§ MR. ADDERLEYsaid, he rose to call the attention of the House to the Military defences of the Colonies, and to the source from which those defences are supplied. In doing so his object was rather to elicit the opinion of the Government and what their intentions were, than to offer any lengthened observations of his own on the subject. The Return which he had moved for some time ago of the amount of forces in each of our Colonies, and of the amount of taxation which was borne by each for their support, had been laid upon the table of the House, but had not yet been circulated amongst hon. Members; he must, therefore, trust to other sources of information which were within his reach, and especially to a return which had been ordered on the Motion of the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen (Colonel Sykes). The question he wished to raise was one of some importance—it was how far this country should not only supply the colonists with troops, but defray the cost of those troops within their territories. Of course, if the House were prepared to continue the present system, they could do so; but he believed that many hon. Members were not acquainted with the nature of the case, and he wished them to consider whether it was the duty of this island not only to furnish out of its limited population the greater part of the Colonies with troops for their defence, but to provide, by heavy taxation, for the greater part of the cost which these troops occasioned. It seemed to him that the very reverse was the right principle, as well for the interest of the Colonies as for those of this country itself; for the principal result of the plan now adopted was not only that it was needlessly expensive, but that not one single colony of the British Empire was in a state of adequate defence and security in the event of war breaking out. England had of late years granted all her Colonies self-government, without calling upon them to satisfy the corollary— namely, by undertaking their own defence. England had given all her Colonies self-government freely and fully; nor in his opinion did she regret having done so. She 392 had also abrogated those commercial laws by which she had once sought to promote the separate interests of her own people, and she now treated Imperial and colonial interests as one and the same. He would submit a few facts to the House. By the returns which had been moved for by the hon. and gallant Member for Aberdeen it appeared that the sum annually expended upon the military defence of the Colonies was not less than £3,500,000 sterling, whilst the amount paid by the Colonies for their local defence was only £337,000 per annum; in other words, the proportion of the expenditure borne by the colonists for the defence of their own territory was but one-tenth of the whole. Deducting, however, the cost of such merely military stations as Gibraltar, Malta, the Ionian Islands, the Bermudas, Ceylon, and other similar dependencies, they still demanded an expenditure of two millions and a half, whilst the sum contributed by such Colonies proper was only £220,000. The proportion, therefore, was the same; the Colonies proper paying, in round numbers, only one-tenth of the cost of their own defence—a very inadequate contribution to local defence indeed, for such colonies as Australia and Canada. But this was not all. There was another feature in the case. Of the inadequate force maintained for their defence only one-fourth was composed of local militia and police; the rest consisted entirely of Her Majesty's forces. Then, what was the total expenditure for defences per head of the population? The population of the United Kingdom was 30,000,000, and the total annual taxation for the purposes of defence was about £30,000,000, or £1 per head of the population. But he would take one of the Colonies, and one which told least for his argument. He would take Canada, which bore more taxation for the purpose than any of the other Colonies. Canada paid about £40,000 a year in military expenditure. Supposing the population of the colony was 2,000,000, a resident in this country paid fifty times as much as any resident in the colony. Moreover, wholly disproportioned as was the burden on the Colonies of their own defence, or their share in the defence of the empire, there was a still greater inequality between the distribution of the expenditure amongst the Colonies themselves; so absurdly unequal was it indeed that, he might almost say as a general rule, those who ought to pay the least paid most, and those who ought to 393 pay the most paid least. Now, in his opinion, those which ought to pay least for their own defence were the purely military stations; yet, strange to say, these were the colonies which paid most, whilst Canada and the Cape of Good Hope had a considerable number of Queen's troops for which they paid nothing at all; and it was only by a recent arrangement that Australia had been called upon to contribute any portion of the cost of her defences. With regard to the last-mentioned colony he wished to observe that to his mind the despatch of Earl Grey, written in 1849, to Sir Charles Fitzroy, then Governor of New South Wales, laid down exactly the principle which ought to govern us in this matter. The country was indebted, however, to the right hon. Gentleman opposite (Mr. Labouchere) for having done his utmost, when Minister, to carry out that principle. The principle however had been but impectfectly carried out and as it were at haphazard. Thus the Australian colonies were not taxed equally amongst themselves, and Victoria, for no other reason that he could divine except that she was richer, was made to pay 50 per cent more than any other of those colonies. Now, this was a state of things which ought to be looked into as soon as possible. But he should not mind even this disproportion, or the absurd anomaly of the whole arrangements, if he were satisfied that they had the redeeming merit of giving security and proper defence for the Colonies. But what after all was the number of troops which the system provided for the defence of the Colonies. The number of troops at home at the present moment was about 110,000, including the militia. In India we had 85,000 of Her Majesty's troops in addition to the Native army; but in all our Colonies put together, our military stations and Colonies proper scattered as they were all over the globe, how many troops were there? Forty-two thousand; or, deducting those which were in Gibraltar, Malta, and the other purely military stations, the whole number of troops to garrison the vast colonies of Canada, Australia, South Africa, New Zealand, and all our Colonies proper, was 22,000 only. What were the consequences? In the first place the Colonies themselves were very insecure. In case of a general war any maritime nation that had anything like a power on, not to say command of, the seas—that was out of the question — would be able to embarrass us greatly in 394 the defence of the Colonies, and perhaps it might be absolutely impossible not to lose some of them. Probably, too, a general war would oblige us to withdraw our troops and leave the Colonies entirely to their own defence. What then would be the result? How would they muster, at a moment's notice, any forces at all? Had not our whole system tended to crush everything like a military spirit in the colonists, to render them utterly incapable of defending themselves, to produce a sort of corrupt feeling in their minds of dependence upon the mother country, and to sacrifice all national spirit for the sake of mere pecuniary advantage? He wished to call the attention of the noble Lord the Foreign Secretary especially to this subject. In former times the noble Lord took considerable part, not only as Colonial Minister, but as an independent Member of the House, in debates upon the question, and with true patriotic English spirit, said, over and over again, that we could not withdraw troops from our Colonies, and that if we did not defend the Colonies other nations would be perfectly willing to take them from us. In his opinion the converse of that proposition would hold good, for if we continued to defend the Colonies as we now defended them we should most assuredly hand them over to foreign powers. He contended, in the first place, that the present expenditure was excessive, for surely that outlay must be excessive which led to no satisfactory result. With our troops scattered about the Colonies to no purpose, when a general war broke out we were embarrassed for want of them at homo; and were obliged to resort to hiring German and Swiss legions. On occasion of the last war we all but got into a quarrel with the United States of America on the subject. We attempted an intrigue to enlist American mercenaries, whilst sending our own soldiers vice versâ to America. Another reason against the present mode of scattering the troops through the Colonies was that, after all, the Queen's troops were not the best adapted for the defence of the Colonies. The local militia were best acquainted with the nature of the country they had to defend, and were in all respects, as proved abundantly by the whole history of the American wars, the best adapted for that purpose, while we lost great numbers of our best soldiers year after year by sending them to climates where they died in hundreds. Then, so long as this system 395 of expenditure was continued, the system of colonial defence was of the most wasteful kind; for the more the troops that were sent the richer the colonists became; the bribe of commissariat contracts was a constant premium on local disturbance, while no proper control could be exercised over them or over the expense of the military buildings. Let him take the case of that German Legion which, when disbanded at the close of the Russian war, was treated so much better than our own soldiers. They were sent over to South Africa as soldiers on half-pay at an expense of a quarter of a million of money, on the understanding that they were never to be placed on full pay unless there was a necessity for their employment. The Governor, however, found out that necessity as soon as they were landed, and they had been kept on full pay from that day to this, though the expense had never been audited in this country, nor had the Vote ever been taken in this House, hut, probably, covered up in some balances had passed in silence without a check. What was the case with the Kaffir wars? Those wars had cost the country millions upon millions, and yet the Imperial Parliament had never seen a single item of their accounts, which in fact, had never left the colonial closets to this day. The despatch of Lord Grey, to which he had before alluded, was written at the time of the rebellion in New Zealand, and the object was to induce the Governor of New South Wales (Sir Charles Fitzroy) to send a regiment to New Zealand. In that despatch, which was dated in March, 1848, Lord Grey stated to that Governor how important it was that the colony should take upon itself its fair share of protection. He was of opinion, he said, that a colony which had made so much progress in wealth and population as that of New South Wales ought to bear its share of the expenditure for such purposes, and that the smallest contribution it could offer was to provide what additional means were necessary for its local defences. He suggested that the Governor should invite the gentlemen of the colony to form artillery corps, and he added that, as the colony was now in possession of representative institutions, and while all restrictions on their trade were removed, if they did not provide accommodation for the troops the troops would he removed. He (Mr. Adderley) believed that in the first instance the colonists were inclined to resist these propositions, but this significant postscript at the 396 end of the despatch brought them to their senses, and the colonists now provided, as he had stated, 50 percent. of their own expenses. The waste incurred by the present system might be shown in another way. No one would argue that the mother country ought to provide for the internal police of the country. The only ground on which the presence of the soldiers in the Colonies could be justified was the protection they afforded them against foreign aggression; but he had already shown that as a defence against foreign aggression they were useless, and in point of fact they were only employed for the purposes of internal police. He was far from saying that the colonists ought to bear equally with residents in England their share of the military and naval expenditure, because for one reason they were not represented in this House. The body which controlled the policy of war ought of course to bear its chief cost. But the Colonies were often the cause of war, some by their very position were provocations of jealousies. At all events, there was no reason why they should not hear some share both of naval and military expenditure, and furnish men for the purpose of their own defence. His idea was that they should bear a share, he would not say how much, but one-tenth towards the military expenses within their own territories (they paid nothing towards the naval expenses) was clearly very far short of what they ought to contribute. Whatever England paid for colonial defence it should be a contribution towards the support of colonial troops, and not the contribution of a part of her own army which she wanted at home. He had never heard more than two objections to the course he now proposed. The one was, that the colonists would soon assert their entire independence if we ceased to send them troops for their defence. He thought that position would not bear argument, for what could be the value of that dependence upon us which was only to be maintained by nursing in the minds of our colonists a corrupt and enervating system of dependence? He believed that in point of fact there was no foundation for any such fear, for the spirit of loyalty never more pervaded the Colonies than since they had been somewhat more thrown on their own resources. This was a healthy loyalty—not an interested servility. Was there no proof of that during the Crimean war, when the Canadians offered to raise two regiments at their own expense? To this day he had never heard 397 any good excuse why the War Minister had rejected the offer. They had further proofs of the patriotism of the Colonies in their readiness to assist both in purse and person towards the expenditure of the empire during the late Russian war. Contributions to the Patriotic Fund were obtained from Canada, Australia, and South Africa, showing the pride they felt in sharing in the defence of the empire. For his own part, he would rather see them independent of the mother country at once than retain their present corrupting dependence. If the time should ever come—and it might happen in their own lifetime—when a Member of the present Royal Family ruled over the country with the title and authority of the King of Canada, he was convinced that a much more healthy relation would exist between England and Canada than under the present system, which crippled the means of defence, broke down the martial spirit of the people, and burdened this country with unnecessary expenditure, wholly valueless even for its pretended object. The other objection he had heard raised was, that Canada was not able to defend itself. Now, he would meet that objection with only this one fact—that the intelligence, the wealth, and the population of Canada, were greater now than the intelligence, the wealth, and the population of the United States, at the time when they established their independence, not with the help, but against the resistance of this country. The militia of Canada had long ago proved its efficiency, and that Canada need not depend upon recruits from England for her own security. Imperial and financial, and military interests all demand that the local resources of the Colonies for their own defence should be unlocked. He would only appeal to the Government whether they had considered the present state of things, and if so, whether they thought it satisfactory, and if they did not, whether they were taking any steps with regard to it? If they were, he should be happy to leave the matter in their hands; but he wished also to give notice, if they were not, he should call the immediate attention of the House to a matter of this urgent importance not a day later than the commencement of next Session, and move for a Select Committee on the subject.
§ LORD ALFRED CHURCHILLsaid, he entirely concurred in the remarks of the right hon. Gentleman. The question of our colonial defences was one of the greatest importance, and there was no subject 398 which more deserved the serious consideration of the House. He could state that the Australian colonies, with which he was best acquainted, viewed with the utmost alarm the presence of a large French fleet in the South Pacific Ocean. The French already had ten ships on the coast, and. as he understood, were about to send five more, while we had only five altogether, so that they would outnumber us by three to one. Then with regard to military force, there were only four regiments in the colonies—one in New South Wales, one in Van Diemen's Land, one in New Zealand, and one in Victoria. Of these regiments, the two on the mainland were employed in discharging the duties of internal police. While the Russian war was going on the regiment was removed from Melbourne to escort the gold from the diggings. He believed that if the matter were properly put to them the colonists would cheerfully come forward as a local militia for the purposes of their own defence. He thought this country ought to find them arms and ammunition, and they would find the men. He thought, also, if we were to send over blockships for the defence of the coasts that the colonists would man them, which he need not say would greatly increase the force for colonial defence. The position of the colonies in case of war ought to be seriously considered. In case of a war with Europe they would be sure to be attacked, and the colonists argue, that as they are no parties to the disturbance of the peace of Europe, it is hard that they should be attacked. The question arose, therefore, whether we were not hound either to afford them sufficient protection, or to give them their independence, so as to free them from any fear of attack from the enemies of England. He did not say that the time had come for the independence of the Colonies, nor did he believe that the colonists themselves wished it. There was a spirit of loyalty and patriotism in those colonies which had increased tenfold since they had received free government. He believed on a rough guess, that the colonies contributed £180,000 to the Patriotic Fund, and he knew that the colony of Tasmania had contributed at the rate of 10s. per head from the whole population. He instanced that to show the patriotic feeling towards this country that was still entertained. At any rate it was the duty of the mother country to place the defences of her Colonies in such a condition that they should be under no fear of any 399 hostile attacks, or to leave them entirely free to adopt their own measures.
§ MR. MARSHsaid, the seaboard of the Australian colonies was so vast that it was almost impossible that the troops could he provided to defend it. Such troops would he of very little use against external attack, and nothing was so unlikely as internal trouble among a population so prosperous and wealthy, unless the Government were very badly administered indeed. At present nothing could exceed their loyalty, and he thought that the advantages which the Colonies derived from their connection with Great Britain were even greater than those derived from it by the latter, seeing that they had nothing to pay either for armaments or diplomacy. With regard to the naval forces on the Australian coast, the British Navy would be as necessary there for the protection of British commerce as if Australia were independent. Almost every ship in the ports of that colony belonged to British subjects, and was insured at Lloyd's or in some other part of the United Kingdom, so that the colony would not be the losers if those ships were captured. The naval force on that coast was, therefore, an imperial question, but he maintained that to the land defences a very different principle applied.