HC Deb 14 July 1859 vol 154 cc1204-18
MR. H. BAILLIE

said, he wished to make a few observations in reference to the Report of the Commission appointed to inquire into the Military Organization of our Indian Empire. He was aware that Her Majesty's Ministers, having been but a short time in office, had not, perhaps, had leisure to consider the subject; but, inasmuch as this was a question which involved not only the efficiency of Her Majesty's army in India, but also the efficiency of Her Majesty's army in this country, it was a question which ought to receive the attention and most careful consideration of that House, and in the present state of political affairs a settlement of it ought not to be much longer delayed. Now, in the Report of this Commission the opinion was expressed—and he believed it to have been the unanimous opinion of all the Members of the Commission—that henceforth an army of not less than 80,000 men should be permanently maintained in our Indian empire. He knew not, of course, what might be the opinion of Her Majesty's Ministers on this subject, but it would be very easy for that House to vote that number of men, or any number of men, because the House would not be called upon to pay them; but it would not be so easy to raise the men, more especially in time of war; and he very much feared that the Commission, in coming to this conclusion, had been influenced rather by what they conceived to be the necessities of our Indian empire, without a just appreciation of the wants and necessities of this country; now, this last consi- deration, in his opinion, was of far greater importance to the people of this country than even the stability and the maintenance of our Indian empire. The noble Lord now at the head of the Government had always had great credit given to him by his friends for the efficient manner in which he was supposed to have conducted our military affairs during the late Russian war. He (Mr. Baillie) was always one of those who presumed very humbly to differ from that opinion; and he did so, because he was aware that during the whole course of that war, the army of this country never was in a state of efficiency, if to be in a state of efficiency was to have the whole number of men that were voted by Parliament. So far from that being the case, during the whole course of that war the army of this country was from 40,000 to 50,000 below the number voted by Parliament. It was on that account that they had been obliged to raise foreign legions. There was a foreign legion raised in Germany, and another in Switzerland, and another in Italy, and there was nothing which so much lowered the character and reputation of this country in the eyes of foreigners as this exhibition of our apparent weakness. Now, he did not make this statement for the purpose of casting any blame or censure upon the noble Lord now at the head of the Government. Far from it—he was persuaded that no man in England would have used greater endeavours to promote the efficiency of the army; but he made this statement in order to show the House the great difficulty in this country in raising men in time of war, and also to point out the impossibility of our maintaining an army of 80,000 men in India, should we be engaged in a foreign war. He also wished to show that the House was in the habit of voting money for men which the Government were utterly unable to raise. Now, let them just consider what was the state and condition of the army at the present time. Her Majesty's forces now in India amounted to about 85,000 men; a number which did not include those who were formerly in the service of the East India Company. Now observe, this force of 85,000 men was not much larger than the Commission proposed should be permanently maintained in our Indian empire. Lot the House then see what had been the result during the last two years of their having maintained an army of 85,000 men in India as regarded the effect upon the Home Establishment. What had been the consequence, in spite of all the efforts made during the last two years? Why, the consequence had been that they had been unable to raise the number of men they wanted last year. The standard of the height of the men had been reduced to the lowest point, free kits had been given to the soldiers, and every inducement had been held out to enlistment; but in spite of all this, the army was 10,000 men below the number voted last year. But that was not all; the Government had been obliged to call out 23,000 militia to do the duty of the regular troops. Now, the militia was a force which ought to be their reserve in time of war; but they had been obliged to call the militia out in time of peace, and therefore, in point of fact, the army was really deficient 33,000 men, and not 10,000. His right hon. Friend the late Minister of War (General Peel) made a statement the other evening which had been very much cavilled at, but which was perfectly correct, as his statements always were; but on examining that statement, he did not think the House would think it quite so satisfactory as it appeared at first sight. In the first place, his right hon. Friend included among the 110,000 men he mentioned, the 23,000 militia to whom he had referred. Now, if they included their reserve in their efficient force, of course if they had a war they would have no reserve; and therefore he did not think the militia ought to be included in the regular forces of the country. His right hon. Friend had also included the depots of the regiments that were in India. The men in these depots consisted in a great part of raw recruits, and of men who were liable at any moment to be sent away from this country to join their regiments. They were a very large force, amounting in number to nearly 19,000 men, and they were all paid by the Indian Government. Now, it would be monstrous if that House was to regard the forces for which the Indian Government paid as among the available forces of this country. Well, then, deducting these 19,000 men, and deducting the militia, they would have to deduct upwards of 40,000 men from the numbers stated by his right hon. Friend, and that would leave only 70,000 men available; but then they must also deduct from those 70,000 men, the non-fighting corps. There were 1,800 men in the Waggon Train; there was the Medical Staff; and they must deduct the men who were not available when in hos- pital. In fact, he did not think it would be an unfair estimate when he said they must deduct 20 per cent from the force; and this would leave them with a force of somewhere about 58,000 men for the home service. Then, they would require for garrison of Ireland 25,000 men; so that for the defence of England and Scotland they would have an available force of somewhere about 40,000 men. Then they would have to place garrisons in all their arsenals. They might put militia in them; but they must have some regular troops; and when they had placed a sufficient number of men in Woolwich, Sheerness, Chatham, Dovor, Portsmouth, and Devonport, he should like to know what would be the amount of force left available. He thought they would be fortunate if they could bring 25,000 men into the field. It was for the House to decide whether that was a force which, under existing circumstances, it was safe to depend on for the maintenance of the honour and safety of the country. He would not at the present time enter into the question of Indian finance, although were he to do so he did not think he should have much difficulty in proving that, if the Indian Government were compelled to maintain permanently 80,000 European troops in India, which would cost as much as 160,000 in England, and if in addition the Indian Government had to maintain a Native army of twice that amount, he did not think the Secretary of State for India, with all his great financial ability, would find it easy to make an even balance between the expenditure and the revenue. That, however, was a question into which, however important, he would not enter. The question which for us at the present moment was a far more serious one was, could we with our present system of voluntary enlistment raise and maintain so large an army in this country as would not only furnish permanently 80,000 men in India, but would provide for the wants and necessities of all our numerous colonies, and at the same time keep up such an army in this country, as would give some security to the people that their hearths would not be invaded, and that in the event of war that they would be able to maintain the honour and defend the interests of the nation. Now, they had learned by the papers laid upon the table of the House that Her Majesty's late Government announced to the Powers of Germany that in the event of their going to war to maintain their interests England would be neutral, and that even in case their ports were blockaded England would not interfere. He thought that was a very unwise declaration, but that declaration had been repeated by the present Government, and in diplomatic circles it was rumoured to have been repeated in language which had given much offence to the German Powers. The statement, however, had been made, and we must abide the consequences. And what were the consequences? That in the event of our having the misfortune to be engaged in war with any great Power—with France for example—we must expect to have intimated to us that the German Powers intended to remain neutral, and that they would take good care that no legions were raised in Germany for English purposes. Under these circumstances it behoved the House to consider well what would be our position if the intense desire which now prevailed, amongst all classes to maintain a cordial alliance with France should be misinterpreted by our vivacious neighbours, and, unfortunately producing a contrary effect, should end in a war. He was one of those who thought that in the event of hostilities, if all means failed of raising by voluntary enlistment a force sufficient to defend the honour and interests of the country, the person as well as the purse ought to be available for the public welfare; nor did he see that there would be any more infringement of popular liberty in the one case than in the other. He might be told that any such plan would be impracticable, and that no Minister would venture to make such a proposition; but at all events let not the House of Commons and the country be deluded by the mere passing of votes for numbers of men—as they did during the Crimean war—whom they knew by past experience they should never be able to raise—thus teaching the public to believe that we had a force sufficient for all the requirements of the State, when in point of fact it was a force efficient only on paper, and at a period of difficulty and danger would not be forthcoming for the public service. They had, as he had stated, been obliged in a time of peace to call out 25,000 militia, to do the duty of regular troops whom it had been found impossible to raise, and he feared that the desire for peace which appeared to prevail among all classes in this country was attributable, not so much to any abstract love of peace as to the conviction that the present system of our military administration would not enable us to contend successfully against those systems which had been devised and adopted in modern times by the other great nations of the world, He would on the present occasion abstain from expressing any opinion as to what ought to be the amount of the European force employed in India, and he would defer any explanation of his views upon that point until the subject was brought before the House by the Government. He might say, however, that in his opinion the European force requisite for India would depend entirely upon the manner in which the Government of that vast dependency was conducted. If officials in India were to be allowed to set Her Majesty's Proclamation systematically at defiance, as they seemed inclined to do, not only would a very large force be necessary for India, but he did not know what amount of force which could be sent to that country would enable us to maintain tranquillity in our Indian empire. In conclusion, he wished to know whether it was the intention of the Government to bring this subject under the consideration of the House previously to the prorogation of Parliament.

MR. W. VANSITTART

said, that he could not agree with his hon. Friend that this country was unable to maintain 80,000 European troops in India. We had already 85,000 men there, independently of the 25,000 which were maintained by the old East India Company, He had read with much interest the Report of the Commissioners on this subject, which he ventured to say was second to none in importance not only as regarded the power and welfare of India, but of the whole British empire. Happily, the Commissioners were unanimous on one point—namely, that India would require the presence of a large European force, not less than 80,000 men; 50,000 for Bengal, including the Punjab, and 15,000 for each of the minor Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. But there was a great diversity of opinion as to whether this force should be a local force, or whether it should form an integral portion of the British army, to be supplied in regular routine from the line. On carefully going through the evidence submitted to the Commissioners, he was of opinion that the force should be composed partly of troops of the line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and partly of troops raised for service in India only. There was no doubt that any one who had been in India could not fail to have been struck with the appearance of a line regiment recently arrived from England as contrasted with a local regiment. Both officers and men were better set up, smarter looking, and there must necessarily be a greater amount of vigour and fresh European notions and feelings, and consequently discipline, than in a local regiment, the officers and men of which lived on year after year in India with no prospect of revisiting their native country until they were completely worn out by the climate, sickness, or age. He was aware that symptoms of disaffection had appeared among the late East India Company's or local Europeans stationed at Meerut, Allahabad, Berhampore, and elsewhere; but it arose solely from the men understanding the noble Lord at the head of Her Majesty's Government to have said in his speech, in introducing his India Bill, on the 12th of February of last year, that their services were optional, and that if they objected to the change they were entitled to their discharge. As what the noble Viscount did say was very short, he would, with the permission of the House, read it. The noble Viscount, in speaking of the army, said,— With regard to Queen's troops no change will be made. With regard to the others, they will be transferred to the Crown from the service of the Company, subject to the same conditions of service as those under which they were enlisted; and, if they dislike that change, I think, in common justice, they will he entitled to their discharge." [3 Hansard, cxlviii. 1287.] On this speech reaching Calcutta a pettifogging attorney, a sort of "needy knife grinder," took down those words and sent them up to Meerut, and they were freely discussed and as freely commented upon by the men. he thought at the time that the noble Lord was rather indiscreet; but it would have been unbecoming in so humble an individual as himself to correct the noble Lord. In regard to the recruiting of this force he (Mr. Vansittart) did not anticipate any difficulty, for it could be effected partly by volunteers from line regiments ordered home, as at present, and partly by recruiting separately for it in Great Britain. He thought the patronage might be placed at the disposal of the Horse Guards, because it would establish that prestige which was so dear to Englishmen, of bearing Her Majesty's commission direct from Her Majesty's Royal hands. This surely would be preferable to handing it over to the Secretary of State for India and his Council, to be distributed among his constituents, and among the relatives and friends of the councillors, who were already sufficiently well paid and by no means overworked. In regard to the Native portion of the army, he would reduce the proportion even below that recommended by the Commissioners of "two Natives to one European." He would make the proportion three Natives to two Europeans; and this would give us an army of 200,000 men for all India, consisting of 80,000 Europeans, and 120,000 Natives. Such was his opinion of the Sepoys that he was anxious to reduce that part of the army as much as practicable, and he was satisfied this force of 200,000 men would be amply sufficient to meet all requirements, and prove an economical measure; more especially if they carried out Sir Charles Trevelyan's suggestion to transfer some of the duties now performed by the military to a police. The police should be a civil force, localized and commanded by a European for each district; a portion of the men should be armed, not with the Minie or Enfield rifle, but with the common percussion musket, and to those who wore thus armed should be intrusted the duties of escorting treasure from district to district, of supplying guards for the gaols, and so forth. Sir Charles Trevelyan also recommended that the magazines should be deposited in places held by Europeans; that there should be as few detached posts as possible; and that at all the stations there should be a sort of fortification, within which the treasury, the military chest, the records, the stores, the magazines, women, and children might be placed. Now that the whole country was being disarmed, railways were being so rapidly constructed, and the annexation policy had been so fully carried out, there was every prospect of India enjoying a long period of repose and peace, and it was in such times as these that a Sepoy army was found to be not only worse than useless, but costly and troublesome. Well armed, well trained, and with nothing to do, they were left to brood in stagnation and listlessness in cantonments over imaginary fears, which probably terminated cither in their taking fright, or rushing once more, under the impulse of panic, into mutiny and murder, spreading ruin and desolation over the beautiful plains of Hindostan, and burning and massacring everything and everybody who fell in their way, without respect to sex or age; or else they had to be watched and guarded by our European troops. Under all these circumstances, he thought his hon. Friend had done well in bringing this important subject before the House; and it was to be hoped that the Secretary of State for India would give an assurance that he would take it into his earliest consideration.

SIR CHARLES WOOD

said, that as he supposed it was the wish of the House to proceed with the business on the paper as speedily as possible, he would not follow the two hon. Gentlemen through many of the topics on which they had touched. He freely acknowledged the intimate connection between Indian finance and the all important question of the amount of military force which it was necessary to maintain in India. No doubt the strength of that force would require to be indefinitely increased if the Government of that country were to be conducted without regard to the feelings and sentiments of its people; but if India were governed properly, he believed the amount of European and Native troops which it would be requisite to keep up would not exceed that which the resources of the country could easily bear. With regard to the Report of the Commission on the organization of the Indian army, the present Government had hardly had sufficient time yet to consider hat question. Indeed, looking at the importance and difficulty of this subject, he was not surprised that the noble Lord who preceded him in his present office, with all his diligence and power of work, had not been able to bring into a more forward state the measures which were necessary on this subject. The question really required the greatest attention and care, nor could it be decided without information which was not enjoyed here. Opinions formed on the spot on such a matter must obviously be far more valuable than any that could be formed in this country. Moreover, events might at any time happen in India which would materially affect this question. While, as the hon. Gentleman had admitted, he had hardly had time since he acceded to office even to read all the papers relating to this subject, he could assure him that it would receive from him the most careful and impartial consideration, with a view to its being decided at the earliest practicable period; but he was wholly unable to mention the precise time when he would be able to make the statement required of him.

GENERAL PEEL

said, that although his hon. Friend (Mr. H. Baillie) had concluded his remarks by asking a question of the Government, he had referred to a speech made by him in that House on a former occasion. As there ought to be no mistake as to the amount of force in this country and in India he was glad to avail himself of the present opportunity of entering into a short explanation, and of answering a letter which he had seen in that day's papers, which was written in so different a spirit from that which characterized many previous letters in the same journal, and which, though anonymous, were supposed to come from a source tolerably well-known, that he had the greatest possible pleasure in replying to it. The letter in question stated that he had made a great mistake in the statement he had made, and must have quoted from a return made at the War Office by clerks who did not know their business, and who had taken the number of men voted by Parliament instead of the number of men actually in this country. He begged to say that he had done no such thing. The document he had quoted from was the monthly returns made by the Horse Guards to the War Office, signed by the Adjutant General of the Forces, who was responsible for the accuracy of the figures he had explained to the House the condition of the British army on the 1st of June, 1859, and had read the line giving the total force at home. The only inaccuracy in the report of what he had said on a former evening was that he was represented as saying that he did not include the depots of regiments in India, whereas he had said nothing about them. What he said was that the numbers he had read did not include the Marines (one of the finest forces in the country), the pensioners, or the Irish constabulary. The return gave not only the exact number of men in the regiments, but also in the depots, and told where they were stationed. The number of men voted by Parliament last Session was, for the British establishment, 122,655; and for the Indian establishment, 106,902; making a total of 229,557. The number absolutely raised was 219,912. They were now distributed thus:—In India, 85,219; and there were ordered home, or on their return passage, 5,725. The latter were still on the Indian establishment and paid for by that establishment. There was at home, on the British establishment, 64,653; depots of regiments on the Indian establishment, 21,769; and in the Colonies, 42,546; making up the total already mentioned as having been actually raised and receiving pay, namely, 219,912. It was impossible, in considering the strength of the regiments, to leave the depots out of consideration. The regiments coming home from India, the instant they arrived were transferred with their depots to the British establishment, and were available for any purpose for which they might be called upon to give their service. Take the case of a single regiment, the 36th. The depôt consisted of 656 men. This regiment was on. its way home, and would be transferred with its depôt from the Indian to the British establishment. So far from having overstated the number of men available for home service, he did not include in his statement the depôt at Warley for the local force of India; these, being maintained at the expense of the Indian Government, were not included in the return from the Horse Guards. His hon. Friend had committed altogether, for cases of emergency, the embodied militia. No force in the British army at this moment was in a greater state of efficiency than the embodied militia. It had now been out two years, and it was impossible to make it more efficient. So, again, there were the pensioners, who would be of the greatest possible use in doing garrison duty in the event of our being attacked. He trusted the House would see that he had not overstated the case. He did not say that our force was sufficient for this country. That was a question to be determined in relation to what was passing at the time, and it now rested with Her Majesty's present Government. He held that, during the period they had been in office, the late Government had maintained in this country the largest force which it was their duty to call upon the public to pay for. he did not say that circumstances had not arisen making it expedient to increase the number of our troops, but while they were in office no such step was advisable. He thought it very undesirable to add to the number of regiments in the British establishment, involving, as it would do, the throwing of a burden on the country for half-pay. The number of regiments of the line was 131 battalions. Supposing fifty battalions were required for service in India, they must have twenty-five additional battalions in this country to form a relief for them. So, again, if they required forty- two battalions for the colonies, they wanted about twenty more at home for their relief. To have a sufficient number of regiments of the line to do duty in the Colonies and in India we did not need more than fifty battalions to be kept in England. It would therefore be very unwise to add to that number. He believed that his right hon. successor took the same view as to the number of regiments, and was not in favour of either increasing or diminishing the number of British regiments which existed when the seals of the War Office were handed over to him. The number of the embodied militia is 23,000.

COLONEL HERBERT

said, the number given for the home forces included the officers, sergeants, and drummers, whereas it was supposed to represent only rank and file. If a deduction were made on that account from the number stated, it would leave only 96,517 men, which was a material difference from the figures stated by the right hon. and gallant General. But they ought to speak of efficient serviceable men; and therefore, if they made account of sick men, men waiting for their discharge, and also recruits, whether instructed or uninstructed, and the recruiting staff, the deduction, according to good authority, on that ground would be 20 per cent from the 96,517 men. The embodied militia of 25,000 men were to servo as a reserve; and he did not think it satisfactory that the available forces of the country were at so low an ebb. But it must be admitted, while the numbers given by the gallant Officer might be true, they were calculated to lead to misapprehension. In the same way, when our forces were in the Crimea, it was stated by the Chancellor of the Exchequer that at a particular time they amounted to 27,000 or 28,000 men. This statement was scouted by the public, and it was stated by a correspondent of a public journal that Lord Raglan's army did not contain more than 12,000 available men. Both statements were true; but the latter included only the efficient serviceable men, rank and file, who were fit for duty. The other number was the gross number of men of all ranks; and that was, no doubt, the case also with the numbers given by the hon. and gallant Officer. Statements of gross totals such as those made by the right hon. General the late Secretary of War were likely to lead to misapprehension in the public mind, because they always included a large number of men not available for service in the field.

LORD STANLEY

said, that the subject of the organization of the Indian army was not one which could be properly discussed in a desultory conversation like the present; but as the question had been raised he wished to vindicate the Commissioners from the imputation of having fixed an arbitrary number for the European troops in India. That was a matter which obviously must depend upon both financial and political considerations, and the Commissioners carefully abstained from expressing a decided opinion on the subject, although they went the length of saying that the amount of European troops to be hereafter maintained in India should be greater than it was before the mutiny. He did not attach much importance to conjectural estimates in such a case; and the same observation applied to the proportion to be maintained between the European and Native forces. The solution of those questions would depend in some measure upon the success of the working of the military police now established on so large a scale in various parts in India, and he did not believe that either here or in Calcutta the Government could pronounce an accurate opinion upon them until they had seen how the police system worked over a considerable period of time. Upon only one point could he venture to record his opinion, and that was the question whether the European force in India should be a local force, or a part of the general army of the line. He believed that it was a matter not only of expediency, but almost of necessity, in the carrying on of the Indian Administration, that a considerable portion of the European army in India should remain as at present a local force. He should defend that view upon the ground of economy, because the expense of relief and transport would be saved; he should defend it also upon the ground of efficiency, because by that means we should have soldiers acclimatized and familiar with the country, for it was well known that a largo proportion of the mortality occurred in regiments newly arrived; and finally, he should support it on account of the local administration, because we could not expect officers of the line, who in India were mere birds of passage, to qualify themselves for Indian service in the same manner as those did to whom India was a homo for life. He did not indeed know how the civil and military administration of India was to be carried on if we deprived the Governor-General of the assistance which he now derived from the presence of sonic thousands of educated Englishmen, who knew the Natives and their language, and who intended to remain in the country for the working part of their lives. He trusted that the House would think he was using a wise discretion in declining to enter at the present moment into the other important questions raised by the Report of the Commissioners.

COLONEL SYKES

thought it was no object of the House to raise any discussion now on the Indian army, but only to elicit an assurance from the Government that the subject would be brought before the House. Such an assurance he received in February last, and he was perfectly satisfied that the assurance would be fulfilled. When it was so brought he would gladly state the result of his experience and in the meanwhile he would merely make one remark upon the amount of the military force to be maintained in India. He quite agreed that the number of European troops must depend upon the manner in which we governed India, and the manner in which the people were satisfied with our government. Before the mutiny broke out we had 45,000 European troops there, and the revenues of India were barely sufficient to pay that number. What would the House say to the payment of 131,000 European troops including the 20,000 at the depots in England? He was convinced that it was utterly impossible for the revenues of India to pay for more than 50,000 European troops, and he entreated the House to consider this well before they sanctioned the continued employment in India of such an overwhelming and unnecessary force. He was satisfied that 50,000 European soldiers would be quite sufficient for carrying on good government and ensuring the safety of the country.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he fully concurred with the noble Lord (Lord Stanley) that it was indispensable to have a considerable local European force in India—especially of artillery—as it was most necessary that the army should become accustomed to the feelings and habits of the Natives.

SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE

expressed a hope that no action would be taken by the Government on the Report of the Commissioners without the House being afforded an opportunity of discussing the whole subject, inasmuch as no decision at which they might arrive would otherwise be likely to give satisfaction, He did not think that it would be found so difficult to maintain an army of 80,000 Europeans in India, but at the same time he thought great danger might result from maintaining too large an European army there, because the Government of this country, in case of an European war, might he led to withdraw a portion of the forces, and thus leave the country insufficiently protected.