HC Deb 03 August 1860 vol 160 cc639-53

said, he wished, before the noble Lord replied to the remarks that had been made, to put a question of which he had given notice—Whether, since Her Majesty's Government have absolutely declined to join in any measures for preventing, by force of arms, any descent upon the Neapolitan Territory by the Troops under General Garibaldi, it would not be expedient to refrain from the expression of any strong opinion of their own, or from endorsing that of others in an opposite sense, which it appears, from recent circumstances, is liable to lead to great misapprehension of their intentions by Foreign Authorities? He had no wish to make any attack on the policy of the noble Lord, which perhaps was the only one which could be adopted under the circumstances, still there was an apparent discrepancy between the declarations of the British Government and their acts or, rather, their negation of action, which might give rise to much misconception abroad. Some time back the noble Lord at the head of the Government, amid the cordial cheers of the House, which was responded to by the country generally—said that what was really wanted in Southern Italy was the ejection of those governments that had misconducted themselves. Afterwards, on the 12th of July, the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary gave an opinion not altogether unfounded, and in which many shared, that under certain circumstances it might be desirable that the change should go no further, and that the kingdom of Naples should be left intact. He would admit the difficulty of stating beforehand what changes should take place. But it was very doubtful whether Sicily should be separated from Naples, and whether, seeing how closely the two countries approximated, being only divided by a strait of a couple of miles broad, they could remain separate. Some time ago he asked the noble Lord (Lord John Russell) what pressure had been brought to bear upon the Government of Sardinia in reference to the expedition to Sicily, and the noble Lord, upon the authority of the British Minister at Turin, stated that no pressure had been put upon that Government in any way, but that, the expedition to Sicily having taken place, and been successful, the King of Sardinia had written to Garibaldi to stop in his victorious career; and the noble Lord went on to say that the text of that letter was approved by Her Majesty's Government. But Garibaldi having declined to accept the advice given in that letter, and consequently having refused to act in accordance with the views of the British Government, the question arose how far the abstract opinion which Her Majesty's Government had given when they approved of the letter ought to be followed out to its logical consequence—namely, by the intervention of military force. The Neapolitan Government had been led to believe that it was the desire of the British Government to preserve the kingdom of Naples to the present King, and had been led to look to France and England to give practical effect to the noble Lord's opinion. That was evident by the instruction given to the Neapolitan Envoy who was sent to Her Majesty's Government, and who passed through Paris on his way. The noble Lord had also made a statement as to the proposal made to him on the part of the Neapolitan Government by the Marquis de la Greca, and on the following day he read a letter from that nobleman, giving a different version of the object of his mission. It was not to be supposed that either the noble Lord or the Neapolitan Envoy had made a misstatement, and it was clear that the difference arose entirely from the noble Lord having endorsed the opinion expressed in the King of Sardinia's letter to Garibaldi, which opinion and letter it was obvious was not the spontaneous act of the King of Sardinia, but was written under pressure. The position of England in the matter, however, was somewhat undignified; for Garibaldi, having refused to act upon the letter, had refused to act upon the recommendation of the British Government, and it was for the noble Lord to consider how far that recommendation should be enforced. He thought the noble Lord at the head of the Government having explicitly stated his views, and the opinion of the country being so unmistakeably with him, the Government should take care not to encourage, even in appearance, an opposite idea, and that our actions should not be at variance with our declarations. They had recently received an assurance from an important personage that there was no aversion on his part to any arrangement suitable to the circumstauces for settling this question. He should have been glad had that statement been made earlier, and it would have more effect now if our recommendation in reference to the boundaries of Savoy and Switzerland had been accepted. The negotiation upon this matter, as conducted by the noble Lord (Lord John Russell), reflected great credit upon him. There was but one fault, so far as he could judge from the papers before them, which the noble Lord had fallen into, and that was a want in some respects of sufficient candour, added to which the noble Lord had certainly favoured the Government of France, and allowed them to gain a great advantage in the Savoy question.

In putting the question he had read he would add another, namely, whether the noble Lord had received any account of the noble conduct of Abd-el-Kader in protecting some thousands of Christians in his house in Damascus—his house and that of the British Consul being the only ones that were not sacked in that quarter of the city, and whether any acknowledgment of that conduct was contemplated?


I did not intend to address the House with reference to the question raised by the lion. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Rich) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ayrshire (Sir James Fergusson), but it is a matter of importance to know, as far as may be consistent with the interests of the public service, the exact state of affairs in regard to the signature of the convention with Syria. No one must be more sensible than the noble Lord of the importance of supporting the authority of the Turkish Government, and of not adding to their weakness by any unnecessary interference on the part of the European Powers. The House will therefore be glad to know the terms and nature of this convention, and what stipulation has been made or is to be made with reference to the contingents that the various European Powers are to supply for the expedition to Syria, whether any stipulation has been made as to the course which the European forces are to take, and whether they are to act in a manner contrary to the instructions which the Turkish commander may receive from Constantinople. I do not wish to say a word of doubt as to the policy of the French Government in Syria. Considering their claims to the protectorate of the Latin Christians of the East, it is almost impossible for the French Government to avoid taking active steps as to the terrible outrages that have occurred in Syria. But the Crimean war chiefly arose from the jealousy of the Russian and French Governments, the one claiming to protect the Latin, the other the Greek Church in the East. It is clear that if the French Government interfere in a manner likely to raise the jealousy of the Russian Government great evils will ensue, and it will be almost impossible, if the French Government interfere in Syria in favour of the Latin Christians, for the Russian Government not to be almost compelled to interfere in favour of the Greek Christians in many other parts of the Turkish dominions. A rumour is current in Paris that the delay in the signature of this convention has arisen from a desire of the part of the Turkish Government that the intervention should be extended in favour of the Christians in other parts of Turkey. If that be the case it will show that out of these disturbances there may grow questions that may endanger the peace of Europe in future. The noble Lord has, I believe, received reports from our Consuls in the Levant, and, among others, a communication from our Consul at Salonica, with reference to the proposed convention which I hope it will be consistent with his duty to lay upon the table.


My hon. Friend the Member for Richmond (Mr. Rich) has stated, from the papers before the House and from the accounts in the newspapers, the unfortunate transactions which have taken place in Syria. I, therefore, feel it to be quite unnecessary to go into further details of the facts that have occurred; but the House will naturally expect that I should state what has been done, both by Her Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government, in consequence of these acts, showing, as they do, so much cruelty on the part of one of these tribes, and so much negligence, to say the least of it, on the part of the Turkish authorities. The last accounts state that since the 13th of July the massacre has to a great degree ceased, and by the latest account we have received, we learn that order has been restored at Damascus. Fuad Pasha had, at the date of that account, arrived at Damascus, and the late Governor, who showed such culpable negligence, who appeared to be indifferent to the murder of the Christians, who never interfered at all when these murders were going on, and of whom it is said that if he had interfered with 80 or 100 men he might have stopped these disturbances—that Pasha has been sent to Constantinople to be tried. Sir Henry Bulwer states that he is to be sent again to Damascus, where the witnesses are, but that there will be no disposition en the part of the Porte to show any lenity to that Governor, and that he will be treated with the severity of justice that he deserves. The Turkish Government have sent to Damascus Fuad Pasha, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, a man of great energy, with not less than 25,000 men for Syria. It appears true that on the 10th ultimo a sort of truce, for I cannot call it a peace—was signed between the Druses and Maronites, the terms of that truce being that no inquiry should be made into past transactions on the part 'if the Maronites, and that all attacks upon the Maronites shall cease. The hon. and gallant Member for Ayrshire (Sir James Fergusson) is, I think, justified in saying that with regard to these unfortunate events we are not to consider the Maronite Christians as persons totally defenceless, and as by no means intending to attack their neighbours, but that, on the contrary the Druses and Maronites were both armed, and, having sentiments of most bitter hostility to each other, the question really was who should attack the other first. Undoubtedly, however, the atrocities practised have been those practised by the Druses on the Christians. The Christians have been the sufferers, and the lives of thou-ands of the Christians have been sacrificed. Such have been the proceedings on the part of the Porte, and now with regard to those of the Christian Powers. When these accounts were first received the French Government proposed a Commission of Inquiry, and that it should not be limited to Turkish officials or Commissioners, but that European Commissioners should be joined with it, that they should endeavour to search out the authors of these massacres, and that they should determine what measures would secure peace for the future. To that proposal not only Her Majesty's Government and the other Powers but also the Porte at once willingly assented, and it was agreed that the Commission should be issued. But on the receipt of further accounts from Damascus, including the facts connected with the attacks on the house of the French Consul and the destruction of the convents that were especially protected by the French Government, that Government represented to us that they did not wish to take up any separate case, or to ask for reparation for any separate injury or insult, but that they wished the Powers of Europe to con- sider whether the evil was not of a magnitude, and whether the crimes perpetrated were not of a nature so horrible, that the Powers of Europe ought to take up the case and endeavour to provide a remedy against the recurrence of such scenes. Her Majesty's Government readily acceded to that view. I must say that the Russian Government stated at once that what they wished with regard to Turkey was that there should be no separate action, that no Power should act alone, but that whatever was done should be done by general consent. The French Government, as I have stated, proposed that European forces should be at once sent to Syria with the view of strengthening the Turks, and enabling them to adopt measures for the pacification of that country. That was a course which was, no doubt, one of grave importance, and which no one could say was without danger, but it did seem to be dictated by the necessity of the case, and Her Majesty's Government agreed to consider, in conference with the representatives of the other Powers in Paris, what should be done. Those negotiations have occupied several days. There were questions as to the form in which the Resolutions of the Conference should be embodied, but it was finally agreed that in the shape of a protocol provision should be made for sending European troops to Syria. I have, since I came into the House, received intelligence that at three o'clock to-day a protocol was signed by the representatives of the five Powers and of the Sultan at Paris. The protocol, or it may be the two protocols, which have been signed, is to the following effect:—That, upon the representation of the Sultan that he wishes for the aid of his Allies in order to restore tranquillity in Syria, the European Powers agree that a body of troops not exceeding 12,000 men shall be sent to that country. The next article provides that half of these troops shall be furnished by France, and that immediately after the signature of the protocol they shall be at liberty to depart, with the view of resorting immediately to the coast of Syria. It is provided that when they arrive there all their movements shall be made in concert with the Commissioners of the Porte, and that the Sultan, on his part, shall furnish provisions and every other facility for their accommodation and march. By a further article of the protocol it is provided that the stay of the foreign troops in Syria shall not be prolonged beyond six months, it being believed that the object for which they are sent there can be attained within that time.

The hon. Gentleman who spoke last asked whether there were any representations on the part of Russia on this subject, and whether they had not caused some delay in the signature of the convention. As I have said, there is not at present any convention; but, with regard to the substance of his question, it certainly was the view of the Russian Government—a view which is no new one on their part, because in the month of April Prince Gortschak off expressed to the representatives of the other Powers the same opinion—that it was desirable the five Powers, with the Sultan, should declare that their serious attention was turned to administrative measures with the view of ameliorating the condition of the Christians in Turkey. It is stated that the Powers, together with the Porte, recollect the engagements which were entered into in 1856, and that, together with the Sultan, they engage that those measures of amelioration shall be adopted. I must upon this subject say that Sir Henry Bulwer lately sent out queries to the various Consuls in European Turkey, and that some of the answers which have been received—answers which evince the great intelligence and knowledge of the country possessed by the Consuls—without indicating that the Government of the Sultan is wilfully tyrannical and oppressive, certainly show that there exist under it a great many abuses, some of them abuses difficult to remedy, but others such as, in my opinion at least, might easily be removed, and which therefore justify the proposal which has been made by the Russian Government. The article which refers to that subject is in the most general terms, and will not justify the intervention of any foreign Power with regard to any future case. Every such case will be left to be dealt with upon its merits. Of course, what is now taking place may be alluded to as a precedent, but there is no provision for the future. According to the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it would be most imprudent and most dangerous to make any provision for the future under which there might be interference with the Government of the Sultan. There is, besides, a protocol, declaring, nearly in the terms of that of 1840, that in interfering in the affairs of Turkey none of the Powers will seek any addition of territory or any exclusive in- fluence or any separate commercial advantage.

In the difficult and, I must own, perilous condition of the Turkish Empire, and considering the necessity which there seems to be that the Powers of Europe should from time to time interfere in the affairs of that empire, it seems to Her Majesty's Government, and I believe that it is the opinion of all the Powers of Europe, that the only path of safety lies in concert, in combination, and in endeavouring, without seeking separate advantages, to point out to the Porte in what manner his throne may be made secure and satisfaction be given to all his subjects, Christians as well as Turkish. The task is a most difficult one, and nothing but the most disinterested conduct on the part of the Powers, as well as the inclination of the Sultan, to adopt the reforms which are necessary, will enable us to tread safely in that direction. At the same time, while advice is given and while reforms are suggested, it is necessary that their ultimate execution should be left in the hands of officers appointed by the Porte. If we or any other Power were to attempt to interfere directly in the administration of Turkey there is this great danger; that we should not only diminish the authority of the Sultan, but might awake the fanatical passions of the Moslems, who might think that they were betrayed, and might involve the whole empire in bloodshed and sedition. The question is one of the greatest difficulty. When the protocol has been received I will lay it upon the table; but I trust that the House will not press the Government to produce papers relating to difficult negotiations which have taken place, or will be taking place, upon this subject. We must endeavour, according to our views of policy, to do what seems to us best adapted to preserve the peace of Europe, and to improve the state of Turkey; and until something definite is settled I trust that the House will not ask us to produce papers relating to the subject.

In answer to the question of the hon. Member for Devizes (Mr. D. Griffith), I do not think that I have anything to add to what I have formerly said with regard to the state of Italy. We do not propose to interfere by force in the affairs of Southern Italy, or to prevent the Italians settling their Government in their own way. They may adopt very wise Resolutions, they may adopt what we may think very impolitic ones, but the Governments both of England and France are determined to act upon that principle of non-intervention. With respect to the conduct of Abd-el-Kader, I have today received despatches from our Consul, but I cannot state accurately what are their contents.


Considering the difficult position in which the noble Lord is placed with regard to this question, I am not disposed to find fault with the explanation he has made, or with regard to the intervention which is proposed, and which is about to take place. Probably, there is no intervention within our memory which could be so well excused as this which is now about to take place in Syria, because it takes rather the aspect of a movement of a police force, than an expedition of troops with any special political object. I have seen with satisfaction what appeared to me the moderate and fair course, which, so far as we can judge from what we learn from the papers, that has been pursued by the different Governments in regard to this very difficult and perilous question. I hope that the course which has been pursued by the French Government, at least so far as we can judge from what we read, will be admitted to be another ground for lessening some of that distrust which has been excited with regard to the intentions of that Power. The hon. Member for Horsham (Mr. Seymour FitzGerald), in putting his question to the noble Lord, expressed his hope and belief that the noble Lord was as strong as ever he was in the intention of maintaining the integrity of the Turkish Empire, and of supporting the Sultan's Government. I do not quote the words of the hon. Gentleman; but I understand that to be what he meant. Now, Sir, I have risen for the purpose of entering my protest against any such policy. I know something of the difficuly of the position, and I can feel for the extreme difficulty in which the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary finds himself. Now, we have been supporting the Sultan for a considerable period, and hitherto with very indifferent success. I think the hon. and gallant Member who sits below me (Sir Charles Napier) can toll us something of what took place in 1840, and I have no doubt that if he were to give his unbiassed testimony—as I am sure he would if he stood up to say anything about it—he would tell us it was not a very fortunate achievement in which he was engaged in 1840, and that probably his vessels had not left sight of the shores of Syria before the Turks returned to their tyranny, and the Christians again passed under the yoke of their oppressors. It is notorious to everybody that whilst that part of Asia was under the government of the Egyptian Pasha there was tranquillity throughout the land, and travellers might pass wherever they liked with at least a fair security; hut when that rule was withdrawn, the country returned to the condition of its former, and of its present anarehy. I contest altogether the wisdom and right of the Government of this country in interfering to support a Power which is utterly and obviously, according to the noble Lord's own statement, doomed to extinction from a decay which it is altogether impossible, in my opinion, for any human aid to avert. Well, then, coming down from 1840, we have had that sad calamity, the Crimean war. I am one of those not responsible for that war. When war was declared, and a message came down to this House from the Crown, I expressed my disapprobation of it on the ground that that which you were undertaking to do, and upon which you were willing to sacrifice unknown millions of English treasure and many thousands of English lives, was a thing which every man in this House, who knew anything of the circumstances, at that moment must have known was an impossible task; and yet you rushed into it as if it were a matter of easy achievement, and persuaded the people of this country that you were doing a meritorious work for freedom. A noble Lord in the other House of Parliament went so far as to make a speech to show that the Mahomedans, in their practices and character, were better Christians than the Russians themselves. Why, I recollect the noble Lord at the head of the Government, who is not at all particular in that which he states when he has an object in persuading the House to take a certain course—adverse often, I believe, to the honour and to the interests of the country—the noble Lord—I recollect it as well as if it had been said only last night—stated that he believed there was no country in Europe in which improvement and improved administration had made such progress within the last twenty years as in Turkey, and in its government. I do not say the noble Lord did not believe that; but if he did believe it, he was the only man at all acquainted with Turkish affairs, who could possibly entertain so erroneous a notion. The thing was utterly inaccurate, and without foundation.

After you had made the war, and, as you said, chastised Russia, and re-established the power and dignity of the Porte, and secured the integrity of the Turkish Empire, by a treaty of the various Powers of Europe, you come now, nearly seven years after the commencement of that war, and four years only after its termination, and you find that country in a worse condition of anarchy than it was before you meddled with it. Your war did several things for Turkey. It destroyed what it had of a fleet; it destroyed what it had of an army. It left its finances in a more embarrassed condition than before; it left its revenues from Egypt, and, I think, from Syria, also pledged and mortgaged to the Powers which had lent it money; and it did that to which the noble Lord has referred as a thing greatly to be dreaded—it depreciated and stained altogether, in the eye of the Mahomedan population, the dignity of the Sultan, which they had been previously so much accustomed to regard. You have maintained upon the throne a man totally incapable of doing any single thing in the way of Government. We hear every three months that the Sultan has issued a severe order about something connected with the finances. That is all pretence; done with the idea of bolstering up, in the markets of Europe, Turkish Stock, and to force people to believe there is going to be some improvement. But there never is any improvement made. When you hear there is a wedding in the Sultan's family, in that of any of the Grand Pashas, the extravagance and expense is something that can hardly be credited in any Christian country. All this we hear; but we find, from time to time, that there is growing up in every part of the empire suspicion and distrust of the Government, hatred of the system under which they live—the tribes, as in Syria, massacring one another; and yet the very authorities of the Sultan, the pashas, who were receiving his wages—men whom, for aught I know, you decorated during that war—did not lift a hand to stay the shedding of the blood of your fellow-creatures, and, to some extent, your co-religionists. What is to be the end of it? I was speaking the other day to a gentleman possessing very extensive knowledge of the condition of the Turkish Empire. He believed that five years will not pass over before the Turks themselves, if nothing else occurs, will rise and pull down the Government, which has no longer dignity in their eyes, and which has no longer the power to protect any portion of its subjects. He also says that in European Turkey such is the helplessness of the Government, and the unprotected condition of the people, that the Christians are everywhere providing themselves with arms for their own defence, and for the purpose, of course, of maintaining their own political views in the circumstances that may arise.

What I want to impress upon the noble Lord is this, and I am sorry to tell the noble Lord that I do not think on this question of foreign matters he is of very teachable material—and perhaps he may think that I am not a very qualified adviser; but seeing that his noble Colleague at the head of the Government did no good by the expedition of 1840—he nearly quarrelled with France, not showing them the moderation which France is showing now—and seeing that both were concerned in the war of 1854, which has produced no useful result, I would seriously ask whether we are to be led again into a struggle with any European nation with the view of maintaining the integrity of a decaying and doomed empire? What has the Crimean war done for us? The only visible result presents itself in the shape of the Commissionaires in the streets of Loudon, unfortunate men who lost their arms in endeavouring to maintain the integrity of the Turkish Empire. The unseen consequences are an enormous addition to our debt and thousands of ill-fated Englishmen buried on the heights of Sebastopol, for whom all you did or could do was to send the Bishop of Gibraltar to consecrate the ground in which their bones repose. The noble Lord hopes that whatever may be done for Turkey will be done by general concert. It appears to me that there are only two modes of dealing with the question which have any argument to recommend them. One is the course of entire abstention. It is very likely that the adoption of that policy by the Powers of Europe would be followed before long by a sanguinary contest both in Asiatic and European Turkey. [Lord JOHN RUSSELL: Hear, hear!] The noble Lord, by the approbation he gives to that statement, puts his seal to all I have said with respect to the perilous condition of Turkey. I say let the European Powers agree to consult together as to what should be done, not for the purpose of sustaining the Turkish Empire, which I hold to be utterly impossible, but for the purpose of deciding what shall take place when the Turkish Empire comes to an end. For instance, it would he a positive blessing to the Sulton if there could be a separate Government organized for Syria which should he independent of Constantinople; and probably before long the rebounds from these atrocities committed in Syria will be found in European Turkey, and you may have there risings and disturbances similar to those which have taken place in Syria. If this should occur, instead of caring very much that Russia should add a province to her bulk—-for the addition of provinces does not always give power to kingdoms and Governments—do in the name of common sense and common humanity abstain, at any rate, from attempting longer permanently to sustain a government, which everybody in Turkey believes to be unsustainable. Judging from the tone of Russia, of France, and of the noble Lord at the head of the Foreign Office—and I take it Austria and Prussia would not throw obstacles in the way—if you do not adopt the policy of abstention, why should there not be some discussion with a view to establish new, separate, and better governments. The question of Constantinople, which is supposed to be the great political question, is surely not an insuperable difficulty. It cannot be said that Heaven permitted a great city to grow up in a favoured spot to form continually a bono of contention between the nations of Europe, or that the statesmen who have settled so many questions cannot suggest what can be done with this. What I am myself most anxious for is that England should hold itself aloof from that policy—should, in point of fact, repudiate it as altogether a mistake—that the integrity of the Turkish Empire is to be maintained, and that not this power, but the pretended power—the feebleness and dignity of the Sultan, is to be supported; and that all that is to be done again at the expense of the taxes drawn from the English people, and of the blood of Englishmen squandered like water in the endeavour to do that which nature says is impossible, and that all experience tells us we must fail in if we ever attempt.


Sir, the hon. Member for Birmingham has charged me with being not very particular in the statements I make when they are to support my argument. I think I might return the compliment, but there is this difference between us, that upon certain questions of foreign policy and foreign affairs I happen, from a variety of circumstances, to he better informed than the hon. Member appears to be. I take leave to say that I derive my knowledge more especially from a long superintendence of the Foreign Department of the Government, while the hon. Member obtains his chiefly from persons who, from their race, their prejudices, and their interests, are not the most impartial judges of the matters to which he has referred to-night. The hon. Member says that I stated on a former occasion that there was no country in Europe which, in the same space of time, had made such great progress in internal improvement as the Turkish Empire had since the death of the late Sultan. [Mr. BRIGHT: Previous to 1853.] My observation referred to the period since the accession of the present Sultan. I repeat that assertion, and I do so with the utmost deliberation and perfect knowledge of what I am stating. I am quite sure that everybody who really knows anything about Turkey will confirm the assertion I made,—that is, anybody who speaks impartially, free from prejudices, and with large and enlightened views. I give the hon. Member credit for the most perfect sincerity in what he states, but I must say that he takes a very limited view of the matter on which he speaks. It is very easy to say that the Turkish Empire will fall to pieces, and therefore you had better arrange what is to be done with the fragments; but the answer to that observation is, "only leave the Turkish Empire alone and perhaps it will not fall to pieces." If the course suggested by the hon. Member were adopted, and it were to be arranged beforehand what should be done with the fragments of the Turkish Empire, it is not very likely that that empire would last very long, for when once parties who are strong begin to divide prospectively the spoil of the weak, it is probable that the unfortunate party whose spoil is to be divided will not be very long lived. But I differ from the hon. Member in this. I admit that there is immense progress to be made in order-to bring Turkey up to the point of any European nation; yet, in looking at Turkey, we are too apt to think of what remains to be done rather than of that which has been done. Still, it is my opinion that if the Turkish Empire be left to itself, free from constant interference, except by good advice and support, it will not fall to pieces as the hon. Member fancies. It is exceedingly easy to say, "You must make a partition of Turkey," but has the hon. Member considered what the political consequences may be, and must be, on the balance of power in Europe, and on the interests of other countries, of that system of partition which he now so earnestly recommends? I venture to say that, in this respect, the hon. Member takes a very limited view of the matter. He sees only the evils of the present day, and shuts his eyes entirely to those more large and serious consequences which would inevitably result if the principles he recommends were adopted. This is a very large question, and the subject is of too great importance to be discussed on a Motion for the adjournment of the House till Monday; but I only protest against the adoption of the maxims and policy of the hon. Member, and I can assure him that there are much graver, more serious, and more extensive results than be imagines involved in the policy he recommends. I trust that a different policy may tend to avert the evils which would inevitably ensue from the adoption of the policy of the hon. Member.