LEAVE. FIRST READING. (Hansard, 1 March 1859)

§ MR. BOVILL

said, he rose to move for leave to bring in a Bill to amend the law relating to Petitions of Right. His object was to afford the Subject a simple and efficient remedy against the Crown and the various departments of the Government. The only mode by which a Subject could obtain redress in a dispute with the Crown or the Government was by a Petition of Eight, and this form of proceeding was of such a character as, in many instances, to amount to a complete and absolute denial of justice. The proceeding was so dilatory and expensive that few were inclined to adopt it, and so antiquated that few persons even in the profession of the law were acquainted with its forms, and as each counsel was consulted it often required days of study to ascertain what were the proper forms to be adopted. The law officers of the Crown were embarrassed, the highest judges of the land had condemned it, and lord Chancellor after Lord Chancellor had expressed his regret that this method of examining questions between the Crown and the subject should be retained. When a Subject sought redress from the Crown as represented by one of the public departments he prepared a Petition of Right, which was presented to the Home Secretary, and referred by him to the law officers of the Crown. If the clam for redress were made out, the petition passed from the Home Secretary and obtained the sign manual of the Queen, with the words, "Let right be done." This fiat acted as a reference to the Lord Chancellor, and a Commission was thereupon issued, and a jury summoned before whom the Suppliant produced evidence at a great expense in support of his case. If the verdict on the Commission was in 1115 his favour he was then only in the position of an ordinary suitor commencing a suit. The whole expense previously incurred, and it frequently amounted to some hundreds of pounds, was entirely thrown away. The Crown was then called upon to answer, and the suit proceeded according to the ordinary forms applicable to the case. Another jury were summoned, and the case was tried before the Judge and jury. The result was that, unless he recovered more than £1,000 the suitor would generally be out of pocket, and no one would embark in such a litigation to enforce his claims against the Crown unless he had a claim amounting to £2,000 or £3,000. Many contracts were made during the late war by the different departments of the Government, and some were rather abruptly broken by the Government at the close of the war, so that the question had a practical interest at the present moment. If a person who entered into a contract with the Government was charged with a breach of it, the remedy on the part of the Crown against him was direct and immediate; but, on the other hand, when he wanted to enforce his rights against the Government, he was practically prevented from doing so, and the result was that the greatest possible dissatisfaction prevailed among the mercantile community. Under these circumstances it had occurred to him and many other lawyers that some amendment should be made in the law. He desired to simplify the present cumbrous and expensive proceedings, and there was no reason why they should not be assimilated to those that took place between Subject and Subject, or to those that were adopted when the Crown endeavoured to enforce its rights by process of law. The Bill which he had prepared would be found to accomplish that object. Delay would be avoided, expense would be saved, and wherever a Subject succeeded in maintaining his claim he would be entitled to his costs, while, if on the other hand he brought forward a claim which he could not substantiate, he would then equally have to pay the costs incurred by the Crown. The mode in which he proposed to carry out this amendment of the law was, not to allow a writ to be issued in the name of the Sovereign, but to preserve, as more consistent with the Constitution, the form of the ancient Petition of Right, at the same time sweeping away all the other unnecessary and expensive forms of pro- 1116 ceeding. He proposed to allow the petition to be presented and prosecuted in the form either of a bill in Chancery or of a declaration at law, the Attorney General being called upon to answer it on the part of the Government. In that way delay and expense would be avoided; but, in order that there should not be frivolous and vexatious suits brought against the Government, his Bill provided that no person should be at liberty to prosecute his Petition of Right until he had satisfied a Judge of one of the superior courts that he had reasonable grounds for proceeding with his suit. If he were told that affording a simple remedy would encourage useless litigation, his answer was that the penalty of having to pay the costs in the event of failure would deter persons from needlessly embarking in law proceedings. The change which he proposed was not without precedents, for in 1855 an Act was passed by which the costs in revenue prosecutions were made payable or recoverable by the Crown, as the case might be. So, too, there were precedents for allowing persons to sue the Attorney General on the part of the Crown. In 1857 an Act was passed which enabled all persona having claims upon the Government in Scotland to sue the Lord Advocate, and last Session, when the administration of India was transferred to the Crown, it was provided that persons having claims against the Government in respect to Indian affairs should be entitled to issue a writ against the Secretary of State, and so have their cases determined by the ordinary tribunals of the country. He was sure that the change he proposed would be of essential advantage to the public service, because when people knew they had a clear and simple remedy they would be more willing to enter into contracts with the Government; and, at all events, the public would have the satisfaction of knowing that there was one equal law for the Crown and its Subjects. The hon. and learned Gentleman concluded by moving for leave to bring in a Bill "to amend the Law relating to Petitions of Right, to simplify the proceedings, and to make provision for the costs thereof."