HC Deb 10 August 1859 vol 155 cc1301-15

Order for Consideration read.

SIR CHARLES WOOD

said, that when the Bill was last before the House an arrangement had been entered into by which the Bill had been allowed to pass through its second reading without discussion, on condition that he should at the present stage give some explanation of its object and provisions. He would therefore at once proceed to redeem the pledge he gave on that occasion, and state the reasons why it was necessary at so late a period of the Session to pass the measure. Almost from the earliest period of the existence of the East India Company, they had power to maintain a certain number of European troops in India. Previous to 1799, the portion of those troops who were undergoing training in England or were on their passage, were not under military discipline. In 1799 an Act passed which removed that anomaly, and brought them under military law, but the number was limited to 2,000. In 1853, when he was President of the Board of Control, an application was made to him by the Marquess of Dalhousie, then Governor General, to increase the number of Company's troops beyond the then existing limit—12,000. The first step he took in consequence of that application was to consult Lord Hardinge, who had been Governor General of India, and who was then Commander-in-Chief of the British Army, and who united in his person the best means of forming a sound opinion, and by Lord Hardinge's advice, he assented to the proposal to increase the number of Company's troops by three regiments. In order to do so, it was necessary to increase the limit imposed by the Act of Parliament, and in the 31st clause of the Act of 1853 the limit of the number to be maintained out of the Indian revenues was increased to 20,000, and the number training in England or on passage to India to 4,000. There was a doubt whether the gross amount of troops chargeable on the Indian revenues was 20,000 or 24,000. Up to the period of the mutiny there was no question as to the legal effect of the clause, because the number did not approach to 20,000, and therefore it was immaterial whether the correct interpretation was a gross limit of 20,000 or 24,000. When the mutiny broke out it became desirable to increase the number of European troops, and, proceeding on the supposition that 24,000 was the legal limit, without giving sufficient attention to the point, the number was increased beyond 20,000, and at one time approached, if it did not exceed 24,000. It was obviously desirable that the doubt should no longer exist, and the present Bill had been introduced with that object. The late Government went so far as to sanction the establishment in India of 25,500, exclusive of troops in training or on their passage to India, and that showed that sufficient at-attention had not been paid to the legal limit, because a much larger number was sanctioned than could be maintained either under the interpretation that the limit was 20,000 or 24,000. He did not find, however, that the number sanctioned had been actually reached, as according to the latest returns, the number borne on the rolls in India was 20,110, and the number in England was about 2,000. As soon as these facts were brought to his notice it seemed to him an indispensable duty to bring in a Bill to legalize what had been done, and to cover anything which might be illegal. According to the interpretation of 24,000 being the legal limit, there had been nothing illegal, as the total number of troops was only about 22,000, but the question ought to be beyond doubt or suspicion, and therefore this Bill had been introduced. The House would remember that the Bill would not render it necessary to keep up the number to the limit, it only required that that number should not be exceeded. The Bill would in no degree prejudice any question which might be raised about the Indian army. If the Government wished to increase the number they must come to Parliament again, and this measure would have nothing to do with the organization of the Indian army. Having said this much with respect to the object of the Bill he would take the opportunity, in accordance with the understanding with the House, of offering some few remarks on the general question of the nature of the force henceforward to be kept on foot in India. Hon. Gentlemen were aware that a Commission had sat upon the organization of troops maintained in India. The first and most important question which that Commission had to consider was, whether the European force to be maintained in India should be exclusively regiments of the line, or a mixed force composed partly of regiments of the line and partly of local troops—in other words whether they should be troops for general service, or troops partly for general and partly for local service. A majority of the Commission reported in favour of troops exclusively for general service; but a very large minority entertained a different view. It was evident, however, from the opinions given and from the evidence, that the decision of the Commission could not be considered as very impartial, because officers of the Queen's troops were in favour of a force exclusively for general service, and Indian officers were in favour of the maintenance of a local force. It was very natural such should be the case, but it diminished the value of the opinion pronounced, as both parties might quite naturally and imperceptibly be strongly biased in favour of the service to which they belonged. Whatever was the opinion of the Commissioners, he thought that the weight of authority was in favour of the maintenance of a local force. He had already stated what was the opinion of Viscount Hardinge as to the increase of the local force, and no one could be so well qualified to offer an opinion upon the subject. The same opinion was entertained by men like Sir J. Lawrence, who were intimately acquainted with India and the Indian service. With reference to an observation made by the hon. and learned Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) that there would be great economy in employing troops of the line, he was inclined to think that, whatever other advantages there might be, it would entail a heavier expense if the force in India was composed entirely of troops of the line. Another reason which weighed with him (Sir Charles Wood) in favour of a local force was the advantage of thus providing a number of educated and able men who, looking forward to passing their lives in India and earning there a position which their energies could command, would study the habits and language of the Natives and fit themselves for the discharge of those duties, other than military, which were indispensable for the good government of India. There were many instances in which men so qualified not only took an important part in active service in the field, but in the government of the outlying provinces of that empire. Influenced by these and other considerations, the late Government came to the conclusion that a local army should be maintained. Her Majesty's present Government, soon after they came into office, came to the same decision. Recent occurrences in India, might produce some effect upon men's minds in relation to the question of maintaining a local force. It seemed to him that those occurrences were of an exceptional nature, and, serious as they were, they hardly ought to alter the decision which had been arrived at upon other grounds. He did not think that the local army had any substantial grievance, or that the precedent of the St. Helena regiment was at all in their favour. It was enlisted for local service in St. Helena; in 1830, it was transferred to the Crown and served under the Crown for upwards of a year. It was determined not to keep up a local force at that island, and therefore if they had remained as a Queen's regiment there would have been a complete change in the terms of their service. Instead of serving only in St. Helena, the men might have been sent to serve in the West Indies, and therefore it was perfectly just in that case to offer the men their discharge, with the option of volunteering into Queen's regiments. The case was a precedent against the local force in India rather than one in their favour. The oath taken by the men who enlisted into the Company's service was the same as that taken by every man who enlisted in the Queen's service, with the addition of a reference to their serving the East India Company. When the rule of the Company was terminated so much of the oath was void, but it did not affect the former part of the oath, which bound every man who enlisted to obey the Queen's officers. He, therefore, retained the opinion which he had stated, that he did not think the men had any substantial grievance. At the same time he must admit that there was a great deal to be said, not in excuse of their insubordinate conduct, but in justification of the view which they took. Many officers of high rank took the same view, and as they had a very strong interest in taking that view, he was inclined to think that it was not fair or right to treat the men as mutineers. The question was referred to the Government of India, and by them to the Government at home. Both stated their opinion that the claim of the men as a matter of right was inadmissible. The home Government, however, gave Earl Canning power to act as he thought best under the circumstances which existed at the time he received the despatch. Thus matters stood when he succeeded to the office which he had now the honour to hold, and he thought the only course was to confirm the discretionary power which had been vested in Lord Canning by his predecessor; and he informed Earl Canning that whatever he might think fit to do would receive every support in their power. By the last accounts the Government had received an announcement of the measures which had been taken, and he must say he thought they were the best which could be taken under the circumstances. Earl Canning bad said that he could not admit the claim for bounty or discharge, but, considering that the men thought they had not entered into obligations to serve the Crown, and that with very few exceptions their conduct had not been of a violent description, he was prepared, with the entire concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, to allow each man who wished his discharge to take it and return to England in the same way as if he had been discharged under ordinary circumstances. There was one further remark which he wished to make. It seemed that almost the whole of the persons who had made complaint were recruits recently sent out to India. He thought it was a great mistake to send a great number of raw recruits to be drilled and trained in India. It was not the best mode for making them think the military service the most agreeable in the world. He believed it would be found that a large proportion of those who took their discharge could hardly be called soldiers. They were men not yet trained. A great number was raised in the manufacturing towns. A great number, too, was raised in London, and it might fairly be considered more as a strike than a mutiny. Not a word could be said in palliation of soldiers who acted as they had done; but it was not fair to consider these men as mutineers in the strict sense of the term. He did not think the circumstances such as to justify departing from the decision of the late and the present Government, to maintain a local force in India. But as to the question how it was to be organized, and of what proportions of the different arms it was to be composed, he wished to reserve complete discretion to the Government, as those points must depend, to a considerable extent, upon information which had not yet been received. He wished to make only one further ob- servation. The hon. Member for Evesham (Sir H. Willoughhy) had the other day called attention to the large number of officers of the Indian army who were entitled to the most considerate attention from the House and from the country. By far the greater part would probably be employed in the European or Native forces, or in political, civil, and engineering services. He hoped the whole number would be absorbed; but if not, their claims must, in some way or another, be fully and fairly considered. He was quite sure it would be as unjust to them as it would be discreditable to the Government if such men, who had behaved so nobly, were treated with the slightest disregard or without the fullest consideration. In conclusion, he would repeat that this Bill would not prejudice the many questions connected with the subject of our Indian forces, which must be left open for the full consideration of the Government and Parliament at a future period.

GENERAL PEEL

said, he fully agreed with the right hon. Baronet on one point— that the day when the Government commemorated the close of the Session was not a proper time to enter into a discussion of the great question—the organization of the Indian army, and he therefore objected to this very important branch of that question being brought forward at such a period. He must also complain of the way in which the Bill had been hurried on. It was introduced on Saturday morning last, was read a second time at the morning sitting of the same day, without any explanation, passed through Committee yesterday morning, and was now brought forward for a third reading. A Bill of such importance ought not to be dealt with in that manner, and he did not think there were sufficient grounds for it. The Royal Commission, by a majority, had recommended that no local army should be maintained at all, and if with the view of leaving undisturbed existing interests a local European force should be maintained, it ought to be kept within the present limit. In the face of that recommendation it was proposed, however, by this Bill to increase the number beyond the present limit. He could not speak in the same light terms as the right hon. Baronet of the mutiny which had occurred in the local forces. He did not say the men had no grievance, but there was a proper manner in which they could have made their grievances known. A serious feature of that mutiny was the corres- pondence which went on from one regiment to another, and from one local army to another, without a single soldier or non-commissioned officer coming forward to acquaint their officers with what was going forward. An army in which such a low state of discipline as that existed was not to be trusted. He wished to ask the right hon. Baronet whether the Government had received any communications from Lord Clyde and General Mansfield upon the subject. General Mansfield, he believed, had been in favour of a local army. Lord Clyde had not formed any very strong opinion either way; but since the mutiny of the local forces he was led to believe that both those gallant officers had come to the conclusion that a local European army could not safely exist in India. He wished to know whether the Government had received such communications from them, and whether they would be prepared to lay them on the table of the House. He wished to know, if the number of local troops was to be increased, in what manner it would be done. The sanction which the late Government gave to the number being exceeded had remedied itself, because 8,000 men had claimed their discharge and were now on their way home, probably to take a new bounty and to be sent back to India. There was only a certain number of men to be raised by voluntary enlistment, and that number did not exceed what we required for our own service. At the present moment there were some thousands wanting to make up the number voted, and one-third of the militia only existed on paper. Under these circumstances, were the Government about to allow the enlistment of men in the recruiting market of England who would not be available for general service? If it were absolutely necessary that a local army should be raised for India, they might do it in another way. They had already a German regiment in the Indian service. No doubt they would make better soldiers than they made colonists. He did not see why the Government could not have recourse to the same area of recruiting. They could not do so in recruiting for the regular army, because only 3 per cent of foreigners was allowed in a regiment of the line. During the latter portion of the time he was in office he had recourse as far as he could to that class, and enlisted some capital recuits who were foreigners. The restriction to 3 per cent did not apply to the Indian army, and he did not see why, if it were necessary to increase the local force, they should not enlist foreigners to a greater extent than at present. He was glad that the Secretary for War was present, because he wished to correct a mistake into which that right hon. Gentleman had fallen. The right hon. Gentleman stated the other night that it was not fair to include the depôts of Indian regiments in the strength of the national forces, because they could not be made use of in case of emergency without their volunteering. That was an entire mistake, as the depôts could be called upon to do garrison or any other duty, the same as other soldiers. He wished to know from the right hon. Gentleman upon what terms the officers would be admitted into the local army, if it were increased, as it was the unanimous opinion of the Commissioners that it would be a great advantage if the two armies were placed on the same footing and exchange allowed from one to the other. The great difficulty, however, which stood in the way arose from the different funds in which the Indian Army was interested. He did not entirely agree with the majority of the Commission with regard to the local army. He thought it would be the greatest possible advantage to have but one army, and that the Queen's army under the same command and the same discipline; but he did not think it possible at once to do away with the local army, in which so many officers were entitled to certain rights and privileges. At the same time he objected most strongly to any increase in the local army. If there were any chance of getting the number, there might be some reason for passing this Bill; but, taking the number of recruits enlisted weekly for Indian service, it was obvious that they would not reach the number who were about to accept their discharge, and therefore the question could not arise until next Session. The right hon. Baronet had adopted a purely Indian view of the question. Every officer of the Indian army took one view, and every officer of the English army took the other, so that when he knew to which service the officer belonged he could tell beforehand what evidence he would give the Commission. He believed that the pressure upon the right hon. Baronet had come from the Council. It was nothing more nor less than a question of patronage. It was a proposal to increase the Indian army that the Council might get the patronage. It was his firm conviction that they could better do without the Council than leave them any patronage. They might give the Council any salaries they pleased in order to get the best men, but India never would thrive if it were considered as the property of individuals instead of part and parcel of the British dominions. He appealed to the right hon. Baronet whether upon his own view it was necessary to press this Bill at the present period of the Session, when it was impossible that the subject could receive a free and a full discussion.

SIR DE LACY EVANS

said, he entirely concurred with the right hon. and gallant Officer that depôts and recruits were completely available for the service of Her Majesty in England as well as in India. He believed they were as amenable for any duty that may be assigned to them as were the Grenadier Guards. He should be very sorry if it were otherwise. But he entirely disagreed with the right hon. and gallant Member as to a German army. It was to be regretted that German legionaries were sent to India and were there now. He did not believe that they had fired a shot, but according to reports from Southern Africa he was afraid that, unless they were looked very sharply after, ill consequences would occur between them and the Natives. Circumstances in former times had obliged the English Government to take considerable bodies of foreign troops into their pay. Nothing, however, but the necessity and emergency of a great war could render such a measure expedient. The right hon. and gallant Gentleman seemed deeply impressed with the guilt of the local troops in India, speaking of their conduct as a great and serious mutiny, which had changed the opinion of Lord Clyde and General Mansfield as to local troops being maintained. There was no extenuation admitted for their insubordination. But for his own part, he would not call it a mutiny. Eighteen months ago, in February 1858, the Prime Minister of England stated that the army in India would consist of the Queen's troops and a local corps whose service would be confined to that country. With regard to the Queen's troops no change, the Prime Minister stated, would be necessary; but the troops of the Company would be transferred to the Crown, and those soldiers who disliked the change would, he thought, in common justice, be entitled to their discharge. This declaration of the Prime Minister was widely circulated in India, and passed from one regiment to another, in which there were many men both intelligent and well educated. How could it be accounted for that after this declaration the Government of India had so bungled the matter? Why was it referred to a military lawyer? When the men had been told by the highest authority what they had a right to, was it in equity or fairness to be treated as a mutiny? With regard to the present Bill, he approved its object; he thought a local army indispensable in India. The gallant General (General Peel) had stated that the Bill was entirely opposed to the recommendations of the Commission. It was very injudicious to place His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief on that Commission, as his influence might have operated to bias the opinions of the subordinate members. As President of the Board, the Commander-in-Chief must have been placed in an invidious position. What rendered the statements of the gallant officer the more remarkable was, that they were directly in contradiction to those of the Government of which the gallant Gentleman had been a Member. When it was said that all the regiments serving in India should belong to one army, it should be remembered that there were many special points to be considered, which rendered a distinction between the two armies highly desirable. He believed both the officers and men of the Indian army had fully deserved the confidence of the country. Who was it that retrieved the disasters into which they had fallen at Cabul. Why Pollock and Nott, two of the Company's officers. The turning point of the late mutiny was the capture of Delhi; that also was performed by an officer of the local force. He should at present only observe, that on various grounds, he should be prepared to support the Bill.

MR. SIDNEY HERBERT

said, that the hon. and gallant Member (General Peel) had misunderstood what he had stated in reference to the Indian depôts; he said that the best way to make use of these men in the event of their service being required would be to distribute them amongst the other battalions, which could not be done unless they volunteered from their own regiments. No doubt they could be used as depot battalions at any moment or any service that the Crown might choose. The hon. and gallant General had addressed the House in two characters, as one of the majority of the Commission which reported against a local force, and as a Member of the Govern- ment which decided on maintaining it. The Bill would not make any alteration in the existing state of things; it would not add a single battalion to the force, and there was no intention on the part of the Government to depart in any way from the conclusion at which the late Government was understood to have arrived.

COLONEL NORTH

said, that in his opinion the European regiments of the Indian army had committed a gross act of insubordination; but it did not amount to a military mutiny, except in the case of the regiment that had intrenched itself in its quarters, and elected its own officers. In the other regiments no bad feeling on the part of the men towards the officers had been exhibited. Never was a thing so grossly mismanaged by the Indian Government as this had been from the beginning. If such a feeling had arisen in any regiment of the Crown, the circumstances would have been fully explained to the men. In this case the soldiers were told that the Attorney General had decided against them; had they been told the Adjutant General had decided against them they would have been quite satisfied. He agreed with the right hon. and gallant General (General Peel) in thinking that the worst feature in the case was the fact that all this correspondence had taken place between the various regiments without its coming to the knowledge of the officers. In another point, the Indian Government had been unjust to part of the Native army. The customary donation batta was withheld from the army that went through the Persian war. A greater mistake could not have been made. The Native troops were embarked at Bombay for the sea voyage without making any objection, though it was repugnant to their religious prejudices, and on previous occasions the Bengal troops had refused to embark. They brought the war to an end in six months. On returning home they found the other Native regiments of the Bengal Presidency in open mutiny, and murdering their officers. Two of the Queen's regiments that made the campaign in Persia afterwards formed the column that relieved the garrison of Lucknow; the native troops of the Persian army under Sir H. Rose, gained the victories of his campaign in Centra! India. Was this an army that should have been made an exception to the usual custom, by refusing it the batta? These troops vo- luntarily gave up the treasure and arms taken during the operations in Persia, in the full belief that the allowance would be granted to them. It was a great mistake, and he gave notice that, early in the next Session, he should bring the subject before the House. As to the European regiments of the Indian army, he did not believe a mutinous feeling existed among them; the men thought they had a grievance, and he hoped it would be properly remedied. But even if matters were set right, the country would have lost a large number of good soldiers.

COLONEL DUNNE

said, it was to be regretted that a Bill relating to such an important subject as the organization of the Indian army should have been brought in at the very end of the Session. Earl Canning had the right of deciding what should be done with the European regiments, and he appeared to have gone wrong at first, and then to have stuck to his first decision. When he was told that the law officers of the Crown had given an opinion on the case he should like to see what case was submitted to them. The attestation of men enlisting for the Indian army was such that the soldiers might well believe that they were in the right. He quite agreed with the determination of the late and present Governments to maintain a local European force in India; the question was as to the amount of it. The objection to raising that force above a certain amount was, that it interfered with the recruiting for the Queen's army in this country. The Government had not dealt fairly with the soldiers in reference to their pensions, a subject he should bring before the House next Session.

MR. AYRTON

said, that in vindication of what he had said on a former occasion as to the needlessly large proportion of European officers in the Native Indian regiments, he wished to state that the opinion he had expressed was that of officers of great Indian experience, as was shown by many passages in reports by Sir H. Frere, Colonel Green, and General Jacobs, who had all testified to the necessity of changing the system, and of causing the cadets first to join European regiments, and having learned their duty in them, and passed their examination, then being appointed to Native regiments. He thought the gallant officer (Colonel Sykes) owed him an apology for the remarks he had made in reference to him, though the gallant officer's authority did not appear to be so great as it used to be, since his former colleagues did not require his services.

SIR FREDERIC SMITH

said, he would give his hearty support to the Bill. He had read the evidence before the Commission with great attention, and it had convinced him that the maintenance of a local European force in India was a necessity'; the great question was as to its numbers. By law it was limited to 20,000 men, or with the number in the depôts of this country, 24,000 men. The object of the right hon. Gentleman was to increase that number to 30,000. There were at present 23,800 Europeans in the Indian service, and 92,000 of the Queen's troops. He did not think there was much force in the objection of the gallant officer (General Peel); they had the men in one force or the other. As to what was called the mutiny or insubordination of the European regiments, he took the view of the Secretary for India. He could not call that a mutiny where the men had such a strong case. As to the remarks of the hon. Member for the Tower Hamlets (Mr. Ayrton) on the training of the officers of the Indian army, he believed they were trained as well and their attainments stood as high as the officers of any service in the world.

COLONEL SYKES

said, that in reference to the opinions quoted by the Member for the Tower Hamlets, he might to observe that Sir H. Frere was a civilian; Colonel Green's remarks he thought an error of judgment, and the statements of General Jacobs only applied to local and irregular troops. A Native regiment that in cantonments was so tractable that it gave no more trouble than a child, became useless in battle the moment it lost its European officers. The more European officers there were to a Native regiment, the more certain they could be of its services. A Native regiment of 1,000 men might be managed by four European officers when in cantonments, but not on the line of march or in battle array. As to the Bill before the House, he entirely concurred in the necessity of it. India could not be governed without a local army acquainted with Indian habits and associations, and accustomed to regard India as its home. Without such an army the Indian Government would be placed in the utmost possible danger. The opinion of the Commission that had been alluded to was only the opinion of the majority of officers upon it who had no Indian experience, against the minority who had had great experience in India. As to the mutiny of the European troops, he believed the men were technically wrong, but morally in the right. The men attested for the service of the East India Company could not be transferred to the service of the Crown without a renewal of their engagement. When recruits were taken be fore the magistrate the oath of allegiance to the Crown was administered; but in the copy of the attestation given to them, the oath of allegiance was omitted. Every man now in India had this copy of his attestation to the service of the Company only, without any reference to the oath he had taken to the Crown.

SIR HENRY WILLOUGHBY

said, he thought the Indian Government was not exclusively responsible for the Indian mutiny. The House of Commons was in some degree to blame. When the settlement of the Indian Government was under discussion, it omitted to make the transfer of the service of the Indian army quite clear, in the section of the Act relating to the military force. A small donation on their being transferred to the service of the Crown would probably have prevented the difficulty that had arisen as to the Company's forces. He agreed with what had fallen from the hon. and gallant Member for Westminster on the question of a local force and the troops of the line. The House should bear in mind that these troops were paid for out of the Indian revenue over which they had no control. It had always been a constitutional principle that the army of this country should be paid by money voted by the House, and he thought that the army for India ought to be a local force, maintained out of the revenues of that country.

GENERAL UPTON

remarked, that when he was in India he always found that the Company's officers regretted most strongly that the army was not one body instead of being two distinct forces. In his opinion, fifteen years was quite long enough for European regiments to remain in India.

MR. VANSITTART

said, he was convinced that the existence of a local European force would be the sole means of preventing India being denuded of European troops. He wished, however, that some arrangement could be made for the appointment of the officers of this local army by the Horse Guards instead of the East India Company. He felt sure it would be for the benefit of India if they had only one class of officers in place of two.

Order for Third Reading read.

Bill read 3°, and passed.