THIRD READING.

HC Deb 07 August 1860 vol 160 cc847-85

Order for Third Reading read.

Motion made, and Question proposed, "That the Bill be now read the third time."

MR. DODSON

said, that the House had had the greatest difficulty in obtaining the information necessary to form their opinion on this important subject. He thought that if the opinions of the Members of the Indian Council to be found in the blue-book, now so reluctantly laid upon the table of the House, could have been uttered by those Members of the House, this measure would never have reached a third reading. It was a remarkable circumstance that until lately almost everybody was in favour of a local army in India. In spite of professional bias Lord Clyde and many other distinguished officers were at one time strongly in favour of a local army; he was aware that they had since changed their opinions, but the fact that they ever entertained different opinions from those they now held, was in his mind a strong argument in favour of a local army. The Secretary for India had also changed his opinion since last year, but he did not think that the right hon. Gentleman had clearly explained the reason why. Was it to be concluded that because the local army had once mutinied, that therefore they must necessarily mutiny again? The local army mutinied, not because it was a local army, hut because the conditions on which they entered the service were not continued, and any other army would be as likely to do the same. The House had been told that authorities were balanced on the question whether there should be a local or Imperial army in India, and under such circumstances it was desirable to look to the authority of men free from professional bias, and having, in consequence of their position, an opportunity of becoming acquainted both with Indian and Imperial questions. In favour of a local army, then, there was the opinion of men who had been Governors-General of India—such as Lord Dalhousie, Lord Canning, and Lord Ellenborough. The great argument alleged for the change was the recent mutiny; but that took place last year, and the Secretary for India was not then converted to his present opinion. Had a proposal been made to turn over the Queen's army to the East India Company without any fresh bounty, would not that have been likely to create a mutiny? If no better reason were assigned the public would be disposed to impute the change to a desire to increase the patronage of the Horse Guards. Without imputing corrupt motives to the Horse Guards, he nevertheless thought that the patronage of that establishment was great enough already—it was stated in the Report of the Committee on Military Organization to be worth upwards of a million at the regulation price of the commissions only—and that it was not expedient to add to it the patronage of the Indian army. Even if the. Indian army were to be amalgamated with the Royal army, he conceived that the present was an ill-chosen moment for that object. The effect of the proposed amalgamation must necessarily be to increase the Indian expenditure, for the cost of transporting men from one country to the other would be very considerable. Yet neither the finances of India nor of this country were in a position to bear any such increase of cost. In The Times of that morning there was a statement on the subject of Indian finance which furnished a strong reason against the creation of any additional burden. The Calcutta correspondent of The Times, enclosing the annual financial statement, said it was probable that the real deficit in the current year, including various charges, would not fall far short of £8,000,000. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India said he was not bound to ask the advice of the Indian Council; but was he justified in flying in the face of the advice offered by that body upon such a subject? It was said that this was an Imperial and not a purely Indian question. No doubt it was, but it was also a matter of Imperial interest that India should be safe and prosperous instead of being a mere nursery for the soldiers of the European army, as it was in danger of becoming under the new system. In the event of any future European struggle there would be a constant temptation to withdraw European troops from India, and unless they maintained a purely local force there it would be difficult to prevent the English Government from treating India as a sort of Algeria, and as a mere training ground for soldiers. Now, we wanted India, not for a military colony, but as a country which hereafter should make us independent of the United States for the supply of cotton, of China for tea, and of slave countries for the supply of sugar. He denied that there was any ground for the allegations made against the local troops. If they were less smart on parade than the Queen's troops they did not fight less well; nor did it necessarily follow that because a local army was maintained therefore its officers must be employed in civil duties. He deprecated amalgamation, because it would destroy that which could never be replaced, and would entirely destroy the individuality of a force which had rendered such good service in India.

MR. VANSITTART

said, that as objections had been taken in some quarters that on a former occasion he ignored the services rendered by the local European regiments at the siege of Delhi, and stated that India was reconquered by the Line, or Royal troops, he hoped the House would allow him to offer a few words in explanation. With regard to the first of these allegations he had distinctly declined, in the speech referred to, to follow the hon. Members for Perth, Pontefract, and Aberdeen, in drawing a contrast between the local and Royal officers, as such a contrast would be invidious. Adverting to the second allegation, he must confess that he still retained the opinion that to the Line, or Royal regiments, we were mainly indebted for the reconquest of India. It was not surprising that this should have been the case, taking into consideration the immense flood of Royal troops which were poured into India, and the small proportion of local Europeans who remained available, as was fully explained in the admirable speech delivered by his hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Ludlow (Colonel Herbert) on the same evening. With the permission of the House he would read a brief extract from the original despatch of Major General Wilson, commanding the Delhi Field Force, to Captain Norman, the Assistant Adjutant General of the Army, dated September the 16th, 1857, giving the following details connected with the assault of that city:— The assault was delivered on four points. The first column, under Brigadier General J. Nicholson, consisting of Her Majesty's 75th Regiment (300 men), 1st European Bengal Fusiliers (200 men), and the 2nd Punjab Infantry (450 men), covered by the 1st Battalion of Her Majesty's 60th Rifles. The 2nd column, under Brigadier Jones (Her Majesty's 60th Regiment), consisting of Her Majesty's 8th Regiment (250 men), the 2nd European Bengal Fusiliers (250 men), and the 4th Regiment of Sikhs (350 men), similarly covered by the 60th Rifles. The third column, under Colonel Campbell, of Her Majesty's 52nd Light Infantry, consisting of his own Regiment (200 men), the Kumaon Battalion (250 men), and the 1st Punjab Infantry (500 men). The reserve, under Brigadier Longfield, Her Majesty's 8th Regiment, composed of Her Majesty's 61st Regiment (250 men), 4th Punjab Rifles (450 men), the Beelooch Battalion (300 men), and the Sheend Rajah's Auxiliaries (300 men), and 200 of Her Majesty's Rifles. With reference to this extract, to the fact of Lucknow being held by Her Majesty's 32nd Regiment, and to the equally important fact that, with the exception of that gallant regiment, the Madras Fusiliers, General Havelock's force of 1,800 men when he quitted Allahabad on the 7th of July, 1857, consisted of Her Majesty's 64th, 84th, 78th Highlanders, and Maude's Royal Artillery, he put it to the House whether he was not justified in making the observations to which objection had been taken. He would merely add that if he required further evidence of the necessity for the amalgamation of our two European forces, he might find it in the spirit of antagonism evinced in the criticism to which his allusion to the services of the Royal army had been subjected.

SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBY

said, he would not follow the hon. Gentleman in his comparison between the two forces; for he believed both had done their duty to the utmost, and that no body of men ever behaved with more bravery or achieved greater success. But as the local Europeans were nearer the scene of action, he thought there need be no hesitation in believing the testimony of Sir John Lawrence and other eminent officers that the local Europeans had taken a very distinguished part indeed in the siege of Delhi. He had listened to the able speech of the hon. Member for Sussex (Mr. Dodson) with the greater interest because that hon. Gentleman had taken no previous part in these discussions, and his opinion might, therefore, be regarded as unbiassed. For himself, he could not help thinking that this Bill, though a short one, would have most important consequences. It originally consisted of a preamble which stated it was not expedient there should be a local corps for India, and of one enacting clause which stopped all further recruiting for that force. But to this the House had added, on the Motion of the right hon. Member for Oxfordshire (Mr. Henley), a proviso that the House would uphold the rights and privileges of the officers of the local Indian army, and guaranteed to them their pay, pensions, and allowances, together with their advantages of promotion. Now, that proviso brought up a question which lay at the root of the whole matter, and which he hoped some Member of the Government would answer to-night—How was that amalgamation to be carried into effect? Those who had read the five blue-books and the three white ones would see that the ablest men in India—even those who were anxious for the amalgamation—were puzzled to know how it was to be done. He thought, looking at the position of the two armies, there was but one way, and that was by dipping into the public purse. In one army the promotion of the officers was by seniority, and they had a provident fund amounting to £4,000,000 sterling; in the other case, the promotion was mainly by purchase. It was impossible to carry out the amalgamation, except by inducing a large number of Indian officers to retire on their full pay and allowances; and if they did that, what would the effect be on the Indian finances?—and those finances he considered already to be in a disquieting and dangerous position. He objected to the Bill that it took away from the Secretary of State in Council certain powers; and he thought it a great blot on these proceedings that the Indian Council had not been allowed to express their opinion on this measure before the second reading of the Bill. In the first speech of the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India, he had made use of language which had caused considerable pain to every Member of that Council. He said it was natural that the Council should not be willing to part with their power; from which the inference had been drawn that the right hon. Gentleman had charged his Council with being unwilling to lose their patronage. He should not think his right hon. Friend meant anything of the kind—[Sir CHARLES WOOD Hear, hear!]—but such was the interpretation put on it, and his right hon. Friend would say whether that was his intention or not. Reverting to the Bill before the House—it was said that this was an Imperial question. He thought, however, they had better not push that argument too far, for it might be said in India, "If this is an Imperial question, why should the expense of it come out of the Indian taxes? If it is for the interest of the Empire that 80,000 English soldiers shall be maintained in India, we will be very glad if the Empire will pay for them." This argument was taken in India already; and he believed it would be very dangerous to create in India an opinion that the interests of England required that we should maintain there a larger force than the country itself required. Let the House bear in mind that the military Estimates had increased within the last four years from £13,000,000 to £20,000,000, and that the revised Estimates now amounted to no less than £16,000,000. The House was not told anything of the state of Indian finance, but documents before them showed that within the last four years there had been £39,000,000 of deficit; the Indian debt had been increased from £59,000,000 to £97,000,000; and the home charges from £2,500,000 to £5,500,000; and at this moment they were about to resort to a novel and dangerous system of taxation. They all knew with what difficulty this country bore the income tax, and they might, therefore, guess how in a semi-civilized country like India every kind of fraud and chicanery would be resorted to in order to defeat it. It was notorious that when it was attempted to impose a house tax on India, the people left the towns and lived under the trees to defeat it; and so it would be with the income tax. The local army would not be got rid of by this Bill, for there would still be left 17,000 men for whom provision must be made, and to whom their rights had been guaranteed. Then what was to be done with the Provident Fund? he was astonished that the right hon. Gentleman had not consulted his Council, because he was informed that a Committee was to be appointed. The Indian army looked to the Secretary of State in Council, and not to any Committee. The question of expense was also a most important consideration. The right hon. Gentleman said that the expense of the amalgamation would not exceed £200,000. He (Sir Henry Willoughby) had little doubt in his own mind that it would be more than £2,000,000. It was calculated that every soldier cost £100 before he was settled down in India from this country; and with the constant transport of troops that would be going on under this system the House might imagine what the expense would be. But another evil was that in abolishing the local force they removed the intermediate link between the Queen's troops and the Native regiments. Hitherto the officers of the Native regiments felt on a friendly footing with the officers of the local Europeans. He feared that would not be the case between them and the officers of the Line. What did the right hon. Gentleman mean to do with the 200,000 Native troops? Did he mean to make police of them? Had not the very best authorities said that the concurrent authority of the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor General was an impossibility in India? It was a double Government of the very worst kind—a species of Government, indeed, which in this country it would be impossible to conceive, and entertaining such an idea even for a moment would be handing over India to all those evils which it had taken the House of Commons and the best men of former times years of patient industry and trouble to counteract and destroy. Then the Governor General, placed as he was in that vast empire, had nobody to look to for support so much as the local Queen's army and the Native army—they had been the instruments of his power, and they had upheld the empire through every danger, and he thought that when Lord Canning told them in one of his despatches that not only among all the military classes, but among all other classes there was a great impatience of remaining in India at all—that no one wanted to stop—that they found it too hot—surely it should be the policy of this country to do all they could to increase inducements to men to remain in that country, and take an interest in the performance of their duties. It was a matter of astonishment that Lord Clyde should have published a letter stating that the officers of the Indian army were dissatisfied with their position, without having that which he did not profess to have—unquestionable information on the point. He regretted the disposition that had been shown to underrate the value of the local army, by whom our empire in the East had been upheld and extended. He could not understand upon what grounds Lord Clyde had asserted that Indian officers were unfit for superior command. He (Sir Henry Willoughby) had read the history of India in a different way, and could point to many officers in India competent to the highest command. He might remind Lord Clyde that the subjugation of the Wuzurees, which he had himself attempted unsuccessfully, bad since been accomplished by General Chamberlain. He thought that the debates which had taken place on this Bill had done some good, by showing that there was a body of men in that House who did attach importance to the necessity of doing justice to the military men of India. And he could not help thinking that it would compel his right hon. Friend to act in future with considerable caution in the matter. The House of Commons had no interest but to uphold British power in India, and that, he thought, would best be effected by allowing one-third of the Queen's army to be permanently stationed there, and arrangements should be entered into for making the country the scene, as it were, of the whole of their career, so that they might become acquainted with the habits of the country and the character of the Natives, as no movable regiments of the Line could do.

SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE

said, he wished to take this, the last opportunity he should have, of expressing his entire disapproval of the plan proposed by the Government, and of placing on record the strong feeling he entertained of the danger that must follow to the public service if that plan were carried out. As to the guarantees of position and promotion which were promised to the officers of the local army, he could not conceive any regulation by which they could be properly fulfilled which would not create a distinction between the European and Native forces. If regimental appointments in the present local force were to be determined by selection, what would become of the existing system of promotion in the army? And even supposing that regimental promotion was secured to the local offices, what would be their position with regard to other commands? If they aspired to anything beyond their regiments, they would probably encounter that disposition of which they had already seen signs, to regard Sepoy offieers as unfit for the command of British troops. However objectionable the system of promotion by seniority might be, it had this advantage, that it gave a guarantee and security to those who devoted themselves to the service that they would not be liable to any capricious abuse of power on the part of any Governor General or Commander-in-Chief. As to the question into whose hands the patronage of the army should be placed if the system of seniority were altered, he would certainly rather see it confided to the Governor General than to any other person; but it was impossible that such a person could exercise that control which was essential to ensure impartiality over the appointments, or prevent those abuses which must necessarily follow if the scheme of the Government was adopted. There was no ground for assuming that the opinion of Lord Cornwallis was favourable to the scheme of amalgamation. The authority of the Duke of Wellington had also been quoted with just as little reason, for the Duke declared in emphatic language that he saw such difficulty in the proper officering of the Native army if the amalgamation were attempted that the scheme would be attended with great danger. It had been argued that the establishment of a purely local force exposed us to the danger of a combination to throw off its allegiance to this country. But was there any inherent probability of danger of mutiny on the part of a local European force? Was it possible that the men could lose that love of their own country that was innate to every Englishman? The men of the local army were enlisted, as in the Line, for limited periods of ten or twelve years. They were usually induced to stay longer by the temptations of bounty; but in consequence of the climate and other circumstances the force consisted for the most part of young men. This was attended with advantages in 'point both of economy and health, for they were generally a more healthy force than troops of the Line, not because they became, properly speaking, acclimatized, but because they accustomed themselves to the climate of India. The noble Lord at the head of the Government spoke of these troops as a Praetorian army—meaning, if it meant anything, that they were ready to sell themselves to the highest bidder. He added that they acquired local ties, and were thus capable of dangerous combination. But these regiments were really in a state of constant flux, and the noble Viscount was well answered by the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) who followed him in debate, and who said that home ties were so strong among the men of the local army, that the difficulty was to prevent the growth of home sickness. How inconsistent were these two arguments? The House had seen an instance of this home sickness in the desire manifested by these men to get home, and in demands which, he would admit, were, in some cases, not made in a proper manner, although in other eases they were urged respectfully enough. It was alleged that the old soldiers took the lead in the mutiny, and that the non-commissioned officers gave no information of their plans. The papers, however, approved both these charges. No doubt, there was commotion among particular regiments at particular stations, but anything like a general combination was contradicted by the evidence contained in the Papers laid before the House. Invidious comparisons had been made between the conduct of the local European force, and that of the soldiers of the Line; and it had been said that when the Queen's troops had a complaint to urge they placed confidence in their officers. Well, the local European army also placed confidence in its officers, and likewise in the declaration of the Prime Minister, in favour of their claim. The combination of these men had been often referred to; but was it a combination for unlawful ends? he rested his case on that point—on the statement of their Commander-in-Chief. Lord Clyde did not ascribe the danger to the fact that the troops were local troops, but to their being soldiers and Englishmen, whose feelings it was perilous to tamper with. The hon. and gallant Member for Ludlow (Colonel Herbert) had accused the men of seeking to combine with the Sikhs; but there was nothing in the whole correspondence to support that charge. An isolated letter had, indeed, been found, which was contradicted in every essential particular, and which brought charges not merely against the local force, but against the Royal troops also. Such accusations ought not, therefore, to have been made in that House. They were keenly felt by the service, and were completely disproved by the Papers which had been produced. Certain regiments had, no doubt, been guilty of gross misconduct, and if the Government had proposed to blot out those regiments nobody could have complained; but a whole army ought not to be condemned fur the disaffection of a part. He was surprised that when the ground had been taken away from the advocates of this Bill they should still continue to support it. He warned the House against the danger of hasty legislation on this subject, and appealed to them, if they valued the efficiency of the public service and the security of their Empire, not to give their assent to this measure.

SIR JAMES ELPHINSTONE

moved that the Bill be read a third time that day three months. He was in hopes that the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for India would have come forward to state the reasons why lie differed from the opinions entertained by his Council. Those reasons should have been before the House at the same time that the objections of the Indian Council to the present scheme of the Government were laid upon the table. During the whole of the discussions which had taken place on this subject they had met with every kind of obstruction, and papers had been kept back which ought properly to have been in the hands of Members on the first occasion when the question was brought forward. He wished now to advert to the financial portion of the question, which had been very little touched upon in the previous debates. He asked the Secretary for India why they were keeping at the present time 80,000 men in India—uniess it was the finances of the country which obliged them to do it? Disarmaments had taken place in different parts of India, and the rebellion had entirely died out. The country was now in that condition that they might gradually withdraw the troops from India, and by the volunteering system have established a local force of acclimatized men for the protection of India and for suppressing any disturbance that might arise. The Government had sent out a gentleman to India to endeavour to arrange its finances, and his first act was to establish an income tax and a monetary system which was altogether opposed to all the principles which had been laid down hitherto by financiers in this country. Above all, he had established protection in India, in favour of three hundred millions of subjects of Her Majesty:—nevertheless while, the night before, they were declaiming against the last shreds of protection which were still left in this country, not one word was said by his hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, or any other hon. Member on that side of the House, in reference to the gigantic system of protection which was being established in India, by the gentleman who had been sent out there. They would hear more before long of the income tax which had been imposed in India, for it would necessitate the maintenance of a large army in that country-It would be an instrument in the hands of the tax collectors of India to oppress the Natives, and for every rupee which was collected by them for the Government, two would be collected for themselves. The mutiny which had occurred in India, and about which so much had been said, was the most miserable attempt at strike which it was possible to imagine, and he believed that ten rupees given to each man and a plum-pudding would have put an end to that mutiny, which had branded their local army with disgrace, had shown the Government of India in a most despicable light, and would attach a stigma to it as long as it existed. With regard to the expense, they had been told by the Secretary of State for India that the difference of cost between the two systems would be something like £200,000, but he (Sir James Elphinstone) believed it would be nearer £^,000,000. The expense alone of sending the women and children belonging to two or three regiments to India had actually amounted to £22,000. He should wish that Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield had come forward with a clearer and more logical description of the means by which they had arrived at a different conclusion from the one of last year. It was a most remarkable thing that about the same time a series of conversions were made, and among the converts was the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India. He bad no hesitation in saying that if this Bill had been referred to a Committee the Report would have been that the Bill was wholly unwarrantable; and, if the measure should unfortunately pass, we should hereafter have to come back to the state of things which at present prevailed in India.

Amendment proposed, to leave out the word "now," and at the end of the Question to add the words "upon this day three months."

MR. J. B. SMITH

said, there was a mystery hanging over this question, which he was very desirous of having cleared up. Why was it that the Government and the Secretary of State, who had spoken last year in favour of maintaining the local army of India, had so suddenly changed their minds? One of the principal reasons assigned was the mutiny, but it was clear that this was a false pretence. Sir James Outram had designated the stories about the mutiny as an absurd and foolish exaggeration; and said that the men had not mutinied because they were a local force, but because they considered themselves treated with deliberate injustice and contumely. It is evident that the Government concurred in this opinion, as no sooner did the mutineers return to this country than every man who chose was re-enlisted. The right hon. Gentleman, the Secretary of State for India, was in possession of all the authorities to which he now appealed, when he held a different view from that on which this measure was founded. Indeed, the weight of authority was in favour of maintaining a local force. He attached great importance to the opinion of Lord Ellenborough, a man of great ability, who had been Governor-General of India, and three times President of the Board of Control; who had opportunities during his residence in India of seeing a local army in times both of war and peace, and who was strongly in favour of a local army. He regretted that this Bill was to be persevered in. Those who had voted at first in its favour, after reading the Papers, and hearing the discussions which had taken place, had felt it their duty afterwards to oppose it; and there could be no doubt, if the Bill had been brought forward at an earlier period, and if the Papers had sooner been laid on the table, it would not have stood the test of mature discussion.

MR. T. G. BARING

understood from the speeches of the hon. Baronet the Member for Portsmouth and the hon. Gentleman who last spoke that the grounds upon which the third reading of the Bill was now opposed were, that it was introduced late in the Session, and debated in thin houses;—that the information was incomplete;—the Indian Council had not been consulted, and their dissents only lately produced. Now, he did not think that the introduction of a Bill in June rather than May was any valid reason for resisting its progress. The subject had undergone ample discussion, there was an adjourned debate on the Motion for leave to bring in the Bill; an adjourned debate on the second reading; the House would recollect the tedious length to which the discussion was pushed on the instructions to the Committee; and now, on the third reading, there was another discussion. With regard to the state of the House during those debates, the House would remember that on the bringing in of the Bill there was a largo attendance. There was also a large attendance when the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn (Lord Stanley) made a very able speech against the Bill, and when the hon. and gallant Member for Huntingdon gave his support to the Bill, as well as during the speeches of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman), and of the Secretary of State for War. Those facts being taken into account, it was rather unfair that hon. Gentlemen should assert that the Bill had been proceeded with in thin Houses. Assertions equally unfair were, he might add, made with respect to information on the subject not having been produced, for more than a year had elapsed since the Report of the Royal Commission, together with the Appendix to it, had been laid on the table. It was contended that the Council of India had not been consulted with reference to the proposed amalgamation, and that their opinion on the point had not been placed before the House; but the fact was, that the opinions of the most distinguished Members of that Council had been presented to Parliament last July twelvemonth. Mr. Willoughby, for instance, Colonel Durand, and General Vivian, had been examined at great length before the Royal Commission, the Appendix to which contained also the opinions of Sir John Lawrence; and he would take it upon himself to say that, except in one or two minor particulars, there was nothing new in that ingenious and elaborate dissent which Mr. Willoughby had recently published. But, beside the information which the Report of the Commission and the Appendix to it conveyed, other information of a very important character had also been presented to the House, before the Bill was introduced. He should further observe that if it were, as the hon. Member for Evesham (Sir Henry Willoughby) seemed disposed to think, a great blot on the proceedings of the Government in the matter that the dissent of the Council of India had not been laid on the table before the second reading of the Bill, the blame of the omission rested entirely with the Council itself, for on the 17th of May his right hon. Friend the Secretary of State for India gave its Members an opportunity of recording their dissent, while it was not until the 12th of June that the Bill was introduced. With respect to the course proposed by his right hon. Friend, towards the Council, he would only say that it was strictly in accordance with law, and had been deliberately adopted by two administrations. Passing, however, from those preliminary objections to some which were again urged against the measure itself, he must say be could not understand on what good ground it could be maintained that its operation would be to diminish the authority of the Governor General. It could not, he thought, be seriously contended that the influence of Her Majesty's Viceroy would be impaired by the fact of Her Majesty's troops being sent out to India, or by placing a few regiments, simply in regard to discipline, under the supervision of the Commander-in-Chief at homo. Then, again, he knew of no patronage which, by the passing of the Bill would be taken out of the hands of the Governor General, for all Staff appointments would still be made in India. But it was said that if the proposed scheme were carried into effect we should not be able to find sufficient officers fit to be employed with Native troops, or in the Civil Service in India. The fact, however, was that, those officers who had distinguished themselves most in the Native army, and in civil situations, had, in many instances, received their training in the local European regiments; and, he should like to know what the difference was in the training of an officer brought up in that force and in the Queen's army serving in India, and why officers of Line regiments should be incapable of performing duties which their fellow-countrymen in the local force had efficiently discharged. He might point to the names of Havelock, Mansfield, Markham, Lugard, and others which were quoted by a most distinguished Indian officer (Colonel Mayne) in 1855 to show how well qualified they were to do any service which the east India Company might require at their bands—as furnishing a sufficient answer to the opponents of the measure upon that head. The officers of the Royal army were made of the same stuff as their brethren of the local force, and would, he felt assured, find themselves quite equal to any position in which they might be placed. Next came the question of the expense which the passing of the Bill would entail, and which the hon. Members for Portsmouth and Evesham had estimated at £2,000,000; by what process of calculation he was at a loss to understand. It was a conclusion, at all events, very different from that which had been come to by a gentleman perfectly independent of all parties, who was employed by the Government to make the calculation, whose report was upon the table of the House, and who says, that £114,000 would be the extent of the cost of converting the existing number of local European troops into troops for general service. If hon. Gentlemen doubted the accuracy of that estimate, then must they show that the figures of Mr. Hammack were erroneous in order to substantiate their view of the case. [Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE: They are erroneous.] he might add, that Mr. Hammack had taken into consideration the actual expense only of the change, and not the saving which would be effected by the conversion of a double into a single staff, and which, it was calculated, would amount to £20,000 per annum. That sum must, therefore, be deducted from the £114,000 which he had just mentioned; while the comparison would be still more favourable to the Line if additions were to be made to the depots of the local army, as was recommended by Sir James Outram, of no less than five battalions of infantry and a proportionate force of cavalry and artillery, but the extra expenditure for which would not be requisite if the present Bill passed into a law. Again, to keep up a small local force would be, as Colonel Durand had observed, "a half measure of doubtful aspect, far from creditable to England, and might possibly incur the risk of evoking grave discontents," while, in order to maintain a local army on an extensive scale, it would be necessary to raise and discipline at home thirty new local regiments at least, and during the time occupied in effecting that object to employ additional Line regiments in India, to replace those Line regiments by the newly-raised local regiments in due season, and to discharge the troops thus replaced on their return to this country—a proceeding which he thought the British House of Commons would hardly regard with satisfaction. Another point to which reference had been made was the health of the troops. He wished hon. Members, instead of accepting the very ingenious Minute of Mr. Willoughby, without examination, had referred to the papers which it quoted, for it appeared that Dr. R. Martin, instead of having given his opinion in favour of the local troops, as might have been fancied, stated That the official results in respect to the mortality at each age among the military officers and the civil servants of the Bengal Presidency afford a convincing proof that in the East Indies no advantage in the way of acclimatization has hitherto been derived from length of residence. [Mr. H. D. SEYMOUR intimated his dissent.] Perhaps his hon. Friend thought that the carelessness of the soldier was an evil harder to be combated than the effects of a tropical climate. Such, however, was not the opinion of Dr. R. Martin, a gentleman more competent, perhaps, than any other to give an opinion on this point; for he stated:— The greater losses in certain newly arrived regiments, as compared to those of older standing in India, are not necessary to the climate and maybe entirely prevented. The question, however, was capable of being reduced from one of opinion to one of fact. Very recently a return showing the mortality of the troops in both services at the several stations in India for the last forty years, ending in 1856, had been obtained. It appeared that among 815,634 troops of the Line there had been 56,782 deaths, or in the ratio of 6.9 per cent; while of 476,172 local troops 31,943 had died in the same period, being in the proportion of 65 per cent. The difference, therefore, was hardly preceptible. [Sir JAMES ELPHINSTONE: Have you got the stations?] The return was not for particular stations, but for the whole of India. That the troops sent out from England did not die quickly was clearly shown in the case of the twenty regiments who went out during the mutiny and were not engaged in action. The loss of men in those regiments was about 3–¾ per cent, and among the railway servants in India the mortality was at the rate of 2¼per cent. The most important point raised in the discussion was that relating to the mutiny of the European troops. The hon. Baronet the Member for Lanarkshire (Sir Edward Colebrooke) talked of unfair charges against the men, and other hon. Gentlemen had adopted the line of argument that there had been no mutiny, that the troops had been ill-treated, and that no weight ought to be attached to the opinion of Lord Clyde. What was Lord Clyde's opinion? he said that it was known with absolute certainty that open resistance on the part of the Bengal European troops had been talked of in the barracks for weeks, and there had been the most unlawful and mutinous combination to intimidate the Government; that the combination, so far as the original design of the movement, might be considered as perfect; and that the recollection of the strike or mutiny would never die out in the Indian local army, for the men would always advert to it when they were dissatisfied; that for those reasons he was irresistibly led to the conclusion that it would be henceforth dangerous to maintain a local European army. The House was bound to listen to the opinion of those who were on the spot, and who, in addition, were responsible. He entertained great respect for the opinions of Sir John Lawrence and of Mr. Willoughby, in reference to matters as to which they had knowledge; but it must not be forgotten that Lord Clyde was on the spot; he was Commander-in-Chief, and he was responsible, whilst Mr. Willoughby and Sir John Lawrence were civilians—they were in England, and they were not responsible. The papers laid on the table showed that Lord Clyde was originally in favour of the claims of the men, and therefore it was also clear that what he subsequently said in reference to their conduct was an unprejudiced opinion. Now, was there any danger in this "strike" of the troops, as it had been called? Lord Canning said, in writing to Lord Stanley— Your Lordship will see plainly that for some days a collision between large bodies of our English soldiers has been imminent. From Lord Canning to Farrier Murphy nobody had any doubt that what had taken place was a mutiny. He would give an instance of what had taken place. The 5th European Infantry Regiment was stationed at Berhampore, and they had a conference; letters were produced from other regiments; they refused to do duty; they rescued two prisoners; they congregated in their barracks to defy attack and to protect each other, and they appointed their own officers. Their commanding officer applied to Calcutta for a force to overawe his men, and Lord Canning sent 500 men and two guns, and to this display of force the troops submitted. Was that but a strike, or a remonstrance? The commanding officer of the regiment, an Indian officer, reported that 205 of his men were "disloyal," a word for the use of which the hon. Member for Hertford had taken the Secretary of State for War to task, and the officers of companies referred to portions of their men as "mutinous." The "loyal" men in the regiment were only 79, and yet this was not to be called a mutiny. He did not wish in any way to blame the officers, but Colonel Mackenzie, a Queen's officer, whom it was found necessary to place in command of the regiment in order to reduce it to a state of discipline, said, that though the officers gave him every assistance in their power, yet their ideas as to the treatment of European troops were entirely different from his own, and this arose from want of experience on their part, lie said that punishments for crime had been quite inadequate, and he instanced several cases, such as a sentry asleep on his post—forgiven; Corporal Harty three times drunk in four months—forgiven; Sergeant Cunningham drunk on guard—warned that he would be tried next time; and, lastly, the instance of a soldier drawing his bayonet with intent to stab another soldier when on guard, who was also forgiven. The fault, it had all along been contended, lay not with the individuals, but with the system. There were forty-two officers attached to the 5th Regiment, but the greater part of them were employed in miscellaneous duties in different quarters of India; of fourteen captains only four were with the regiment; of the nine senior lieutenants only one was present. The commanding officer had served long in the Native army but had no knowledge of European troops. Did not these facts bear out Lord Clyde's opinion that— The Bengal army cannot supply officers capable of forming new European regiments. For such business they have everything to learn from the colonel downwards? What could be expected from such a system? To continue and extend it, which must be done if the plan of the Government were rejected, would beat once absurd and dangerous. Nobody had any intention to interfere with the rights of the officers. Hon. Gentlemen talked as though the Bengal army was in a perfect state, but the whole of it was gone, and nothing but the skeleton of it in the shape of cadres of officers remained, who were mainly employed with Native troops and in staff appointments There could be no difficulty in continuing that arrangement; whereas, if the scheme of the Government were rejected, the local officers would have to he brought home, to raise and discipline new local regiments, a work for which it was no discredit to them to pronounce them wholly unfit, and their staff appointments would have to be filled by officers of the Line serving in India. A great deal had been said about authorities; but he thought they preponderated largely in favour of the plan proposed by Her Majesty's Government. The Government proposed to do away with the prasent system of Staff employments, arid in the opinion of almost every officer and civilian in India the system of Staff employments had been the bane of the local army. Some hon. Gentlemen talked as if there never had been any jobbing in India; but what was the opinion of the officers of the Indian army? Colonel Harrington was asked before the Commission— Do you object to the present system of having a certain number of European officers from the regiment on the Staff—and his reply was—I do; because every young officer who comes out now says,' My father is a Director,' and so and so; 'directly I have passed my examination, in a couple of years I shall be off, and care nothing for the regiment.' And no wonder, when the threat of being sent back to one's regiment is held out as a punishment for misconduct or misbehaviour. Regimental officers are constantly taunted with the remark ' that the best and most intelligent officers are selected for the Staff.' Officers are selected: but the rule is interest, and merit the exception that guides these selections. What was the opinion of Sir Bartle Frere upon this system? he said— It may be set down as a truth hardly disputable, and of cardinal importance, that there can be no reasonable hope of ever keeping an useful Native army as long as we persevere in our present system of making staff appointments away from the regiments an object of ambition to regimental officers, and a better provision for a young man in position and emolument than the command of Native soldiers. Again, no one had contended that the discipline of the local army was equal to that of the regiments of Her Majesty's Line. No one now would say after the recent occurrences that the difference was in mere pipe-clay, or that it was not in the whole instruction and government of the troops. Authorities, he held, were decidedly in favour of the plan of the Government to get rid of the present system of Staff appointments and to apply the system of English regimental discipline to the European troops in India, So with respect to the political question. It had been said that the Natives of India would suffer by the proposed change; but the staunchest friends of the Natives, the most earnest advocates of their rights and interests—Sir George Clerk and Sir Charles Trevelyan, for example—were supporters of the scheme for amalgamating the two armies. The opinion of Lord Cornwallis had again been quoted against amalgamation; but that opinion was given only five months after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis in India, whereas, for the whole of the rest of his life, he was in favour of combining the local European army with the regular army. An hon. Member had also cited the opinion of the Duke of Wellington; but that opinion was the same as the opinion entertained by the Government in 1855, namely that so long as the Government of India was vested in the East India Company the military authority could not be separated from the Civil Government, and the transfer of the Government from the East India Company to the Crown altogether removed that serious objection to the complete amalgamation of the armies. He would remark that upon that occasion the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, who opposed the present Bill, supported a Motion for amalgamating the two armies. [Sir DE LACY EVANS was understood to intimate dissent]. In 1855 Sir Erskine Perry brought forward a Motion for a Committee to inquire into the expediency of employing Indian forces in the Crimea, and of amalgamating the local European army in India with the regular army. That Motion was seconded by the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster, who acted as a teller on the occasion, and it was supported by the hon. and learned Member for Sheffield, who now predicted the most direful results from the scheme of the Government. He (Mr. Baring) must request the House not to accede to the Motion of the hon. Member for Portsmouth, for he was convinced that the Bill would place the European forces of Her Majesty in India on an efficient footing; that concomitant measures would increase the general efficiency of the army; and he was no less convined that there was nothing in the Bill which interfered unjustly with any of the rights or interests of the officers of the Indian army.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, that the hon. Gentleman alluded to something that took place a few years back; but he (Sir De Lacy Evans) did not recollect to have heard at that time a word about amalgamatian, and all that he did, as far as he recollected, was to support a Motion for obtaining reinforcements from India in aid of the war in the Crimea. But no sooner did he hear of the scheme of amalgamation than he protested against it. The hon. Gentleman in the latter part of his speech alluded to the rights and privileges of the officers of the local European force, and said that there was nothing in the Bill which endangered those rights. Of course the Bill did not touch them because there was no allusion to them whatever. That was what they complained of—they did not know what was to be done. The Bill only declared that there should be no local European force in India, and did not explain how the new system was to be carried out. It had been stated that this object had already been effected, as the local force had dissolved itself; but it appeared by the Returns that from 18,000, to 20,000 men still remained, and the Bengal Artillery, lauded as not being inferior to any Artillery in the world, had been brought up to its complement by Lord Canning through the means of volunteers who had seen five or six years' service. The Artillery of Bombay and Madras likewise remained intact. Were these still to be maintained or were they to be broken up? The Bill told them nothing; and what he contended was that such a measure ought not to have been brought forward without a full and complete statement of the manner in which the amalgamation was intended to be carried out. The measure had been introduced in a most objectionable way late in the Session, and without Papers or information, and when the Papers were at length produced they did not amount to one-third of what they had a right to expect; and when objections were made to such a course of proceeding, it was stated that there were 800 pages of documents connected with this subject not before the House. The Secretary for India said that he did not know anything about them, or that they were not in his possession; but, after considerable discussion, it turned out that they were in the possession of the Secretary for India. The noble Lord at the head of the Government then requested that the second reading of the Bill might take place, promising that all the documents should be presented to the House before the next stage. Nevertheless, another stage was proposed, when only one- third of those documents were before the House. The necessity for this Bill, as alleged by the Government, was occasioned by the improper conduct of the European forces in India; and therefore it was requisite that the documents should be before the House, in order that the House might judge whether or not that allegation was sustained. On the recommendation of Lord Clyde, Courts of inquiry were instituted, and the men who had claimed their discharge went before those Courts and respectfully stated their grievances. It appeared that these men were mainly induced to claim their discharge in consequence of a statement made in a speech by the Prime Minister; and, considering the manly character of that noble Lord, it was surprising that the complaints of the men were allowed to continue so long without the expression of an opinion from the noble Lord as to the right of the men to claim their discharge in consequence of the statement he made. The right hon. Gentleman the Secretary for India had now changed his mind, and, because the House had not changed with him, he reproached them with factious opposition. Then although he knew as much of the facts of the case as now, he would not allow that there was anything like a mutiny, and he laid it down that the conduct of the officers had been so honourable that it would be discreditable to the House to do anything injurious to their interests. There could not be a better answer to the speech of the Under Secretary for India, who had just sat down, than the speech of his superior in August last. He was afraid that patronage had something to do with the change which had taken place. The authority of the Duke of Wellington had been frequently quoted in these debates, but he had laid it down most clearly that the Commander-in-Chief in India should have the exclusive and independent command of the army there. The Marquess of Wellesley, too, had stated that to attempt to control the patronage of India from home would be most injurious to Indian interest. lie was afraid, however, that the authority of the Governor General and the Commander-in-Chief in these matters had already been impugned. The patronage of the Commander-in-Chief at home was greater by far than that possessed by any other Department, either in England or any other country—and yet they were about largely to increase it. In conclusion he must protest altogether against the measure. It had been brought forward in a most improper and unsatisfactory manner and without any information being given on the subject; and there had been almost a contest in obtaining even the Papers that were before the House.

SIR HARRY VERNEY

said, the arguments of those who supported amalgamation were founded on alleged defects in the organization of the Indian army, on the absence of officers from their regiments, and the consequent bad state of discipline. But those were points which ought to have engaged the attention of the Government, and the existence of such defects furnished no valid argument against the system. He must protest against the statement of the hon. Member for Penryn (Mr. T. G. Baring), who, in defending the Government measure, said that the officers of the Queen's army were competent to perform all the duties now performed by the officers of the local army. He thought the contrary must of necessity be the case. Every officer of the Queen's army who went to India thought chiefly how and when he should come home again; but an officer of the local army, who looked to spend his life in India, studied the language and the character of the Natives, learned to treat them with consideration and conciliation, and learned also how to take care of his own health. This great difference between the feelings of the two men, necessarily rendered the one less fit than the other for Indian service. He felt certain that it would become necessary hereafter to have a local force in India; and, such was his confidence in the character of the noble Lord (Viscount Palmerston), that he believed he would be the first to acknowledge the error of the Government, and endeavour to rectify it. Meanwhile, he trusted that those who, like himself, entertained the greatest repugnance to this Bill, would now allow it to pass. The arguments against it had been repeatedly urged, and the opponents of the Bill might now leave the responsibility with the Government, and allow the House to pass to the other pressing business of the Session.

COLONEL PERCY HERBERT

said, the hon. Baronet the Member for Lanarkshire (Sir E. Colebrooke) had referred to some observations that fell from him on a former occasion. As far as his recollection would serve him at this distance of time, what occurred was this. In answer to those who bad declared that there had been no mutiny among the European troops in India, he had observed, that when troops barricaded themselves in their barracks, and talked of seizing the guns and joining the Sikhs, this was, at all events, very like a mutiny. In support of what he then said he would read an extract from a despatch of Sir William Mansfield, dated the 26th of September, 1859:— Such was the feeling throughout the Bengal artillerymen that, though the old soldiers and non-commissioned officers were too wary to commit themselves to overt crime, not one of them, in any part of the country, came forward to warn their officers of what was impending, their combination and conspiracy in this respect being more thorough than that of the Sepoys themselves in 1857. There was actually a design to march to Delhi from Meerut. In one intercepted letter an artilleryman speculated on raising the Sepoys, and calling on the Sikhs to help them, with which help he thought he would be able to ' drive the Royals out of India,'—his own expression. We found out from a recruit's letter, after the discovery had been made at Meerut, that it had been the common talk at Cawnpore six weeks before that the Artillery were to seize the guns in an up-country station. He would now ask the House to judge between him and the hon. Member for Lanarkshire, as to whether he was justified or not in the language he had used. His objection to a local force was not on account of its origin in having belonged to the Company, but because in a force raised for local service alone discipline could not be maintained at so high a pitch as in regiments which were periodically sent from this country to India. The hon. and gallant Member for Westminster (Sir De L. Evans) had alluded to the evidence taken before the Committee on Military Organization, and had remarked on the very large amount of patronage which would be placed in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief, and on the disposal of first commissions resting in the breast of the Commander-in-Chief for the time. That statement was quite accurate; but the hon. and gallant Member went on to say that in no other department of the State was patronage conducted in that manner. He would remind the House that the greater portion of the nominations for naval cadetships was in the hands of the First Lord of the Admiralty, and the First Lord was guided by rules only in his own breast, the same as the Commander-in-Chief of the Army would be in the disposal of first commissions.

SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE

explained, that what he had said was, that there was nothing before the House to give 'support to the assertion which had already been made by the Secretary of State for War, on the authority of the despatch of Sir William Mansfield. It was clear that Sir William Mansfield referred to the letter of an artilleryman in the Punjaub. The letter had not been produced, and he did not believe in its existence.

MR. HORSMAN

said, that, without wishing to go into the merits of the question, he rose to enter his final protest against this measure being passed, and to restate the grounds of the opposition which he had offered to it. He thought it was a great error to treat this question, as the hon. and gallant Member who had just sat down, as a merely military question. He and those Friends of his who opposed the Bill considered it as a question affecting the whole administration of India, and on that account it was that he complained of the little care and pains that had been taken in presenting it to the House. When the Act of 1858 was passed Parliament was of opinion that the transfer of the Government from the Company to the Crown would cast upon the Legislature new duties and responsibilities. The Sepoy mutiny had brought home the vivid reality of the warning that they held their Indian dominions by a precarious tenure, and they felt that their best hope of retaining India was to bring the greatest amount of thought and statesmanship to bear on Indian administration. They had not, however, found in the proceedings of the Government any recognition of the real difficulties and responsibilities of Indian administration. This measure, which effected a total revolution in that administration, was introduced with as much unconcern as a turnpike Bill, or a Bill for paving and lighting a provincial town. It was introduced late in the Session, at a short notice, and contained only one clause, without any plan accompanying it. It was the maximum of change with the minimum of information. He thought the course of the Government had been unusual and unprecedented, and that opportunity had not been afforded to Parliament to form an accurate judgment upon the matter in which great responsibility was to be incurred. Another ground of complaint was, not for what the Bill contained, but what was omitted—not for what it disclosed, but what it concealed. An enormous change was about to be accomplished without any indication on the face of the Bill of the nature of that charge. Even if it were just in principle Parliament was not justified in passing a measure of which it had such imperfect means of judging. The first question which he asked the other night, and to which some appearance of an answer had been attempted in the speech of the Under Secretary, was, what would be the future relations between the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief? The Governor-General, in the eyes of the Native Princes, was a great military Power, and hitherto had been understood to be at the head of all military affairs. But already the Commander-in-Chief in India had been writing despatches direct to the Horse Guards of a controversial character, and impugning the opinions and authority of the Governor-General. That was an indication of what was likely to occur. Already there was a double Government. The military authorities were setting themselves in opposition to the Governor-General, and in that case it was easy to see that the position and authority of the Governor-General would be very much weakened. He might be mistaken as to the nature of the relations existing between the Commander-in-Chief and the Governor General, but he certainly thought the subject ought to have been fully and fairly brought under the notice of the House. Another very large and important question had been mooted by the hon. Baronet the Member for Evesham (Sir Henry Willoughby)—the question of expense. It was admitted that the change would entail additional expense on the finances of India. During the last four years there had been a deficiency in the Indian Exchequer of no less than £37,000,000, for which sum the taxpayers of England were security, and they would eventually have to pay it; yet we were now most improvidently proceeding to increase the expenditure and add to the debt. Surely, then, the House ought to have had definite and precise information as to the effect which the measure was likely to have on the future change which it would entail, in respect of our military expenditure. Then, again, it appeared from the papers before Parliament that 29,600 men would annually be on their passage between this country and India, and the services of those men would be lost during the time they were on shipboard. There was another serious question to consider—the enormous amount of additional patronage that would be conferred upon the Horse Guards—more than doubling the patronage that department already dispensed. The House was told that the Commander-in-Chief did not desire that additional patronage, and that a wish to obtain it was no part of the reasons for the transfer. That was, no doubt, true; but the question which the House had to consider was, not what was the character of the present Commander-in-Chief, but whether the transfer was right in a constitutional point of view—whether the transfer to the Horse Guards of so large an amount of patronage ought not to be seriously considered by Parliament before it assented to such a change. A comparison had also been made between the relative efficiency of the local army and troops of the line. Upon the question of health there could be no doubt that men who were acclimatized and seasoned in India were more healthy, and consequently more efficient, than troops arriving from England. Then came the question who were most efficient for Indian duties, and whether officers who had gone out to India young, who bad learnt the languages, studied the character of the people and were acquainted with the country, and who made it the sphere of their future hopes and prospects, were less fitted for those duties than officers who went out merely for five years, who looked upon their residence in India as an exile and a penance, and who desired nothing so much as to leave it as soon as possible? Mr. Wilson, in a recent Minute, said that nothing had struck him so much as the contrast between local officers and officers of the Line in their treatment of the Natives. It was admitted that we could not hold India entirely by force, but that to some extent we must govern by opinion; and then it became a question whether men who go out intending to make India their home were not more likely to study the character and feelings of the Native population than officers who only went out unwillingly for a short period. A further question had been raised as to the fitness of Indian officers for the higher appointments in India. He had seen with regret the opinion that had been attributed to Lord Clyde as to the unfitness of local Indian officers for those appointments. It was invidious to institute any comparison between two gallant armies, but it was a fact that our three greatest military disasters in India had arisen from the inefficiency of the commanders who were sent from England; and those disasters had every one been retrieved by the conspicuous ability of officers belonging to the local force. A study of events during and since the recent mutiny would convince any one that the Indian officers would bear comparison with the officers of the Queen's army. He repeated that all these considerations should have been submitted to Parliament before so great a change was made. It used to be said that India must be governed in India; but now it seemed that India was to be governed in England and from the Horse Guards. This led him to consider whether that Department was equal to this new task. Of the present Commander-in-Chief no one could speak but with respect and praise. As a member of the Committee upon Military Organization he (Mr. Horsman) had heard the evidence of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War, and he knew how they had co-operated in promoting improvements in the army. Many improvements had been effected, and he was bound to say that great credit was due to the Commander-in-Chief, not only for what lie had done, but for the improvements which he was desiring to carry still further. He believed there never had been a Commander-in-Chief who was actuated by a wiser and purer zeal for the promotion of improvements in the army. But what had been the unchanging, and apparently unchangeable character of that Department, not only in the present, but during the last two centuries? It had been notoriously the worst managed Department of the State. History was full of instances of military disasters caused by inefficient commanders, of Commissions of Inquiry after our military operations, and nowhere had there been greater mischief in that respect than in India; favouritism, and not efficiency, had been the principle which governed the distribution of its patronage. The subject had been forced upon his attention by a speech delivered two years since by the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes). The Native army at that time consisted of 300,000 men, besides the Native contingents of 400,000 more, making 700,000 men over whom the Commander-in-Chief had the control, and of which he might at any time be called upon to take the personal direction. There was no post which required on the part of a Commander-in-Chief so great a combination of physical and mental energy. Nevertheless, the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen in 1858 stated that he had himself as a Director seen a Commander-in-Chief sworn in at the India House, who was so infirm that he could not rise from his chair to return thanks for the honour that had been conferred upon him; and he had also seen another Commander-in-Chief sworn in who was so blind that he would have fallen over a chair in leaving the room but for the interposition of a benevolent Director. With such Commanders-in-Chief no wonder great disasters occurred. There were other instances which could be given of the manner in which the Horse Guards filled up that responsible and difficult post in India. By the change now proposed a great addition would be made to the duties of the War Department, which was already in a state of confusion, and which the House had been warned would break down if any war-strain should be brought upon it. It was to this Department which was admitted to be in so unsatisfactory a state that Parliament was about to transfer the whole administration of the Indian army, thereby more than doubling the labours, duties, and responsibilities of a Department already overloaded with work. On what authority was this change to be made? The Secretary of State for India advised the Cabinet; but who advised the Secretary of State? The first advisors to whom he might be expected to resort were the Council provided by Parliament for his special assistance. The fifteen gentlemen composing this Council, eminent men in India, were unanimously opposed to this plan; but that did not seem to have any effect upon the right hon. Gentleman. It might be said that these were all old Indians with Indian prejudices. Well, what other opinions had been given? Every one of the last four Governors-General of India was against the Bill, and three of them were living witnesses of the folly and temerity of the change. A Governor General of India was chosen from the ranks of English statesmen and Cabinet Ministers. He went out to India without prejudices, and came back with Indian experience. These authorities warned the Government that the change they were about to make would be attended with the worst consequences. Lord Canning, Lord Dalhousie, and Lord Ellenborough, all English statesmen with Indian experience, were strong and emphatic in their condemnation of the abolition of the local army. That was surely a reason why Parliament should pause and why it should have time for reconsideration. There were few who did not feel that in the face of such authority against the Bill, they were incurring a very serious responsibility in passing it. He did say that even if the change were right, the House ought not to act hastily in the face of such authorities. Two authorities certainly had been cited. There was the authority of Lord Clyde, and also of Sir William Mansfield. He confessed he should pay rather more attention to their authority if their opinions had been more consistent. They had, however, originally been in favour of a local army, and it was a curious coincidence that Lord Clyde, Sir William Mansfield, and the Secretary of State for India, who were now cited as important authorities in favour of this Bill, changed their opinions at the same moment, and that moment was when the plan of the Commander-in-Chief for the abolition of the local army was submitted to them. It ought also to be remarked that the authority of Lord Clyde and Sir William Mansfield was a military authority. They treated this as a soldier's question—as a question merely affecting the army of India. The Governors-General of India and the Council of India, on the contrary, regarded this not only as a military, but also as a civil and political question, affecting not only the discipline of the army, but the safety and maintenance of the empire of India. He would rather defer to the opinion of statesmen and those who had governed India than take the opinion of military men, who*looked at the matter in a merely professional point of view. The explanation for the change of opinion in regard to the abolition of the local army was that a mutiny had taken place among the troops, and that recent information had given to this mutiny a graver and more alarming character. It was said that the mutiny had not been confined to the young troops, as had been at first supposed, but had spread to the veterans. That, however, was called a mutiny now which was described by Lord Clyde as a just demand of what were the soldiers' rights. It was also made known to the soldiers that the Prime Minister of this country had declared that if the soldiers of the Company's army did not choose on the change of Government to transfer their allegiance to the Crown they were entitled to their discharge. They claimed their discharge accordingly, and now it was called a mutiny. It now appeared that all the particulars of this mutiny were known last year to the Government, when no change was thought desirable. Before the papers were produced the House agreed to the second reading by a large majority; but after they had been laid upon the table one Member after another rose to express his regret for the vote he had given, and his intention to oppose the further progress of the Bill. So great had be "he change of opinion produced by the papers that many lion. Gentlemen who had voted for the Bill had since stated their belief that if the Bill had been introduced early in the Session it would have been doubtful whether the Government would have carried the second reading. As it was, the Bill would, no doubt, be carried. The failure of the opposition was chiefly duo to a cause which had been predicted when the Act of 1858 was passed. There were some who thought that when the transfer of the Government of India from the Company to the Crown was effected, the Secretary for India would act under a sense of responsibility and that Indian affairs would receive due attention. Others thought that that would not be the case, and in particular Sir Charles Trevelyan then warned the Committee before which he was examined that the financial, judicial, political, and other affairs of India brought before a Parliament already overburdened could not be attended to, that the control would therefore become nominal, and that habitual apathy would soon succeed. Had not that been the case during the present Session? If not, should they have had seven India Bills all introduced at the fag-end of the Session—one of the most important of which, dealing with the finance of India and involving a large loan, was actually put off to the last week before Parliament separated? He hoped that the debates on this measure would tend to remedy this evil. They had not effected much this Session, but they had laid a good foundation for the future. Any Minister of India must now feel that when a serious measure of Indian legislation was to be brought before the House, it must be well prepared, early introduced, supported by the most ample information, and must undergo that full discussion which it was the duty of the Minister to invite, and which Parliament would grossly neglect its duty if it did not take care to enforce.

SIR MINTO FARQUHAR

said, he wished to correct an error into which the Under Secretary for India had fallen in estimating the financial results of the change. Mr. Hammack distinctly stated that an Indian army of 80,000 men, in the proportion of troops of the several arms as proposed by the Commander-in-Chief, would, if composed of Line troops, cost £6,765,084, and if of local troops £6,302,316, the difference between the two being £462,763. Mr. Hammack also estimated that the substitution of Line troops for the local force of 19,500 men in India in February last would entail an additional cost of £114,253; and he went on to show that if the entire force of 80,000 Europeans consisted of two-thirds Line and one-third local the additional annual expense would be £308,512. One-half Line and one-half local, £231,384; one-third Line and two-thirds local, £154,256.

MR. T. G. BARING

I stated that the Government plan would increase the cost of the present force by £114,000.

SIR MINTO FARQUHAR

was sorry he had misunderstood the hon. Gentleman. He wished the House, however, to observe these facts. He must reiterate his surprise and regret at the manner in which the opinions of the Indian Council had been set aside on a question which so deeply concerned them, and that the opinions of such distinguished men as the Governor General, Sir James Outram, Sir John Lawrence, and others, should be disregarded by the Government. Not only the financial but the political interests of India were imperilled by this measure. He rested his opposition to this Bill upon the clear and able speech of the noble Lord the Member for King's Lynn, upon the statements of other hon. Members in this House, and upon the opinions of Lord Canning and of the other eminent men whose names he had mentioned. He had not opposed it from any hostility to the right hon. Baronet opposite, for whom and for the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary of State for War he had great respect. He had acted according to what, in his conscience, he believed to be his duty, and therefore he was not open to a charge of faction.

MR. HADFIELD

rose to complain of the restrictions which impeded the commercial intercourse between this country and some districts of India. It was a question in which his constituents were deeply interested, and he trusted the right hon. Gentleman would speedily direct his attention to the subject.

SIR CHARLES WOOD

It will soon—I hope on Monday next—be my duty to lay the financial state of India before the House, and the hon. Gentleman will then have a more fitting opportunity for discussing the question to which he has referred than is afforded by the present occasion. I hope that I may congratulate the House upon having at length reached the last stage of a protracted discussion. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud (Mr. Horsman) as well as several other hon. Members, has continually complained that upon two or three points the House had received no information as to the views of the Government; but I must remind him that on the 12th of June, in introducing this measure, I stated fully what were our opinions with regard to those subjects. I then stated that we had pledged ourselves to take the opinion of the House upon this most important question, and that it would be most improper for us to adopt any measures in regard to it which had not received the sanction of this House. I fully agree with those who have stated that this question is one of vast and mighty importance to the welfare, and perhaps to the safety, of India, and I am disposed to regret that some Gentlemen have rather dwarfed its proportions by introducing subjects of minor importance into the discussion. They have made the question to turn more upon the mode and form of carrying the scheme into effect than upon the merits of the scheme itself, and have wasted much time by referring to returns which after all are comparatively unimportant. Whatever some hon. Gentlemen may think of the necessity of preserving a local European army in India, and however high may be the authorities arrayed against the Government, I can assure the House that we had only one motive for adhering to our scheme, and that is that we conceive the welfare and prosperity of our Indian dominions would be best promoted by the course which we propose to adopt. A good deal of argument has been raised, as though the whole question turned upon the inconsistency of the course which we have pursued. I have never concealed from the House that I have changed my opinion since last year. The hon. and gallant Member for Westminster said that I last year introduced into this House a Bill for the purpose, not only of maintaining but of increasing the local Indian army. That assertion is quite incorrect. The real object of that Bill, however, was not to increase the local army, but to legalize the employment of 4,600 men who, owing to the exigencies of the time, had been added to it by the Government of Lord Derby beyond the limit allowed by law; and I then said that the course which the House might adopt upon that occasion would not prejudice any question which might thereafter be raised in regard to the Indian army, and that nothing which we did or said was to he considered as implying an opinion that a local army ought to be maintained in India. Hon. Gentlemen have gone on repeating, until I have no doubt they believe it, that we were in August, 1859, in possession of all the circumstances of the mutiny of the local European troops. I have always stated that my change of opinion has in part arisen from the views which were taken of what then occurred by such men as Lord Clyde, Sir William Mansfield, Sir Hugh Rose, and Sir Patrick Grant, and of many of their letters I was not in possession in August, 1859. Although some letters had been received, if lion. Members will look at the dates they will see that four-fifths of the communications which have been laid before Parliament could not have been in our possession in August, 1859. I attach the greatest possible importance to the letters of Lord Elphinstone, and I cannot omit to avail myself of this opportunity, the first which has occurred since his lamented death, to pay a tribute to his memory. A man of sounder judgment, of greater energy, of greater talent, or of greater discretion and tact, as evidenced through all his long Indian administration, was never sent out from this country. Not one of his letters was in our possession in August, 1859. The letters of other eminent authorities had not then been received; and therefore it is quite a mistake to say that in August last we were in possession of the grounds on which we have formed our present opinion. Mr. Hammack's report is also dated November, 1859, and some other papers relating to this subject are dated as late as April last. The statement of the hot), and gallant Member for Westminster that I was aware in last August of 10,000 men having taken their discharge is also quite inaccurate. When I spoke at that time I was not aware of the discharge of a single man. The circumstances had totally changed when we came to the determination against continuing a local army in India. It wa3 the intention of the late Government to maintain the small local army which then existed; but it was found that such a course would not satisfy the advocates of a local army, who insisted that, in order to keep up its character and efficiency, it should be a large force. They insisted that the local army should be two-thirds of the whole European force. [Mr. D. SEYMOUR: Lord Canning does not say that]. Lord Canning in his last despatch does not insist upon two-thirds, but says that one half will do; but the opinion of Lord Ellen-borough and of the military commission of the Indian Council is, that of the whole European force of 80,000, two-thirds should be a local force. When, therefore, we learnt that the 10,000 men had taken their discharge, we had to consider, not whether we should continue a small local army, but whether we should create a large one. Any candid and impartial man will admit that the circumstances had entirely changed between the summer of 1859, and the succeeding winter and spring. That is my answer to the charge of inconsistency. But even if it had not been so, surely the fact that men like Sir William Mansfield and Sir Patrick Grant, who were responsible for the safety of the army, and were eye-witnesses of the events passing in India, were induced to change their opinions and driven to the conclusion that it would he impolitic to maintain a local army in that country, affords some excuse at least for our also coming to the same conclusion. It has been erroneously said that Lord Clyde changed his opinion. Lord Clyde was never in favour of a local army. That is, indeed, stated in Mr. Willoughby's Minute, but it is one of several inaccuracies which have crept even into that able document. The fact is that Lord Clyde says he had abstained from expressing any difference of opinion from the Governor General, because he thought it his duty rather to obey than to dissent from that authority; but that when the events of last summer occurred, a strong impression was produced in his mind, which he should not conceal, against the maintenance of a local army. This change of opinion on the part of Sir William Mansfield, and of Sir Patrick Grant, himself a Sepoy officer, who could not be supposed to have entertained a prejudice against a local army, seems to my mind one of the strongest reasons for giving weight to their judgment. This question has, no doubt, important political bearings, but still it is pre-eminently a military question. The right hon. Member for Stroud (Mr. Hors-man) said we have never stated our views as to the effect of this measure on the authority of the Governor General. Now, on the 12th of July I said we did not conceive that the course we were pursuing would in the slightest degree affect the Governor General's authority—that he was the representative of the Crown in India, and ought to have precisely the same power in controlling and directing all military operations as the home Government has in this country. It has been observed that the sceptre and the sword must be wielded by the same hand in India. Well, if the sceptre was shaken in the hand of the Governor General during the mutiny, who replaced it as firmly as ever in his grasp but the troops of the Line. The Governor General selected the officers appointed to the command of expeditions in India; and the same power in all respects would remain with him under this Bill.

MR. HORSMAN

Does the Native army remain under him?

SIR CHARLES WOOD

Certainly. I said before that ultimately the Native army was to be officered from the Staff corps, which was to be entirely selected by the Indian Government.

MR. HORSMAN

Is not the Native army to be under the Horse Guards?

SIR CHARLES WOOD

Certainly not. If, instead of imagining all sorts of hypothetical consequences from this measure, hon. Gentlemen would confine themselves to the measure itself, as it has been stated in Parliament, they would save themselves and the public from much misapprehension. There will be no change in the position of the officers; and to give assurance of that, I am quite willing to accept the Amendments of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Oxfordshire with respect to the rights and privileges of the officers and soldiers of the local army; but they are quite unnecessary, because the Bill does not in the least touch those rights and privileges. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the Correspondence in which the Commander-in-Chief at home expressed his opinion that the Commander-in-Chief in India ought to communicate with him in reference to the condition of the local army in India. But all that the Commander-in-Chief in this country stated was, that he thought reports might be made to him of the discipline of all European regiments in the Queen's service. It was not unnatural that the head of the army should entertain such an opinion; and there is no reason to believe, as it seems to me, that such a proceeding would weaken the authority of the Governor General. My right hon. Friend behind me very naturally laughed at the assertion of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Stroud, that we had become guarantee for the £37,000,000 of debt occasioned by the late war. There is no such guarantee. We have entered into no such engagement, and we have uniformly repudiated the notion that there was any such intention, and in a recent declaration of the Government of India Lord Canning states that he thinks it essential, in order to enforce a good financial administration in India, that the Government there should not look for the assistance of this country, but stand on their own resources. Then, as to the expense, I took the proportion of two-fifths local and three-fifths Line, as proposed by the late Government, and the cost of substituting two-fifths Line for two-fifths local I stated would be £184,000, all things included—in round numbers it would not exceed £200,000 a year; and if we are right in supposing that the change proposed would add materially to the efficiency of the army and the safety of the empire such an increase in an expenditure of between £13,000,000 and £14,000,000 for military purposes should form no impediment to its adoption. In many respects there will be considerable economy in having a single instead of a double establishment, and I certainly do not think the additional expense will exceed £200,000 a year. Then comes the health of the army. I believe the greatest nonsense has been talked about the acclimatization of the local army in India. It is much more likely that living some time in India will diminish health. Let me quote on this subject one simple paragraph from Dr. Martin. He says:— Length of residence in India, so far from conferring any advantage on the English constitution in the way of acclimatization, surely and gradually leads to physical degradation. It is perfectly impossible to state the matter more distinctly and decidedly. I admit that there is ground for serious consideration in the statement that the breaking up of the local army may diminish the number of men from whom able and useful official servants could be selected in India; and I yielded for a considerable time to the force of that argument; but I believe we have good reasons for expecting that the supply of able servants for civil employment to be drawn from the army will not be diminished by placing the whole army in the immediate service of the Crown. With reference to the political bearings of this question, so far from coming to a hasty conclusion, I hesitated for a long time. The military grounds were clear enough: on them I have not for some months entertained a doubt; hut the political bearings of the question on India I had very seriously to consider, I fully admit it was for some time before I could make up my mind on that subject. If this was a question on which all Indian authorities were on one side and all military authorities on the other more doubt might be entertained respecting it; but it is perfectly notorious that Indian authorities are pretty nearly divided on the subject, while most of the able men recently returned from India, who have seen recent changes and recent events, are in favour of amalgamation. The opinion of the Duke of Wellington has been referred to. This is what he says:— The difference in the state of the King's troops in the East Indies from that in which the East India Company's European infantry is known to be is conclusive against it in my opinion. The British army cannot be made a colonial corps without destroying its character and strength. Would it not be a most disgraceful and terrible mode of losing possession of any part of Her Majesty's dominions by means of a mutiny of the officers of a local or colonial army employed to garrison it? Yet that is what we must look to if the army is to be employed as mere colonial troops, and never to quit the Colonies from the] day they enter the service. I do not think it necessary to trouble the House at greater length on this subject. Whatever course is to ho pursued with regard to India, we think the first clement of strength is to have the most efficient army the country can provide; and while consulting the wishes and feelings of the people we must impress them with the conviction that it is from affection and kindness to them, not from fear, that any concessions are made to them.

Question, "That the word 'now' stand part of the Question."

Put, and agreed to.

Main Question put, and agreed to.

Bill read 3°, and passed.