OBSERVATIONS.

HC Deb 13 February 1860 vol 156 cc919-52

MR. BAILLIE COCHRANE

rose to call the attention of the House to our relations with China. It appeared to him that at the commencement of another contest with that country it was most desirable that the House should express its opinion as to the instructions to be given to the Ministers and officers out there, and also as to the authority under which those instructions were to be carried out. He should not think it necessary to refer to the former lorcha war, though he had no doubt he should only be expressing the opinion of the majority of Members, in saying that that war was the cause of the present; nor would be refer to the opinion expressed by the noble Lord, the Foreign Secretary, and other Members of the present Government in 1857, when they were opposed to the noble Viscount now at the head of the Government, nor to the blue-book, except so far as it might be necessary to enable him to explain the present position of affairs. He would regard the question as subsequent to the Treaty of Tien-tsin. Early in 1857 Lord Elgin was appointed special envoy to China; but, owing to the disturbances in India, he did not place himself in communication with the Chinese officials until the close of that year. The original demands made by Lord Elgin in December 1857 were two, one the complete execution of treaty engagements, the other, compensation to British subjects for losses incurred in 1857. But, most unfortunately, on the 11th of February, 1858, the noble Lord took a step further, and reserved to himself the power of demanding other conditions from the Chinese Government, and, more unfortunately still, the first of those demands was that the Chinese Government should concede the right of having a British Minister resident at Pekin. This demand was in fact the cause of all our present difficulties. Every hon. Member who had read the blue-book would do full justice to the ability, energy, and frankness of Lord Elgin. His energy he had displayed with an extremity of vigour against the Chinese Government, at one moment demanding from them all the observances of a high civilization, and at another treating them as most ignorant barbarians. His frankness he had displayed in the unfavourable opinion which he invariably expressed with regard to this demand for a resident envoy at Pekin. On the 12th of July, 1858, he wrote to Lord Malmesbury:— The concessions obtained in it from the Chinese Government are not in themselves extravagant; nor, with the exception of the important principle of exterritoriality, in excess of those which commercial nations are wont freely to grant to each other; but in the eyes of the Chinese Government they amount to a revolution, and involve the surrender of some of the most cherished principles of the traditional policy of the Empire. They have been extorted, therefore, from its fears."—P. 345. And on November 5, 1858, he wrote thus:— In order that your Lordship may correctly apprehend the drift of this correspondence, it is neces- sary that I should state at the outset that the Chinese authorities contemplate the permanent residence of foreign Ministers at the capital with more aversion and apprehension than any of the other innovations introduced by the treaty of Tien-tsin. 'If we were quite sure,' say they, that you would always send to us men thoroughly wise, discreet, and considerate, it might be different; but if, for instance, so-and-so were appointed to represent a foreign Government at Pekin (and the right, if exercised by you, would, of course, be claimed by all other Governments), a month would not elapse before something would occur which would place our highest officers in the dilemma of having either to risk a quarrel or submit to some indignity which would lower the Chinese Government in the eyes of its own subjects.' No doubt such apprehensions are to some extent chimerical; but I am bound to admit that I do not consider them to he altogether so. The doctrine that every Chinaman is a knave and manageable only by bullying and bravado, like the kindred doctrine that every trading junk carries guns and is piratical, is, I venture with all deference to think, sometimes pushed a little too far in our dealings with this people. Be this, however, as it may, I advert to the point now only because I wish your Lordship to understand that I believe that the objections to the permanent residence of foreign Ministers at Pekin, which the Chinese authorities urge on this head, are sincerely entertained by them, and not entirely groundless."—P. 406. As to the feeling of the Chinese on the point, there was no manner of doubt. Here was an extract from a most touching despatch from the Chinese Commissioners in reference to it: — The established reputation of your Excellency for justice and straightforwardness, for kind intentions and friendly feeling, make us place the fullest confidence in your assurance that when you exacted the condition referred to you were actuated by no desire whatever to do injury to China. The permanent residence of Foreign Ministers at the capital would, notwithstanding, be an injury to China in many more ways than we can find words to express. In sum, in the present critical and troublous state of our country, this incident would generate, we fear, a loss of respect for their Government in the eyes of her people, and that this would indeed be no slight evil it will not be necessary, we assume, to explain to your Excellency with greater detail. It is for this reason that we specially address you a second letter on this subject, and we trust that your Excellency will represent for us to Her Majesty your Sovereign the great inconvenience you feel (the exercise of the right would be) to our country, and beseech her not to decide in favour of the permanent residence at Pekin. When we bethink us of the lustre shed by the well-doing and justice of Her Majesty, we feel assured that she would not wish, by being peremptory in a matter so hurtful to our country, to involve it in embarrassment: and our country will not fail to be impressed with gratitude."—P. 411. In spite of this the demand was insisted on. What happened? The treaty was signed on the 26th June, 1858. After the treaty was signed Lord Elgin went to Japan. He returned to Shanghai at the end of January, 1859, and at the commencement of February he sent a letter to the Commissioners, requesting them most strongly not to leave Shanghai until he returned from Canton, whither he intended going, to suppress some disturbances. Unfortunately, Lord Elgin did not return to Shanghai, but came home to England, and was replaced by Mr. Bruce, in May, 1858. Lord Malmesbury's instructions to Mr. Bruce were that on his arrival in China he should repair without the loss of one moment's time to Shanghai, on his way to the mouth of the Peiho, to complete the ratification of the treaty signed in the previous year. Lord Malmesbury then went on to say, and he begged the particular attention of the House to this,— You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Pekin of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may he made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Pekin. The Admiral in command of Her Majesty's Naval Forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient Naval Force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you should reach Tien-tsin in a British ship-of-war. The object, no doubt, was that the vessel of war should serve as an escort, and as a matter of dignity to the mission. There was not a single word in this despatch, or any other written by Lord Malmesbury, which in any way could be twisted into a justification of Mr. Bruce's proceeding up the Peiho with a fleet. From the first moment he got out, Mr. Bruce appeared to have been panic-struck. He saw danger everywhere, he saw Russians everywhere, and he was ready to receive information from any one about the supposed evil intentions of the Chinese Government. One authority quoted by him in his despatches was a Cantonese money-lender, who told him that the Russians had offered to send 10,000 muskets to the Chinese, which the Emperor of China judiciously declined, lest, as he said, they should be carried by 10,000 Russians. In his first despatch he complained that the Chinese Commissioners were waiting at Shanghai—the very place where Lord Elgin desired them to wait; and he went on thus — In my previous despatches I have informed your Lordship that we can ascertain nothing as to the intentions of this Government, with respect to the visit of Foreign Envoys to Pekin; but the Imperial Commissioners, on hearing of my arrival in China, have proceeded from Soo-chow to Shanghai—a fact of some significance, and which gives colour to the opinion that they hope to raise questions or begin negotiations at that point; otherwise they would have returned ere this to Pekin, for the purpose of making preparations for our reception. The House would bear in mind that this was a mission of peace, sent to ratify a treaty which was known to be most unpalatable to the Chinese nation. Mr. Bruce went on to say: — I hope in this way to compel the Chinese Government to declare itself upon those points which we know are the most unpalatable to it; and if there exists on its part a disposition to evade its obligations, to thrust us back, as before, on the seaboard, and refuse the reception which I cannot waive without lowering our national dignity, I trust we shall be in possession of their views when we arrive at the mouth of the Pciho, and not be left to discover them gradually at Pekin. If, as is most probable, the Court of Pekin is wavering, anxious to evade, but unwilling to risk a rupture, I trust that identity of views among the Foreign representatives, firm language, and an imposing demonstration of force, will secure the observance by it of the recent treaties, and incline it to listen to moderate and pacific advisers. Then followed three despatches from the Chinese Commissioners to Mr. Bruce, in which they said: — The Commissioners, having the fullest confidence in his predecessor (Lord Elgin) when he engaged them to remain at Shanghai to consider all matters not disposed of, were unable to return to Pek in; and if Mr. Bruce now proceed direct to Tien-tsin, the Commissioners having to travel by land, cannot reckon upon arriving there so soon. Indeed, taking into consideration the hindrance to be expected from the weather on their land journey, this will certainly occupy two months and more, as Mr. Bruce, they imagine, must be well aware. Mr. Bruce again wrote to the Commissioners, proposing to place steamers at their disposal for the purpose of reaching the mouth of the Peiho; but they replied that they had no authority to go by sea, and again urged Mr. Bruce as strongly as possible to grant an extension of the time. Mr. Bruce, however, would not listen to any delay; and, though he himself had remained for an entire month at Hong Kong, in order to meet the French Minister, M. dc Bourboulon, notwithstanding the directions of Lord Elgin to lose no time in proceeding to Shanghai, he refused to extend any leniency to the Commissioners who had remained at Shanghai, in consequence of instructions from their own Government, confirmed by the authority of Lord Elgin. And now came the most interesting feature of what he might call this extraordinary narrative. On the 16th of June, Admiral Hope arrived at the mouth of the Peiho, which was reached on the 20th by Mr. Bruce and the other Commissioners. In the interval Admiral Hope had discovered that the forts were fortified, that barriers had been placed across the river, and that, in fact, it was not intended to allow the mission to proceed by the Peiho to Tien-tsin. And those preparations were not made without justice, because Lord Elgin in a despatch said:—"We have no right to navigate the Peiho until after the ratification of the treaty." But Mr. Bruce, on arriving and discovering the state of affairs, took what appeared to him to have been the most unwarrantable step of ordering Admiral Hope to clear the passage. That order was given on the 21st of June. But Admiral Hope judiciously delayed his proceedings; and he firmly believed that had it not been for the attacks which had been made on another gallant Admiral—a high-minded and gallant officer, now a Member of the House (Sir Michael Seymour)—on the ground of over-caution in a former engagement at the Peiho, Admiral Hope would have had the good sense not to obey those instructions. He now came to a point which he could not touch on without bitter regret—a regret that was mingled with astonishment, in which he thought the House must sympathize. The attack was to have been made on the 21st; but would it be believed that at nine o'clock on the morning of the 25th, the 26th being the day on which the treaty was to have been ratified, Mr. Bruce received a despatch from one of the highest officers of the Crown in China, stating that he had arrived at Peh-tang-ho, another mouth of the Peiho, ten miles to the northward, to sec Mr. Bruce and to conduct him with all possible dignity to the Court of Pekin? The statement was so important and almost incredible that he would suffer Mr. Bruce to tell the story in his own words:— About nine a.m. on the 25th a junk came alongside Her Majesty's ship Magicienne, anchored about nine miles from the forts, and a petty mandarin came on board with a letter addressed to me by the Governor General of Pechelee, a translation of which I herewith inclose. It announced that the Governor General had been ordered to proceed to Peh-tang-ho, an inlet or small mouth of the river, about ten miles to the northward of this anchorage, and thence to offer his services to Her Majesty's Minister; that Kweiliang and Hwashana had been summoned back to Pekin, as the persons authorized to exchange ratifications and to convey the Minister to the capital. I was requested, therefore, to await their arrival, and to allow time for the withdrawal of the troops quartered at Peh-tang-ho, after which the Governor General would come in a vessel to convey me to the landing place, whence I should proceed to Pekin by land. This letter was dated the 23rd, and only reached me on the 25th—a delay which is inexplicable if it had been intended to reach me in time. As, in the body of the letter, the name of Her Majesty was not put on the same level with that of the Emperor of China, thereby violating the principle of equality established by the treaty, it was returned by Mr. Wade for correction, with an intimation that I was about to proceed to Tien-tsin. As the attempt to pass up the river was to be made at ten a.m., it would have been difficult for me, at that late hour, to have communicated with the Admiral, who was at a distance of nine miles, and already engaged in his operations. Could it believed that Mr. Bruce, being in receipt of a communication at nine o'clock in the morning, stating that it was intended to receive him properly, and when a misunderstanding might possibly exist as to the place at which he was to land, gave as an excuse for not sending nine miles to stay the effusion of blood that "Admiral Hope had already commenced operations"? And what would be thought by the House when he added that operations did not actually commence till two o'clock, and that Mr. Bruce, in the meantime, although he knew that the Chinese Government was then in the right, having done all that was expected at its hands, made no effort whatever to prevent the slaughter of our troops? A force of 1,100 went into action, of whom 434 were killed and wounded, and the sorrow for their loss could scarcely be alleviated by the gallantry displayed by both officers and men when the signal to "engage the enemy" was hung out by Admiral Hope, and below it that noble command, "as closely as possible." The very first night of the Session they had heard how the gallant Admiral, struck down and shattered, had shifted his flag from ship to ship, and, although himself desperately wounded, had yet been able to observe and sympathize with the gallantry of the officers under his command. They had heard of Vansittart and Shadwell, of Lemon, of Commerell, of Heath, Fisher, and Parke, rivals in glory and companions in fight. All this strife went on from two o'clock till night fell like a curtain on the scene; and Mr. Bruce, at nine miles' distance, and knowing that the Chinese Government had fulfilled its obligations, made no effort what- ever to stop the carnage. He sympathized deeply with any Minister at such a distance from home, whoso position of necessity entailed great responsibility; but he could not help expressing his painful conviction that Mr. Bruce had made an undue use of the authority with which he was intrusted. What was the excuse afterwards made by Mr. Bruce? He said there was treachery on the part of the Chinese, that the batteries were masked, and that the gunboats were lured into the river, and were then fired upon without due notice. But what was the fact? Why, Lord Elgin himself, in one of his despatches written before he left the country, stated distinctly that the Chinese were fortifying the Peiho, and that they were justified in doing so. There had been a very remarkable letter written by an "Eye-Witness," and what did the author, Captain Longley, state? He very frankly remarked that it was on our part that the declaration of war was made; and he added, "I need not tell you that there was no treachery in the case at all. We saw the masks on the embrasures, and we know by these that there were guns there. The Chinese fired one shot to warn us off, and waited to see if we would draw away our forces. Had they opened all their fire upon us at that time, I do not think a single gunboat would have escaped. So I hope we shall hear no more about treachery. The writer went on to tell a story about a crusty old gentleman who liked to follow his own crotchets and live within his own house, and expressed himself unable to see why the Chinese should not act on that principle if they thought proper. "I don't say," he added, "that we are to give up our trade if we can help it, but I don't think we are right in forcing our civilization upon China." Nothing could be stronger than the expressions of Lord Elgin: — We know from thePekin Gazette that the Emperor has issued orders for the reconstruction of the forts which we knocked down at the mouth of the Peiho, and for the erection of other works to protect Pekin. It would hardly, I think, be reasonable on our part to require that the Emperor of China should leave his capital undefended for the express purpose of enabling us, whenever we see fit so to do, to attack him there. Another mode in which Mr. Bruce had been defended was by stating that Mr. Ward, the American Minister, who very wisely did not co-operate at all in these proceedings, was received with insult and contumely when he subsequently went up the river. He had seen this stated even in The Times, and he was greatly surprised that a journal of such high character and ability should have published a statement altogether incorrect; but that surprise was removed when he subsequently found that the journal had been misled by Mr. Bruce's own despatch. Would it be believed that all this was totally imaginary? The fact was, Mr. Ward was received with great consideration. In the American account of the mission it was stated that,— The despatch of Hanguh, the Governor General, was couched in the most courteous terms, expressing his great desire to carry His Majesty's orders into effect, and to facilitate the journey of the American Envoy and his suite to Pekin,…The distance to Pehtang is about twelve miles, but it could not be seen from the ship. They were met by three junks, handsomely fitted up, in one of which they proceeded two miles to the landing-place, which was ornamented with coloured silk festoons. A guard of honour lined the streets up to the House, and the foreigners rode to it in carriages; and though the equipage of these vehicles and the discipline and uniform of the soldiers were not what they would have been in Paris or Vienna, they exhibited as much courtesy as could be desired. In addition to this description he found that President Buchanan said, in his last Message, "It is but justice to the Chinese authorities to observe that throughout these transactions they have acted with good faith, and in a friendly spirit to the United States." The reception "was after their own peculiar fashion; but they ought to regard with a lenient eye the ancient customs of the empire." Mr. Buchanan added, "The conduct of our Minister on this occasion has my entire approval." Thus the opinion expressed by Mr. Bruce, that Mr. Ward's mission was received with indignity, entirely fell to the ground. And taking the whole case into consideration, even with every indulgence, he thought Mr. Bruce had acted precipitately, and not in the spirit of a Minister charged with the ratification of a treaty of peace. He declared war on his own authority, and did not bear in mind the advice of the Duke of Wellington on a somewhat similar occasion. In 1835 the Duke of Wellington in a despatch to Lord Napier, said, "It is not by force and violence His Majesty intends to establish a commercial intercourse with China, but by the other conciliatory measures so strongly inculcated in all the instructions you have received." It was in this spirit Mr. Bruce should have acted. It might be interesting to the House to know what was the opinion on this subject of men perfectly competent to give one, of many official gentlemen in China, and even of Lord Elgin himself. Mr. Consul Alcock and Mr. Consul Robertson had both stated that the Chinese officials had shown every disposition to act in a friendly spirit. In his despatch of April 9, 1858, Lord Elgin said:— I must, however, begin by observing that the evils which I am about to signalize do not arise from any indisposition on the part of the natives to live peaceably with foreigners. On the contrary, they have their origin rather in the exaggeration of this desire than in its defect. The state of Ningpo in this respect furnishes their favourite and, perhaps, most plausible argument to that class of persons who advocate what is styled a vigorous policy in China; in other words, a policy which consists in resorting to the most violent measures of coercion and repression on the slenderest provocations. He believed his first despatch, of September 20, expressed only a very qualified approval of Mr. Bruce's proceedings; and in his last despatch the noble Lord distinctly stated how he thought the necessity for taking these violent measures might have been prevented. The noble Lord said, that although the denial of the passage to the capital for our ambassador might be considered evidence of an unfriendly disposition on the part of the Chinese, yet it was a matter in which Mr. Bruce might have remonstrated without having recourse to force to clear the passage. In the noble Lord's despatch of October, which did him the highest honour, he expressed a strong hope that peaceful relations might, be restored to China without the effusion of more blood. That was in accordance with the passage relating to China in Her Majesty's most gracious Speech from the Throne. He hoped when the noble Lord expressed himself so admirably he really meant what he said, and that he did not mean it in the spirit of the old Inquisitors, who, when they ordered a criminal for execution, directed that he should be treated tenderly. But, somehow or other, all this cordiality of feeling did not express itself in action. Mr. Oliphant, in his new work, stated his belief that the Chinese perfectly understood the position of the English Home Government. The Chinese did not blame the Home Government, but the officials carrying out its instructions in China. In a conversation with the Emperor, recorded in the blue-book, the Minister is represented as saying— Bonham has been directed by the Sovereign of the State to trade with China in a friendly spirit, and not to be troublesome. Bonhara has been presented by the Sovereign of the State with the O-ta-pa (the Order of the Bath), a thing somewhat of the same sort as the ancient red-gold-fish purse. Bonham is very pleased with this. He parades it with pride. It will prevent him making any difficulties. Mr. Bruce insisted much on Russian guns and upon Russian influence employed against England in China. If they would take the trouble to read the despatches of Count Poutiatine, they would find they were written with the best possible feeling. The Russian Minister gave Lord Elgin very good advice, and offered to lend "his moral support to all demands of common interest which may be made by the Plenipotentiaries of other Powers to the Court of Pekin." But he stated that what China wanted in her present position was repose, and that harsh measures would only lead to increased difficulties and to bloodshed. He (Mr. Cochrane) thought that was statesmanlike advice; and he believed that a palace had been prepared for the reception of our Ambassador at Pekin. It was absurd to raise the bugbear of Russian influence; and if the Russians had such influence, they must have gained it by conducting their diplomacy in China in a very different manner from that of England. He would now make a few remarks upon the despatches of the noble Lord the present Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. The earlier despatches of the noble Lord were written in a spirit of conciliation; he hoped they were not written in the spirit of the Inquisition, that gave up prisoners to execution, recommending them to be used as tenderly as possible. The noble Lord, in a speech made in 1857, said: — In dealing with nations less civilized than ourselves, it is by lofty thought and forbearing humanity that the genius of commerce contrasts with the ambition of conquerors. You may indeed, force a road for your merchants over the ruin of cities and the corpses of your customers, but I warn you that your trade will flee. The place for commerce recoils from bloodshed. Those were noble sentiments, but not more noble or truer than those to which the noble Lord had given expression when he said— We have heard much of late—a great deal too much, I think—of the prestige of England. We used to hear of the character, of the reputation, of the honour of England. I trust, Sir, that the character, the reputation, and the honour of this country are dear to us all; but if the prestige of England is to be separate from these qualities— if it is to be separate from the character, from the reputation, and from the honour of this country— then I, for one, have no wish to maintain it. To those who argue, as I have heard some argue, It is true we have a bad case—it is true we were in the wrong—it is true we have committed injustice, but we must persevere in that wrong, we must continue to act unjustly, or the Chinese will think that we are afraid'—I say, as has been said before, 'Be just and fear not.' Whatever we lose in prestige, of which I do not presume to be a judge, I am convinced that the honour and character of this country will be raised higher by such a policy. Never will England stand higher in the world's estimation than when it can be said that, though troublesome and meddlesome officials prostitute her arms and induce a brave Admiral to commence hostilities which ought never to have been begun, yet the House of Commons, representing her people, have indignantly declared that they will be no party to such injustice, and that neither for commercial advantages nor for political advantages, nor for any other immediate advantages to their country, will they consent to stain that honour which, after all, has been, and must be, the sure foundation of her greatness."— [3 Hansard, cxliv., 1474]. These were sentiments in which he felt assured every hon. Member in that House must concur; and he should appeal to the noble Lord, now that he was in power, to carry out the views to which, when in Opposition, he had given expression. But while he made that appeal to the noble Lord, he was fully prepared to admit that, after the reverse which we had recently experienced in China, it was necessary that some great demonstration should be made with the view of retrieving our position in that country. He should, however, like to see that demonstration great, not only in point of magnitude, but by force of its moderation. We boasted ourselves at public meetings to be the pioneers of civilization, as the Spaniards of former days were wont to boast that they had spread Christianity throughout the West, and we were called upon to justify by our acts the professions which we made. It was, then, not with the view of tying up the hands of the Executive by pledging it to any specific Resolution, but in the hope that the expression of opinion on the part of the House of Commons might tend to the prosecution of our claims against China with justice and moderation, that he had ventured that evening to trespass upon their attention. The Government might do all that they deemed expedient to retrieve our position in that country; but he should ask the noble Lord not to insist upon a demand—that of having a resident representative of England at Pekin—which was opposed to all the feelings and habits of the Chinese people. He should also ask the noble Lord to inform the House fully and clearly what were the limits which he had prescribed to the action of the authorities who were in command of the expedition against China, and by whom those instructions were to be carried into effect.

SIR MICHAEL SEYMOUR

said, that as his name had been mentioned in connection with the subject under discussion, he hoped to obtain the permission of the House to make some observations with respect to it; although he regretted to say that in doing so he had not the advantage which he should have possessed had certain documents been laid on the table of the House which would have enahled him to render his statement more complete. The question which had been raised by the hon. Gentleman who had just spoken was a very large one; its details were spread over a very considerable portion of time, and were marked by the occurrence of many extraordinary events. When, in 1857, the subject first came under the notice of the House, he was not unmindful that many hon. Members had been kind enough to take a favourable view of the course with respect to it which he had deemed it to be his duty to adopt; and he now begged to assure those hon. Gentlemen that he had derived no ordinary encouragement in the performance of that duty from the support which they had been so good as to accord; while to those who had taken a different course, and who had used hard words in speaking of his conduct, he could only say that he forgave them, and that he was willing to believe they had clone no more than that which they deemed to be right. But to proceed to the discussion of the subject immediately at issue. He might state that soon after he took the command in China he went to the north, and having ascertained that the Russian war was at end, had assisted in facilitating the return to their own country of about 100 Russian prisoners. He returned to Hong Kong at the end of the year. On his coming back he found that the dispute about the lorcha Arrow had arisen, and, being then a stranger to China, he referred to the merchants, and other persons of experience resident there, for information upon the point. Acting upon that information, after a delay of ten or eleven days, he ordered his second in command, with two or three vessels, to make such a demonstration, and to demand from the Chinese authorities an explanation with regard to their conduct; but without any favourable result. Having, however, ascertained that Canton was by treaty stipulations placed in a similar posi- tion with two or three other mercantile cities in China, and that we possessed a right of entry there, and of communicating with the Government officials, he sought to secure that object, in the hope that one half-hour or ten minutes' conversation would put an end to all further proceedings. The entry to the city was, however, denied, and there were consequently no possible means of personal communication with the Chinese officials. But to revert for a moment to the proceedings which had taken place in that House in reference to the subject, he must say he had been rather surprised to read that some hon. Members had disputed the right of the lorcha to carry the British flag, seeing that the ordinance under which the right was claimed had been sent to this country and had received the Royal assent, and had, when it had gone out to Hong Kong, met with the concurrence of all the parties interested in these transactions. It was not intended to meet the requirements of the Chinese alone, but of others. The lorcha was one of a vast number of other British vessels, carrying an immense amount of British property. It was also said that the vessel had no protection—that her papers had expired. But that was not the fact. She had the right to carry the British flag, and the ordinance gave the power to the British consul to overhaul her papers and to renew the protection from year to year. If she had protection she was tegular, and if she was not regular she became forfeited to the British Crown. As it happened, however, her papers were examined and found to be correct. That being so, and the lorcha being entitled to protection, he had deemed it his duty to take some steps for the purpose of exacting from the Chinese officials some acknowledgment of the error they had committed in the case of the vessel in question, and thence had followed the further operations to which he had been obliged to resort. He could say with the most perfect truth, however, that the duty which had thus been cast upon him was one which was of a most distasteful character to his feelings, knowing as he did that he was commencing warlike proceedings against an unwarlike people. But he proceeded up the river to Canton, and as he neared the city and was surrounded by hundreds of thousands of the population, the first question which presented itself to his mind was, how he could best deal, with such a population according to the dictates of humanity, and with as little as possible of slaughter. He directed the attack in such a manner as he thought best calculated to attain these purposes, He told the Commissioners of Canton that he had power to breach the wall, and with 300 men he did so and passed into the city. It had been said in the discussion in that House that the city of Canton was then in his power, as, indeed, it frequently was; and if he had thought fit he might, as there were not wanting some who said he should, have gone the length of firing the city and burning it down; but he said it was no part of the duty of a Christian officer to take that course, and he would not do it. He continued, however, to hold the Canton river, which was a matter of some difficulty. Owing to the number of war-junks, and the extreme ingenuity of the Chinese with their fire bombs, the position could not be maintained without considerable risk to the ships. He did not regret the course he had pursued, his desire being to make it as little oppressive as possible to the inhabitants on the hanks of the river, who, with the small officials, became friends, and in many instances supplied the force with refreshments, and gave them notice of firerafts. Operations had gone on satisfactorily for the objects in the view, but unfortunately, owing to the smallness of his force, he was obliged to restrain for many weary weeks and months the ardour of his gallant officers and men, who were eager for action. He did restrain their ardour, however, and waiting until the proper hour for action should arrive. When the noble Earl, the British Ambassador to China, arrived, the question came to he whether they should continue where they were at Canton or despatch the force to the north. The unfortunate mutiny in India then broke out, and it became his duty to do all he could to despatch reinforcements to support and sustain Her Majesty's authority in that country. The Shannon, the Pearl, the Sanspareil, were detached to Calcutta, and the Fury to Sir Henry Ward, the able and energetic Governor of Ceylon, who rendered every assistance in his power by despatching all the troops he could possibly spare. During the absence of Her Majesty's Ambassador in India the operations in China were suspended. During that absence, however, he had found it his duty to establish a blockade of Canton for this reason—he found that the Chinese High Commissioner and the other authorities had collected Chinese produce, and that they were en- deavouring to open the trade with other foreign nations to the exclusion of the British. It was impossible to allow that; and the holding of the river was also considered essential to the arrangements which were to be made for the future; for in the report he had sent borne he stated that he should hold the Canton river until Government had decided what steps should be taken. He had already referred to the absence of certain papers, which would prevent him from speaking on one point on which it was most desirable that he should have had the opportunity of addressing the House; and he would proceed to state that in the early part of 1858 he was called on to accompany the noble Lord (the Earl of Elgin), the British Ambassador, in conjunction with His Excellency the Ambassador, the Admiral, and forces of France, to the north of China, after the final capture of Canton. The blockade was raised on the 10th of February, and arrangements were made for proceeding to the north. He confessed he had always hoped that when this period arrived no hostilities would really be necessary in the north. It was supposed that what had occurred at Canton would induce the Emperor of China to see the advisability of yielding. Moreover, happily for our prospects, the representatives of Russia, America, and France had united with us on the common ground of a revision of treaties, and he hoped that nothing hostile would ensue. With these views he had even asked from the authorities at home a discretionary power to reduce the naval forces in China. Well, it was thought necessary to make a demonstration in the north of China and to proceed to the entrance of the Peiho. The arrangement was, that all should rendezvous at Shanghai. They arrived off the Peiho on the 24th of April; on the 25th the French arrived. On the 26th they proceeded to reconnoitre the entrance of the Peiho river; on the 27th they moved over the bar two of the despatch-boats; on the 30th he was informed by Her Majesty's Ambassador that a letter had been received rendering it advisable to postpone hostile action, and that he should be informed when a different state of affairs presented itself. A conference was held without result on the 1st of May. On the 12th his Excellency the Russian Ambassador was good enough to allow him to question one of the Russian gentlemen who had come from Pekin as to what was going on there and the nature of the road thither. Advantage was also taken of delivering a letter from Her Majesty's Ambassador to the officials in the port to reconnoitre and find out the nature of the landing, the states of the tide, and the consistency of the ground over which their force might have to travel. The final decision was taken on the 19th. On the 20th of May they proceeded to the entrance of the Peiho, when the operations against the forts were attended with the most successful result. The loss in killed and wounded was 103 men, more than half of it being unhappily occasioned by the explosion of a Chinese magazine. After the capture of the forts not the slightest molestation of any kind was offered by the Chinese until Tien-tsin was reached on the 30th. Here he would gladly sit down; but the House would not, he hoped, think him out of order if he made some reference to the manner in which he had performed his duties in reference to the noble Earl, Her Majesty's Ambassador to China. He hoped he might be allowed to say, in regard to his own part in these transactions, that from the moment the noble Earl entered upon his duties, he had never deviated from an anxious desire to forward his Excellency's wishes, or to uphold the interests of this country and obey the orders of the Queen and Her Majesty's Government. He would not have made this reference, and hoped the House would not say he was out of order (for he had refrained from noticing, on various occasions, remarks in certain public journals), if his conduct as a naval officer had not been in some measure assailed. He believed he took the right course as a naval officer and commander in chief in a distant part of the world—that course being strictly to adhere to his duty —strictly to adhere to the instructions of the Admiralty, which he served. If he had exercised forbearance in not asking for official documents relating to certain operations in which he took part, it was only because he did not think an officer should be too sensitive, even if the public thought fit to deal with his character. Were he to justify himself, his course, as it seemed to him, was this—to ask the Admiralty whether, in consequence of his character having been assailed, they would permit him to use certain documents in order to make his conduct plain before the world. If they objected to that course, he must bow to their decision. In his case he had received the fullest approbation of the Government and the Admiralty, and therefore had not thought it necessary. But when he told the House that an hon. Gentleman—an able and very agreeable writer, who held a position of confidence, who held an official position by the side of the noble Lord, the Ambassador in China —when he gave to the world his work, which bore the impress of something like authority, in which he reflected upon his character—when that writer said that he (Sir M. Seymour) was slow, and wanting in energy, and of having thwarted the policy of the noble Lord, he thought he might fairly ask why did not this gentleman give the whole story to the world? He could have done it, but he did not; but he wished to poison the public mind in regard to the conduct of one who had endeavoured to do his duty. The House must understand that the instructions were very clear. The House would see by the blue-book that the negotiations were entrusted entirely to the Ambassador. He was told that it would be for him to determine, and for him alone, how long the negotiations should be continued, when, if unsuccessful, to be broken off; and when he judged that further negotiations were useless, and the employment of force necessary to compel the Chinese to comply with his demands, his duty then would be to announce that fact to the Admiral, with whom it would then rest to decide how he would employ the force at his disposal. He begged to tell the House that he never was called upon to act until the time he was called upon to attack the forts. Had he been called upon to act he would have respectfully told Her Majesty's Ambassador that he thought it would be better to delay, as in his opinion it was important—in acting against the Chinese it was always important—to act with effect. He had experienced the advantageous moral effect of such a course in dealing with this people. He knew the difficulty of getting the Chinese to show a front of resistance. After the successful capture of the Peiho forts the Chinese never troubled them again. In the case of affairs in the north he had given notice for the production of papers, and he believed the Government had no objection to their production. The author of the work to which he had referred seemed to forget that he (Sir M. Seymour) had not acted alone—he acted with Admiral de Genouilly, a man of honour, open, candid, and of the highest professional attainments, so much so that it was impossible for him to express the satisfaction he always felt in carrying out joint operations with that gallant Officer. Therefore, when they singled him out he did not understand it. Those gentlemen were very fast men for fighting. Fight whom? Blame him for not fighting? Whom? Chinamen? He did not mean to say that Chinamen could not he got to resist. They did so get together at the Peiho forts, and became almost impudent, and the result was therefore useful, as they were prepared to meet them. If they had gone in a hurry up the river, no doubt the forts would have been taken; but what then? they should have commenced fighting at the opening of the river, and been slaughtering Chinamen all the way to Tien-tsin. Allusion had been made in the work in question to the enemy having retired unscathed. Why, they fled like sheep. His own vessel, a steamer, could not make the turning, and he was compelled to put her stem on to the opposite mud, to back her short, and then go on. All hands on board were not sufficient to turn her round, and who came to help them? Why, hundreds of the Chinese came down to lend a hand in getting her off, and to assist her down the river. They also came swimming off on both sides of his vessel, with fruits, vegetables, flowers, birds, and all sorts of things for the English. Yet some of those bellicose gentlemen, for the sake of a flourish of their pen and a little fine writing, did not scruple to talk the nonsense he had referred to. He regretted very much having to enter upon these subjects. He wished to act with the greatest forbearance in regard to anything that was written about him; but there were occasions when an officer was bound to answer imputations upon his conduct, and he hoped the House would giant him their indulgence. As to the commercial aspect of the question, he held that our interest in China must be purely commercial; and if we attempted to gain any other end, we should be acting unjustly and unfairly towards China. This country was very powerful for war—China was very weak. It was impossible that we could carry our arms into China without very serious consequences to that Empire. He believed that China had never recovered from the effects of the first war; and he further believed that if we carried the hostilities now impending beyond what the necessities of the case required, there would be great reason to deplore it. He had no hesitation in expressing his opinion as to the future. If it proved necessary to adopt hostile measures, with the large allied forces now going out to China, success there would be inevitable. It could not be supposed that any Chinese or Tartar force could resist the arms of two such powerful nations as the Allies, when mustered so strongly as in the expedition now on its way out. It was much to he desired that the Emperor of China would listen to the advice which was offered him, and avert hostilities while it was yet in his power. He feared, however, that such would not be the case, and he had read with regret the news of the gathering of large Tartar forces in the vicinity of Pekin. The Chinese people did not like taking advice, and the persuasion even of their best friends was of no avail. In the event of their not yielding to our demands, we must of necessity proceed to retake the forts before which our gallant forces had been defeated, and then advance upon Tien-tsin. He felt satisfied that, once in force at Tien-tsin, the Court of Pekin would open their eyes to the propriety and necessity of yielding; but in any case he should deprecate the consequences of success, if not exercised with justice and moderation towards the Chinese. As he said before, China was really not a country to go to war with. They had nothing to oppose to our strength, and we could not carry war into China with any real satisfaction to ourselves, although we might bring ruin and desolation upon the empire. If they pushed on to Pekin, they would run the risk of making it like what Canton was at this moment; and very possibly the Court would leave the city, and then they would find themselves in Pekin without the means of getting any officials to negotiate with. There was a probability, too, that a defeat might induce the Chinese not only to lay down their arms, but to remain in what he might call a condition of passive resistance, and what could be done then? What could our forces do before an enemy that offered no opposition? He supposed they would just have to come away. After having endeavoured in vain by peaceful means to procure the ratification of the treaty, which he had no hesitation in saying he thought ought to he carried, he did not see how we could avoid proceeding to hostilities; but, having attained the success which must accompany the allied forces, the utmost forbearance and consideration should be extended to a nation so utterly indefensible as China. The fabric of Chinese power was of so flimsy a character, so merely ornamental, and so unstable, that he had no doubt the consequence of any rude shock from the Allies would be to break up the empire. The risk we ran of bringing about such a result ought, he thought, to make us cautious how far we carried our operations.

LORD JOHN RUSSELL

I suppose there is no one in this House who can question the professional opinion of the gallant Admiral who has just sat down, or who will be disposed to doubt his zeal and devotion in the service of the Crown and the country. The gallant Admiral has received the approbation of the Board of Admiralty, his immediate superiors, and therefore I think it is quite unnecessary— indeed impossible—for me to go into the questions he has adverted to with regard to his conduct and the differences with the noble Lord who was Her Majesty's Ambassador in China. I doubt whether this is an occasion when we can conveniently and usefully discuss the whole question with regard to China; but at the same time, the hon. Gentleman (Mr. B. Cochrane) who brought forward this subject made so many charges against Mr. Bruce, and went so much into detail that I cannot altogether avoid questioning some parts of the narrative in which he introduced them. The House will recollect that Mr. Bruce was sent to China entirely for the purpose of obtaining the ratifications of the treaty of Tien-tsin, and of acting at Pekin as Her Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary, Before he went he laid a paper before the Earl of Malmesbury, asking for instructions, and pointing out that, as there were parts of the treaty which he had reason to fear were very unpalatable to the Chinese, some difficulties might arise, not then perceived, in carrying the treaty into effect. I must say that Mr. Bruce did not suggest that the entrance to the Peiho would be resisted; but he asked the question whether he should insist on going up to Pokin. The Earl of Malmesbury then directed him to go to Pekin, and gave him the following instructions as to the mode of proceeding there:— You will probably find it advisable, before your departure from Shanghai, to send an intimation to Pekin of your approach, and to request that suitable arrangements may be made for your honourable reception at the mouth of the Peiho, and at Tien-tsin, and for your journey from that place to Pekin. The admiral in command of Her Majesty's naval forces in China has been directed to send up with you to the mouth of the Peiho a sufficient naval force, and unless any unforeseen circumstances should appear to make another arrangement more advisable, it would seem desirable that you reach Tien-tsin in a British ship of war. The case which actually occurred was not foreseen. Mr. Bruce was directed to proceed to the mouth of the Peiho with a suitable naval force. Admiral Hope says, Mr. Bruce said with an "imposing" naval force. But I take it for granted that such a naval force was intended as would inspire so much respect or awe to the Chinese that there would then be no difficulty in proceeding up the Peiho and arriving at Pekin. Many petitions have been addressed to me on the assumption that Mr. Bruce, immediately on his arrival, attempted to reach Pekin by force; that he intended to force his way. Mr. Bruce, I submit, acted exactly according to his instructions. He wrote immediately on his arrival at Shanghai, on the 10th of May, to ask that suitable preparations should be made for his reception. He said he should proceed to Tien-tsin, and when he arrived there he hoped suitable preparations would be made according to his character as Plenipotentiary for his conveyance to Pekin. He states it in these words:— The undersigned takes this opportunity of informing his Excellency Kweiliang that, in compliance with the above instructions of his sovereign, he is about to proceed without delay, by ship, to Tien-tsin. He trusts that the necessary orders will be given for the conveyance of himself and his suite from thence to Pekin, and for the provision of suitable accommodation for him during his residence in the capital itself, in a manner befitting the dignity of the nation he represents. It is obvious that there is no contemplation of the use of force in that request, but that it is a simple request that the Ministers of the Emperor of China will make due preparation for his journey and reception. The hon. Gentleman says that there were persons waiting at Shanghai to negotiate with him, and that they were told by Lord Elgin to stay there for that purpose. But it is rather remarkable that the hon. Gentleman, who professes a wish to show every indulgence to Mr. Bruce, did not, in this respect, do him bare justice, because the fact is that in the beginning of March Lord Elgin wrote to the Ministers of the Emperor of China that he should not return to Shanghai, that he was about to proceed to England, and that another person would go from England with the view of exchanging ratifications at Pekin, and residing there as Her Majesty's representative. These Chinese Ministers, after the receipt of that letter, remained from the 30th of March until the middle of June, but no one can say that they were justified in expecting either Lord Elgin or Mr. Bruce to negotiate at Shanghai, when they had received an intimation that another and more natural course had been decided upon. Mr. Bruce accordingly, in further compliance with his instructions, called on Admiral Hope to furnish him with an adequate force. According to directions received from Lord Elgin, that force was furnished, and he proceeded to the mouth of the Peiho. Up to this time he had had no intimation whatever from the Chinese Ministers that his entrance to the Peiho and proceeding to Tien-tsin would be opposed, or even objected to. These Chinese Ministers proposed to re-negotiate, or, in fact, re-open certain points, and to alter some parts of the treaty. Mr. Bruce very properly declared that that was no part of his duty; that it was his duty to exchange ratifications, and not re-open questions already settled by the treaty, and that he intended to proceed to the Peiho. If any one will look at the correspondence with these Ministers, he will find that, although they attempted to re-open questions, yet after a time they apparently coincided with Mr. Bruce. At all events, they declared themselves ready to do what he desired. They made some objections to the length of the journey and the time it would take, but they never, nor do I believe it was in their minds or knowledge to do so—they never suggested to Mr. Bruce that the Emperor of China objected to that mode, or that any resistance would be made to his proceeding to Pekin. Indeed, I cannot conceive what objections there could be, supposing the Emperor of China intended to admit him to Pekin and ratify the treaty. If that were the Emperor's intention, there could be no objection to Mr. Bruce proceeding by the usual and shortest route, nor to giving him those advantages in his short journey of forty miles from Tien-tsin to the capital which would enable him to reach it in a manner he had been led to expect, as becoming the representative of a friendly Power. But another party seems to have had a predominant influence with the Emperor of China. They do not manage matters in that country as they do here. In England when one party is in power the other is out. The one pursues a policy, the other criticizes it. But in China there are two parties in power at the same time, one being for peace, and the other for war, and therefore the treatment shown to the mission was of a character totally different from that which was expected. Mr. Bruce desired that the Admiral should proceed to the mouth of the Peiho, and when there endeavour to ascertain what arrangements had been made for his reception. He always proposed that he should be allowed to go up with one or perhaps two ships, just sufficient for himself and retinue. It was not proposed to take up the whole squadron. The Admiral could not find out what orders had been given to the forts. It did not appear whether there was to be resistance or not, A number of country people appeared, whom Mr. Bruce calls a rabble, and they said there was no person of authority among them, that they were mere country people, that they had put stakes in the river to defend themselves against pirates (which is not a very unlikely event), and that they knew nothing of what the Government would do. So matters remained until the last moment. It was not that Mr. Bruce insisted on refusing the proposition of the Emperor of China that he should go some other route, but up to nine o'clock on the day the attack was made he was induced to think that the Government of China was not disposed to resist his proceeding up the Peiho. And let me say that my belief is, that if Admiral Hope had been as successful as the gallant Admiral (Admiral Seymour) was the year before in passing the forts and destroying them, we should have heard that Mr. Bruce had arrived at Pekin; and as the gallant Admiral has said, if his boat had got into the mud, there would have been hundreds of Chinese to assist him; and that the Emperor of China would have said the resistance was made against his orders, and that he was quite ready to disavow any such resistance, and to receive Mr. Bruce as became the representative of a friendly Power. But events, I must own, turned out otherwise. I do not attempt to say precisely what course was that which might have saved Mr. Bruce from difficulty. It appears to me that the evils which he had to consider were very great on every side. He was placed without instructions in a position he did not expect. He had with him a large force. He had with him, mind you, a large force —a large British force, with a British Admiral in command. He desired the Admiral to clear the river. When the morn- ing came on which that was to be done, he received intimation that if he would go to another place, ten miles off, he would be received by a high officer, and means provided by which he might reach Pekin. Let any one who really feels that indulgence which the hon. Gentleman professed consider the difficult position to which Mr. Bruce was placed. He was ordered by the Government of his country to go to Pekin to obtain the ratification of the treaty, and not to ratify the treaty anywhere else. He was told at the mouth of the river that militia and rabble had put stakes, in order to defend themselves against pirates. There were some persons at Shanghai who told him that the Emperor of China meant to resist the advance of the British Minister. Other persons told him that preparations were made for his reception, and everything would pass in tranquillity. He had to decide this difficult question, whether he should attempt to pass by force, or without orders desire the British Admiral to retire from forts which were taken with case by a British force the year before, and thus give the appearance to the whole of China—I may say to the whole of England and the whole of Europe—of shrinking before forts which were easily overcome a short time before. Let us suppose he had taken the latter course. Let us consider what opinion would then have been passed upon him in this country. Let us suppose that at nine o'clock in the morning he had said, "I will not attempt to pass these forts, but submit to any proposal which the Chinese Government may make." For my own part, I am inclined to think that after the successful resistance made to the British and French advance the Chinese were more disposed to he civil and apparently conciliatory to the Americans than they would have been under other circumstances. It was their obvious policy. Let us suppose that Mr. Bruce had met with the same treatment as the American Minister, and that he had been conveyed to the capital in what is said to be not the most honourable mode of conveyance. I will suppose him to have arrived at the capital, and to have been told, as Mr. Ward was, that if he expected an audience he must perform the kotoo— strike his head to the ground and offer himself as the representative of a tributary nation. I will suppose him to have displayed the same spirit as Mr. Ward—and I am sure he would have displayed it— that he had replied that he would perform no ceremony which was not performed at the Courts of the Western Powers, or which would be considered as degrading, or as placing his Sovereign in an inferior position to the Emperor of China. The Chinese would have said to him, as they said to Mr. Ward, "What was the use of your coming here, then? You can't ratify your treaty here; we will conduct you to the coast, and there it will be ratified." Suppose Mr. Bruce had done all this, what would have been said of his conduct here? Would not people have said to him, "You had instructions to go to Pekin to get your treaty ratified; you have not obeyed them; you have suffered humiliation, and you have not carried out your object, your only excuse being that you had reason to apprehend some resistance, though you were aware, and, indeed, had seen it with your own eyes, that a similar resistance had been previously overcome with the greatest case? Don't you know the character always given of the Chinese, that they are an unwarlike nation? Don't you know that the resistance from which you ran away might have been overcome in half an hour, if you had gone boldly forward?" Can anybody doubt that this would have been the judgment passed on Mr. Bruce here? On the other hand, there was the danger that, the Chinese having got ready their forts, blocked up the river, and altogether made more extensive preparations than Mr. Bruce was aware of, Her Majesty's troops might suffer a reverse in spite of their gallantry and bravery. These were the alternatives presented to Mr. Bruce, and never was a civil officer placed in a situation of more difficulty. Without attempting to decide—and I will not attempt to decide myself whether his course was the best—I say there were infinite difficulties on both sides, and the Government were justified—and not only justified, but they would have been neglecting their duty in doing otherwise—in telling Mr. Bruce that their confidence in him was not diminished by the course he had taken. I have said thus much because it was necessary, after the numerous complaints which have been made against Mr. Bruce, and after what has been said to-night by the hon. Member, to place before the House the difficulties in which he was placed. When this news reached Her Majesty's Government, we came to the immediate and unanimous conclusion that, whatever might be the terms proposed to the Chinese Government, or the course hereafter pur- sued towards them, it was necessary to support them by such a force in the Chinese waters as should make it manifest that our moderation was the result of willingness, not of weakness. With regard to the particular terms we have offered, the gallant Admiral said, most truly, that we could not have asked for less than the treaty of Tien-tsin, which had been signed and had received the special approval of the Emperor of China. Nothing but the ratification remained to be given, and it would have been impossible for us, because Her Majesty's forces had suffered a loss, because 400 or 500 men had been killed or wounded, to give up a treaty solemnly agreed to, or to retreat from conditions to which the Emperor of China bad given his consent. It was also necessary to ask for an apology for what has occurred, to which I think we are entitled; for, whatever may be the case of the Emperor of China with regard to his right of forbidding a passage up his rivers, or defending their entrance, he was clearly not justified in barring the passage without giving notice, or in entrapping the British Minister into an ambuscade. For such a proceeding the dignity of the Crown and the nation requires an ample satisfaction and apology. With regard to the general question I quite agree with the gallant Admiral and the sentiments that have been expressed by the hon. Gentleman that we should treat the Chinese with every justice. It is not because England and France are far stronger in war than China that therefore we ought to give them an inch less than the justice to which they are entitled. I agree with the gallant Admiral, too, in those motives of policy to which he referred. I know very well that in pressing too severely upon the Emperor of China we may entirely dislocate the whole fabric of the Empire and the state of society already too much weakened and impaired, and that that which is our only business there, commerce, might be seriously injured by standing out for complete, instead of resting satisfied with insufficient, terms of peace. But, at the same time, everybody I have seen possessing any acquaintance with China is of opinion that unless we place ourselves in a position to show that we are able to enforce all our demands, the lives not only of British subjects, but of all Europeans in China, would be endangered. We must be strong enough to vindicate our honour and treat with them on equal terms. At first it was necessary to make preparations by which to show our strength, and this we did in communication with the Emperor of the French. There was a chance that the Emperor of China might offer terms himself; that Mr. Bruce's readiness to receive those terms might be known, and that the whole matter might have been settled in a way to satisfy our honour, and at the same time obtain for us the terms of the treaty. That hope has to some extent been disappointed. It may be that it would be wiser to send out a person of more authority than Mr. Bruce, who has not been engaged in this conflict, who might obtain from the Emperor the concession of terms of peace which he would not otherwise assent to. That is a matter to which the attention of the Government has been seriously directed, and I shall take an early opportunity, as soon as the next mail comes in—and we expect it very soon—to state to the House the course which the Government intend to pursue. In the mean time, not fearing the decision of this House, not unwilling to give it every information, I venture to say that I do not think that they are in a position at this moment, without all the circumstances of the case before them, to come to a decision. I think it would be well for the House to wait before it pronounces any absolutely decisive opinion either on the conduct of Mr. Bruce or the course which the Government propose to pursue. I agree with the gallant Admiral that our business in China is commerce. A Minister residing there would not have the same duties to perform as a Minister residing at any European Court. His chief business would be to treat of matters of commerce, to protect his own countrymen residing in the country, and to obtain reparation for them if any of them chanced to sustain injury; and it is a serious question to consider whether this could best be done by a Minister residing at Pekin, or at one of the outports, and going to Pekin occasionally. These are matters which require grave consideration. I am not saying now that we ought to ask for more than we have already obtained, the option which is given by the Treaty of Tien-tsin. Every honour has been rendered, and justly rendered, to the brave men who fought so gallantly yet unsuccessfully. But the character of the naval service has not suffered by that misfortune. I need only add that I shall feel happy indeed if the measures which have been adopted should lead by successful negotiation to the establishment of permanent relations of peace with that country.

SIR JOHN PAKINGTON

I very much agree with what fell from the noble Lord at the commencement of his speech, that for several reasons the present is not a desirable moment for entering into a general discussion of the question of our relations with China. That opinion acquires even greater force from what was stated at the conclusion of the noble Lord's speech, and by the arrangements which the Government have made for bringing the Naval Estimates forward to-night. The questions arising out of the late unfortunate collision with China, involving not only transactions which have occurred, but matter affecting our future relations with that great Empire, must necessarily be of importance, and in many respects also of extreme difficulty. The hon. Member for Honiton (Mr. B. Cochrane) availing himself of the right which he undoubtedly possessed, has placed before the House the opinions which he entertains on some parts of the subject. He has stated them with great clearness and ability; and I am bound to say, as far as we are now in possession of information, that there were many parts of his observations in which I am much disposed to concur. The noble Lord, in answering my hon. Friend, passed in review several of the transactions which have taken place, but he has not gone into the whole of them; and if I now abstain from entering more fully into the subject, I wish it to be understood that I am not assenting to all that fell from the noble Lord. The conduct of Mr. Bruce in particular is a point on which I should be sorry to express any premature opinion. I am simply anxious not to appear as altogether concurring in the intimation that has fallen from the noble Lord. My belief is, that the conduct of Mr. Bruce must he divided into two periods — namely, that which elapsed prior to his leaving Shanghai, and the subsequent period after his arrival at the mouth of the Peiho. And I would remind the noble Lord that in his observations he has altogether omitted, or, at least, he has touched very lightly on the despatch which bears more than any read by him upon the question at issue—I mean that sent by Mr. Bruce to Shanghai on the 12th or 13th of November. On this matter I wish to be understood as altogether reserving my opinion. But I have felt a very great desire to hear what are the intentions of the Government on so important and delicate a matter. I hope I may infer from the little the noble Lord has said today, that the course which they will pursue will be one of moderation. Further than that I will not inquire, especially after the declaration, which I heard with great satisfaction, and as to which I hope no misunderstanding exists—that as soon as the next despatch is received, which the Government expect will be on a very early day, we may anticipate a full explanation from the noble Lord of the policy which they are prepared to adopt with regard to China. [Lord J. RUSSELL signified his assent.] With that understanding, I think the offer made by the noble Lord affords an additional reason for abstaining at this moment from any further discussion; particularly as we are all anxious to hear the statement of my noble Friend opposite (Lord C. Paget). But although I thus wish to exercise some reserve in entering into the general question of our policy in China, there is one part of the subject on which I wish to maintain no reserve at all, and that is as to the appeal which I understood was in some sense made to me by the hon. and gallant Admiral the Member for Devon-port (Admiral Seymour) with regard to the opinion expressed by the late Board of Admiralty regarding his conduct while in command on the Chinese station. I confess I. entertain some regret that the hon. and gallant officer felt obliged—as I presume he did in justice to himself—to allude to the unfortunate difference which occurred between him and the noble Lord our Ambassador in China. I am inclined to believe that the fact of that difference was very little known in this country, and I am still more strongly disposed to believe that no one was inclined to attach blame to the gallant Admiral. I am sorry that the matter has been brought before the House of Commons, but as he has felt it due to himself to advert to the subject, I think I am bound in justice to confirm what has fallen from him, and to say that the Board of Admiralty unanimously approved of his conduct. After the case was brought under their notice, they sent out to the gallant Admiral for an explanation of the facts, and a full and clear explanation was returned by the gallant officer. After it had been carefully considered it was my pleasing duty to assure him, on the part of the Board of Admiralty, that we approved of the course which he had adopted; and I think I am bound further to express the opinion of the Board that there had been nothing in the conduct of the gallant Admiral which was not perfectly consistent with the high and honourable character which he has at all times borne.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, as he had placed a notice of Motion on this subject upon the Paper, he might be permitted to say a few words, which the hon. Member who had introduced the discussion had spared him the necessity of prolonging to any great extent. The policy to be pursued towards China by Her Majesty's Government he hoped would be maturely considered; but with regard to this question the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appeared in a new character. The House would remember the eloquence and grace with which he had delivered his opinions on the same subject on a former occasion; but he could not as truthfully congratulate the noble Lord on the extenuatory speech of that evening, and he did not think he had satisfactorily replied to the arguments of the hon. Member for Honiton. The noble Lord had stated that every indulgence was to be extended to Mr. Bruce; but the important question still remained, whether in making war on another country, he was justified by his instructions, or whether his acts had been subsequently approved of by the Government. In a speech made by the Earl of Derby on the 24th of January, he said—

MR. SPEAKER

The gallant General must not read a speech which was made in the House of Lords.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he would simply refer to the speech as being made in "another place." The noble Earl was reported to have said,—

MR. SPEAKER

The gallant General is equally out of order in repeating what took place during the present Session of Parliament in the House of Lords.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he would not allude to the House of Lords. He would merely state that a noble Lord who had been Prime Minister at no very distant period, had declared that Mr. Bruce was not sanctioned by any instructions from his Government in the course which he had pursued. There were some other passages of importance in the speech of the noble Earl, but, under penalty of the displeasure of the Speaker, he would not refer to them; the despatch of the noble Lord the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, however, might be legitimately remarked on. That noble Lord who now extended an absolute approbation to the conduct of Mr. Bruce, stated in the last document which he had submitted to the House, Now, although the denial of a passage to the capital by the usual and most convenient route would have been evidence of an unfriendly disposition, yet it was a matter upon which you might have remonstrated and negotiated without having recourse to force to clear the passage. Now, they were told by the noble Lord, that it would have been unbecoming to the English character and reputation if he had remonstrated or proceeded according to any other course than that which he had adopted. [Lord J. RUSSELL:—No.] Surely, there was some inconsistency in such a declaration, He understood the noble Lord to deny that such was his meaning. If, however, the effect of the discussion which had taken place were to induce Her Majesty's Government to nominate some high personage to conduct the negotiations in China, who did not labour under the disadvantage of having been mixed up in the previous controversy, he believed that a beneficial result would have been attained. The noble Lord had also stated that when the next despatches had arrived they (the Government) would be prepared to come to a decision and to state their policy. Under these circumstances it would ill become him to press the Motion of which he had given notice. But the noble Lord, in alluding to this matter, had not attached sufficient importance to the war they were then engaged in. It was a war which would employ an army of 30,000 men. The noble Lord had stated satisfactorily, as far as it went, but rather vaguely, that the demands Her Majesty's Government would make on China were very moderate. The demands might he of that character, but if they were to be backed by 30,000 men, the results of such demands might be by no means moderate. It was a subject for the most serious consideration by the House. He would postpone his Motion till the period alluded to by the noble Lord, but there ought to be no delay on the part of the Government in making their intentions known.

VISCOUNT PALMERSTON

I think, Sir, it seems to be the general opinion of the House that it will be more expedient and desirable to postpone the discussion of this question till my noble Friend shall be enabled by the arrival of further accounts from China to explain to the House fully what course Her Majesty's Government intend to pursue. We have another im- portant subject immediately coming on, and I should hope the House will forbear the discussion of this question at present, in order to go at once into the Navy Estimates. I will only observe that the hon. and gallant General appears to have misunderstood something that fell from my noble Friend, and consequently sees some inconsistency between it and what he has written on a former occasion. But there really is none; the gallant General supposes my noble Friend to have told Mr. Bruce, in the despatch referred to, that if he had been informed beforehand that he could not be allowed to go up the Peiho, he might have remonstrated, and some arrangement might have been made as to the manner in which he should have proceeded to Pekin. Now what my noble Friend said was, that no such intimation having been given by the Chinese authorities, and the expedition having been already detained for some time at the mouth of the Peiho without receiving any intelligence as to its route, it was not advisable, under such circumstances, to retire without attempting to ascend the river. It must also be recollected that Mr. Bruce's decision was probably influenced by his instructions from the Earl of Malmesbury, who told him he was to be accompanied by a sufficient force. Mr. Bruce might, not very unnaturally, think that this force was to be "sufficient" for some purpose or other. As the immediate purpose was to go up in a ship of war to ratify the treaty of Tien-tsin, he might also be allowed to consider that the sufficiency of the accompanying force was to be measured by its power of overcoming any obstacle in the way. But I will not set the example of continuing the discussion I am asking the House to postpone. I wish now to state that the hon. and learned Member for Bridgwater (Mr. Kinglake) has a Motion standing on the notice paper for tomorrow evening. In the present state of things it will be very inconvenient to press on a discussion upon that Motion; and I would ask the hon. and learned Member to have the kindness to postpone it till a time when the House will be better able to consider it.

SIR CHARLES NAPIER

said, he thought a great deal had been said in justification of Mr. Bruce, but very little of Admiral Hope. He was sure the House would like to hear more of the courage he had shown in the action in the Peiho than they would see in the despatches. He wished then, before the conversation on the China question closed, to read a letter from an officer who was near the Admiral during the action, who bore witness to the extraordinary courage his commanding officer displayed. It said: — I am going to try and give you an account of our most disastrous affair, as my time will allow, and I know you will make allowances for me. I suppose the Admiral's despatch will be published, but I doubt if you will get all there; at any rate, you cannot hear from that source how nobly he behaved. We went into action at 2.30, the Admiral standing on the top of the cook-house, myself and the French captain on the harness casks in front of him. By three o'clock he was badly wounded by a round shot taking away the fleshy part of the thigh, the lieutenant commanding and eight men killed, and twenty-two badly wounded. The Plover then dropped down for more men, and the Admiral left her to hoist his flag in the Opossum all this time his wound had been unattended to, except what my little surgical knowledge pointed out. When we left the Plover there were only nine of us with a whole skin left out of her crew; she was literally like a butcher's slaughterhouse. We had not been long in the Opossum before the Admiral was again wounded. We had managed to get him on the top of the cook-house again, and, being weak from his wound, he was supporting himself by the mainstay, when a round shot took that away and threw him down on the deck, injuring him on the head and fracturing his ribs,—still he would not give in, and was placed on the gunwale, till, at last, being quite done up, he fainted. I then got him into a boat (French), and was taking him away, but he came to, and asked me which was the ship furthest in. I said,'Cormorant' Then take me there.' So we went to the Cormorant, where, finding him perfectly unable to stand, I had the signal made for Captain Shadwell, the senior captain, who came on board and took charge. In all the records of our naval history there was no instance of an officer showing greater pluck and gallantry, particularly as every one who had been wounded must know the depressing effects such severe wounds had on the system. He would not go into the question whether Admiral Hope was right or wrong in the attack he made; but he thought Her Majesty's Government would only show a good feeling if it sent him out the Victoria Cross. It was not a decoration intended only for successful actions; it was the reward of great valour, and no officer had ever displayed more than Admiral Hope. He trusted the Government would see the necessity and propriety of giving him the Cross.