsaid, he thought the hon. Gentleman who had ascribed the failure of the naval scheme for establishing a volunteer reserve to the terms of enrolment not being sufficiently simple had hit the right nail on the head. There was too much red tape in the proposition as originally framed. The men were at first 1146 to enter for five years, and at the end of that period they were required to present themselves before the shipping master to be again enrolled. Now, the great object of the seaman was to get his pension, and by the process just named his pension was in danger. Before it could really operate as an incentive to him, he must see that his prospect of gaining it was a certain one. Again, the regulation binding the men not to take long voyages ought not to be stringently enforced; because the young and active sailor, whom it was most desirable to secure, was of an enterprising disposition, and naturally wished to see remote parts of the world. Even if allowed, after joining the reserve, to go on a distant voyage, his services might be made available in foreign waters in the event of an emergency. It was to be regretted that naval officers were not very popular with merchant seamen, many of whom refused to enter the reserve because they had to be approved by those officers. It was to be regretted likewise that a widespread feeling of distrust in the Government had been created among the seafaring classes by the treatment of the continuous-service men at the close of the Crimean war. Moreover, the shipping masters did not receive adequate compensation for the duties imposed on them in connection with this scheme, and it would be well to fix definitely the scale of that remuneration. One of those persons had recently told him that he would not for £500 a year undertake to go through all the talking and encounter all the sneering that he had experienced from the men while trying to get them to enlist during the last three months. Nothing could be more important than the projected establishment of training ships in our great ports, and this was the point he rose partly to insist upon. Twelve hundred lads annually were proposed to be admitted to these ships for a twelve months' training, and the best conducted and most proficient of their number would be then selected for the navy. Nothing could be more calculated to render the Queen's service as popular as it used to be than this mode of making admission to it the reward of the better class of youths passing though the ordinary schools of the country, and thence transported to these training ships. The system would tend to assimilate the merchant service and the Royal Navy, which had remained too long insulated, and it would 1147 also serve to raise the character of both. The cost of the experiment would not exceed £24 for each youth, and no motives of false economy should prevent the House from supporting a plan which would furnish the country yearly with 1,200 young seamen, who would form such a reserve as would enable us to pursue our ordinary avocations in peace and security. In proof of the value of the northern ports as naval nurseries, he might mention that in 1858, 875 seamen were entered at North Shields, and 918 at South Shields, while in the previous year as many as 1,113 were entered at the former and 1,331 at the latter. He was confident there would be no lack of efficient seamen for the Royal Navy if the Admiralty only gave them good pay, treated them with greater trust and better faith, and relieved them, as much as possible, from troublesome and unnecessary restrictions.
MR. LINDSAYsaid, that he found it impossible to support the Motion. It was with the deepest regret that he heard from the noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty the other evening that the number of men who had joined the naval reserve had fallen so far short of the number required. Everything had been done to give the scheme a fair chance; a forcible appeal had been made to the country, a liberal bounty had been offered, and yet it had turned out a complete failure. The merchant seamen would not enter into the Queen's service. As a Member of the Commission he had dissented from the report of his colleagues, and had foretold the failure of the scheme. He could not, therefore, join in the recommendation of what he had formerly condemned, but he sincerely regretted the fulfilment of his predictions. One fact brought out by the evidence laid before the Commission—and it was an essential one for the House to consider—was that, while the merchant service had been making great progress in the employment of mechanical appliances to reduce manual labour on board ship, not one step had been taken in that direction by the Admiralty for the last fifty years. He had suggested to the Admiralty, for instance, that patent trusses should be employed; but the answer he received was, that they would twist off the mast heads, an objection which he had never heard made in the American service, where trusses were largely used. By adopting mechanical appliances 800 men 1148 might be enabled to do the work of 1,000, and thus fewer men would be required for each ship, and a saving effected in the cost of the crew. Another thing which he thought might be done with advantage would be to decrease the number of seamen and increase that of marines. The evidence before the Commission proved that that might be done without interfering with the efficient working of the vessel; and, as a marine cost only some £32 a year, while a sailor cost £44, the sum of £12 per man might thus be saved every year. He proposed that the whole of the seaport towns should be garrisoned by marines, and that the men should be trained part of the week afloat at the great gun exercise, and part of the week ashore in military duties. They might also be exercised in the bay in boats, and they would thus be made more efficient, if required, to go to sea. In the event of hostilities the marines would be embarked on board the fleet, the line regiments would garrison the seaports, and the militia would take care of the inland towns. He believed that if this plan were adopted, it would considerably reduce the expense of the army. The noble Lord the Secretary to the Admiralty said the other night that sailors were suspicious, and would not enter the reserve for fear of being entrapped. Why had they such fears? Because for years there had been an impassable barrier between the merchant service and the Royal Navy, and it was his wish to break down that barrier. With that object in view, he had brought forward the propositions recorded in the blue-book. Commencing with the boys, he would have school or training ships common to both services. The Government should have the power of nominating one portion and the merchant shipowners the other portion of the boys to be trained in those ships, from which, according to their good conduct or their efficient training, they should be drafted into either the one or the other service. Then he would have a common seamen's fund, to which the officers in both services should contribute, and which should be distributable among the seamen of both services. He further proposed that Greenwich Hospital should be opened, not merely to seamen of the Royal Navy, but to all who had joined the reserve. Sailors in both services would then be brought up together in youth, associated together in manhood, and succoured in the same asylum in old 1149 age. There was another point upon which he was sorry to say he differed in to to from all his colleagues. He advocated an appeal to the officers of the merchant service to enter the proposed reserve, as well as to the men. There was a great scarcity in the Royal Navy of officers physically efficient, and he believed there was a scarcity even now of active young lieutenants. Supposing the emergency arose, which he hoped never would arise, and they had to call upon the reserve of men, what would be the use of 30,000 men, if they had them, without experienced officers? In his opinion they would be nothing more or less than a rabble. If education and social position, officers of the merchant service were the equals of naval officers, and he thought it a great oversight not to appeal to them. He was glad to find that there was a change with respect to flogging in the navy, and he believed the service would be more popular if what sailors called the black articles were expunged from the Articles of War.
§ LORD CLARENCE PAGETsaid, he did not rise for the purpose of opposing the Motion of his gallant Friend. Ear from it, and he was exceedingly glad that his gallant Friend had called the attention of the House to the question of Manning the Navy, but he hoped to be able to convince him before he sat down, that the Government were carrying out, one by one, the recommendations of the Royal Commissioners. But he would first make one or two remarks upon what had been said by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley) and the hon. Member for Northumberland (Mr. Liddell) in reference to the volunteer force. It was not surprising that in all these matters there should be a great difference of opinion. The right hon. Gentleman said they tied them up too tightly, for they enrolled them for five years, and then if a war broke out, they insisted upon the men remaining another five years. Now all he could state was, that if there was not some guarantee of that sort, and if there should be a war towards the end of the term, the greater part of the men enrolled might say that they would not go to sea. His hon. Friend the member for Northumberland opposite said, why not enter the men for life? So that it would be seen that on the one hand they would be asked to enter them for life, and on the other for only five years, and then lot them go perfectly free. He would admit that this 1150 measure was fraught with considerable difficulty, and the observations which hon. Gentlemen made were extremely valuable. It should be recollected, however, that it was a new measure, and if the Admiralty found that it did not work well, they would be the first to tell the House so, and say that it required amendment. Some hon. Gentlemen condemned the measure, but it had only been in operation for six weeks, and it was rather too early to assume that it had failed. On the contrary, the last accounts from the north were that men were beginning to get over the extraordinary delusion that they were to be entrapped into the service and sent off to China, and he had reason to believe, from letters he had received from shipping masters, that the few words he had addressed to the House the other night had already produced a good effect. It was, therefore, to be hoped that in course of time, when the misapprehension he had alluded to was cleared away, and the matter set in its proper light before the men, the reluctance which had lately seemingly prevailed on their part to enter the service would vanish, and that there would be no cause to be dissatisfied with the measure itself on that account. But it was certainly pressing too hardly upon the measure to condemn it really before sufficient time had elapsed to enable its efficiency to be tested. As regarded the remarks of his gallant Friend the Member for Southwark, he was glad to be in a position to assure him in reference to his suggestion to place efficient ships on the Coastguard, that the Admiralty were already doing all in their power for that purpose. The Majestic, a screw line- of-battle ship, was stationed at Liverpool on the Coastguard service; and the Dauntless, a frigate, on another station. As to the complaint of the pensioners that when sent on board they did not always get the same ratings as they had had when in the service before, the Admiralty had no knowledge of such a thing. It might occasionally happen that a pensioner going on board ship might be found not so capable of discharging the duties of a petty officer as when he was before in the service, and in such cases an officer would only be discharging his duty in removing an inefficient man from the post to make room for a better. Another complaint was that the men could not get leave to go into the country, but were kept prisoners in the neighbourhood of the ship. [Sir CHARLES NAPIER: At the ports.] His gallant Friend 1151 was wholly misinformed, for if the men wished to leave the port, and could show good reason for asking such indulgence, and were persons who could be depended on to return at the expiration of their leave, they had only to ask for a pass to enable them to go where they pleased. It was true they did not allow these men to leave the neighbourhood of the port unless they asked for a pass. Moreover, discretion was requisite as to whether the ship was or was not likely to be ordered to sea. It would be easily understood that it would be impossible to allow liberty-men to leave the neghbourhood of the port if the ship was under sailing orders.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERWhom are they to ask?
§ LORD CLARENCE PAGETThe captain of the ship.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERSuppose he should change his mind?
§ LORD CLARENCE PAGETHis gallant Friend next said, "Why not man the seaports with marines;" but no one knew better than he that if marines did not get their turn of sea duty, they became nothing more nor less than landsmen. He agreed entirely in the expediency of gradually increasing the number of marines, and the Admiralty were taking steps to carry out the recommendations of the Commission on that point. The late Government had taken a Vote for 2,000 extra marines, and the present Government had also added 1,000 men to the force. With regard to the training ships recommended by the Royal Commission there were two distinct schemes, one being for the education of 2,000 boys for the navy at the public expense, and another that a large number of boys should be educated on board of training ships at the mercantile ports, partly at the public, and partly at their own parents' expense, of whom a portion should be taken into the navy; the former and more important scheme would, if the House approved of the Estimates, be now carried out, and with regard to the second part of the scheme—namely, the education of the merchant boys, the Government had by no means given up that part of the scheme; but the arrangements connected with the volunteer force were really running away with so much money that they thought it better to proceed cautiously, and see how the scheme was likely to succeed on the whole. Many other recommendations of the commission, not adverted to by the gallant Admiral, the Admiralty were endeavouring to 1152 carry out. For instance, they were giving additional pay to gunnery lieutenants, and they were also giving a 1d. a day additional to what were called trained men—men who had passed an examination in gunnery. The Admiralty had by no means set their faces against the suggestion of the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. Lindsay) with regard to the officers of merchant vessels, but they did not wish to go on too fast. First let it be seen how the men dropped in, and if that result were satisfactory it would be open for consideration in what manner advantage could be taken of the services of merchant officers. Many improvements had taken place with the view of rendering the position of men in the navy more comfortable. They now received their cooking utensils free; continuous-service men had their clothes given to them; and various points of details, such as paying the men more frequently, improvement in the system of paying allotments, badge money, outfit to petty officers on promotion to warrant officers, pensions to warrant officers, were in process of carrying out by the Admiralty. Again, the Coastguard was proposed to be increased this year by 500 men, and other matters, with which he need not trouble the House, were under consideration with a view to effect still further improvements. He hoped he had said enough to show that it had been the consistent endeavour of the Board of Admiralty to take advantage of every recommendation contained in the Report of the Royal Commission, and as far as possible to carry them into effect.
§ MR. H. TAYLORsaid, he wished to remind the House that the coasting trade, which had always been regarded as the nursery of the navy, was most injuriously affected by the increase of railways and screw steamers. Half of the coal which was annually brought to London now reached the metropolis through the instrumentality of steam, either by sea or on land, and one screw steamer of 800 tons, managed by a crew of eight able seamen, was capable of carrying as much coal as eight sailing ships, which would require 70 or 80 men and boys. He believed that in the course of a few years 80 or 90 screw steamers, employing from 600 to 800 men, would fulfil all the requirements of a trade which now found employment for 800 or 900 ships, with 8,000 or 9,000 men. The general trade was becoming narrowed in the same way, as shipowners found that it was for their interests to employ steam in 1153 place of sailing vessels; and the result would be, that in some short time to come great difficulty would be experienced in procuring sailors in sufficient numbers for the navy. He had given the subject very serious consideration, and, as a sailor himself, he believed the Government ought to consider the propriety of establishing school ships, in which lads should be trained for the naval service.
§ SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONEobserved that he had listened with great pleasure to the details given by the noble Lord respecting the extent to which the Government had carried out the recommendations of the Royal Naval Commission. But it could not be too strongly urged that the school system was the very basis and foundation of all their recommendations towards the formation of a reserve of 10,000 or 12,000 men, and that they ought not to hesitate at a trifling expenditure, when by its means they expected to procure the very best material for maintaining the future efficiency of the navy. In answer to the hon. Member for Sunderland (Mr. W. Lindsay), he would remind the House that in men-of-war the number of men was proportioned not to the machinery or steam power, but to the guns; and if patent trusses or improved machinery of the kind were placed in such vessels, the force applied would soon pull them to pieces. They had been tried on board two vessels, and but that the yards were fortunately slung in chains, they would have been down on the top of the men's heads. He believed that if the Government steadily refused to increase the bounty, and simply established school ships, taking every possible means of giving publicity to the advantages which were offered, after a little patience things would present a very different aspect from what they did at present. There were other matters, however, which had not been touched upon by the noble Lord the Secretary of the Admiralty, and one of the most important of those was the hulk accommodation. The Bellerophon, at Portsmouth, had been improved as much as was possible, but still not more than one-fifth of the ship's company could get into the galley; and, having no resource but either to go to bed or walk the decks like caged beasts, he did not think it was to be wondered at that the men seized every opportunity of getting away from such a wretched abode, and of getting their feet to a good public-house fire. Comfortable docks and barracks would go far to make 1154 the men behave more like Christians than they had sometimes done. In paying off a ship's company, likewise, he believed that some change might be effected with advantage. At present a ship when dismantled presented a most disheartening spectacle. The system and discipline which it had taken four or five years to build up was scattered to the winds, and he had heard captains say that the night before a crew was paid off was one of the most saddening and dispiriting possible. He believed that such a practice was unnecessary, that it was a remnant of barbarism which had clung to the service, and that its bad effects only required to be fully understood to lead to its being done away with. Some difference ought to be made, in paying off the crew, between the men who entered for continuous service and those who left probably with the intention of not returning again. The former might receive two-thirds of the pay which appeared from the paymaster's books to be due to them, and with this advance they might be permitted to visit their friends without any delay. On their return they would obtain the balance which was due to them; and if they had been unfortunate enough to fall among thieves they would have the means of regaining a respectable appearance. The Government would have a perfect right to retain a portion of the money, because no man had a right to return as a beggar to the service with which he had become connected. As to the other men who left them there need not be so much ceremony; but as to the continuous service men, he urged the Government to take his suggestion into their consideration. They were about to discuss a Motion on the subject of flogging in the navy; he believed for some of the crimes committed on board ship it would be impossible wholly to do away with flogging. But if the men were tried by courts-martial, as in the army, it would tend to familiarize the officers with the rules of evidence, and give men an idea of security; they would be satisfied that justice was done. It would not reduce the amount of flogging; on the contrary, it would rather increase it, as if tried by court-martial every man who deserved flogging would get it; at present, many who deserved it did not get it; the Admiralty were so severe on captains in the matter of punishment on board their ships, that they often forbore it from apprehension of the consequences to themselves. As to the Articles 1155 Of War, they were never acted on, and he did not see why they should be allowed to remain in their present obsolete form. Could not a Commission of naval officers be appointed to modify them, and bring them into accordance with the more humane notions of the present day?
§ SIR MICHAEL SEYMOURsaid, he was glad to hear the assurance from the noble Secretary to the Admiralty that the Government was desirous of carrying into effect the recommendations of the Manning Commission. The inutility of the volunteer system had been proved, and this Commission, presided over by men of great experience and intelligence, had, in their Report, recommended a naval reserve as the best means of increasing their force. But he regretted that the attempts to form this reserve had not been successful. The question was no doubt one of the most pressing importance, but it was a mistake to suppose that the harshness with which they were treated was the cause which prevented sailors from entering the navy. He believed the gradual improvement in the treatment of the seamen in ships of war, and the greater attention to their comforts, had much broken down the aversion formerly entertained; and it was rather ignorance of the present condition of men in the service that caused the difficulty in obtaining them in sufficient numbers. He rejoiced that the Admiralty had conceded pensions to the widows of warrant officers; the concession had been too long-delayed. The Report of the Commission often alluded to the compulsory system of manning the navy of France. That system gave France an advantage if any sudden increase in her naval force was required—a matter of great anxiety in the event of a disturbance of the peace between the two countries. Not possessing such a system, England could only depend on money rewards and other attractions to draw men into the naval service. Their Navy Estimates, therefore, must always stand at a high figure, and the only prospect of a reduction was in some plan of a reserve. The most reliable part of the present re-servo were the coast-guard men, who made a fine body of sailors; their conduct on board the ships they served in during the Russian war was exceedingly creditable to them. The other parts of the present reserve were not so reliable. Even the Coast Volunteer system had been a failure, for no dependence could be placed on the men coming forward in large numbers in cases 1156 of emergency. As to the pensions for the reserve, he disapproved them for short service; it would be better to give an equal amount in the rate of pay after four or five years' service. It was of the highest importance that every effort should be made to augment the force of continuous-service men. He quite agreed with hon. Members who had spoken of the advantages which both the merchant service and the Royal Navy would derive from the establishment of school ships. They would, in all probability, take the place of the old apprentice system. He should hail with pleasure any scheme that would unite the mercantile service with the navy, being satisfied that the naval service would be greatly the gainer. With respect to the subject of punishment, he entirely concurred in the opinion that it would be inexpedient in a Government service, such as that of the navy, to abolish the system of flogging. As a body, naval officers were desirous to abate the severity of that system as far as possible, but the power of inflicting corporal punishment must, in order to secure discipline, he maintained. He recollected an instance in which three out of a brigade of 300 or 400 men had been guilty of committing a gross outrage on a woman, which had resulted in her death, and he felt assured that the instant punishment which had followed the commission of the act had not only had a duly deterrent effect upon the rest of the men, but had been regarded by them as just and right.
§ MR. BENTINCKsaid, it appeared to him to be impossible to overrate the importance of this question. There were very few men either in or out of the House who did not desire to keep up our naval defences. Something had been done already to put them in a better state, but in the contingency of a reverse at the beginning of a naval war—an event he would not anticipate—the whole of the£l3,000,000 which the House was asked to vote for the navy would have been completely thrown away, unless a reserve of men had been formed at least equal to half those on board ships in commission. He was, therefore, glad to find that it was the intention of the Government to carry into effect the recommendations of the Manning Commission, as well as to hear from his noble Friend the Secretary to the Admiralty that two block-ships had been removed, and their places supplied by vessels of a better class. For his own part, he should like to see the same course pursued in the case 1157 of all our block-ships, which he regarded as perfectly useless, and he felt assured that in order to effect that or any similar object which would place our navy on a thoroughly efficient footing the House of Commons would not hesitate to vote the necessary supplies, so that the Government had only themselves to blame if they failed to state fully and plainly to the House what it was they required. A great mistake had been made in 1857 when so many ships were paid off, but for that the Government, and not the House of Commons, were responsible. He looked upon the appointment of a man conversant with the details of the naval profession, as his noble Friend opposite (Lord C. Paget) was, to the offiec of Secretary to the Admiralty as a step in the right direction, because he could not help thinking the system of selection for that office, as well as the higher offices of the Board, of men merely for oratorical ability, was one which was extremely vicious in principle. Before long he hoped to see a thorough reconstruction of that Board. He should merely observe, in conclusion, that the exclusion of boys from particular departments of the navy who did not happen to be possessed of that proficiency in reading and writing to which others had attained seemed to him to be impolitic, for the dunces among our youth, as some persons might be disposed to call them, had frequently arms as strong as their heads were thick, and, if they were but afforded the means of learning their profession, might furnish the country with most efficient seamen.
§ ADMIRAL WALCOTT—I give my cordial support to the Motion now before the House, as it is of paramount importance to put forth every effort to accomplish the manning of the navy. I feel no apprehension that England will prove unequal to any emergency which may befal her. At the present moment there are in all 162,012 British, and 14,375 foreign seamen employed in the merchant service, and it would be of signal advantage to induce an adequate number of them to enter the Royal Navy. The first step in the right direction is to enlist year by year 2,000 to 4,000 boys; and I am glad to learn that measures are to be taken to provide school ships for the former number. If these vessels were despatched to the principal mercantile ports, some of the finest lads in the country—not boys from reformatories—could avail themselves of the opportunity. The greatest caution must 1158 be exercised in the selection of officers, they must be men like those of Her Majesty's ship Britannia, possessed of good temper, forbearance, and discretion. I had the pleasure of personally visiting Captain Harris now of that ship, when in command of Her Majesty's ship Illustrious, and after a most careful inspection of the system which he pursued, I give my most cheerful testimony to the admirable measures to a desirable end which were there amply exhibited. It is a melancholy truth much to be deplored by all right-thinking men who have the interest of the service at heart, that in it there is not sufficient encouragement held out to the A.B. The sailor is a roving creature, like the elements with which he has to battle, given to change and excitement, and he is especially averse to an engagement of five years. The case of Lieutenants, who rarely attain the promotion which they have a right to expect, is full of painful reflection. From the first hour when I entered the navy to the present time it has been impossible for me to be blind to a system of invidious patronage and baneful partiality. Let it once be an assured fact that there is only one direct and certain road to employment, promotion and honour, and that to be a thorough practical seaman every inch, to possess scientific knowledge, to devote heart and spirit to the duties of the profession, and you would exercise a magical influence and enthralling fascination. Instead of broken-hearted grey-haired men, you would inspire spirited youths to enter and continue a succession of men who uphold the honour of a service, never sinking into apathy and disgust at its injustice, but enthusiastically attached to it and exceedingly eager to earn distinction. The reward of merit is a glory to a country, to withhold it is its shame and discredit; to bestow it improperly is a cruel wrong to the deserving, a snare to those who are not so, and the betrayal of a national trust. Efficient as the navy is, secure as we are that it will ever win new lustre when put upon its trial, let only justice be shown in England to the officer and man and they will maintain her supremacy, her honour, and her existence, with the new vigour that springs from the certainty of her approval, and the affection that is quickened by its bestowal.
§ MR. DIGBY SEYMOURremarked that there was some inconsistency in the answer given by the Secretary to the Admiralty, for while he had not offered any 1159 opposition to the Motion, he seemed to intimate that the Government would not pledge themselves at once to carry out the recommendations of the Manning Commission. He thought the Government ought at once to pledge themselves to bring in a Bill if necessary to carry out those recommendations with a view of meeting the present exigency, and of providing a constant supply for the navy in the future. One of the chief recommendations was relative to the establishment of school-ships, and Captain Engledue and Captain Vincent, among others, had both given the clearest testimony as to the importance of that recommendation, stating that the merchant service would hail the establishment of these training ships with delight, believing that the class of apprentices would thereby be improved. Only last night he had been present at a meeting at Southampton, called for the purpose of memorializing the Government to place one of these training schoolships in Southampton Water. There was a very general expression of opinion in favour of that proposal; and if Government grudged the expense, if they would only find the ship and half the cost, the other portion, he believed, would readily be subscribed at the port and throughout the county of Hampshire. Captain Sullivan estimated the expense of one of these ships for one year at £4,000, including extras, such as £100 for a chaplain; the Commission had recommended that there should be ten or twelve of them; the whole expense, therefore, of establishing these schoolships, and carrying out this great national experiment, would be £48,000. The plan which Captain Sullivan proposed, was to take boys of twelve or thirteen years of age for a year, then to apprentice them to the merchant service; at the end of their five years to let them serve for two years in a vessel of the Royal Navy, and then to bind themselves to enter at any time into the Royal Naval Volunteers, so as to be called on at any time when war menaced. There was one other recommendation he should like to refer to. Captain Sullivan pointed out the fact of about 10,000 situations at the command of the Treasury, and other public departments of the Government. Those situations were invariably given to those who had extraordinary political influence with the Government. There could be no doubt, however, that there were many of those situations, such as tide-waiters, landing waiters, for which well deserving- 1160 seamen were qualified, and which he (Mr. Digby Seymour) thought ought to he given in reference to a scale of merit, instead of being placed at the service of gentlemen who had given, or promised to give, their political support and influence to the Government for the time being. He protested against such a system. The new field of rewards after long years of valuable services thus opened would, with the other arrangements, go far to popularize the Royal Navy. Give that force the opportunity of an introduction not only to the Coastguard service, to Greenwich Hospital, to pensions from the State,'—but add to those anticipated advantages those offices to which he had referred—offices that would best fulfil the purposes for which they existed if they were appropriated as the rewards of honest merit in the naval forces of the country.
§ SIR CHARLES NAPIERsaid, in reply, he assured the noble Lord that he had made no mistake. The order given at Portsmouth was clear and distinct, that if a man passed certain limits he was to be taken up as a straggler. Was the British sailor, he asked, to be reduced to that in the present day? Why, even in the war time, he was never obliged to go and point out to his officer beforehand the exact spot where he wanted to go, and then only at his peril stray a hair's breadth beyond it. For the life of him he could not tell how such a nefarious system could have ever been conceived by the Admiralty—a system which was now producing the greatest discontent at Portsmouth, and which could not be too quickly abolished. The practice of refitting a vessel when she arrived in port was an absurd waste of public money When ships came home their crews should be at once discharged into other vessels ready to receive them, where they would be found to do their duty just as well. He concurred with his hon. Friend who had just spoken, in the propriety of distributing the offices within the patronage of the Government to such men as had served their country well, and who were fitted for those situations. He had been assured that it was not intended to "cushion" his present Motion. To test the sincerity of the Government, he begged to ask whether they intended to remove the "beastly" block-ships, and substitute efficient vessels for them? It would depend upon the answer he received to that question whether or not he should divide the House.
§
Resolved, —
That, in the opinion of this House, the recommendations of the Commissioners on Manning the Navy ought to be taken into consideration by Her Majesty's Government, with a view to carry out the principles of such recommendations.